Retreating from the Nuclear Path Testing the Theory of Prudential Realism to Explain Nuclear Forbearance

Retreating from the Nuclear Path

Testing the theory of Prudential Realism to explain Nuclear Forbearance

A Dissertation Submitted to the

Graduate School

of the University of Cincinnati

in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

in the Department of Political Science

of the College of Arts and Sciences

Anil Pillai

M.A. University of Denver, Denver 2005 M.B.A. Xavier Labour Relations Institute, Jamshedpur, India 1992 B.A. Loyola College, Chennai, India 1988

2012

Committee Chair: Dr. Dinshaw J. Mistry, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Conventional explanations for a state’s nuclear policy (acquisition or forbearance) may be found in traditional International Relations (IR) theories such as neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism, amongst many others. Departing from these theories, especially hard realist theories, a new explanation for nuclear forbearance was propounded by T.V. Paul, based on the theory of “prudential realism.” In this modified soft realist version, nations under certain circumstances may prudently forego military capabilities that other states see as threatening

(Paul, 2000). The circumstances as envisaged by Paul, relate to the level of conflict and cooperation and the level of politico-security interdependence in a given region. The theory thus differentiates itself from traditional hard realist theories and neoliberal institutionalist theories and offers a new explanation for a state’s nuclear choice.

This dissertation tests the theory of “prudential realism” through a comprehensive case study analysis by using the same variables and definitions as used in the theory. The case studies are new and have been rigorously researched to make a contribution to the existing literature. My question is directed towards understanding whether a) states do indeed behave prudently in exercising their nuclear choices and b) whether elevating a few variables (level of conflict & politico - security interdependence) to explain these choices is adequate to capture the correlates of nuclear preferences? In rigorously testing the theory, I hope to ascertain if, as the theory claims, nuclear weapons acquisition or forbearance by a non great power state is determined by its situational context and degree of politico-security interdependence with its key adversaries and allies in its immediate geo-strategic environment.

Five cases in this dissertation, drawn from different regions and contexts, proved to be useful tests of the theory with respect to its two key variables, namely level of conflict and

politico-security interdependence. A comprehensive case study analysis of four states situated in a zone of high conflict revealed that their nuclear decisions were not fully consistent with the core arguments of the theory regarding the level of conflict. However, their nuclear decisions were fully consistent with respect to the theory’s claims regarding its second variable, namely politico-security interdependence (All four cases supported the theory’s claims). With respect to

Libya, a state situated in a zone of moderate conflict, the case study analysis revealed that its nuclear decisions too were not fully consistent with respect to the theory’s claims regarding the level of conflict. On the contrary, Libya’s nuclear decisions were fully consistent with respect to the theory’s claims regarding politico-security interdependence.

Based on its findings, the dissertation comes to the conclusion that although prudential realism does present a logical and credible argument in explaining nuclear behavior with respect to its key variables, yet with some modifications, it could offer an even more robust explanation.

iii

Anil Pillai

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the help and invaluable contributions of several individuals. I would like to first and foremost thank my chair, Professor Dinshaw Mistry, for his untiring and dedicated efforts in guiding this project from its very inception through the concluding stages. He not only encouraged me to adhere to a time schedule but also helped demystify many complex terms and concepts that had the potential to derail the dissertation. His inputs were critical in shaping my thought process and without his constant encouragement, supervision and support; this dissertation would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my other committee members, Dr. Thomas Moore and Dr. Barbara Bardes who supported me through the dissertation process, never accepting less than my best efforts. I thank you all.

It is impossible to forget the support of family and friends. First and foremost, I owe my wife Deepa a world of gratitude for having spent countless hours weaving through a maze of papers, reading my drafts and for providing the intellectual and moral support in helping me finish my dissertation. Thanks also to my parents who, despite the physical distance, kept encouraging me through the most difficult phases. A true friend is one in need. This dissertation would never have become a reality without the help and suggestions of my many supportive friends and colleagues. My thanks to Joe Waddle who with his light hearted banter assured me that nothing is impossible; to John Callaghan and Ivan Ivanov for providing their valuable comments and finally to all my other colleagues who constantly provided me with the moral support and encouragement in all my endeavors.

Finally, this dissertation is solely a result of my work and efforts and to that extent I bear full responsibility for any errors and shortcomings that may have occurred.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………………v LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………………..vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……………………………………………………………….xi

Chapter One-Introduction…………………………………………………………………..1

Chapter Two-Theory and Method…………………………………………………………. 14

Chapter Three-South Korea…………………………………………………………………63

Chapter Four-North Korea…………………………………………………………………. 99

Chapter Five-Taiwan………………………………………………………………………132

Chapter Six-Egypt…………………………………………………………………………160

Chapter Seven-Libya………………………………………………………………………187

Chapter Eight-Conclusion…………………………………………………………………216

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………232

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1.0. Retrospective classification of states’ nuclear status in 2010 9

2.0. Cohen’s “India and the bomb: a catalog of arguments” 15 2.1. Enduring Rivalries up to 1996 - States with high levels of conflict 46

2.2. Correlates of War Scale 47

2.3. Assignment of Values for Level of Conflict 49

2.4. Overview of Politico-Security Interdependence and Nuclear Decisions 51

2.5. Country Wise Level of Conflict 54

2.6. An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Forbearance (states with active 55 nuclear program)

2.7. An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Forbearance (states with peaceful 56 nuclear program) 2.8. An Empirical Analysis of Non Forbearance 57 3.0. S. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1960-1969) 68

3.1. S. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1970-1979) 72

3.2. S. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1980-2010) 77

3.3. North Korea and South Korea -Militarized Inter State Disputes 79

3.4. Ratio Analysis of Militarized Inter State Disputes 81

3.5. S. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict 82

3.6. North and South Korea Defense Spending 87

3.7. S. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence 93

3.8. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence 94

3.9. Summary of Results 97

3.10. S. Korea’s Nuclear Timeline & Corresponding Decisions 98

vii

4.0. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1960-1979) 103

4.1. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1980-1990) 106

4.2. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1991 –2001) 109

4.3. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (2002-2006) 112

4.4. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (2007-2009) 113

4.5. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (2009-2010) 115

4.6. North and South Korea –Militarized Inter State Disputes 116

4.7. Ratio Analysis of Militarized Inter State Disputes 118

4.8. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict 118

4.9. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence 125

4.10. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence 126

4.11. Summary of Results 130

4.12. N. Korea: Nuclear Timeline and Corresponding Decisions 131

5.0. Taiwan: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1967-1976) 138

5.1. Taiwan: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1977-1989) 140

5.2. PRC-ROC Militarized Disputes, 1949-1996: Correlates of War 143 Project Data, (Revised)

5.3. Ratio Analysis of Militarized Interstate Disputes 144

5.4. Taiwan: An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict 144

5.5. Taiwan’s Defense Budgets 147

5.6. Conventional Military Balance – 2008. (PRC v ROC) 148

5.7. Taiwan: An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence 154

5.8. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence 155

5.9. Summary of Results 158 viii

5.10. Taiwan’s Nuclear Timeline 159

6.0. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1948-1959) 164

6.1. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1960-1969) 166

6.2. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1970-1980) 167

6.3. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1981-2007) 170

6.4 Egypt and Israel - Militarized Inter-State Disputes 172

6.5. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict 172

6.6. Operational Inventories of Jet Combat Aircraft and Tanks on Eve of War 174

6.7. Value of Soviet Weaponry Supplied to Egypt: Comparison of Estimates 178

6.8. Soviet Economic Credits to Egypt, (1955–1968) 178

6.9. U.S. Aid to Egypt -- 1972-1979 180

6.10. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence 181

6.11. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence 182

6.12. Summary of Results 185

6.13. Egypt’s Nuclear Timeline 186

7.0. Libya: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance -- (1970-1979) 192

7.1. Libya: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance -- (1980-1989) 194

7.2. Libya: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1990-2002) 197

7.3. Libya: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (2003- 2007) 199

7.4. Libya: Militarized Interstate Disputes 201

7.5. Libya: An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict 201

7.6. Libya v neighbors; Conventional capabilities 203

7.7. Libya: An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence 208

7.8. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence 209

7.9. An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence (1970-2007); 211 Libya and her neighbors

7.10. Summary of Results 214

7.11. Libya’s Nuclear Timeline 215

8.0. Summary-Level of Conflict –High Conflict Zone 221

8.1. Summary-Politico-Security Interdependence –High Conflict Zone 223

LIST OF MOST FREQUENT ABBREVIATIONS ADD- Agency for Defense Development

AEA- Atomic Energy Authority

AEC- Atomic Energy Council

BJP- Bharatiya Janata Party

BTWC- Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

CANDU- Canada Deuterium Uranium

CIST- Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology

CTBT- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CWC- Chemical Weapons Convention

CWP- Chemical Weapons Program

DPP- Democratic Progressive Party

DPRK- Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

DMZ- Demilitarized Zone

GNP- Gross National Product

HEU- Heavy Enriched Uranium

HFO- Heavy Fuel Oil

IAEA- International Atomic Energy Agency

ICJ- International Court of Justice

ILSA- Iran Libya Sanctions Act

INER- Institute of Nuclear Energy Research

KEDO- Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

KEPCO- Korea Electric Power Corporation

KMT- Kuomintang

KNFDC- Korea Nuclear Fuels Development Corporation

KPA- Korean People’s Army

Kt- Kilotons

LEU- Low Enriched Uranium

LOC- Line of Control

LWR- Light Water Reactor

MIDs- Militarized Inter State Disputes

MDT- Mutual Defense Treaty

MOST- Ministry of Science and Technology

MTCR- Missile Technology Control Regime

MWe- Millions of Watts of Electrical Output

MWt- Millions of Watt of Thermal Output

Nat U- Natural Uranium

NGO- Non Governmental Organization

NIC- National Identity Conception

NPT- Non Proliferation Treaty

NTD- New Taiwan Dollar

NWFZ- Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

OAE-Office of Atomic Energy

PRC- Peoples Republic of China

PWR- Pressurized Water Reactor

QIZ- Qualifying Industrial Zone

xii

ROC- Republic of China

ROK- Republic of Korea

TBP- Tributyl Phosphate

TNRCC-Tajura Nuclear Research Center

TNT- Trinitrotoluene

TRA- Taiwan Relations Act

TRIGA- Training, Research, Isotope, General Atomics

TRR- Taiwan Research Reactor

U-235- Uranium 235

UF4- Uranium Tetra Fluoride

UF6- Uranium Hexafluoride

U.N.S.C.- United Nations Security Council

UO2- Uranium Oxide

UO3- Uranium Trioxide

WEC-Weapons Exploitation Committee

WMD- Weapons of Mass Destruction

xiii

Chapter 1

Introduction

Since the 1950s, predictions about the spread of nuclear weapons have resonated across the world. Over subsequent decades, with several countries acquiring and testing nuclear weapons, and others having the technological know-how to manufacture these weapons, the world was faced with an acute dilemma of how to contain the threat of nuclear proliferation. Reflecting the perspective that several countries would acquire nuclear weapons, John Mearsheimer predicted, in 1990, that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) “will come under increasing stress in the post-Cold War World” because “the international system’s new architecture creates powerful incentives to [nuclear] proliferation.”1 He noted the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the post

Cold War era when he warned that Germany and, even more, “the minor powers of Eastern

Europe would have strong incentives to acquire nuclear weapons” in the post-Cold War era:

“Without nuclear weapons, these Eastern European states would be open to nuclear blackmail from the [former] Soviet Union and, if it acquired nuclear weapons, from Germany. No Eastern European state could match the conventional strength of Germany or the [former] Soviet Union, which gives these minor powers a powerful incentive to acquire a nuclear deterrent, even if the major powers had none. [Thus,] a continuation of the current pattern of ownership [of nuclear weapons] without proliferation seems unlikely.”2

However, contrary to Mearsheimer’s predictions, by the end of the twentieth century, several states had either renounced their nuclear weapons or the technology and capability to

1John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs,Vol.72, No.3 (Summer 1993),p.61.

2John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security,Vol.15,No.1(Summer 1990),p.36. 1

manufacture these weapons.3 But although several states had renounced their nuclear aspirations, the actual number of nuclear weapon states slightly increased slightly from the original five members (Great Britain, USA, France, China, and Russia) in the 1960s to nine states in 2006.

The new members to the club included India which had first acquired key nuclear weapons relevant capabilities before the NPT came into force and had conducted nuclear tests in 1974 and

1998, Pakistan which conducted nuclear tests in 1998 and North Korea which followed suit in

2006 and 2009. It also included Israel, an undeclared nuclear state which, like India, had acquired key nuclear weapons capabilities before the advent of the NPT.

What explains this aberrant pattern of behavior? Why do some states aspire to join the nuclear club at the risk of international isolation while other states, who had so assiduously sought nuclear weapons or the technology to manufacture these weapons, abandon their nuclear aspirations?

Conventional explanations for a state’s nuclear policy (acquisition or forbearance) may be found in traditional international relation theories such as neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism, amongst many others. Departing from these theories, especially hard realist theories, a new explanation for nuclear forbearance was propounded by

T.V. Paul, based on the logic of “prudential realism.”4 In this modified soft realist version, nations under certain circumstances may prudently forego military capabilities that other states see as threatening. The circumstances as envisaged by Paul, relate to the level of conflict and co-

3 Joshua Williams and John Wolfsthal,“The NPT at 35:A Crisis of Compliance or a Crisis of Confidence?”(UNA-USA policy brief, April 29, 2005),pp.1-2.

4T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence (Montreal:McGill-Queens University Press, 2000),p.5.

operation and the level of politico-security interdependence in a given region.5 In other words, the crux of Paul’s argument is that nuclear choices made by states are largely determined by the nature of their security environment. States situated in low and medium conflict zones are more likely to act according to the dictates of prudential realism and exercise nuclear forbearance when compared to those states situated in regions of high conflict.

Theory is the search for patterns of behavior and a good theory will help us understand certain behavioral patterns that may not be obvious initially. Like any new theory, Paul’s explanation of nuclear forbearance, based on the logic of prudential realism, makes use of certain variables, has hypotheses, and arrives at certain conclusions that need to be further probed.

Therefore, this dissertation will henceforth refer to Paul’s explanations as the theory of prudential realism.

1.1 Defining the Question My central research question in this dissertation is whether states behave in a prudent manner (as defined by Prudential Realism) in exercising their nuclear choices and if so, whether such choices are influenced primarily by their level of conflict and politico-security interdependence with other states in the region where they are situated?

1.2 Testing the theory of Prudential Realism The main objective of this dissertation is to test the theory of “prudential realism” using the same variables and definitions, but on a new set of cases. Theory testing aims to strengthen or reduce support for a theory, narrow or extend the scope & conditions of a theory or explain which of the prevailing theories best explains a case or general phenomenon.6 Specifically, by

5Ibid,p.15.

6Alexander George and Andrew Bennett,Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT Press,2005),p.109.

applying Paul’s existing theory to a new and diverse set of cases across regions, I test the theory’s primary conclusion that nuclear weapons acquisition or forbearance by a non great power state is determined by the level and type of security threats that it faces and the nature of interactions with its key adversaries and allies in its immediate geo-strategic environment.7 In undertaking a rigorous case study analysis, this dissertation goes a step further and modifies certain concepts of prudential realism. For example, the zone concept as used in prudential realism has been modified to account for periods of high, medium and low conflict within a zone.

The original theory did not fully draw this distinction.

A second modification has been to relate nuclear decisions to the phases of rivalry or tensions among different states. This distinction is important to understand whether states faced with low conflict are more likely to exercise a policy of forbearance and vice-versa. Also, Paul’s study did not specifically suggest any hypotheses or a list of tests that can be used to judge the accuracy of the theory. The two core variables ‘politico-security interdependence’ and ‘level of conflict’ are not operationalized in terms of a summary chart(s) that accounts for periods of high and low conflict or periods of high and low interdependence and their impact on nuclear forbearance. This dissertation fills in the gaps by accounting for all these factors, applying them on a new set of cases and arrives at a conclusion by testing the theory in a much more comprehensive manner. Therefore, from a methodological perspective, this dissertation goes well beyond the basic framework of the theory and adopts a systematic and rigorous approach in analyzing the cases over different time periods. Methodological rigor & within case analysis is a substantive contribution of this dissertation.

7Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.4. 4

By rigorously testing this theory, through a case study approach and with certain modifications, this dissertation hopes to advance our understanding of nuclear behavior, especially in understanding decisions pertaining to nuclear forbearance.

1.3 Why this theory? T.V. Paul’s theory of prudential realism makes some interesting observations on a state’s nuclear choice. The theory differentiates itself from traditional hard realist theories and neoliberal institutionalist theories in explaining state behavior. Paul argues that each paradigm

(realism and neo-liberalism) seeks to explain state behavior in some context more than others and that the main tenets of these paradigms are useful in explaining state security policies in different contexts.8 There are three main reasons for testing Paul’s theory. First, “it fills a gap between the central realist insight about anarchy and national acquisition of arms, and the liberal view that anarchy can be mitigated through norms that reinforce conscious acts such as non acquisition.”9 For example, drawing from realist and liberal camps, the theory offers its own unique perspective on the security policy of states. In “prudential realism” a state may choose to mitigate the effects of anarchy by acting in a prudent manner by adopting “benign and cautious” policies that do not increase the insecurity of others.10 It thus differentiates itself from hard realist theories in terms of key variables such as “power” and “interests” and “views the security policies of states as mutually interdependent and less unilateral than hard realism would expect.”11 Second, the methodologies used by Paul in arriving at his conclusions are based on a

8 Ibid,p.148.

9Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.148.

10Ibid,p.149.

limited number of cases. Testing this theory with additional cases will help answer several crucial questions such as the broader applicability of this theory in explaining nuclear forbearance and whether states do indeed adopt a soft realist policy (prudential realism) in shaping their security policies.

In testing the theory of prudential realism, this dissertation adopts Paul’s definition of nuclear forbearance as “the propensity among some states not to acquire nuclear weapons or to reverse a nuclear program despite having the technological capability or potential capability to manufacture such weapons, and the decision by other states to forgo existing weapons they already possess.”12 The above definition encompasses three types of states – namely, states that did not make any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, states that tried to acquire nuclear weapons and then reversed course, and states that surrendered nuclear weapons they already possessed.13 I also adopt Paul’s usage of the term technologically capable non-great power states.

Based on the available technology determinant literature, I define technologically capable non- great power states as those states that possess the scientific know-how, economic prosperity and literacy levels to pursue a nuclear program. 14 This, however, does not mean that every

11Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.149.

12Ibid,p.3.

13Some scholars have gone beyond this definition of three types of states. To more accurately describe 21st century nuclear proliferation, a ten-stage categorization of nuclear weapons status has been developed. It draws on seventy years of nuclear history and combines elements from both vertical and horizontal dimensions of nuclear proliferation popularized in the 1960s. See Thomas W. Graham’s report on Nuclear Weapons Stability or Anarchy in the 21st Century: China, India, and Pakistan, dated June 9, 2011. Available at http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Nuclear_Weapons_Stability_or_Anarchy_in_the_21st_Century__China,_India,_ and_Pakistan_250211_1545.pdf

14 Sonali Singh and Christopher Way,“The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation:A Quantitative Test,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol. 48, No.6 (December 2004),p.862. 6

technologically capable non-great power state, at the time of initiation of a nuclear weapons program, was entirely self reliant. Some states examined in this dissertation, were not entirely technologically self sufficient and did seek, in varying degrees, external assistance to overcome infrastructural deficiencies or shortages in raw materials.

1.4 Why this dissertation is important for scholarship? This study aims to fill a gap in scholarship, which is in understanding the conditions under which a state is most likely to exercise its nuclear choice, either forbearance or non- forbearance. The non-proliferation literature has to a large extent relied on neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist explanations for arguing its case. My question is directed towards understanding whether states do indeed behave prudently in exercising their nuclear choices and whether elevating a few variables (level of conflict & politico - security interdependence) to explain these choices is adequate to capture the correlates of nuclear preferences?

A great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the nuclear arming and disarming behavior of several states. As Quester argues, “almost all the published predictions of the spread of nuclear weapons have been too pessimistic” and that nuclear weapons have not spread largely due to the untiring efforts of the United States and her allies.15 Similarly, Mitchell Reiss notes that nuclear weapons did not prove to be “the irresistible temptation” that many feared they would be.16 Despite the addition of India, Pakistan and Israel to the nuclear club, after China became the world’s fifth nuclear state, the rate of proliferation over the years has actually declined with several countries renouncing their nuclear programs. For example, “Six nations abandoned indigenous nuclear weapon programs under way or under consideration in the 1960s:

15George H. Quester,“The Statistical “n”of “nth” Nuclear Weapons States,”Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No.1(March 1983),p.167.

16Mitchell Reiss, “The Future That Never Came,” Wilson Quarterly,Vol.19,No.2(Spring 1995),p.47. 7

Egypt, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and West Germany. Since the late 1970s, Argentina,

Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, Romania, South Africa, South

Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia have abandoned nuclear weapon programs or nuclear weapons (or both) on their territory.” 17 (Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan did not actually develop weapons but inherited them with the collapse of the Soviet Union). Iraq gave up its nuclear program after the 1991 Gulf war and subsequent UN disarmament efforts.

Libya, which was actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program, gave it up in December 2003 after negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom.18 Therefore, the vast majority of states have simply not tried to acquire nuclear weapons. Of the 192 states recognized by the

United Nations, studies have shown that the most pessimistic figure for states that at one time or another have engaged in nuclear activity stands at 20.3 percent.19 (See Table 1.0. below) What is to be observed about all these cases is that although the ultimate outcome was the same – attainment of a nuclear-free status – the paths taken by each country varied substantially.

Therefore, understanding the conditions under which states abandoned their nuclear weapons program and whether in doing so they acted in their enlightened self interests would undoubtedly be an important contribution to the existing literature.

17Joseph Cirincione, Jon B.Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats,(Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005),p.24.

18Ibid,p.14.

19Benoit Pelopidas, “The Oracles of Proliferation: How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading that Limits Policy Innovation,” The Non-Proliferation Review,Vol.18, No.1(March 2011),p.306. 8

Table1.0. Retrospective classification of states’ nuclear status in 2010 States Percentage

153 79.7 States with no history of military nuclear activity 39 20.3 States with some history of military nuclear activity States that engaged in nuclear activity or kept arsenals 28 14.6 on their soil (before relinquishing or returning them)

9 4.7 States that engaged in nuclear activity and acquired nuclear weapons and maintained their arsenals.

2 1.0 States that were probably engaging in military nuclear activity in 2010 Source: Benoit Pelopidas, “The Oracles of Proliferation: How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading that Limits Policy Innovation,” The Non-Proliferation Review, Vol.18, No.1(March 2011),p.306.

1.5 Why is this dissertation important for policy? Important events in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation have had a positive impact on the strengthening of international security. As disarmament efforts are further extended it is critical to examine the circumstances under which states are willing to renounce nuclear weapons? Understanding the relevance of certain variables in influencing forbearance has significant policy relevance in so far as it provides a pathway in encouraging potential proliferators to embrace disarmament efforts. As Solingen argues, “Different understandings of nuclear incentives can lead to different policy implications as there is no single approach that is the holy grail of denuclearization.” 20 While one approach may provide a good explanation for nuclear decisions at some point in time, other explanations may be more forthcoming during other times.

1.6 The Case Study Approach In explaining his theory, Paul adopts a case study approach and involves in the conceptual homogenization and pairing of states. He draws his cases from different regions,

20Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics:Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East(Princeton University Press, 2007),p.289.

strategic situations and foreign policy orientations. The countries studied in Paul’s original study are Germany, Japan, Canada, Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa,

Ukraine, South Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel. The “hard test” cases are Germany and Japan because they are major economic powers and former great powers that had engaged in protracted conflict and enduring rivalries with the United States. Canada and Australia are “soft test” cases as they are situated in regions of low conflict and enjoy security protection from the United

States. Neutral states Sweden and Switzerland are somewhat hard test cases as they had no direct nuclear umbrella, yet were hostile to the Soviet Union during the cold war era. Argentina and

Brazil are also somewhat hard test cases since they had no allies and were involved in a limited, enduring rivalry.21

1.7 Case selection and Methodology For the purpose of this dissertation, I have settled on a focused comparative case study method primarily due to its inherent advantages, namely the potential for achieving high conceptual validity, their strong procedures for fostering new hypothesis and their capacity for addressing causal complexity. 22 Methodologically, like Paul, I too indulge in conceptual homogenization and pairing of states. I draw my cases from different regions (East Asia and

Middle East), strategic situations and foreign policy orientations. Why these two regions? First, since 1968, about fourteen industrializing nations globally were thought to have initiated steps towards producing nuclear weapons with differing outcomes and two-thirds of these cases were identified with the Middle East and East Asia. As Solingen argues, “the two regions are at the

21Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.13.

22George and Bennett, Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, pp.67-72.

forefront of policy debates as potential nuclear dominoes.” 23 Second, the two regions also provide wide variation in terms of regime types, economic models, regional security dilemmas, power distributions and the relationship between energy resources and nuclear technologies.24

Based on these factors, the two regions provide “useful cases that enable “tough tests for corroborating or rejecting” the theory of prudential realism.25 My cases in East Asia pertain to

South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan: South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan represent important cases of nuclear forbearance during the Cold War (though as discussed later North

Korea eventually acquired nuclear weapons in the 2000s). These are hard test cases as all these countries are in regions of high conflict and were involved in enduring rivalries with their neighboring states. My cases in the Middle East pertain to Egypt and Libya. (For the purpose of this dissertation, both countries are considered to be part of the Middle East) Since Egypt had an enduring rivalry with Israel and is considered to be a state in a high conflict zone, it is therefore analyzed along with the other states in East Asia. Libya fits the example of a state that is situated in a zone of moderate conflict and was chosen accordingly. Unlike Egypt and other states in East

Asia, Libya had moderate to low levels of conflict that were episodic and sporadic. For Libya, the motivations to acquire nuclear weapons were a combination of multiple factors that have been examined in chapter six in great detail.

1.8 Commonalities and differences in these cases What is common among all these cases is that they all pursued at some stage --- either indigenously or with external assistance --- a nuclear weapons program. What is different about these cases is that while the eventual outcome was the same – attainment of a nuclear-free status

23Solingen, Nuclear Logics,pp.8-10.

24Ibid,pp.8-10.

25Solingen, Nuclear Logics,pp.8-10. 11

– the paths taken by each country varied and under different circumstances. In order to avoid repetition, the cases analyzed by Paul have not been studied. While Paul’s theory applies to high, medium and low conflict zones, for the purpose of this dissertation, I have restricted my cases to high and medium conflict zones. These are the zones in which proliferation is most likely, and therefore forbearance decisions in these regions offer relevant tests of the theory. In selecting my sample and methodology, I hope to vigorously test the theory of prudential realism and generate meaningful conclusions.

1.9 The Roadmap In this introduction to the dissertation, I have defined my research question, explained my selection of case studies, and given a general overview on the path and direction of the dissertation. The remainder of the dissertation is structured in the following manner. In chapter 2,

I review the literature on nuclear forbearance by examining alternate theoretical approaches and their limitations. This chapter also includes a section on the research design and hypotheses where I first focus on the theory of prudential realism and then examine the definition and measurement of the key variables in detail. From chapters three through seven, I conduct a structured, focused comparative case study approach. These chapters analyze nuclear choices of certain states in the Far East and the Middle East. In all these cases I begin with a description of a state’s nuclear history, analyze the type of decisions taken over a period of time

(forbearance/non-forbearance) and finally compare these decisions with the main predictions of prudential realism to either falsify or confirm the hypotheses that I am testing.

Finally, in chapter eight, I summarize the findings from the case studies and discuss their implications in the context of their support or lack thereof for the theory of “prudential realism”.

I find that in terms of the first variable, i.e. level of conflict, the nuclear decisions of states,

across several time periods, are not fully consistent with the theory’s claims. The nuclear decisions however, can be justified in terms of the theory’s alternate explanations for forbearance and non-forbearance. With respect to the second variable, i.e. politico-security interdependence, the theory does offer a more robust and comprehensive explanation of the nuclear decisions of these five states the way they occurred. (all 5 cases fully support the theory’s claims)

Chapter Two

Theory and Method

Explanations of why states seek nuclear weapons or abandon their nuclear aspirations can be found across a range of literature. Most of the literature focuses on military, economic, or social factors at the international or domestic levels.1 There are so many reasons ascribed to a state’s nuclear choice that it is difficult to identify fully with any one of them. For example, while on a visit to India in 1965, Stephen P. Cohen made a list that enumerated thirty four different reasons why Indian elites were clamoring for the bomb. The list gives us a sense of the difficult nature of making a nuclear choice, not just in India but elsewhere as well. A summary of

Cohen’s list is in Table 2.0.

1Realists focus on the anarchic nature of the international system and how acquisition of nuclear weapons transforms state behavior under these conditions. Scott Sagan compares three models: security, domestic politics, and norms, in which the first focuses on military motivations, the second on domestic coalitions, and the third on prestige, whether derived from acquiring or getting rid of nuclear weapons. Neo liberal institutionalists consider the impact of institutions in ameliorating the security dilemma caused by the anarchic nature of the international system. For neoliberals, institutions can mitigate the effects of anarchy by providing information about others, monitoring and enforcing compliance and therefore reducing uncertainty among states. Constructivists reject the main premise of realist theory. There are scholars who ascribe other reasons for states nuclear choices. For example, Etel Solingen provides a systematic understanding of the relationship between domestic models of political survival and nuclear policy, as an explanation of nuclear behavior while Maria Rost Rublee turns to the social psychology literature to examine how social policy decisions affect policy decisions. For a good sample of the literature on the theoretical frameworks outlined above, see Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No.3(Winter 1996/1997),pp.54–86, Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1984),pp.49-110,Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Col.:Westview Press, 1989); Alexander Wendt,“Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,”International Organization,Vol.46, No.2(Spring 1992),pp.391- 425; Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics:Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton University Press, 2007); Maria Rost Rublee, Non Proliferation Norms; Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2009).

Table 2.0. Cohen’s “India and the bomb: a catalog of arguments” (abridged): Arguments for and against the bomb.2 Issue-Area Pro-Bomb Spin Anti-Bomb Spin

Bomb will deter attack. Bomb will invite attack. Bomb can be used tactically. Any use of bomb risks Military-Strategic Bomb makes up for conventional escalation. military deficits. Bomb is logistical nightmare and too big for most targets.

Bomb will raise national prestige. Abstaining will raise national Others are going nuclear. prestige. Diplomatic-Reputational We can easily break our Others will only go nuclear if commitment to a peaceful nuclear we do. program. Others will be alienated if we go back on our word.

Bombs are cheap. Bombs are dear. Economic Bomb will give us more power in Bomb will invite economic trade and aid talks. sanctions.

The people are demanding it. The people are not

The military and scientists want demanding it. Domestic-Institutional it. Principle of civilian control of foreign and defense policy.

Bomb would be a statement of Bomb would be an admission independence from imperialists. that we are no better than the We must avenge the deaths of our imperialists. Ethical-Normative soldiers. Taking vengeance only Nehru built the basis for the produces new suffering. bomb. Nehru opposed the bomb in principle.

2Source:Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006),p.10. 15

A Review of the Theoretical Frameworks

2.10 The Realist Paradigm The theory most often used to explain and predict why states consider acquiring or renouncing nuclear weapons is realism. It is also the theory that is most often challenged by scholars. Realist theories, especially the hard realist variety, rely heavily on power based explanations in explaining nuclear acquisition and non acquisition by states.3 Therefore with respect to nuclear weapons, classical realists tend to focus on external pressures. For classical realists, the acquisition of nuclear weapons should be seen as the rational response of states attempting to protect their interests, since security is paramount for a state to survive.4

Neorealism embodies the same basic assumptions as classical realism but relies heavily on understanding the structural differences in the international system that causes war and peace.5 Neorealist scholars often trace nuclear decisions to the anarchical international system, balance of power and self help.6 In an anarchic system, states seek to increase their power

3Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.6.

4Tanya Ogilvie-White “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation.An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate?” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.4, No.1(Fall 1996),p.44. Theoretical explanations for proliferation have mushroomed in the past few years, downplaying, in the process, the broad consensus that security threats cause nuclear proliferation. Ogilvie-White (1996) provides a good insight into the rich array of explanations on offer. For a more nuanced analysis of classical realist theories, See E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (Harper Perennial; 1st edition March 25, 1964), Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York, Knopf, 1985), Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

5William C. Potter and Gaukar Mukhatzhanova, “Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century, The Role of Theory, An Introduction,” in William C. Potter and Gaukar Mukhatzhanova eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century, The Role of Theory, Vol. 1(Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press, 2010),p.2.

6See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979),pp.73-74. The pros and cons of these arguments have been vigorously debated by numerous scholars. See Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary 16

relative to others in order to survive. A state’s propensity to acquire nuclear weapons is greatly influenced by external security considerations. The acquisition of nuclear weapons is seen as the

“rational response of states” attempting to protect their interests, since security represents the ultimate challenge to a state’s survival.7 Nuclear weapons facilitate a state’s desire to secure balance of power equilibrium by increasing security for all. Thus the theory of neorealism is essentially pessimistic about halting the spread of nuclear weapons, since their perspective of international politics is one that is characterized by anarchy, where states strive to maximize their security. Factors such as the domestic nature of states, the types of regimes, and the behavior of groups and individuals are viewed as being subservient to security interests. Realists like

Mearsheimer and Waltz argue that it was the presence of nuclear weapons during the Cold War that vastly expanded the scale of violence in any major war, making deterrence of such war far more robust.8

A realist explanation as to why nations want nuclear weapons revolves around several factors. First, great powers always reciprocate the behavior of other great nuclear powers by manufacturing nuclear weapons themselves. Thus, it was not surprising that the Soviet Union

Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995); Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: From Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Benjamin Frankel, Roots of Realism and Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996); Ethan B. Kapstein, “Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics,” International Organization, Vol.49, No.4(Autumn 1995),pp.751-774; David A. Baldwin, ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993; Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist- Neoliberal Debate”, International Organization, Vol.48, No.2 (Spring 1994),pp.313-344. As cited in Mark Kramer, “Neo-Realism, Nuclear Proliferation and East Central European Strategies,” Center for Strategic and International studies (May 15, 1998).

7Ogilvie-White,“Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation,”p.45.

8Mearsheimer,“Back to the Future,”pp.5-56.

developed atomic and hydrogen bombs. Second, a state may want nuclear weapons for fear that security guarantees may not work all the time. Britain’s desire to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent arose from her doubts about an effective U.S. response. Third, a country without nuclear allies will want nuclear weapons all the more if some of its adversaries have them. This was precisely India’s response to the Chinese threat especially after the collapse of the Soviet

Union. Fifth, some countries may find nuclear weapons a cheaper, potent and safer alternative as compared to conventional weapons. Sixth, countries may want nuclear weapons for offensive purposes. Finally, by building nuclear weapons, a country may hope to enhance its international standing and prestige.9

In addition to these reasons, realists also argue that specific scenarios may lead to intensified proliferation resulting in more stability than instability. For example, Waltz uses the rational deterrence theory to argue why more nuclear weapon states may be better. He argues that once states acquire a second-strike nuclear capability war between the nuclear armed states is unlikely to occur, due to the fact that mutual destruction is virtually assured. This therefore creates an incentive for many states to redouble their efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities and thereby ensure their survival. It would also follow from this logic of “more may be better” that international stability and peace is likely to prevail.10 If defense and deterrence are made easier

9Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” in Fred Holroyd, ed., Thinking about Nuclear Weapons, Analyses and Prescriptions (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.376-378. Waltz’s argument on ‘More may be better’ has been contested by Sagan. See, for example, Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of NuclearWeapons: A Debate (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995) and a discussion on “The Kenneth Waltz-Scott Sagan Debate-The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Good or Bad?” Security Studies,Vol.4, No.4(Summer 1995),pp.695-810.

10Waltz,“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,”p.375.

and more reliable by the spread of nuclear weapons, it may actually decrease the chances of war.

States will thus resort to nuclear weapons, seen as a rational response, to protect themselves from security threats.

There are several realist scholars who subscribe to the view that shifts in polarity (bipolar to multipolar) can lead to intensified proliferation as those states that do not have any security guarantee will scramble to ensure their survival. For example, Goldstein argues that multipolarity will make nuclear weapons relevant for at least three reasons. First, they provide states with the strategic flexibility to address serious threats to their security. Second, as the competitiveness of the bipolar system fades, smaller powers will be forced to resort to nuclear weapons. Finally, a multipolar system is likely to weaken the credibility of superpower security guarantees. 11

Likewise, Benjamin Frankel subscribes to the basic tenets of neo-realist theory and argues that

“bipolarity reduced the dangers of proliferation because the presence of superpowers reduced the influence of systemic characteristics such as the security dilemma and reliance on self-help.”12

He cautions that the end of bipolarity would mean a new wave of proliferation. Mearsheimer also subscribes to the view that a bi-polar system is more stable by arguing that the departure of the superpowers from Central Europe would transform Europe from a bipolar to a multipolar system and that the new system would be more prone to instability.13

11Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the Twenty-first Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (CA: Stanford University Press, 2000),pp.263-266.

12 Frankel,“The Brooding Shadow,”pp.37-38.

13Mearsheimer,“Back to the Future,”p.7. For many years Kenneth Waltz argued that bipolar systems are inherently more stable than multipolar systems. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3(Summer 1964),pp.881-909; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp.163-176. “In 1993 Waltz said that he had been “mistaken” in “conflating peace and stability”. He averred that rather than being more stable, bipolar systems are merely less war-prone than multipolar 19

However, not all of the realist predictions are pessimistic. Realists also describe conditions under which a state may have incentives to renounce nuclear weapons. For example, realists argue that a countervailing deterrent capability from a powerful state can reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation even in the case of those states facing a very high threat. While powerful states can resort to balancing behavior on their own, weaker states may find it more prudent to balance by forming alliances with stronger nuclear armed states. The security umbrella provided by a powerful state to its allies can not only prevent any major attack on these allies, but more importantly will also negate the desire for an independent nuclear arsenal. 14 For example, security guarantees by the United States did play an important role in the nuclear decisions of states such as Japan and Germany. This is also a key argument made by prudential realism in explaining nuclear forbearance.

2.11 Limitations of the Realist Model Despite its claims, the realist model suffers on account of its lack of predictive power.

Several shortcomings of the theory are examined in detail below. First, neorealism’s inability to explain the sudden and peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union put into question Waltz’s argument that bipolar systems would be more stable than multipolar systems. The end of bipolarity did not result in a spurt in proliferation. An examination of the nuclear trajectories of states in the

Middle East and South Asia clearly highlights this point. Both regions had hierarchic and multipolar distributions of power and this according to realist theory should have encouraged proliferation in both regions. However, this did not happen. While much of the Middle East was

systems.” See Kenneth N. Waltz,“The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2(Fall 1993),p.45. As cited in Mark Kramer, “Neo-Realism, Nuclear Proliferation and East Central European Strategies,” Center for Strategic and International studies,(May 15, 1998).

14Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.22. 20

affected by nuclearization, a similar trend was not observed in East Asia.15 The trends in East

Asia of forming alliances and avoiding proliferation, contradict another fundamental assumption of realism----“that states prefer using self-help strategies for survival in an anarchic international system.”16

Second, for realists, the value of nuclear weapons increases under conditions of anarchy because it protects not only against nuclear war but conventional war as well since the costs of such a war would far outweigh the benefits.17 Thus, realism explains nuclear proliferation as a response to external security threats, which are thought to be endemic to the international system due to the pervasive logic of the security dilemma. However, a cursory glance of the proliferation literature would reveal that several states actually gave up nuclear weapons despite having the economic and technological capabilities to build these weapons, while for others, “the lack of expertise or resources created considerable, but not insuperable, hurdles on the way to

“success.”18 For example, states facing acute security dilemmas like Egypt, Japan, South Korea etc, refrained from developing nuclear weapons although they were well equipped to do so.

Third, realism’s arguments about credible security guarantee are valid only up to a point.19 U.S.

15Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.12.

16Natasha E. Bajema, “Beyond The Security Model; Assessing the Capacity of Neoclassical Realism for Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation,” in William C. Potter and Gaukar Mukhatzhanova eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century, The Role of Theory, Vol. 1(Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press, 2010),p.60.

17Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,”p.374.

18Harald Muller and Andreas Schmidt, “The Little Known Story Of Deproliferation; Why States Give Up Nuclear Weapons Activities, ” in William C. Potter and Gaukar Mukhatzhanova eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century, The Role of Theory, Vol. 1(Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press, 2010),p.126.

19Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.12. 21

security guarantees did play an important role in the nuclear decision making in states such as

Germany and Japan. However, there were other instances where U.S. commitments did not have any effect in blunting nuclear aspirations. As Levite argues, “there is no evidence to suggest that

U.S. influence has been a sufficient factor to induce reversal.”20 Hyman further questions the credibility of security guarantees in allaying the long term security concerns of states by arguing that “at the very core of realism lies the notion that friends today may become enemies tomorrow… thus the dominant strategy of states is to go for the bomb themselves and thus avoid any unpleasant surprises.”21 The question that is often posed with respect to security guarantees is whether the United States really intervenes on behalf of an ally against a nuclear-armed adversary. Rosen, in “Nuclear Proliferation and Alliance Relations,” is pessimistic about U.S. capability to intervene in such situations. He examines events before and during the Persian Gulf

War and comes to the conclusion that the United States will find it increasingly difficult to respond to regional crises involving nuclear-armed adversaries.22

Arguably, the most stinging critique of realism comes from neo-liberal institutionalism.

The neo-liberal critique rejects the realist assumptions of systemic anarchy and a state’s consequent fear of security and survival that inevitably propels it into conflict. Instead it argues that institutions provide an opportunity for co-operation and restraint. Neo-liberals argue that

20Ariel Levite, “Never Say Never Again, Nuclear Reversal Revisited”, International Security,Vol.27, No.3(Winter 2002/03),p.83.

21Jacques Hyman, “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field” Non Proliferation Review, Vol.13, No.3(November 2006),p.456.

22Stephen Peter Rosen, “Nuclear Proliferation and Alliance Relations,” in Victor Utgoff, ed., The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S.Interests, and World Order (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2000),pp.125-156. 22

systemic anarchy can in certain circumstances lead to the formation of international regimes that can constrain competition and conflict.23

The theory has several drawbacks as pointed out by its critics. One of the criticisms of neorealism in explaining nuclear choices is its inconclusiveness. A regional state that desires to reduce external vulnerabilities can do so through different means ranging from a complete acceptance of nuclear capabilities to their total renunciation.24 States have thus varied in their responses to nuclearization leading Solingen to argue that “the pursuit of security simply does not tell us enough about differences across space nor changes over time.”25 Yet another serious shortcoming of the neorealist approach is the refusal by its proponents to consider the importance of the domestic nature of states, regimes, groups or individuals in explaining nuclear choices.

These variables are important in that they determine to a large extent how much a state can be influenced by external agencies with respect to its nuclear program. In this context, Sagan argues that the explanatory power of the security model is incomplete: “Nuclear weapons, like other weapons are more than tools of national security: they are political objects of considerable

23Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security, Vol. 24, No.1(Summer 1999),pp.42–63. The neo-realist v neo-liberal debate has been vigorous and pre-occupied much of the attention of IR theorists and scholars. Much of the debate has revolved around key issues in International Relations such as the importance of anarchy vis-à-vis interdependence; the feasibility of international cooperation; the importance of absolute gains versus relative gains as incentive for cooperation; the trade-offs between economic welfare and military security etc. For more on the realist-neoliberal divide, see Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate”, International Organization,Vol.48, No.2(Spring 1994),pp.313-344; Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York:Columbia University Press,1986) and David A. Baldwin, ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate(New York: Columbia University Press,1993).

24Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security,Vol.19, No.2(Fall 1994),p.129.

25Ibid,p.129. 23

importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity.”26

2.12 Neo-Liberal Institutionalism If hard realism is not adequate in explaining nuclear forbearance, then neo-liberal institutionalists seem extremely optimistic in stressing the role of institutions as instruments of co-operation. Neo-liberal scholars agree with neo-realists that states are important actors in the international political system and that the international system is anarchic.27 The similarities however, end there. Neo-liberal approaches assume that in a world of anarchy, co-operation is possible if states have significant common interests.

Keohane and Axelrod argue that long term co-operation is quite possible among rational utility maximizers. 28 The key to achieving co-operation, they argue, is the creation of international institutions that “facilitate information sharing about others capabilities and intentions, mediate conflict, reduce transaction costs, and monitor and enforce regime compliance.” 29 Keohane’s view is based on two important assumptions. First, “states are

26Sagan,“Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,”?p.55.

27Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p.8. For additional views on the neo-liberal institutionalist arguments, see Andrew Moravcsik, “A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 51, No.4(Autumn 1997),pp.513-553; Robert O.Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press,1989); numerous essays in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., After the Cold War :International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition,2nd ed.(Boston: Little, Brown, 1989);Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press,1986); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1993); and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press,1984).

28 Robert Axelrod, and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics, Vol.38, No.1(October 1985),pp.226-254.

presumed to be rational utility maximizers that display consistent tendencies to adjust to external changes in ways that are calculated to increase the expected value of outcomes to them.”30

Second, international regimes facilitate agreement among states in select issue areas such as economic and security concerns. 31 Neo-liberal institutionalists would argue that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is a prime example of how institutions, treaties and regimes prevented the spread of nuclear weapons. With the failure of the Baruch plan in 1947, which would have placed all nuclear facilities under an international agency, the United States embarked on a plan that would prevent the spread of nuclear materials and technology. However, as other states soon began amassing the resources necessary for building nuclear weapons, it was decided to create the non proliferation regime. The creation of this regime clearly indicates how economic and security issues were linked for mutual benefit. For example, while states were able to receive full assistance for pursuing a nuclear program for civil purposes, it was linked to the overall security objectives of renouncing nuclear weapons. 32 Therefore for neoliberal institutionalists, a plausible explanation of why some states choose to co-operate with the non proliferation regime is because the benefits (access to peaceful nuclear energy) far outweigh the benefits of developing and maintaining costly nuclear weapons. States would have been worse off had they not joined these institutions.

29Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin,“The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,”International Security,Vol. 20, No.1(Summer 1995),p.42.

30Robert Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes”in Stephen Krasner ed.,International Regimes, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press),p.151.

31Ibid,p.151.

32Charles Costanzo,“Returning from the brink: Is there a theory based explanation for the attenuation of horizontal nuclear proliferation”? (Ph.D. dissertation, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1998),p.78. See, for example, Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press,1988). 25

From a neo-liberal institutionalist view point the biggest success stories in the nuclear realm would include: the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its associated export control groups (Nuclear Supplier group and the Zangger committee), the renunciation of nuclear weapons by several countries, and the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) and the establishment of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In force since 1970, the NPT has attracted a record number of nations within its fold.33 More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance.

In the 1990s, the NPT was further supplemented by the multilateral Missile Technology

Control Regime (MTCR), which sought to deny missile technologies and components to states that may have weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. The NPT was also supplemented by the Chemical Weapons Convention, (CWC) which saw the creation of the global organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for verification and interpretation of the treaty for all members. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions in all environments, for both military as well as civilian purposes. It was adopted by the United

Nations General Assembly on 10 September, 1996 but it has not yet entered into force. As of

April 2012, 183 member states had signed the treaty with another 157 having ratified it.34

States have also concluded regional treaties with the intention of controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction. To date, five treaties establishing a (NWFZ) exist: the Treaty of

33Roger K.Smith, “Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory,” International Organization, Vol. 41, No.2(Spring 1987),pp.253-281. See also, Vilmos Cserveny, “Road to Disarmament, IAEA safeguards: a fundamental pillar of the NPT regime,” Statement made at the General Debate of the NPT Preparatory Committee, New York, May 4,2009.

34Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes. Prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Available at http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/ctbt.pdf. See also, http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/. Internet accessed May 2012. 26

Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean NWFZ), the Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific

NWFZ), the Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia NWFZ), the Treaty of Pelindaba (African

NWFZ) and the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty. A very recent development is the African NWFZ, which entered into force on July 15, 2009. In addition to these NWFZ treaties, other agreements, including the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Agreement, and the Seabed Treaty were formed with the intention of demilitarizing specific areas of the globe, as well as outer space.35

Neoliberals can therefore point to success stories in showing why and how the above institutions and treaties have facilitated co-operation. One can point to the declining rate of proliferation over time, the small percentage of countries that actually became nuclear weapons states and the declining number of countries interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. From an institutional perspective, there are several measures that suggest that the NPT has gained in strength over time. First, more states have joined the regime than ever before. Second, the safeguards regime has become progressively stronger over time and has made the acquisition of clandestine technology extremely difficult. Finally, there is the growing political significance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Today, if the IAEA issues a finding that a state is violating its safeguards agreement it has major consequences for the violating state. It is true that there have been failures in the regime, such as the 1974 Indian test and the discovery of

Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program in the 1990s. However, this has only strengthened the regime as it has adopted new measures to respond to these challenges.36

35“Nuclear weapons free zones,” Report prepared for Nuclear Threat Initiative by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2007.

