Environmental Factors Affecting Military Operations in the Littoral Battlespace

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Environmental Factors Affecting Military Operations in the Littoral Battlespace CHARLES H. SINEX and ROBERT S. WINOKUR ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE LITTORAL BATTLESPACE The changing world situation is causing the Navy to shift from open-ocean warfighting to joint operations conducted in the littoral battlespace. This battlespace encompasses a complex coastal environment with highly dynamic oceanographic and meteorological processes that can affect military operations in ways not seen in the open ocean. The coastal environment and its effects on the military can be described as a complex series of interactions between bathymetry, oceanography, meteorology, and man-made influences. Specific examples are given of important features and their effect on the various phases of an amphibious operation. The article concludes with a discussion of several new methods of measuring and predicting these features that are being developed and applied by the Navy. INTRODUCTION The world is rapidly changing, forcing the Navy and by enemy submarines. Special warfare operations before other services to rethink their roles and missions. The the landing could also be part of the activity. strategic direction envisioned for the Navy is a shift away The coastal environment will be discussed in four from open-ocean warfighting toward joint operations major sections, each limited to a few key, representative conducted from the sea with the Marines, Air Force, processes and the influence of those processes on am­ Army, and Coast Guard. The new littoral battlespace has phibious operations. The first section examines coastal two regional components: a seaward segment, comprising bathymetry, followed by sections on some significant the area from the open ocean to the shore, that must be oceanographic and meteorological features unique to the controlled to support operations ashore; and a landward coastal regime. The fourth section considers anthropo­ segment, comprising the area inland from the shore, that genic or man-made influences. We conclude the article can be supported and directly defended from the sea.! by examining means of measuring and predicting impor­ This littoral battlespace encompasses an extremely tant features of the coastal environment. complex coastal environment. In coastal regions, the proximity of the land, the shallow water depths, and the BATHYMETRY influence of rivers and weather systems combine to pro­ The presence of land and shallow water depths near the duce significant environmental changes in both the coast are directly responsible for much of the environ­ oceanography and meteorology. These changes occur mental variability occurring in the coastal region. The over much shorter spatial and temporal scales than those extent of this region is best seen in Figure 1, which shows seen in the open ocean. The interaction between the land the worldwide coverage of the continental shelf in red, and the ocean also creates features in the coastal environ­ extending out from the coast to a depth of 200 m. The ment that have no counterpart in the open sea. yellow region shows the area of the adjacent continental Coastal variability can both help and hinder military slope where the ocean depths then rapidly fall to 2400 m, operations. The purpose of this article is to provide an leading into the deep ocean basins. overview of the complexity of these environmental inter­ In many areas (e.g., off the coast of China), the con­ actions in the littoral zone and their potential effect on tinental shelf can extend hundreds of miles offshore. In military operations. Our intent is not to provide a detailed such areas, the littoral battlespace could be confined en­ treatment of the physics of the coastal environment; in­ tirely to shallow water. A more typical littoral battlespace, stead, we emphasize representative coastal features and however, has both shallow- and deep-water areas, such as processes and their consequences on military operations. the northern Arabian Sea and the entrance to the Persian We will further restrict attention to Navy support of Gulf, shown in the expanded view of Figure 2. A task amphibious operations rather than address the full range force could easily be sited in the deep water of the north­ of important military actions that might occur in the lit­ ern Arabian Sea to support mine-clearing operations in toral battlespace. Key components of this amphibious the shallow entrances of the Persian Gulf. assault would be preliminary data gathering, mine clear­ In general, the coastal ocean floor is not a gently slop­ ing, the amphibious landings, and maintenance of air and ing, homogeneous surface but often shows a rapid change sea superiority in the battlespace surrounding the oper­ from one type of material to another with a wide variety ation. Maintaining sea superiority also includes antisub­ of relief. Figure 3 shows the range of bottom types that marine warfare (ASW) to prevent attack of the support fleet occur in the Strait of Sicily, with regions characterized by 112 Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Volume 14, Number 2 (1993) Figure 1. Worldwide distribution of ocean depth regimes. The continental shelf is shown in red, corresponding to depths shallower than 200 m. The continental slope covers the depth band from 200 to 2400 m and is shown in yellow. Areas with depths greater than 2400 m are shown in blue. 26 01 Q) ~ Q) -c .a 24 ~ :5 z0 56' 58' 60' 62 64 East longitude (deg) Figure 2. Bathymetric chart of the Gulf of Oman and the northern Arabian Sea. Depth contours are in meters. This region encompasses both deep-water areas and extensive shallow areas in the Strait of Hormuz (upper left). Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Volume 14, Number 2 (1993) 113 C. H. Sinex and R. S. Winokur 38 .-----------~~ __--- __~ ~----------,.~------~~E7~~rr_----~ 37 Ol Q) :s Q) "0 2 § £ 0 z 36 o Mud Rock 0 Mud, rock • Mud/sand 0 Rock, coral D Mud/sand, rock o Sand 0 Coral tSl Sand, gravel • Gravel Shell ~ Sand, rock 35~----------~----------~------------~------- 8 9 10 11 12 13 East longitude (deg) Figure 3. Bottom composition and distribution in the Strait of Sicily (courtesy of the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office). a mud composition rapidly changing to regions charac­ scattering in active sonars, and the acoustic loss associ­ terized by sand or sand and gravel. Similar variability in ated with bottom-interacting paths will cause high trans­ composition is frequently seen in many other coastal mission loss in both active and passive sonar systems. areas around the world, with soft, muddy bottoms adja­ The variable composition of the bottom can also cause cent to sandy, gravelly, or rocky regions. large changes in sonar performance in only short distanc­ Such bottom variability can complicate mine-hunting es. In addition, the proximity of the bottom to the surface operations, which are a necessary prelude to amphibious creates a sound channel that results in an optimum fre­ operations. Bottom mines can easily sink into soft, quency for acoustic propagation (see the article by Boyles muddy bottoms, concealing them from mine-hunting sys­ and Biondo, this issue). Examples of shallow-water ef­ tems that rely on optical detection. Conversely, on rocky fects on sonar performance are shown in Figures 4 and bottoms, variable bottom scattering can significantly de­ 5. Figure 4 illustrates the differences in transmission loss grade the performance of mine-hunting sonars. In shal­ that can occur over short distances. Differences of 10 to low, sandy areas, wave motion and currents may cover 20 dB are evident for paths separated by only 10° or 20° many bottom mines with a layer of sand, again reducing in the southwest quadrant. Similar variability occurs with the effectiveness of optical mine-hunting systems. An bottom scattering. Figure 5 shows bottom-scattering lev­ additional complication in shallow, sandy areas is wave els at a single location (400N, 72°W) in 57 m of water. breaking on the beach, which may suspend enough sand Each trace is the composite of four separate acoustic and fine sediment in the water column to significantly beams emitted in the directions shown. Differences of 15 reduce visibility, further degrading the performance of to 20 dB in scattering level between the two sets of beams optical mine-detection systems for both bottom and are clearly evident, associated with a change in average moored mines. In regions with a highly variable bottom look direction of only 45 °. With this kind of variability composition, a single mine-hunting technique or system in transmission loss and bottom scattering, accurate pre­ may be inadequate to provide a mine-free route from deep diction of sonar performance is extremely difficult, re­ water to the landing zone. A detailed knowledge of quiring large amounts of detailed geoacoustic data. bottom composition and a depiction of the bottom would The shallow-water bathymetry also affects nonacoustic be essential in identifying optimum routes to clear and systems. The presence of magnetic anomalies in the in determining the best bottom mine-hunting systems to Earth's crust generally results in much higher noise levels use. in MAD (magnetic anomaly detection) sensor systems in The shallow water depth and highly variable bottom shallow water. These MAD noise levels can also vary composition also complicate the ASW problem of protect­ significantly from one shallow-water area to another. ing the battleforce from enemy submarines, and degrade Current flowing past bottom features that extend near the the performance of weapons systems such as torpedoes. surface (e.g., underwater hills) can also produce hydro­ Shallow water depth can cause high levels of bottom dynamic disturbances such as internal waves, which may 11 4 Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Volume 14, Number 2 (1993) Environmental Factors Affecting Littoral Military Operations 38 37 82 OJ 88 Q) ~ Figure 4. Shallow-water transmission Q) 94 "0 loss (TL) from source to target south- .a 36 § east of Sicily in the Mediterranean dur- 100 ing January using historical oceano- £; 0 graphic data.
