JANUARY 1977

(This article was originally written for 'Pacific Research (Polo Alto) for an American audience In January 7977. The Military Situation in East

Ten thousand elite Indonesian Because Indonesian armed forces and, until recently by Telecom, troops invaded the former Portuguese blockaded as part of their the Australian international colony of East Timor on December 7, invasion, it has been difficult to ascertain communications service, which passed o·n. 1975, ten days after the popular what is actually going on there. The Radio Maubere messages as nationalist administration of the Indonesians claim to have consolidated "unauthenticated".2 FRETI LI N party had unilaterally control of the Island. FRETILlN, There are also independent reports: proclaimed the Democratic Republic of through its only links with the outside correspondence from and the East Timor a nation with 1/200 the world - its radio broadcasts - claims to confidential findings of an Indonesian population of Indonesia. Operation have liberated the entire republic, except relief mission. Komodo, as the original takeover plan a few towns. Upon close examination and Finally, there are admissions by was named by the Indonesian comparison with the increasing amount Indonesian government sources and in­ government, envisioned victory in a of independent data, the FRETILlN consistencies in some reports which can matter of days; a year later the nationalist position appears much closer to the truth. be used to evaluate the respective claims. resistance had fought thirty to forty Most establishment press reports have thousand occupying Indonesian troops to originated in Indonesia. Articles in D.R.E.T. LIVES a stalemate. Even after a five month dry publications such as the For Eastern Though Indonesian diplomats have period when the military advantage lay Economic Review and New York Times repeatedly claimed that their government with the invading forces, troops of the have carried Jakarta datelines. This is has consolidated control over East Timor, Democratic Republic continued to because all foreigners, except a few President Suharto himself made an control the bulk of the territory, inflict Australians and several captured extraordinary admission in his August 26, heavy casualties on the Indonesians, and Portuguese soldiers, were evacuated from maintain the loyalty of most of the East Timor on the eve of the Indonesian 1976 statement: ... the FRETIUN movement is still population despite Indonesia's alternating invasion by mainly Australian planes. The possessed of strength in areas of the policies of terror and amnesty.1 Indonesians have allowed very few foreign journalists to travel to East Timor Portuguese colony ... for this 1. For background on the Timor conflict see since the invasion, and they have been reason, I ndonesia must try to any of the following: carefully watched. convince members of the movement Helen Hill, The Timor Story (Australian to join the government as soon as Union of Students, Melbourne). FRETILlN releases printed by Decolonization, (United Nations) No. 7 sympathizers in Australia and the West, as possible ... 3 August, 1976. well as by Communist news services, are 80th the continued radio broadcasts of J.S. Dunn, The Timor Story (Legislative based on the broadcasts of Radio FRETI UN and the large presence of Research Service, Parliament of Australia, Indonesian troops are testimony to July, 19761. Maubere. Since early 1976, Radio Richard W. Franke, East Timar: The Maubere has broadcast three times a week continued resistance. HIdden War, East Timor Defense in four languages: Portuguese, Tetum (the Committee, New York, July, 19761. For a Timorese lingua franca), ElJglish, and 2. The Timar Information Service short summary see "Conflict in Timor", (Melbourne) regularly prints all public Pacific Research, November-December, Indonesian. These broadcasts are messages from Radio Maubere. 1975. monitored by FRETlLlN supporters in 3 How strong is FRETIUN today? there were no helicopters to break (FAUNTIL,. the East Timorese What are its prospects for success in the down the isolation of the remote Liberation Army) is based on the former long run? How is the Timor conflict parts of' the rugged mountain Portuguese army in the territory. From affecting Indonesia? It is impossible to zones. 