2.13 Limitations of Neoliberal Institutionalist theory Realists debunk the myth of co-operation as propounded by neo-liberals. The primary contention is the realist or neorealist assertion that international institutions play a minimal role in shaping international politics and that the prospects for co-operation in anarchy are bleak.37

As far as nuclear proliferation and reversal is concerned, realists would argue that systemic constraints far outweigh any other factor in a nations nuclear choice, and that security matters clearly determine whether a nation pursues nuclear weapons or not. Challenging the NPT, realists will argue that institutions like the non-proliferation regime “are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on self-interested calculations of the great powers…”38 In addition, realists would argue that states have proven that if the gains from breaking out of the treaty outweigh the costs, they may choose to do so, as has been the case with

Iraq and North Korea. North Korea hesitantly signed the NPT in 1985, after the Soviet Union made clear that the North Koreans would have to adhere to the treaty in order for it to obtain the much coveted nuclear research assistance. North Korea ratified the treaty on December 12, 1985, but subsequently reversed course on January 10, 2003 when it announced that it was pulling out

36Jim Walsh, “Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation,”Paper prepared for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Stockholm, Sweden, October 2005.

37Realists have vigorously contested the claims made by neo-liberal institutionalists. Classical Realists such as George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Hans Morgenthau argued that the “utopianism” “legalism” or “idealism” of the liberal theorists did not accurately reflect the reality of international affairs. From a systemic perspective, Waltz argued that in an anarchic world order, bipolarity stabilizes, or balances power, and that cooperation was equally difficult. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.171. For additional realist critiques of institutionalist theory see John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security,Vol.19,No.3(Winter 1994/95),pp.5-49. as also Mearsheimer’s rejoinder to his critics in his article “Promises, Promises: Can Institutions Deliver?” International Security, Vol.20, No.1(Summer 1995),pp.39-93; Joseph M. Grieco. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism”, Neorealism and Neoliberalism,(New York: Columbia University Press),1993.

38Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,”p.7. 28

of the treaty. The withdrawal became effective April 10, 2003, making North Korea the first state ever to withdraw from the treaty. 39

There are other conceptual and methodological differences in subscribing to a neoliberal theory. For example, there is no systematic evidence to indicate that the states that adopted a policy of forbearance did so as a result of a favorable disposition towards a non proliferation regime. Domestic or international factors may have directed their behavior and compelled them to sign and abide by the NPT.40 Similarly Jacques Hymans, while accepting the basic argument of institutionalist theory that regimes did dampen proliferation tendencies, is critical of the assumption that the regime caused all states with a nuclear potential to abandon their nuclear pursuits. Hymans raises an important question: “has the regime caused states that otherwise would have decided to acquire nuclear weapons not to do so or has it simply reinforced the nonproliferation commitments of already abstaining states?”41 The logic behind his argument is that if regimes were so important, one might have expected rampant proliferation prior to the emergence of the NPT and other treaties in the 1970s. In fact, at this point in time there was a large gap between states that were capable of going nuclear and those that actually did so.42

39Devon Chaffee, “North Korea’s Withdrawal from Nonproliferation Treaty Official,” Report prepared for the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, April 10, 2003.

40Domestic factors played an important role in the case of North Korea and some states in the Middle East in explaining their compliance with the non proliferation regime. Hence, this is a factor that cannot be overlooked. Likewise, there is no evidence to prove that regional institutions like Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in East Asia and the Arab League in the Middle East played a role in the process of denuclearization in these regions. “The process of nuclearization in East Asia had commenced in the 1970s, well before the establishment of regional institutions.” Solingen, Nuclear Logics, p.32. For a good overview on domestic politics explanations on nuclear decisions, see Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East,(Princeton University Press,2007).

41Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation,p.6.

42Ibid,p.6 29

Critics also point out the failure of the regime in preventing proliferation by India, Pakistan and

North Korea and above all the very survivability of the regime in the long run.

2.14 Domestic Politics Explanations Decisions related to nuclear forbearance may not just be influenced by security considerations but may also be predominantly influenced by domestic factors such as domestic political structures and traditions, bureaucratic politics and group dynamics and civil—military relations. Scholars have argued that domestic politics and international politics are inextricably interrelated and that “relaxing the unitary state assumption generates new fruitful assumptions about state politics.”43 Other factors may include cultural, societal, economic and environmental factors. States may pursue nuclear ambitions to divert public attention from existing unfavorable domestic issues.44 Nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs are even used to divert public attention and to create a favorable nationalist sentiment as in the case of India and Pakistan. For example, a Gallup international poll in 1998 found that 97 percent of Pakistani respondents supported the Pakistani nuclear tests during the period.45

43Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997),p.3. The inadequacy of security factors in explaining nuclear proliferation has been highlighted by many scholars. Over a period of time, the field of international relations – in general – has moved away from the narrow focus of systemic theories of international behavior and foreign policy toward theories that open up the “black box” and examine factors within states. Accordingly, over a period of time, domestic policy explanations of a state’s foreign policy have been accorded the primacy that it deserves. After decades of debates about the merits or otherwise of classical realism, structural realism and neo-liberalism in International Relations, attention is now shifting to domestic politics and calls for more research on the subject. “Some even contend that realism’s dictum on the “primacy of foreign policy” is wrong and that the domestic politics of states are key to understanding world events.” See Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol.17,No.1(1992),pp.177-198.

44Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,”Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 51, No.1(February 2007),p.170.

45Ibid,p.170. 30

Mitchell Reiss argues that domestic pressures, such as the cost of nuclear arms, the opposition of political elites, etc. had an important role in preventing countries from developing an overt nuclear arsenal.46 For example, in the case of South Africa, Reiss argues that it was the internal characteristics of the state that drove the state’s nuclear policy. Although the external threat in the form of a Soviet attack did influence its nuclear program, internally, the apartheid regime saw itself involved in a perpetual struggle against an enemy, whose objectives were the dismantling of the South African state. The transition from apartheid to democracy and South

African President F.W. de Klerk’s electoral victory in September 1989 “signaled the end of the nuclear weapons program.”47 In a speech to Parliament in 1990, president DeKlerk sought to improve South Africa’s relations not just with the international community but also amongst countries within the region. This necessitated the elimination of nuclear weapons which at that time served no national objective. In DeKlerk’s own words, “A nuclear deterrent had become not only superfluous but in fact an obstacle to the development of South Africa’s international relations.”48 There was a strong belief that nuclear restraint would help attract foreign investors and also help lift restrictions on the import of advanced technology that would eventually further

South Africa’s economic development.49

46Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb:The Politics of Nuclear Non-proliferation (New York:Columbia University Press,1988),p.173.

47Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals,p.410.

48Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995),p.32.

49 Mitchell Reiss,“Nuclear Rollback Decisions:Future Lessons?”Arms Control Today,Vol.25, No.6 (July/August 1995),p.12. 31

The underlying importance of domestic politics is reinforced by scholars who argue that any state that wishes to embark on a nuclear weapons program must create a domestic coalition to support such a program.50 In this context, Solingen provides a very persuasive argument in explaining the relationship between denuclearization and domestic politics. She argues that democratic states pursuing liberal economic policies may decide that it is not in their interests to develop an overt arsenal, due to their extensive reliance on the global economy and the international community. When states perceive greater economic benefits and are desirous of global integration, they are more susceptible to following the dictates of the non proliferation regime with the reverse also holding true.51 South Africa’s decision to denuclearize was therefore motivated not just by a regime change but also by a change in South Africa’s goals, as its leaders believed that by giving up nuclear weapons and rejoining the Western alliance, it would be able to enjoy the benefits of international political and economic co-operation.52

In extrapolating her domestic politics argument, Solingen makes an important distinction between outward-looking regimes, inward-oriented ones and a hybrid of these two models.

Outward looking regimes are those that essentially rely on expanding economic activities, controlling military expenditures and ensuring economic growth through global integration.

These regimes are helped by stable and non-violent regional security environments. Inward

50Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, and Samuel Wu, “Forecasting the risk of nuclear proliferation: Taiwan as an illustration of the method” in Zachary Davis and Benjamin Frankel eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (London: Frank Cass, 1993),p.311.

51Etel Solingen, “The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing Fence-Sitters in the Post–Cold War Era,” IGCC Policy Paper PP08 (Irvine, Calif.: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October 1, 1994).

52See David Fischer, “South Africa,” in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds.,Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994). 32

looking regimes are those that employ import-substituting models, resist integration into the global economy while at the same time favoring extreme nationalism and in some cases authoritarian rule. Solingen’s third model essentially comprises of a combination of the first two models and emerges when leaders have to form “compromise coalitions” especially in those societies that are deeply divided with respect to economic reform. States that correspond to the first model or those that were essentially outward oriented included most East Asian states with the exception of North Korea. These were the states that were more prone to forbearance. On the other hand, states that corresponded to the second or inward looking model (Argentina under

Peron, Pakistan, North Korea and the Middle East) had political coalitions that strongly depended on domestic bases of support, were hostile to integration into the global political economy and were more likely to pursue nuclear weapons programs. According to Solingen, the

Islamic Republic of Iran was the archetypal example of a regime that corresponded to the third model of a “compromise coalition.” While the reformist camps sought more openness and global integration, the radicals were clearly opposed and sought a more aggressive nuclear policy.53

Within the framework of the domestic politics model, it would be pertinent to also highlight the contributions made by Sagan, Allison, and other scholars. Graham Allison developed three models to explain decision making. One of these was the “Governmental

Politics Model” that explained decision making as the result of rational but self-interested bargaining between intrastate state actors. This model dispenses with the notion of a “unitary" actor and sees “many actors as players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather

53Solingen,Nuclear Logics,pp.41-44. 33

according to various conceptions of national, organizational and personal goals.” 54 The advantage of this model is that while explaining the importance of domestic politics in decision making, it helped us understand the perspective of key individuals in arriving at a decision and why they often worked at crossroads to each other. While this model was developed to explain foreign policy outcomes, in moving away from the notion of the state as a unitary actor and in focusing attention on the key individuals and organizations, it has also had an important contribution to make in evaluating nuclear decision making.

Scott Sagan developed an approach which explains the salience of domestic politics in explaining issues such as nuclear policy. Sagan argues that within the domestic politics framework, three types of actors emerge as important players. These include: a) officials of the state nuclear establishment, b) important officials within the military and c) politicians, especially in those states where they have the strong backing of their constituencies and public opinion to develop nuclear weapons.55 For Sagan, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is likely to satisfy the “parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some individual actors within the state.”56 Jacques Hyman makes a strong case that domestic institutions shape how easily a state can make the policy decision to acquire nuclear weapons. He refers to “veto-players” as those domestic political actors, whose acquiescence is necessary to initiate a policy change, i.e. turning a peaceful nuclear program into a military one. His main point is that “When the nuclear policymaking arena contains a large number of entrenched veto players, they all need to agree

54Graham Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, The American Political Science Review, Vol.63, No.3(September 1969),pp.707-708.

55Sagan “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,”pp.63-64.

56Ibid, pp.63-64.

before a nuclear weapons project can be set in motion.”57 Hyman also poses the question of why some states achieve their leaders’ nuclear ambitions quite efficiently, while others – an increasing number in recent decades – are unable to achieve this outcome. He focuses on the relations between politicians and scientific and technical workers in developing countries.58

2.15 Limitations of the domestic politics argument A major limitation of the domestic politics argument can be found in the realist critique of this theory. The realist theory of international relations claims that the structure of a state’s domestic politics has little or no impact on either its foreign policy or its security choices. For neo-realists, it is the structure of the system that explains world politics. The interplay of the security dynamics (co-operation, power shifts, alliances, security dilemma etc) forms the basis of their explanation on how states interact in the system. Extrapolating from this view, Kenneth

Waltz argues that that “one cannot infer the condition of international politics from the internal composition of states.”59 Thus, the keys to war and peace lie more in the structure of the international system than in the nature of the individual states. Realists do acknowledge that domestic actors do have their own interests and can influence government decisions but that these decisions are subordinate to national security issues. Realists further argue that even domestic actors are likely to forms a strong consensus about the need to respond when an adversary does acquire nuclear weapons.60 Another criticism or shortcoming of the domestic

57Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Fall 2011), p.155.

58Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012)

59Waltz, Theory of International Politics,p.51.

60Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,”?p.65.

politics model is that while it lends credence to the argument that domestic actors (bureaucracy, military, and officials of the nuclear establishment) form strong coalitions to push their agenda, it does not identify the conditions under which such coalitions are formed or when they become powerful so as to influence a particular outcome.61

2.16 Constructivist Theory: Norms, Values and Ideas Over the years, constructivist theory has provided one of the most strident critiques of structural realism by providing an alternative to the realist materialist assumptions of international politics. Alexander Wendt denies that the assumption of anarchy necessarily suggests competition among states. As Wendt explains “anarchy is what states make of it.” In other words, “whether a system is conflictual or peaceful is a function not of anarchy and power but of the shared culture created through discursive social practices.”62 States therefore do not have to incessantly worry about the anarchic international system and be drawn into conflict.

Constructivists shift the focus of attention to the international social environment in explaining decisions relating to nuclear abstinence. For a constructivist, states adopt a policy of forbearance not because it is the best choice for their security, but because of the social costs and rewards involved. 63 From a constructivist perspective, institutions reflect the collective identities of

61Ibid,p.64. Sagan argues that this is a serious weakness shared by several domestic level theories of International Relations and not just proliferation. See also Ethan B. Kapstein, “Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics,” International Organization,Vol.49, No.4(Autumn, 1995), pp.751-774.

62Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol.46, No. 2(Spring 1992),pp.391–425; and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For a good analysis of the constructivist debate, see articles by Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization,Vol.46, No.2(Spring 1992),pp.391-425; “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994),pp.384-396; and “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations,” International Organization,Vol. 41,No.3(Summer 1987),pp.335-370.

63Rublee, Non Proliferation Norms,p.28. 36

member states and consist of norms that can change actors’ perceptions, beliefs and interests. For example, a constructivist would argue that the international non-proliferation regime has its roots in the antinuclear sentiment that developed following the bombings of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki.64 Normative and regime-based arguments that focus on nuclear behavior highlight the importance of these regimes and norms in persuading states to adopt a desired course of action.

For example, Nina Tannenwald argues that the “nuclear taboo” is a powerful norm that has constrained the use of nuclear weapons since 1945. Tannenwald argues that in the mid 1950s, there was a global movement against the use of nuclear weapons which ultimately led to the strengthening of the taboo of seeing nuclear weapons as abhorrent weapons and also calling for an end to the arms race. Thus, the basis of the argument is that social pressure and public opinion are crucial to the creation of the nuclear taboo.65

Similarly, from a norms perspective, Sagan argues that decisions to acquire (or forgo) nuclear weapons may “serve important symbolic functions, both shaping and reflecting a state’s identity.”66 His explanation is that at times norms and shared beliefs take precedence over security issues or parochial interests. From this perspective, Sagan argues that the French decision to acquire nuclear weapons was based less on security considerations and more in enhancing France’s position and prestige in the international system. De Gaulle’s vision of an independent nuclear arsenal as a symbol of French grandeur and independence lends credence to

64Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security,Vol. 29, No.4(Spring 2005),pp.5-49.

65Ibid, pp.20-23.

66Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,”?p.73. 37

this view.67 Proponents of the “norms” argument also subscribe to the view that nuclear weapons serve as a symbol of modernity and prestige. Finally, proponents of the norms model also argue about a more optimistic view of the future of proliferation because normative constraints are powerful enough to dissuade any kind of a nuclear chain reaction which under a realist model would be inevitable.

There are other scholars who adopt a constructivist lens in articulating their views.

Jacques Hymans stresses the importance of ideas (including identities, perceptions, and emotions) in explaining nuclear decision making. Hymans arguments focus on the causal power of ideas

(including identities, perceptions, and emotions) and are very much in the constructivist tradition.

For Hymans, the primary focus is the leader’s decision to go nuclear. He argues that it is the policymakers fear and pride, combined with perceptions of threat and capacity and national identity that drives nuclear decision making. Therefore, non-proliferation restraint stems less from external efforts to stop states from going nuclear, and more from “individual hearts.”68 The decision to go nuclear is an extraordinary and important one and to take such a decision requires considerable will power on the part of individual leaders.

For Hymans, it is the “National Identity Conception” (NIC) or a leaders understanding of the “true” nature of the nation that will ultimately guide the decision to acquire or not acquire a nuclear weapon. Therefore those leaders who do possess a strong national identity conception will not only perceive the need for a nuclear weapon but will also have the exceptional willpower to take that extraordinary step. The variable of national identity conceptions provides strong support to Hymans argument across several cases. For example, in the case of France, it took an

67Ibid,p.79.

68Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation,p.1. 38

oppositional nationalist prime minister like Pierre Mendes who, in 1954, reversed Frances traditional ‘no nuclear’ policy and made the case for a French nuclear arsenal. Likewise Hyman argues that Australia’s nuclear posture must be understood in terms of the nationalist identity conceptions of different prime ministers. While Australian leaders did harbor fears about communist expansion, the absence of a strong nationalist identity dampened any momentum towards a nuclear program. In the case of India, Hymans argues that although India possessed the capability to go nuclear for decades, it was the rise to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party

(BJP) in 1988 and its nationalist identity that led India to cross the nuclear threshold.69

2.17 Limitations of the Constructivist model While constructivists provide a range of explanations from norms and values to the social environment in explaining the lack of interest in developing nuclear weapons, they do not provide adequate information on when and where these normative factors are likely to prevail. 70

Normative explanations also do not find resonance in all cases of non proliferation. For example,

Solingen finds little evidence in her case studies that norms played a significant role in influencing renunciation or proliferation decisions. In the case of Japan, Solingen argues that nuclear forbearance had more to do with Japans “pragmatic pacifism” than the presence of institutional and normative restraints. She sees a similar trend at work in the nuclear forbearance displayed by South Korea and Taiwan, and finds little evidence of norms playing a role in the non-proliferation decisions of the Middle East. Solingen also regards constructivist analysis of nuclear proliferation to be lacking in examining to what extent norms deploring nuclear weapons

69Ibid,pp.14-15.

70William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008),p.157.

acquisitions have developed internationally, and also in accounting for the emergence of competing norms that do value nuclear weapons.71

T.V. Paul also points to certain limitations of normative theory. He argues that proponents of regime theory have strived to show that states decide to forgo nuclear weapons for normative reasons. For example, “middle and small states” would believe that by acquiring nuclear weapons they would go against international norms that give them legitimacy and power.

But as in the case of the non-proliferation regime, consisting of the NPT, the IAEA’s Full-

Scopes Safeguards program, and other instruments, normative theory cannot fully explain why some states acquire nuclear weapons outside of the regime (e.g. Pakistan and India), or why some states opt out of regime rules and norms even after signing on to them (e.g. North Korea and Iraq).72

2.18 Other Models There are some other models that have been developed to explain nuclear choices.

Cognitive and psychological approaches to nuclear proliferation provide an interesting explanation of why states do and do not go nuclear. The logic of why leaders make irrational decisions even when they are free from organizational constraints is best explained through the concept of “belief systems.” The underlying argument of this concept is that beliefs and subsequent actions are interlinked, and that only by understanding the beliefs of leaders can we make an assessment of foreign policy decisions. For example, the reason why irrational behavior often occurs during crisis situations is because leaders are unable to perceive the actual reality and therefore take decisions that are resistant to change. Under situations of crisis, decision

71Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.158.

72Paul, Power versus Prudence,pp.10-11. 40

makers also tend to presume that others share their world view and that their decisions are justified.73

Peter Lavoy developed the myth maker model to explain why nuclear weapons spread, despite the uncertainty surrounding them and despite their potentially disastrous consequences.

He argues that national elites create a fear psychosis about the security problems facing their state and thereby create the myth about the importance of nuclear weapons and the security it provides. It is a myth because beliefs about nuclear weapons are created more on “logic and faith” rather than factual information on the relationship between nuclear weapons and war.

Lavoy substantiates his argument by providing the example of the role played by the chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission in creating the nuclear myth.74

In the next section, I examine, in detail, the theory of prudential realism and its explanations for nuclear forbearance.

2.20 Prudential Realism

T.V. Paul’s theory of prudential realism is a relatively new theory in IR literature. Drawing from realist and liberal camps, the theory offers its own unique perspective on the nuclear choices of nation states.

2.21 Prudential Realism and Nuclear Forbearance In “prudential realism,” Paul develops his own explanation of why nations under certain circumstances may prudently forego military capabilities that other states see as threatening.

“Cautiousness and enlightened self interests characterize states’ behavior.” 75 Paul’s basic

73Ogilvy White, “Is There a Theory of Non Proliferation?”p.52.

74Ibid,p.52.

75Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.5. 41

argument is that the nuclear choices of technologically capable non-great power states are the result of two situational variables, namely the level of conflict and co-operation in their region and their politico-security interdependence.76 States weigh their prudential calculations regarding the unilateral acquisition of nuclear arms. The prudential calculations derive from anticipated losses to national security resulting from nuclear proliferation.77 I now examine each of these variables.

2.22 Level of Conflict and Nuclear Forbearance Paul argues that whether a non great power state acquires or abandons nuclear weapons is determined largely by “the level and type of security threats that it faces and the nature of interactions or conflicts with its key adversaries and allies in its immediate geo-strategic environment.”78 Paul therefore creates three types of zones. In a high conflict environment, states engage in enduring rivalries and protracted conflicts. In such an environment, regional states that face nuclear enemies and who do not have credible security guarantees are more likely to obtain nuclear weapons. A zone of moderate conflict is one where states pay equal attention to economic and security issues. Interstate conflicts are not enduring or protracted but episodic.

Nuclear proliferation is unlikely, given that states would want to stress economic objectives. A zone of low conflict is characterized by no militarized dispute or armed conflict among the principal actors for at least twenty years. Therefore states in this zone are the most likely to exercise nuclear forbearance.79

76Ibid,p.15.

77Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.33.

78Ibid,p.4.

79Paul, Power versus Prudence,pp.20-23. 42

2.23 Politico-Security Interdependence and Nuclear Forbearance How does politico-security interdependence cause nuclear forbearance? Paul’s concept of politico-security interdependence posits that “nuclear choices of technologically capable non great power states depend on the degree of mutual vulnerability and the resultant anticipated sensitivity in their relationship with states with which they are most closely connected in the region, both allies and adversaries.”80 Leaders of technologically capable non-great power states would be aware that acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons could lead to conflict with neighboring states that they will affect most seriously through their actions. Therefore, in order to prevent the operation of the security dilemma and a subsequent arms race, technologically capable non-great power states exercise nuclear forbearance with the understanding that nuclear forbearance can help them to minimize their risks and also avoid possible losses to their security.81

2.24 Specification of Variables The variables used in this dissertation are the same as in Paul’s theory. Like Paul, I too explain “Nuclear Forbearance” (the dependent variable) through two key variables, namely

“Level of Conflict” (LOC) and “Politico-Security Interdependence.” (PSI) In the following sections I first discuss Paul’s definition of each of the variables, followed by my definition and the measurement of the variables.

2.25 Level of Conflict Paul contends that “The nuclear choices of potential proliferators are likely to be influenced by the security environment and conflict level of its region….. Drawing partially from the literature on complex interdependence, I create three ideal types of regions or zones for analytical purposes. There are zones of high conflict, zones of moderate conflict and zones of low conflict. The conflict level in a zone may be measured with the following indicators: severity, intensity, duration, and scope of

80Ibid,p.15.

81Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.15. 43

conflicts involving key states, especially the significant dyads in the region in terms of militarized interstate disputes and crises…..The first type of zone is a high threat environment characterized by protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries among two or more significant actors in the zone. The analytical constructs of protracted conflicts and enduring rivalry capture somewhat similar phenomena: a longstanding intense conflict involving two or more parties with a history of crises and, in some instances, war. Protracted conflicts are characterized by hostile interactions that extend over long periods, with sporadic outbreaks of crises and open conflicts. An enduring rivalry is characterized by sustained mutually contingent hostile interaction, with parties considering the gain or loss of a stake to the rival as more important than their own value satisfaction…. In this type of zone, states follow hard realist patterns of behavior and pursue a “security first” approach because they are extremely concerned about relative gains and less worried about the negative security externalities that they may impose on their enemies….If a technologically capable state in a high conflict region forswears nuclear arms, it does so largely as a function of countervailing deterrent capability, provided by an ally or the states own capability, such as chemical weapons or conventional superiority, that can somewhat neutralize the nuclear capability of the adversary…Credibility of the allies’ commitment is critical in dissuading a technologically capable state in a zone of high conflict from “going nuclear.” Factors that determine alliance credibility include active troop presence, nuclear and conventional weapons deployed on the ally’s territory, integration of both states’ forces and a security treaty that stipulates automatic entry by the great power on the side of the smaller ally in the event of war.82

A zone of moderate conflict is one where states pay approximately equal attention to security and economic goals. States are mindful of the negative security externalities emanating from their individual actions. Militarized inter-state disputes (MIDs) may exist, but their frequency, intensity and scope are lower than in a high conflict zone and they are unlikely to have led to border wars. …. The threat environment is moderate and although security goals may dominate the agenda during some periods, such questions are less prominent in daily interactions…… If states pursue pro nuclear policies, they may do so most likely because of bureaucratic politics or the organizational interests of the armed forces. Such a region is a good candidate for denuclearization and the eventual achievement of a nuclear free zone. Examples would be Latin America and South East Asia.

High levels of economic interdependence characterize a zone of low conflict. This is a low threat environment, force is rarely applied in mutual relations, and economic issues dominate in normal interstate interactions….. In terms of the earlier measures of conflict, states in this zone would have had no militarized disputes and armed conflicts among the principal actors for at least twenty years and no conventional arms race vis-à-vis each other. States are unlikely to use force to resolve their disputes. States’ behavior is dictated by the postulates of prudential realism. Western Europe and North America come close to this model.”83

82Credible security guarantees are an important component of the theory especially in influencing nuclear decisions. There is a burgeoning literature on the nature and type of alliances. Agreements that only commit the allies to “consultation” or “co-operation” in a crisis or conflict are coded as “ententes” On the contrary; defense pacts are defined as treaties that “commit states to intervene militarily on the side of any treaty partner that is attacked.” See Douglas M. Gibler and Meredith Reed Sarkees, “Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.41, No.2(2004),p.215.

83Paul, Power versus Prudence,pp.18-23. 44

Since I am testing Paul’s theory, I use the same variables and the same definitions as mentioned above including testing the theory’s alternate explanations for forbearance namely possession of an effective deterrent capability (conventional superiority or chemical arms) or a credible security alliance.

2.26 Empirical Analysis of Level of Conflict The term ‘Empirical Analysis’ has been used to quantify and assign a value to the LOC corresponding to each period of a state’s nuclear history. This term has been used across all my cases. For Paul, the LOC and co-operation in a zone can be measured by the severity, intensity, duration and scope of conflicts, involving key states in the region, in terms of MIDs. “The conflict level in a zone may be measured with the following indicators: severity, intensity, duration, and scope of conflicts involving key states, especially the significant dyads in the region, in terms of MIDs and crises.”84 He adopts the definition provided by Gochman and Maoz on MIDs which is “a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, display of force and actual uses of military force? These acts must be explicit, overt, and non-accidental and government sanctioned.”85 He then codifies these MIDs. For example, in terms of severity, for an enduring rivalry to exist there must be at least five militarized disputes between the same two states and in terms of duration, there must be at least twenty to twenty five years between the outbreak of the first dispute and termination of the last. Other attributes of an enduring rivalry include lack of membership in common alliances, low levels of economic

84Ibid, pp.19-20.

85Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights,” Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.28, No.4(1984),p587. 45

interaction and the possibility of one or more MIDs leading to war.86 In terms of the intensity of conflict, the issues between two enduring rivals must be the same and unresolved.87 Table 2.1 provides an illustration of the enduring rivalry between states that form part of the analysis in this dissertation. The rivalries correspond to Paul’s codification of MIDs in terms of severity, intensity and duration.

Table 2.1: Enduring Rivalries up to 199688 - States with high levels of conflict Rivalry# Life Disputes* Duration

S. Korea – N. Korea 1949-1992 20 43

Egypt - Israel 1948-1989 36 41

Taiwan- China 1949-1996 18 47

# (By no means are these rivalries over. Data given above is the available data until 1996)

* Number of disputes varies according to different authors.

Like Paul, I too operationalize the LOCs in terms of the severity, intensity, duration and scope of conflicts, involving key states in the region, in terms of militarized interstate disputes. I too use the Gochman and Maoz definition of MID as “a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, display of force and actual uses of military force?

These acts must be explicit, overt, and non-accidental and government sanctioned.89 Furthermore, for each of my cases, I use the same coding criteria for MIDs as used by Paul in terms of

86Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.20.

87Gary Goetz and Paul Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constraints and Empirical Patterns,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol.37,No.2(June 1993),p.160.

88Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry (Anne Arbor.: University of Michigan, 2000),pp.145-146.

89Gochman and Maoz, “Militarized Interstate Disputes,”p.587. 46

intensity, severity and duration.90 I then go a step further and use the Correlates of War scale to measure MIDs. The Correlates of War measures this on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is no military response, 2 is the threat of military force, 3 is the display of military force, 4 is the use of force and 5 is full scale war. 91 (See Table 2.2 below) In chapters 3-7, I use this scale across all my cases to show the type of MIDs that confronted each state.

Table 2.2: Correlates of War Scale --Level of Hostility- Scale 2- Threat to use Force: Action Definition

Threat to use force Threat by one state to use its regular armed forces to fire upon the armed forces or violate the territory of another state. Threat to blockade Threat by one state to use its ships, airplanes or troops to seal off the territory of another state, so as to prevent either entry or exit. Threat to occupy territory threat by one state to use military force to occupy the whole or part of another state's territory Threat to declare war Threat by one state to issue an official declaration of war against another state

Threat by one state to use all or part of its nuclear arsenal against the territory Threat to use nuclear weapons or forces of another state.

Level of Hostility- Scale 3- Displays of Force Action Definition

Alert Reported increase in the military readiness of a state's regular armed forces.

Mobilization Activation by a state of all or part of its previously inactive forces. Public demonstration by a state of its land based military forces, not Show of troops involving combat operations (e.g., maneuvers). Public demonstration by a state of its naval military forces, including a Show of ships purposeful display of naval forces outside the territorial waters of a targeted state. Public demonstration by a state of its airborne capabilities (e.g., repeated air Show of planes space violations). Explicit attempt to publicly demonstrate control over a border area through

the construction or reinforcement of military outposts to defend or claim Fortify border territory

90For each case the MIDs have been estimated based on the literature and available data and represent the best possible estimate. This estimate may vary amongst different sources.

91Daniel Jones, Stuart Bremer and David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes,1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules and Empirical Patterns,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.15, No.2 (1996), pp.171-173. 47

Nuclear alert Increase in military readiness of a state's nuclear forces. Crossing of a recognized land, sea or air boundary for a period of less than twenty-four hours by official forces of one state, without any force being Border violation used on the territory (or population) of the targeted state or any significant public demonstration of military force capability

Level of Hostility- Scale 4- Definitions of Uses of Force Action Definition

Use of ships, planes or troops by one state to seal off the territory of another Blockade state so as to prevent entry or exit of goods or personnel. Boarding, stopping, or inspection of ships, land vehicles or the confiscation of goods is sufficient evidence for the erection of a blockade.

Occupation of Use of military force by one state to occupy the whole or part of another territory state's territory for a period of more than twenty-four hours. The immediate occupation after a war by the victorious side's army is not coded as an incident unless provisions of the treaty are violated by the occupying forces or further militarized incidents are undertaken by the state being occupied. Seizure Capture of material or personnel of official forces from another state, or the detention of private citizens operating within contested territory. Seizures must last at least twenty-four hours to be included. Clash Outbreak of military hostilities between regular armed forces of two or more system members, in which the initiator may or may not be clearly identified. Raid Use of regular armed forces of a state to fire upon the armed forces, population, or territory of another state. Within this incident type, the initiator can be clearly identified and its action is not sanctioned by the target. Declaration of war Official statement by one state that it is in a state of war with another state Use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from the arsenal of one state Use of CBR Weapons employed against the territory or forces of another resulting in less than 1,000 total battle deaths per dispute. Source: Daniel Jones, Stuart Bremer and David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes,1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules and Empirical Patterns,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.15, No.2 (1996),pp.171-173.

Level of Hostility- Scale 5- War

The highest level of hostility that a dispute can reach is what Singer and Small (1982) classify as

‘war’ and has also been used by the Gochman and Maoz militarized dispute data (1984). I use the Gochman and Maoz classification of war “as sustained military hostilities between the regular armed forces of two or more states resulting in 1000 or more battle fatalities; a minimum of 100 battle fatalities or 1000 troops in active combat is required before a state is considered to

be a participant in a war.” 92 I also assign a high value (Scale 5) to nuclear tests conducted by a state. These are significant events and though they may not directly relate to the use of force against a rival state yet they do have the potential for serious consequences.

Based on the Correlates of War scale for MIDs, I assign values for the LOC during a particular period. These values are assigned in the following manner across all my cases. (See

Table 2.3)

Table 2.3. Assignment of Values for LOC Scale Value Assigned

Scale 2- Threat to use Force Low

Scale 3- Displays of Force Medium

Scale 4- Definitions of Uses of Force Medium

Scale 5- War & Nuclear Tests High (War means 1000 or more battle fatalities)

These values are then examined corresponding to each period of a state’s nuclear history to see if there is any relation between the LOC and the resultant nuclear decision. For example, do periods of high levels of conflict (Scale 5) necessarily result in less forbearance and vice –versa.

This is a good test for X1 (level of conflict) because Paul’s argument is that enduring rival states with high levels of conflict will have the maximum incentive to acquire nuclear weapons.93

Having discussed the level of conflict, I now shift my focus to Paul’s second variable; i.e.,

Politico-Security Interdependence.

2.27 Politico-Security Interdependence (PSI)

The concept of politico-security interdependence as defined by Paul posits that

92Gochman and Maoz, “Militarized Interstate Disputes,”p.589.

93Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.22. 49

“nuclear choices of technologically capable non great power states depend on the degree of mutual vulnerability and the resultant anticipated sensitivity in their relationship with states with which they are most closely connected in the region, both allies and adversaries. States involved in security interdependence are aware of the consequences of unilateral action more than are states that lack such a relationship. Their interdependence manifests itself in the awareness among technologically capable non great power states that their behavior in nuclear matters is tied to the expected behavior of other significant states and that there are costly reciprocal effects associated with breaking away. They thus know about the consequences of arming and hence prudently chose to avert a negative outcome. In more formal terms, nuclear forbearance is the result of a conscious effort by technologically capable states not to create an intense negative security externality for other significant actors that will be most affected…….. Moreover, leaders of a technologically capable non-great power state may believe that their acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons would result in greater conflict with those neighboring states that they will affect most prominently and the targeting of their countries by hostile nuclear powers. The responses of adversarial states could include, in extreme circumstances, threat of military strikes, and in ordinary circumstances, balancing behavior – i.e. seeking the help of extra regional powers for protection. Allies, especially major power benefactors, could undertake undesirable actions such as reduction or removal of security guarantees and disruption of economic and military support.”94

However, there are three important points to be noted as far as Paul’s conception of politico- security interdependence is concerned. First, the theory restricts itself to only nuclear weapons.

While he does claim that all forms of weaponry can cause negative security externalities yet he concludes that nuclear weapons carry the highest externalities because of their ‘uncontestable nature’ and because they are incomparable in terms of speed and destructive power. Unlike conventional weapons, the possession of nuclear weapons dramatically increases offensive capabilities and hence they are incomparable. 95 Second, Paul’s concept of politico-security interdependence includes relationships such as economic and military support and security guarantees.96

94Ibid,pp.15-16.

95Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.17.

96Ibid,p.16. 50

I accept and adopt Paul’s explanation of high, moderate and low politico-security interdependence, wherever applicable, across all my cases. (See Table 2.4)

Table 2.4. – Overview of Politico-Security Interdependence and Nuclear Decisions Security Interdependence Nuclear Decision

Non Forbearance –No fear of reciprocal decisions. States fear relative Low gains and have the maximum incentive to pursue nuclear weapons. More likely to exercise nuclear forbearance. States pay equal attention Moderate to security and economic goals. MIDs may exist but they are sporadic. Forbearance. Extremely sensitive to generating negative security High externalities among allies and adversaries in the region. Will not contemplate acquiring nuclear weapons.

The values of politico-security interdependence during any particular period can range from high to low depending on the effects of the reciprocal decisions of a state’s allies and adversaries. If a state was concerned about the reciprocal decisions by either its allies or adversaries and would not risk a nuclear weapons program for fear of creating negative security externalities then it is adjudged to have had high politico-security interdependence. A low value indicates otherwise. I use the word concerned to indicate a state’s level of sensitivity in its relationship with other states in the region; high concern resulting in forbearance and vice-versa. This reasoning, based on the theory’s explanation, has been applied across all the cases. Sometimes nuclear decisions initiated by states can also result in low or high PSI.

2.28 An Empirical Analysis of Politico -Security Interdependence Closely related to theoretical issues are a set of important questions concerning how to quantify politico-security interdependence. Based on Paul’s definition of politico-security interdependence and which I adopt, a good measure of the same would be the number of reciprocal decisions and their impact on a state’s nuclear policy. These decisions could be just one or more. Operationalizing reciprocal decisions involves examining and quantifying the decisions of allies and adversaries either in opposing a state’s decision to acquire nuclear

weapons or in sustaining or inducing a policy of forbearance. For example, when a state tries to acquire nuclear weapons, its allies and adversaries can reciprocate and punish it by taking a number of decisions and vice-versa. This measure relates to the original definition because, as

Paul argues, “security interdependence manifests itself in the awareness among technologically capable non great power states that their behavior in nuclear matters is tied to the expected behavior of other significant states with whom they interact in the region and there are costly reciprocal effects associated with breaking away from such a relationship.”97 Paul’s concept of politico-security interdependence includes relationships such as economic aid, security assistance, and security guarantees. For example, Paul argues that responses to acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state could range from the threat of military strikes by its adversaries to the disruption of economic and military support by its closest allies especially the “major power benefactors.”98 All these factors are examined in the context of security interdependence while testing the cases.

2.29 Aggregate Politico-Security Interdependence The term aggregate politico-security interdependence, as used in all my cases, refers to a state’s overall PSI for each period with its allies and adversaries. This value can be either high or low. A separate table has been included to indicate aggregate or net assessment of politico- security interdependence for each period for each case. First, a state’s PSI with its ally(s) and adversary(s) has been recorded as follows: High-High to indicate high for ally and high for adversary; High-Low to indicate high for ally but low for adversary; Low-High to indicate low for ally but high for adversary and Low-Low to indicate low for ally and low for adversary. Then

97Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.15.

98Ibid,p.16. 52

the overall or aggregate PSI (sum of both allies and adversaries) has been calculated accordingly.

In case of a high-low or low-high situation, overall PSI (final value) has been reckoned based on an analysis of the then prevailing circumstances and the eventual decision taken by the state. For example if a state had high PSI with its allies (in this case a state should exercise forbearance) and low PSI with its adversaries in one period but eventually exercised a decision of non- forbearance during this period then overall PSI has been adjudged to be low for this period. This is based on the theory’s definition of low politico-security interdependence where states do not fear reciprocal decisions by its allies. On the contrary, states fear relative gains and have the maximum incentive to pursue nuclear weapons.

2.3 Level of Conflict – Differentiating between Zone and State This is an important concept that needs further explanation. Within the different zones, states may have experienced differing levels of conflict. The theory has an explanation for this and claims that regions do not remain static and shifts in conflict will arise when there is an underlying shift in the basic issues that cause enduring rivalries and protracted conflicts, namely territorial disputes and ideological conflicts. However, as depicted in Table 2.5., enduring rival states (South Korea, North Korea, Egypt and Taiwan) did witness periods involving high, medium and low levels of conflict. More importantly, there were no changes in the underlying reasons behind their rivalry, i.e. territory and ideology. This is a significant factor that is not accounted for by the theory. Therefore, since the level of conflict can fluctuate within a zone, I have devised a table that shows the periods of conflict associated with each case that I am analyzing.

Table 2.5 Country Wise Level of Conflict99 -- (Based on the Co-relates of War Scale for MIDs) Name of Country High Conflict Medium Conflict Low Conflict Years Years Years 1960-1969, 1970-1979, South Korea 2000-2010 None 1980-1989, 1990-1999 2002-2006, 1960-1979, 1980-1990 & North Korea 2007-March 2009 April 2009-2010 1991-2001

Taiwan 1949-1966 1990- 2007 1967-1976, 1977-1989 Egypt 1948-1959, 1960-1969, ------1981-2007 1970-1980

Libya100 1970 -1979 & 1980--1989 ------1990-2002 & 2003-2007

2.4 Defining Nuclear Forbearance: (Y) Nuclear forbearance –the dependent variable –as defined by Paul and which I adopt can be defined as “the propensity among some states not to acquire nuclear weapons despite having the technological capability or potential capability to manufacture such weapons, and the decision by other states to abandon existing weapons they already possess.”101 In testing his theory, Paul applies this definition of forbearance across three different circumstances: a) when a state never pursued a nuclear weapons program b) when a state halted or reversed a nuclear weapons program having already initiated it and c) when a state surrendered existing nuclear weapons already in its possession. For the purpose of uniformity and for testing the theory, I use the same definition, wherever applicable, across all my cases.

99Despite being states that were all situated in a zone of high conflict, enduring rival states such as South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan and Egypt had different levels of conflict across different time periods. The values of high, medium and low have been assigned based on the co-relates of war scale for MIDs as depicted in table 1.4.

100Libya was a state situated in a zone of moderate conflict because unlike enduring rival states, it had conflicts that were episodic and sporadic. This argument is based on the theory’s definition of states situated in a zone of moderate conflict. However, despite being situated in a zone of moderate conflict, Libya did have certain periods of high and low conflict.

101Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.3. 54

However, in addition to the above, I have also associated a nuclear program, by any state, for peaceful purposes as one pertaining to nuclear forbearance. These peaceful programs are important and need to be included because barring Libya, all the other states analyzed in this dissertation initiated their nuclear program with peaceful intentions. The infrastructure thus built up was then later diverted for a weapons program. A peaceful nuclear program has also been empirically analyzed in terms of technological and non-technological factors. For example, treaties and joint declarations; number of training and research reactors and nuclear power plants; number of training programs for scientists in nuclear research activities; participation of scientists in conferences for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy etc are some of the indicators that a state is pursuing a nuclear program solely for peaceful purposes. These have been depicted accordingly. (For an empirical analysis of forbearance --See Tables 2.6 & 2.7.)

Table 2.6. An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Forbearance - Technological & Non-Technological Indicators for states with an active nuclear weapons program.102 Technological Indicators Non-Technological Indicators

A. Dismantling of Nuclear Infrastructure & Halting 1. Signing of treaties that restrict proliferation. Nuclear Related Activities 2. Participating in a bilateral or regional safeguards regime. 1. Number of Uranium enrichment facilities dismantled. 3. Membership in regional nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ) 2. Number of research reactors and nuclear power 4. Number of memberships in other multilateral non- Plants dismantled. proliferation mechanisms (Proliferation Security Initiative; Nuclear Suppliers Group) 3. Number of Fuel fabrication facilities dismantled. 5. Agreements (number) to the Additional Protocol and subsidiary arrangements to the additional 4. Number of Electronic fire-sets, fusing/detonation, protocol. delivery vehicle development and other equipment dismantled. 6. Number of disclosures to the IAEA regarding safeguards violations, where applicable. 5. Number of outside facilities (where nuclear material is kept or stored) that were dismantled.

102Table 2.6. refers to measures taken by states that already embarked on a nuclear weapons program. Such states had the necessary infrastructure and raw material in place to manufacture a nuclear weapon. Dismantling of such infrastructure was a clear indication that a state was committed to forbearance. 55

6. Number of raw material conversion facilities Dismantled.

7. Halting of weapons testing, uranium enrichment, plutonium production and other activities that were clearly linked to a nuclear weapons program. B. Halting Imports of Raw Materials

1. Quantity of imports of nuclear materials (uranium hexafluoride) (UF6).

2. Quantity of nuclear material, directly usable in weapons: highly enriched uranium [HEU] and plutonium. 103

Table 2.7. An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Forbearance - Technological & Non-Technological Indicators For states with a peaceful nuclear program Technological Indicators Non-Technological Indicators

1. Number of Training and Research reactors and 1. Number of Joint Declarations & signing of nuclear nuclear power plants. co-operation agreements with other countries for peaceful purposes. 2. Number of Atomic Energy institutes and Power 2. Signing of treaties and safeguards agreements corporations. (Indicates a commitment to non-proliferation) 3. Number of research experiments conducted in Atomic Energy. 4. Number of training programs for scientists in nuclear research activities. 5. Participation of scientists in conferences for the Peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Although the emphasis is on forbearance as the dependent variable, my cases include states that did make an effort to acquire nuclear weapons or weapons related technology for various reasons.

I therefore define a decision of non-forbearance as one where states seek to make a conscious effort to either initiate a nuclear weapons program or seek to acquire nuclear weapons outright. A state’s efforts, in this regard, may accordingly revolve around creating the necessary infrastructure and acquiring raw materials. This effort may be indigenous or with the help of

103Richard Wallace and Arvid Lundy,“ Using Open Sources for Proliferation Analysis,” in James E Doyle ed., Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Non-Proliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy, (Oxford: Elsevier Inc., 2008),p.199.

external sources. For example, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) efforts from 1980-1993, in terms of the infrastructure built, were clearly directed towards a nuclear weapons program and hence its decisions during this period have been categorized as relating to non-forbearance. The efforts to acquire nuclear weapons or weapons related technology can also be empirically analyzed through both technical and non-technical measures. (See Table 2.8.)

Table 2.8. An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance – Technological and Non-Technological Indicators Technological Indicators -- (Nuclear Infrastructure) Non-Technological Indicators

1. Number of Atomic Research Reactors and 1. Violating treaty obligations/commitments to the NPR laboratories constructed. having already signed/ratified it. (This could be one treaty or multiple treaties). 2. Number of Uranium conversion facilities constructed. 3. Number of Uranium enrichment facilities constructed. 4. Number of Lithium Enrichment facilities. 5. Number of Nuclear Power Plants constructed.

6. Number of Fuel and Target Fabrication Laboratories. 7. Number of Hot Cell facilities for production of radioisotopes. 8. Number of plutonium production and reprocessing plants. 9. Number of Weapons component Fabrication Plants. Nuclear Activities 1. Uranium milling and extraction activities to produce ‘yellowcake’ 2. Quantity of Uranium enriched ( Heavy Enriched Uranium) 3. Quantity of Uranium used for producing Plutonium. 4. Quantities of Plutonium 239 produced.

5. Quantities of Tritium produced. Others 1. Negotiations with other countries for nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology. 2. Signing of agreements for infrastructure or raw material for a nuclear weapons program. 3. Sending scientists and engineers abroad for training missions in the production of nuclear weapons.

All these measures depicted in (Table 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8) are used, wherever applicable, in the case study analysis to determine forbearance or non-forbearance. For example, some states like the

Republic of Korea (ROK) never had nuclear weapons while others like the DPRK did possess nuclear weapons. The measures cover all such cases. All of these measures also cover both of the following concepts-- absolute measures of forbearance/no forbearance and also relative measures of forbearance-- for variations in levels of forbearance over time in each case. For example, not all periods were entirely related to forbearance or non-forbearance. Some states that were committed towards a policy of forbearance during a certain period suddenly reversed course in the same period, and initiated certain steps towards a nuclear weapons program. This resulted in a policy of lesser or relative forbearance and has been depicted as such. Likewise, states that exercised a policy of non-forbearance during a period, were also known to have reverted to a policy of forbearance within the same period resulting in a policy of relative non-forbearance.