Recommended publications
  • The Effectiveness of Influence Activities in Information Warfare
    The Effectiveness of Influence Activities in Information Warfare Cassandra Lee Brooker A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Research School of Business May 2020 Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Surname : BROOKER Given Name/s : CASSANDRA LEE Abbreviation for degree : MRes Faculty : UNSW Canberra School : School of Business Thesis Title : The Effectiveness of Influence Activities in Information Warfare Abstract Rapid, globalised power shifts, technological advances, and increasingly interconnected, ungoverned communications networks have resulted in the rise of asymmetric grey zone threats. The lines are now blurred between political, civil, and military information environments. The rise of influence activities is the new ‘sharp power’ in information warfare (the iWar). Western democracies are already at war in the information domain and are being out-communicated by their adversaries. Building on the commentary surrounding this contemporary threat, and based on a review of the literature across three academic disciplines of: Systems Thinking, Influence, and Cognitive Theory; this study aimed to investigate solutions for improving Australia’s influence effectiveness in the iWar. This study asked how systems thinking can offer an effective approach to holistically understanding complex social systems in the iWar; as well as asking why understanding both successful influencing strategies and psychological cognitive theories is central to analysing those system behaviours. To answer the aim, a systems thinking methodology was employed to compare two contrasting case studies to determine their respective influencing effectiveness. The successful case system comprising the terrorist group ISIS was compared and contrasted with the unsuccessful case system of Hillary Clinton’s 2016 election campaign – using a single stock of influence to determine relevant reinforcing and balancing feedback.
    [Show full text]
  • Agile Command Capability: Future Command in the Joint Battlespace and Its Implications for Capability Development
    UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT AGILE COMMAND CAPABILITY: FUTURE COMMAND IN THE JOINT BATTLESPACE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT Steven J. Harland, MPhil(Cantab), C. Psychol, FRSA Gregory Harland Ltd Surrey Research Park Guildford GU2 7YG United Kingdom Paul J. Shanahan, PhD Gregory Harland Ltd Surrey Research Park Guildford GU2 7YG United Kingdom Cdr David J. Bewick MA RN Command Development Directorate of Command and Battlespace Management/J6 Ministry of Defence St Giles Court 1-13 St Giles High Street London WC2H 8LD United Kingdom UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT AGILE COMMAND CAPABILITY: FUTURE COMMAND IN THE JOINT BATTLESPACE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT1 Steven J. Harland, MPhil(Cantab), C. Psychol, FRSA Gregory Harland Ltd Surrey Research Park Guildford GU2 7YG United Kingdom Paul J. Shanahan, PhD Gregory Harland Ltd Surrey Research Park Guildford GU2 7YG United Kingdom Cdr David J. Bewick, MA RN Command Development Directorate of Command and Battlespace Management/J6 Ministry of Defence St Giles Court 1-13 St Giles High Street London WC2H 8LD United Kingdom Command cannot be understood in isolation. The available data processes technology and the nature of armaments in use; tactics and strategy; organisational structure and manpower systems; training, discipline, and…the ethos of war; the political construction of states and the social makeup of armies – all these things and many more impinge on command in war and in turn are affected by it.2 Martin van Creveld, Command in War ABSTRACT The paper defines the Ministry of Defence (MoD) requirements for Future Command3 within the context of the United Kingdom’s (UK) Joint Higher Level Operational Concept (HLOC).
    [Show full text]
  • Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts
    Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts Susan W. Brenner* with Leo L. Clarke** ABSTRACT Civilian-owned and -operated entities will almost certainly be a target in cyberwarfare because cyberattackers are likely to be more focused on undermining the viability of the targeted state than on invading its territory. Cyberattackers will probably target military computer systems, at least to some extent, but in a departure from traditional warfare, they will also target companies that operate aspects of the victim nation’s infrastructure. Cyberwarfare, in other words, will penetrate the territorial borders of the attacked state and target high-value civilian businesses. Nation-states will therefore need to integrate the civilian employees of these (and perhaps other) companies into their cyberwarfare response structures if a state is to be able to respond effectively to cyberattacks. While many companies may voluntarily elect to participate in such an effort, others may decline to do so, which creates a need, in effect, to conscript companies for this purpose. This Article explores how the U.S. government can go about compelling civilian cooperation in cyberwarfare without violating constitutional guarantees and limitations on the power of the Legislature and the Executive. * NCR Distinguished Professor of Law and Technology, University of Dayton School of Law. ** Associate, Drew, Cooper & Anding, P.C., Grand Rapids, Michigan. 1011 1012 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 43:1011 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber Warfare: the New Domain and Future Battle Space
    CYBER WARFARE: THE NEW DOMAIN AND FUTURE BATTLE SPACE Maj C.W. Ethelston JCSP 41 PCEMI 41 Exercise Solo Flight Exercice Solo Flight Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2015. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2015. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 41 – PCEMI 41 2014 – 2015 EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT – EXERCICE SOLO FLIGHT CYBER WARFARE: THE NEW DOMAIN AND FUTURE BATTLE SPACE Maj C.W. Ethelston “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada.