5 the beginning of the Indonesian incursion answer these questions with certainty, Thus, the makes in the border regions in September, 1975, but upon careful examination of the it difficult for an invading army - be it FRETI UN forces demonstrated an military situation one can safely conclude the Japanese during World War 11 or the impressive capacity to resist well­ that the war for Timor will continue for Indonesians today - to control much equipped Indonesian elite troops. Aus­ some ti me, with the I ndonesians suffering territory. It is a land well suited to tralian journalist Michael Richardson continuing casualties in a vain attempt to guerilla warfare. described the army in December, 1975: annex the Republic. At the time of the UDT's (the CONTROL OF TERRITORY THE SETTING right-wing political party) short-lived putsch in August there were about I ndonesian forces occupy the central As in any war, the geography of 2,500 full-time Timorese regulars in portions of Dili, Baucau, and some larger Timor is an important factor. the Army led by about 150 villages on the road system. Their control Timor is of relatively recent Timorese sergeants, some of whom is tenuous, much like American control geological formation. The were veterans of the Portuguese was in Vietnam: FRETILlN frequently Portuguese territory is extremely colonial wars in Africa, and a mounts attacks on the towns; travel mountainous with the highest peak, handful of lieutenants. Behind this between them is risky; and they are Tata Mai Lau, reaching a height of first-line army there were 7,000 unsafe at night. 6 almost 10,000 feet. Several other part-time militia men and 20,000 During the dry season I ndon­ peaks are in excess of 9,000 feet. 1976 reservists, each with up to 36 esian troops captured most of the villages Coastal plains exist on the south months training.s along the road system, coast and in pockets on the north but did not After the UDT coup, the great bulk of consolidate control of the surrounding coast, where they are intersected by the army swung behind FRETI UN and territory. Between October and April, rugged mountain outcrops. There is was decisive in forcing the UDT and however, rains made it difficult for the also a plain averaging 500 metres in APODETI (pro-Indonesian) leaders from Indonesians to re-supply and reinforce altitude in the eastern part of the the country. their garrisons. FRETI UN claims to have island. Most of Timor experiences The size of the army - at least those retaken - often after fierce fighting - the two distinct seasons - a dry season under arms today - is not clear. Several villages of Zumalai, Letefoho, Soibada, which lasts from May until October, observers, including Portuguese Barique, Fato, Berliu, Ossu, Vatolari, when practically no rainfall occurs, authorities, confirm FRETIUN's claim to Venilale, Tutuala, Turiscosi and Lospalos. and a wet monsoon season between be extremely well supplied with weapons Laclubar, Alas, Quelicai andVemasse. An October and the end of April. The from the Portuguese NATO arsenal. independent relief mission, whose report effects of these climatic conditions Richardson described a FALlNTIL unit on the vegetation have led to the was smuggled out of Indonesia by operating in the border area just before island sometimes being called "the Australian intelligence and leaked to the the full-scale invasion: green and brown land". Timor has Australian press, confirmed that (It is) very well armed with standard few permanent rivers. In the dry FRETILlN controls 85% of the country­ equipment from Portuguese military season most streams are reduced to a side while the Indonesians control stockS, including G-3 automatic territory including only of the trickle, but when the heavy rains fall 20% rifles, German-nlade Mausers, 60 and population.7 in the mountains they become 81 mm. mortars, various makes of raging torrents.4 The military force of the light machine gun, hand grenades, The bulk of the population lives a Democratic Republic of East Timor bazooka rocket launchers, mines, subsistence existence in the mountainous and some 75 mm. mountain guns.9 areas away from the few roads built by The D.R.E_T. Defense Minister, the Portuguese. Only a small percentage 6. The Portuguese paper 0 Dia (November Rogerio Lobato, told Richardson that 7-8, 1976) reported a surprise attack on ammunition and fuel stocks adequate for of the population lives in the larger towns DHi, in which FRETI LIN troops destroyed of Dili and Baucau. The roads along three I ndonesian tanks. The Sydney twelve months had been cached all over which the Indonesian forces have advan­ Morning Herald reported a FRETILlN the country in preparation for the ced are passable only in the dry season mortar attack on Baucau, which forced expected Indonesian invasion. FRETI LI N and are non-existent in many parts of the the I ndonesians