However, for the sake of clarity and consistency, nuclear decisions for a time period have always been categorized as either forbearance or non-forbearance irrespective of any reversal in such decisions during any given period.

2.5 Time Line of Nuclear Decisions For any state, in describing its nuclear history, the timeline begins whenever it actively considered a nuclear program, even if it was a peaceful one. By actively, I mean a substantial investment in resources and raw materials that shows that a state was serious in pursuing a nuclear program. Subsequent periods correspond to each phase of a state’s nuclear history. For example, a new timeline begins whenever there was a change in a state’s nuclear decision. For example, the ROK initiated a peaceful nuclear program from 1960 to 1969 but then following a changed security environment, began to actively pursue a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s.

However, from the 1980s it reverted to a policy of forbearance. The timeline for the ROKs nuclear history has been framed accordingly. Also a timeline of 1960-1969 indicates a start date of 01.01.1960 and an end date of 31.12.1969 unless otherwise explicitly stated. This is repeated across all my cases.

2.6 Framing the Hypotheses First, with respect to the level of conflict, the main criteria are the level of conflict with an exception based on countervailing deterrent capability. Accordingly my first set of hypotheses

(H1) is as follows:

H1a: States with a high level of conflict (X1 is high) will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. (Y) i.e. X1 high → Y is absent

H1b: States with medium or low levels of conflict (X1 is low) will exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. (Y) i.e. X1 medium or low → Y is present

This first set of hypotheses relate to the first variable, namely level of conflict. The tests for these hypotheses also account for within case analysis, i.e. for any fluctuations in the values of MIDs that might have a bearing on nuclear decisions.

The next set of hypotheses (H2) relate to the second variable, namely Politico-Security Interdependence.

H2a: States possessing, in the aggregate, low levels of politico-security interdependence (X2 is Low) with allies and adversaries will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H2b: States possessing, in the aggregate, high levels of politico-security interdependence (X2 is high) with allies and adversaries are most likely to exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

Although Paul includes security guarantees under level of conflict, it is also a central part of H2 and therefore I test it in H2.

2.61 Interpreting the Results If a state’s nuclear decision (forbearance/non-forbearance) is fully consistent with the theory’s claims, with respect to its key variables, across all relevant time periods of its nuclear history then the corresponding hypothesis is considered to be fully supported.104 For example, a decision of forbearance must always correspond to any or all periods of low conflict and non- forbearance to any or all periods of high conflict. Likewise, if a state’s nuclear decision is consistent with the theory’s claims, with respect to its key variables; across a majority of time periods (more than 50%) of its nuclear history then the corresponding hypothesis is considered to be mostly supported. If a state’s nuclear decision is not consistent with the theory’s claims across a majority of time periods then the corresponding hypothesis is considered to be only partially supported. Finally, if a state’s nuclear decision is not consistent with the theory’s claims, in terms of its key variables, across all periods of its nuclear history, then the corresponding hypothesis is considered not supported.

2.7 Data Collection and Analysis Research on nuclear policies and intentions face several obstacles including amongst other things, the cloak of secrecy under which these programs are often shrouded. This research will essentially make use of scholarly literature and documents. I will also, if possible, refer to primary sources such as diaries, declassified documents, public speeches, interview transcripts, cabinet discussions and personal memoirs wherever available.105 There are several declassified documents available from the National Security Archives as also the personal memoirs of several leaders which contain records about their line of thought and the circumstances guiding their

104Some states had only one period of high or low conflict and if the nuclear decision during this period was not one of forbearance or forbearance respectively then the corresponding hypothesis is fully supported.

105George and Bennett,p.97. 60

actions. Public sources are also an important source of information. These sources are not a substitute for analysis of archival sources but they are often an important part of contextual developments to which policy makers are sensitive.106 For example, country profiles are an important source of information. These profiles are produced by governments, businesses and

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and contain relevant information pertaining to a state’s political system, military forces, nuclear infrastructure, its diplomatic behavior and commitment to the non-proliferation regime and other treaties to which it might be a signatory.

This information will be used in conjunction with media accounts to determine states’ nuclear policies. Media accounts may be relied on to determine what nuclear technologies a state is importing or developing and how these might reveal a state’s undeclared pursuit of nuclear weapons. News media accounts are important because reporters have information that are sometimes not available to other researchers. Considering that possibility of bias in reporting, news reports will be carefully validated against other information or other news reports on the same topic. Important information is also available from academic institutions or NGOs such as the non-proliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for

Non-proliferation studies, the nuclear threat initiative and Global Security. Information provided by these sources will also be carefully scrutinized and validated.107 To the best of my ability, I attempt to balance between several different sources, and rely on the more established and credible sources of information to maximize the accuracy and reliability of my results.

106See Deborah Welch Larson, The Origins of Containment (N.J:.Princeton University press,1985) Larsen illustrates the different ways in which contemporary newspaper accounts help the investigator to understand important elements of the context in which policy makers operate.

107Doyle,ed., Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Non-Proliferation,p.266.

In the next chapter, I test the theory of prudential realism by undertaking a case study analysis of South Korea. Subsequent chapters undertake a similar case study analysis of North

Korea, Taiwan, Egypt and Libya respectively. Barring Libya, all the other cases (four) are classified as hard test cases as all these states were situated in a high conflict zone having had, at some periods in their history, protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries with their principal adversary in their region. All four states, in varying degrees, also actively pursued a nuclear weapons program before exercising a policy of nuclear forbearance. I begin each case with a brief history of the state, then examine, over different time periods, its nuclear decisions with respect to the theory’s two key variables (politico-security interdependence & level of conflict) and eventually, based on my findings, draw my conclusions about the theory.

Chapter Three

South Korea

This chapter examines the nuclear decisions of the Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea, a state situated in a high conflict zone. The ROK has been classified as a state situated in a high conflict zone based on the parameters pertaining to LOC & MIDs as outlined in chapter 2. The chapter begins by analyzing the ROK’s nuclear decisions. These have been analyzed across the time period from 1960 to 2010 as it corresponds to South Korea’s nuclear history. I have chosen to end the timeline at 2010 because the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted its second nuclear test in 2009 and understanding its impact on the ROK’s nuclear decisions is important. Decisions made by South Korea to not acquire nuclear weapons or to embark on a nuclear program for peaceful purposes are categorized under forbearance (Y).

Likewise, all decisions to initiate a nuclear weapons program or acquire nuclear weapons have been examined under non-forbearance. South Korea had five phases in its nuclear decision making; 1960-69 (Forbearance); 1970-1979 (Non-Forbearance); 1980-1989 (Forbearance);

1990-1999 (Forbearance) and 2000-2010 (Forbearance). Some of these periods of forbearance also had some indicators of non-forbearance.

In the next step, the ROK’s nuclear decisions (forbearance & non-forbearance) are empirically analyzed in terms of technological and non technological indicators. For example, from a technological perspective, nuclear forbearance (Y) is quantified by verifying both, the number of steps taken to initiate a peaceful nuclear program as also the steps taken to dismantle the existing nuclear infrastructure committed to a nuclear weapons program.1 From a non-

1This definition is based on the fact that the ROK initiated its nuclear program for peaceful purposes and subsequently having launched a nuclear weapons program decided to exercise a policy of forbearance. As 63

technological perspective, nuclear forbearance (Y) is quantified by examining the number of agreements and treaties signed that indicate a commitment to the NPR. Likewise, decisions pertaining to non-forbearance have also been quantified using technological and non- technological indicators.

Having done this, the chapter then compares the core arguments of prudential realism against the nuclear decisions of the ROK the way they occurred, based on the theory’s two key independent variables namely level of conflict (X1) and politico- security interdependence (X2).

First, the two independent variables are empirically analyzed corresponding to each period of

South Korea’s nuclear history. For example, the level of conflict is empirically analyzed in terms of the number of MIDs and depending on their scale (based on the co-relates of war) the

MIDs are assigned values ranging from high to low. Likewise, the second variable, politico- security interdependence is empirically analyzed via number of reciprocal decisions/actions initiated by the ROK and her allies and adversaries. Next, the chapter shows if the level of conflict, as the theory predicts, was a determining factor in the ROK’s nuclear decisions, both forbearance and non-forbearance by testing two sets of hypotheses.

H1a: States with high levels of conflict will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H1b: States with medium or low levels of conflict will exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

However, the theory does have a caveat in that “if a technologically capable state in a high conflict zone forswears nuclear arms, it does so largely as a result of a countervailing deterrent capability, provided either by an ally or the state’s own capability such as chemical weapons or conventional superiority that can somewhat neutralize the nuclear capability of the

explained in the earlier section, both these situations correspond to forbearance. This same logic has been extended to all other similar cases in the dissertation. 64

adversary.2 Therefore, if a state with high levels of conflict does exercise a policy of forbearance and if it is found to be as a result of countervailing capabilities then such deviant behavior is accounted for and explained in a separate paragraph.

With respect to the first hypothesis, the tests indicate that the ROK exercised a policy of forbearance during the only period that it experienced high levels of conflict. H1a is therefore not supported. However, the ROK’s deviant behavior during this period can be explained by the theory’s alternate explanation with respect to countervailing capabilities. The second hypothesis

H1b is supported in three of the four periods that the ROK had medium levels of conflict. The tests indicate that in one period of medium conflict, the ROK did not exercise a policy of forbearance as it should have. H1b is therefore mostly supported. However, the ROK’s deviant behavior during this period can be explained with respect to the theory’s second variable, namely politico-security interdependence.

Next, the chapter also shows if politico-security interdependence, as the theory predicts, was a determining factor in the ROK’s nuclear decisions, by testing two additional sets of hypotheses.

H2a: States possessing, in the aggregate, low levels of politico-security interdependence with allies and adversaries will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H2b: States possessing, in the aggregate, high levels of politico-security interdependence with allies and adversaries are most likely to exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

The tests indicate that the ROK always exercised a policy of nuclear forbearance when it experienced overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence with its allies and adversaries. H2b is therefore fully supported. The ROK also always exercised a policy of non-

2Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.22.

forbearance when it experienced overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence with its allies and adversaries. H2a is also therefore fully supported.

Finally, in concluding the chapter, I summarize all of the above results.

3.1 Introduction In 1948, following the division of the Korean peninsula, the Republic of Korea was born south of the 38th parallel and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to the north of it. Continuous cross-border skirmishes and raids at the 38th parallel and the failed

Korean elections in 1948, escalated to warfare and eventually culminated in an all out war when

North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. The most important consequence of the war was the hardening of ideological and political attitudes between the two sides that ultimately resulted in “shattering the thirteen hundred year old unity of the Korean people.”3 Ever since the subsequent division of the Korean peninsula in 1953, South Korea has been engaged in “an intense protracted conflict/enduring rivalry,” with the North that continues to this day.4

3.2 South Korea’s Nuclear Decisions: The First Phase: (1960-1969) – Forbearance In the aftermath of the Korean War and subsequent belligerence of the North, Seoul never initiated its nuclear program until the 1960’s. There were several reasons for this. First, the signing of the ROK-U.S. mutual defense treaty of 1953 implied a credible security guarantee for

Seoul against future threats.5 Second, in the struggle against communism, the Eisenhower

3Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas:A Contemporary History(New York.:Basic books, 2001),p.10.

4Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.120.

5Paul argues that credibility of the allies’ commitment is critical in dissuading a state in a high conflict zone from going nuclear. Factors that determine alliance credibility include troop presence, conventional and nuclear weapons, deployed on the ally’s territory, and a security treaty that stipulates the entry of the great power on the side of the smaller ally in the event of war. Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.23. On security assurances see Jeffrey Knopf, “Security Assurances and Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Paper prepared for the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Washington, DC, Sept. 2-5, 2010. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1643191. Knopf has sought to 66

administration reiterated its commitment to the region and South Korea in particular by deploying tactical nuclear weapons under the “New Look” policy. For example, in 1959, the

United States stationed Matador missiles in South Korea which with its range could target all of

North Korea, key areas of China and the Soviet Far East. Likewise, the introduction of the Mace missiles in 1961 further strengthened the U.S. tactical nuclear force in South Korea.6 Therefore, in the 1950’s & 1960’s, a robust U.S. presence in the Korean peninsula along with credible security commitments was the primary cause of peace and stability in the peninsula.7 These commitments were important because during this period, South Korea did not possess the required technological and economic resources to pursue a nuclear weapons program.

Therefore, when South Korea did initiate its nuclear program, during this period, it was primarily in order to redress its energy needs as also as a source of status and prestige. (See

Table 3.0)

clarify the different forms of security assurance and to present preliminary hypotheses on the factors that affect how successful assurance strategies will be in promoting nonproliferation.

6Kang Choi and Joon-Sung Park, “South Korea, Fear of Abandonment and Entrapment,” in Muthiah Alagappa ed., The Long Shadow:Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press, 2008),p.375.

7Victor Cha and David Kang, Nuclear North Korea:A Debate on Engagement Strategies(New York.: Columbia University Press, 2003),p.70. 67

Table 3.0. An Empirical Analysis8 of Forbearance (1960-1969) Year Forbearance ( Measures) Forbearance ( Measures) Technical Indicators Non-Technical indicators 1) South Korea completes construction of a nuclear ______reactor building for the 100kw TRIGA (Training, 1960 Research, Isotope, General Atomics) Mark II research reactor. 2) The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) is ______1961 founded. 3) South Korea asks the IAEA to discuss and provide ______1967 advice on site construction and on the financing of a nuclear power plant. 4) South Korea establishes the Atomic Energy ______1968 Development Promoting Committee. 5) The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) 1) South Korea signs the submits tenders to General Electric, Westinghouse Nuclear Non-Proliferation 1968 Electric International, Combustion Engineering, and Treaty. the British Nuclear Export Executive for the construction of a nuclear reactor. 6) The South Korean government signs a turnkey contract ______1969 with Westinghouse for the construction of a nuclear reactor. 7) South Korea holds the ceremony of laying the ______cornerstone for a 2000kw TRIGA (Training, Research, 1969 Isotope, and General Atomics) Mark III research reactor. 8) South Korea obtains a $98,600,000 loan from the ______1969 Export-Import Bank of United States for the construction of nuclear power plants. Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative: South Korea- Nuclear Chronology. Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/chronology_1950_1979.html.

As a precursor to starting its nuclear program, the ROK joined the IAEA in 1957 and subsequently created an Office of Atomic Energy (OAE) in 1959. Beginning in the 1960’s, the

ROK initiated a number of steps to benefit from nuclear power, concerned as it was with power generation. For example, in 1960, the ROK completed construction of a nuclear reactor building for the 100kw TRIGA (Training, Research, Isotope, General Atomics) Mark II research reactor and by 1961 had also established The Korea Electric Power Corporation.9 (KEPCO) These were

8The term ‘Empirical Analysis’ relates to measurement, i.e. measuring the number of steps taken by a state in exercising a policy of forbearance and vice-versa).This term has been used, wherever applicable, across all the cases in this dissertation.

small but significant steps that indicated the ROK’s desire for a peaceful nuclear program that could meet its energy needs.

3.21 The Second Phase: (1970 – 1979) - Non–Forbearance. South Korea pursues the nuclear weapons option It was in the early 1970’s that changes in the regional security environment influenced

South Korea's decision to adopt a policy of non-forbearance. First, from across the border, the

DPRK’s provocations began to increase in both intensity and frequency. Second, Nixon’s ‘Guam doctrine’ in 1969 was the first sign that the United States was moving in a new strategic direction as far as its allies was concerned. Despite willing to commit to its treaty commitments, the Guam doctrine made it abundantly clear that henceforth the United States would play only a secondary role in protecting her allies. It was essentially meant to reduce the political, economic and military burdens of the United States in Asia. Accordingly, in July 1970, Secretary of State

William Rogers announced the withdrawal of 20,000 troops from South Korea and in August of the same year, Vice President Spiro Agnew indicated that the United States would remove all of its forces completely over the next five years. The unilateral nature of U.S. decisions upset

President Park. However, despite his opposition, the withdrawal of the 7th Infantry division was completed in March 1971 and the 2nd Infantry division remained only as a “strategic reserve.”10

For the first time, since the end of the Korean War, the ROK forces found themselves deployed with less U.S. support at the Demilitarized Zone. (DMZ) Other U.S. policies such as Nixon's goals of détente with the Soviet Union, and his 1972 surprise visit to Communist China further

9Jonathan Pollack and Mitchell Reiss,“South Korea:The Tyranny of Geography and the Vexations of History,” in Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn and Mitchell Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004),p.258.

10Choi and Park, “South Korea, Fear of Abandonment and Entrapment,”p.376.

heightened South Korea’s fears of abandonment by the United States. With the United States security umbrella, South Korea never had any incentive to develop nuclear weapons. However, with the United States wavering in its security commitments and the North Koreans building up their military force, the 1970’s was a period of great uncertainty for South Korea. The changed international security environment and the fundamental shift in U.S. policy towards South Korea in the 1970’s were critical factors that led to South Korea seeking a secret nuclear weapons option under the direction of the Blue House.11

President Park decided to seek nuclear weapons for a number of reasons including military independence from the U.S., strategic superiority over the DPRK and for domestic purposes.12 The ROK pursued its nuclear weapons program in two phases. In the first phase, in

August 1970, The Agency for Defense Development (ADD) and the Weapons Exploitation

Committee, (WEC) “a covert, adhoc committee,” were established with the primary responsibility for research and development of advanced weapons systems, including nuclear weapons.13 By 1973, the ADD had completed a long term plan for nuclear weapons development at a cost estimated to be in the range of U.S. $ 1.5 billion and $ 2 billion.14 President Park also set up two ad hoc working groups to study South Koreas security options and in 1972, he received a report entitled “Atomic Fuel Development Plan” that recommended that South Korea fully pursue the nuclear option. The president is said to have subsequently decided to pursue a

11Pollack and Reiss, “South Korea,”p.262.

12Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and Disengagement(N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002),p.247.

13Peter Hayes, “The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue” in Andrew Mack, ed., Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula (Australia.: Allen and Unwin, 1993), p.52. See also House Committee on International Relations, Investigations of Korean American Relations, report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, 95 Cong., 2 sess.(GPO,1978),p.79.

14Pollack and Reiss,“South Korea,”p.262. 70

plutonium bomb, and in pursuit of this measure sought to acquire a reprocessing facility from

France and a research reactor and heavy water reactor from Canada to produce bomb-grade plutonium.15 When the U.S. discovered the secret weapons research program in 1974-1975, it threatened to withdraw all U.S. troops from the region unless the program was shut down.16 The

Ford administration also hinted at economic sanctions that had the potential to cripple the South

Korean economy.

The second phase of the ROK’s nuclear program related to certain decisions made by the

Carter administration. When President Carter announced his new administration’s plan to withdraw ground troops in 1976, the South Koreans were “incredulous” and reacted sharply over fears of abandonment.17 There were once again “strong hints” to build nuclear weapons if

Carter’s plans were carried out.18 Seoul renewed its efforts to pursue a nuclear weapons program focusing this time more on acquisition of nuclear material and development of indigenous material. (See Table 3.1)

15Daniel A. Pinkston, “South Korea’s Nuclear Experiments,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies Web Site. Available http://cns.miis.edu/stories/041109.htm. Internet accessed March, 2010.

16Hayes, “The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue,”p.52.

17For fears of abandonment see Victor Cha: “Abandonment, Entrapment and Neoclassical Realism in Asia, The United States, Japan and Korea.”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.44, No. 2(Jun., 2000),pp.261-291.

18Robert Harkavy, “Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation” in George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973),pp.148-149. 71

Table 3.1. An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1970-1979) (Non-Forbearance- Measures) (Non Forbearance –Measures) Year Technical Indicators Non-Technical Indicators 1) The Agency for Defense Development along with the ______Weapons Exploitation Committee was established. 1970 ADD had the primary responsibility for research and development of advanced weapons systems. 2) Efforts made to acquire French spent fuel reprocessing ______Early facilities, and with Canada for a heavy-water (CANDU) 1970’s reactor. 3) The Daeduk Engineering Center at the Korea advanced Energy Research Institute is established. This is the 1. Having ratified the NPT in 1975, national center for nuclear fuel cycle and research and the ROK violated it by adopting development. a policy of non-forbearance 1975 during this period. 4) The Korea Advanced Energy Research Institute

(KAERI) concludes a treaty with the French nuclear

engineering company, SGN, to import nuclear fuel cycle-related technology. 2. Safeguards agreement between 5) South Korea makes plans for purchase of mixed oxide South Korea and the IAEA 1975 (MOX) fuel fabrication facility from Belgium. comes into force. (Also subsequently violated) 6) South Korea attempts to purchase Post Irradiation ______1976 Examination Facility (PIEF) from France. This is used as a mechanism for separation of Plutonium. 7) Korea Nuclear Fuel Development Institute sets up small ______Late 1970’s pilot plants for fuel pellet fabrication and testing. 8) The South Korean government announces its decision

to launch uranium exploration and processing projects in April 1979 joint venture with Gabon and Paraguay. 9) The South Korean government concludes an agreement May 1979 with Australia to supply uranium for South Korea’s nuclear power plants. Sources: Nuclear Threat Initiative: South Korea, Nuclear Profile – (1950-1979); Jungmin Kang and H.A. Feiveson, “South Korea’s shifting and controversial interest in spent fuel reprocessing,” The Non Proliferation Review (Spring 2001),p.71.

Under pressure from the U.S., President Park cancelled the French contract for a reprocessing plant but instead resorted to purchasing factories from France for Uranium concentration and conversion under the aegis of the Korean Nuclear Fuels Development

Corporation.19(KNFDC) Such technologies, once put into operation, would have provided South

Korea with the ability to produce fissile material.

19Harrison, Korean Endgame,p.248. 72

Besides the main agreements illustrated in Table 3.1, the ROK also had numerous other agreements with Spain, France, Australia, Canada and the U.S. for the transfer of nuclear material.20 The ROK’s desire to pursue nuclear weapons coupled with the lack of a sophisticated fuel cycle technology and the high costs associated with the fabrication and enrichment of uranium meant that much of this technology had to be imported.21

3.22 The Third Phase: (1980-1989) – Forbearance Despite a commitment towards a policy of forbearance during this period, the ROK also initiated some measures towards non-forbearance that resulted in relative or lesser forbearance. I begin with the ROK’s commitment to forbearance. By 1983, the security situation had decreased.

South Korea’s reforms policies that began in the 1960’s and launched the country on the path towards economic growth became more embedded in the 1980’s. There was greater support and consensus towards a growth model that favored exports and reduced state intervention. From a political perspective, the 1980’s was a period of transition in South Korea. In 1987, South Korea witnessed the first democratic election since 1971, which also marked the beginning of the Sixth

Republic. President Roh Tae Woo assumed power in 1988 and advocated policies that revolved around a domestic social agenda and a strong export performance. Roh’s foreign policy initiative known as “Nordpolitik” was meant to provide greater impetus for South Korea’s economic growth. The policy essentially entailed creating an “Economic Commonwealth” to promote greater trade with the North while at the same time normalizing relations with the Soviet Union

20William Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenge of the Emerging Suppliers (Lexington Books, 1990),p.312.

21Jong-dall Kim and John Byrne, “The Asian Atom: Hard Path Nuclearization in East Asia,” in John Byrne and Stephen Hoffman ed., Governing the Atom: The Politics of Risk, Energy and Environmental Policy (N.J:.Transaction Publishers, 1996),p.286. 73

and China.22 Roh firmly believed that normalization of relations with these two major powers would not only provide new economic opportunities for South Korea, particularly in China, but would also help moderate North Korean belligerence. He also declared that South Korea would not “store, possess, deploy or use nuclear weapons on its soil.”23 In 1987, South Korea also ratified the CWC. All these factors necessitated a strong commitment towards forbearance and the ROK acted accordingly.

However, despite an overwhelming preference for forbearance, there were reports that in

1982, South Korea converted Uranium Oxide (UO2) into Uranium Tetra fluoride (UF4) which was then used to produce about 154kg of uranium metal. These activities were not related to any increase in MIDs. On the contrary, the plutonium experiments of the early 1980’s were linked to

South Korea’s desire for the right to maintain a complete nuclear fuel cycle, although it was also acknowledged that the knowledge and experience gained through these experiments could also be applied to weapons development.24

3.23 The Fourth Phase (1990 -1999) - Forbearance In the early 1990’s, South Korea found itself confronted with two major problems. The first problem was in relation to North Korea’s nuclear activities and the second problem emanated from the U.S. decision to withdraw all land and sea based tactical nuclear weapons from foreign countries including South Korea. The plan also included all forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Korea.25 Although both these developments adversely affected South

22Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.94.

23Steven R Weisman, “South Korea to Keep Out All Atom Arms,” New York Times, November, 9, 1991.

24Pinkston, “South Korea’s Nuclear Experiments,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies Web Site. Available http://cns.miis.edu/stories/041109.htm. Internet accessed March 10, 2010.

25Choi and Park,“South Korea,”p.379. 74

Korea’s security, the ROK continued with a policy of forbearance and sought to seek a negotiated settlement to the North Korean nuclear problem. In December 1991, South Korea and

North Korea adopted the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non Aggression, and Exchanges and

Co-operation,” commonly known as the “Basic Agreement.” It included many confidence building measures such as “control of major movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the DMZ, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reduction in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities and verifications thereof.”26 By December 31 1991, there was also an agreement on a draft “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The declaration clearly spelled out that both North and South Korea must “eliminate the danger of nuclear war” and “create an environment and conditions favorable for peace and peaceful unification…and contribute to peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world.” It required both Koreas not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.”27 The 1990’s also witnessed a momentous shift in China’s foreign policy. On August

24, 1992, the ROK and China agreed to establish full diplomatic relations after more than four decades of Cold War rivalry.28

While external relations improved, internally also there were further moves towards denuclearization. In 1993, President Kim Young Sam, the first democratically elected civilian

26Ibid,p.379.

27Choi and Park,“South Korea,”p.379.

28Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006),p.52. 75

president, declared that South Korea would never develop nuclear weapons of its own.29 In 1997,

President Kim Dae-Jung took office in the midst of the economic turmoil in South Korea.

Emboldened by what he described as a “globalized economy,”30 he vigorously pushed for economic reform and restructuring as recommended by the International Monetary Fund, vowed to improve relations with the United States and Japan and also initiated a new dialogue with the

North. His policies had a dramatic effect on the economy. After the economy shrank by 5.8 percent in 1998, as a result of the Asian financial crisis, it grew by 10.2 percent in 1999.31 In a further commitment to a policy of forbearance, South Korea also signed the Additional Protocol on June 21, 1999, and it entered into force on February 19, 2004. This was a significant step which allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency to have wider access to any nuclear programme in the country. President Kim also articulated the ‘Sunshine Policy’ which resulted in greater political contact between North and South Korea eventually culminating in a summit meeting between the two nations in Pyongyang in 2000.

3.24 The Fifth Phase: (2000-2010) – Forbearance amidst Provocation Once again the emphasis in the fifth phase was forbearance. Despite a nuclear test by

North Korea in 2006, President Roh Moo Hyun’s government continued the ‘Sunshine’ policy, sought to establish Korea as a business hub in North East Asia and reaffirmed a policy of cooperation with the North including the setting up of the Kaesong and Kumgang Projects.32

29Sam Jameson, “No A-Arms for S. Korea, Leader Pledges,”Los Angeles Times, November 14, 1993.

30Bernard Kirshner, “Kim Dae Jung: Linking Liberal Democracy to Economic Growth in South Korea,”Los Angeles Times, January 11, 1998.

31“Kim Dae-Jung: Dedicated to reconciliation,”Available at http://archives.cnn.com/ 2001/WORLD/ asiapcf/east/06/12/bio.kim.daejung/ Internet accessed, April 22, 2010.

32Solingen, Nuclear Logics, p.99. See also, James Brooke, “South Korea Stakes Its Future on Keeping Peace With North,”New York Times, May 25, 2004. 76

President Lee Myung Bak discontinued the ‘sunshine’ policy since taking over office following

North Korea’s repeated failure to reciprocate to friendly gestures.

However, like in the 1980’s, once again the ROK’s policy of forbearance was tempered by activities related to a nuclear weapons program. For example, South Korea's Ministry of

Science and Technology (MOST), as part of its commitments under the additional protocol, disclosed to the IAEA in 2004 that South Korea had conducted uranium enrichment experiments during January and February 2000. These experiments were not only a technical violation of

Seoul's nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards commitments that have been in effect since

1975, but also aroused suspicions about South Korea’s nuclear plans.33 These activities were in no way directly related to any increase in MIDs and South Korean diplomats dismissed these experiments as being isolated and conducted by a few scientists without any official sanction.

They also reiterated the ROK’s commitment to a non-nuclear policy.

Table 3.2. An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1980-2010) Years Forbearance (Measures) Forbearance (Measures) 1980-2010* Technical Indicators Non-Technical indicators 1. President Roh Tae Woo declared that South

______Korea would not “manufacture, possess, store, November 1991 deploy, or use nuclear weapons.” 2. North Korea and South Korea adopt the ‘Basic 1991 ______Agreement’ on developing confidence building measures. ______3. The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization January 1992 of the Korean Peninsula is signed. 4. President Kim Young Sam declares that ROK

would never would never develop nuclear 1993 weapons on its own. 1999 ______5. ROK signs the Additional Protocol. ______6. South Korea ratifies the Comprehensive Test 1999 Ban Treaty.

33Pinkston, “South Korea,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies Website http://cns.miis.edu/stories/041109.htm. Internet accessed March 10, 2010.

2004 7. South Korea ratifies additional protocol.

(Indicators of non- forbearance during this period) Despite professing a policy of forbearance, some activities related to a nuclear weapons program were carried out by the ROK, during the period 1980-2010, resulting in relative or less forbearance during certain periods, (1979-1989) & 2000-2010. Technical Indicators Conducted Chemical uranium 1979 to 1981 enrichment Separated small quantities of None of these activities were related to any spiral 1982 in the Level of Conflict (LOC). From 1980-2000, plutonium the values of LOCs were medium even as the ROK Manufactured depleted 1983 to 1987 conducted some activities with respect to non- uranium munitions forbearance. Experimented with uranium 2000 enrichment

*Since the ROK continuously followed a policy of forbearance from 1980-2010, I have depicted the entire period in one table.

In the absence of any technological measures, Table 3.2 depicts only the non- technological measures undertaken by the ROK in exercising a policy of forbearance during this entire period. The table also depicts South Korea’s activities relating to non-forbearance during the period 1980-2010. The South Korean government had somewhat violated its international agreements by not declaring any of these activities to the IAEA in Vienna.34 With respect to its current nuclear posture, there is an overwhelming belief that the ROK is committed to a policy of forbearance and that it is fully cooperating with the IAEA in a transparent manner. Nuclear power is currently being harnessed to meet increasing energy demands. Currently, the ROK possesses a total of 20 reactors using a mixture of CANDU and pressurized water reactors

(PWR) technologies.35

34Jungmin Kang et al, “South Korea's nuclear surprise,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 61, No. 01 (January/February 2005),pp.40-49.

35Nuclear Threat Initiatives: “Nuclear Overview: South Korea,” Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/skorea/index.html. Internet accessed April 23, 2010. See also, 78

3.3 Prudential Realism and Nuclear Forbearance Having examined the ROK’s nuclear history, I now test the theoretical validity of prudential realism whose explanations for nuclear forbearance are based on two key variables namely, level of conflict and politico-security interdependence.

3.31 Level of Conflict With respect to the level of conflict, the main premise of H1a is that -- States with high levels of conflict will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. Likewise the main premise of

H1b is that -- States with medium or low levels of conflict will exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. So if I see that the ROK was not exercising a policy of forbearance when it had high levels of conflict then H1a is supported. Likewise, if I see the ROK exercising a policy of forbearance whenever it possessed medium to low levels of conflict, then H1b is supported. Did the ROK’s nuclear history conform to this pattern? I begin by briefly examining the ROK’s enduring rivalry with the DPRK.

Table 3.3. North and South Korea –Militarized Interstate Disputes36 Activity Year Scale37 1. Korean War 5 1950-53 2. South Korean plane hijacked to North Korea 4 1958 3. Shooting incident on Demilitarized Zone 4 1966 4. South Korean Frigate sunk. 4 1967 5. Shooting incidents alongside DMZ 4 1967

Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns, Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollbacks,”Nonproliferation Review,Vol. 13, No 3,(November 2006),p.542.

36The above table reflects only the major recorded incidents. On the contrary, by United States Forces Korea (USFK) estimates, there were 1,439 major provocations and DMZ violations since 1953 with 90 U.S. troops killed in action (KIA), over 390 ROK (KIA) and 889 North Korean (KIA).See USFK Headquarters, “Korea Story Brief, KSB,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, U.S. Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command, and the U.N. Command, CP Yongsan, South Korea, September 27, 2004.

37MIDs have been measured on a scale of 1 to 5,based on the correlates of war scale. This has been explained in Chapter 1.

6. North Korean gunboat sunk. 4 1967 7. South Korean fishing vessels captured by North; 4 1968 8. Northern Commando raid on South Korean Presidential palace 4 1968 unsuccessful. 9. North Korean spy vessel captured by South. 4 1968 10. North Korean guerilla raid on Eastern coast. 4 1968 11. Several North Korean ships suspected of infiltration sunk or captured; 4 1969 12. South Korean plane hijacked to North 4 1969 13. South Korea captures infiltration ship and captures agents setting 4 1970 explosives 14. North Korean assassination attempt on the South Korean President kills the 4 1973 wife of the President 15. Discovery of DMZ Northern infiltration tunnel announced 3 1974 16. North-South maritime clash in the West 4 1975 17. Shooting incident on DMZ; 4 1977 18. Southern aircraft hijacked to North 4 1977 19. Another infiltration tunnel discovery announced 3 1978 20. North Korean spy rings arrested 3 1979 21. North Korean spy rings arrested 3 1982 22. A number of South Korean politicians killed in Myanmar bombing attributed to North Korea and presumably focused on South Korean 1983 4 President. 23. North Korean spy rings arrested. 4 1983 24. South Korean airliner blown up; possibly linked to Olympic games, later 4 1987 attributed to North Korea. 25. Another infiltration tunnel discovery announced. 3 1990 26. North Korean espionage submarine runs aground on east coast of South 4 1996 Korea. 27. North Korean army incursion in DMZ. 4 1996 28. Military intrusion and exchange of fire across DMZ. 4 1997 29. North Korean submarine trapped in fishing nets of South Korean East 4 Coast. 1998 30. North Korean vessel sunk. 4 1998 31. Serious naval clashes by North and South Korean gunboats in Yellow Sea 4 linked initially to crabbing activities. 1999 32 North Korea threatens military retaliation if U.S. and South Korea enter 2

Yellow Sea area claimed by North Korea. 2000

33. Twelve North Korean incursions into South Korean Waters and exchange 4 of fire across DMZ. 2001 34. Continued naval intrusions and clashes. 4 2002 35. North Korea threatens to abandon 1953 Korean War armistice if U.S. 2 imposes trade sanctions. 2003 36. North Korean vessels, claiming to be in pursuit of illegal fishing craft, cross 4 the Northern Limit Line and are fired upon by the South. 2004 37. Several rounds of fire are exchanged near a South Korean post in 4 2006 Gangwon. 38 North Korea conducts first nuclear test. 5 2006 39. North Korea conducts second nuclear test. 5 2009 40. Naval vessels from the two Koreas exchanged fire in the area of the, 4 Northern Limit Line reportedly damaging a North Korean patrol ship. 2009 41. North and South Korea exchange artillery fire near their disputed sea 4 2010 border. 42. Sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean Warship near the disputed border 4 2010 43. North Korean troops began firing artillery towards Yeonpyeong island, 4 2010 close to the disputed Yellow Sea border Source: Michael Colaresi, Karen Rasler and William Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation: p.11.

Table 3.4. Ratio Analysis of Militarized Inter State Disputes 10 Year Figures Number of disputes Ratios between 2 decades (based on Table .3.6) 1950-1959 2

1960-1969 10 1:5

1970-1979 8

1980-1989 4 2:1

1990-1999 7

2000-2010 12 1:2 (approx.)

3.32 An Empirical Analysis of Level of Conflict Like Paul, I too operationalize the level of conflict in terms of the severity, intensity, duration and scope of conflicts, involving key states in the region, in terms of militarized interstate disputes. Level of conflict has been quantified in terms of MIDs on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is no military response, 2 is the threat of military force, 3 is the display of military force,

4 is the use of force and 5 is full scale war. (See Table 3.5. below) This scale has been adapted

from the Correlates of War.38

(Table – 3.5.) --- An Empirical analysis of the Level of Conflict 39 Level of Nuclear Conflict Nature of Dispute Period Scale Timeline (X1) Value 1. Shooting incident on Demilitarized Zone. (DMZ). (1966) 4 2. South Korean Frigate sunk. (1967) 4 3. Shooting incidents alongside DMZ. 4 (1967)

4. North Korean gunboat sunk. (1967) 4 5. South Korean fishing vessels captured by North. (1968) 4

6. Northern Commando raid on South Korean 4 1960-1969 (Medium) (1968) Presidential palace unsuccessful.

7. North Korean spy vessel captured by South. (1968) 4

8. North Korean guerilla raid on Eastern coast. 4 (1968)

9. Several North Korean ships suspected of 4 (1969) infiltration sunk or captured. 10. South Korean plane hijacked to North. (1969) 4 Since all the MIDs during this period relate to the uses of force (Scale 4), they have been assigned a medium value.

38Daniel Jones, Stuart Bremer and David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes,1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules and Empirical Patterns,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.15, No.2 (1996), pp.171-173. The Co-relates of War scale codifies MIDs from 1-5 where 1 is no military response, 2 is the threat of military force, 3 is the display of military force, 4 is the use of force and 5 is full scale war. I use the Gochman and Maoz classification of war “as sustained military hostilities between the regular armed forces of two or more states resulting in 1000 or more battle fatalities; a minimum of 100 battle fatalities or 1000 troops in active combat is required before a state is considered to be a participant in a war.” See Gochman and Maoz, “Militarized Interstate Disputes,”p.589.

Unlike Paul, I assign values to MIDs. The values of these MIDs (based on my estimates) fluctuate from low to high depending on the type of MIDs during each decade. For example, MIDs that involved a war between the two states, e.g. (Korean War) are assigned a high value. The nuclear tests by the DPRK are also assigned a high value as they had the potential to escalate the conflict level in the Korean Peninsula. Likewise, MIDs that involved use of force are assigned a medium value while those without the use of force are assigned a low value. These parameters of high medium and low are used across all my cases.

39From Table 3.5., it is evident that despite the protracted conflicts and enduring nature of their rivalry, not all the periods were associated with high conflict. For example, there were periods of medium conflict even as there were no changes in the issues (territorial and ideological) that generated these conflicts. It is also evident that nuclear decisions were not related to LOC. Non-Forbearance was exercised during a period of medium conflict (1970-1979) and Forbearance during a period of high conflict (2000-2010).

1. South Korea captures infiltration ship and captures (1970) 4 agents. 2. North Korean assassination attempt on the South (1973) 4 Korean President. 3. Discovery of DMZ Northern infiltration tunnel. (1974) 3

4. North-South maritime clash in the West. (1975) 4 1970-1979 (Medium)

5. Shooting incident on DMZ. (1977) 4

6. Southern aircraft hijacked to North. (1977) 4

7. Another infiltration tunnel discovery announced. (1978) 3

8. North Korean spy rings arrested. (1979) 3 Since majority of the MIDs during this period relate to the uses of force (Scale 4), they have been assigned a medium value.

1. North Korean spy rings arrested. (1982) 3 2. A number of S. Korean politicians killed in (1983) 4 1980-1989 (Medium) Myanmar bombing. 3. North Korean spy rings arrested (1987) 4

4. South Korean airliner blown up. (1987) 4

Since majority of the MIDs during this period relate to the uses of force (Scale 4), they have been assigned a medium value.

1. DMZ infiltration tunnel discovery announced. (1990) 3 2. North Korean army incursion in DMZ. (1996) 4

3. North Korean espionage submarine runs aground (1996) 4 on east coast of South Korea. 1990-1999 (Medium) 4. Military intrusion and exchange of fire across (1997) 4 DMZ.

5. North Korean submarine trapped in fishing nets of (1998) 4 South Korean East Coast.

6. North Korean vessel sunk. (1998) 4 7. Serious naval clashes by North and South Korean (1999) 4 gunboats in Yellow Sea. Since majority of the MIDs during this period relate to the uses of force (Scale 4), they have been assigned a medium value. 1. North Korea threatens military retaliation if U.S. (2000) and South Korea enter Yellow Sea area claimed by 2

North Korea. 2. Twelve North Korean incursions into South (2001) 4 Korean Waters. 2000-2010 (High) (2002) 3. Continued naval intrusions and clashes. 4

4. North Korea threatens to abandon 1953 Korean (2003) 2 War armistice. 5. North Korean vessels are fired upon by the South. (2004) 4

6. Several rounds of fire are exchanged near a South (2005) 4 Korean post. 7. North Korea conducts first nuclear test (2006) 5 (2009) 8. North Korea conducts second nuclear test 5

9. Naval vessels from the two Koreas exchanged fire (2009) 4 in the area of the, Northern Limit Line. 10. North and South Korea exchange artillery fire near ( 2010) 4 their disputed sea border. (2010) 11. Sinking of the Cheonan 4

12. Firing near Yeonpyeong Island. (2010) 4 The Level of Conflict during this period has been assigned a high value because of the DPRK’s two nuclear tests. These nuclear tests had the potential to escalate the crisis to unacceptable levels. Source: Michael Colaresi, Karen Rasler and William Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation:p.11.

3.33 How did the Level of Conflict influence the ROK’s Nuclear Decisions? From the perspective of prudential realism, South Korea would have the greatest

incentive to acquire nuclear weapons as a result of its enduring rivalry with a nuclear weapons

state like the DPRK.40 However, this did not happen. Barring one period in its nuclear history,

the ROK never tried to acquire nuclear weapons. I begin by testing H1a. The tests indicate that

South Korea exercised a policy of forbearance in the only period (2000-2010) that it experienced

high levels of conflict. H1a is therefore not supported. However, prudential realism does offer

an alternate explanation in that “a technologically capable state in a high conflict region that

forgoes nuclear weapons may have credible security guarantees provided by a great power or

possess a countervailing capability in conventional and chemical and biological weapons.”41

Since I examine security guarantees in the next section, I focus my attention here on

countervailing capabilities, namely conventional force capabilities and chemical weapons.

Following the Korean War, South Korea allocated very few resources to modernizing the

armed forces. For example, from 1953 to 1965, its annual average defense budget was less than

40Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.22.

41Ibid,p.5. 84

$150 million. As Solingen argues, “The conventional balance in the Korean Peninsula, in the mid 1970’s, when South Korea ratified the NPT, arguably favored the South only if one included

U.S. troops. North Korea enjoyed formidable conventional strength backed by Soviet and

Chinese forces.”42 The DPRK commenced crash arms buildup programmes during the period

1967-1971 which did not elicit an immediate response from the South.43 On the contrary, South

Korea’s armed forces modernization project (Yulgok Project) began only in the mid 1970’s as a result of an increase in KPA capabilities, and a decline in U.S. security commitments. However, the United States did play a leading role in augmenting the ROK’s force modernization plans.44

For example, in 1978, Congress approved a $1.2 billion military assistance program for South

Korea including an $800 million military equipment transfer program. There were also plans to sell 60 F-16 fighters to South Korea in the next few years.45 By the 1980’s, South Korea’s upgraded and modernized conventional forces were definitely considered technically superior to that of the North.46

Over the years, the ROK has substantially increased its military budget to ensure parity with the North. The Korean defense reform proposed significantly higher spending on new high- tech equipment, in order to compensate for lower military manpower. For example, South Korea

42Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.84.

43 Taik –young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas; State, Capital and Military Power (New York, Routledge, 1999),p.79.

44Chung-in Moon and Sangkeun Lee, “Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula,” Asian Perspective,Vol.33, No.4(2009),p.76.

45Han Sungjoo, “South Korea and the United States: The Alliance Survives,” Asian Survey Vol. 20, No. 11(Nov, 1980),p.1080.

46Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, “North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ballistic Missiles,” Report prepared for the Strategic Studies Institute, (April 2007),p.2. Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf.

increased its defense budget almost fifteen fold from 183.5 billion won in 1973, when it began the first phase of its armed forces modernization project, to 28980 billion won by 2009. (See

Table 3.6) In 2005, the ROK Ministry of Defense released the “Defense Reform 2020 Initiative” in which one of the key objectives was to create a leaner and more efficient military based on technological improvements. Some key goals included procuring advanced aircraft and transforming a coastal patrol force into a blue water navy.47 As a result, over the years, South

Korea has rapidly modernized its weapons systems. For example, Seoul purchased the Patriot missiles (PAC-2) from the U.S. and built the Aegis ships. It also produced the Hyunmu 1 and 2, cruise missiles that could hit targets anywhere in North Korea.48 In January 2011, ROK sources indicated that they were attempting to expedite the purchase of fifth generation stealth fighters by

2015.49 As part of the modernization program there were also reports that the ROK was seeking defense related deals with Israel to buy drones, missiles, radars etc. In January 2011, a 29 million dollar deal was signed with Israel’s Elbit systems to supply Airborne Electric Warfare Suites and

Missile Warning systems for the ROKAF CN-235 transport aircraft.50

47Bruce Bennett, “A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s Defense Reform Plan,” RAND 2006. Available at http://www.rand.org.pubs/occassional_papers/2006/RAND_OP165.pdf.

48J J Suh, “Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race,” report prepared for Foreign Policy in Focus dated May 17, 2010.

49 “South Korea to Speed Up Combat Fighter Purchase,” Reuters, January 29, 2011. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/30/idINIndia-54508620110130.

50 “Elbit Systems to Supply the Republic of Korea Airborne EW Suites and MWS Valued at Approximately $29 Million,” Elbit Systems, January 11, 2011. Available at http://ir.elbitsystems.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61849&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1514783&highlight= See also, Amos Harel, “South Korea eyes upgrading Israel defense deals in light of tensions with North,” Haaretz, January 12, 2011. Available at http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/south-korea-eyes- upgrading-israel-defense-deals-in-light-of-tensions-with-north-1.336491.

On the contrary, the DPRK’s economic crises over the years have impeded its ability to upgrade and modernize its combat forces. Therefore, by the 21st century, many experts believed that the ROK clearly possessed a qualitative conventional edge over the DPRK.

Table 3.6. Comparison of North and South Korea Defense Spending51 ROK Defense DPRK Official DPRK Total DPRK defense % of Year Budget Defense Budget Budget (bn. budget as percent GDP (bn. Won) (bn. Won) Won) of Total Budget 1960 14.7 7.40 0.374 1.968 (19.0) 1961 16.6 6.00 (0.613) 2.338 (19.8) 1962 20.5 5.91 (0.613) 2.729 (19.8) 1963 20.5 4.22 (0.613) 3.028 (19.8) 1964 24.9 3.52 (0.613) 3.418 (19.8) 1965 29.9 3.73 (0.613) 3.476 (19.8) 1966 40.5 4.00 (0.613) 3.571 (19.8) 1967 49.6 3.98 1.201 3.948 30.4 1968 64.7 4.08 1.565 4.813 32.4 1969 84.4 4.14 1.560 5.049 31.0 1970 102.4 3.69 1.753 6.003 29.2 1971 134.7 3.94 1.960 6.302 31.1** 1972 173.9 4.13 1.256 7.389 17.0 1973 183.5* 3.37 1.280 8.314 15.4 1974 296.8 3.63 1.557 9.672 16.1 1975 442.4 4.25 1.864 11.368 16.4 1976 703.8 4.91 2.058 12.326 16.7 1977 949.6 5.18 2.096 13.349 15.7 1978 1289.4 4.98 2.344 14.744 15.9 1979 1526.3 4.80 2.563 16.973 15.1 1980 2257.7 5.81 2.750 18.837 14.6 1981 2697.9 5.54 3.009 20.333 14.8 1982 3120.7 5.60 3.242 22.204 14.6 1983 3274.1 4.99 3.531 24.019 14.7 1984 3306.1 4.40 3.819 26.158 14.6 1985 3689.2 4.39 3.935 27.329 14.4 1986 4158.0 4.24 4.045 28.896 14.0

51Government spending on defense in the two Korea’s differs on account of economic systems, fiscal tools and pricing mechanisms. The official DPRK defense budget since 1972 has been suspected to exclude ‘hidden spending’. Transparency has also been a problem because official defense budgets only include figures for wages, operation and management expenses, maintenance, and acquisition of weapons and equipment. But investments in the secondary economy (defense industrial sector), research and development (R&D) investment in dual use technology, and other social welfare services provided through the defense sector are not fully reflected in the official figures. For an explanation of the pattern of government spending in the DPRK, see Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas, pp.38-117. See also, Chung- In Moon and Sangkeun Lee, “Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula,” Asian Perspective, Vol.33, No.4 (2009),p.82. 87

1987 4745.7 4.12 3.971 30.085 13.2 1988 5520.2 4.03 3.863 31.661 12.2 1989 6014.8 3.89 4.006 33.383 12.0 1990 6637.8 3.56 4.262 35.514 12.0 1991 7452.4 3.31 4.466 36.909 12.1 1992 8,410.0 3.27 4.481 39.303 11.4 1993 9,215.4 3.17 4.628 40.243 11.5 1994 10,075.3 2.96 4.724 41.442 11.4 1995 11,074.4 2.78 -- 24.220 -- 1996 12,243.4 2.73 3.0 20.600 14.6 1997 13,786.5 2.81 -- (19.712) -- 1998 13,800.0 2.85 2.922 20.015 14.6 1999 13,749.0 2.60 2.923 20.018 14.6 2000 14,477.4 2.50 2.997 20.956 14.3 2001 15,388.4 2.47 3.222 21.679 14.4 2002 16,364.0 2.39 3.297 22.129 14.9 2003 17,514.8 2.42 50.781*** 323.449 15.7 2004 18,941.2 2.43 54.414 348.807 15.6 2005 21,102.6 2.60 64.506 405.700 15.9 2006 22,512.9 2.66 67.085 419.282 16.0 2007 24,497.2 2.72 68.541 433.235 15.8 2008 26,649.0 2.76 71.330 451.500 15.8 2009 28,980.3 -- 76.250 482.600 15.8 Source: Chung-In Moon and Sangkeun Lee, “Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula,” Asian Perspective, Vol.33, No.4 (2009),p.84.

