TAIWAN in 2000 Managing the Aftershocks from Power Transfer
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TAIWAN IN 2000 Managing the Aftershocks from Power Transfer Yu-Shan Wu Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC) in 2000 was over- whelmed by such issues as the March presidential election and its impact on the island’s conflict-prone political system, the fragile relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and a shaky economy. The victory of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian in the presi- dential election was itself a milestone in the ROC’s political development, for it ended the more than half century rule of the Kuomintang (KMT). Beijing’s saber rattling over the Taiwanese electorate’s choice of a pro-independence candidate was less noisy than expected. However, just as people began congratulating themselves on the smooth power transfer and the relatively tranquil state of cross-Strait relations, Tai- wan suddenly was caught up by the unprecedented eruption of a feud be- tween the new president and the KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan. Political uncertainty, plus the DPP’s pro-environment and pro-welfare policies, put Taiwan’s stock market into a tailspin. President Chen and his KMT oppo- nents collided over the issue of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. Chen’s first prime minister Tang Fei resigned under great pressure. A DPP minority gov- ernment was formed in October. At the end of the year the KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan was gearing up to impeach the president. All in all, Taiwan experienced unprecedented volatility in its domestic politics, and it is certain that shocks of greater magnitude are waiting ahead. Yu-Shan Wu is Professor in the Department of Political Science, Na- tional Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China. Asian Survey, 41:1, pp. 40–48. ISSN: 0004–4687 Ó 2001 by The Regents of the University of California/Society. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223. 40 TAIWAN IN 2000 41 The Presidential Elections: A Milestone Since democratization began in late 1980s, the long-ruling KMT has steadily lost ground to its primary opponent, the DPP, in local elections. However, the KMT’s grip on the central government was repeatedly reaffirmed by the electorate, which has been worried about the DPP’s pro-independence stance and its lack of experience in managing Taiwan’s economy. The March 2000 presidential election was no exception to the rule. Chen Shui-bian garnered a mere 39% of popular vote. However, the division within the KMT camp and the vehement competition between Vice-President Lien Chan and former Tai- wan Governor James Soong split the party’s support. The result was Chen’s being elected with a plurality. Both Chen and Soong rose to national prominence as winners in 1994’s year-end elections. Chen defeated his KMT opponent and became mayor of Taipei, while Soong overwhelmed his DPP challenger and became the first governor of Taiwan. Since then, these two men had been considered the brightest political stars in their respective camps. Four years later both lost their political bases. The KMT made a comeback in the Taipei mayoral race and drove Chen out of power, while it was the abolition of the Taiwan pro- vincial government following a major constitutional amendment that pushed Soong out. In 1999 both sought to become the presidential candidate of their respective parties. Then their fates diverged. Though Soong enjoyed great popularity, his candidacy bid was unsuccessful. President cum KMT Chair- man Lee Teng-hui handpicked Vice-President Lien Chan to be his party’s candidate and had a party congress in August endorse his decision. Soong was forced to choose between running as an independent candidate and face the wrath of Lee or give up and vanish from the political scene. He chose the collision course. In the meantime, the DPP’s Chen was able to defeat his party opponent, the former chairman Hsu Hsin-liang, and consolidate his sup- port among the rank and file. As for the KMT camp, it fielded two candi- dates for the presidential race; Vice-President Lien, the official candidate, suffered from lukewarm grassroots support, while Soong was a superstar without an extensive party organization behind him. The structure of the three-way election favored Chen, who otherwise stood no chance to win if there had been a united KMT front. During the campaign, Chen Shui-bian made great efforts to reach beyond the DPP’s traditional supporters. His most serious problem was to convince Taiwan’s voters that he was realistic and flexible enough to manage the cross-Strait relationship. As a consequence, the DPP passed its “Resolution on the Future of Taiwan” in May 1999 and for the first time grudgingly ac- 42 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001 cepted the legitimacy of the ROC.1 Prior to the