to cancel a visit of also claims to have captured significant journalists, diplomats, and an Indonesian stocks of Indonesian arms, chiefly territory. The flurry of Portuguese cabinet minister. road-building activity in recent years had A recent I ndonesian report confirmed that American-made, and sufficient ammun­ little impact: one of the 16 AV-10 Bronco ground­ ition to make these weapons usable. Most of the road and bridge attack aurcraft that Indonesia recently Indonesian sources, on the other hand, obtained, has been destroyed in action in Claim to have captured approximately construction projects undertaken in' Timor, though allegedly not because of the past ten years failed to survive D.R.E.T. attacks. (The Age, 2.2.771. 11,000 of the 13;000 small arms they the ravages of the extreme monsoon 7. The Age, November 19, 1976. The authors conditions, while until late 1974 of the relief report are not named. However, at about the same time, the President of the Indonesian Council of 8. Michael Richardson, "Fretilin Ready for a Churches, General Simatupang, and Long War of Resistance", The Age, Catholic leader Frans Sede reportedly December, 1975. 3. The Age (Melbourne), August 26, 1976. returned to Jakarta ·from Timor, weeping 9. R ichardson, "Hunger Campaign in East 4. Dunn, The TimorStory, p.1. at what they had seen. Timor", The Age, September 20,1976. 4 presence ott I imor. The destroyer Monginsidi on left, the patrol boat BC704 foreground, and the destroyer Nuku - an old Soviet ship - on the right. The ships are off Atapupu, on the north coast of Indonesian Timor, 74 km from the East Timor border - Courtesy: Michael Richardson of the Age. mate came from the Portuguese, but Nevertheless, the departure of those The rest have joined FRETILlN in the observers, including Richardson, weak in stamina and resolve will mountains. Meanwhile, 20,000 out of this report. have left FRETILlN with a well­ Dili's 30,000 people have registered for After more than a year of fighting, trained and experienced hard core of evacuation to Portugal.14 ETlLlN appears still to field a first class guerilla fighters.12 fighting force. Though Jakarta Most likely, FALlNTIL troops FRETILlN claims to have won ials officially admit that F.ALlNTIL move in and out of the fighting, carrying support even from Timorese who fled to only 600 to 800 men, Indonesian on other activities such as food produc­ West T!mor when it first took control. ligence reportedly places the figure at tion, health care, and education. FALlNTIL forces, it asserts, liberated to 5,000.10 D. R. E.T. Foreign As in other guerilla wars, the key to thousands of Timorese from prison-like ster, Jose Ramos Horta claimed on FRETILlN's success lies not in its ;-efugee camps in in 30 that the army consisted of fighting force, but in its popular support. November, 1976. The refugees, claims regulars, 30,000 militia, 1,000 in Well before the Indonesian invasion, FRETILlN, joined with FRETILlN in the women's army (women have been FRETILlN was the most popular of East forests.15 in combat since border confron­ Timor's political parties. Not only was There is no independent con­ began), and 1,000 in the youth FRETILlN strongly nationalistic, but it firmation of the refugee story, but many 1 1 . carried out educational and social pro­ of FRETILlN's former political A well-informed Australian observer, grams in rural areas. opponents now back the D.R.E.T. against Dunn, believes that many fighters The brutality and unfamiliarity of ~ndonesia. Jose Martins, leader of the told to go home after the original the Indonesian, chiefly Javanese, invaders small . K.O.T.A. party denounced assault had been blunted, drove most of the remaining Timorese to Indonesia in April, 1976. In December, than remain as a burden on limited FRETILlN's side. The leaked relief 1975, the Indonesians had paraded him­ supplies. He suggests: mission report stated: and other East Timorese - before the Five thousand people welcomed the U.N. to iustifv intervention under Indonesian troops at the town of See Peter Monkton, AM (Radio Program Amaru, but now there are only 1000 transcript). Australian Broadcasting Cor­ people in Amaru.13 poration, September 20, 1976, and Sydney Morning Herald. 14. ibid. Letter to UN Secretary-General Waldheim, 12. Dunn', Timor Story, p.78. 15. Statement by D.R.E.T. Foreign Minister, August 30, 1976. 13. The Age, November 19, 1976. Jose Ramos Horta. 