JANUARY 1977 (This article was originally written for 'Pacific Research (Polo Alto) for an American audience In January 7977. The Military Situation in East Timor Ten thousand elite Indonesian Because Indonesian armed forces Australia and, until recently by Telecom, troops invaded the former Portuguese blockaded East Timor as part of their the Australian international colony of East Timor on December 7, invasion, it has been difficult to ascertain communications service, which passed o·n. 1975, ten days after the popular what is actually going on there. The Radio Maubere messages as nationalist administration of the Indonesians claim to have consolidated "unauthenticated".2 FRETI LI N party had unilaterally control of the Island. FRETILlN, There are also independent reports: proclaimed the Democratic Republic of through its only links with the outside correspondence from Indonesia and the East Timor a nation with 1/200 the world - its radio broadcasts - claims to confidential findings of an Indonesian population of Indonesia. Operation have liberated the entire republic, except relief mission. Komodo, as the original takeover plan a few towns. Upon close examination and Finally, there are admissions by was named by the Indonesian comparison with the increasing amount Indonesian government sources and in­ government, envisioned victory in a of independent data, the FRETILlN consistencies in some reports which can matter of days; a year later the nationalist position appears much closer to the truth. be used to evaluate the respective claims. resistance had fought thirty to forty Most establishment press reports have thousand occupying Indonesian troops to originated in Indonesia. Articles in D.R.E.T. LIVES a stalemate. Even after a five month dry publications such as the For Eastern Though Indonesian diplomats have period when the military advantage lay Economic Review and New York Times repeatedly claimed that their government with the invading forces, troops of the have carried Jakarta datelines. This is has consolidated control over East Timor, Democratic Republic continued to because all foreigners, except a few President Suharto himself made an control the bulk of the territory, inflict Australians and several captured extraordinary admission in his August 26, heavy casualties on the Indonesians, and Portuguese soldiers, were evacuated from maintain the loyalty of most of the East Timor on the eve of the Indonesian 1976 statement: ... the FRETIUN movement is still population despite Indonesia's alternating invasion by mainly Australian planes. The possessed of strength in areas of the policies of terror and amnesty.1 Indonesians have allowed very few foreign journalists to travel to East Timor Portuguese colony ... for this 1. For background on the Timor conflict see since the invasion, and they have been reason, I ndonesia must try to any of the following: carefully watched. convince members of the movement Helen Hill, The Timor Story (Australian to join the government as soon as Union of Students, Melbourne). FRETILlN releases printed by Decolonization, (United Nations) No. 7 sympathizers in Australia and the West, as possible ... 3 August, 1976. well as by Communist news services, are 80th the continued radio broadcasts of J.S. Dunn, The Timor Story (Legislative based on the broadcasts of Radio FRETI UN and the large presence of Research Service, Parliament of Australia, Indonesian troops are testimony to July, 19761. Maubere. Since early 1976, Radio Richard W. Franke, East Timar: The Maubere has broadcast three times a week continued resistance. HIdden War, East Timor Defense in four languages: Portuguese, Tetum (the Committee, New York, July, 19761. For a Timorese lingua franca), ElJglish, and 2. The Timar Information Service short summary see "Conflict in Timor", (Melbourne) regularly prints all public Pacific Research, November-December, Indonesian. These broadcasts are messages from Radio Maubere. 1975. monitored by FRETlLlN supporters in 3 How strong is FRETIUN today? there were no helicopters to break (FAUNTIL,. the East Timorese What are its prospects for success in the down the isolation of the remote Liberation Army) is based on the former long run? How is the Timor conflict parts of' the rugged mountain Portuguese army in the territory. From affecting Indonesia? It is impossible to zones. 