resolution’s passing, the DPP’s goal was to establish a Republic of Taiwan, a new and independent nation, as stipulated in the party constitution. The change of tone in the Res- olution from advocating Taiwan independence to accepting the status quo was justified by claiming that Taiwan already was independent and thus there was no need to declare independence a second time. The synchronization of the resolution’s passage with the official nomination of Chen as the DPP’s presidential candidate made the document’s real intent crystal clear: it was intended to allay popular fears about the nature of the DPP and clothe Chen in a moderate and realistic image. Chen announced his proposal for estab- lishing a direct sea link and one-way air link with the mainland in early No- vember. His gesture came in the wake of Lee Teng-hui’s presentation of his provocative special state-to-state relationship theory, which disrupted the del- icate relationship among Washington, Taipei, and Beijing. While dramatic, the DPP White Paper on China Policy for the 21st Century of November further confirmed that Chen was willing to make realistic overtures to the mainland. Chen’s moves proved quite effective in drawing those floating votes that in the past had gone to DPP candidates only in local elections. Voters now believed that Chen could manage the cross-Strait relations. Beijing sought to convince the electorate that China would never accept a DPP president. Pre- mier Zhu Rongji issued an unprecedented stern warning against Chen’s sup- porters 10 days before the election. However, these tactics failed to scare the voters off. Chen’s basically calm response to Zhu’s warning won him further support from the mainstream voters, while those angered at Beijing’s saber rattling rallied around him as a symbol of defiance against mainland China. Though Chen secured the backing of the DPP’s traditional support base and gladly found his opponents dividing the KMT vote, he remained number two in the popularity contest, lagging behind Soong in the first half of 1999. The eruption of the Xingpiao financial scandal in July 1999, however, had seriously damaged Soong’s clean image and undermined his reform creden- tials. Soong did not regain his prior levels of popularity until the presidential race entered its final stage. By that time a large number of KMT supporters were wondering whether Lien or Soong stood a better chance to beat Chen and were willing to cast their votes strategically to prevent Chen’s election. Most chose Soong, and Lien’s support collapsed in the last few days of the campaign. The result was astonishing to even the casual observer. On March 17 Vice-President Lien, the KMT’s official candidate, garnered a mere 23.1% 1. For an analysis of the DPP’s move to the ideological center, see Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwanese Elections and Cross-Strait Relations: Mainland Policy in Flux,” Asian Survey 39:4 (July/August 1999), pp. 565–87. TAIWAN IN 2000 43 of the popular vote. James Soong received the bulk of the KMT vote and registered 36.8% of total vote. Both were defeated by Chen, who got 39.3% of the ballots. Immediately after the election, angry KMT demonstrators en- circled the party’s headquarters and demanded Lee Teng-hui’s resignation as chairman. Several days later, after Soong announced the foundation of the People First Party (PFP), which put to rest speculation that he would return to the KMT and claim leadership, Lee announced his resignation. Lien swiftly took his place and became the leader of a once all-powerful but now demoral- ized political machine. Cross-Strait Tension Chen’s election was a milestone in Taiwan’s democratization process. How- ever, it also brought with it serious political and economic consequences that were only vaguely appreciated by most people during the campaign. These consequences came in three categories: those pertaining to cross-Strait rela- tions, divided government, and the domestic economy. The following discus- sion shall deal with these issues one by one. As a pro-independence candidate, Chen inherently has been distrusted by Beijing. After becoming president-elect on March 18, Chen made great ef- forts to convey a softer tone in his messages to Beijing. This included stating that Taiwan would be willing to discuss the one-China issue with Beijing, that Taiwan would not exclude unification with mainland China as a possible alternative, that confederation was an imaginative formula for unification, and that the two sides should negotiate with the “1992 spirit.” In Chen’s inaugural address, he promised not to declare Taiwan independence, change the name of the ROC, insert Lee’s special state-to-state thesis into the Consti- tution, hold a referendum on the unification-independence question, nor abol- ish the National Unification Guidelines and the National Unification Council as long as mainland China abstained from using force against Taiwan.