5 coercion.1 6 Supporting the Army, the an official U.N. observer from visiting Indonesians have bombarded Timorese FRETllIN zones, and - with the assent cities and FRETILlN positions from the of the Australian government INDONESIAN FORCES sea and air. One FRETILlN broadcast prevented (by threatening) two Aust­ mentioned six Indonesian ships - out of ralian relief m issions from delivering There are about thirty to forty a navy of 86 ships - participating in one non-military supplies to FRETILlN. thousand Indonesian troops on Timor. In North coast bombardment. Maintaining and supplying such a April, 1976, Australian Intelligence put More important, Indonesian sh ips large expeditionary force is costly. An the figure at 32,000 in East Timor and and supporting aircraft have blockaded Australian newspaper estimated that another 10,000 in reserve in West Timor, Timor since the December invasion. Not Indonesia had spent $80 million (above part of Indonesia. 17 By far the most only have they cut F RETI LI N normal military costs) on the war before detailed non-FRETILlN source, one international communications and travel September, 1976, and FRETILlN sources which is reliable, is a letter from an to the outside world, they have prevented claimed that the Indonesians had spent Indonesian pol itician opposed to the war: After Dili was occupied by the I ndonesian troops, reinforcements were sent non-stop to East Ti mar. Now I've heard that there are already 35 thousand troops there. A big proportion from all the elite/ The total size of the the East Timor war. Mostly they commando troops have been sent to Indonesian Army. {TN I} is between are drawn from Central and East Timor. like the red berets (RPKAD), 220,000 and 250,000. At anyone Java, with strong abangan ties (i.e. orange berets (Kopsatgas), violet time up to 42,000 have been less Islamic Javanese). Politically, in berets (Kmps Marinir/KKO), plu~ reliably reported to be stationed in the past they have had strong troops from Java (especially from the Timor zone in the past year. pro-Sukarno leanings. According to West Java (Siliwangi) and East Java According to a number of reliable a FRETILlN report, after a large (Brawijaya), troops from Central reports, virtually all serious fighting number of KKO soldiers defected Java (Diponegoro) mostly got dis­ is conducted by elite units, which to FRETlLlN, they attacked troops pensation not to be sent to Timor, constitute a fraction of TNl's total, from the RPKAD. because they are Suharto's troops), but which are also said to be the RPKAD KORPS PARA Sumatra, and Sulawesi.18 only militarily useful units. The KOMANDO. This unit, only a These predominanSly elite, largely ordinary battalions are apparently regiment in size, is in military Javanese troops are better paid and better inadequate for assault work as terms, the elite of the elite. It is trained than Indonesian regulars. required in East Timor. always the best trained, receives the TNI is essentially organised most up-to-date equipment, and around divisions from the main good provlsloning. Recruits are T hough the I ndonesians tried to use provinces of I ndonesia. In Java, the inducted annually by taking the ola Soviet-made weapons in the early most populous region, there are biggest and most physically fit men stages of border warfare, the. invading three territorial divisions, Siliwangi from the main territorial units. forces used more modern American (West Java), Diponegoro {Central (Most recruits stay only for a short equipment. The author of the Jakarta Java} and Brawijaya (East Java). time, often only a year, until they letter stressed that war machinery, such Of the perhaps 10 battalions reach a fairly low age limit, or can't as tanks and armoured vehicles, were of each division, two or three are keep up with the demanding level rushed to Timor. To transport and supply made up of members of the of physical fitness required). the expeditionary force, Indonesia i m­ territorial division for airborne or pressed a large portion of its "civilian" air KOSTRAD - ARMY STRATEGIC ranger training. The essential fleet, including Pertamina aircraft. The COMMAND. The RPKAD is both criterion of selection is the capacity army employs many helicopters in East tactically and administratively to undergo tough paratroop train­ Timor, which fits in with reports of an responsible to KOSTRAD. All ing. All elite units in these para­ extreme shortage of choppers for relief other elite units are under the troop or ranger units receive sub­ work in West Irian following a recent administrative command of their stantially higher pay and food earthquake. FRETILlN claims to have territorial divisions, but under provisions (and one of the causes of downed five helicopters. 