The Korean Institute of Defense Analysis (KIDA) announced that by 2009, North Korea's defense budget reached 76.25 billion won or nearly USD 9 billion based on purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.52 For the same period, the ROK’s defense budget was 28,980 billion won or 26.66 billion U.S. dollars.

* As a result of the force modernization project, the size of the ROK’s defense budget rose 51.2 percent, from 183.5 billion Won in 1973 to 296.8 billion Won in 1974. This spike was also as a result of North Korea’s military provocations and declining commitments by the United States.

** North Korea’s defense spending peaked in 1971. This was a result of the worsening relationship with China and the Soviet Union which drove the North Korean leadership to adopt a more self-reliant defense posture. The defense buildup during this period could have also been closely associated with its offensive military posture toward the South.

***A sudden rise in the actual amount of defense spending from 3.3 billion North Korean won (NKW) in 2002 to NKW 50.7 billion in 2003 was not a result of an actual budget increase, but a change in accounting units that reflected a new monetary and foreign exchange rate policy in July 2002.

52Jon Grevatt, Analysts reveal real “North Korea 2009 defense budget,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 19, 2011. See also, Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the forces of key neighboring states,” Report Prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Revised May 6, 2011. 88

With respect to chemical weapons, (CW) there was no evidence that the ROK possessed non- nuclear deterrent capabilities in the form of chemical or biological weapons when it exercised a policy of forbearance during 2000-2010. For example, South Korea ratified the Biological and

Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in June 1987. It eventually ratified the CWC in April 1997 declaring, in the process, possession of several thousand tons of chemical warfare agents and one chemical weapons production facility. By 2008, Seoul had taken steps to completely eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile even as it continued a policy of forbearance.53 In conclusion, the

ROK’s decision to adopt a policy of forbearance, even when it had high levels of conflict from

2000-2010, was clearly a result of its qualitatively superior conventional force capabilities. The

ROK’s actions thus corroborate the theory’s alternate explanations for forbearance occurring under high levels of conflict.

I now shift my attention to H1b. The tests indicate that the ROK exercised a policy of forbearance in only three of the four periods that it experienced medium levels of conflict. H1b is therefore mostly supported. However, in this instance also, the ROK’s deviant behavior during one period (1970-1979) can be explained with respect to the theory’s alternate explanation of declining security guarantees and conventional capabilities. Since security guarantees have been dealt with in the next section, my focus here is on declining conventional capabilities. Prudential realism claims that “states engaged in protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries, especially those inferior in conventional capability vis-à-vis their opponents, might see nuclear arms useful for deterrence purposes.”54 The conventional balance on the Korean peninsula in the mid-1970’s, when South Korea ratified the NPT, arguably favored the South

53Chris Schneidmiller, “South Korea Completes Chemical Weapons Disposal,” Available at http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/ts_20081017_3838.php. Internet accessed January 20, 2011.

54Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.24. 89

only if one included U.S. troops. North Korea enjoyed formidable conventional strength, backed by Soviet and Chinese forces.55 Therefore, the ROK’s nuclear decisions in the 1970’s were driven, amongst other things, by an asymmetry in its conventional capabilities vis-à-vis the

DPRK and clearly vindicates the theory’s claims in this regard.

3.4 Politico-Security Interdependence (X2) and Nuclear Decisions With respect to politico-security interdependence, the main premise of H2a is that --

States possessing, in the aggregate, low levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. Likewise, the main premise of H2b is that -- States possessing, in the aggregate, high levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries are most likely to exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. So if I see that the ROK was not exercising a policy of forbearance on account of overall, low politico-security interdependence then H2a is supported. Likewise, if I see the ROK exercising a policy of forbearance on account of overall, high politico- security interdependence then H2b is supported.

Did the ROK’s nuclear history conform to this pattern? In this section, I examine the ROK’s politico-security interdependence with its allies and adversaries and how the level of interdependence influenced its nuclear decisions. The time period begins in the 1960’s when the

ROK first initiated its nuclear program and corresponds thereafter to each phase of its nuclear program.

3.41 The First Phase: (1960-1969) – High Politico-Security Interdependence In the 1960’s, South Korea experienced a heightened sense of insecurity following North

Korea’s military buildup, armed provocations and acts of terrorism and the drawdown in US forces as a result of the Vietnam War. However, despite all these provocations, South Korea did not contemplate a nuclear weapons program on its own as a result of high politico-security

55Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.84. 90

interdependence with its key ally, the United States. As early as 1957, the Eisenhower administration had announced that U.S. forces in Korea would be provided with nuclear weapons under the “New Look Policy.”56 Since then the ROK received about US $34 billion in aid under the Military Assistance Program, International Military Education and Training Military

Assistance Service Fund, and Foreign Military Sales.57 An independent nuclear weapons program had the potential to generate costly reciprocal effects and seriously risk any further aid from the United States.

As Pollack argues:

“During the period between a political decision to undertake a nuclear weapons program and actually obtaining a nuclear arsenal, the ROK would encounter acute political and security vulnerabilities. A decision could provoke a U.S. withdrawal of political and military support, and South Korea would likely confront the vocal opposition of various nearby powers, including both China and Japan. Seoul would be without its staunchest ally, one armed with unmatched conventional and nuclear forces, and at the same time, the ROK might still be confronted with a hostile and aggressive DPRK.”58

The ROK’s aggregate PSI was high during this period.

3.42 The Second Phase: (1970-1979)—Less Politico-Security Interdependence South Korea’s plans to develop an active nuclear program can be traced to the 1970’s when increasing military incursions by North Korea coupled with the weakening security commitments by the United States meant that the ROK had to rely even more on its own defense capabilities. President Park was convinced that with the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the ROK could not rely on conventional means to counter the threat from across the border. Politico- security interdependence was low with both allies and adversaries as the ROK not only faced an

56William T. Tow, “Reassessing Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 3, No.2,(Summer 1991),pp.179-218.

57Ham Taek-young, The Political Economics of National Security: South-North Korea’s Economic, Military and National Power (Seoul:Pubmun Press,1998),pp.156-158.

58Pollack and Reiss, “South Korea,”p.260. 91

extremely high threat from North Korea but also had no assurance on U.S. security guarantees.

The ROK’s aggregate PSI was low during this period.

3.43 The Third Phase: (1980-1989)—High Politico-Security Interdependence In the 1980’s, South Koreas economic growth became more pronounced but even during this period, South Korea was heavily dependent on the United States and Japan. In 1987, Japan invested US$494 million, or 47 percent of the total foreign investment of US$1.1 billion.

Cumulative United States investment was about US$1.4 billion by 1988.59 Also, U.S. commitments to South Korea’s security did not waver during this period. PSI with allies was high as South Korea was dependent on U.S. and Japanese assistance and was acutely aware of the reciprocal effects of a nuclear policy. PSI with the DPRK was also high during this period.

The ROK’s aggregate PSI was high during this period.

3.44 The Fourth Phase: (1990-1999) – High Politico-Security Interdependence In the 1990’s, South Korea faced a strategically favorable environment in terms of greater economic growth and a reduction in threat from North Korea following the adoption of the Basic

Agreement in 1991 and the signing of the joint declaration for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in 1992. Despite the U.S. announcement to withdraw all land and sea based tactical nuclear weapons in 1991, U.S. security commitments to South Korea were still forthcoming though not as robust as in the past. PSI with the DPRK was also high during this period. The

ROK’s aggregate PSI was high during this period.

3.45 The Fifth Phase: (2000-2010) – High Politico-Security Interdependence Pyongyang’s nuclear test in 2006 radically altered the security environment forcing many to wonder if the ROK would follow suit. However, this did not happen largely on account of

U.S. assurances and renewed security commitments. At the thirty-eighth ROK-U.S. annual

59Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, eds. South Korea: A Country Study. (Washington: Library of Congress, 1990). 92

consultative meeting, the term extended deterrence was included in the joint communiqué at the insistence of the ROK.60 In 2009 after the DPRK conducted its second nuclear test, U.S.

President Barack Obama reaffirmed that the United States would provide an “extended nuclear umbrella” to South Korea in response to increasing nuclear threats from North Korea. Military experts opine that under the extended nuclear deterrence pledge the U.S. military would mobilize all necessary capabilities to neutralize North Korean nuclear provocations.61 PSI with the DPRK was high during this period as the ROK did not want to create negative security externalities by pursuing its own weapons program. The ROK’s aggregate PSI was high during this period.

Table – 3.7. An Empirical Analysis of Politico- Security Interdependence Nuclear PSI62 Reciprocal Decision(s) by Allies PSI with Reciprocal Decision(s) by Adversary Timeline with (U.S./Japan) -- (Measures) adversary (DPRK)-Measures allies DPRK signs treaty on Friendship, 1. U.S. provides ROK with (High) Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with 1960-1969 tactical nuclear weapons (High) the Soviet Union and China. South besides commitment to Korean decisions always linked to defense treaty. reciprocal decisions by the North. In response to ROK’s nuclear program: DPRK begins peaceful nuclear program. 1970-1979 1. U.S. threatens to end civilian (Low)* (Lower) nuclear energy co-operation. 2. Also threatens to end bilateral relationship. 3. U.S. threatens financial aid. (Exim Bank Loan)

60 Muthiah Alagappa, “Nuclear Weapons and National Stability: Far Reaching Influence and Deterrence Domination,” in Muthiah Alagappa ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press,2008),p.504.

61Jung Sung-ki, “US Nuclear Umbrella: Double-Edged Sword for S. Korea,”The Korea Times, June 24,2009.

62The values of Politico-security interdependence during these periods can range from high to low depending on the effects of the reciprocal decisions of South Korea’s allies and adversaries. A high value indicates that South Korea was acutely aware of reciprocal decisions by its allies and adversaries and could not risk a nuclear weapons program. A low value indicates otherwise.

1. U.S. renews security pledge. 2. U.S. pledges economic aid. DPRK begins its pursuit of nuclear Cumulative United States (High) weapons program. South Korean (High) 1980-1989 investment aggregates decisions always linked to reciprocal

US$1.4 billion by 1988.63 decisions by the North.

3. Japan pledges Economic aid. By 1987- Japan had invested US$494 million.64 DPRK approves Hyundai’s investment 1990-1999 1. U.S. pledges economic and (High) zone at Kaesong. South Korean decisions (High) security aid. always linked to reciprocal decisions by the North. In response to DPRK’s nuclear 1. 2006- DPRK conducts tests; its first nuclear test. 1. 2006 - U.S. comitted to (High) 2000-2010 extended deterrence for 2. 2009- DPRK conducts second (High) ROK. nuclear test. 2. 2009 - President Obama reaffirms “extended nuclear umbrella. Data Source: Jonathan Pollack and Mitchell Reiss, “South Korea: The Tyranny of Geography and the Vexations of History,” in Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn and Mitchell Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004)

*PSI with DPRK was low in one period because during this period the ROK was not concerned about the reciprocal actions of the DPRK and embarked on its own nuclear weapons program.

Table – 3.8. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence Years Allies Adversaries Sum of interdep. allies Overall PSI & adversaries 1960- 1969 High with DPRK* High with U.S. & Japan High/High High 1970-1979 Relatively Low with allies Low with DPRK Low/Low Low

1980-1989 High with DPRK High/High High High with U.S. & Japan 1990-1999 High with DPRK High/High High High with U.S. & Japan 2000-2010 High with DPRK High/High High High with U.S. & Japan Aggregate assessment- ROK’s interdependence overall was High with allies and Adversaries

*Barring one period, PSI with DPRK was always high as the ROK was aware of the sensitivity of its relationship with the DPRK in nuclear matters and prudently chose to avoid a negative outcome. South Korea’s decisions were always linked to reciprocal decisions by the North.

3.46 Prudential realism’s main contention with respect to politico-security interdependence is that enduring rival states possess low politico-security interdependence and will therefore not

63Savada and Shaw, eds. South Korea: A Country Study. (Washington: Library of Congress, 1990).

64Ibid. 94

exercise a policy of forbearance. On the contrary, high politico-security interdependence will always result in a policy of forbearance. Having examined how the ROK’s politico-security interdependence, with both its allies and adversaries, influenced its nuclear decisions, I now test whether these decisions were in conformity with the claims of prudential realism in this regard. I begin by testing H2b.

It is true that following the end of the Korean War, South Korea did possess a credible security commitment from the U.S. This credible alliance was therefore sufficient enough to prevent Seoul from seeking an independent nuclear deterrent throughout much of its history. The

ROK continues to adopt a policy of forbearance today solely on account of credible security commitments. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has reaffirmed U.S. defense commitment to

South Korea and the USFK does currently maintain a force level of 28,500 personnel in the

Korean peninsula.65 Despite some nuclear experiments in the 1980’s and early in the 21st century, aggregate politico- security interdependence of the ROK, with its allies and adversaries, was high during four of the five periods of its nuclear history resulting in a policy of forbearance during each of these periods. PSI was high because the ROK was aware of the consequences of arming and wanted to avoid creating an intense negative security externality for other actors, both allies and adversaries that would be affected.66 For example, President Park had conveyed to the Canadians that it was not in the interests of South Korea to develop nuclear weapons

65Sara Sorcher, “Gates Reaffirms Defense Commitment to South Korea,” As cited in Nuclear Threat Initiative, October12, 2010. Available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1010/101210cdam1.htm. Internet accessed November 17, 2010.

66Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.15. 95

because both China and the Soviet Union were nuclear powers.67 This analysis therefore fully supports H2b.

However, it is also true that when the credibility of U.S. security guarantees declined, as it did during the 1970’s, South Korea began to actively pursue a nuclear weapons program.

Therefore, during the only period that the ROK had overall, low politico-security interdependence with its allies and adversaries, it exercised a policy of non-forbearance. H2a is also, therefore, fully supported.

3.5 Conclusion Based on my analysis in the preceding pages, I conclude that with respect to the level of conflict, prudential realism does not explain South Korea’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. The ROK had five phases in its nuclear history. (1950-1959, 1960-1969, 1970-1979,

1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2010) The evidence indicates that the ROK exercised a policy of forbearance during the only period it had high levels of conflict. (2000-2010) H1a, is therefore not supported. However, the ROK’s deviant behavior during this period is explained by the theory’s alternate explanation with respect to countervailing capabilities. The second hypothesis H1b is supported in only three of the four periods that the ROK experienced medium levels of conflict. The evidence indicates that in one period of medium conflict (1970-1979), the

ROK did not exercise a policy of forbearance as it should have. H1b overall, is therefore mostly supported. The ROK’s deviant behavior during this period (1970-1979) can be explained with respect to the theory’s second variable, namely politico-security interdependence.

With respect to the second variable, politico-security interdependence, the theory does succeed in fully explaining South Korea’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. The evidence indicates that South Korea always exercised a policy of forbearance whenever she experienced

67Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.84. 96

overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. (1960-

1969, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 & 2000-2010) H2b is thus fully supported. Likewise, South Korea did not exercise a policy of forbearance in the only period that she experienced overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries.(1970-1979) H2a is also, therefore, fully supported. With respect to PSI, both the hypotheses are therefore supported.

(See Table 3.9)

Table 3.9. – Summary of Results

Nuclear Nuclear H1a H1b H2a H2b Timeline Decision

1960-1969     Forbearance

1970-1979  X   Non- Forbearance

Forbearance

1980-1989     (with some indicators of non- forbearance)

1990-1999     Forbearance

Forbearance

2000-2010 X    (with some indicators of non- forbearance) Net H1a H1b H2a H2b Assessment   X

X - Not supported Symbols  - Not Applicable  - Fully Supported - Mostly Supported

Table 3.10. South Korea’s Nuclear Timeline & Corresponding Decisions Nuclear Level of Conflict PSI—(Allies & Adversaries) Nuclear Decision Timeline (Medium) Overall (High) 1) Robust alliance between the ROK and the U.S. Forbearance All the MIDs related 1960-1969 to a use of force 2) Presence of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.

3) U.S. $3 billion in economic aid to ROK until 1968. Overall (Low) Non (Medium) 1) ROK less concerned at some Forbearance Majority of the MIDs 1970-1979 points about reciprocal effects of related to a use of its nuclear program. More force. concerned during other periods. Overall (High) (Medium) 1) U.S. remains committed to South Korea’s security despite absence of a security guarantee. Forbearance Majority of the MIDs 2) Cumulative United States 1980-1989 related to a use of investment in ROK peaks at (Some activities force. about US$1.4 billion by 1988. resulted in less forbearance) 3) DPRK supports ROK’s investments in its industrial zones. (Medium) Overall (High) . Majority of the MIDs 1) U.S. pledges economic and Forbearance 1990-1999 related to a use of security aid. force. 2) DPRK approves Hyundai’s investment zone at Kaesong. (High) Overall (High) Forbearance 1) 2006 - U.S. comitted to extended Two nuclear tests were deterrence. (Some activities 2000-2010 conducted by the resulted in less DPRK in 2006 & 2) 2009 - President Obama forbearance) 2009) threatening the reaffirms “extended nuclear security environment. umbrella” In the next chapter, I test the theory of prudential realism by examining the nuclear decisions of

the DPRK, the way they occurred. The DPRK had an enduring rivalry with the ROK and had

twice tested nuclear weapons. The DPRK’s nuclear decisions are compared with the theory’s key

variables of level of conflict and security interdependence, hypotheses are tested and conclusions

are drawn accordingly.

Chapter Four

North Korea

This chapter examines the nuclear decisions of The Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea, (DPRK) or North Korea. It begins by examining North Korea’s nuclear decisions across the time period from 1960 to 2010. This period has been chosen because it corresponds to the DPRK’s nuclear history. Decisions made by North Korea to not acquire nuclear weapons or to embark on a nuclear program for peaceful purposes are categorized under forbearance. Likewise, all decisions to initiate a nuclear weapons program or acquire nuclear weapons have been examined under non-forbearance. The

DPRK had six phases in its nuclear history: 1960-1979 (Forbearance); 1980-1990 (Non-

Forbearance); 1991-2001(Forbearance); 2002-2006 (Non-Forbearance); February 2007-

2008 (Forbearance) and 2009-2010 (Non-Forbearance). While the DPRK’s policy was generally one of forbearance prior to 2003, it was one of non-forbearance thereafter.

Some periods of forbearance had some indicators of non-forbearance and vice-versa. This resulted overall in a period of lesser forbearance and lesser non-forbearance respectively.

In the next step, the DPRK’s nuclear decisions are empirically analyzed in terms of technological and non technological indicators. Having done this, the chapter tests if the level of conflict, as the theory predicts, was a determining factor in the DPRK’s nuclear decisions, both forbearance and non-forbearance, by testing two sets of hypotheses.

H1a: States with high levels of conflict will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H1b: States with medium or low levels of conflict will exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

With respect to the first hypotheses, the tests indicate that the DPRK did not exercise a policy of forbearance during the only two periods that it experienced high levels of conflict. H1a is therefore fully supported. With respect to the second hypotheses, the tests indicate that the DPRK exercised a policy of forbearance in three of the four periods that it experienced medium to low levels of conflict. H1b is therefore mostly supported. The DPRK’s deviant behavior during one period can be explained with respect to the theory’s second variable, namely politico-security interdependence.

Next, the chapter tests if politico-security interdependence, as the theory predicts, was a determining factor in the DPRK’s nuclear decisions by testing two additional sets of hypotheses.

H2a: States possessing, in the aggregate, low levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H2b: States possessing, in the aggregate, high levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries are most likely to exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

The tests indicate the DPRK always exercised a policy of nuclear forbearance when it experienced overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence with its allies and adversaries. H2b is therefore fully supported. Likewise, the DPRK always exercised a policy of non-forbearance whenever it experienced overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. H2a is also therefore fully supported.

Finally, in concluding the chapter, I summarize the above results.

100

4.1 Introduction The DPRK emerged out of the Korean War as a pro-Soviet ally. As opposed to the South, the DPRK has had dictatorial and isolationist regimes and its economy, based on the Soviet and Chinese models, relied extensively on a centralized economic system to achieve industrialization and economic growth. Unlike the ROK, the DPRK commenced its initial foray into a peaceful nuclear program in the 1960’s. Following the end of the

Korean War, the DPRK faced the daunting presence of U.S. and South Korean troops on its borders and began its initial foray into a nuclear program. Five decades later its continuously shifting stance with respect to its nuclear program can be best understood as a “broad search for security that embraces both military and economic priorities.”1

4.2 The First Phase: (1960-1979) –Forbearance During the 1960’s, the DPRK continued to exercise a policy of forbearance following security assurances by the Soviets and the Chinese. However, this was the period when the DPRK began to earnestly explore a peaceful nuclear program. The

Yongbyon Nuclear Research Centre, which comprised of a small research reactor (IRT-

2000) constructed with Soviet assistance, formed the core of the DPRK’s nuclear program. However, despite an overall policy of forbearance during this period, North

Korea also initiated some measures towards non-forbearance that resulted ultimately in relative or lesser forbearance. Why did this happen? This was a direct result of U.S. policies in the region. Under the ‘New Look Policy’ in the 1950’s, the United States had deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea in the form of “atomic artillery, Honest John missiles, bombs, and atomic demolition munitions.”2 By the mid 1960’s, the total number of US nuclear weapons deployed in the Pacific theater peaked at 3,200 weapons, with

1Harrison, Korean Endgame, p.201.

2Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997),p.479. 101

about 2,600 of them in South Korea and Okinawa.3 Sensing its own vulnerability, the

DPRK sent a delegation to Beijing following China's first nuclear test in October 1964 and sought assistance to build a parallel program. This request was turned down by the

Chinese who however, did assist North Korea in conducting surveys to identify uranium deposits.4 Having thus failed in its mission to obtain external assistance for a nuclear weapons program, North Korea now began exploring an indigenous nuclear weapons capability as a result of which it not only conducted nuclear fuel related research but also created several institutions like the Nuclear Energy Research Institute, and the

Radiological Institute.5

3Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol. 55, No. 6 (November/December 1999),p.30.

4Oberdorfer,“The Two Koreas,”p.252.

5NTI, “North Korea, Nuclear Chronology,” Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Nuclear/chronology.html. Internet accessed May 7, 2010.

102

Table 4.0. An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1960-1979) Forbearance ( Measures) Year Forbearance ( Measures) --- Technical Indicators Non-Technical indicators 1. North Korea begins basic research and experiments in the 1960 field of atomic energy. 2. North Korea procures an IRT-2000 research reactor from 1962 the USSR. 3. North Korea completes the installation of a Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. 1965 Becomes functional in 1967. The reactor is used to produce radioactive isotopes for medicine, industry, and scientific research.

1974 1. North Korea joins the IAEA. 4. North Korea begins plans to expand its nuclear facilities, including the construction of a 30MW graphite-moderated Mid 1970’s reactor. 2. North Korea signs a

INFCIRC/66 trilateral safeguards 1977 agreement with the IAEA. 5. North Korea begins construction of 5MW(e) "Research 1979 Reactor No. 1" in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. (Indicators of non- forbearance during this period) Despite professing a policy of forbearance, some activities related to a nuclear weapons program were carried out during this period resulting in less forbearance. 1. North Korean technicians learn plutonium-reprocessing None of these activities were as a 1960’s techniques at Soviet plutonium separation facilities. result of a spiral in the LOC. The 2. DPRK seeks assistance from Beijing with weapons LOC did not spike in the 1960’s. 1964 program. On the contrary, the values of 3. China assists North Korea in conducting a uranium mining LOC’s went down during the next 1964 survey of the entire country. several decades even as the DPRK indulged in activities related to 4. Kim Il Sung issues directive to develop nuclear warheads 1966-1967 non-forbearance. (See Table 4.8) for missiles. for an analysis of LOCs. 5. North Korea begins plutonium extraction activity on a small 1975 scale.

Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative-North Korea Profile. Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Nuclear/chronology.html

Overall, this was a period of forbearance with some attempts being definitely made towards a nuclear weapons program.

4.21 The Second Phase: (1980-1990) – Non-Forbearance During this phase, the DPRK’s policy of non-forbearance was evident in terms of the infrastructure created for pursuing a nuclear weapons program. During this period (1980-

1990) the DPRK possessed, at Yongbyon, 3 nuclear reactors, one reprocessing /

103

radiochemical laboratory, three nuclear waste storage sites and a fuel fabricating and uranium purification facility. The 5 Megawatt (MWe) reactor at Yongbyon, the construction of which began in 1980, was a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural- uranium-fuelled reactor and was capable of generating sufficient quantities of plutonium-

239, in its spent fuel.6 The reactor went critical in August 1985. It operated intermittently from 1986 until 1994 when it was shut down under the Agreed Framework. Construction on a second 50MW reactor began in 1984 using the same basic materials and technology as utilized in the 5MW(e) reactor – magnox-clad natural uranium fuel, graphite moderation, and CO2 gas cooling. This reactor was theoretically thought to be capable of producing about 55kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year, if operated at full power for

300 days. Construction was eventually frozen in 1994 under the ‘Agreed Framework’. In the late 1980’s, North Korea began construction of a 200 MWe Magnox type reactor at

Taechon based on the same technology – magnox-clad natural uranium fuel, graphite moderation, and CO2 gas cooling. This reactor was thought to be capable of producing

“up to 220kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually, if operated at full power for 300 days per year”.7 Construction of this reactor was also halted under the ‘Agreed

Framework’. The uranium-conversion and fuel-fabrication facility at Yongbyon was designed to produce fuel for the entire line of graphite-moderated reactors that were

6Leon Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998),p.21.

7 “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” Report Prepared for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, pp. 27-32. Available at http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic- dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/north-koreas- nuclear-weapons-programme/#weapons

104

being constructed in North Korea during the 1980s.8 The DPRK also built a factory at

Yongbyon to refine yellow cake and to produce uranium metal fuel elements for its graphite-moderated reactors. In addition to these activities, between 1980 and 1985,

North Korea was also involved in uranium mining and milling operations at various locations near Sunchon and Pyongsan.9

All of these were credible indicators that the DPRK’s nuclear program was truly accelerating. However, despite a policy of non-forbearance, there were some indicators of forbearance also during this period which was not in any way associated with a decline in

LOCs. For example, under international and especially Soviet pressure, the North was persuaded to accede to the NPT in 1985. This was the first indicator of forbearance during this period. Under the provisions of the NPT, North Korea had 18 months to negotiate and sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The DPRK took no action to fulfill this requirement until 10 April 1992, when it eventually brought its safeguards agreement into force. There were also other indicators of forbearance during this period.

In July 1988, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo called for “new efforts to promote

North-South exchanges, family reunification, inter-Korean trade, and contact in international forums.”10

8 Ibid, p.33.

9Gary Samore and Adam Ward, “Living with ambiguity: North Korea’s strategic weapons programmes,” in Hazel Smith ed., Reconstituting Korean Security: A policy primer (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007),p.44.

10Federation of American Scientists, “North Korea; Nuclear Weapons Program—Current Status.” Available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html. Internet Accessed January 31,2011. 105

Table 4.1. An Empirical Analysis of Non Forbearance (1980-1990) Year Non -Forbearance ( Measures) --- Technical Indicators -- The Yongbyon Facility11 Research Reactors 1. 2MWt IRT-2000 research reactor. 2. Gas-graphite, natural uranium, 5MWe reactor. Operated since 1986 for the primary purpose of 1980 producing plutonium. Shut down briefly in 1989 & then in 1994.

1984 3. 50 MWe Magnox prototype power reactor. Construction was halted in 1994. 4. 200 MWe MAGNOX-type reactor was started at Taechon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang. 1988 Construction was halted in 1994. Nuclear Reprocessing Facility One Reprocessing Radiochemical Laboratory. The reprocessing facility separates weapons-grade 1984 plutonium-239 from the reactor's spent fuel. Nuclear Waste Facilities --3 sites at Yongbyon. Fuel Fabrication & Uranium purification facility 1985-1987 One Facility in Yŏngbyŏn-kun became operational between 1985 and 1987. 1987 A plutonium separation facility (“Radiological Research Lab”) was built at Yongbyon Despite an emphasis on non-forbearance, there were some indicators of forbearance 1. DPRK Accedes To The NPT. – ( Not related to a decline in Level of Conflict) 1985 . 2. Roh Tae Woo initiates new measures to promote North South Ties and the North co- operates. 1988

4.22 The Third Phase: (1991-2001) – Forbearance By late 1991, there was a thaw in relations between the DPRK and the ROK. In

December 1991 both countries signed the Joint Declaration for Denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula. Under the denuclearization agreement, both states agreed not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, store, possess, deploy or use nuclear weapons.” They also agreed not to “possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment.”12 Also,

11Center for Nuclear Studies, “North Korea: Nuclear Infrastructure,” Available at http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_north_korea/nuc/yongbyon.htm. Internet accessed May 14, 2010. See also George Baldwin and Jooho Whang, “Case Study: Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Plutonium Facilities,” in James Doyle ed., Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation (Elsevier Inc, Oxford: UK. 2008), p.380; Siegfried Hecker, “The Risks of North Korea's Nuclear Restart,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 12, 2009).

106

in 1992, following a delay of five years, the North eventually brought its safeguards agreement with the IAEA into force. The agreement required the DPRK to send the

IAEA an “Initial Report” on all nuclear material to be subject to safeguards in the country. It also provided for international monitoring and onsite inspections by the agency.13 However, despite a thaw in relations and a commitment to forbearance, tensions soon arose between the DPRK and the ROK.14

4.23 ‘The Agreed Framework’ On October 21, 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed

Framework wherein Pyongyang was required to halt the operation and construction of nuclear reactors that were suspected of being part of a covert nuclear weapons program.

An international consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development

Organization (KEDO) was formed to implement the agreement. “Under the “Agreed

Framework” the DPRK agreed that a) there would be no operations at the facilities covered by the freeze and no construction work of any kind, either at existing facilities or new, related facilities such as the 50MW (Yongbyon) and 200 MW (Taechon) reactors that were in a construction or planning phase; b) the spent fuel from the 5 MWe reactor at

Yongbyon would be stored and disposed of in a manner that did not involve reprocessing in the DPRK and c) that any movements of nuclear material or equipment within those

12Andrew Mack, ed., Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula, (Australia.: Allen and Unwin, 1993),pp.3-5.

13Sigal, Disarming Strangers,p.209.

14On March 9, 1993, following the restoration of the U.S. - ROK ‘Team Spirit’ military exercise, the North adopted a series of provocative measures including declaring its intention to withdraw from the NPT, testing a medium-range missile in March 1993 and unloading spent fuel from its nuclear reactor in May 1994. This first crisis was eventually resolved through the untiring diplomatic efforts of President Jimmy Carter. See Leon Sigal, “The Lesson’s of North Korea’s Test,” Current History, Vol.105, No.694 (November 2006),p.363.

107

facilities, any necessary maintenance work by the operator and any transfers of nuclear material out of the facilities would have to be carried out under the observation of IAEA inspectors or under other IAEA arrangements.”15 In return, the United States agreed to the establishment of a multi-national consortium that would finance and supply North

Korea with two light-water reactors (LWR) by 2003. The agreement also called upon the

United States to supply North Korea with fuel oil for heating and electricity to “reach a rate of 500,000 metric tons annually.”16 The Agreed Framework increased the DPRK’s politico-security interdependence with the U.S. and was signed by Kim Jong Il, amidst stiff domestic opposition, with the hope that the United States would reciprocate both diplomatically and economically.17 However, this did not happen.

Very soon, the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework was in trouble. There were credible reports that North Korea had initiated some measures towards non- forbearance by pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program at an alleged secret underground nuclear site at Kumchang-ri.18 Faced with this evidence, the Clinton

15 ‘The Agreed Framework at a Glance,’ Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, September 2004. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/agreedframework.pdf. See also, GlobalSecurity.org, “Weapons of Mass Destruction, Yongbyon”. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/yongbyon.htm. Internet accessed May 14, 2010.

16Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, p.247.

17Selig Harrison, “U.S. policy and the legacy of 1945,” in Hazel Smith ed., Reconstituting Korean Security: A policy primer (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007), p.104. See also Siegfried Hecker, “Denuclearizing North Korea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May/June 2008).

18 “Perry Report on North Korea Impending,” Prepared for the James Martin Center on Non- Proliferation Studies. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_north_korea/perry.htm. Internet accessed on October15, 2010.The ‘Agreed Framework,’ was confronted with a domestic backlash in the U.S. The Republicans described the policy as one of appeasement. The Economist reported that there were also fears that other rogue states could seek similar concessions for “not being bad boys.”See, “The Yongbyon Test,” The Economist, June 4, 1994,pp.14-15. 108

administration slowed the timely implementation of the deal. In 1998, Pyongyang retaliated to the slow implementation of the deal by not only acquiring gas centrifuges to enrich uranium from Pakistan but also by conducting a test of a Taepodong 1 missile though missile issues were technically not part of the deal.19

As depicted in Table 4.2 below, under the U.S.-North Korean “Agreed

Framework,” the DPRK undertook three concrete measures towards forbearance: a) It froze its activities at the 5-MWe gas-graphite reactor, the fuel fabrication facility, and the reprocessing plant; b) It halted construction on the 50-MWe gas-graphite reactor and did not begin work on another 200 mw one and c) It also placed numerous other facilities under IAEA safeguards.

Table 4.2. An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1991 –2001) Technological Indicators Location of Facility Type/Status IAEA Safeguards POWER REACTORS Simpo Site of two 1,000-MWe, light water reactors Yes financed by KEDO according to the terms of the “Agreed Framework;” Construction commenced in August 1997. Yongbyon Gas Graphite natural U; 5 MWe, operations Under IAEA verification frozen. Yongbyon Gas Graphite natural U:50 MWe, construction Under IAEA Verification halted. Taechon Gas Graphite natural U:200 MWe, construction Under IAEA Verification halted. RESEARCH REACTORS

IRT, Yongbyon Pool Type, HEU; 4MWt, operating. Yes

Yongbyon Critical Assembly Yes

Pyongyang Sub-Critical Assembly Yes

19Sigal,“The Lesson’s of North Korea’s Test,”p.364.

109

(REPROCESSING (PLUTONIUM EXTRACTION)

Yongbyon Partially Completed; Operations Frozen Yes

Pyongyang Soviet- Supplied laboratory scale “hot-cells” No

URANIUM PROCESSING

Pyongsan Uranium Mining (Status unknown) Not Applicable ( N/A)

Pakchon Uranium Mining (Status unknown) (N/A)

Pyongsan Uranium Milling (Status unknown) (N/A)

Pakchon Uranium Milling (Status unknown) (N/A)

Yongbyon Uranium Purification facility (UO2) operating. Yes (As per agreement) Yongbyon Fuel Fabrication facility; operations frozen Yes

Yongbyon Pilot Scale fuel fabrication facility dismantled. No

Although this was a period of forbearance, there were some indicators of non-forbearance. Technical Indicators of Non-Forbearance 1996-1997 DPRK accused of pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program at an alleged secret underground nuclear site at Kumchang-ri. 1998 DPRK acquires gas centrifuges to enrich uranium from Pakistan.

April 1998 The North stopped canning the plutonium-laden spent fuel at Yongbyon.

--Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998,p.158

Abbreviations:4.24 The Fourth HEU- Highly Phase: Enriched 2002 Uranium-2006 (Non; Nat -UForbearance)- Natural Uranium ; MWe-Millions of Watts of Electrical Output;By 200 MWt2, -there Millions was of increasingWatts of Thermal disagreement Output; UO2 between- Uranium North Oxide Korea and U.S. on the

scope and implementation of the Agreed Framework and the allegation by the U.S. that

the North Koreans were engaged in a uranium enrichment program.20 The Bush

administration secured a multilateral agreement to suspend fuel oil shipments, and other

sanctions, and the DPRK reacted with a series of provocative steps.21 In December 2002,

North Korea retaliated by expelling IAEA inspectors who had been monitoring the

20Joby Warrick, “U.S. Followed the Aluminum: Pyongyang's Efforts to Buy Metal Was Tip to Plans,” Washington Post, October 18,2002.

21Michael Mazarr,“The Long Road to Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.86, No.5 (Sep/Oct2007), pp. 75-94. On sanctions, see also, Barbara Demick, “No More Gambling on N. Korea,” Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2006. 110

nuclear freeze. In January 2003, Pyongyang also declared its immediate withdrawal from the NPT.22 President Bush essentially pursued a policy of “hawk engagement” with the

DPRK whereby the United States was willing to engage with Pyongyang in the near term while not ruling out punitive action in the long run.23 Such a policy was not acceptable to the regime in the DPRK. On 9 October 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear device at Mount Mant'ap near P'unggye-ri, Kilchu-kun, North Hamgyong Province. North Korea said it used 2 kilograms of plutonium in the experiment conducted in October 2006.24

22Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense:A New Security Strategy for America (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999),pp.128-133.Internet accessed May 27, 2010.

23Victor Cha, “Korea’s place in the Axis,”Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3(May - Jun., 2002), p.83.

24Yoshiharu Asano, “DPRK Plutonium: 30 Kilograms Extracted, 2 Kilograms Used in Nuclear Test,”Yomiuri Shimbun, July 2,2008. 111

Table 4.3. An Empirical Analysis of Non – Forbearance (2002 -2006) Non Forbearance ( Non-Forbearance ( Measures) Year Measures) Technical Indicators25 Non-Technical Indicators 1) North Korea received a shipment of 20 tons of the December specialty chemical, Tributyl Phosphate [TBP] from a IAEA inspectors expelled 2002 Chinese company in Dalian.26 from North Korea. North Korea announces its January 2003 withdrawal from the NPT.

February2003 2) One 5MWe graphite reactor restarted.

3) Begins reprocessing the Plutonium stored at the Yongbyon Early 2003 facility eventually yielding 20-28 kilograms of weapons

grade plutonium. Early 2006 4) Estimated production of plutonium - 43 to 61 kilograms.

20 to 53 kilograms considered usable in nuclear weapons.

October 9, 5) DPRK’s first Nuclear Test – Estimated Yield of 0.5-0.8 2006 kilotons.

4.24 The Fifth Phase: (2007-March 2009) –Forbearance After the October 9, 2006 nuclear test, the six party talks resumed in December

2006. On 13 February 2007, the six parties agreed to an “Action Plan” in which North

Korea would shut down its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in exchange for heavy-fuel oil aid. (HFO) The Six Parties agreed to take 11 concrete steps to disable the three main

Yongbyon facilities related to North Korea’s plutonium program (nuclear fuel fabrication

25For a good insight into the technical measures taken by the DPRK in pursuing a nuclear weapons program during this period, see Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing- Islamabad-Pyongyang” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 1(Spring, 2003),p.67; Wade L. Huntley, “Bucks for the Bang: North Korea’s Nuclear Program and North East Asian Military Spending,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2009) p.150; David Albright and Paul Brannan, “The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-2006,” Report prepared for the Institute for Science and International Security,(June 26, 2006), p.3. http://www.isis- online.org/publications/dprk/dprkplutonium.pdf.

26TBP was a material that could be used to extract material for nuclear bombs from North Korea's stockpile of spent nuclear-reactor fuel.

112

plant, plutonium reprocessing plant, and 5-megawatt experimental nuclear power reactor.

A reported eight out of eleven steps were completed by 2009. (See Table 4.4.)

Table 4.4. An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance – Technical Indicators -- (2007-2009) Step Facility Status

1) Discharge of 8000 spent fuel rods to 5-megawatt reactor On-going: 6,100 completed as of the spent fuel pool. February 2009 2) Removal of control rod drives 5-megawatt reactor To be done after spent fuel removal is mechanisms. completed 3) Removal of reactor cooling loop and wooden cooling tower interior 5-megawatt reactor Tower demolished June 26, 2008 structure. 4) Disablement of fresh fuel rods. Not agreed to by North Korea Fuel fabrication facility

5) Removal and storage of 3 uranium ore Completed concentrate dissolver tanks. Fuel fabrication facility

6) Removal and storage of 7 uranium conversion furnaces, including storage Fuel fabrication facility Completed of refractory bricks and mortar sand 7) Removal and storage of both metal casting furnaces and vacuum system, and removal and storage of 8 Fuel fabrication facility Completed machining lathes

8) Cut cable and remove drive mechanism associated with the Reprocessing facility Completed receiving hot cell door. 9) Cut two of four steam lines into reprocessing facility Reprocessing facility Completed

10) Removal of drive mechanisms for the fuel cladding shearing and Reprocessing facility Completed slitting machines

11) Removal of crane and door actuators that permit spent fuel rods to enter the Reprocessing facility Completed reprocessing facility Source: Mary Beth Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, February 12, 2009.

The DPRK also agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs in accordance with the February agreement by December 31, 2007 and also pledged not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how. On July 14,

2007, as part of its pledge to achieve nuclear disarmament, North Korea confirmed to the

113

U.S. that it had disabled its Yongbyon nuclear reactor which was subsequently confirmed by IAEA officials the next day.27 These were significant steps towards forbearance.

Following these steps by the DPRK, the “ROK, China, United States, and Russia initiated deliveries of approximately 50,000 metric tons of HFO per month, with the ROK completing delivery of the first tranche of 50,000 metric tons in August, China the second in September, the United States the third in November, and Russia the fourth in

January.”28

4.25 The Sixth Phase: (April 2009-2010) – Non-Forbearance On April 14, 2009, North Korea refused to participate in the six party talks and said it would not be bound by previous agreements which would have eventually disabled the Yongbyon facilities. North Korea also announced that the failure of the six party talks meant that it would restart the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. North Korea’s sudden shift in its stance can be attributed to several reasons. First was the failure to complete implementation of the disablement of the Yongbyon reactor because of a dispute over the presence of international inspectors and their activities at Yongbyon. The second reason was the stroke suffered by North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Il, in August 2008; and the final reason was North Korea’s unsuccessful endeavor to have the U.S. accept certain pre-conditions prior to denuclearization. These pre-conditions included diplomatic recognition of the DPRK prior to denuclearization, adoption of a non threatening posture

27“Timeline:N. Korea nuclear stand-off,” BBC News, December 6, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2604437.stm.

28“Six Party Talks,” Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/6-party.htm. Internet accessed, May 27, 2010. 114

by the U.S. and the restriction of U.S. military forces in the Korean peninsula.29 On May

25, 2009, North Korea's Korean Central News Agency announced that the DPRK had carried out a nuclear test intended to “contribute to safeguarding our sovereignty and socialism and guaranteeing peace and safety on the Korean peninsula and the surrounding region.” It is widely believed that the second test had an explosive yield of about 3 to 8 kilotons Trinitrotoluene (TNT) with a most likely yield of 4 kt TNT.30

Table 4.5. – An Empirical Analysis of Non – Forbearance (2009-2010) Time Frame Non Forbearance (Non-Technical Indicator)

April 20, 2009 1) IAEA inspectors expelled from North Korea (Technical Indicator) 1) North Korea begins reprocessing thousands of spent nuclear fuel rods at the Yongbyon site, extracting plutonium from the rods to develop fissile material April 26, 2009 for nuclear weapons.31

4.3 North Korea: Prudential Realism and Nuclear Forbearance In this section, I test the theoretical validity of prudential realism whose explanations for nuclear forbearance are based on two key variables namely the level of conflict and politico-security interdependence.

4.31 Level of Conflict With respect to the level of conflict, the main premise of H1a is that -- States with high levels of conflict will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. Likewise the main

29Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 5, 2010. Available http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33590.pdf. Internet accessed June 2010.

30 “North Korea’s Nuclear Test and its Aftermath: Coping with the Fallout” Report prepared for Nuclear Threat Initiative by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 25, 2009. Available http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_north_korea_nuclear_test.html.

31Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea Nuclear Chronology,” Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Nuclear/nk_nuclear_2009.html. Internet accessed, August 16, 2010.

115

premise of H1b is that -- States with medium or low levels of conflict will exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. So if I see that the DPRK was not exercising a policy of forbearance when it had high levels of conflict then H1a is supported. Likewise, if I see the DPRK exercising a policy of forbearance for all the periods it possessed medium to low levels of conflict, then H1b is supported. Did the DPRK’s nuclear history conform to this pattern? I begin by briefly examining the DPRK’s enduring rivalry with the ROK.

Table 4.6. illustrates the intensity, severity and enduring nature of the DPRK’s rivalry with South Korea.

Table 4.6. North and South Korea –Militarized Interstate Disputes32 Activity Year Scale* 1. Korean War 1950-53 5 2. South Korean plane hijacked to North Korea 4 1958 3. Shooting incident on Demilitarized Zone 4 1966 4. South Korean Frigate sunk.. 4 1967 5. Shooting incidents alongside DMZ 4 1967 6. North Korean gunboat sunk. 4 1967 7. South Korean fishing vessels captured by North; 4 1968 8. Northern Commando raid on South Korean Presidential palace 4 1968 unsuccessful. 9. North Korean spy vessel captured by South. 4 1968 10. North Korean guerilla raid on Eastern coast. 4 1968 11. Several North Korean ships suspected of infiltration sunk or captured; 4 1969 12. South Korean plane hijacked to North 4 1969

32(The above table reflects only the major recorded incidents. On the contrary, by United States Forces Korea (USFK) estimates, there were 1,439 major provocations and DMZ violations since 1953 with 90 U.S. troops killed in action (KIA), over 390 ROK KIA and 889 North Korean KIA). On the contrary, by United States Forces Korea (USFK) estimates, there were 1,439 major provocations and DMZ violations since 1953 with 90 U.S. troops killed in action (KIA), over 390 ROK KIA and 889 North Korean KIA).MIDs have been assigned a scale from 1-5, based on the correlates of war scale. 116

13. South Korea captures infiltration ship and captures agents setting 4 1970 explosives 14. North Korean assassination attempt on the South Korean President kills the 4 1973 wife of the President 15. Discovery of DMZ Northern infiltration tunnel announced 1974 3 16. North-South maritime clash in the West 4 1975 17. Shooting incident on DMZ; 4 1977 18. Southern aircraft hijacked to North 4 1977 19. Another infiltration tunnel discovery announced 3 1978 20. North Korean spy rings arrested 3 1979 21. North Korean spy rings arrested 3 1982 22. A number of South Korean politicians killed in Myanmar bombing attributed to North Korea and presumably focused on South Korean 1983 4 President. 23. North Korean spy rings arrested. 4 1983 24. South Korean airliner blown up; possibly linked to Olympic games, later 4 1987 attributed to North Korea. 25. Another infiltration tunnel discovery announced. 3 1990 26. North Korean espionage submarine runs aground on east coast of South 4 1996 Korea. 27. North Korean army incursion in DMZ. 4 1996 28. Military intrusion and exchange of fire across DMZ. 4 1997 29. North Korean submarine trapped in fishing nets of South Korean East 4 Coast. 1998 30. North Korean vessel sunk. 4 1998 31. Serious naval clashes by North and South Korean gunboats in Yellow Sea 4 linked initially to crabbing activities. 1999

32 North Korea threatens military retaliation if U.S. and South Korea enter 2 2000 Yellow Sea area claimed by North Korea. 33. Twelve North Korean incursions into South Korean Waters and exchange 4 of fire across DMZ. 2001 34. Continued naval intrusions and clashes. 4 2002 35. North Korea threatens to abandon 1953 Korean War armistice if U.S. 2 imposes trade sanctions. 2003 36. North Korean vessels, claiming to be in pursuit of illegal fishing craft, cross 4 the Northern Limit Line and are fired upon by the South. 2004 37. Several rounds of fire are exchanged near a South Korean post in 4 2006 Gangwon. 38 North Korea conducts first nuclear test. 5 2006

117

39. North Korea conducts second nuclear test. 5 2009 40. Naval vessels from the two Koreas exchanged fire in the area of the, 4 Northern Limit Line reportedly damaging a North Korean patrol ship. 2009 41. North and South Korea exchange artillery fire near their disputed sea 4 2010 border. 42. Sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean Warship near the disputed border 4 2010 43. North Korean troops began firing artillery towards Yeonpyeong island, 4 2010 close to the disputed Yellow Sea border Source: Michael Colaresi, Karen Rasler and William Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation:p.11.