5 the beginning of the Indonesian incursion answer these questions with certainty, Thus, the geography of East Timor makes in the border regions in September, 1975, but upon careful examination of the it difficult for an invading army - be it FRETI UN forces demonstrated an military situation one can safely conclude the Japanese during World War 11 or the impressive capacity to resist well­ that the war for Timor will continue for Indonesians today - to control much equipped Indonesian elite troops. Aus­ some ti me, with the I ndonesians suffering territory. It is a land well suited to tralian journalist Michael Richardson continuing casualties in a vain attempt to guerilla warfare. described the army in December, 1975: annex the Republic. At the time of the UDT's (the CONTROL OF TERRITORY THE SETTING right-wing political party) short-lived putsch in August there were about I ndonesian forces occupy the central As in any war, the geography of 2,500 full-time Timorese regulars in portions of Dili, Baucau, and some larger Timor is an important factor. the Army led by about 150 villages on the road system. Their control Timor is of relatively recent Timorese sergeants, some of whom is tenuous, much like American control geological formation. The were veterans of the Portuguese was in Vietnam: FRETILlN frequently Portuguese territory is extremely colonial wars in Africa, and a mounts attacks on the towns; travel mountainous with the highest peak, handful of lieutenants. Behind this between them is risky; and they are Tata Mai Lau, reaching a height of first-line army there were 7,000 unsafe at night. 6 almost 10,000 feet. Several other part-time militia men and 20,000 During the dry season I ndon­ peaks are in excess of 9,000 feet. 1976 reservists, each with up to 36 esian troops captured most of the villages Coastal plains exist on the south months training.s along the road system, coast and in pockets on the north but did not After the UDT coup, the great bulk of consolidate control of the surrounding coast, where they are intersected by the army swung behind FRETI UN and territory. Between October and April, rugged mountain outcrops. There is was decisive in forcing the UDT and however, rains made it difficult for the also a plain averaging 500 metres in APODETI (pro-Indonesian) leaders from Indonesians to re-supply and reinforce altitude in the eastern part of the the country. their garrisons. FRETI UN claims to have island. Most of Timor experiences The size of the army - at least those retaken - often after fierce fighting - the two distinct seasons - a dry season under arms today - is not clear. Several villages of Zumalai, Letefoho, Soibada, which lasts from May until October, observers, including Portuguese Barique, Fato, Berliu, Ossu, Vatolari, when practically no rainfall occurs, authorities, confirm FRETIUN's claim to Venilale, Tutuala, Turiscosi and Lospalos. and a wet monsoon season between be extremely well supplied with weapons Laclubar, Alas, Quelicai andVemasse. An October and the end of April. The from the Portuguese NATO arsenal. independent relief mission, whose report effects of these climatic conditions Richardson described a FALlNTIL unit on the vegetation have led to the was smuggled out of Indonesia by operating in the border area just before island sometimes being called "the Australian intelligence and leaked to the the full-scale invasion: green and brown land". Timor has Australian press, confirmed that (It is) very well armed with standard few permanent rivers. In the dry FRETILlN controls 85% of the country­ equipment from Portuguese military season most streams are reduced to a side while the Indonesians control stockS, including G-3 automatic territory including only of the trickle, but when the heavy rains fall 20% rifles, German-nlade Mausers, 60 and population.7 in the mountains they become 81 mm. mortars, various makes of raging torrents.4 The military force of the light machine gun, hand grenades, The bulk of the population lives a Democratic Republic of East Timor bazooka rocket launchers, mines, subsistence existence in the mountainous and some 75 mm. mountain guns.9 areas away from the few roads built by The D.R.E_T. Defense Minister, the Portuguese. Only a small percentage 6. The Portuguese paper 0 Dia (November Rogerio Lobato, told Richardson that 7-8, 1976) reported a surprise attack on ammunition and fuel stocks adequate for of the population lives in the larger towns DHi, in which FRETI LIN troops destroyed of Dili and Baucau. The roads along three I ndonesian tanks. The Sydney twelve months had been cached all over which the Indonesian forces have advan­ Morning Herald reported a FRETILlN the country in preparation for the ced are passable only in the dry season mortar attack on Baucau, which forced expected Indonesian invasion. FRETI LI N and are non-existent in many parts of the the I ndonesians to cancel a visit of also claims to have captured significant journalists, diplomats, and an Indonesian stocks of Indonesian arms, chiefly territory. The flurry of Portuguese cabinet minister. road-building activity in recent years had A recent I ndonesian report confirmed that American-made, and sufficient ammun­ little impact: one of the 16 AV-10 Bronco ground­ ition to make these weapons usable. Most of the road and bridge attack aurcraft that Indonesia recently Indonesian sources, on the other hand, obtained, has been destroyed in action in Claim to have captured approximately construction projects undertaken in' Timor, though allegedly not because of the past ten years failed to survive D.R.E.T.