19 KOSTRAD command for tactical low troop morale in East Timor has pruposes. been that corruption has siphoned It is KOSTRAD's control over 16. See KOT A party internal document, this extra benefits off before they these units that has given it a "Intervention of the Republic of reach the troops). crucial part in the war in East I ndonesia in the Life of : KKO = MARINES. The marines are Report for the Study of the Situation of Timor. One of the first Indonesian located primarily in bases around the Ex·Colony", March 23, 197Ej, released soldiers captured by FRETlLlN Java, though there are some else­ by Martins in New York when he wrote to troops in the border crossings of the UN Secretary-General in April. where. Their total strength is September 1975, gave his unit as 17. Testimony of Australian Member of thought to be between 5-7,000 Parliament Ken FrV before the UN KOSTRAD. Security Council, April 1, 1976. and they have been heavily used in 18. Letter published in Timor Information Service, Mav 6, 1976, p.2. 19. Canberra Times, September 21, 1976. 6 lover $100 million by that date.2u I I iFIGHTING

FALlNTIL avoids large-scale Ifrontai confrontations with the superi~r ,firepower of the I ndoneslans. Instead, It Ifocuses on supply lines and occasional I raids. Nevertheless, it reports that there \has been heavy fighting for several Villages, with territory changing hands Iseveral times. The villages of Tutuala, Uatolari, and Ossu, on different parts of ithe island, have been scenes of fierce lconflict. Indonesians landed amphibious Ireinforcements near Bobanaro and 5uai, in the border region, in July, 1976 l Massive bombardment has caused Ithe burning of whole villages and heavy :civilian casualties. The Indonesian relief Imission report estimated 60,000 Timor­ lese dead - a figure confirmed both by \ FRET! LI N and pro-I ndonesian Timorese. 'IThere is no indication how many may die FRCT! UN troops on the way to the front, Ba Bai River, September 7975. On far left .should continuing warfare deplete is FAUNT!L border zone Commander Fernando Carmo, killed in Dili during the ,Timorese food supplies as happened Indonesian landing of December 7, 7975. At centre is Central Committee member and 'during World War If. The Indonesian relief youth movement leader Goinxet Bernadine Bonaparte, who was also killed the same . report mentions looting, rape, and other day. - Courtesy jill jollife. disorderly conduct by I ndonesian forces. I t is i mpossib le to develop an Actually it is no secret any more in :Soldiers from the Brawijaya division were accurate toll of FALlNTIL casualties, Indonesia. Especially in Jakarta, {eportedly withdrawn in January 1976 but it is known that FRETI LlN has no where the Army hospital (R5 Gatot for exceptional brutality during the early western medicine and minimal western' 5ubroto) and the Air Force hospital 21 occupation. medical training, although traditional at Halim airbase is overflooded with medicines and training are used extensive­ war victims. And what makes it ly. There is probably a high death rate more tragic is that the fam if ies - 20. The Australian, "I ndonesia Closes T imor among injured fighters. even their wives - are not allowed Waters", September 20, 1976; Jose Ramos to VISit their husbands in the Horta, letter to Kurt Waldheim, August Reports of "unacceptably high" 30, 1976. Indonesian casualties are probably the hospital. At the same time, news 21. The Age, February 14, 1976, reported strongest evidence of continued harsh that many Indonesian soldiers were from Jakarta: "Most of the 'excesses are fighting and Indonesian difficulties in killed by the Timorese is just thought to have occurred close to the East Timor. FRET!LlN and Australian trickling down in Jakarta and whole initial attack, when I ndonesian troops were ordered to brook no res istance. The sources suggest that Indonesian dead, Java. 50 knowing that your Indonesian military leadership is reported wounded, and missing totalled 10,000 by husband, son, or father has to go to to be shocked at the behaviour of some the middle of the 1976 dry season. 22 Timor is nearly as shocking as a units whose discipline broke down Hospitals in Jakarta, 5urabaya, and death trial penalty. 50, when I saw seriously and who went far beyond the troops coming back from Timor last 'get tough' order. Late last month certain Denpasar have been overflowing with units, understood to mainly be from the casualties from Timor. The Jakarta letter month (red berets), I was not East Java Brawijaya division, were pulled commented: surprised to see them so delightful, out of East Timor because of their acts. released, talkative, because they The Northern Territory Times (Darwin, have escaped from Hel1. 