Table 4.7. Ratio Analysis of Militarized Inter State Disputes 10 Year Figures Number of disputes Ratios between 2 decades (based on Table 4.7) 1950-1959 2

1960-1969 10 1:5

1970-1979 8

1980-1989 4 2:1

1990-1999 7 1:2 (approx.)

Table -4.8. An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict33 (LOC) Nuclear LOC Nature of Dispute Period Scale34 Timeline (Value) 1. Shooting incident on Demilitarized Zone. (DMZ). (1966) 4 2. South Korean Frigate sunk. (1967) 4 3. Shooting incidents alongside DMZ. (1967) 4

1960-1979 (Medium) 4. North Korean gunboat sunk. (1967) 4 5. South Korean fishing vessels captured by North. (1968) 4 6. Northern Commando raid on South Korean 4 (1968) Presidential palace unsuccessful. 7. North Korean spy vessel captured by South. (1968) 4

33Source: Michael Colaresi, Karen Rasler and William Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation: p.11. North Korea’s timeline begins in the 1950’s because that is when it actively began a peaceful nuclear program. The nuclear tests are included as MIDs and assigned a high value as they were significant events that had the potential to influence the level of conflict. From Table 4.8, it is evident that despite the protracted conflicts and enduring nature of their rivalry, not all the periods were associated with high conflict. For example, there were periods of medium conflict even as there were no changes in the issues (territorial and ideological) that generated these conflicts.

34MIDs have been assigned a scale from 1-5 based on the correlates of war scale.

118

8. North Korean guerilla raid on Eastern coast. (1968) 4 9. Several North Korean ships suspected of infiltration 4 (1969) sunk or captured. 10. South Korean plane hijacked to North. (1969) 4 (1970) 4 11. South Korea captures infiltration ship.

12. North Korean assassination attempt on the South 4 (1973) Korean President. (1974) 3 13. Discovery of DMZ Northern infiltration tunnel.

(1975) 4 14. North-South maritime clash in the West.

(1977) 4 15. Shooting incident on DMZ.

(1977) 4 16. Southern aircraft hijacked to North.

(1978) 3 17. Another infiltration tunnel discovery announced.

18. North Korean spy rings arrested. (1979) 3 Since the LOC during this period primarily relates to the uses of force (Scale 4), they have been assigned a medium value. 1. North Korean spy rings arrested (1982) 3 2. A number of South Korean politicians killed in Myanmar (Medium) bombing; attributed to North Korea and presumably (1983) 4 focused on South Korean President. 1980-1990 3. North Korean spy rings arrested. (1983) 4 4. South Korean airliner blown up; possibly linked to 4 (1987) Olympic games, later attributed to North Korea. 5. Another infiltration tunnel discovery announced. (1990) 3 Since the LOC during this period primarily relates to the uses of force (Scale 4), they have been assigned a medium value. 1. North Korean army incursion in DMZ. (1996) 4

2. North Korean espionage submarine runs aground on east (1996) 4 coast of South Korea. 3. Military intrusion and exchange of fire across DMZ. (1997) 4

4. North Korean submarine trapped in fishing nets of South (1998) 4 Korean East Coast. 1991-2001 (Medium) 5. North Korean vessel sunk. (1998) 4 6. Serious naval clashes by North and South Korean (1999) 4 gunboats in Yellow Sea. 7. North Korea threatens military retaliation if U.S. and (2000) South Korea enter Yellow Sea area claimed by North 2

Korea. 8. Twelve North Korean incursions into South Korean (2001) 4 Waters. Since the LOC during this period primarily relates to the uses of force (Scale 4), they have been assigned a medium value. 2002-2006 (2002) 1. Continued naval intrusions and clashes. 4

119

2. North Korea threatens to abandon 1953 Korean War (2003) 2 (High) armistice. 3. North Korean vessels are fired upon by the South. (2004) 4 4. Several rounds of fire are exchanged near a South Korean (2005) 4 post. 5. North Korea conducts first nuclear test (2006) 5 Since this period involved a nuclear test, the level of conflict has been assigned a high value. North Korea’s actions contributed to the potential for high conflict 2007-2009 (Low) ------Since there was no conflict during this period, the level of conflict has been assigned a low value (2009) 1. North Korea conducts second nuclear test 5

2. Naval vessels from the two Koreas exchanged fire in the (2009) 4 area of the, Northern Limit Line. 2009-2010 (High) 3. Two Korea’s exchange artillery fire near their disputed ( 2010) 4 sea border. (2010) 4. Sinking of the Cheonan warship. 4

5. Firing near Yeonpyeong Island. (2010) 4 Since this period involved a nuclear test, the level of conflict has been assigned a high value.

4.32 How did the Level of Conflict influence the DPRK’s Nuclear Decisions? From the perspective of prudential realism, a state like the DPRK would have the

greatest incentive to acquire nuclear weapons as a result of its enduring rivalry with the

ROK and the presence of U.S. troops on its borders. The DPRK did acquire nuclear

weapons and tested them on two occasions in 2006 and 2009. This would seem to support

the theory’s contention that enduring rival states with high levels of conflict would have

the most incentive to acquire nuclear weapons.35 Was this the case? With respect to the

first hypotheses, the tests indicate that the DPRK did not exercise a policy of forbearance

whenever it had high levels of conflict. H1a is therefore fully supported. With respect to

the second hypotheses, the tests indicate that the DPRK exercised a policy of forbearance

in three of the four periods that it experienced either medium or low levels of conflict.

H1b. is therefore mostly supported. The DPRK’s deviant behavior during one period

35Paul, Power versus Prudence, p.22. 120

(1980-1989) is better explained in terms of the theory’s second variable namely, politico- security interdependence, which is explained in the following section.

4.4 Politico-Security Interdependence and Nuclear Decisions With respect to politico-security interdependence, the main premise of H2a is that

-- States possessing, in the aggregate, low levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. Likewise, the main premise of H2b is that -- States possessing, in the aggregate, high levels of politico- security interdependence with allies or adversaries are most likely to exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. So if I see that the DPRK was not exercising a policy of forbearance on account of low politico-security interdependence then H2a is supported. Likewise, if I see that the DPRK was exercising a policy of forbearance whenever it possessed high politico- security interdependence then H2b is supported. Did the DPRK’s nuclear history conform to this pattern? In the next section, I examine the DPRK’s politico- security interdependence with its allies and adversaries and how that level of interdependence influenced its nuclear decisions. The time period begins in the 1960’s when the DPRK first initiated its nuclear program and corresponds thereafter to each phase of its nuclear program.

4.41 The First Phase: (1960-1979) – High Politico-Security Interdependence Following the Korean War, the United States had reinforced its security commitment to South Korea by deploying nuclear tipped 280 millimeter artillery shells in

South Korea. In 1957, the strength of the nuclear arsenal was further augmented by the storage of sixty nuclear bombs at Kunsan Air Base, situated near Seoul.36 PSI with the

36John Park and Dong Sun Lee, “North Korea: Existential Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage,” in Muthiah Alagappa ed., The Long Shadow, Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st century Asia (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008),p.272. 121

ROK & U.S. was low during this period as the DPRK faced a precarious security situation and did not fear any reciprocal reactions from both these states. The DPRK, however, was now inclined towards greater dependence on its close communist allies, namely Moscow and Beijing. The 1960’s thus marked a period of close cooperation with both Moscow and Beijing including the signing of the treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. The 1961 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual

Assistance with the Soviet Union and China guaranteed security against external threats and made it obligatory for both China and the Soviet Union to provide military aid to

North Korea in the event of war.”37 All these factors were indicative of the fact that the

DPRK had high PSI with its allies and did not pursue a nuclear weapons program for fear of reciprocal actions from its allies. Aggregate politico-security interdependence was high resulting in a policy of forbearance.

4.42 The Second Phase: (1980-1990) – Low Politico-Security Interdependence The DPRK’s nuclear program accelerated and eventually peaked in the late

1980’s. There were several reasons for this. First and most important was the increasing threat perception and resultant insecurity of the DPRK. The South Korean nuclear program in the 1970’s coupled with the modernization of its armed forces heightened this sense of insecurity and accelerated the DPRK’s quest for nuclear weapons. Second, North

Korea also faced economic stagnation. In the 1980’s, economic growth of the DPRK began to falter and was under 2 percent a year. Finally, by the late 1980’s, the DPRK was facing declining security commitments. For example, the 1961 treaty with the Soviet

37 “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” Peking Review, Vol.4, No.28(July 11, 1961),p.5.

122

Union had expired and was replaced by a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and

Co-operation. Besides, the DPRK’s close allies namely the Soviets and the Chinese had also begun pursuing closer relations with South Korea. Therefore by the late 1980’s,

North Korea was “in a parlous position militarily, economically and politically.”38 PSI was low with both allies and adversaries. Aggregate politico-security interdependence during this period was low, inducing a policy of non-forbearance.

4.43 The Third Phase: (1991-2001) – High Politico-Security Interdependence By the early 1990’s, relations between the DPRK and the ROK and the DPRK and the U.S. began to improve. In September 1991, President George H.W. Bush announced plans to unilaterally withdraw all land and sea based tactical nuclear weapons deployed in foreign countries. Following this assurance, the DPRK reciprocated by adopting a slew of countermeasures. First, it slowed its nuclear program. Second, in

December 1991, South Korea and North Korea adopted the “Basic Agreement” that included many confidence building measures. A month later the two Koreas also signed the “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”39 In October

1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework requiring North

Korea to freeze operation and construction of its nuclear reactors.40 Washington and

Seoul reciprocated with several measures. The U.S. eased longstanding sanctions against

North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the

Export Administration Act, thereby clearing the way for increased trade, financial

38Sigal, Disarming Strangers,p.23.

39Choi and Park, “South Korea, Fear of Abandonment and Entrapment,”p.379.

40Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals,p.247. 123

transactions, and investment.41 Likewise when South Korea began assisting in the

North’s economic growth, Kim reciprocated by approving Hyundai’s investment zone at

Kaesong in 2000. Aggregate politico-security interdependence was high resulting in a policy of forbearance.

4.44 The Fourth Phase: (2002 -2006) – Low Politico-Security Interdependence During this period there were allegations that the DPRK had confessed to possessing a uranium-enrichment program, which could be used to build nuclear weapons. Oil shipments were consequently suspended and the DPRK reciprocated by dismissing IAEA inspectors in 2002 and announced its withdrawal from the NPT in

January 2003. The DPRK also resumed its nuclear activities and on 9 October 2006, successfully tested its first nuclear device. PSI with both allies and adversaries was low during this period as the DPRK was not concerned about any reciprocal reactions as it tested a nuclear device. Aggregate politico-security interdependence was low during this period resulting in a policy of non-forbearance.

4.45 The Fifth Phase: (2007 –March 2009)—High Politico-Security Interdependence On 13 February 2007, the six parties agreed to an “Action Plan” in which North

Korea would shut down its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in exchange for heavy-fuel oil aid. On July 14, 2007, as part of its pledge to achieve nuclear disarmament, North Korea confirmed to the U.S. that it had disabled its Yongbyon nuclear reactor which was subsequently confirmed by IAEA officials the next day.42 Once again, forbearance was

41Daryl Kimball, “The U.S.- North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance,” Arms Control Association. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework. Internet Accessed August 25, 2010.

42“Timeline: N. Korea nuclear stand-off,” BBC News, December 6, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2604437.stm. Internet accessed August 28, 2010.

124

induced as a result of the DPRK’s high politico-security interdependence with both allies

and adversaries.

4.46 The Final Phase: (April 2009-2010) – Low Politico-Security Interdependence During this period, the DPRK had low PSI with both the U.S. and the ROK. The

DPRK, citing hostile policies by Washington, conducted a second nuclear test in May,

2009. PSI was also low with its allies (Russia and China).

Table 4.9. –An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence (PSI) Nuclear PSI with Reciprocal Decisions by Allies Reciprocal Decisions by Timeline allies (Soviet Union & China) Adversary-- (U.S.&ROK) 1) Treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual 1) 1960- U.S. stations nuclear assistance signed between DPRK and the missiles in S.Korea. Soviet Union and China. 2) 1970- ROK pursues nuclear 1960-1979 program. (High) (Prevents DPRK from pursuing a nuclear weapons program) PSI—Low with ROK & low with U.S.

1) 1990- Soviet Union on verge of collapse. Drastically diminishes aid to DPRK. PSI- Low with ROK & Low with 2) China pursues closer ties with S. Korea. U.S. 1980-1990 (Low) (Political, economic, military isolation of DPRK) PSI is low bcause DPRK not concerned about reciprocal decisions of allies or adversaries

Reciprocal Decisions by Adversaries43 1) 1991, President George H.W. Bush announces plans to unilaterally withdraw all land and sea based tactical nuclear weapons deployed in foreign countries. 1991-2001 2) 1994- U.S. signs Agreed Framework with DPRK. (High) 3) The United States agrees to provide nuclear heavy fuel oil to replace the electric facilities under IAEA supervision. 4) The United States agrees to an international consortium to construct two modern, light-water reactors in North Korea. 5) ROK assists in the North’s economic growth. --- (PSI High with U.S. & ROK)

Reciprocal Decision by Adversary 2002-2006 (Low) 1) U.S. suspends oil shipments and abandons 1994 agreement. (PSI low with U.S., China, Russia and with ROK)

*In the 1970’s, the DPRK’s PSI with both the U.S. and the ROK was low because of an increased threat perception. The DPRK was not concerned about the reciprocal actions of its adversaries.

43From 1991 onwards, there were no reciprocal decisions made by the Soviet Union following its collapse. China and Russia made a few decisions subsequently. The bulk of the interdependence was with the U.S. and the ROK. Hence the table has been depicted in this format. 125

Reciprocal Decisions by Adversaries and Allies 1. Six-Party Talks held in February 2007. 2007-Mar. 2. ROK, China, United States, and Russia initiate deliveries of approximately 50,000 2009 (High) metric tons of Heavy Fuel Oil per month. 3. The six parties also established five working groups to form specific plans for implementing the Joint Statement in multiple areas.

(PSI- High with ROK, China, U.S. & Russia) Reciprocal Decision by Adversary 1) U.S. supports U.N.S.C. resolution 1874 passed in June 2009 in response to DPRK’s April 2009- second nuclear test. 2010 (Low) 2) The U.S. also appointed a sanctions coordinator to promote international implementation of the resolution.

(PSI low with China, Russia & U.S. and ROK)

Table – 4.10. A Net Assessment of Politico-Security Interdependence Years Allies Adversaries Sum of interdep. Overall PSI* allies & adversaries 1960-1979 Low with ROK High with China & S.Union Low with U.S. High/Low High

1980-1990 Low with ROK Low/Low Low Lower with China & S.Union Low with U.S

1991-2001 High with ROK High with China & Russia High/High High High with U.S.

2002-2006 Low with U.S. Low with China and Russia Low/Low Low Low with ROK

2007- Mar 2009 High with U.S. High with China and Russia High/High High High with ROK

April 2009-2010 Low with U.S. Low with China and Russia Low/Low Low Low with ROK

Aggregate assessment – From 1960-2010, the DPRK’s interdependence overall (considering the total number of years) was high with allies and Adversaries . *Overall PSI has been assessed based on the influence it had on the DPRK’s eventual nuclear decision. For example, a high PSI with allies from 1960-1969 dissuaded the DPRK from pursuing a nuclear program, aware as it was of the reciprocal effects of such an action.

4.47 Having examined how the DPRK’s politico-security interdependence, with both its

allies and adversaries, influenced its nuclear decisions, I now test whether these decisions

were in conformity with the claims of prudential realism in this regard. I begin by testing

126

H2b. In the immediate aftermath of the Korean War, the DPRK was dependent on its allies for aid and was conscious of the reciprocal effects of pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Between 1948 and 1984 the DPRK’s close allies namely Moscow and Beijing provided aid worth 2.2. billion and 900 million dollars respectively.44 In the 1960’s, the

DPRK had high politico-security interdependence with its allies even as it did explore the potential for a peaceful nuclear program.45 During this period, there were credible security guarantees from both Moscow and Beijing and the DPRK was reassured on the security front resulting in a policy of forbearance. Similarly, PSI was also high with the

ROK because North Korea’s decisions were always linked to those of South Korea. The next phase of high politico-security interdependence was in the 1990’s following aid and security assurances from the West that resulted in a policy of forbearance. War was not an option with military experts estimating that the total damages of a war considering all countries in the region could be as high as “one million casualties and one trillion dollars in estimated industrial damage and lost business.”46 Finally, for a brief period from 2007-

March 2009, the DPRK adopted a policy of forbearance as a result of high politico- security interdependence. Therefore, the DPRK exercised a policy of forbearance in each of the three periods she experienced overall, high politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. H2b is therefore fully supported.

44Samuel S. Kim, “Sino-North Korean Relations in the Post Cold War World,” in Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, eds., North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival (Armonk, N.Y.:M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006), p.195.

45Jaewoo Choo, “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence on China; Political Ramifi- cations,” Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No.2 (2008),p.370.

46Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea,p.6. 127

However, not all of the DPRK’s decisions were related to forbearance. For example, by the late 1980’s, the DPRK began to face a heightened threat perception due to several factors including the collapse of the Soviet Union, a faltering economy and

China’s rapprochement with Seoul. The DPRK also lacked a credible security guarantee.

The 1961 treaty with the Soviet Union had expired and was replaced by a Treaty of

Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Co-operation. This new treaty did not call for mutual “defense” but for mere “contact.” A request for a “nuclear umbrella” under the new treaty, by the DPRK, was also rejected.47 China did not let the treaty expire but instead, downgraded its relations with Pyongyang.48 In the 1980’s, the DPRK was thus politically, economically and militarily isolated resulting in low politico-security interdependence and a policy of non-forbearance. In terms of the DPRK’s isolation,

David Kang argues that the

“end of the Cold War was devastating for North Korea. During the 1990’s, the North lost two of its major allies and fell so far behind South Korea and the United States that it was forced to seek an alternative to conflict in the peninsula. The intensity of the security dilemma, the loss of allies, the tremendous economic growth in South Korea –all are evidence that North Korea’s position has severely worsened. China and Russia have reduced the level and intensity of their ties with North Korea significantly over the past decade. Soviet aid to North Korea, for example, fell from $260 million in 1980 to no aid at all in 1990. By 1992; moreover, both Russia and China had officially recognized South Korea and established formal diplomatic relations with Seoul, leaving North Korea with no partisan allies. Already lagging, economically by the late 1990’s North Korea had fallen far behind its neighbors.”49

47Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution., 2007),p.193.

48Harrison, Korean Endgame,p.288.

49See David Kang, “Acute Conflicts in Asia After the Cold War; Kashmir, Taiwan and North Korea.” in Muthiah Alagappa ed, Asian Security Order: instrumental and normative features(California; Stanford University Press, 2003),pp.349-380.

128

Likewise, from 2002-2006, as security assurances decreased owing to differences with the West, the DPRK had low politico-security interdependence with not just the U.S. but also Russia and China. This resulted in a policy of non-forbearance which eventually culminated in a nuclear test. Therefore, the DPRK exercised a policy of non-forbearance in each of the three periods she experienced overall, low politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. H2a is also, therefore, fully supported.

4.5 Conclusion The DPRK had six phases in its nuclear history (1960-1979, 1980-1990, 1991-

2001, 2002-2006, 2007- Mar 2009, April 2009-2010). With respect to H1a, the evidence indicates that the DPRK never exercised a policy of forbearance on both the occasions that it experienced high levels of conflict. (2002-2006 and April 2009-2010) H1a is thus fully supported. However, with respect to the second hypotheses, the evidence suggests that the DPRK exercised a policy of forbearance in three of the four periods that it experienced medium to low levels of conflict. (1960-1979, 1991-2001 and 2007-Mar

2009) H1b is overall, therefore mostly supported. The DPRK’s deviant behavior during one period (1980-1989) is better explained in terms of the theory’s second variable namely, politico-security interdependence.

With respect to politico-security interdependence, the theory does fully explain

North Korea’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. For example, North Korea exercised a policy of forbearance in each of the three periods that she experienced overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries.

(1960-1979, 1991-2001 and 2007-March 2009) H2b is thus fully supported. Likewise,

North Korea exercised a policy of non-forbearance in each of the three periods that she experienced overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and

129

adversaries. (1980-1990; 2002-2006 & April 2009-2010) H2a is also, therefore, fully

supported. (See Table 4.11)

Table 4.11. –Summary of Results

Nuclear Timeline H1a H1b H2a H2b Nuclear Decision

Forbearance (with 1960-1979     some indicators of non-forbearance) Non – Forbearance 1980-1990  X   (with some indicators of forbearance) Forbearance (with 1991-2001     some indicators of non-forbearance)

2002-2006     Non Forbearance

Feb. 2007-March     Forbearance 2009

    April 2009-2010 Non-Forbearance

H1a H1b H2a H2b Net Assessment

  

X - Not Supported  - Fully Supported Symbols  - Not Applicable - Mostly Supported

130

Table 4.12. North Korea’s Nuclear Timeline and Corresponding Decisions Nuclear PSI-- (Allies and Nuclear Decision Timeline (Level of conflict) Adversaries)

(Medium) Overall (High) Forbearance

Since majority of the MIDs Treaty of friendship, (Some activities 1960-1979 during this period relate to cooperation, and mutual resulted in less the uses of force (Scale 4), assistance signed between forbearance) they have been assigned a DPRK and the Soviet Union Medium value. and China. (Medium) Overall (Low) Non- Since majority of the MIDs 1990- Soviet Union on verge Forbearance during this period relate to of collapse. Drastically the uses of force (Scale 4), diminished aid to DPRK. (Some 1980-1990 they have been assigned a activities Medium value. China pursues closer ties resulted in less with S. Korea. Non- (Political, economic, military forbearance) isolation of DPRK. (Medium) Overall (High) Since majority of the MIDs Signing of the ‘Agreed Forbearance during this period relate to Framework’ and increasing (Some activities 1991-2001 the uses of force (Scale 4), aid by the U.S. and the ROK resulted in less they have been assigned a diminish threat perception. forbearance) Medium value. (High) Overall (Low)

First nuclear test conducted ‘Agreed Framework’ Non- 2002-2006 by North Korea of significant Collapses. No security Forbearance consequence. guarantees from either Russia or China. (Low) Overall (High) Feb. 2007- March No MIDs during this period. Six Party Talks pledge Forbearance 2009 renewed aid to DPRK.

April 2009- (High) Overall (Low) 2010 Non- Second nuclear test DPRK conducts second Forbearance conducted by North Korea is nuclear test. Not concerned of significant consequence. with reciprocal actions by either allies or adversaries.

131

Chapter Five

Taiwan

This chapter examines the nuclear decisions of Taiwan, hereinafter also referred to as the

ROC. It begins by discussing these decisions in the time period from 1949 (with the proclamation of the PRC) until 2007, a period of high interdependence in the region.

Nuclear decisions by Taiwan are categorized as forbearance or non-forbearance as the case may be. It then measures both forbearance and non-forbearance in terms of technological and non technological indicators. The time period varies for each case and corresponds to its nuclear decisions. For example, Taiwan had four phases in its nuclear decisions: 1949-1966 (Forbearance); 1967-1976 (Non-Forbearance); 1977-1989

(Forbearance); and 1990-2007 (Forbearance). The parameters for choosing the timeline have been enunciated in chapter 2. However, not all phases associated with forbearance were marked by policies geared entirely towards forbearance. For example, the period

(1977-1989) although predominantly marked by forbearance also had some indicators of non-forbearance that resulted in a policy of relative or lesser forbearance.

In the next step, the ROC’s nuclear decisions are empirically analyzed in terms of technological and non technological indicators. Having done this, the chapter tests if the level of conflict, as the theory predicts, was a determining factor in the ROC’s nuclear decisions, both forbearance and non-forbearance, by testing two sets of hypotheses.

H1a: States with high levels of conflict will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H1b: States with medium or low levels of conflict will exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

132

With respect to the first hypotheses, the tests indicate that the ROC exercised a policy of forbearance during the only period it experienced high levels of conflict. H1a is therefore not supported. However, the ROC’s deviant behavior during this period can be explained with respect to the second variable, namely politico-security interdependence.

With respect to the second hypotheses H1b, the tests indicate that the ROC exercised a policy of forbearance in two of the three periods that it experienced medium to low levels of conflict. H1b is therefore mostly supported. However, Taiwan’s deviant behavior during one period can be explained with respect to the theory’s alternate explanation on security guarantees and conventional capabilities.

Likewise, the chapter then shows if politico- security interdependence was a determining factor in the ROC’s nuclear decisions, both forbearance and non-forbearance by testing two additional sets of hypotheses.

H2a: States possessing, in the aggregate, low levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H2b: States possessing, in the aggregate, high levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries are most likely to exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

With respect to politico-security interdependence, the tests indicate that the theory does explain the ROC’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. For example, a policy of forbearance by the ROC was always associated with overall, high levels of politico- security interdependence with its allies and adversaries. H2b: is therefore fully supported. Likewise, a policy of non-forbearance by the ROC was associated with overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence with its allies and adversaries.

133

H2a: is also, therefore, fully supported. Therefore, with respect to politico-security interdependence, both the hypotheses are supported.

Finally, in concluding the chapter, I summarize all of the above results based on my overall analysis.

5.1 Introduction Taiwan’s nuclear policies have to be seen in the light of its relationship with mainland China, its principal adversary. With the victory of the Communist party on the mainland in 1949 and the subsequent confinement of the Nationalists in Taiwan, relations have continued to remain strained. The PRC asserts that there is only “One China” and

Taiwan is an inalienable part of it. For the Chinese, Taiwan remains a very sensitive issue and unification of the island with the mainland is considered to be a matter of national honor and pride. Chinese culture has traditionally equated “national power and dignity with national unity.”1 Chinese leaders have always reserved the right to use force if necessary to unite the region and have stated so consistently from 1949 to the present.

Sovereignty and security issues coupled with the fear of abandonment by the United

States were the driving factors behind Taiwan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. When the

Chinese exploded a nuclear weapon in 1964, it was a subtle reminder to the Taiwanese authorities on their own vulnerability. The nuclear explosion meant that the PRC now had the potential to annihilate nationalist forces and resulted in Taiwan’s leadership calling for a suitable response. Although alarmed by the nuclear tests and wanting to weaken the

1Derek Mitchell, “Taiwan’s Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence, Abandonment and Honor,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004), p.294.

134

PRC, the United States was averse to provoking a major conflict in the region that had the potential to reunite both Moscow and Beijing.2

5.2 The First Phase: (1949-1966) - Forbearance With the Communist victory and the proclamation of the PRC in 1949, with its capital at Beijing, the Nationalists were forced to flee to Taiwan. The PRC’s overwhelming military superiority meant that the ROC did have serious security concerns and was therefore more inclined to ally with the U.S. A robust security guarantee from the U.S. in the form of a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954 and the stationing of nuclear weapons in Taiwan resulted in the ROC’s security concerns being addressed and its exercising a policy of forbearance for almost two decades. During this period, the ROC also committed itself to several safeguards agreements. The U.S. conducted nuclear safeguards inspection in Taiwan under an agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy signed in 1955. After the international safeguards inspection mechanism was established within IAEA, Taiwan signed an IAEA-ROC-USA "trilateral" safeguards agreement

(INFCIRC/158) at Vienna in 1964, thereby transferring the responsibility of safeguarding nuclear materials from the U.S. to IAEA. Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the island did build its first nuclear reactor at National Tsinghua University in 1956.

However, this did not translate into a serious nuclear program until much later.

5.21 The Second Phase: (1967-1976) -- Non-Forbearance Taiwan’s real focus on a nuclear weapons program is believed to have started in the 1960’s following the Chinese nuclear test in 1964. In a series of cables, President

2Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, from William E. Colby, for Deputy Director of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, “Visit of General Chiang Ching-kuo,” 19 September 1963. Secret Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 Vol.XXII, Microfiche Supplement (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State, 1997). http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB38/document9.pdf.

135

Chiang Kai-shek, requested the U.S. for military action against China's nuclear installations, and also urged the formation of an Asian anti-communist defense organization, and possibly the creation of a common defense force.3 However, this did not happen and many Taiwanese were now skeptical about U.S. commitments to the islands security. President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and the subsequent Sino-U.S. communiqué recognizing “One –China,” only hastened Taiwan’s uneasiness with the direction of U.S. foreign policy.4 Taipei therefore began its own covert nuclear weapons program under the direction of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) and the

Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology. (CIST)

Taiwan’s nuclear weapons program when launched in 1967 was known as the

“Hsin Chu” project and included the purchase of a heavy-water reactor, a heavy-water production plant, and a plutonium separation plant.5 In 1969, a small heavy water reactor was provided by Canada with an assurance that it would be used for peaceful purposes.

Canada also supplied Taiwan with U.S. origin heavy water and 25 metric tons of natural uranium fuel rods. It produced 15 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium by 1975 and about 30 kilograms by 1978.6 Subsequently, the United States provided a small amount of separated plutonium for research purposes, and reprocessing technology, although provided by a French firm, was also sought from the United States, Germany, and other

3David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (January/February 1998),p.57.

4Andrew Nathan, “What’s Wrong with America’s Taiwan Policy, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2(Spring 2000),p.94.

5Mitchell,“Taiwan’s Hsin Chu Program.”p.297.

6Albright and Gay, “Taiwan.”p.57. 136

nations.7 In 1969, Taiwan built a plant to produce natural uranium fuel, a reprocessing facility and a plutonium chemistry laboratory with equipment supplied from France,

Germany and the U.S. The plutonium chemistry laboratory was operating in 1975 or

1976 using a supply of 1075 grams of separated plutonium that the laboratory had received from the U.S. in 1974. Taiwan also possessed one pilot scale fuel fabrication facility at INER. The plant began operating in 1972 or 1973, using a supply of natural uranium from South Africa and was expected to produce about 20-30 metric tons of fuel a year. By April 1973, Taiwan had two heavy water reactors, one heavy-water production plant, and a plutonium separation plant. It also had one plant to produce natural uranium fuel, one reprocessing facility and a plutonium chemistry laboratory with equipment supplied from France, Germany and the U.S. In 1973, the U.S. embassy in Taipei had reported that a Canadian reactor, ostensibly for research purposes, coupled with “the lack of a research program has caused considerable comment among Chinese and foreigners.”8 By 1974, it became apparent to the U.S. that Taiwan was working on a nuclear weapons capability and would be capable of producing a weapon within five years.9

7Matthew Bunn, “Civilian Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Programs: The Record,” Report prepared for the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, June 29, 2001, p.5. Available at http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/nuclear-engineering/22-812j-managing- nuclear-technology-spring 2004/readings/prolif_history.pdf.

8Embassy Taipei to State Department, “Chung Shan Nuclear Research Institute,” cable 1197, February 24, 1973 in Burr, “New Archival Evidence.” Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/

9Albright and Gay, “Taiwan.”p.57. 137

Table 5.0. An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1967-1976) Year Non Forbearance ( Measures) Non-Forbearance ( Measures) Technical Indicators Non-Technical Indicators 1) CIST creates a blueprint for a nuclear weapons program at an estimated cost of 1967 $140 million. 2) The US $140 million Hsin Chu Project is

launched. Taiwan purchases one heavy-water 1967 reactor, a heavy-water production plant, and a plutonium separation plant. 3) (INER), established in 1968 as the sole 1968 national institute in Taiwan specializing in nuclear technology & R&D programs. 4) INER purchases a small heavy water reactor 1969 (40 megawatt) dubbed Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR) from Canada. 5) Taiwan builds a plant to produce natural uranium fuel, a reprocessing facility and a plutonium chemistry laboratory with 1969 equipment supplied from France, Germany and the U.S. 6) Work begins on a reprocessing facility at the Having ratified the NPT in 1970, Taiwan April 1970 “Hot laboratory,” located next to the research was guilty of having violated its reactor. commitment to the NPR by pursuing a nuclear weapons program in the 1970’s. Source: David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (January/February 1998).

5.22 The Third Phase: (1977 – 1989) -- Forbearance In this phase, Taiwan committed itself to a policy of forbearance because of the discoveries made by the U.S. and the IAEA. However, despite an overwhelming emphasis on forbearance, there were also some indicators of non-forbearance during this period that resulted overall in relative forbearance. I begin with Taiwan’s commitment to forbearance.

The IAEA played a vital role in discovering Taiwan’s clandestine nuclear program during the 1970’s. Despite the safeguards agreements (Taiwan had ratified the

NPT in 1970) Taiwan’s statements about its plutonium facilities were ambivalent at best.

As a result, the IAEA initiated concrete steps, including upgrading its surveillance system and verification measures, to inspect all of Taiwan's nuclear facilities and to make the

138

nuclear program more transparent.10 By 1975-76, the Washington Post had also reported that Taiwan was indulging in nuclear activities which needed closer scrutiny.11 From

August-September 1978, U.S. nuclear monitoring of the INER revealed that Taiwan did have a secret uranium enrichment program. All these discoveries led to a more forceful stance by the U.S. and an equally authoritative rejoinder by Chiang that his government

“has no intention whatsoever to develop nuclear weapons or a nuclear device.”12 The

United States eventually embarked on a series of concrete measures to ensure that

Taiwan could not acquire nuclear weapons. These included additional verification arrangements, insisting that Taiwan dismantle its plutonium facilities, and also demanding the return of the U.S.-supplied separated plutonium. The United States also began closely monitoring the actions of Taiwanese scientists by engaging in bilateral nuclear cooperation.13

Indicators of non-forbearance during this period were associated with Taiwan’s second foray into a nuclear weapons program. This program began when Chiang Ching- kuo became President of the ROC in 1978. He began a second nuclear program and by

1987 it was widely believed that Taiwan was only one or two years away from producing a nuclear bomb. However, the United States gathered timely information about this program when a nuclear scientist and U.S. informant, Chang Hsien-i, defected to the

10Mitchell, “Taiwan’s Hsin Chu Program,”p.299.

11Edward Schumacher, “Taiwan Seen Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel,” Washington Post, August 29, 1976.

12Fox Butterfield, “Taiwan Denying Atomic Operation,” New York Times, September 5,1976.

13Albright and Gay, “Taiwan.”pp.58-59. 139

United States.14 Following this event, Chiang Ching kou’s successor President Lee Teng-

Hui gave a written guarantee to President Reagan that Taiwan would conclusively end its nuclear program. This commitment towards a policy of forbearance was further corroborated by Defense Minister Tang Fei’s statement that Taiwan would “never develop nuclear weapons.”15

Table 5.1. An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1977-1989) Year Forbearance (Measures) Forbearance ( Measures) Technical Indicators Non-Technical Indicators 1) Taiwan agrees for every fuel element in the core of 1976-1977 the research reactor to be radioactively scanned by ------scientists from Los Alamos National Laboratory.

1977 2) Taiwan dismantles its reprocessing facilities under pressure from the U.S. ------

1978 3) Taiwan returns 863 grams of plutonium in 1978 to the U.S. ------4) To reduce the amount of weapons grade plutonium, 1978 Taiwan agrees to convert the research reactor to a ------new core that used both low enriched uranium oxide and natural uranium fuel assemblies. 5) Taiwan agrees to shut down the Taiwan Research 1988 Reactor (TRR) in 1988 for conversion to a new pool ------type, light water cooled and heavy water moderated reactor Not all activities were related to forbearance during this period Technical Indicator of Non-Forbearance

1987 1) INER began building a multiple hot cell facility in violation of its 1976 commitment.16 ------Source: David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (January/February 1998)

14Foreign Broadcast Information Services Report, (FBIS) “PRC Media Response to Taiwan Nuclear Weapons Debate Low-key,” Friday, November 12, 2004. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/taiwan/fbis111204.html.

15Victor Lai, “Taiwan Reiterates Never to Develop Nuclear Arms,” Central News Agency, January 5, 2000. (FBIS-CHI-2000-0105).

16Albright and Gay, “Taiwan,”p.59.

140

5.23 The Final Phase: (1990-2007) -- Forbearance Since the 1990’s, Taiwan has not made any effort towards acquiring nuclear weapons. While some argue that Taiwan’s nuclear program has been irrevocably shut down, there are others who believe that the program has only been suspended and could be quickly restarted should the need arise. Today, Taiwan has a fairly advanced civilian nuclear facility that produces about 20 percent of its electricity needs. Although Taiwan is not a member of the IAEA, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) confirms to the IAEA code and guidance. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed to a Model Protocol for additional safeguards. The government’s current policy is to not “develop, produce, store, use or acquire nuclear weapons.” Taiwan is currently placed in the category of “abstaining countries” having the technical capability but not the political desire to develop nuclear weapons. As Wei and Wang argue, “Although it depends on the United States for its security commitments, yet it maintains its position as a “virtual proliferant,” through the technological infrastructure of a civilian nuclear program.”17 On July 28, 1995, following

Chinese threats ahead of the Presidential and legislative elections, President Lee Teng-hui re-opened the nuclear question by arguing that Taiwan “should re-study the question from a long-term point of view.” Although he did subsequently retract his statement, yet the Taiwanese leadership did indicate that the political will to develop nuclear weapons was there.18 In the light of diminished security guarantees from the U.S., Taiwan’s best strategy has been ambiguity in it nuclear policy.

17 Wei – Cheng Wang, “Taiwan, Conventional Deterrence, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Option” in Muthiah Alagappa ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press, 2008),pp.416-417.

18Gerald Segal, “Taiwan’s Nuclear Card,” The Asian Wall Street Journal, August 5, 1998. 141

5.3 Taiwan: Prudential Realism and Nuclear Forbearance In this section, I endeavor to test the theoretical validity of prudential realism whose explanations for nuclear forbearance are based on two key variables namely, level of conflict and politico-security interdependence.

5.31 Level of Conflict With respect to the level of conflict, the main premise of H1a is that -- States with high levels of conflict will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. Likewise the main premise of H1b is that -- States with medium or low levels of conflict will exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. So if I see that Taiwan was not exercising a policy of forbearance for all of the periods it possessed high levels of conflict, then H1a is supported. Likewise, if I see Taiwan exercising a policy of forbearance whenever it possessed medium to low levels of conflict, then H1b is supported. Did Taiwan’s nuclear history conform to this pattern? I begin by briefly examining Taiwan’s enduring rivalry with the PRC.

Taiwan did and continues to have a protracted conflict with the PRC over issues related to territory and ideology. The conflict is intense, severe and of an enduring nature. Table (5.2) illustrates the MIDs between Taiwan and the PRC.

142

Table 5.2 -PRC-ROC Militarized Disputes, 1949-1996: Correlates of War Project Data, (Revised) 19

Serial Dates of Dispute Casualties Cause of Conflict Scale20 No. 1. 1.10.49 – 07.08.50 >18,000 territory 5 (Civil war)

2. 16.02.51-16.10.52 <25 territory 4 3. 11.02.53-19.01.54 >3,000 territory 4 4. 24.08.54-27.11.55 >900 territory 5 ( First Taiwan crisis)

5. 08.06.56-04.10.56 0 territory 2 6. 22.07.56-08.08.56 0 policy 2 7. 12.06.57-13.06.57 <25 territory 4 8. 22.07.58-19.12.58 >2300 territory 5 (Second Taiwan crisis) 9. 20.03.59-11.05.59 0 regime/government 2 10. 07.01.62-19.12.62 101-250 regime/government 4 11. 06.02.63-09.01.66 ? regime/government 2 12. 17.10.66 <25 regime/government 4 13. 08.09.67 ? regime/government 2 14. 08.06.87-30.09.87 0 policy 2 15. 29.04.88-09.12.88 0 policy 2 16. 09.02.91-03.03.91 0 policy 2 17. 21.07.95-25.08.95 0 policy 3 (Third Taiwan Crisis) 18. 08.03.96-25.03.96 0 policy 3 (Third Taiwan Crisis)

19Brian Job, Andre Laliberte and Michael Wallace, “Assessing the Risks of Conflict in the PRC- ROC Enduring Rivalry, “Pacific Affairs, Vol.72, No. 4(Winter, 1999-2000), p. 518. The MIDs in Table 4.2 do not include a spate of cross border hijackings that took place in 1993 and 1994. There were 12 hijackings that occurred over the years 1993 and 1994. Of the fourteen flights hijacked, twelve were bound for cities on China’s southeastern coast. These have not been included as they were instigated by disgruntled elements within the PRC and not by ROC officials. From Table 5.2, it is evident that despite the protracted conflicts and enduring nature of their rivalry, not all the periods were associated with high conflict. For example, there were periods of medium and low conflict even as there were no changes in the issues (territorial and ideological) that generated these conflicts.

20MIDs have been assigned a scale from 1-5 based on the correlates of war scale.

143

Table 5.3. Ratio Analysis of Militarized Interstate Disputes 10 Year Figures Number of disputes Ratios between 2 decades (based on Table 5.2) 1950-1959 9 Ratio of disputes (1969 to 1959)

1960-1969 4 1:2 approx.

1980-1989 2 Ratio of disputes (1999 to 1989)

1990-1999 3 3:2 approx.

Table -5.4. An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict21 Level of Nuclear Conflict Nature of Dispute Period Scale Timeline (X1) Value

1. Territory -- End of Chinese civil war; Battle of Kuningtou; Communist 1949-50 conquest of Hainan Island and capture of Wanshan and Zoushan Island.22 5 2. Territorial Dispute 16.02.51-16.10.52 4 4 3. Territorial Dispute 11.02.53-19.01.54

5 4. Territorial Dispute 24.08.54-27.11.55 (First Taiwan crisis)

(High) 1949-1966 5. Territorial Dispute 08.06.56-04.10.56 2

6. Policy Dispute 22.07.56-08.08.56 4

7. Territorial Dispute 12.06.57-13.06.57 4 5 8. Territorial Dispute 22.07.58-19.12.58 (Second Taiwan crisis) 9. Dispute over regime/government 20.03.59-11.05.59 2

10. Dispute over regime/government 07.01.62-19.12.62 4

11. First Chinese nuclear test 10.16.1964 4

21From Table 5.4, it is evident that despite the protracted conflicts and enduring nature of their rivalry, not all the periods were associated with high conflict. There were periods of medium and low conflict even as there were no changes in the issues (territorial and ideological) that generated these conflicts.

22Roderick MacFarquhar, John K. Fairbank and Denis C Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge University Press, 1991),p.820. 144

12. Dispute over regime/government 06.02.63-09.01.66 2

13. Dispute over regime/government 17.10.66 4 Since the level of conflict during this period includes the Chinese Civil War and the first two Taiwan Crises that resulted in considerable fatalities, it has been assigned a high value. 1967-1976 (Low) 1. Dispute over regime/government 08.09.67 2 Since the level of conflict during this period only involved the threat of military force, it has been assigned a low value. 1. Policy Dispute 08.06.87-30.09.87 2 1977-1989 (Low) 1. Policy Dispute 29.04.88-09.12.88 2 Since the level of conflict during this period only involved the threat of military force, it has been assigned a low value. 1. Policy Dispute 09.02.91-03.03.91 2 3 2. Policy Dispute 21.07.95-25.08.95 (Third Taiwan 1990-2007 (Medium) Crisis)* 3 3. Policy Dispute 08.03.96-25.03.96 (Third Taiwan Crisis) Unlike the first two Taiwan crisis, the third crisis only involved a display of force and hence the level of conflict has been assigned a medium value.

*The Third Taiwan crisis did not involve any war and only a show of force. Hence it has been ranked on a scale of 3.

5.32 How did the Level of Conflict (X1) influence nuclear decisions? With respect to the level of conflict, the tests indicate that Taiwan exercised a

policy of nuclear forbearance during the only period that it experienced high levels of

conflict. H1a is therefore not supported. However, Taiwan’s deviant behavior during this

period can be explained with respect to the second variable namely politico-security

interdependence.

With respect to the second hypotheses H1b, the tests indicate that the ROC

exercised a policy of forbearance in two of the three periods that it experienced medium

to low levels of conflict. H1b is therefore overall, mostly supported. However, Taiwan’s

deviant behavior during one period (1967-1976) can be explained with respect to the

theory’s alternate explanation on security guarantees and conventional capabilities. I

145

focus here on Taiwan’s conventional capabilities. By the 1970’s, China was a nuclear weapons state and possessed a significant conventional advantage over Taiwan. Not only was Taiwan’s conventional strength declining but so was its military expenditure. For example, China’s armed forces were about ten times as large as Taiwan’s in the 1970’s while Taiwan’s military expenditure declined on an average by 8 percent between 1961 and 1987.23 Therefore, Taiwan’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons from 1967-1976 as a result of declining conventional capabilities does vindicate the theory’s alternate explanations in this regard.

Taiwan’s subsequent military modernization program did result in enhanced conventional capabilities but this modernization did not commence until the 1990’s. In

August 1993, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) issued its “ROC Military Ten- year Force Target Program” to describe its plans to fundamentally reform the armed forces in three stages.24 As a result of this policy, U.S. arms transfers have been significant. “The value of deliveries of U.S. defense articles and services to Taiwan totaled $4.0 billion in the 2002-2005 period and $3.5 billion in 2006-2009. Among customers worldwide, Taiwan ranked 4th (behind Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia) in

2002-2005 and 4th (behind Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt) in 2006-2009.”25

23Solingen, Nuclear Logics,pp.105-106.

24Dr. Alexander C. Huang, “Taiwan’s Defense Modernization for the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities,” Paper prepared for the Conference on War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Duke University, February, 1999,p.16.

25Shirley A. Kan,“Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” CRS Report for Congress, dated February 24, 2011,p.1. 146

Table 5.5. Taiwan’s Defense Budgets* % of total government % of GDP Fiscal year Military budget (US$ bil.) Spending

1994 9.8 3.8 24.3

1995 9.5 3.5 24.5

1996 9.5 3.4 22.8

1997 9.4 3.3 22.5

1998 8.2 3.2 22.4

1999 8.8 3.2 21.6

2000 12.9 2.9 17.4

2001 8.0 2.9 16.5

2002 7.5 2.7 16.4

2003 7.6 2.6 15.5

2004 7.8 2.4 16.7

2005 8.0 2.3 16.1

2006 7.8 2.1 16.1

2007 9.2 2.4 18.7

2008 10.5 2.5 20.2

Source: Shirley A. Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” CRS Report for Congress, February 24, 2011, p.32.

*Barring one year (2006) Taiwan’s military budget has been steadily increasing since 2002. Strengthening Taiwan’s defense entails more than force modernization alone. The transformation of the military is an equally important component of Taiwan’s defense modernization program and is an effort to reduce the disparity in the conventional force structure with the PRC.

Taiwan’s force modernization resulted in a re-interpretation of Taiwan’s ability to singularly defend itself. Michael O’Hanlon, in an article published in International

147

Security in 2000, concluded that Taiwan could defend itself against an amphibious assault even without U.S. intervention, and would likely be able to do so until 2010.26

However, as of 2008, the PRC not only remained a nuclear weapons state, it also possessed a far greater conventional advantage that showed no signs of diminishing.

