Opposition Parties and Anti-Government Protests in Comparative Perspective
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OPPOSITION PARTIES AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTESTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE by Yen-Pin Su B.A., National Taiwan University, 2001 M.A., National Taiwan University, 2005 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2014 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH THE DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Yen-Pin Su It was defended on March 26, 2014 and approved by Steven Finkel, Daniel Wallace Professor, Political Science John Markoff, Distinguished University Professor, Sociology Co-Dissertation Advisor: Scott Morgenstern, Associate Professor, Political Science Co-Dissertation Advisor: Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Associate Professor, Political Science ii Copyright © by Yen-Pin Su 2014 iii OPPOSITION PARTIES AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTESTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Yen-Pin Su, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2014 My dissertation adopts an interdisciplinary approach to examine the relationship between political parties and social movements in democratic countries. This work touches on the debates about why protest movements emerge and the literature on the consequences of party politics. It draws on rational choice and political process theories to explain the variation in anti- government protests in the context of democracies. I argue that the mobilization capacity of opposition parties matters for understanding the differing levels of protests. Specifically, focusing on the size and unity of the opposition camp as two unique dimensions of mobilization capacity, I contend that a larger opposition camp should encourage more anti-government protests only if the camp is more united. Moreover, I argue that, because of the differences in socio-economic backgrounds, political development trajectories, and the role of parties as mobilization agents, the effects of opposition mobilization capacity should work differently in developed countries and developing countries. My research methodology includes work with both quantitative and qualitative data sources. I test my arguments empirically using statistical analyses of an original dataset incorporating protest event data and electoral data in 107 democratic countries. The analyses demonstrate that when opposition parties are strong and united, they are more able to mobilize large-scale collective protest actions. Moreover, I find that a higher level of mobilization capacity of opposition parties matters more to encourage anti-government protests in developing iv countries than in developed countries. Drawing on the interviews that I conducted during field trips in Peru and Taiwan, the qualitative case studies further illustrate why opposition mobilization capacity matters for the developing countries. Overall, my research contributes to the literature on political behavior and enriches institutional theories by providing an innovative theoretical perspective and rigorous empirical analyses. More importantly, my research is relevant to more than political scientists and sociologists: the quantitative and qualitative data will help researchers understand the extent to which the dynamics of party/movement interactions vary across different regions, a necessary advance in a literature that has been dominated by single case studies. v TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ................................................................................................................................. XIII 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 PUZZLE ............................................................................................................... 1 1.2 WHY STUDY PROTESTS? ............................................................................... 7 1.3 EXISTING EXPLANATIONS RECONSIDERED ........................................ 11 1.3.1 Opportunity, Threat, and Protests ............................................................... 11 1.3.2 Institutional Approaches ............................................................................... 15 1.4 PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION ................................................................... 18 2.0 THEORY .................................................................................................................... 20 2.1 THE THESIS OF REPRESENTATION CRISIS .......................................... 20 2.2 INSTITUTIONS AS AGENTS OF MOBILIZATION: OPPOSITION PARTIES AND PROTESTS ............................................................................................. 27 2.2.1 Party/Movement Coalitions and Linkages .................................................. 28 2.2.2 Opposition Parties and Social Movements .................................................. 32 2.2.3 A Theory of Opposition Mobilization Capacity.......................................... 35 2.3 OPPOSITION MOBILIZATION AND PROTESTS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS ........................................................................................................................ 43 2.3.1 Opposition Mobilization and Protests in Developed Countries ................ 44 vi 2.3.2 Opposition Mobilization and Protests in Developing Countries ............... 47 2.4 SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 49 3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................................... 51 3.1 LARGE-N TESTS ............................................................................................. 51 3.1.1 Case Selection: Democratic Countries around the World ......................... 51 3.1.2 Data for Anti-Government Protests ............................................................. 54 3.1.3 Operationalization of Anti-Government Protests ...................................... 60 3.1.4 Patterns of Anti-Government Protests ........................................................ 62 3.2 CASE STUDIES................................................................................................. 68 3.2.1 Case Selection: Peru and Taiwan ................................................................. 68 3.2.2 Data for Case Studies .................................................................................... 70 3.2.3 Research Design for Case Studies ................................................................ 74 3.3 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 78 4.0 THE EFFECTS OF OPPOSITION MOBILIZATION CAPACITY ON ANTI- GOVERNMENT PROTESTS IN 107 DEMOCRACIES ....................................................... 79 4.1 OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES ............................................... 80 4.1.1 Variables of Opposition Mobilization Capacity ......................................... 80 4.1.2 Control Variables .......................................................................................... 83 4.2 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES ........................................................................ 85 4.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS ................................................................................... 88 4.4 ROBUSTNESS CHECK (I): SENSITIVITY TESTS .................................... 96 4.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECK (II): ADDRESSING ENDOGENEITY ............... 102 4.5.1 Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) ............................................................ 103 vii 4.5.2 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) ............................................................. 106 4.5.3 Control Function Model .............................................................................. 107 4.5.4 Results ........................................................................................................... 109 4.6 PATTERNS OF PROTESTS AND OPPOSITION MOBILIZATION: DEVELOPED COUNTRIES VS. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ............................... 111 4.7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 117 5.0 CASE STUDY (I): PERU ........................................................................................ 119 5.1 THE EMERGENCE OF ORGANIZED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE ALIANZA POPULAR REVOLUCIONARIA AMERICANA (APRA) ............ 120 5.2 THE STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS UNDER THE MILITARY REGIMES ......................................................................................................................... 126 5.3 THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY ............................................................... 131 5.4 PERUVIAN SOCIETY UNDER FUJIMORI’S RULE ............................... 136 5.5 POST-FUJIMORI PERU ............................................................................... 144 5.6 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 152 6.0 CASE STUDY (II): TAIWAN................................................................................. 157 6.1 TAIWAN UNDER AUTHORITARIAN RULE ........................................... 158 6.2 THE EMERGENCE OF THE DANGWAI MOVEMENT ......................... 161 6.3 POLITICS OF PROTESTS UNDER THE LEE TENG-HUI GOVERNMENT ............................................................................................................... 167 6.4 NEW RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE DPP UNDER THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN GOVERNMENT .......................................... 175 viii 6.5 THE RETURN