23 Austral ia) published copies of letters from East Timorese in Dili to relatives in One woman told him of a 'bizarre Australia, which gave accounts of indis· execution' soon after the fall of Dili. One traveller to a small West criminate killings, on the scale of the According to the woman 59 Chinese and Javanese village reports that the villagers Japanese invasion of World War 11. J.S. Timorese were lined up and shot one by were horrified that two sons of the village Dunn (The Timor Story) also gives a fu~ one while the large crowd that gathered were brought home dead from the war, account of I ndonesian atrocities in the was instructed to count each of the dead early stages of the invasion. aloud. The same eye witness also reported but were not buried with military I nterviews with eye witnesses (mainly the killing of 27 WOmen believed to be honours. former U.D. T. su pporters) among Fretilin sympathizers. She said the women Demoralized by heavy casualties and Timorese' refugees in Portugal have con­ were shot after being separated from their the military stalemate, the unmotivated firmed Fretilin claims of widespread babies, who were thrown crying into a atrocities committed by Indonesian truck. The Age, 14.1.77. I ndonesian troops have become dis- troops. The interviews are conducted by 22. National Times (Australia), September the former Australian Consul in Dili, J.S. 27 -OctOber 2, 1976; The Australian, 23. Timor Information Service, May 6, 1976, .. Dunn: September 20, 1976 . p.3. 1 affected. There are reports of refusals to to I ndonesia. Groups are lobbying to cut Australian relief money through fight and even defections. The Guardian aid to Indonesia - because of both Timor Indonesian Red Cross, instead of (London) cites an Indonesian Army and Indonesian's miserable human rights International Red Cross. He also officer, who reported "cases of troops record - but there are no prospects for to discuss with Indonesia the refusing to go on patrol and helicopter early success. unification of families of East teams refusing to leave their bases". The I n Australia, Labor, student, and -refugees in Australia. And most Times (London) also reported "growi religious aid organizations have been tant, he committed Australia to indiscipline in Army units" 24 East among the strong~st' supporters of out - with Indonesia - the Timorese members of the Indonesian FRETI LI N, but the Australian govern­ boundaries between Australia U.N. delegation in October, 1976 report· ments of Gough Whhlam (A.LP.) ,and Portugal. Australia is willing to ed that several Indonesian commander~ conservative "Liberal" Malcolm Fraser with Indonesia because it knows it had negotiated local "stand-to" agree­ have taken concrete actions against get an advantageous division.28 ments with FALlNTIJ.. . FRETILlN while uttering symbolic objec­ These actions, combined These same sources confirmed two tions to the Indonesian invasion. Australia's continued harassment FRETILlN claims of greater dissension: Australian maritime, stevedoring, FRETILlN backers, amount to de First, on July 2, the D.R.E.T. asserted and postal workers imposed lengthy bans recognition of Indonesian rule. that 100 K. K.O. elite marines had on shipments to Indonesia. The how I ndonesia, in the person of defected tp FRETI LlN. Though the Australian Council of Trade Unions sent a spokesman, General Sudharmono, K.K.O. is known as a body which harbors high level .delegation to Jakarta to protest the agreements, and Fraser has lingering pro-Sukarno sentiment, this is both the invasion and the killing of five relatively little to discount no mean feat, since FALlNTI Land Australian T.V. journalists. Members of impression. parliament have expressed opposition to K.K.O. troops do not speak the same DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT language. Second, in October the the Indonesian invasion. And anions and D.R.E.T. claimed, "five Indonesian Army religious aid organizations organized two With the U.5. backing units revolted in Dili, refused to figh~ unsuccessful attempts to send food and and Austral ian supporters neutralized and asked for return to Indonesia. ,,2 military supplies to FRETlLlN during the actions of the Australian go The pro-Indonesian sources claimed that 1976. FRETILlN has been amassing sup these defections included some from the Though the Whitlam government elsewhere. With support from R.P.K.A.D., the elite of the elite. made statements which the Indonesians countries and most