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Future Combat Systems Program CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Arroyo Center View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. ARROYO CENTER Lessons from the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program Christopher G. Pernin, Elliot Axelband, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Brian B. Dille, John Gordon IV, Bruce J. Held, K. Scott McMahon, Walter L. Perry, Christopher Rizzi, Akhil R. Shah, Peter A. Wilson, Jerry M. Sollinger Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pernin, Christopher G., 1973- Lessons from the Army's Future Combat Systems program / Christopher G. Pernin, Elliot Axelband, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Brian B. Dille, John Gordon IV, Bruce J. Held, K. Scott McMahon, Walter L. Perry, Christopher Rizzi, Akhil R. Shah, Peter A. Wilson, Jerry M. Sollinger. pages cm Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-7639-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. United States. Army —Procurement. 2. Armored vehicles, Military—United States. 3. United States. Army—Weapons systems—Evaluation. 4. United States. Army— Technological innovations—Evaluation. 5. Technological innovations—United States— Management . 6. Systems engineering—United States—Management . I. Title. UC263.P46 2012 355.6'2120973—dc23 2012045151 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2012 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/ publications/permissions.html). Published 2012 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface The Future Combat Systems (FCS) program was the largest and most ambitious planned acquisition program in the Army’s history. As a program it was intended to field not just a system, but an entire brigade: a system of systems developed from scratch and integrated by means of an advanced, wireless network. Moreover, the FCS- equipped brigade would operate with novel doctrine that was being developed and tested along with the materiel components of the unit. To paraphrase the Army at the time, FCS was Army modernization. In 2009 the FCS program was cancelled, although some of its efforts contin- ued on as follow-on programs. The FCS program had garnered considerable attention throughout its existence, but few studies have been released documenting the lessons from the program to aid the Army in moving forward from such a large acquisition termination. In 2010, the Army’s Acquisition Executive asked RAND Arroyo Center to conduct an after-action analysis of the FCS program in order to leverage its successes and learn from its problems. This report documents a history and lessons from the FCS program. It should be of interest to the broad acquisition community, as well as those interested in Army modernization, requirements generation, and program management. This research was sponsored by Dr. Malcolm O’Neill, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisi- tion, Logistics and Technology. It was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s Force Development and Technology Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD105725. iii iv Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Director of Oper- ations (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6419; fax 310-451-6952; email Marcy_ [email protected]), or visit Arroyo’s web site at http://www.rand.org/ard.html. Contents Preface ................................................................................................. iii Figures ................................................................................................ xiii Tables .................................................................................................. xv Summary ............................................................................................ xvii Acknowledgments ................................................................................ xxxi Acronyms .......................................................................................... xxxiii chapter one Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 Background and Purpose ............................................................................. 1 Sources for This Report ............................................................................... 3 Organization of This Report .......................................................................... 3 chapter Two Background of the Future combat Systems Program ......................................... 5 Strategic Contexts of the 1990s Informed Capabilities ............................................ 5 FCS Grew Out of the Need to Move the Army into the Future ................................. 8 Not “Out of Nowhere” .............................................................................. 9 Program Assumptions Were Derived from the Army’s Understanding of the Future Operating Environment ......................................................................... 10 Most Conflicts Would Involve High-Intensity, State-to-State Combat ...................... 11 Army Forces Must Be Deployed Very Early in a Crisis ........................................ 12 Future Army Forces Would Have to Dominate Any Type of Conflict ....................... 13 Very High Levels of Situational Awareness Will Be Available to Army Forces .............. 14 Army Operations Would Be Supported by Intratheater Air Mobility of Light Mechanized/Motorized Forces ............................................................... 15 Conclusions and Lessons ............................................................................ 17 Conclusions .......................................................................................... 17 Lessons .............................................................................................. 18 v vi Lessons from the Army Future Combat Systems Program chapter Three cost, Schedule, and Performance of the FcS Program over Time ......................... 21 “System-of-Systems” Interoperability and Unit View Were Key to FCS Planning ............ 21 Initial FCS Schedule Incorporated Immediate and Future Goals ............................. 23 The Army Began Execution of the Vision Immediately ......................................... 24 Acquisition Was to Be Realized Through Multiple Stages ...................................... 26 Costs and Schedule During Concept and Technology Demonstration Phase: Why So Fast and All at Once? ................................................................. 28 Costs ................................................................................................. 28 Schedule ............................................................................................. 30 Problems Became Clear as FCS Neared Milestone B .........................................
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