    [Show full text]
  • Operationally Responsive Space (ORS): an Architecture and Enterprise Model for Adaptive Integration, Test and Logistics
    Air Force Institute of Technology AFIT Scholar Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 6-2008 Operationally Responsive Space (ORS): An Architecture and Enterprise Model for Adaptive Integration, Test and Logistics Jeff A. Alexander Martha Charles-Vickers Talbot L. Smith Michael L. Vickers Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd Part of the Other Aerospace Engineering Commons, and the Systems Engineering Commons Recommended Citation Alexander, Jeff A.; Charles-Vickers, Martha; Smith, Talbot L.; and Vickers, Michael L., "Operationally Responsive Space (ORS): An Architecture and Enterprise Model for Adaptive Integration, Test and Logistics" (2008). Theses and Dissertations. 2880. https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/2880 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE (ORS): AN ARCHITECTURE AND ENTERPRISE MODEL FOR ADAPTIVE INTEGRATION, TEST AND LOGISTICS THESIS Jeff Alexander Martha Charles-Vickers Talbot Smith Michael S. Vickers AFIT/GSE/ENV/08-J01DL DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED The views expressed in this thesis are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force,
    [Show full text]
  • Information Operations, Information Warfare, and Computer Network Attack Their Relationship to National Security in the Information Age
    IV Information Operations, Information Warfare, and Computer Network Attack Their Relationship to National Security in the Information Age Daniel T. Kuehl· Introduction hat is "information warfare"? Is it nothing more than a bumper W sticker, used as a "quick fix" rescue for budgets and programs that find it useful to attach themselves to the hot new concept? Is it such a revolu­ tionary new amalgam of technologies and concepts that old and traditional forms of warfare are soon slated to fall into the same receptacle in which out­ moded military technologies such as the catapult and war galley slumber? Is warfare as we understand it, featuring "blast, heat, and fragmentation," about to become obsolete?1 The intent of this brief introduction to information warfare (IW) and information operations (10) is to both explore these issues and present the thesis that they are best understood in light of the environment in which they take place-the information environment-and to explore the relation­ ship of that environment to the specific topic on which this book is focused, computer network attack. Information Operations, Inforntation Warfare, and Computer Network Attack What is Information Warfare? A useful starting place is to trace the evolution of the term information warfare itsel£ The earliest use of the term in the United States probably origi­ nated in the Office of Net Assessment, where in the 1970s Dr. Tom Rona was investigating the relationships among control systems, a field known as cyber­ netics. Dr. Rona described the competition between competing control systems as "information warfare," in the sense that control systems can be described as the means for gathering, processing, and disseminating information, processes which can be diagrammed and described with flow and feedback charts of mind-numbing dryness and complexity.2 In 1993 the Department of Defense published an official definition for the term, in a highly classified DoD Directive, TS3600.1.
    [Show full text]
  • Fujitsu Tactical Iot Connecting Command and Control with the Battlespace
    White Paper Fujitsu Tactical IoT Fujitsu Tactical IoT Connecting Command and Control with the Battlespace Integrating Tactical Information to Enrich Situational Awareness. Gathering sufficient relevant, quality data to build a situational picture that enables timely decision-making is an enduring challenge for the military. Constraints such as intermittent links, low bandwidth, different security domains, and low power of mobile devices makes connecting the tactical space and disadvantaged user with operational intelligence and information particularly difficult. By seamlessly integrating Command and Control systems and information with battlespace management tools and the tactical users could provide complete situational awareness, enabling enhanced decision making capabilities. Page 1 of 4 www.uk.fujitsu.com White Paper Fujitsu Tactical IoT Tactical Architecture Connecting Command and Control with the Battlespace Working closely with a number of SMEs (Small / Medium Enterprises), Establishing this communications link, and enabling the access to Fujitsu has developed an innovative architecture that enables the and sharing of this data, there is the potential to dramatically enrich a seamless integration of hard-to-reach tactical information with existing holistic operational picture for Command and Control. It delivers critical operational information and intelligence. Fujitsu’s solution provides information and intelligence on assets, people and equipment, for the secure interface between the tactical architecture and more new and existing tactical systems alike: strategic, (fixed or deployed) HQ-based communications. ■ People – evaluating the health and wellbeing of soldiers in the battlespace, including temperature and motion sensor data through The architecture exploits the open lean services architecture the Ultra Electronics COMBATCONNECT vest, compliant with the developed by 2iC and published by MOD, to provide a Service Oriented Generic Soldier Architecture (GSA) Defence Standard 23-12 Architecture (SOA) within the tactical environment.