Table 5.6. – Conventional Military Balance – 2008. (PRC v ROC) Taiwan Strait Military Balance Ground Forces

China Taiwan

Total Taiwan Strait Area Total

Personnel (Active) 1.25 million 440,000 130,000

Group Armies 18 8 3

Infantry Divisions 19 8 0

Infantry Brigades 24 11 8

Mechanized Infantry Divisions 4 1 0

Mechanized Infantry Brigades 5 1 3

Armor Divisions 9 4 0

Armor Brigades 8 3 5

Artillery Divisions 2 2 0

Artillery Brigades 17 6 5

Airborne Divisions 3 3 0

Amphibious Divisions 2 2 0

Amphibious Brigades 3 3 3

Tanks 6,700 2,800 1,100

Artillery Pieces 7,400 2,900 1,600

Source: Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008

26Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security,Vol. 23, No.2(Fall, 2000). 148

5.4 Politico-Security Interdependence (X2) and Nuclear Decisions With respect to politico-security interdependence, the main premise of H2a is that

Likewise, if I see Taiwan exercising a policy of forbearance whenever it possessed overall, high politico-security interdependence then H2b is supported. Did Taiwan’s nuclear history conform to this pattern? In this section, I examine Taiwan’s politico- security interdependence with its allies and adversaries and how the level of interdependence influenced its nuclear decisions. The time period begins in 1949 with the establishment of the PRC and corresponds thereafter to each phase of the ROC’s nuclear program.

5.41 The First Phase: (1949-1966) –High Politico-Security Interdependence with the United States The establishment of the PRC in 1949, and the PRC’s overwhelming military superiority meant that the ROC faced considerable security threats. However, during this period, Taiwan did have an alliance relationship with the United States in 1954 in the form of a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) which provided for military aid and support in case either side was attacked. “In fact, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan went so far as to include the stationing of nuclear capable weapons on Taiwanese territory in the

149

1950’s.”27 Following the signing of the treaty, the US government deployed the Matador missiles in 1956, the Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft missiles in 1958 and maintained a robust military presence that reassured the Taiwanese about U.S. security commitments to the region.28 Aggregate politico-security interdependence was high resulting in a policy of forbearance.

5.42 The Second Phase: (1967-1976) – Lower Politico-Security Interdependence Taiwan initiated a nuclear weapons program in the 1960’s with key assistance from the United States. The nuclear weapons program was driven by a heightened sense of insecurity following China’s explosion of a nuclear device in 1964 and declining security commitments from the U.S. However, the U.S. initiated four measures in the late

1960’s and early 70s, including recognition of the PRC, the implementation of the Nixon doctrine, signing the Shanghai communiqué and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from

Taiwan, which served to heighten the threat perception of Taiwan. PSI with the U.S. was now low. When Chiang Kai Sheik failed in his efforts to persuade U.S. President Lyndon

Johnson to strike at China’s fledgling nuclear facility, he decided that the ROC had to develop its own nuclear capabilities.29 The ROC’s PSI with the U.S. was high but at lower levels when compared to other periods. Aggregate politico-security interdependence was low during the 1960’s and mid 1970’s resulting in a policy of non- forbearance by Taiwan.

27Hersman and Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns,” p.543.

28Neerada Jacob, “The Sanctions Impact on Nuclear Reversal: A Case Study of Taiwan,” Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, March 26-29, 2008,p.10.

29Wei – Wang, “Taiwan, Conventional Deterrence, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Option,” pp.411- 414. 150

5.43 The Third Phase: (1977-1989)—High Politico-Security Interdependence During the mid 1970’s and 1980’s, U.S. intelligence was convinced that Taiwan was seeking a nuclear capability. The United States had considerable leverage in controlling Taiwan’s nuclear program and initiated a total of 5 reciprocal measures during this period, forcing Taiwan to halt its nuclear program. First, in the summer of

1976, U.S. concerns about Taiwanese interest in nuclear reprocessing triggered a U.S. demarche (protest). Second, when further suspicious activities were detected at INER, the State Department demanded that the research be reoriented so that it was more relevant to producing power than weapons. Third, Taiwan was to include all present and future nuclear facilities and materials under the U.S.-ROC bilateral agreement for nuclear cooperation, which would ensure that all activities were compatible with civilian uses only. Fourth, Taiwan was to “terminate all fuel cycle activities and reorient facilities involving or leading to weapons-usable materials.” This ensured that uranium enrichment and heavy water production capabilities were ruled out. Finally, operations at the TRR had to be suspended and Taiwan would transfer all plutonium to the United States and avoid any program that was deemed to have applications for weapons development.30 In

April of 1977, Premier Chiang agreed to U.S. demands to make such changes. In the same year, the United States initiated 2 additional measures to ensure that Taiwan could not acquire nuclear weapons. These included additional verification arrangements, insisting that Taiwan dismantle its plutonium facilities, and also demanding the return of

30William Burr, ed., ‘The United States and Taiwan's Nuclear Program, 1976-1980: Intervention in the Nuclear Activities of a Vulnerable Ally.’ National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No. 221, posted June 15, 2007. Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb221/index.htm.

151

the U.S.-supplied separated plutonium. The United States also began closely monitoring the actions of Taiwanese scientists by engaging in bilateral nuclear cooperation.31 When the nuclear program was restarted by President Chiang Ching Kuo, the United States reciprocated with two additional measures. First, it announced the suspension of heavy water shipments and second it shut down, with the help of the IAEA, the TRR and hot cell facility. 32

Taiwan’s politico-security interdependence with the U.S. was high because the

ROC was conscious of the fact that any decision to pursue nuclear weapons would result in costly reciprocal actions from the U.S. “The United States was not only one of the main sources of foreign investment for Taiwan; it was also its provider of weapons and its principal supplier of low enriched uranium for its power reactors.” 33 Since Taiwan was heavily dependent on the United States militarily, it eventually abandoned its nuclear program. According to Premier Chiang, his country's vulnerability and its “unique relationship” with the United States allowed the latter to deal with Taiwan “in a fashion which few other countries would tolerate.”34 Aggregate politico-security interdependence was high resulting in a policy of forbearance.

31Albright and Gay, “Taiwan.”pp.58-59.

32Ibid,p.59.

33Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.112.

34William Burr, “The Taiwanese Nuclear Case: Lessons for Today,” Report prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 9, 2007. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19491.

152

5.44 The Final Phase: (1990-2007) – High Politico-Security Interdependence Since 1990, Taiwan’s official position has been that it will not involve itself in a nuclear weapons program.35 Newly elected President Lee Teng- Hui gave a written guarantee to President Reagan that Taiwan would conclusively end its nuclear program.

By October 2008, the United States had agreed to sell Taiwan $6.4 billion worth of military equipment.36 In 2010, the Obama administration announced the sale of $6 billion worth of defense equipment to Taiwan thereby reaffirming U.S. commitment to its ally.37

With respect to its adversary, Taiwan feared the PRC’s response. Given Taiwan’s size and resource capabilities, the development of nuclear weapons increased the risk of reciprocal action, in the form of a pre-emptive strike, by the PRC and was therefore considered a liability.38 Aggregate politico- security interdependence was high during this period resulting in a policy of forbearance.

35“MND Refutes Nuclear Bomb Ploy.”China Post, December 23,1997.

36Michael Roberge and Youkyung Lee, “China –Taiwan Relations,” Report Prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations, August 11, 2009. Available http://www.cfr.org/china/china- taiwan-relations/p9223.

37John Pomfret, “U.S. sells weapons to Taiwan, angering China,” Washington Post, January 30, 2010. 38Mitchell, “Taiwan’s Hsin Chu Program,”p.303.

153

Table 5.7. – An Empirical Analysis of Politico- Security Interdependence (PSI) Nuclear PSI Reciprocal Decisions by Ally (U.S.) PSI with Reciprocal Timeline with Ally Adversary-- Decision by (PRC) (PRC) Offers credible security guarantees in the form of a 1949-1966 (High) Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954 & a nuclear umbrella. (Moderate ) PRC conducts nuclear test.

U.S. initiates 4 decisions (High)

1967-1976 but 1) Recognizes PRC in 1971 ------

(Lower 2) Implements Nixon Doctrine, 1969. (Moderate) compared 3) 1972, President Nixon visits China and signs

to other Shanghai Communiqué.

periods) 4) 1974 -- Withdraws nuclear weapons from ROC.39

U.S. convinced about Taiwan’s nuclear program. Phase 1 - Initiates 5 measures in stages: 1977-1989 (High) 1) U.S. issues demarche. 2) U.S. insists that Taiwan dismantle its fuel cycle activities leading to weapons-usable materials. 3) Insists that operations at Taiwan Research ------Reactor (TRR) have to be suspended.

1977, U.S. initiates 2 new measures: 1) Insists on additional verification measures. (Moderate) 2) Keeps Tab on Taiwanese scientists. In response to Taiwan’s second nuclear program U.S. initiates 2 measures 1. 1987- U.S. suspends heavy water shipments. 2. 1988- U.S. & IAEA shut down TRR and hot cell facility. In response to Taiwan’s decision of forbearance: PRC responds with more

1990-2007 (High) 1. U.S. increases arms sales, over the years. $ 484 meetings and

million arms delivery in 1988.40 $6 billion sale agrees to (Moderate) confirmed in 2010. resume semi- . official dialogue Source: Mitchell, “Taiwan’s Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence, Abandonment and Honor,” Albright and Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted.”

39Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.103.

40Jeff Abramson, “U.S. Conventional Arms Sales to Taiwan,” Arms Control Association, Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/taiwanarms.

154

Table 5.8. A Net Assessment of ROC’s Politico- Security Interdependence (PSI) Years Allies Adversaries Sum of interdep. Overall PSI** Allies & adversaries 1949-1966 High with U.S. Moderate with China* High/Moderate High

1967-1976 High but Lower with Moderate with China Low/Moderate Low U.S. 1977-1989 High with U.S. Moderate with China High/Moderate High

1990-2007 High with U.S. Moderate with China High/Moderate High

*The PSI was high with the U.S. because Taiwan’s decisions were always linked to those of the U.S. The PSI with China was moderate because China would always be expected to respond to any Taiwanese nuclear moves, so Taiwan had to calculate this in their decisions. At the same time, China did not specifically threaten military strikes etc if Taiwan went nuclear and China had a nuclear program regardless of what Taiwan did in its nuclear activities.

**Overall PSI has been ascertained on the basis of Taiwan’s relations with the U.S. Although China was expected to respond to moves by Taiwan, yet Taiwan’s nuclear program was largely influenced by its economic and military relationship with the U.S. Therefore, PSI with the U.S. remained high in all but one period. In the only period that Taiwan’s PSI was low (1967-1976), it exercised a policy of non-forbearance.

5.45 Having examined how the ROC’s politico- security interdependence, with both its allies and adversaries, influenced its nuclear decisions, I now test whether these decisions were in conformity with the claims of prudential realism in this regard. I first examine

H2b. With the culmination of the civil war, Taiwan faced an increasing security threat from the communist regime in the PRC. However, a robust security guarantee from the

U.S. in the form of a MDT in 1954 and the stationing of nuclear weapons in Taiwan assuaged the ROC’s security concerns and resulted in the ROC exercising a policy of forbearance for almost two decades. The U.S. did also have a troop presence in Taiwan during this period. It ranged from 811 to 4,174 troops in 1954, peaking in 1958 at 19,000 and then stabilizing between 4,000 and 10,000 until 1977.41 Politico-security interdependence with the U.S. was high during this period, (1949-1966) as Taiwan

41Tim Kane, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003,” A Report of the Heritage Center for Data Analysis, October 27, 2004,p.4. 155

possessed credible security guarantees from the U.S., resulting in a policy of nuclear forbearance. Likewise, politico-security interdependence was high from 1977-1989 because despite the abrogation of the MDT, Taiwan was heavily dependent on the United

States both militarily and financially. “The United States was not only one of the main sources of foreign investment for Taiwan; it was also its provider of weapons and its principal supplier of low enriched uranium for its power reactors.”42 This period was also associated with a policy of forbearance. The final phase from 1990-2007 was also one of high politico-security interdependence resulting in a policy of forbearance. Any decision to pursue a nuclear weapons program would have resulted in costly reciprocal actions

(both financial and military) on the part of the United States resulting in serious consequences for the ROC. Also, the ROC was aware of the consequences of arming and wanted to avoid creating an intense negative security externality for other actors, both allies and adversaries that would be affected.43 Politico-security interdependence was, however, moderate with respect to the PRC, because China would always be expected respond to any Taiwanese nuclear moves and so Taiwan had to calculate this in its decisions. Therefore, Taiwan exercised a policy of forbearance during each of the three periods she experienced overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. This analysis fully supports H2b.

However, not all of the ROC’s decisions were related to forbearance. A series of measures initiated by the United States in the 1970’s not only diminished its status as a dependent ally but also heightened Taiwan’s vulnerability within the region. These

42Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.112.

43Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.15. 156

included the decision to recognize the PRC as the legitimate representative of the mainland; Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, the Shanghai Communiqué that recognized

‘One China’; the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Taiwan in 1974 and the abrogation of the MDT in 1979 and its replacement with the Taiwan Relations Act.

(TRA)44 “The TRA replaced an expiring MDT and a debate ensued around the enactment of the TRA as to whether it should replicate the MDT's security guarantee. Proposals to incorporate such a guarantee were eventually rejected.”45 Taiwan thus exercised a policy of non-forbearance during the only period she experienced overall, low levels of politico- security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. Based on this analysis, H2a is also fully supported.

5.5 Conclusion With respect to the level of conflict, I conclude that prudential realism does not fully explain the ROC’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. Taiwan had four phases in its nuclear history. (1949-1966, 1967-1976, 1977-1989 and 1990-2007) With respect to the first hypotheses, the evidence suggests that Taiwan exercised a policy of nuclear forbearance during the only period it experienced high levels of conflict. (1949-1966)

H1a is therefore not supported. With respect to the second hypotheses H1b, the evidence suggests that Taiwan exercised a policy of forbearance in two of the three periods that it experienced medium to low levels of conflict. (1977-1989 & 1990-2007) H1b is therefore overall, mostly supported. However, Taiwan’s deviant behavior during one period (1967-1976), where it did not exercise a policy of forbearance, can be explained

44Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.103.

45Ted Galen Carpenter and Justin Logan, “The Trouble with Taiwan,” Taiwan Economic News, March 11, 2005. 157

with respect to the theory’s alternate explanation on security guarantees and conventional capabilities. With respect to politico-security interdependence, the ROC always exercised a policy of forbearance while experiencing overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. (1949-1966, 1977-1989 and 1990-2007)

H2b is therefore fully supported. Likewise, the ROC exercised a policy of non- forbearance during the only period she experienced overall, low levels of politico- security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. (1967-1976) H2a is also therefore, fully supported.

Table 5.9. Summary of Results Nuclear H1a H1b H2a H2b Nuclear Decision Timeline 1949-1966 X    Forbearance

1967-1976  X   Non-Forbearance

1977-1989     Forbearance 1990-2007     Forbearance

Net H1a H1b H2a H2b

Assessment

X  

 - Fully Supported X - Not supported Symbols  - Not Applicable - Mostly supported

158

Table 5.10. - Taiwan’s Nuclear Timeline Nuclear Level of Conflict PSI-- (Allies and Nuclear Decision Timeline Adversaries) (High ) Overall (High) Forbearance Includes the Chinese 1954 - U.S. signs defense Civil War and the first treaty and is committed to 1949-66 two Taiwan Crises that ROC’s defense. Economic aid resulted in begins. considerable fatalities. (Low) Overall (Low) Non- ROC perceives existential Forbearance Level of conflict only threat following PRC’s nuclear involved the threat of test. 1967-76 military force. U.S. initiates several steps that heighten threat perception.( Nixon visit to China, Shanghai communiqué etc) ( Low) Overall (High) Forbearance ROC dependent on U.S. Level of conflict only Military aid and civilian (There were 1977-89 involved the threat of nuclear co-operation. some activities military force. related to non- Extremely cognizant of forbearance reciprocal actions by U.S. (Medium) Overall (High)

1990-2007 Includes the third ROC dependent on U.S. Forbearance Taiwan Straits crisis. military aid and heavy water However, there was shipments for power plants. only a display of force. U.S. increases arms sales to Taiwan substantially.

2007- Bilateral trade between China and Taiwan peaks at $102 billion.46

46Roberge and Lee, “China-Taiwan Relations,” Available at http://www.cfr.org/china/china- taiwan-relations/p9223.

159

Chapter Six

Egypt

This chapter examines the nuclear decisions of Egypt, a state situated in a high conflict zone. It begins by examining these decisions across the time period from 1948 to 2007.

The time period begins with Egypt’s initial foray into a nuclear program and concludes with Egypt emerging as a key regional player. Decisions made by Egypt to not acquire nuclear weapons or to embark on a nuclear program for peaceful purposes are categorized under forbearance. Likewise, all decisions to initiate a nuclear weapons program or acquire nuclear weapons have been examined under non-forbearance. Egypt had four phases in its nuclear decisions -- 1948-1959 (Forbearance); 1960-1969 (Non-

Forbearance); 1970-1980 (Forbearance) and 1981 to 2007 (Forbearance continues under a new regime). However, in the last period, there were also some indicators of non- forbearance that resulted in relative or lesser forbearance.

In the next step, Egypt’s nuclear decisions are empirically analyzed in terms of technological and non technological indicators. Having done this, the chapter tests if the level of conflict, as the theory predicts, was a determining factor in Egypt’s nuclear decisions, both forbearance and non-forbearance, by testing two sets of hypotheses.

H1a: States with high levels of conflict will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H1b: States with medium or low levels of conflict will exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

With respect to the first hypotheses, the tests indicate that Egypt did not exercise a policy of forbearance, in only one of the three periods that it experienced high levels of conflict. H1a is therefore, only partially supported. However, Egypt’s deviant behavior

160

during two other periods can be explained with respect to the theory’s alternate explanations regarding security guarantees and superior conventional capabilities. On the contrary, H1b is fully supported because Egypt exercised a policy of forbearance during the only period it experienced low levels of conflict.

Likewise, the chapter then shows if politico- security interdependence was a determining factor in Egypt’s nuclear decisions, both forbearance and non-forbearance by testing two additional sets of hypotheses.

H2a: States possessing, in the aggregate, low levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H2b: States possessing, in the aggregate, high levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries are most likely to exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

With respect to politico-security interdependence, the tests indicate that the theory does explain the Egypt’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. For example, Egypt exercised a policy of forbearance whenever it had overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence with its allies and adversaries. H2b is thus fully supported. Likewise,

Egypt exercised a policy of non-forbearance in the only period she experienced overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. This supports H2a:. With respect to politico-security interdependence, both the hypotheses are therefore fully supported.

Finally, in concluding the chapter, I summarize all of the above results based on my overall analysis.

6.1 Introduction Situated at the crossroads of the African and Asian continents and next to Israel,

Egypt has for long been influential as a regional and even an international political

161

power. A key player in the establishment of the Non Aligned movement, Egypt has played a pivotal role in contemporary Middle Eastern and global affairs.1 Its chief adversary Israel, with whom it had an enduring rivalry, possesses both, nuclear weapons and a significant conventional advantage. Egypt always viewed its nuclear asymmetry with Israel as unacceptable and was strongly committed to redressing this imbalance.2

Given its strategic location and rivalry with Israel, Egypt should have had the biggest incentive to develop nuclear weapons. Was this the case? I begin by examining Egypt’s nuclear decisions.

6.2 The First Phase: (1948-1959)3-- Nuclear Forbearance Egypt’s early initiation into a nuclear program began some years after the conclusion of the Arab –Israeli war when President Nasser founded the Atomic Energy

Commission (AEC), now known as the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) and established the Center for Nuclear Research.4 The Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority was largely

1From its strategic rivalry with Israel, Egypt has moved on to become a key representative of the peace process in the region. In a radical shift from the Nasser era, President Sadat shifted Egypt from a policy of confrontation with Israel to one of peaceful accommodation through negotiations. Since Camp David, Egypt has been a staunch ally of the U.S. and the beneficiary of substantial; U.S. aid. President Mubarak who succeeded Anwar Sadat has maintained Egypt's commitment to the Camp David peace process, while at the same time re-establishing Egypt's position as an Arab leader. Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League in 1989 and continues to play a moderating role in such international fora as the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement. As a major regional player, it has sought a key role in the Israeli Palestinian issue and is very often relied on to solve complex issues.

2Robert Einhorn, “Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non- Nuclear Course,” in Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn and Mitchell Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004), p.43. Gamal Abdel Nasser stated that if Israel produced nuclear weapons, so would Egypt. See Khalil Shikaki, “The Nuclearization Debates: The Cases of Israel and Egypt,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.4, No.3 (Summer 1985), p.85.

3This timeline has been chosen because of the Arab-Israeli war and Egypt’s subsequent initiation of a peaceful nuclear program.

4IAEA, “Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Egypt,” Available at www-pub.iaea.org. 162

responsible for the country’s civilian nuclear program and was located at Inshas near

Cairo. Ibrahim Hilmy Abdel Rahman was the first Secretary General of the AEA and was responsible for nuclear developments in Egypt until 1958. During the initial stages of the program, a number of scientists were sent abroad for training. Requests for cooperation in the nuclear field were also sought from the Soviet Union and India. In 1957, Egypt and the Soviet Union signed a protocol for cooperation in the nuclear field which allowed the

Soviet Union to build the first Egyptian research reactor, named ETRR-1, a 2MWt light- water reactor at Inshas. The IAEA subsequently helped Egypt to update the reactor and improve its safety standards. “The development of Egypt’s nuclear programme under

Nasser reflected both his personal ambition and the general regional security perspectives and developments at the time.” 5 Whether Nasser intended this infrastructure to serve military or exclusively peaceful purposes is a matter of considerable debate among scholars.6 However, it is widely accepted that in 1954 Nasser had declined foreign assistance to establish a weapons program.7 Egypt’s decision to pursue a nuclear program during this period was for peaceful purposes.

5Mark Fitzpatrick, ed. “Egypt: the usual suspect” in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008),p.18.

6Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Egypt: Nuclear Overview,” Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/ profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/

7Fitzpatrick, ed. “Egypt.”p.21.

163

Table. 6.0. An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1948-1959) Year Forbearance Measures (Technological Forbearance Measures (Non- Indicators) Technological Indicators) The Egyptian Board of Atomic Energy is

created. “Its functions include formulating policy for the AEE which in turn conducts 1955 research into the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” The Egyptian Board of Atomic Energy 1955-1957 ______sends missions to other countries to study their nuclear research agencies. The United States begins assisting Egypt in 1956 installing a radioisotope laboratory in the ______National Research Center at Inshas Egypt selects Inshas as the site for its first Egypt is one of the 23 member states 1957 nuclear research center. elected to the first IAEA Board of Governors. Egypt concludes its first nuclear protocol with the Soviet Union which includes the supply of 1957 an experimental light water reactor for Inshas and equipment for a theoretical physics laboratory, including a Vandergraaf 2.5MW accelerator. Source: Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East (New York: Routledge, 1988); Mohammad El- Sayed Selim, "Egypt and the Middle Eastern Nuclear Issue," Strategic Analysis, January 1996. As cited in NTI: Egypt Nuclear Chronology. Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/chronology_1950’s.html.

6.21 The Second Phase: (1960 -1969) -- Non-Forbearance Egypt´s interest in developing a nuclear weapons program in the 1960’s can be attributed to a host of factors including “its perception of an evolving Israeli nuclear capability, an inability to defeat Israel using conventional weapons, a desire to lead the

Arab world politically and technologically, and strong domestic support for an indigenous nuclear capability.”8 In December 1960, Israel’s public acknowledgement that it was building a nuclear reactor at Dimona in the Negev desert caused a radical shift in

Egypt’s nuclear policy. Concerned over Israel’s nuclear activities, Egypt declared that it would now redouble its efforts to develop a nuclear program with military applications.

The key figures who were responsible for this effort were Sayed Amin al Khashab the

8Levite, Never Say Never Again, p.63. 164

Secretary General of the AEE and Salah Hedayat, its Director General. Thus Egypt’s quest for nuclear weapons was strongest in the period leading up to 1967 when as a response to the Israeli program, Egypt tried to acquire a bigger reactor together with fuel cycle facilities.9 As Jim Walsh observes “it is fair to say that Egypt's most intensive efforts to acquire nuclear weapons (or the capability to produce them) occurred during this phase—that is, just after the disclosure of the Dimona reactor, but before the 1967

Arab-Israeli war.”10 In pursuit of a nuclear program, Egypt undertook a host of domestic measures which included increasing its budget; training its nuclear scientists and also approaching a wide range of countries for assistance. For example, in the early 1960’s,

Nasser approached India for assistance with reprocessing technologies that could produce plutonium for weapons development, but did not succeed in this endeavor. Nasser also sought a heavy-water reactor from the Soviet Union in 1963 but failed in this effort too. 11

As a desperate measure, Egypt also tried to acquire nuclear weapons through the ‘the quick fix approach,’ i.e. through an outright purchase of nuclear warheads from other states including the Soviet Union and China. 12 While both states were willing to assist

9Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East (London & New York: Routledge, 1988),pp. 55-56.

10James Walsh, Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in International Politics (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,2001)

11In 1965, the U.S. embassy in Cairo reported that the UAR was attempting to obtain 150 megawatt Nuclear reactors supposedly for desalting and generating electricity but which also had the potential to produce Fissionable materials which could used for Nuclear weapons production. “Attempts to Purchase 150 Megawatt Nuclear Reactor by the United Arab Republic.” DNSA, January 17, 1965. The National Intelligence Estimate 4-66 had singled out Pakistan, Egypt and South Africa as the countries most likely to want nuclear weapons in the next decade; but all three were assessed to require “substantial outside help” to obtain them. NIE-4-66, dated January 20, 1966.

165

Egypt with radiochemistry, they were unwilling to provide facilities that would have helped Egypt develop a nuclear weapons program.13 Ultimately, Egypt’s eventual defeat in the Six Day war, in 1967, ended all aspirations for the development of a nuclear program. As Einhorn observes:

The loss of oil from the Sinai, the closure of the Suez Canal, and the decrease in foreign assistance in the aftermath of the war had a devastating impact on the Egyptian economy, and funding for the nuclear program was frozen. More fundamentally, the war changed Egypt’s strategic outlook. Regaining Egyptian territory occupied by Israel became the paramount national objective, and this meant devoting scarce resources to rebuilding and strengthening Egypt’s conventional arms capabilities, not giving priority to the nuclear option.14

Table.6.1. An Empirical Analysis of Non- Forbearance (1960-1969) Year Non-Forbearance Measures (Technological Indicators)

1) Starts operation of the Soviet-supplied 2MW Vandergraaft research reactor at the Inshas Nuclear Research Center. Other facilities run by Egypt at Inshas include a 1961 small French-supplied hot cell complex for plutonium extraction research, the Middle East's first industrial electronic accelerator, and a pilot nuclear fuel factory used to process natural uranium mined in Egypt.15 2) Establishes the Design Consultants Association, a nuclear engineering consultancy 1965 group, funded by the Egyptian government, to help Egypt develop an independent nuclear fuel cycle. December 1965 3) Makes direct approach to Soviet Union and to purchase nuclear weapons.16

1967 4) Approaches China for purchase of nuclear weapons. Request is turned down.

5) Signs a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. The agreement anticipates joint 1969-1970 research in the production of heavy water, nuclear fuels, and raw materials prospecting.17 6) Fuel Fabrication -- Egypt’s metallurgical laboratory at Inshas, with assistance from West Germany was able to produce nuclear fuel on a small, laboratory scale.18

12 Shai Feldman, “Middle East Nuclear Stability: The State of the Region and the State of the Debate,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol.49, No.1 (Summer 1995),p.205.

13Fitzpatrick, ed. “Egypt.”p.20.

14Einhorn, “Egypt.”p.47.

15Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, “Egypt's Budding Nuclear Program,” The Risk Report, Vol. 2, No. 5 (September-October 1996).

16Hedrick Smith, “Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense,”New York Times, February 3, 1966.

17Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Nuclear Chronology: Egypt Profile,” Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/chronology_1950’s.html. 166

There were no violations of treaty commitments by Egypt during this period and hence there were no non-technological indicators.

6.22 The Third Phase: (1970-1980) -- Nuclear Forbearance Under President Anwar al-Sadat (1970-81), there was a shift in overall strategy and foreign policy. The overriding goal of Arab leadership was replaced with economic recovery and development as the main priorities. Sadat also ended Egypt’s close association with the Soviet Union, signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 and forged closer ties with the United States in the hope that such ties would indirectly help Egypt in achieving its objectives vis-à-vis Israel. Nuclear weapons had no place in the new scheme of things.19 On the contrary, a civilian nuclear program began to acquire momentum and

Sadat’s presidency was characterized by key agreements with several countries including the Soviet Union, France and Germany. As a result of this new policy, Egypt eventually decided to ratify the NPT in February 1981 having signed it in 1968. Unable to convince

Israel to sign the treaty, the Egyptian leadership succumbed and ratified the treaty realizing that such a step was necessary to enhance the possibility of receiving foreign technology needed to expand its civilian nuclear program.

Table 6.2. An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1970-1980) -- Non –Technological Indicators Year Forbearance Measures (Non- Technological Indicators) 1974 Accepted full scope IAEA safeguards

1979 Negotiated peace treaty with Israel

18Barbara Gregory, “Egypt’s Nuclear Program: Assessing Supplier Based and Other Developmental Constraints,” The Non-Proliferation Review (Fall 1995),p.23.

19Gawdat Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East (University Press of Florida, 2007), p.117. U.S. intelligence still regarded Egypt as a country with nuclear potential but not on par with either Iran or Pakistan. DNSA, October 2, 1974. 167

6.23 The Final Phase: (1981- 2007) -- Forbearance continues In this final phase, Egypt committed itself to a policy of forbearance although there were some activities related to non-forbearance that may have tempered the overall policy of forbearance. President Hosni Mubarak replaced President Sadat following his assassination and his administration consistently rejected a nuclear weapons program.20

President Mubarak was an ardent supporter of a Middle East that was free of nuclear weapons. In 1990, President Mubarak expanded his initial nuclear weapon-free zone proposal by calling for the transformation of the Middle East into a zone that would be free of all weapons of mass destruction—WMDFZ- thereby including biological and chemical weapons. By the end of 1994, Egypt had obtained support from Syria and Saudi

Arabia for its position.21 Mubarak believed that the presence of alternative sources of energy and the cost of financing a nuclear program obviated the need to pursue a nuclear program. In 2001 the president stated that “Egypt does not have a need for a nuclear- power plant in a country that is full of natural gas reserves.”22 On the contrary, he forged close ties with the U.S. and was committed to Egypt’s integration in the global system.

Under his leadership, Egypt was keen on meeting its domestic energy requirements and negotiated agreements to buy two nuclear power reactors each from Canada, France,

20Mr. Mubarak succeeded Anwar Sadat, who was assassinated in 1981. One of the longest serving leaders in the Arab world, he gained a fifth consecutive term by being elected in 2005in a polling system that allowed multiple candidates to stand. The president has portrayed himself as an economic liberal and has pursued friendly relations with the West. Under his stewardship, Egypt has emerged as a key regional player and has often played a vital role in brokering peace between the Israeli’s and Palestinians. In February 2011, Mr. Mubarak relinquished office in the face of a popular revolt and Egypt faces an uncertain future with respect to its new role in the Middle East.

21Nabil Fahmy, “Egypt’s Disarmament Initiative,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November 1990,pp. 9–10.

22Einhorn, “Egypt.”p.52.

168

Germany, and the United States. However, these agreements never came to fruition on account of financial problems and safety concerns in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986.23 The period corresponding to the Chernobyl disaster marked the end of any serious Egyptian nuclear activity.24

However, in 2004 & 2005 there were reports that Egypt was working on a clandestine nuclear program and that its nuclear activities may have been linked to

Libya’s nuclear program in the past. Egyptian and Libyan nuclear scientists had a long history of co-operation that could be traced to the early 1970’s and there was genuine concern that the two nations were co-operating once again.25 Concerns about Egypt’s nuclear program arose when the IAEA reported in February 2005 that Egypt had not declared 67 kg of imported UF4, 3 kg of uranium metal, 9.5 kg of imported thorium compounds, unirradiated fuel rods containing 10 percent enriched U-235, and the undeclared irradiation of uranium and thorium targets that had been dissolved in three laboratories.26 Cairo subsequently explained that the failures to report were largely on account of differing interpretations of Egypt’s safeguards obligations and reiterated that the country’s nuclear program was strictly for peaceful purposes.27 During this period,

23Gawdat Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation: Egypt,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3(May 2007),p.413.

24Einhorn, “Egypt.”p.52.

25Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson eds., Getting Ready for a Nuclear Ready Iran (Strategic Studies Institute; U.S. Army War College Co, 2005),p.59.

26Pierre Goldschmidt, “The IAEA Reports on Egypt: Reluctantly?” Proliferation Analysis, June 2, 2009.

27 “Egypt Says Nuclear Programme Peaceful,” Khaleej Times Online, January 6, 2005. 169

Egypt became a member of several organizations and became a signatory or state party to six treaties/agreements that indicated its renewed commitment to nuclear forbearance.

Table. 6.3. An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance ( 1981-2007) -- Non-Technical Indicators International Organizations Status*28

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization – Member (1996) Preparatory Commission Conference on Disarmament Member (1979)

Treaties/Agreements (Nuclear)

1) Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) State Party* (Ratified 1981) Signatory (1996) (Egypt’s ratification required for 2) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty the CTBT to enter into force)** 3) Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Signatory (1981) Nuclear Weapons.

4) Partial Test Ban Treaty State Party

5) Nuclear Safety Convention Signatory** (1994)

6) African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Signatory (1996) (Pelindaba Treaty) There were some activities related to non-forbearance during this period. Failure to report some activities to the IAEA raised some concerns about Egypt’s nuclear program. Source: Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes © Center for Nonproliferation Studies

28 * “A State Party fulfilled and implemented domestic legislative legal practices to bring about the legal application of the Treaty on the government and other entities to which the Treaty is applicable, such as formal approval by parliament or legislative bodies, and the Treaty is formally declared to be applicable on the State Party, and the required legal instrument of ratification has been duly deposited with the depositary.”

** “A Signatory State refers to a State whose competent authority or representative has affixed its signature to a Treaty text thus indicating acceptance of the Treaty and a commitment not to undertake any actions that would undermine the purpose of the Treaty, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, pending formal ratification.” (Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes © Center for Nonproliferation Studies).

170

6.3 Egypt: Prudential Realism and Nuclear Forbearance In this section, I endeavor to test the theoretical validity of prudential realism whose explanations for nuclear forbearance are based on two key variables namely, level of conflict and politico-security interdependence.

6.31 Level of Conflict With respect to the level of conflict, the main premise of H1a is that -- States with high levels of conflict will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. Likewise the main premise of H1b is that -- States with medium or low level of conflict will exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. So if I see that Egypt was not exercising a policy of forbearance whenever it had high levels of conflict, then H1a is supported. Likewise, if I see Egypt exercising a policy of forbearance whenever it possessed medium to low levels of conflict, then H1b is supported. Did Egypt’s nuclear history conform to this pattern?

I begin by briefly examining Egypt’s enduring rivalry with Israel.

Egypt did have a protracted conflict with Israel over issues related to territory and ideology. The conflict was intense, severe and of an enduring nature. Between 1948 and

1967, the Arab Israeli conflict went beyond territorial disputes. It was considered intractable and absolute as the goal of the Arab states was to eventually liquidate Israel.

Table (6.4) illustrates the level of conflict between Egypt and Israel.

171

Table.6.4. (Egypt and Israel - Militarized Inter-State Disputes) Dates of Dispute Cause of Conflict Highest action Scale*29

October 1948 –Israeli War -- Combined Territory 5 War of Independence Casualties > 1000 October 29, 1956- War -- Combined Territory 5 Sinai Campaign Casualties > 1000 June 5-6, 1967 War -- Combined Territory 5 Six Day war Casualties > 1000 1967- 1970 War -- Combined Territory 5 War of attrition Casualties > 1000 October 1973 War -- Combined Territory 5 Yom Kippur War Casualties > 1000 Table 6.4. only includes the main wars fought between Israel and Egypt with combined casualties estimated at > 1000.

Table -6.5. An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict30 Level of Nuclear Conflict (X1) Nature of Dispute Period Scale Timeline (Value) 1. Israeli War of independence 1948 5 1948-1959 High 2. Sinai Campaign 1956 5 Since the level of conflict during this period includes two major wars that resulted in considerable fatalities, it has been assigned a high value.

1960-1969 High 1. Six Day war 1967 5

Since the level of conflict during this period includes the Six Day War that resulted in considerable fatalities, it has been assigned a high value.

1970-1980 High 1. Yom Kippur War 1973 5

Since the level of conflict during this period includes the Yom Kippur War that resulted in considerable fatalities, it has been assigned a high value.

1981- 2007 Low No Dispute -- 1

29MIDs have been assigned a scale from 1-5 based on the correlates of war scale.

30From Table 6.5, it is evident that despite the protracted conflicts and enduring nature of their rivalry, not all the periods were associated with high conflict. There was a period of low conflict even as there were no drastic change in the ideological issues that generated these conflicts. 172

6.32 How did the Level of Conflict influence nuclear decisions? Prudential realism’s contention is that by virtue of having a protracted conflict and enduring rivalry with a nuclear weapons state like Israel, Egypt would have the greatest incentive to seek nuclear weapons.31 Was this the case? I begin by testing H1a.

From 1949 to 1955, Egypt did have a protracted conflict with Israel over issues related to territory and ideology. The conflict was intense, severe and of an enduring nature and included two major wars during this period. Egypt exercised a policy of forbearance during this period and its nuclear program was intended for purely peaceful purposes.

The period from 1960-1969 was also a period of high conflict that involved the six day war. Concerned over Israel’s nuclear activities, Egypt redoubled its efforts to develop a nuclear program with military applications. From 1970-1980, Egypt continued to have high levels of conflict including the Yom Kippur War but its nuclear decision reverted to one of forbearance. During this period, economic recovery and development were the main priorities and consequently a nuclear weapons program was not contemplated.

Egypt did not exercise a policy of forbearance in only one of the three periods that it experienced high levels of conflict. H1a is therefore, only partially supported.

However, Egypt’s deviant behavior in two other periods (1948-1959 & 1970-1980) can be explained with respect to the theory’s alternate explanations on security guarantees and non-nuclear countervailing deterrent capabilities. Since, I am testing security guarantees under H2, my focus, in this section, is on Egypt’s non-nuclear countervailing deterrent capabilities (Conventional and Chemical and Biological Weapons) and the extent to which it influenced its nuclear decisions.

31Paul, Power versus Prudence, p.22. 173

I begin by examining Egypt’s conventional force structure. In 1955, Egypt concluded a significant arms deal with the Czechs which significantly boosted its military strength and helped it maintain conventional balance over Israel. By the end of 1962, significant weapons transfers to the region tilted the balance further against Israel and this imbalance only worsened in the subsequent years.32 Therefore, when Egypt adopted a policy of forbearance in the 1950’s & 1970’s, it did have a conventional advantage. (See

Table 6.6) However, despite this conventional advantage, Israel was still an undeclared nuclear weapons state in the 1970’s.33

Table 6.6. Operational Inventories of Jet Combat Aircraft and Tanks on Eve of War34 Jet Combat Aircraft Tanks

1956 1967 1973 1956 1967 1973

Egypt 205 431 620 430 1300 1955

Israel 110 290 488 400 800 1700

Syria 44 78 326 200 400 1270

Iraq 34 150 224 135 395 945

Jordan 16 18 52 105 300 400

With respect to chemical weapons, Egypt did have a robust CWP. Egypt is generally regarded as having inherited stocks of mustard agent and possibly phosgene abandoned

32Zach Levey, “Israeli foreign policy and the arms race in the Middle East 1950-1960,” Journal of Strategic Studies,Vol.24, No.1 (March 2001),p.30.

33Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.235.

34Fuad Jabber, “Not by War Alone: Curbing the Arab-Israeli Arms Race,”Middle East Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3(Summer, 1974),p.236.

174

by British forces during their withdrawal from Egypt in 1954.35 The CWP is believed to have been initiated in response to Israel's covert pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.36 Egypt was also the first Arab state to employ chemical weapons agents in the Middle East during its war against the royalist troops of North Yemen (1963-67) including phosgene and mustard.37 In 1963, Egypt opened its first chemical weapons production facility at Abu- Za’abal, 10 kilometers northeast of the city of Cairo. After the

1967 war, Egypt expanded its chemical arsenal, especially in the period leading up to the

Yom Kippur War in 1973. Even as Egypt exercised a policy of forbearance in the 1970’s, in the nuclear realm, it continued to expand its chemical arsenal including its delivery systems and had collaborations with both Iraq and Syria in this regard.38 Therefore,

Egypt’s deviant behavior of exercising nuclear forbearance while experiencing high levels of conflict can be explained in terms of the theory’s alternate explanations regarding non-nuclear capabilities.

With respect to the second hypotheses, H1b, the tests indicate that during the only period that Egypt experienced low levels of conflict, it did exercise a policy of forbearance. H1b is therefore fully supported.

35Gawdat Bahgat, “The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Egypt,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.29(Spring 2007).

37 “Egypt's Chemical Weapons Program,” Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/ nuke/ guide/ egypt/ cw/ index.html.

38Dany Shoham, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1998), pp.48-56.Egypt’s minister of war Abdel Ghany El-Gamasy said, in 1975, that “Weapons of mass destruction are not limited to nuclear weapons. Egypt has enough of other types of weapons of mass extermination and it has the capability of retaliating to an Israeli nuclear blow by making use of these other weapons.” Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, p.69. 175

Today, as Egypt continues its policy of forbearance, its operational conventional military strength is far below what it was in 1976.39 A similar story is repeated with respect to equipment where Egypt has had to contend with units possessing older Soviet equipment.40 It no longer possesses a non-nuclear deterrent capability in terms of superiority in conventional forces. However, it is widely believed that Egypt still possesses stocks of chemical weapons. Egypt acceded to the Geneva Protocol on

December 6, 1928, but remains outside the CWC. The Egyptian government has indicated that it will not accede to the CWC until Israel joins the NPT.

6.4 Politico-Security Interdependence (X2) and Nuclear Decisions With respect to politico-security interdependence, the main premise of H2a is that

-- States possessing, in the aggregate, low levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. Likewise, the main premise of H2b is that -- States possessing, in the aggregate, high levels of politico- security interdependence with allies or adversaries are most likely to exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. So if I see that Egypt was not exercising a policy of forbearance on account of low politico- security interdependence then H2a is supported. Likewise, if I see Egypt exercising a policy of forbearance whenever it possessed high politico-security interdependence then H2b is supported. Did Egypt’s nuclear history conform to this pattern? In this section, I examine Egypt’s politico- security interdependence with its allies and adversaries and how the level of interdependence influenced Egypt’s nuclear

39Adel Safty, ‘Proliferation, Balance of Power, and Nuclear Deterrence: Should Egypt Pursue a Nuclear Option?’International Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1996),p.26.

40Anthony H. Cordesman, Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006),pp.18-25. 176

decisions. The time period begins in the 1950’s when Egypt first initiated its nuclear program and corresponds thereafter to each phase of its nuclear history.

6.41 The First Phase: (1948-1959)—High Politico-Security Interdependence President Nasser initiated a peaceful nuclear program in 1954, two years after he took oath of office as President. When the AEE was subsequently created in 1955, Egypt never seriously considered military applications for its nuclear program. Egypt’s initial approach to the nuclear program was apparently for peaceful purposes- “to enable it to reap the rewards of this new and promising technology.”41 Despite increasing U.S. aid to

Egypt during this period, Nasser’s pro-Soviet tilt ensured that the Soviets remained a committed ally. Egypt had a lot of support forthcoming from the Soviet Union during this period and could have jeopardized this aid if it had chosen to pursue a nuclear weapons program. PSI with Israel was also high as Egypt’s decisions were closely related to those of Israel. Aggregate politico-security interdependence was therefore high during this period.

6.42 The Second Phase: (1960-1969) – Low Politico-Security Interdependence Soviet aid continued to remain high during this period. The Soviet Union substantially increased its military assistance to Egypt during 1962-73. It exported weaponry to the amount of $7,105 million of which $1546 million was supplied in the years 1955-1966 and $6,259 million over the period 1967-73. (See Table 6.7).

41Einhorn, “Egypt.”p.45.

177

Table 6.7.-- Value of Soviet Weaponry Supplied to Egypt: Comparison of Estimates --(USD) million Periods Egyptian Ministry of War (Estimates) Authors Estimates 1955-1966 1546 2760

June 1967-1973 6259 7403

1955-1973 (Grand 7805 10,163 Total) Source: Moshe Efrat, “The Economics of Soviet Arms Transfers To The Third World,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October 1983), pp. 437-456

Table 6.8. -- Soviet Economic Credits to Egypt, 1955–1968 Date Sum (millions) USD Purpose

January 1958 175 5 year plan

December 1958 100 Aswan 1

August 1960 225 Aswan II

June 1963 44 5 year Plan

May 1964 277 5 Year Plan ( Aswan Dam and Industrial Projects January 1968 46 Oil Exploration in Sirveh March 1968 160 Steel Complex at Helwan Grand Total 1027

Source: Jesse Ferris, “Guns for Cotton,”? Aid, Trade, and the Soviet Quest for Base Rights in Egypt, 1964– 1966, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol.13, No. 2(Spring 2011),p.12.

Janos Horvath, “Economic Aid Flow from the USSR: A Recount of the First Fifteen Years,” Slavic Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Dec., 1970),pp.613-632.

Despite continued Soviet assistance, politico-security interdependence was low once Egypt became aware of Israel’s clandestine nuclear program at Dimona. Concerned about Israel’s nuclear activities, Egypt was less concerned about Soviet reactions during this period. Nasser declared that “acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel

178

would be cause for war no matter how suicidal for the Arabs.”42 Despite an increase in aid to Egypt, the United States was also unable to persuade Nasser to desist from pursuing both an arms race with Israel and a nuclear weapons program, guided as he was by Pan Arab Nationalism. 43 Aggregate politico-security interdependence was therefore low during this period. Egypt was not concerned about reciprocal decisions by either its allies or adversaries and was fully prepared to adopt a security first approach in order to safeguard its interests.

6.43 The Third Phase: (1970-1980)-- High Politico-Security Interdependence The six day war of 1967, followed by Nasser’s death in 1970, virtually shut down

Egypt’s nuclear weapons program. Under President Anwar al-Sadat (1970-81), there was a shift in overall strategy and foreign policy. Nasser’s overriding goal of Arab leadership was replaced with economic recovery (Infitah) and development as the main priorities.

Sadat also ended Egypt’s close association with the Soviet Union, signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 and forged closer ties with the United States in the hope that such ties would indirectly help Egypt in achieving its objectives vis-à-vis Israel. Nuclear weapons had no place in the new scheme of things.44 During Sadat’s period, politico-security interdependence with the U.S. was high because Egypt was particularly sensitive in its

42“Need to Reassure President Nasser on the Peaceful Nature of the Dimona Reactor”, Memorandum From the Department of State's Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), February 11, 1964.

43 U.S. Department of State had requested the United States Embassy in the United Arab Republic to convince Gamal Abdel Nasser that the Surface-to-surface missiles program being pursued by the United Arab Republic was creating a dangerous Arms race; U.S. Department of State also requested that the United States Embassy in the United Arab Republic convince Gamal Abdel Nasser that he cannot win an Arms race with Israel due to Israel's superior (Technological development; Funding). “Warning to Gamal Abdel Nasser Not to Proceed with the Acquisition of Surface to Surface Missiles.” Digital National Security Archive, May 29, 1964. Available at http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/chron/executeSearch.do

44Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, p.117. 179

relationship with the U.S. As shown in Table 6.9, there was a substantial increase in the

amount of foreign aid Egypt received from the United States, between 1974 and 1979,

following Sadat’s peace initiatives. For example, aid increased from 21.30 million

dollars in 1974 to 2588.5 million dollars in 1979 when Egypt signed a peace treaty with

Israel. Since 1979, Egypt has been the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance,

receiving an annual average of close to $2 billion in economic and military aid.45

Aggregate PSI was high during this period.

Table 6.9. – U.S. Aid to Egypt 1972-1979. USD (million) Year Military I.M.E.T Misc. Direct Direct Economic Economic P.L. P.L. Total Loan Grant Economic Assistance Assistance Support Support 480 480 Aid Grant Loan Grant Fund Fund Loan Grant (Narcotics) Loan Grant 1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 1.50 1973 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.80 1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.50 9.50 3.30 21.30

1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 194.30 58.50 104.50 12.80 370.10

1976 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.40 150.00 102.80 201.70 4.40 464.30

1977 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 600.00 99.20 196.80 11.70 907.80

1978 0.00 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.00 617.40 133.30 179.70 12.50 943.20

1979 1500.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 250.00 585.00 230.70 22.40 2588.50

Source: Jeremy Sharpe, “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, January 10, 2007, pp.31-32.