of the Third interpreted as encouragement for the FRETIUN has won passage of two U INTERNATIONAL SCENE invasion, Australia has never diplomatic­ General Assembly reunions condem ally bac\<.ed the Indonesian action. In Despite Indonesia's massive advan­ Indonesia, the first in December, 1 December, 1975, Australia voted at the tages of population and resources, it had the second in November, 1976. U.N. to condemn the invasion. When relied heavily on outside support for its Security Council has also passed Indonesia staged meetings and ceremonies intervention. Either through grant aid or similar resolutions, with no on Timor in 1976, to formalize military sales, the U.S. has delivered opposition. integration, Australian diplomats - along roughly $200 million worth of military FRETI UN's international bac with most of the diplomatic community equipment and supplies to Indonesia notably former Portuguese colonies - were pointedly absent. To this date, since 1966, in addition to traini ng large Africa '- won a major diplomatic Australia official policy is for withdrawal numbers of Indonesian troops and for FRETIUN when the Non-AI of Indonesian troops and self-deter­ offi cers. 26 Nations Conference, meeting in .sri mination for the Timorese, under U.N. Since President Ford and Secretary in August, 1976, pas'sed a auspices. criticizing Indonesia's, Timor intervent. of State Kissinger were in Jakarta just These diplomatic stands appear to twelve months before the December, Given the romanticism often attacher be little more than a sop to pro­ 1975 invasion, there is no doubt that the Third World, nonaligned nations, FRETILlN groups in Australia, for the U.5. approved Indonesian action. The may not surprise some people. Australian government - particularly the U.S. has not objected to the use of U.5. Indonesia is a key member of the Fraser administration, which has been in arms in the conflict, and in fact, a State The Guardian (London) actually power since the period of the invasion - Department spokesman stated in the dieted FRETI UN failure: has repeatedly provided concrete support early days of the fighting: The attempt is bound to fail, to the Indonesians. The Australian I n terms of the bilateral relations success would lead to I government has harassed FRETILlN and between the U.S. and I ndonesia, we founding member and the its Australian supporters. It froze are more or less condoning the most populous state in the FRETILlN bank accounts and seized, on incursion into East Timor.27 ment, walking out. 29 more than one occasion, North Australian There is no doubt that US military Only 11 of the 85 renro

This attempt by Lynch to link the ~Ia ! The devaluation decision to wage costs completely ignored the fact that the most changeable element of our Balance of Payments was not the value of goods exported and imported (which would be ~t Devaluation affected by wage levels) but the move­ ment of capital into and out of Australia. The massive outflow of private capital from Australia was the real reason for devaluation. (1) That pressures on Aust­ :!Disasteraf ralia's exchange rate in the months preceding devaluation were closely linked Ide" i The decision of the Fraser Govern- ation that reducing inflation was their to the actions of the international ment to devalue the Australian dollar by number one economic priority. specu lator and not to the lack of es 17.5% on 15 December 1976 must rank competitiveness of Austral ian produced The Reason for Devaluation ltts one of the worst economic decisions goods is borne out by the fact that the .made by a Government in Australia's post The official explanation put forward value of Australia's exports exceeded our le' ::World war history. by the Treasurer was "that the Govern­ imports and we had a Balance of Trade :r··! There was confusion surrounding the ment had been forced to devalue because Surplus in 1975/760f $1,468m. leteasons for the devaluation, disillusion­ of the .deterioration that had occurred Australia has traditionally relied on ~ment over the magnitude of the over recent years in Australia's underlying the excess of inflow of private capital _ ~evaluation, uncertainty of the employ­ external situation as a result of the higher over outflow (i.e. net private capital hB1inent effects of the decision and astonish­ increase in wage costs than in our major inflow) to bolster our balance of 'ment that the Government would take trading partners and the continuing loss payments. However in the five months to uch action in the face of its pro clam- of reserves." November 1976 there was an extraord- 9