Retreating from the Nuclear Path Testing the theory of Prudential Realism to explain Nuclear Forbearance A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in the Department of Political Science of the College of Arts and Sciences by Anil Pillai M.A. University of Denver, Denver 2005 M.B.A. Xavier Labour Relations Institute, Jamshedpur, India 1992 B.A. Loyola College, Chennai, India 1988 2012 Committee Chair: Dr. Dinshaw J. Mistry, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Conventional explanations for a state’s nuclear policy (acquisition or forbearance) may be found in traditional International Relations (IR) theories such as neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism, amongst many others. Departing from these theories, especially hard realist theories, a new explanation for nuclear forbearance was propounded by T.V. Paul, based on the theory of “prudential realism.” In this modified soft realist version, nations under certain circumstances may prudently forego military capabilities that other states see as threatening (Paul, 2000). The circumstances as envisaged by Paul, relate to the level of conflict and co- operation and the level of politico-security interdependence in a given region. The theory thus differentiates itself from traditional hard realist theories and neoliberal institutionalist theories and offers a new explanation for a state’s nuclear choice. This dissertation tests the theory of “prudential realism” through a comprehensive case study analysis by using the same variables and definitions as used in the theory. The case studies are new and have been rigorously researched to make a contribution to the existing literature. My question is directed towards understanding whether a) states do indeed behave prudently in exercising their nuclear choices and b) whether elevating a few variables (level of conflict & politico - security interdependence) to explain these choices is adequate to capture the correlates of nuclear preferences? In rigorously testing the theory, I hope to ascertain if, as the theory claims, nuclear weapons acquisition or forbearance by a non great power state is determined by its situational context and degree of politico-security interdependence with its key adversaries and allies in its immediate geo-strategic environment. Five cases in this dissertation, drawn from different regions and contexts, proved to be useful tests of the theory with respect to its two key variables, namely level of conflict and ii politico-security interdependence. A comprehensive case study analysis of four states situated in a zone of high conflict revealed that their nuclear decisions were not fully consistent with the core arguments of the theory regarding the level of conflict. However, their nuclear decisions were fully consistent with respect to the theory’s claims regarding its second variable, namely politico-security interdependence (All four cases supported the theory’s claims). With respect to Libya, a state situated in a zone of moderate conflict, the case study analysis revealed that its nuclear decisions too were not fully consistent with respect to the theory’s claims regarding the level of conflict. On the contrary, Libya’s nuclear decisions were fully consistent with respect to the theory’s claims regarding politico-security interdependence. Based on its findings, the dissertation comes to the conclusion that although prudential realism does present a logical and credible argument in explaining nuclear behavior with respect to its key variables, yet with some modifications, it could offer an even more robust explanation. iii Copyright @ 2012 Anil Pillai iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without the help and invaluable contributions of several individuals. I would like to first and foremost thank my chair, Professor Dinshaw Mistry, for his untiring and dedicated efforts in guiding this project from its very inception through the concluding stages. He not only encouraged me to adhere to a time schedule but also helped demystify many complex terms and concepts that had the potential to derail the dissertation. His inputs were critical in shaping my thought process and without his constant encouragement, supervision and support; this dissertation would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my other committee members, Dr. Thomas Moore and Dr. Barbara Bardes who supported me through the dissertation process, never accepting less than my best efforts. I thank you all. It is impossible to forget the support of family and friends. First and foremost, I owe my wife Deepa a world of gratitude for having spent countless hours weaving through a maze of papers, reading my drafts and for providing the intellectual and moral support in helping me finish my dissertation. Thanks also to my parents who, despite the physical distance, kept encouraging me through the most difficult phases. A true friend is one in need. This dissertation would never have become a reality without the help and suggestions of my many supportive friends and colleagues. My thanks to Joe Waddle who with his light hearted banter assured me that nothing is impossible; to John Callaghan and Ivan Ivanov for providing their valuable comments and finally to all my other colleagues who constantly provided me with the moral support and encouragement in all my endeavors. Finally, this dissertation is solely a result of my work and efforts and to that extent I bear full responsibility for any errors and shortcomings that may have occurred. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………………v LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………………..vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ……………………………………………………………….xi Chapter One-Introduction…………………………………………………………………..1 Chapter Two-Theory and Method…………………………………………………………. 14 Chapter Three-South Korea…………………………………………………………………63 Chapter Four-North Korea…………………………………………………………………. 99 Chapter Five-Taiwan………………………………………………………………………132 Chapter Six-Egypt…………………………………………………………………………160 Chapter Seven-Libya………………………………………………………………………187 Chapter Eight-Conclusion…………………………………………………………………216 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………232 vi LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1.0. Retrospective classification of states’ nuclear status in 2010 9 2.0. Cohen’s “India and the bomb: a catalog of arguments” 15 2.1. Enduring Rivalries up to 1996 - States with high levels of conflict 46 2.2. Correlates of War Scale 47 2.3. Assignment of Values for Level of Conflict 49 2.4. Overview of Politico-Security Interdependence and Nuclear Decisions 51 2.5. Country Wise Level of Conflict 54 2.6. An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Forbearance (states with active 55 nuclear program) 2.7. An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Forbearance (states with peaceful 56 nuclear program) 2.8. An Empirical Analysis of Non Forbearance 57 3.0. S. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1960-1969) 68 3.1. S. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1970-1979) 72 3.2. S. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1980-2010) 77 3.3. North Korea and South Korea -Militarized Inter State Disputes 79 3.4. Ratio Analysis of Militarized Inter State Disputes 81 3.5. S. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict 82 3.6. North and South Korea Defense Spending 87 3.7. S. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence 93 3.8. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence 94 3.9. Summary of Results 97 3.10. S. Korea’s Nuclear Timeline & Corresponding Decisions 98 vii 4.0. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1960-1979) 103 4.1. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1980-1990) 106 4.2. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1991 –2001) 109 4.3. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (2002-2006) 112 4.4. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (2007-2009) 113 4.5. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (2009-2010) 115 4.6. North and South Korea –Militarized Inter State Disputes 116 4.7. Ratio Analysis of Militarized Inter State Disputes 118 4.8. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict 118 4.9. N. Korea: An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence 125 4.10. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence 126 4.11. Summary of Results 130 4.12. N. Korea: Nuclear Timeline and Corresponding Decisions 131 5.0. Taiwan: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1967-1976) 138 5.1. Taiwan: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1977-1989) 140 5.2. PRC-ROC Militarized Disputes, 1949-1996: Correlates of War 143 Project Data, (Revised) 5.3. Ratio Analysis of Militarized Interstate Disputes 144 5.4. Taiwan: An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict 144 5.5. Taiwan’s Defense Budgets 147 5.6. Conventional Military Balance – 2008. (PRC v ROC) 148 5.7. Taiwan: An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence 154 5.8. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence 155 5.9. Summary of Results 158 viii 5.10. Taiwan’s Nuclear Timeline 159 6.0. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1948-1959) 164 6.1. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance (1960-1969) 166 6.2. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1970-1980) 167 6.3. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of Forbearance (1981-2007) 170 6.4 Egypt and Israel - Militarized Inter-State Disputes 172 6.5. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of the Level of Conflict 172 6.6. Operational Inventories of Jet Combat Aircraft and Tanks on Eve of War 174 6.7. Value of Soviet Weaponry Supplied to Egypt: Comparison of Estimates 178 6.8. Soviet Economic Credits to Egypt, (1955–1968) 178 6.9. U.S. Aid to Egypt -- 1972-1979 180 6.10. Egypt: An Empirical Analysis of Politico-Security Interdependence 181 6.11. A Net Assessment of Politico- Security Interdependence 182 6.12. Summary of Results 185 6.13. Egypt’s Nuclear Timeline 186 7.0. Libya: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance -- (1970-1979) 192 7.1. Libya: An Empirical Analysis of Non-Forbearance -- (1980-1989) 194 7.2.