6.44 The Final Phase: (1981 – 2007) -- High Politico-Security Interdependence Following President Sadat’s assassination in 1981, President Mubarak continued

the program of economic development and domestic stability. By now the relationship

with the Soviet Union had diminished considerably. Both Israel and the U.S. mattered

most. Egypt’s politico-security interdependence with both Israel and the United States

45Jeremy Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Backgrounds, Recent Trends and the FY 2008 Request,” CRS Report for Congress, July 3, 2007, p.10. Available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32260.pdf. 180

continued to remain high under President Mubarak. Egypt and Israel signed an important

accord in trade and industry in 2004 (The Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) Protocol)

that provided for the establishment of joint industrial zones in Egypt from where goods

would be exported to the United States without payment of customs tariffs.46 As of 2007,

(the concluding timeline) Egypt continued to be a major beneficiary of U.S. aid receiving

a total of 1,751.3 million dollars.47 Aggregate politico-security interdependence remained

high during this period.

Table –6.10. – An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence (PSI) PSI Reciprocal Nuclear PSI with with Reciprocal Decisions by Ally Decisions by Timeline adversary* ally Adversary-- Israel 1) Soviets provide strong support to Egypt. 1948- 1959 (High) Egypt signs nuclear protocol with Soviet (High) ------Union. 1) Soviets continue with economic and 1960-Israel

military aid but refuse to sell Nuclear announces building (Lower) Weapons to Egypt. Soviet economic aid (Low) of Dimona nuclear 1960-1969 from 1955-1968 was 1027 million USD. reactor in the Negev Desert. Egypt ends close association with the Soviet Union. Moves closer to U.S. & Israel. The U.S.: a) provides economic and military aid Signs a peace treaty (High) 1970-1980 (High) with Egypt in 1979. b) shares military equipment and technology c) participates in joint military exercises Total aid in 1979 peaks at 2588 million dollars. 2004 - Israel signs The United States continues economic and the (QIZs) Protocol) 1981-2007 (High) military aid to Egypt. In FY2007, Egypt (High) that boosts trade receives a total of 1,751.3 million dollars.48 between Israel and Egypt. *Egypt’s PSI with Israel was always high because Egypt’s decisions were always linked to those of Israel.

46Hassen Zenati, “Egypt, Israel sign strategic trade accord,”Middle East Online, December 14, 2004.

47Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt: The January 25 Revolution and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, February 11, 2011, p.10. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf

48Ibid. 181

Table 6.11. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence (PSI) Years Allies Adversaries Sum of interdep. Overall PSI allies & adversaries High with 1948-1959 High with Israel High High/High U.S.S.R.

1960-1969 Lower with Low with Israel Low * Low/Low U.S.S.R* High with U.S. (From the 1970’s, 1970-1980 High with Israel High the U.S. was a High/High strong ally of Egypt) 1981-2007 High with U.S. High with Israel High High/High

*Overall PSI was low in 1960’s because of Israel’s nuclear activities and the fact that Egypt was less concerned with both Soviet & Israeli reactions during this period. Egypt was more concerned about its survival following revelations about Israel’s secret nuclear program.

6.45 Prudential realism’s main contention with respect to politico-security interdependence is that enduring rival states like Egypt possess low politico-security interdependence and will therefore not exercise a policy of forbearance. On the contrary, high politico-security interdependence will always lead to a policy of forbearance.

Having examined how Egypt’s politico-security interdependence, with both its allies and adversaries, influenced its nuclear decisions, I now test whether these decisions were in conformity with the claims of prudential realism in this regard. I begin by testing H2b. In the 1950’s, Egypt depended to great extent on the Soviet Union both militarily and economically. However, unlike other states with credible alliances, Egypt never possessed any credible security guarantees. Although, Marshall Andrei Grechko of the

Soviet Union did make an offer of a nuclear guarantee, these commitments were never credible and were even denied.49 The 1950’s was a period of high politico-security

182

interdependence resulting in a decision of forbearance. From the 1970’s, Egypt witnessed a dramatic improvement in its relations with the U.S. and subsequently with Israel.

Under President Anwar al-Sadat (1970-81), politico-security interdependence with the

U.S. was high because of the nature of the close bilateral relationship between both the countries. For example, there was a substantial increase in the amount of foreign aid from the United States between 1974 and 1979 following Sadat’s peace initiatives.

Egypt’s nuclear policy during the 1970’s was also one of forbearance. Following

President Sadat’s assassination in 1981, President Mubarak continued the program of economic development and domestic stability. Egypt’s politico- security interdependence with both Israel and the United States remained high under President Mubarak and continued to do so until 2007 resulting in a policy of forbearance. Egypt’s aggregate politico-security interdependence was thus high during three phases of its nuclear history resulting in a policy of forbearance during each of these periods. This analysis fully supports H2b.

However, not all the periods related to high politico-security interdependence.

There was one period when Egypt’s hitherto peaceful nuclear program acquired military overtones and Egypt undertook a series of measures to acquire nuclear weapons following Israel’s disclosures about its own nuclear program. Egypt’s aggregate politico- security interdependence was low during this period resulting in a policy of non- forbearance. H2a is also, therefore, fully supported.

6.5 Conclusion With respect to the level of conflict, I conclude that prudential realism does not fully explain Egypt’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. Egypt had four phases in

49Hedrick Smith, “Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense,” New York Times, 4 February 1966. 183

its nuclear history. (1950-1959, 1960-1969, 1970-1980 and 1981-2007) With respect to the first hypotheses, the evidence suggests that Egypt did not exercise a policy of forbearance in only one of the three periods that it experienced high levels of conflict.

(1960-1969) H1a is therefore, only partially supported. With respect to the second hypotheses, the evidence suggests that Egypt exercised a policy of forbearance during the only period she experienced low levels of conflict. (1981-2007) H1b is therefore fully supported.

With respect to politico-security interdependence, the theory’s explanations for

Egypt’s nuclear decisions, the way they occurred, are fully supported. For example,

Egypt exercised a policy of forbearance in each of the three periods she experienced overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries.

(1948-1959, 1970-1980 and 1981-2007) H2b is thus fully supported. Likewise, a covert nuclear program by Israel, in the 1960’s, heightened Egypt’s threat perception resulting in low politico-security interdependence. Egypt therefore exercised a policy of non- forbearance in the only period she experienced overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. (1960-1969) H2a – is also fully supported. With respect to politico- security interdependence, both the hypotheses are therefore supported. (See Table 6.12)

184

Table 6.12. Summary of Results Nuclear Nuclear H1a H1b H2a H2b Timeline Decision

1948-1959 X    Forbearance

1960-1969     Non- Forbearance

1970-1980 X    Forbearance

1981-2007     Forbearance

Net H1a H1b H2a H2b

Assessment

   H1a is supported in only 1 out of 3 periods - Partially Supported Symbols  - Fully Supported  - Not Applicable X - Not Supported

185

Table 6.13. Egypt’s Nuclear Timeline Nuclear Level of Conflict PSI-- ( Allies and Adversaries) Nuclear Decision TimeLine (High) Overall (High) 1. Israeli War of Soviets remain committed ally during Forbearance 1948-1959 independence this period. 2. Sinai Campaign Overall (Low) Non- (High) Soviet aid continues to Egypt but Forbearance Egypt perceives existential threat following Israel’s revelation of 1960-1969 1. Six Day War nuclear activities at Dimona. Less concerned with Soviet reactions during this period.

Both U.S and Soviets are unable to stop its nuclear program. (High) Overall (High) 1979 peace treaty commits U.S. to providing greater economic and Forbearance 1970-1980 1. Yom Kippur War military aid. From 1979, Egypt receives an average of USD 2billion as aid.50 (Low) Overall (High) Forbearance Mubarak committed to strong ties 1981-2007 No Militarized Interstate with the U.S. The United States (There were Disputes. continues economic and military aid some activities to Egypt. relating to Non- 2004 - Israel signs the Qualifying Forbearance) Industrial Zones (QIZs) Protocol) that boosts trade between Israel and Egypt.

50Jeremy Sharpe, “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, January 10, 2007, pp.31-32.

186

Chapter Seven

Libya

This chapter examines the nuclear decisions of Libya, across the time period from 1970 to 2007. This time period has been chosen as it corresponds to Libya’s nuclear history following Muammar Gaddafi’s ascension to power in 1969 until its complete renunciation of WMD in 2003. Libya fits the theory’s description of a state situated in a zone of moderate conflict. The threat environment facing Libya was moderate. It did not have conflicts that were enduring or protracted but were instead episodic. Also, the frequency, intensity and scope of MIDs were lower than those of states situated in a high conflict zone.1

Libya had four phases in its nuclear decisions -- 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-

2002 and 2003 to 2007. While the first three phases were associated with non- forbearance, the last phase was entirely associated with forbearance when Libya decided to abandon its nuclear program. However, during 1970-1979, despite a commitment to non-forbearance, there were also some indicators of forbearance that tempered Libya’s policy of non-forbearance.

In the next step, Libya’s nuclear decisions are empirically analyzed in terms of technological and non technological indicators. Having done this, the chapter tests if the level of conflict, as the theory predicts, was a determining factor in Libya’s nuclear decisions, both forbearance and non-forbearance, by testing two hypotheses.

1For Paul, states with moderate levels of conflict are those states that do not have enduring rivalries. He argues that a zone of moderate conflict is one in which states pay equal attention to security and economic goals. Militarized interstate disputes may exist but their frequency, scope and intensity are lower than in a high conflict zone and they are unlikely to have led to border wars. For a description of a moderate conflict zone, see Paul, Power versus Prudence, p.21. 187

H1a: States with high levels of conflict will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.2

H1b: States with medium or low levels of conflict (X1 is mid or low) will exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. The tests indicate that Libya did not exercise a policy of forbearance whenever she had high levels of conflict. H1a is therefore fully supported.

However, Libya exercised a policy of forbearance in only one of the two periods that she experienced low levels of conflict. H1b is therefore only partially supported. Libya’s deviant behavior, during this one period, can however be explained in terms of the theory’s alternate explanation with respect to non-nuclear countervailing capabilities.

Likewise, the chapter then shows if politico- security interdependence was a determining factor in Libya’s nuclear decisions, both forbearance and non-forbearance by testing two additional sets of hypotheses.

H2a: States possessing, in the aggregate, low levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H2b: States possessing, in the aggregate, high levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries are most likely to exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

With respect to politico-security interdependence, the tests indicate that the theory does explain Libya’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. For example, a policy of forbearance by Libya was always associated with overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. H2b is thus fully supported. Likewise, a policy of non-forbearance by Libya was always associated with overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence with both allies and adversaries. H2a. is also fully

2 Although Libya was a state situated in a zone of moderate conflict and did not have conflicts that were enduring or protracted, yet on two occasions it did have high levels of conflict. 188

supported. Therefore, with respect to politico-security interdependence, both the hypotheses are supported.

Finally, in concluding the chapter, I summarize all of the above results based on my overall analysis.

7.1 Introduction In September 1969, Muammar Gaddafi acquired power through a bloodless military coup that overthrew the monarchy and established a new political system.3

Within a few years, he undertook a series of foreign policy and domestic measures which aimed at reducing Western influence in the region. He closed American and British bases, partially nationalized foreign oil and commercial interests in Libya and also promoted oil embargoes against the West in order to end their support for Israel.4 Gaddafi was also an ardent supporter of Pan-Africanism that included, amongst other things, providing aid to “liberation movements” across Africa and acting as a mediator in several conflicts amongst African countries.5

7.2 Libya’s Nuclear Decisions The First Phase: (1970 – 1979) -- Non-Forbearance In Libya’s case, its nuclear program is believed to have commenced from the time

Gaddafi acquired power.6 The first phase was clearly related to non-forbearance as Libya

3Dirk J.Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.63.

4Habib, Henry, “Changing Patterns in Libyan Foreign Policy,” Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, No 2 (Winter 1986), pp.3-15.

5Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, pp.133-136.

6 For a comprehensive analysis of Libya’s nuclear weapons program see Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink, Adelphi series, (Routledge 2006). Bowen examines the motives for Libya’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi’s rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. He assesses the mechanisms through which the regime proliferated, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. He also examines the decision to give up the quest for 189

actively sought nuclear weapons. However, despite an overwhelming emphasis on non- forbearance, there were also some indicators of forbearance during this period that tempered Libya’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. In 1973, the Atomic Energy Establishment

(AEE) of Libya was established with the primary intention of building Libya’s nuclear science infrastructure and technology. From the very beginning, Libya adopted an ambiguous position with respect to its nuclear program by affirming its peaceful intentions in the nuclear field while also seeking a nuclear weapon in the greater cause of

Arab liberation. However, despite this ambiguity, by the 1970’s it was clear that Libya was pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Gaddafi hoped to achieve a nuclear capability in two ways; a) by attempting the outright purchase of nuclear weapons and by seeking to develop a nuclear fuel cycle within Libya, by establishing relationships with potential nuclear suppliers. These are further elaborated in the next section. a) 1970-1971 – Outright Purchase Of all the cases analyzed in this dissertation, Libya was the least developed technologically and this continued to preclude the development of a strictly domestic program.7 Given the shortage of manpower and resources, Gaddafi was not averse to buying weapons “off the shelf”. In 1970, desperately seeking nuclear weapons, Libya dispatched Prime Minister Major Abdul Salam Jalloud to Peking to purchase nuclear weapons. The attempt was unsuccessful.8 There were also unsuccessful attempts to acquire weapons from India and other countries. During this time, reports also emerged about an alleged nexus between Libya and Pakistan wherein Libya was willing to assist nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that convinced the regime, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular.

7Levite, “Never Say Never Again,”p.63.

8Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East,p.66. 190

Pakistan in acquiring access to uranium ore concentrate from neighboring Niger in return for Pakistani nuclear assistance to Libya.9 b) 1971-1979- Development of the closed nuclear fuel cycle and plutonium based nuclear explosive device Having failed in its efforts to purchase nuclear weapons outright, Libya chose to pursue the uranium- and plutonium route towards fulfilling its objective. As part of this policy, Libya tried to gain access to uranium ore, uranium conversion facilities, enrichment technologies, research and power reactors and a plutonium separation/reprocessing capability. Dependent on outside suppliers, Libya approached several countries for the necessary resources and technical expertise. These countries included Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Egypt, France, India and Pakistan. However, none of the requests resulted in any significant material gain for Libya.10 For example, in

1973, Libya’s attempts to purchase 20 calutrons to enrich uranium from the French company Thomson-CSF fell through on account of suspicions on the part of the French government. In 1976, negotiations were held between France and Libya for the purchase of a 600 MW nuclear power plant but this deal did not materialize on account of international pressure and because the French government made it clear that it would not provide Libya with the means of producing heavy water.11 In 1978, Libyan officials travelled to India in an effort to acquire nuclear technology. The Libyans offered to pay

9Kenneth Timmerman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya” Simon Wiesenthal Center Middle East Defense News, August 1992, p. 89. Cited in Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Libya Profile, Nuclear Overview,” Internet accessed July 23,2010.

10Wyn Bowen, “Libya,” in James Doyle ed., Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation (Elsevier Inc, Oxford: UK., 2008),pp.332-334.

11Frank Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb, The Nuclear Race in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 1993),p.98. 191

India's entire foreign debt in exchange for nuclear technology. However, the offer was rejected.12In 1977, Libya provided financial assistance and uranium yellowcake (obtained from Niger) to Pakistan in the hope that Pakistan would provide its expertise and assistance in helping Libya with its own nuclear program.13 Finally, the Soviet Union proved to be the exception and agreed to help Libya construct a 10MW research reactor

(IRT-1) at the Tajoura nuclear research center (TNRCC) on the condition that Libya acceded to NPT ratification.

Table. 7.0. An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance -- (1970-1979) Year Non-Forbearance (Measures) Non-Forbearance (Measures) Technical Indicators Non-Technical Indicators 1) Gaddafi sends his closest aide, 1970 Abdessalem Jelloud, to China in ------order to purchase a nuclear weapon. 1) Unsuccessful attempt to purchase, from the French 2) Negotiations begin with Pakistan 1973 company Thomson-CSF, 20 calutrons to enrich uranium. about possible co-operation in the nuclear field. 2) Libya and France sign an agreement under which 1976 France would supervise the construction of a 600 megawatt nuclear power plant. 1977 3) Libya provides financial assistance and uranium

yellowcake (obtained from Niger) to Pakistan. 3) Libyan officials negotiate with 1978 ------India for the supply of nuclear weapons. Despite an overwhelming emphasis on non-forbearance there were some indicators of forbearance during this period. 1975 Libya ratifies the NPT. 14 1980 Libya reaches an agreement with the IAEA to place all of Libya's nuclear installations under international inspection. Source: NTI—Libya Nuclear Chronology Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Nuclear/chronology_1980_1989.html

12Timmerman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Cited in Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Libya Profile, Nuclear Overview,” Internet accessed February 23, 2011.

13Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals,p.307.

14Joshua Sinai, “Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997) 192

7.21 The Second Phase: (1980-1989) -- Non-Forbearance continues Despite Libya’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA which came into force in

1980, it persisted in its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The research reactor at

Tajoura came online in 1981 and was fueled by enriched uranium. This reactor also offered Libya the opportunity to explore plutonium production technology while evading

IAEA safeguards.15 TNRCC was a key center which helped the Libyan authorities in conducting undeclared laboratory-scale plutonium separation and uranium conversion experiments in the 1980’s.16 For example, between 1984 and 1990, thirty eight small uranium oxide and uranium metal targets were irradiated in the Tajura reactor.

Radioisotopes were extracted from these targets using ion exchange or solvent extraction methods at the radiochemical laboratory adjacent to the reactor. Libya did eventually report to the IAEA, in 2004, that very small amounts of plutonium were extracted from at least two of these targets.17 Other safeguard violations during this period included the procurement of centrifuge related technology including the acquisition of a specialized furnace from Japan in 1985 and vacuum pumps from Europe.18 Undeclared, small scale experiments performed at the TNRC during the 1980’s also helped the Libyans manufacture uranyl nitrate, UO2, uranium trioxide (UO3), uranium tetra fluoride (UF4),

15NTI, “Libya Profile, Nuclear Overview,” Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/libya/Nuclear/index.html. Internet accessed March 2, 2011.

16Ibid.

17IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” p.6. Available at Annex http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/iaea0504.pdf.

18Douglas Frantz and Josh Meyer, “For Sale: Nuclear Expertise,” Los Angeles Times, February 22, 2004.

193

and uranium metal all of which had some importance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

However, the Libyans made very little progress as far as plutonium separation was concerned as the IRT-1 reactor at Tajoura was not large enough for a weapons program. Negotiations with the Soviet firm Atomenergoeksport for a larger 440MWe power reactor in the Gulf of Sidra never proceeded beyond the feasibility and design development stage on account of Moscow’s proliferation concerns and Libya’s own concerns on Soviet safety standards.19 This reactor, when completed, would have had the capacity to produce 70kg of plutonium a year.20

Table.7.1. An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance -- (1980-1989) Year Non-Forbearance (Measures) Non-Forbearance (Measures) Technical Indicators Non-Technical Indicators

1)18 Libyans were reportedly trained 1) Raw Materials - Libya imports 1,000 tons of 1980-1981 at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear uranium from USSR; transfer is reported to the Science and Technology, possibly at a IAEA as required. cost of US$100m.

1980-1981 2) Libya pursues gas centrifuge technology with

assistance from a “European expert”. 2) Libya begins negotiations with 3) Tajoura 10-MW reactor begins operations. This Belgonucleaire to build uranium 1981 reactor offered Libya the opportunity to explore conversion pilot plant at Sabha that plutonium production technology. will produce 100 tons/year of uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) from yellowcake.

1984 4) Libya orders modular uranium conversion

facility (UCF) from “Far Eastern” company.

1984-1990 5) Enrichment and conversion activities begin at

Tajoura.

Source: Sho J. Morimoto: Libya’s Nuclear Program; Wyn Bowen, “Libya,” in James Doyle ed., Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation (Elsevier Inc, Oxford.UK. 2008).

19Ann MacLachlan and Mike Knapik, “Belgium and Libya will Sign an Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation,” Nucleonics Week, Vol.25,No.21(May 24, 1984),p.5.

20Henry S. Rowen and Richard Brody, “Nuclear Potential and Possible Contingencies,” in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.:The Brookings Institution, 1980),p.208. 194

7.22 The Third Phase: (1990-2002) -- Non-Forbearance & the Black Market Route By the late 1980’s, Libya, by virtue of its actions, had come to be characterized as a rogue state. It became the focus of international attention as it was accused of several terrorist plots including December 1985 attacks at airports in Rome and Vienna, the

Berlin discotheque bombing and the downing of Pan Am 103 in December 1988.21

President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order imposing additional economic sanctions against Libya in response to its continued support for international terrorism.

The IAEA estimated that it were these actions by the international community that eventually compelled Libya to redouble its efforts in the nuclear field.22 As a result of the embargoes and sanctions, Libya went to the black-market for its nuclear activities and sought assistance from the proliferation network run by former Pakistani nuclear scientist

Abdul Qadeer Khan. From the 1970’s, Khan was a well known figure in the murky world of proliferators. In the late 1980’s, Khan began travelling and meeting officials from a number of countries ranging from North Africa across to the Middle East peddling banned nuclear technology and developing in the process an elaborate black market network.23 This black-market network was non-hierarchical and many of its leaders were spread across the globe. It operated clandestinely and was able to circumvent many of the

21Gordon Corera, Shopping For Bombs, Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (New York: Oxford University Press),p.177.

22 Peter Crail, “Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States,” Arms Control Association, Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology. Internet accessed, July 24, 2010.

23Corera, “Shopping For Bombs,”pp.106-107. 195

export laws and controls. It also depended on a variety of manufacturing companies and suppliers on many continents for its activities.24

In the absence of indigenous expertise, Libya benefitted immensely from such a network as it sought to acquire the full range of nuclear capabilities. The Khan network not only supplied the Libyans with technical assistance but also with sensitive information including nuclear weapons component designs, component fabrication information, and nuclear weapons assembly instructions. Although initial contacts between the two parties were made in 1984, was only in 1989 that Khan renewed his contacts with Libyan officials who at this time were still unable to launch a nuclear weapons program.25 By 1991, both sides had reached an agreement on the supply of P1 centrifuges. By 1997, Libya had received 20 ready-made centrifuges and the components to assemble another 200. The first successful test of a P-1 machine was finished by

October 200026 and two successful tests of P-1 centrifuges were later conducted in the period May- December 2002.27

Besides raw materials like natural and depleted uranium and Low Enriched

Uranium (LEU), Libya also received, from the network, nuclear weapons design and

24David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: Working toward Closing Gaps in the International Nonproliferation Regime,” Report prepared for the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), July 2, 2004. Available at http://www.isis online.org/publications/southasia/nuclear_black_market.htm. 25David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010),p.117.

26Director General, IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement,” February 20, 2004, p.5. Available at Annex http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/iaea0504.pdf.

27Director General, IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement,” May 28, 2004, Annex 1,p.5.

196

fabrication documentation in 2001-2002 including key instructions for the detonators and fissile material.28 “The Libyan purchases alone are estimated to have netted the network about $100 million.”29 Had the network not been discovered and had Libya not given up its nuclear ambitions, it would have had the capability to produce significant amounts of enriched uranium in four to five years.30 By 2002, a Joint Intelligence Committee had concluded that the Khan network was a key player in Libya’s nuclear weapons program.31

Table 7.2. An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1990-2002) Year Non-Forbearance (Measures) Non-Forbearance (Measures) Technical Indicators Non-Technical Indicators

1994 1) Libya restarts small-scale experimentation with ------uranium conversion at TNRC

2) 20 complete P-1 centrifuges and most parts for ------1997 200 more P-1 centrifuges imported via A.Q. Khan network.

2000 3) Initial test of a P-1 centrifuge machine ------completed.

4) Two small cylinders of UF6 imported via A.Q. Khan network, each containing 25 kg of ------2000 uranium. Libya also receives from Pakistan two complete P-2 centrifuges found to be contaminated by HEU. 5) One large cylinder of UF imported via A.Q. 6 ------2001 Khan Network, containing 1,600 kg of natural uranium.

6) Libya receives nuclear weapons design and ------2001 -2002 fabrication documents based of 1960’s Chinese implosion device.

28Bowen, “Libya.”pp.341-342.

29Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004),p.16.

30David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q.Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Spring 2005),p.114.

31Corera, “Shopping for Bombs,”p.169. See also Albright, Peddling Peril,pp.209-214.

197

Source: Sho J. Morimoto: Libya’s Nuclear Program; Wyn Bowen, “Libya,” in James Doyle ed., Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation (Elsevier Inc, Oxford.: UK.,2008).

7.23 The Final Phase: (2003 to 2007) - Forbearance On 19 December 2003, Muammar al-Gaddafi announced Libya’s decision to officially halt its nuclear weapons program and the development of missiles with a range exceeding 300 kilometers. He also announced his intention to open all of Libya’s nonconventional weapons stockpiles and research programs to international inspectors.

This sudden reversal of attitude was due to a large number of factors, primary amongst them being economics. Libya was compelled to exercise a policy of forbearance. The sanctions regime in place had taken a huge toll of the economy. With investments not forthcoming, Libya’s oil revenues remained unexploited.32 Ultimately, the tacit admission of its nuclear program and its desire to cooperate with Britain and the U.S. was a remarkable turnaround of events for a regime that had for decades denied the existence of a nuclear program.33 An assessment of Libya’s non-conventional weapons program by the IAEA and US inspectors in January 2004, revealed that Libya possessed far more extensive nuclear and chemical weapons parts than had been previously envisaged. For example, inspectors found “approximately 23 tons of mustard agents in one chemical weapons production facility and thousands of unfilled munitions. Libya also admitted to the IAEA in 2004 that it had acquired 20 preassembled P-1 centrifuges and the components for another 200 and that, in 2000, Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan had

32Ibid,”p.181.

33David E. Sanger and Judith Miller, “Libya to Dismantle Arms Program, Bush Announces,” The NewYork Times, 20 December 2003. 198

assisted Libya with both a centrifuge enrichment program and a nuclear weapons design.”34

A three phased approach to the dismantlement process was agreed upon by the three governments and the IAEA in January 2004. Phase 1 involved the removal of all sensitive nuclear and other material from Libya to be stored at the Oak Ridge National

Laboratory in the United States. This material included UF6, P-2 centrifuges, conversion modules and guidance systems for some of the SCUD – C missiles. The second phase involved a tripartite agreement between Russia, Libya and the IAEA for the shipment of

HEU supplied by the Soviet Union in the 1980’s for the IRT-1 reactor, for conversion into LEU. This phase also involved removal of several thousand tons of equipment from

Libya and a redeployment of former WMD staff in Libya.

Table 7.3. An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance ( 2003- 2007) Year Forbearance (Measures) Forbearance (Measures) Technical Indicators Non-Technical Indicators 1. Libya agrees to allow international inspectors unconditional access to

------monitor and verify compliance and December 2003 also provide information about all parts of its nuclear fuel-cycle. 1. Proliferation sensitive material including UF6, P-2 centrifuges, conversion modules and 2. Libya ratifies the CTBT January 2004 guidance systems for some of the SCUD – C missiles removed and shipped to the U.S.

2. Second phase involved removal of 1000 tons of February 2004 equipment from Libya and the shipment of 16kg ------of HEU for conversion to LEU. 3. Libya returns 88 nuclear fuel assemblies to 3. Libya signs the Additional Protocol Russia that it had originally received between to its NPT safeguards agreement. March 2004 1980 and 1984. These were returned from Libya's Tajoura research center outside Tripoli.

34Dafna Hochman, “Rehabilitating a Rogue; Libya’s WMD Reversal and Lessons for U.S. Policy.” Parameters (Spring 2006),p.65. 199

4. Small irradiated targets from Tajura research April 2004 reactor shipped to U.S. and stripped of ------plutonium.

September 2004 5. Most aspects of the dismantlement and ------verification process is completed.

4. Ratifies the African Nuclear February 2005 ------Weapons Free Zone, Pelindaba treaty 5. Ratifies the amendment to the July 2006 Convention on the Physical ------Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) Sources: 1. Sho J. Morimoto: Libya’s Nuclear Program & Wyn Bowen, “Libya,” in James Doyle ed., Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation (Elsevier Inc, Oxford.:UK.,2008).

2. Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes -- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/treaties.htm

The final phase also involved routine follow up work and interviewing key personnel who were involved with the nuclear program. This phase was wound up by

September 2004 following which a Trilateral Steering and Co-operation Committee involving U.S., U.K and Libyan experts was set up to continue discussions on nuclear issues as also monitor Libya’s commitment to a policy of forbearance.35

7.3 Libya: Prudential Realism and Nuclear Forbearance In this section, I endeavor to test the theoretical validity of prudential realism whose explanations for nuclear forbearance are based on two key variables namely, level of conflict and politico-security interdependence.

7.31 Level of Conflict With respect to the level of conflict, the main premise of H1a is that -- States with high levels of conflict will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. Likewise the

35Bowen, “Libya,”pp.348-351.

200

main premise of H1b is that -- States with medium or low level of conflict will exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. Did Libya’s nuclear history conform to this pattern?

7.32 Level of Conflict The tests indicate that Libya did not exercise a policy of forbearance whenever she had high levels of conflict. H1a is therefore fully supported. However, Libya exercised a policy of forbearance in only one of the two periods that she experienced low levels of conflict. H1b is therefore only partially supported. Libya’s deviant behavior during one period (1990-2002) can be justified with respect to the theory’s alternate explanations regarding a lack of a conventional or non-nuclear countervailing deterrent capability. This explanation is provided below.

Table 7.4. (Libya Militarized Interstate Disputes)36 Dates of Dispute Rival Cause of Conflict Highest action Scale

Egypt War 5 July 1977 Unknown

Chad War 5 1978 - 1987 Territory

April 1986 U.S. Policy Air strikes 4

Table 7.5. - An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict37 Level of Nuclear Conflict (X1) Nature of Dispute Period Scale Timeline (Value)

1. War with Egypt July 20-24, 1977 High 5 1970-1979

2. War with Chad begins 1978 & 1979

Since the level of conflict during this period includes two wars that resulted in fatalities, it has been assigned a high value. 1. War with Chad continues 1980–1981 and 1983– 5 1980-1989 High 1987.

36MIDs Have been assigned a scale from 1-5 based on the correlates of war scale.

37From Table 7.5, it is evident that despite having conflicts that included wars resulting in multiple fatalities, Libya was a state with moderate conflict as its conflicts were few and sporadic unlike states situated in zones of high conflict that were characterized by enduring rivalries. 201

2. U.S. airstrikes on Libya 1986 4

Since the level of conflict during this period includes a War that resulted in considerable fatalities and airstrikes by the U.S., it has been assigned a high value.

1990-2002 Low No Dispute ------1

Since Libya had no wars or conflicts, the level of conflict has been assigned a low value.

2003-2007 Low No Dispute ------1

Since Libya had no wars or conflicts, the level of conflict has been assigned a low value. Libya’s two main rivals were Egypt and Israel. In the 1990’s, Egypt did not possess nuclear weapons although it continued to possess a robust CWP. Libya’s other nuclear rival, even though undeclared, was Israel. Paul argues that “in a zone of moderate conflict, technologically capable regional states would not obtain nuclear arms unless their potential or existing rivals pursued that path.”38 It is true that Libya accelerated its nuclear weapons program after Israel’s revelation about Dimona. For several decades,

Israel continued to be a target and justification for Libya’s nuclear program. In an interview with Al-Jazeera in March 2002, Gaddafi noted: “We demanded the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction that the Israelis have; we must continue to demand that. Otherwise, the Arabs will have the right to possess that weapon”39 From a conventional perspective also, (See Table 7.6) Libya did face an imbalance with her neighbors, especially Egypt and this was reflected in the considerable losses she faced in her disastrous campaigns against Egypt and Chad. Therefore the theory’s alternate

38Paul, Power Versus Prudence,p.23.

39As cited in Wyn Q. Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink, Adelphi series, (Routledge 2006),p.21.

202

explanations for a state’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program while facing low levels of conflict are vindicated in the case of Libya. However, despite Libya’s increasing arms purchases in the 1990’s, it remained unable to operate what it had received. In 1990, approximately 2300 Soviet personnel were required to train Libyan forces who, at that time, were able to operate only about 30-50 percent of their combat equipment.40 As

Cordessman argues, “much of Libya’s military spending and efforts to acquire foreign arms have been wasted because Libya has never fielded the manpower necessary to make it active.”41

Table 7.6. Libya v neighbors; Conventional capabilities Manpower (1000’s) 1967 1973 1975 1977 1982 1988 1991 Algeria 75 80 80 75 120 126 126 Libya 20 20 25 30 55 86 85 Morocco 65 65 75 85 125 195 196 Egypt 220 390 400 350 447 450 420 Tunisia 25 20 400 350 32 40 35 Chad 5 10 11 9 3 33 17 Main Battle Tanks 1967 1973 1979 1982 1988 1990 1992 Algeria 240 400 140 630 910 900 960 Libya 54 221 2000 2000 1980 2300 2160 Morocco 40 120 140 135 224 284 284 Egypt -- 1880 1600 2100 2425 3190 3190 Tunisia 0 0 0 14 68 84 84 Chad 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 Combat Aircraft 1967 1973 1979 1982 1988 1990 1992 Algeria 21 206 260 306 299 257 241 Libya 17 44 201 555 515 513 409 Morocco 24 48 72 97 109 93 90 Egypt --- 620 563 429 517 475 495 Tunisia 7 12 14 8 43 50 53 Chad 0 0 5 0 2 4 4 Source: Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm; The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1993),pp.83-165.

40Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm; The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1993),p.94.

41Ibid,p.139. 203

7.33 Politico-Security Interdependence and Nuclear Decisions With respect to politico-security interdependence, the main premise of H2a is that states possessing, in the aggregate, low levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. Likewise, the main premise of H2b is that states possessing, in the aggregate, high levels of politico-security interdependence with allies or adversaries are most likely to exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance. So if I see that Libya was not exercising a policy of forbearance on account of low politico-security interdependence then H2a is supported. Likewise, if I see Libya exercising a policy of forbearance whenever it possessed high politico-security interdependence then H2b is supported. Did Libya’s nuclear history conform to this pattern? In this section, I examine Libya’s politico- security interdependence with its allies and adversaries and how the level of interdependence influenced its nuclear decisions. The time period begins in 1970 when Libya first initiated its nuclear program and corresponds thereafter to each phase of its nuclear history.

7.34 The First Phase: (1970-1979) – Low Politico-Security Interdependence After the 1969 coup, Libya’s relations with the West had soured. The United

States and Britain, once close allies, were now adversaries on account of their support to

Israel. Gaddafi responded by adopting a string of anti-Western policies including the closure of U.S. and British military bases in Libya. In view of Libya’s hostile policies,

“U.S. reciprocal measures toward Libya during this period involved a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military coercion.”42 For example, in the late 1970’s,

Washington blocked the sale of military equipment to Libya. During this period, Gaddafi

42Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who “Won” Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,”International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3(Winter 2005/06),p.58. 204

viewed Britain, the United States and Israel as Libya’s primary adversaries. Politico- security interdependence with allies (Soviet Union) was also low because Libya was not concerned with the reactions of the Soviet Union. It was under these circumstances that

Gaddafi initiated a nuclear program unmindful of the possible reciprocal actions from allies and adversaries. Aggregate politico-security interdependence was low during this period.

7.35 The Second Phase: (1980-1989) – Low Politico-Security Interdependence Relations with the West continued to sour during this period. In 1981 Libya signed an economic and political agreement with Ethiopia and South Yemen, which was aimed at limiting Western influence in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.43 In the

1980’s, the Reagan administration imposed an embargo on crude oil imports from Libya and followed it up by severing all diplomatic and economic ties with Libya. In May 1981,

Libyan diplomatic personnel were ordered to leave the United States. These measures proved to be largely ineffective for two reasons: a) Sanctions imposed by Washington were not followed by the rest of the world and b) Libya’s main export was oil.44 Libya succeeded in channeling its oil and oil-related exports barred from the U.S. market, to

Western Europe where it incurred very little loss of revenue. Also, the decision to freeze

Libya’s assets in 1986 could not have hurt the economy much, because less than 2 percent of its overseas liquid investments came under U.S. jurisdiction.45 In August 1981,

43Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Libya: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987)

44Randall Newnham, “Carrots, Sticks, and Bombs: The End of Libya's WMD Program,” Mediterranean Quarterly,Vol.20, No.3(Summer 2009),p.82.

45See Miroslav Nincic, “Getting What You Want: Positive Inducements in International Relations,”International Security, Vol.35, No.1(Summer 2010),p.175. 205

the United States jets shot down two Libyan jet fighters during naval maneuvers in the

Gulf of Sidra. Punitive measures by the West in the 1980’s only served to embolden

Libya. PSI with the U.S. was low during this period.

During this time, however, the Soviet Union proved to be an invaluable ally for

Libya and Libya’s interdependence with the Soviet Union was high. Libya provided the

Soviet Union with valuable economic benefits including oil and hard currency and the

Soviets reciprocated by extending co-operation in the military arena. Subsequent agreements were signed in 1977, 1978, and 1980. “The value of these transactions was estimated at over US$20 billion between 1973 and 1985.”46 The Soviets also supplied

Libya with the 10MW research reactor at Tajoura which came online in 1981. In 1984

Libya and the Soviet Union issued a joint declaration of a treaty of friendship and cooperation that provided for Soviet aid to Libya if Libya were to be attacked. The treaty, however, was never concluded.47 Overall, PSI was low during this period as Libya exercised a policy of non-forbearance. Libya’s nuclear policies were not concerned with the reciprocal actions of either its ally (the Soviet Union) or its primary adversaries

(U.S.& Israel).

7.36 The Third Phase: (1990- 2002) -- Low Politico-Security Interdependence For the Libyans, the 1986 bombings demonstrated the need for an alternate deterrent that would henceforth prevent any external intervention in Libya’s affairs. In the meanwhile, tough U.N. sanctions implemented in 1992 had increased Libya’s isolation and hurt the economy. The sanctions were intended to cripple the Libyan

46Metz, ed. Libya: A Country Study.

47Ibid. 206

economy. By some estimates, the combined sanctions cost Libya between $24-26 billion in revenue and also resulted in high inflation and unemployment rates.48 Other estimates put the figure upwards of $33 billion.49 Also, in August 1996- the Iran-Libya Sanctions

Act (ILSA) was signed into law. This law was the U.S. response against Iran and Libya for their support for international terrorism and their efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In 2002, President Bush signed the ILSA Extension Act of 2001 which lowered the investment threshold in Libya to USD 20 million. Politico-security interdependence during this period continued to be low with respect to adversaries as

Libya stepped up its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons through the black market route. In the post cold war period, PSI with Russia was much lower than it was in the past. The lack of effective Soviet support to Libya during and after the United States raid in April

1986 was a result of Moscow's reluctance to confront the United States. Aggregate politico-security interdependence was therefore low during this period.

7.37 The Fourth Phase: (2003-2007) – High Politico-Security Interdependence Libya’s eventual decision to dismantle its WMD program built so assiduously over the years was closely related to its high politico-security interdependence with major powers. As Gadaffi himself said later, “We made this step because this programme is not useful to Libya but represents a danger and threat to Libya’s integrity.”50 Ultimately,

Libya was a prudent actor and Libya’s decision to exercise forbearance in 2003 was taken with the understanding that such a decision could help it to minimize its risks and also

48Yehudit Ronen, “Libya,” in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman ed., Middle East Contemporary Survey (Tel-Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, 2001),p.408.

49Ray Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came in from the Cold,” Foreign Affairs, May-June 2001,p.64.

50Corera, “Shopping for Bombs,”p.181.

207

avoid possible losses to its security. As Hochman argues, “Evidence suggest that

Gaddafi, or at least his top advisors, understood Libya’s predicament and chose to

privilege economic interests over ideological or nationalist ones.”51 The global war on

terrorism also brought the U.S. and Libya together in which Gaddafi felt as much of a

threat from radical elements at home as did Washington.52

Table 7.7. –– An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence (PSI) 53 Nuclear PSI Reciprocal Decisions by Ally PSI with Reciprocal Decisions by Adversary-- Timeline with ( Soviet Union) adversary Israel/U.S. ally 1) Signs major arms deal with 1) Israel possesses nuclear weapons Libya-1975. 54 (Low) capabilities. 1970-1979 (Low*) 2) 1977- Helps Libya construct 2) U.S. supports Israel. 10MW reactor at Tajura. 1) 1981-The United States closes 1) 1984 --the two countries Libya’s embassy in Washington and issued a joint declaration in expels Libyan diplomats.

principle to enter into a (Low) 2) 1981- U.S. shoots two Libyan 1980-1989 (Low) treaty of friendship and aircraft.

cooperation. 55 3) 1986 -President Reagan imposes additional sanctions on Libya. 4) 1986 -U.S. bombs Tripoli. Soviet Union collapses. Libya 1) 1996- The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act less concerned with reactions (ILSA) becomes law. (Low) from the Soviet Union during (Low) 2) 2002 – President Bush signs the 1990-2002 this period. After cold war, (PSI ILSA Extension Act of 2001 which low with Russia) lowers investment threshold in Libya to USD 20 million. PSI Low with Russia 1) February 2004, the United States lifts (Low) Libya not concerned with the travel ban to Libya. 2003 2007 Russian reactions because Russia (High) 2) April 2004, the White House was not in a position to influence terminates the application of Iran Libya. Libya Sanctions Act. (ILSA)

51Hochman, “Rehabilitating a Rogue,”p.68.

52Jon B. Alterman, “Libya and the U.S.: The Unique Libyan Case,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. XIII, No.1. (Winter 2006),pp.21-29. 53 Table Source: Peter Crail, “Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States,” Arms Control Association, Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology. Internet accessed July 28, 2010.

54Metz, ed. Libya: A Country Study,1987.

55Libya- A Country Study. Military Co-operation with the Soviet Union. Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. Available at http://www.country- data.com/frd/cs/lytoc.html#ly0157. 208

3) June 2004, a new U.S. liaison Office in Libya is inaugurated. 4) September 2004, the United States lifts most of its remaining sanctions. May 2006, the U.S. establishes full diplomatic relations with Libya. *Although Libya had excellent relations with the U.S.S.R on two occasions (1970-1979 & 1980-1989), yet on account of U.S. & Israeli actions it’s PSI with the Soviet Union was also low. Despite Soviet aid, Libya decided to pursue nuclear weapons because it was less concerned about the reactions of the Soviet Union during both these periods.

** In 2003-2007, PSI was high overall because of Libya’s improved relations with the West and its (Libya’s) concern with the reciprocal actions of the U.S.

Table 7.8. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence (PSI) Years Allies Adversaries Sum of interdep. Overall PSI* allies & adversaries 1970-1979 Low with U.S.S.R. Low with U.S. Low/Low Low

1980-1989 Low with U.S.S.R Low with U.S. Low/Low Low

1990-2002 Low with Russia Low with U.S. Low/Low Low

2003-2007 Low with Russia High with U.S. Low/High High

*Overall PSI was low in three periods because during these 3 periods, Libya was not concerned about the reactions of its adversaries and calibrated its nuclear decisions accordingly.

7.4 Having examined how Libya’s politico-security interdependence, with both its allies and adversaries, influenced its nuclear decisions, I now test whether these decisions were in conformity with the claims of prudential realism in this regard. I begin by testing H2a.

After the 1969 coup, Libya’s relations with the West had soured. The United States and

Britain, once close allies, were now adversaries on account of their support to Israel. The

Soviet Union proved to be an invaluable ally but despite this PSI for Libya was overall low. During 1980-1989, despite high interdependence with the Soviet Union, PSI was once again overall low. This was because despite having good relations with the Soviet

Union, Libya’s relations with the West continued to sour on account of sanctions and embargoes. From 1990-2003, Libya redoubled its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons

209

through the black market route. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that PSI, during this period, was low with both adversaries and allies. Libya’s aggregate politico-security interdependence was thus low during three phases of its nuclear history resulting in a policy of non-forbearance during each of these periods. H2a. is thus fully supported.

However, from December 2003-2007, Libya sought greater integration with the West.

Politico-security interdependence, overall, was high during this period resulting in a policy of forbearance. H2b. is also, therefore, fully supported.

Libya’s PSI with its immediate neighbors also deserves mention. Immediately after the revolution, there was deterioration in Libyan-Israeli relations. Israel’s revelations of its activities at Dimona only compounded matters. During the late 1960’s and 1970’s, Israel used its financial clout to convince several African nations to sever their diplomatic ties with Israel. In Libya’s view, there was no place for a Jewish state in the Middle East and the only solution was the complete elimination of the state of Israel.

Libya’s anti-Israeli stance was also evident in its strained relation with President Anwar

Sadat of Egypt.56 As far as Algeria was concerned, Muammar al Qadhafi's Libya was regarded as somewhat more friendly. The Algerian-Libyan security relationship was based on a common hatred of Western imperialism and deep hostility toward Israel.

Libyan support for the Polisario in the Western Sahara meant that Algeria’s relations with

Libya were cordial to begin with. However, Libya’s desire for a full-scale political union has obstructed any possibility of a formal political collaboration because Algeria has consistently backed away from such a union. The establishment of the Union of the Arab

56Waniss Otman and Erling Karlberg, The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2007).

210

Maghreb (UMA) in February 1989 marked the first formal political or economic collaboration between the two neighbors. Relations have been generally cordial but turbulent at times.57

Table 7.9 –– An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence (1970-2007); Libya and her neighbors Nuclear Libya-- Israel Libya-- Algeria Libya--Egypt Timeline (Low PSI) (Moderate PSI) (Moderate PSI)

Algeria supports Libya Tripoli Charter signed in 1969. Israel possesses nuclear weapons against Egypt in the border Charter included what was capabilities. war of 1977. called the National Arab Front. 1970-1979 1973- Libyan airlines plane shot down by Israel. Union of Arab Republics declared between Egypt, Syria Libya continues aid to Palestinian and Libya on April 17, 1971. Radicals. Libya assists Egypt in the Arab-Israeli War (1973).

Libyan--Egyptian War (1977) (Low PSI) (Moderate PSI) (Moderate PSI)

Libya continues hostile policy Relations disturbed by the No diplomatic relations until towards Israel. signing of a unity pact 1989. between Libya and Algerian Libya and Syria establish rival Morocco (the Treaty of 1980-1989 democratic union against Zionism Oujda) in 1984.

Israel provides full support to Libya's unilateral military U.S. in its bombing against Libya. intervention in Chad hardens (April 1986) Algerian attitude towards Libya.

Algeria builds research reactor supplied by China.

1989- Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA) formed. (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). (Moderate PSI) (Moderate PSI)

1990-2002 Thaw in relations with Israel. ------Egyptian-Libyan co-operation Libya reluctantly accepts Arab- increases following thaw in Israeli peace process. relations.

57 Helen Chapan Metz, ed. Algeria: A Country Study. (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994). 211

1992- Company for Trade and Investment was established between the two countries.

Agreements in the fields of trade and transport were signed. (Moderate PSI) (Moderate PSI) In 2007, President Mubarak 2003-2007 Some overtures made with Israel ------pays three visits to Libya but no significant breakthrough. (January 22-May 8- September 23). Overall PSI Overall PSI Overall PSI

Low Moderate Moderate

(Barring Israel, Libya’s PSI with her neighbors was largely moderate. Relations were cordial but at times turbulent. Libya paid equal attention to economic and security goals in its relations with theses states) Sources: Egyptian-Libyan Relations, Egypt State Information Services; Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics (Princeton University Press, 2007); Waniss Otman and Erling Karlberg, The Libyan Economy: Economic Diversification and International Repositioning (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2007) ; Helen Chapan Metz, ed. Algeria: A Country Study. (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994

Libya’s relations with Egypt were initially co-operative but tensions arose in the 1970’s after Egypt’s rapprochement with the U.S. and Israel. The 1977 Libyan-Egyptian war created a considerable strain in their relations. Following the outbreak of this war, there was no diplomatic relations until 1989 after Gaddafi met with Mubarak in Morocco in

1989 during the Arab Summit. Relations continued to improve in the 1990’s especially after the Lockerbie crisis and several agreements in the fields of trade and transport were signed.

7.5 Conclusion Based on my analysis in the preceding pages, I conclude that prudential realism does not fully explain Libya’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. Libya had four phases in its nuclear history. (1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-2002 and 2003-2007) With respect to the level of conflict, the evidence indicates that Libya did not exercise a policy of forbearance whenever it had high levels of conflict (1970-1979 & 1980-1989) H1a is therefore fully supported. However, Libya exercised a policy of forbearance in only one 212

of the two periods that it experienced low levels of conflict. (2003-2007) H1b is therefore only partially supported. Libya’s deviant behavior during one period (1990-

2002) can be explained with respect to the theory’s alternate explanations regarding a lack of a conventional or non-nuclear countervailing deterrent capability.

With respect to politico-security interdependence, the theory’s explanations for

Libya’s nuclear decisions, the way they occurred, are fully supported. For example, Libya exercised a policy of non-forbearance in each of the three periods she experienced overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries.

(1970-79, 1980-1989 and 1990-2002) H2a is thus fully supported. Similarly, Libya exercised a policy of forbearance in the only period she experienced overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence with her allies and adversaries. (2003-2007) H2b is also, therefore, fully supported.

213

Table 7.10. Libya - Summary of Results Nuclear H1b Nuclear Decision Timeline H1a H2a H2b 1970-1979     Non-Forbearance

1980-1989     Non-Forbearance

1990-2002  X   Non-Forbearance

2003-2007     Forbearance

Net H1a H1b H2a H2b Assessment

 H1b is supported in   only 1 of the two periods - Partially Supported Symbols X - Not Supported  - Fully Supported  - Not Applicable

214

Table 7.11. - Libya’s Nuclear Timeline Nuclear Nuclear Decision Level of Conflict PSI—(Allies and Adversaries) Time Line High. Overall (Low) 1) Israel possesses nuclear weapons 1. War with capabilities. 1970-1979 Egypt. 2) U.S. supports Israel. Non- Soviets supply aid and nuclear reactor. Forbearance 2. War with Chad begins. High Overall (Low) 1) 1981- U.S. expels Libyan diplomats. 1. War with Chad 2) 1981- U.S. shoots two Libyan aircraft. continues. 3) 1986 -President Reagan imposes 1980-1989 additional sanctions on Libya. Non- 2. U.S. airstrikes 4) 1986 -U.S. bombs Tripoli. Forbearance on Libya. ______Soviet aid continues but PSI still low with Soviet Union. Low Overall (Low) 1) 1996- The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act Non- No Militarized (ILSA) becomes law. Sanctions intended Forbearance Interstate Disputes. to cripple Libyan economy. 1990-2002 ______Following collapse of the Soviet Union, PSI with former USSR in post cold war period is low. Low Overall (High) 1) Libya keen on rapprochement with the No Militarized West. Forbearance Interstate Disputes. 2) Dismantles nuclear 2003-2007 programme. 3) U.S. reciprocates generously with aid package.

215

Chapter 8

Conclusion

In this concluding section, I begin by recapitulating the key findings of the dissertation and then highlight a few limitations of the theory, which I hope will make the theory more relevant with respect to the forbearance literature. The primary goal of this dissertation was to test the theory of prudential realism whose explanations for nuclear forbearance are based on two key variables namely, level of conflict and politico- security interdependence. The nuclear decisions of four states (South Korea, North

Korea, Taiwan and Egypt) situated in a high conflict zone and one state (Libya), situated in a medium conflict zone were analyzed; hypotheses were formulated and these hypotheses were then tested to see if they conformed to the theory’s main predictions.

With respect to the states situated in a zone of high conflict, two hypotheses pertaining to the level of conflict and two hypotheses pertaining to politico-security interdependence were tested. These hypotheses were:

H1a-- States with high levels of conflict will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H1b – States with medium to low levels of conflict will exercise a policy of forbearance.

H2a - States possessing, in the aggregate, low levels of politico-security interdependence with allies and adversaries will not exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

H2b--States possessing, in the aggregate, high levels of politico-security interdependence with allies and adversaries are most likely to exercise a policy of nuclear forbearance.

Summary of Results In the case of South Korea, I conclude that with respect to the level of conflict, prudential realism does not fully explain South Korea’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. The evidence indicates that the ROK exercised a policy of forbearance during

216

the only period (2000-2010) it had high levels of conflict. H1a, is therefore not supported. However, the ROK’s deviant behavior during this period is explained by the theory’s alternate explanation with respect to countervailing capabilities. With respect to the second hypothesis, the evidence indicates that the ROK exercised a policy of forbearance in three of the four periods that it experienced medium levels of conflict.

(1960-1969, 1980-1989 and 1990-1999) H1b is therefore mostly supported. The ROK’s deviant behavior during one period (1970-1979) can be explained with respect to the theory’s second variable, namely politico-security interdependence.

With respect to the second variable, politico-security interdependence, the theory does succeed in fully explaining South Korea’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred.

For example, a policy of forbearance by South Korea was always associated with overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence. H2b is thus fully supported. Likewise, a policy of non-forbearance by South Korea was always associated with overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence thus fully supporting H2a. Therefore, with respect to politico-security interdependence, both the hypotheses are fully supported.

In the case of DPRK, with respect to the level of conflict, prudential realism does not fully explain the DPRK’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. The DPRK never exercised a policy of forbearance in both the periods that it experienced high levels of conflict. (2002-2006 & April 2009 -2010) H1a is thus fully supported. With respect to the second hypotheses H1b, the DPRK exercised a policy of forbearance, as it should have, in three of the four periods that it experienced either medium or low levels of conflict. (1960-1979, 1991-2001 & 2007-March 2009) However, in one period (1980-

1990), the DPRK did not exercise a policy of forbearance even as it experienced medium

217

levels of conflict. H1b is therefore only mostly supported. The DPRK’s deviant behavior during one period (1980-1989) is better explained in terms of the theory’s second variable namely, politico-security interdependence. With respect to politico-security interdependence the theory does explain North Korea’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. For example, a policy of forbearance by North Korea was always associated with overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence. This confirms H2b.

Likewise; a policy of non-forbearance by North Korea was always associated with overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence. H2a is also therefore fully supported.

In the case of Taiwan, I conclude that with respect to the level of conflict, prudential realism does not fully explain the ROC’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. For example, Taiwan exercised a policy of nuclear forbearance during the only period that it experienced high levels of conflict. (1949-1966) H1a is therefore not supported. With respect to the second hypotheses H1b, the evidence indicates that the

ROC exercised a policy of forbearance, as it should have, in two of the three periods that it experienced medium to low levels of conflict. (1977-1989 & 1990-2007) In one period

(1967-1976) the ROC did not exercise a policy of forbearance even as it experienced low levels of conflict. H1b is therefore mostly supported. The ROC’s deviant behavior during this one period (1967-1976) is better explained in terms of the theory’s alternate explanation on security guarantees and conventional capabilities. With respect to politico-security interdependence, a policy of forbearance by the ROC was always associated with overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence thus supporting

H2b. Likewise, from 1967-1976, the ROC’s decision of non-forbearance was associated

218

with overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence. H2a is also therefore, fully supported. With respect to politico-security interdependence, both the hypotheses are therefore supported.

In the case of Egypt, the conclusion is that with respect to the level of conflict, prudential realism does not fully explain Egypt’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. For example, Egypt did not exercise a policy of forbearance in only one of the three periods that it experienced high levels of conflict. (1960-1969) In two other periods that Egypt had high levels of conflict (1948-1959& 1970-1980) it did exercise a policy of forbearance. H1a is therefore, considered to be only partially supported. Egypt’s deviant behavior in two periods (1948-1959 & 1970-1980) can be explained with respect to the theory’s alternate explanations on security guarantees and non-nuclear countervailing deterrent capabilities. With respect to the second hypotheses, H1b is fully supported because during the only period that Egypt had low levels of conflict, (1981-2007) it did exercise a policy of forbearance. With respect to politico-security interdependence, the theory’s explanations for Egypt’s nuclear decisions, the way they occurred, are fully supported. For example, a policy of forbearance by Egypt was always associated with overall, high levels of politico-security interdependence. H2b is thus fully supported.

Likewise, Egypt’s decision to adopt a policy of non-forbearance from 1960-1969, was associated with overall, low levels of politico-security interdependence. H2a – is also therefore fully supported. With respect to politico- security interdependence, both the hypotheses are therefore supported.

With respect to Libya, I conclude that prudential realism does not fully explain

Libya’s nuclear decisions the way they occurred. First, with respect to the level of

219

conflict, Libya did not exercise a policy of forbearance whenever she faced high levels of conflict. H1a is therefore fully supported. However, Libya exercised a policy of forbearance, as it should have, in only one of the two periods (2003-2007) that it experienced low levels of conflict. H1b is therefore only partially supported. Libya’s deviant behavior during the other period (1990-2002) can be explained with respect to the theory’s alternate explanations regarding a lack of a conventional or non-nuclear countervailing deterrent capability.

8.1 Overall Analysis a) Level of Conflict A comprehensive case study analysis of four states situated in a zone of high conflict and one state situated in a zone of medium conflict yielded some interesting results. First, in terms of the level of conflict, the nuclear decisions of these states, across several time periods, are not fully consistent with the theory’s claims. For example, H1a is fully supported only in the case of Libya and the DPRK. In all other cases H1a is either not supported or only partially supported (less than half the number of periods).

Likewise H1b is fully supported only in the case of Egypt. In all other cases H1b is either mostly supported (more than half the number of periods) or partially supported (half or less than half the number of periods) The nuclear decisions however, can be justified in terms of the theory’s alternate explanations for forbearance and non-forbearance. But since these alternate explanations are not being tested, they are not included in the final result. (See Table 8.0)

220

Table 8.0. – Summary -- Level of Conflict State Nuclear History H1a H1b Supported Not Supported Supported Not supported Mostly South South Korea had five Korea phases in its nuclear Three out of four One period history. N.A.* From 2000-2010 periods (1970-1979)

1960-69, 1970-79; (Only period of 1960-1969 1980-89, 1990-99 & high conflict) 1980-1989 2000-2010 1990-1999 Fully** Mostly*** The DPRK had six North phases in its nuclear From 2002- Three out of four Korea history: 2006 & April periods. One period 2009-2010. N.A. 1960-1979; 1980-1990 1960-1979; (1980-1990) 1991-2001 1991-2001 2002-2006 2007-2009 Feb.2007-09 March 2009-2010

Taiwan had four Mostly One period Taiwan phases in its nuclear decisions: N.A. From 1949-1966 Two out of three (1967-1976) phases 1949-1966; 1967-1976 (Only period of 1977-1989 and 1990- high conflict) 1977-1989 & 2007 1990-2007 ______

Egypt had four phases Fully in its nuclear history. Partially**** Two periods 1981-2007 N.A. Egypt 1948-1959; 1960-1969 Only one of 1970-1980 and 1981- three periods. 1948-1959 & 2007 1970-1980 1960-1969

Libya had four phases in its nuclear decisions Fully N.A. Partially One Period Libya 1970-79; 1980-89 & 1970-1979 & 2003-2007 1990-2002 1990-2002 & 2003- 1980-1989 2007

*N.A. – There is no applicable period for that particular case.

**Fully supported means that in the only period(s) of high/low conflict encountered by a state, the policy was non-forbearance or forbearance respectively. For a hypothesis to be fully 221

supported, a state’s nuclear decision(s) must be fully consistent with the theory’s claims, with respect to its key variables, across all relevant periods of its nuclear history.

*** Mostly – Supported across a majority (>50 %) but not all of the time periods.

****Partially- Not supported across a majority (≤ 50%) of time periods.

Of the five cases, NONE are fully supported with respect to both the hypotheses concerning the level of conflict. (H1a & H1b) Overall the Level of Conflict earns a possible score of 2.0 out of 5. b) Politico-security interdependence On the contrary, in terms of the second variable, politico-security interdependence, the theory does offer a more robust and comprehensive explanation (all

5 cases supported) of the nuclear decisions of these five states the way they occurred thereby obtaining a score of 5 out of 5. As indicated in Chapter 2, I consider the theory to be fully supported only when a state’s nuclear decision corresponds exactly to the theory’s main predictions, based on its key variables namely level of conflict and politico-security interdependence, across a majority of time periods. (See Table 8.1)

PSI had a very critical role in terms of influencing nuclear decisions. In all the cases analyzed, positive interdependent relationships in terms of economic and security inducements had a significant role in inducing a decision of forbearance. This is a significant factor from a policy perspective and is useful in dealing with potential proliferators. In all the cases analyzed, promises of economic aid and security guarantees were attractive incentives as states realized that it was not worth risking a nuclear weapons program for fear of creating negative security externalities amongst both, its allies and adversaries within the region. In the case of Libya, her decision to adopt a policy of nuclear forbearance in 2003 resulted in high PSI with her adversaries in the region.

222

Table 8.1. – Summary – Politico-Security Interdependence State Nuclear History H2a H2b Supported Not Supported Supported Not Supported

South South Korea had Fully Fully Korea five phases in its N.A. N.A. nuclear history. One period Four Periods 1960-69,1980- 1960-69, 1970-79, 1970-79 89, 1990-99 & 1980-89, 1990-99 2000-2010 & 2000-2010

The DPRK had six Fully Fully N.A. North phases in its Korea nuclear history: Three Periods Three periods N.A. 1960-1979; 1980- 1980-1990 1960-1979 1990; 1991-2001 2002-2006 1991-2001 2002-2006 April 2009-2010 Feb.2007-March Feb.2007-09 & 09 March 2009-2010 ______

Taiwan had four Fully Fully N.A. Taiwan phases in its N.A. nuclear decisions: One Period Three Periods

1949-1966; 1967- 1967-1976 1949-1966; 1976 1977-1989 and 1977-1989 and 1990-2007. 1990-2007

Fully Fully N.A Egypt had four One period N.A. Three Periods Egypt phases in its nuclear history. 1960-1969 1948-1959; 1970-1980 and 1948-1959; 1960- 1981-2007 1969, 1970-1980 and 1981-2007.

Libya had four Fully Fully Libya phases in its nuclear decisions Three periods One period N.A.

1970-79; 1980-89 & 1990-2002 1970-79; 1980-89 2003-2007 & 2003-2007 & 1990-2002

PSI is fully supported across all periods for all cases and hence earns a score of 5/5.

223

8.2 Modifying the Theory Prudential realism, as a theory, provides some useful insights into patterns of acquisition and forbearance. Drawing from realist and liberal camps, the theory offers its own unique perspective on the security policy of states wherein a state may choose to mitigate the effects of anarchy by acting in a prudent manner by adopting “benign and cautious” policies that do not increase the insecurity of others. 1 This is a unique contribution of the theory and needs to be much appreciated. However, I would suggest some modifications in the methodology and approach of the theory.

First, the zone concept needs to account for periods of high, medium and low conflict within a zone. For example, a zone of high conflict need not always have high conflict as measured by the severity, intensity, duration and scope of conflicts involving key states in the region. As the findings in this dissertation indicate, there could be periods of medium and low conflict even within a high conflict zone. This distinction is not enunciated. The theory does acknowledge that a region or zone may not be stable in terms of conflict relationships and can be transformed from a zone of high conflict into a low conflict zone and vice-versa, but this is not the same as drawing a distinction within a zone and across rivalries between states. Second, the theory does not relate nuclear decisions to the phases of rivalry or tensions among different states. Paul’s theory asserts that a non-great power decides to nuclearize or to denuclearize according to the level and type of the security threats it faces.2 However, a zone of high conflict need not always have high conflict and this can impact a state’s nuclear decision. Because prudential realism does not analyze this distinction within a zone, it cannot explain why some states

1Paul, Power versus Prudence,p.149.

2 Ibid,pp.4-5. 224

involved in enduring rivalries revisit their nuclear policies. As the evidence in the dissertation indicates, the level of conflict operationalized by MIDs, did not always have a bearing on decisions relating to acquisition or forbearance. For example, nuclear weapons were pursued during periods of low MIDs and forbearance was adopted during periods of high MIDs indicating thereby that decisions relating to acquisition or forbearance were influenced by a range of alternatives.

I would also suggest some modifications in defining interdependence in relation to states situated in a zone of moderate conflict. The theory’s argument is that in a zone of moderate conflict, states are characterized by moderate interdependence and pay equal attention to security and economic issues. 3 This definition can be modified because as the findings of this dissertation indicate, states like Libya, situated in a zone of moderate conflict, had periods of either high or low security interdependence across its nuclear history. In the long term, Libya did pay equal attention to security and economic issues but this did not necessarily translate into moderate interdependence within each phase of its nuclear history.

8.3 Implications for Policy Important events in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation have had a positive impact on the strengthening of international security. As disarmament efforts are further extended it is critical to examine the circumstances under which states are willing to exercise a policy of forbearance and renounce nuclear weapons.

Understanding the relevance or otherwise of certain variables in influencing forbearance has significant policy relevance in so far as it provides a pathway in encouraging potential proliferators to embrace disarmament efforts. In this regard, both the variables

3Paul, Power versus Prudence, p.22. 225

discussed in this dissertation have important implications for policy as the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be underestimated. These weapons do provide a psychological and military advantage for those states that do possess it. When states have protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries, the temptation to acquire these weapons is enormous. When conflict involves two or more nuclear powers, the potential for miscalculation increases dramatically. Therefore, while taking into account rivalry among existing or potential nuclear adversaries, the tendency, for policy planners, must be to reign in their coercive tactics and to control the threat and application of force in international relations as this would curb any desire to use nuclear weapons.4 For example, in high conflict zones, the use of coercive diplomacy coupled with the threat of sanctions can be effective tools in mitigating the desire to acquire nuclear weapons. The second variable is equally important for policymakers and is related to the first because greater interdependence can mitigate conflict, all else failing. As has been seen across all the cases in this dissertation, increased political, economic and military interdependence can offer the reassurances required amongst allies and adversaries and can seriously curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Linking economic and military aid to nonproliferation has been an effective way of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Therefore it is important for policy planners to seriously address both these variables, if they are to succeed in curbing proliferation in the long run.

8.4 Elevation of Security Variables to a Primary Level In elevating security considerations to a primary level, the theory exposes itself to serious criticism. As Solingen argues, “a theory that cannot be easily confirmed even

4See Daniel S Geller, “Nuclear Weapons Deterrence and Crisis Escalation,”The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 2 (June 1990),pp.291-292. 226

under the best possible circumstances suggests potentially serious problems.”5 The case studies in this dissertation reveal several inconsistencies with respect to this line of reasoning. For example, a state such as Libya that was situated in a zone of moderate conflict pursued nuclear weapons more aggressively than states such as Egypt or Taiwan that were situated in a high conflict zone. Likewise, states such as South Korea, North

Korea, Egypt and Taiwan adopted a policy of forbearance when there were no signs of the protracted conflict ending, and in some cases in the absence of conventional superiority or chemical weapons. In elevating security variables to a higher plane, the theory fails to account for these developments. Richard Betts has argued that many insecure states have not pursued the nuclear option but at the same time state’s that have not faced any credible threat (Libya) have not been averse to experimenting with the nuclear option.6 Security guarantees were important factors in exercising a policy of forbearance but that alone cannot explain the entire process. The logical inference from the above analysis is that security considerations alone do not account for nuclear decisions. Nor are they the most important factor as the theory makes it out to be. In all the cases analyzed in this dissertation, alternative explanations especially those relating to domestic politics provide a sound basis for understanding decisions pertaining to forbearance.

8.5 Alternative Explanations A short discussion of domestic politics and some other alternative explanations is warranted. First on domestic politics, as Solingen argues, “understanding relative receptivity to both coercive and persuasive aspects of U.S. influence requires us to

5Solingen, Nuclear Logics, p.251.

6Ibid, p.253. 227

consider reigning domestic models of political survival.”7 Where the domestic political situation in the recipient country was unstable, greater was the receptivity towards concessions by its allies.8 In all the case studies in this dissertation, domestic models of survival that favored high economic growth and greater integration into the international system were responsible for decisions of forbearance. A nuclear weapons program had the potential to seriously disrupt this model.9 In the case of North Korea, incentives offered by the U.S. were received depending on the domestic political situation.

Incentives were well received by the end of the 20th century as the domestic political situation had worsened following the collapse of the Soviet Union, energy shortages and consecutive famines. Likewise in the case of Libya, the regimes position deteriorated in the 1990’s following several attempted military coups and clashes between radical

Islamists and the regimes security forces. As the domestic situation further deteriorated following clashes between the moderates who favored economic reforms and the revolutionary forces, Gaddafi leaned towards the moderates.10 Similar situations were witnessed in South Korea and Taiwan. From a situational context, enduring rival states such as South Korea, Taiwan, North Korea and Egypt, confronted as they were with a history of conflict, should never have allowed their domestic politics to influence nuclear decisions. But this is exactly what happened, thereby lending further credence to the view that regime survival coupled with domestic growth and stability were contributing factors

7Solingen, Nuclear Logics,p.253.

8Nincic, “Getting What You Want,”p.180.

9Solingen, Nuclear Logics, p. 253.

10Nincic, “Getting What You Want,”pp.155-180. 228

that pushed these states towards adopting a policy of forbearance. This is a critical argument that cannot be overlooked. Other domestic political factors influencing nuclear decisions in some of these cases included domestic pressures, presence of “veto-players”, bureaucratic politics and group dynamics and civil—military relations.11

There are also some alternative explanations drawn from neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism. For example, neoliberal explanations would correctly predict as to why Egypt eventually ratified the NPT in 1981 having decided earlier to pursue a nuclear weapons program. From an institutionalist perspective, ratifying the

NPT provided long term benefits to Egypt in that it removed supplier constraints and also reinforced Egypt’s credibility in the international community. The Egyptians believed that they were incapable of sustaining an arms race in the Middle East and that by joining the NPT could force other states such as Israel to do the same. And to take another example, constructivist explanations would correctly predict as to why North Korea pursued a nuclear weapons program. Nuclear weapons offer prestige and international status as a member of the exclusive nuclear club. For the regime in North Korea, nuclear

11 For an understanding on how domestic factors influenced nuclear decisions in each of the cases see Chien-peng Chung, “Democratization in South Korea and Inter-Korean Relations,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 76, No.1(Spring, 2003); Ilpyong J. Kim, “Kim Jong Il’s Military First Politics,” in Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, eds., North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006); Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (N.Y.: St. Martin’s and Macmillan, 1997); Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-Kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); P J Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 2007) & Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009). 229

weapons are an important way to enhance the regime’s status in the eyes of the domestic populace.12

8.6 Conclusion The case studies in this dissertation re-affirm the conclusion that there is no universal explanation for nuclear forbearance and that there are different paths to forbearance which is not unusual given the complexity of the cases, the decision making process, time frame involved, the security environment and above all the type of regime that is involved in the decision making process. Prudential realism is a new theory that makes some very interesting observations with respect to how contexts and situations explain the nuclear choices of states. Five cases in this dissertation, drawn from different regions and contexts, proved to be useful tests of the theory. The theory’s core arguments were partly validated with respect to the level of conflict and fully validated with respect to politico-security interdependence. Based on the entire case study analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn from this dissertation:

A) Enduring rivals’ security policies are NOT determined only by the level and type of

regional security threats that they face. Domestic and normative factors are critical

causal variables influencing nuclear decisions.

B) Enduring rivals’ nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation policies do not always

correspond directly to the level and different phases of their rivalries. For example,

12For an understanding on how institutionalist & constructivist factors influenced nuclear decisions in the case of Egypt & North Korea respectively see Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 2007) & Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009); Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (N.Y.: St. Martin’s and Macmillan, 1997) & Carol Medlicott, “Symbol and Sovereignty in North Korea,”SAIS Review XXV, No.2 (Summer-Fall 2005).

230

nuclear weapons were pursued during periods of low MIDs and forbearance was

adopted during periods of high MIDs.

C) Enduring rivals may give up their nuclear weapons programs even when the causes of

rivalry have not ceased to exist.

D) Level of politico-security interdependence is a critical variable that can influence a

state’s decisions related to forbearance or non-forbearance even when the underlying

causes of rivalry continue to exist.13

13 For a similar study see Amr Yossef, “Suspension of Nuclear Programs: Enduring Korean Rivalry,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIX, No. 1(Spring 2007), pp.139–163. 231

Bibliography

Alagappa, Muthiah. “Nuclear Weapons and National Stability: Far Reaching Influence and Deterrence Domination,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Stanford University Press, 2008.

Albright, David. Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies. New York: Free Press,2010.

______and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (January/February 1998).

______and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q.Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2(Spring 2005)

Allison, Graham. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No.3(September 1969).

Alterman, Jon B. “Libya and the U.S.: The Unique Libyan Case,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. XIII, No.1.(Winter 2006).

Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics, Vol.38, No.1(October 1985).

Bahgat, Gawdat. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East. University Press of Florida, 2007.

______“Nuclear Proliferation: Egypt,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3(May 2007).

______“The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Egypt,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29(Spring 2007).

Baldwin, David A. ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia University Press,1993.

Baldwin,George and Jooho Whang, “Case Study: Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Plutonium Facilities,” in James Doyle (ed)., Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation. Elsevier Inc, Oxford: UK. 2008.

Barnaby, Frank. The Invisible Bomb, The Nuclear Race in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 1993.

Bhatia, Shyam. Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East. London & New York: Routledge, 1988.

232

Bowen, Wyn Q. “Libya,” in James Doyle (ed)., Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation. Elsevier Inc, Oxford: UK., 2008.

______Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping back from the Brink. Adelphi series, (Routledge 2006).

Braun, Chaim and Christopher Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2(Fall 2004).

Brown, Michael E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, (eds.), The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995.

Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press,1977.

Buzan, Barry, Charles Jones and Richard Little. The Logic of Anarchy: From Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Harper Perennial, 1st edition, March 25,1964.

Carter, Ashton B and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.

Cha, Victor and David Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies New York.: Columbia University Press, 2003.

______“Abandonment, Entrapment and Neoclassical Realism in Asia, The United States, Japan and Korea.”International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2(Jun., 2000).

______“Korea’s place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3(May - Jun., 2002).

Choi, Kang and Joon-Sung Park, “South Korea, Fear of Abandonment and Entrapment,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press, 2008).

Choo, Jaewoo. “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence on China; Political Ramifi- cations,” Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No.2(2008).

Chung, Chien-peng. “Democratization in South Korea and Inter-Korean Relations,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 76, No.1(Spring, 2003).

233

Cirincione, Joseph, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Threats (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

Colaresi, Michael, Karen Rasler and William Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation, Cambridge University Press; 1 edition, January 28, 2008.

Cordesman, Anthony H. Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006).

Corera, Gordon. Shopping For Bombs, Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Cumings, Bruce. Korea’s Place in the Sun. New York: W.W. Norton & Company,1997.

Efrat, Moshe.“The Economics of Soviet Arms Transfers To The Third World,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4(October 1983)

Einhorn, Robert. “Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non- Nuclear Course,” in Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn and Mitchell Reiss, (eds)., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004.

Fahmy, Nabil. “Egypt’s Disarmament Initiative,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November 1990.

______Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.

Ferris, Jesse. “Guns for Cotton,”? Aid, Trade, and the Soviet Quest for Base Rights in Egypt, 1964– 1966, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, (Spring 2011)

Fischer, David. “South Africa,” in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds., Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War. Washington D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994.

Fitzpatrick, Mark. (ed). “Egypt: the usual suspect” in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008.

Frankel, Benjamin. Roots of Realism and Realism: Restatements and Renewal. London: Frank Cass, 1996.

______“The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Security Studies, Vol.2, No. 3 (September 1993).

234

Funabashi, Yoichi. The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution., 2007).

Geller, Daniel S. “Nuclear Weapons Deterrence and Crisis Escalation,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 2(June 1990).

George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005.

Gibler Douglas M. and Meredith Reed Sarkees, “Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000,” Journal of Peace Research Vol.41, No.2 (2004).

Goldschmidt, Pierre. “The IAEA Reports on Egypt: Reluctantly?” Proliferation Analysis, (June 2, 2009).

Goldstein, Avery. Deterrence and Security in the Twenty-first Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution. CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.

Gregory, Barbara. “Egypt’s Nuclear Program: Assessing Supplier Based and Other Developmental Constraints,” The Non-Proliferation Review, Vol.3, No.1(Fall 1995).

Grieco, Joseph M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” in David Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

Hanlon, Michael O. “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 23, No.2 (Fall, 2000).

Hamm, Taik –young. Arming the Two Koreas; State, Capital and Military Power (New York, Routledge, 1999)

Harkavy, Robert. “Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation” in George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,1973.

Harrison, Selig. Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and Disengagement. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002.

______, “U.S. policy and the legacy of 1945,” in Hazel Smith ed., Reconstituting Korean Security: A policy primer. New York: United Nations University Press, 2007.

235

Hayes, Peter. “The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue” in Andrew Mack (ed)., Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula. Australia.: Allen and Unwin, 1993.

Hecker, Siegfried. “The Risks of North Korea's Nuclear Restart,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 12, 2009).

______, “Denuclearizing North Korea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May/June 2008).

Henry, Habib. “Changing Patterns in Libyan Foreign Policy,” Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, No 2(Winter 1986).

Hersman, Rebecca and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns, Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollbacks,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3(November 2006).

Hochman, Dafna. “Rehabilitating a Rogue; Libya’s WMD Reversal and Lessons for U.S. Policy.” Parameters (Spring 2006).

Horvath, Janos. “Economic Aid Flow from the USSR: A Recount of the First Fifteen Years,” Slavic Review, Vol. 29, No. 4(Dec., 1970).

Huntley, Wade L. “Bucks for the Bang: North Korea’s Nuclear Program and North East Asian Military Spending,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 33, No. 4(2009).

Hymans, Jacques E.C. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

______“Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field” Non Proliferation Review, Vol.13, No.3(November 2006).

______Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

______“Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 2(Fall 2011).

Jabber, Fuad . “Not by War Alone: Curbing the Arab-Israeli Arms Race,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3(Summer, 1974).

Jentleson, Bruce W and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who “Won” Libya? The Force- Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,”International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3(Winter 2005/06).

Jervis, Robert. “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security, Vol. 24, No.1(Summer 1999).

236

Jo, Dong-Joon and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 51, No.1(February 2007).

Job, Brian, Andre Laliberte and Michael Wallace, “Assessing the Risks of Conflict in the PRC-ROC Enduring Rivalry, “Pacific Affairs, Vol.72, No. 4(Winter, 1999-2000).

Jones, Daniel, Stuart Bremer and David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes,1816- 1992: Rationale, Coding Rules and Empirical Patterns,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.15, No.2(1996).

______“Acute Conflicts in Asia After the Cold War; Kashmir, Taiwan and North Korea.” in Muthiah Alagappa ed, Asian Security Order: instrumental and normative features. California: Stanford University Press, 2003).

Kang, Jungmin et al, “South Korea's nuclear surprise,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 61, No. 01(January/February, 2005).

Kapstein, Ethan B. “Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 4(Autumn 1995).

Keohane, Robert O(ed). Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

______International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.

______Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), After the Cold War International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1993.

______and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown,1989.

______After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1984.

______and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, Vol. 20, No.1(Summer 1995).

______“The Demand for International Regimes” in Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kim, Ilpyong J. “Kim Jong Il’s Military First Politics,” in Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, eds., North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006.

237

Kim, Jong-dall and John Byrne, “The Asian Atom: Hard Path Nuclearization in East Asia,” in John Byrne and Stephen Hoffman (eds)., Governing the Atom: The Politics of Risk, Energy and Environmental Policy, N.J:.Transaction Publishers,1996.

Kim, Samuel S. The Two Koreas and the Great Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press,2006.

______“Sino-North Korean Relations in the Post Cold War World,” in Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, (eds), North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival. Armonk, N.Y.:M.E. Sharpe, Inc.,2006.

Kramer, Mark. “Neo-Realism, Nuclear Proliferation and East Central European Strategies,” Center for Strategic and International studies,(May 15, 1998).

Levey, Zach. “Israeli foreign policy and the arms race in the Middle East 1950-1960,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 24, No.1(March 2001).

Levite, Ariel. “Never Say Never Again, Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 27, No.3(Winter 2002/03).

MacFarquhar, Roderick, John K. Fairbank and Denis C Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China. Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Mack, Andrew (ed.), Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula. Australia.: Allen and Unwin, 1993.

MacLachlan, Ann and Mike Knapik, “Belgium and Libya will Sign an Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 25, No. 21(May 24, 1984).

Malik, Mohan. “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 1(Spring, 2003).

Mazarr, Michael J. “The Long Road to Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.86, No.5 (Sep/Oct2007).

______, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation. N.Y.: St. Martin’s and Macmillan,1997.

Mearsheimer, John J. “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3(Winter 1994/95).

______“Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 15, No.1(Summer 1990).

Medlicott, Carol. “Symbol and Sovereignty in North Korea,” SAIS Review XXV, No.2 (Summer-Fall 2005).

238

Mesquita, de Bueno, James Morrow and Samuel Wu. “Forecasting the risk of nuclear proliferation: Taiwan as an illustration of the method” in Zachary Davis and Benjamin

Metz, Helen Chapin. (ed). Libya: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987.

Milner, Helen. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1997.

Mitchell, Derek “Taiwan’s Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence, Abandonment and Honor,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss (eds), The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution,2004.

Moon, Chung-in and Sangkeun Lee, “Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula,” Asian Perspective, Vol.33, No.4(2009).

Moravcsik, Andrew. “A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997).

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., revised by Kenneth W. Thompson. New York: Knopf,1985.

Nathan, Andrew. “What’s Wrong with America’s Taiwan Policy, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2(Spring 2000).

Newnham, Randall. “Carrots, Sticks, and Bombs: The End of Libya's WMD Program,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3(Summer 2009).

Nincic, Miroslav. “Getting What You Want: Positive Inducements in International Relations,” International Security, Vol.35, No.1(Summer 2010).

Norris, Robert S, William N. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 6(November/December 1999).

Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. New York.: Basic books, 2001.

Ogilvie-White, Tanya. “Is there a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation. An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate?” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No.1(Fall 1996).

Oye, Kenneth A (ed.). Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

239

Park, John and Dong Sun Lee, “North Korea: Existential Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage,” in Muthiah Alagappa ed., The Long Shadow, Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st century Asia. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Paul, T.V. Power versus Prudence, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press,2000.

Potter William and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1(Summer 2008).

Pollack, Jonathan and Mitchell Reiss, “South Korea: The Tyranny of Geography and the Vexations of History,” in Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn and Mitchell Reiss (eds.), The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004.

Potter, William (ed.), International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenge of the Emerging Suppliers. Lexington Books,1990.

______, “The Soviet Union and Nuclear Proliferation,” Slavic Review,Vol. 44, No. 3(Autumn, 1985).

Powell, Robert “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate,” International Organization, Vol.48, No. 2(Spring 1994).

Quester, George H. “The Statistical “n” of “nth” Nuclear Weapons States,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No.1(March 1983).

Reiss, Mitchell. “The Future That Never Came,” Wilson Quarterly, Vol.19, No.2(Spring 1995).

______Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation. New York: Columbia University Press,1988.

______Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press,1995.

______“Nuclear Rollback Decisions: Future Lessons?” Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 6 (July/August 1995).

Ronen, Yehudit. “Libya,” in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (ed)., Middle East Contemporary Survey (Tel-Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, 2001).

Rosen, Stephen Peter. “Nuclear Proliferation and Alliance Relations,” in Victor Utgoff, (ed.), The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation,U.S.Interests, and World Order. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2000.

240

Rowen, Henry S. and Richard Brody, “Nuclear Potential and Possible Contingencies,” in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.:The Brookings Institution,1980)

Safty, Adel. ‘Proliferation, Balance of Power, and Nuclear Deterrence: Should Egypt Pursue a Nuclear Option?’International Studies, Vol. 33, No.1(1996).

Sagan Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. New York: W. W. Norton,1995.

Samore, Gary and Adam Ward, “Living with ambiguity: North Korea’s strategic weapons programmes,” in Hazel Smith ed., Reconstituting Korean Security: A policy primer. New York: United Nations University Press, 2007.

Savada, Andrea Matles and William Shaw (eds.) South Korea: A Country Study, Washington: Library of Congress,1990.

Shikaki, Khalil. “The Nuclearization Debates: The Cases of Israel and Egypt,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.4, No.3(Summer 1985).

Shoham, Dany. “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1998).

Sigal, Leon. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1998.

______“The Lesson’s of North Korea’s Test,” Current History, Vol.105, No.694 (November 2006).

Sinai, Joshua. “Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The Nonproliferation Review(Spring-Summer 1997)

Singh, Sonali and Christopher Way. “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No.6(December 2004).

Smith, Roger K. “Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory,” International Organization, Vol.41, No.2 (Spring 1987).

Solingen, Etel. Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton University Press,2007.

______“The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security, Vol.19, No.2(Fall1994).

241

______“The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing Fence-Sitters in the Post–Cold War Era,” IGCC Policy Paper PP08 (Irvine, Calif.: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October 1, 1994).

Taek-young, Ham. The Political Economics of National Security: South-North Korea’s Economic, Military and National Power. Seoul: Pubmun Press,1998.

Takeyh, Ray. “The Rogue Who Came in from the Cold,” Foreign Affairs (May-June 2001).

Tannenwald, Nina. “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security, Vol. 29, No.4(Spring 2005).

Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-Kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,2000.

Tow, William T. “Reassessing Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 3, No.2,(Summer 1991).

Vandewalle, Dirk J. A History of Modern Libya :New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Vatikiotis, P J. Nasser and His Generation. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978.

Wallace Richard and Arvid Lundy,“ Using Open Sources for Proliferation Analysis,” in James E Doyle (ed.), Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Non-Proliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy. Oxford:Elsevier Inc., 2008.

Walsh, Jim. “Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation,” Paper prepared for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Stockholm, Sweden, October 2005.

Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

______“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” in Fred Holroyd,(ed.), Thinking about Nuclear Weapons, Analyses and Prescriptions. London: Routledge,2001.

______“The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3(Summer 1964).

______“The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993).

242

Wei, Vincent and Chen Wang, “Taiwan, Conventional Deterrence, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Option” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed)., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Stanford University Press, 2008.

Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. UK: Cambridge University Press,1999.

______“Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2(Spring 1992)

Williams, Joshua and John Wolfsthal. “The NPT at 35: A Crisis of Compliance or a Crisis of Confidence?” (UNA-USA policy brief, April 29, 2005).

Zachary, David S. and Benjamin Frankel (eds)., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results. London: Frank Cass,1993.

Zakaria, Fareed. “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 17, No.1(1992).

Dissertation and Conference Papers

Dr. Alexander Huang, “Taiwan’s Defense Modernization for the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities,” Paper prepared for the Conference on War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Duke University, February, 1999, p.16.

Charles Costanzo, “Returning from the brink: Is there a theory based explanation for the attenuation of horizontal nuclear proliferation”? (Ph.D. dissertation, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1998), p.78.

James Walsh, Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in International Politics (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001).

Sang Jo Jeon, “Transforming the ROK-U.S. Alliance,” Research paper prepared for U.S. Army War College,Carlisle Barracks,Carlisle,PA, March 2006, p.2.

Neerada Jacob, “The Sanctions Impact on Nuclear Reversal: A Case Study of Taiwan,” Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, March 26-29, 2008, p.10.

Documents and Other Sources

Abramson, Jeff. “U.S. Conventional Arms Sales to Taiwan,” Arms Control Association, Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/taiwanarms.

243

Albright, David and Paul Brannan, “The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-2006,” Report prepared for the Institute for Science and International Security, (June 26, 2006). http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/dprkplutonium.pdf.

______and Corey Hinderstein, “Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: Working toward Closing Gaps in the International Nonproliferation Regime,” Report prepared for the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), July 2, 2004. Available at http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/uncovering-the-nuclear-black-market/.

“Attempts to Purchase 150 Megawatt Nuclear Reactor by the United Arab Republic.” DNSA, January 17, 1965. Available at http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/chron/executeSearch.do.

Bennett, Bruce. “A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s Defense Reform Plan,” RAND 2006. Available at http://www.rand.org.pubs/occassional_papers/2006/RAND_OP165.pdf.

Bunn, Matthew. “Civilian Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Programs: The Record,” Report prepared for the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, June 29, 2001. Available at http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/nuclear- engineering/22-812j-managing-nuclear-technology-spring 2004/readings/prolif_history.pdf.

Burr, William (ed)., ‘The United States and Taiwan's Nuclear Program, 1976-1980: Intervention in the Nuclear Activities of a Vulnerable Ally.’ National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No. 221, posted June 15, 2007. Available http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb221/index.htm.

______“The Taiwanese Nuclear Case: Lessons for Today,” Report prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 9, 2007. Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19491.

Center for Nuclear Studies, “North Korea: Nuclear Infrastructure,” Available at http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_north_korea/nuc/yongbyon.htm.

Cordesman, Anthony H. “The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the forces of key neighboring states,” Report Prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Revised July, 2011. Available at http://csis.org/files/publication/110712_Cordesman_KoreaMilBalance_WEB.pdf

Crail, Peter. “Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States,” Arms Control Association, Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology.

Director General, IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement,” February 20, 2004. Available at Annex http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/iaea0504.pdf.

244

Director General, IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement,” May 28, 2004, Available at Annex http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/iaea0504.pdf.

Document 12, NIE-4-66, dated January 20, 1966. Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/index.htm.

“Elbit Systems to Supply the Republic of Korea Airborne EW Suites and MWS Valued at Approximately $29 Million,” Elbit Systems, January 11, 2011. Available at http://ir.elbitsystems.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61849&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1514783&hi ghlight=

Egypt's Chemical Weapons Program,” Federation of American Scientists. Available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/cw/index.html.

Embassy Taipei to State Department, “Chung Shan Nuclear Research Institute,” cable 1197, February 24, 1973 in Burr, “New Archival Evidence.” Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/

Federation of American Scientists, “North Korea; Nuclear Weapons Program—Current Status.” Available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html

Foreign Broadcast Information Services Report, “PRC Media Response to Taiwan Nuclear Weapons Debate Low-key,” Friday, November 12, 2004. Available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/taiwan/fbis111204.html.

House Committee on International Relations, Investigations of Korean American Relations, report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, 95 Cong., 2 sess.(GPO,1978),p.79.

IAEA, “Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Egypt,” Available at http://www- pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2007/countryprofiles/Egypt/Egypt2005.htm.

IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-18.pdf.

Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes -- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/treaties.htm.

Kan, Shirley A. “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” CRS Report for Congress, dated February 24, 2011, p.1. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30957.pdf.

Kimball, Daryl. “The U.S.- North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework.

245

Knopf, Jeffrey. “Security Assurances: Concept Clarification and Initial Hypotheses,” Paper prepared for the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Washington, DC, Sept. 2-5, 2010. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1643191.

Libya- A Country Study. Military Co-operation with the Soviet Union. Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. Available at http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/lytoc.html#ly0157

Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, from William E. Colby, for Deputy Director of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, “Visit of General Chiang Ching-kuo,” 19 September 1963. Secret Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 Vol.XXII, Microfiche Supplement (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State, 1997). Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB38/document9.pdf.

Morimoto, Sho J. “Libya’s Nuclear Program” http://www8.georgetown.edu/centers/cndls/applications/postertool/index.cfm?fuseaction =poster.display&posterID=2439.

“Need to Reassure President Nasser on the Peaceful Nature of the Dimona Reactor,” Memorandum From the Department of State's Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), February 11, 1964. Available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/frus021164.html.

Niksch, Larry A. “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 5, 2010. Available http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33590.pdf.

“North Korea’s Nuclear Test and its Aftermath: Coping with the Fallout” Report prepared for Nuclear Threat Initiative by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 25, 2009. Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_north_korea_nuclear_test.html.

“North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” Report Prepared for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, pp. 28-29. Available at http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers

Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Egypt: Nuclear Overview,” Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/index.html.

Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Libya Profile, Nuclear Overview,” Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Nuclear/index.html.

Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Nuclear Overview: South Korea,” Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/skorea/index.html.

246

Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea, Nuclear Chronology,” Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Nuclear/chronology.html.

Nuclear Threat Initiative, Taiwan Profile; Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/taiwan/index.html

Perry Report on North Korea Impending,” Prepared for the James Martin Center on Non- Proliferation Studies. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_north_korea/perry.htm.

Pinkston, Daniel A. “South Korea’s Nuclear Experiments,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies Web Site, November 9, 2004. http://cns.miis.edu/stories/041109.htm.

Roberge, Michael and Youkyung Lee, “China –Taiwan Relations,” Report Prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations, August 11, 2009. Available at http://www.cfr.org/china/china-taiwan-relations/p9223.

Schneidmiller, Chris. “South Korea Completes Chemical Weapons Disposal,” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/ts_20081017_3838.php.

Sharpe, Jeremy. “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, January 10, 2007.

______“U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Backgrounds, Recent Trends and the FY 2008 Request,” CRS Report for Congress, July 3, 2007, p.10. Available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32260.pdf.

Six Party Talks,” Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/6- party.htm.

Sokolski, Henry and Patrick Clawson (eds), “Getting Ready for a Nuclear Ready Iran,” Report Prepared for the Strategic Studies Institute; U.S. Army War College Co, 2005. Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub629.pdf

Sorcher, Sara. “Gates Reaffirms Defense Commitment to South Korea,” October 12, 2010. Available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1010/101210cdam1.htm.

Suh, J J “Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race,” report prepared for Foreign Policy in Focus dated May 17, 2010. Available at http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us-korea_alliance_and_arms_race.

The Agreed Framework at a Glance,’ Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, September 2004. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/agreedframework.pdf

247

“Warning to Gamal Abdel Nasser Not to Proceed with the Acquisition of Surface to Surface Missiles.” Digital National Security Archive, May 29, 1964. Available at http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/chron/executeSearch.do.

Periodicals

Asano,Yoshiharu. “DPRK Plutonium: 30 Kilograms Extracted, 2 Kilograms Used in Nuclear Test,” Yomiuri Shimbun, July 2, 2008.

Brooke, James. “South Korea Stakes Its Future on Keeping Peace with North,” New York Times, May 25, 2004.

Butterfield, Fox. “Taiwan Denying Atomic Operation,” New York Times, September 5, 1976.

Carpenter, Ted Galen and Justin Logan, “The Trouble with Taiwan,” Taiwan Economic News, March 11, 2005.

Demick, Barbara. “No More Gambling on N. Korea,” Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2006.

“Egypt Says Nuclear Programme Peaceful,” Khaleej Times Online, January 6, 2005.

Frantz, Douglas and Josh Meyer, “For Sale: Nuclear Expertise,” Los Angeles Times, February 22, 2004.

Harel, Amos “South Korea eyes upgrading Israel defense deals in light of tensions with North,” Haaretz, January 12, 2011.

Jameson, Sam. “No A-Arms for S. Korea, Leader Pledges,” Los Angeles Times, November, 14, 1993.

Kirshner, Bernard. “Kim Dae Jung: Linking Liberal Democracy to Economic Growth in South Korea,” Los Angeles Times, January 11, 1998.

Lai, Victor. “Taiwan Reiterates Never to Develop Nuclear Arms,” Central News Agency, January 5, 2000.

Liu, Henry C K. “Part 10: The changing South Korean position,” Asia Times, February 7, 2007.

Pomfret, John. “U.S. sells weapons to Taiwan, angering China,” Washington Post, January 30, 2010.

Sanger, David E and Judith Miller, “Libya to Dismantle Arms Program, Bush Announces,” The NewYork Times, 20, December 2003.

248

Schumacher,Edward. “Taiwan Seen Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel,” Washington Post, August 29, 1976.

Segal, Gerald. “Taiwan’s Nuclear Card,” The Asian Wall Street Journal, August 5, 1998.

Smith, Hedrick. “Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense,” New York Times, February 3, 1966.

“South Korea to Speed Up Combat Fighter Purchase,” Reuters, January 29, 2011.

Sung-ki, Jung. “US Nuclear Umbrella: Double-Edged Sword for S. Korea,” The Korea Times, June 24, 2009.

“The Yongbyon Test,” 1994. The Economist, June 4.

“Timeline: N. Korea nuclear stand-off,” BBC News, December 6, 2007.

Timmerman, Kenneth. “Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya” Simon Wiesenthal Center Middle East Defense News, August 1992.

Warrick, Joby. “U.S. Followed the Aluminum: Pyongyang's Efforts to Buy Metal Was Tip to Plans,” Washington Post, October 18, 2002.

Weisman, Steven R. “South Korea to Keep Out All Atom Arms,” New York Times, November 9, 1991.

Zenati, Hassen. “Egypt, Israel sign strategic trade accord,” Middle East Online, December 14, 2004.

249