    [Show full text]
  • Amphibious Operations
    Joint Publication 3-02 OF TH NT E E A W E' L L D R I S E F E N M H D T M T Y R • A P E A C D I U • R N E I T M E A D F S O TAT E S Amphibious Operations 4 January 2019 PREFACE 1. Scope This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for planning, conducting, and assessing amphibious operations. 2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives. 3. Application a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies. b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.
    [Show full text]
  • Operating in the Future Battlespace
    COMMAND AND CONTROL Drawing by Ted Zuber Ted Drawing by COMPLEXITY SQUARED: OPERATING IN THE FUTURE BATTLESPACE by Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn We have to put aside the comfortable ways of thinking But, to what end? What will the future battlespace be? and planning, take risks and try new things so that To say that armed forces must be prepared for full spectrum we can prepare our forces to deter and defeat adver- conflict may be sound in principle, but it is hardly helpful. saries that have not yet emerged to challenge us.1 Yet, to attempt a definitive response would also be foolhardy. “Today’s world is without precedent,” cautioned French Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense military analyst Phillippe Delmas, “It is as different from the Cold War as it is from the Middle Ages so the past offers he military institution has been criticized no basis for comparison.”4 Clearly, there is no crystal ball. continually for preparing to fight the last As quickly as a determinate method of fighting is developed war, and, in many ways, this is understandable by one belligerent, a counter is created by their opponents. because of its conservative nature and abhorrence It is important for commanders and strategists always to of change. There is, after all, a certain degree remember that potential antagonists are equally clever, and Tof comfort, if not logic, in maintaining doctrine, equipment, constantly striving to find a weakness to exploit. And, as tactics and procedures that have proven successful in combat the terrorist attack in New York on 11 September 2001 so operations.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S.-Japan Alliance Conference: Meeting the Challenge Of
    NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE U.S.-Japan Alliance Conference Meeting the Challenge of Amphibious Operations Scott W. Harold, Koichiro Bansho, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Koichi Isobe, Richard L. Simcock II Sponsored by the Government of Japan For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/CF387 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface In order to explore the origins, development, and implications of Japan’s decision to establish an Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) within the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), the RAND Corporation convened a public conference on March 6, 2018, at its offices in Santa Monica, California, that brought together leading U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • "A Room of One's Own(?)" in Battlespace – Women Soldiers In
    Critical Military Studies ISSN: 2333-7486 (Print) 2333-7494 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcms20 "A room of one’s own(?)" in battlespace – women soldiers in war rooms Ayelet Harel-Shalev To cite this article: Ayelet Harel-Shalev (2018): "A room of one’s own(?)" in battlespace – women soldiers in war rooms, Critical Military Studies To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2018.1494882 Published online: 31 Jul 2018. Submit your article to this journal View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcms20 CRITICAL MILITARY STUDIES https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2018.1494882 "A room of one’s own(?)" in battlespace – women soldiers in war rooms Ayelet Harel-Shalev Conflict Management and Resolution Program, and the Department of Politics and Government, Ben- Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY At present, women serve in a variety of combat roles and combat Received 11 November 2017 support positions in various militaries around the globe. In parallel, Accepted 23 May 2018 new technologies of warfare are transferring more and more KEYWORDS soldiers, including women, from the sidelines into the heart of feminist IR; war rooms; the battlespace. More women soldiers are thus becoming signifi- women soldiers; conflict cant participants in war by virtue of their assignment to strategic zones; military; battlespace war rooms. As one of the women soldiers interviewed in this study explained: ‘In the war-room, you see everything. You see more than the soldiers in the field see; you see the whole picture’.
    [Show full text]
  • CYBERSPACE AS BATTLESPACE Black Hat Webcast, Oct 9, 2014
    CYBERSPACE AS BATTLESPACE Black Hat webcast, Oct 9, 2014 Kenneth Geers 2501 Introduction: mission creep The Internet is still a baby. But the cyberspace around it – the effective connection between computers, computer networks, and humans – is already Planet Earth’s greatest technological achievement. Every aspect of human life is different: government, economy, society, and national security. And this revolution is far from over. The current rate of technological innovation is so quick that no one – not even the National Security Agency – can keep up. Therefore, we must occasionally step back and consider whether the path we are on is an optimal path, or whether certain adjustments should (or even could) be made before it is too late. There are many Internet-related problems to solve, but this essay is about the military invasion of cyberspace, and attempts to occupy strategic Internet terrain before the next war. The ramifications are numerous: 1. Hostile activities are taking place in peacetime. 2. Human rights may be needlessly harmed. 3. This dynamic may lead to eternal chaos on the Internet. The Golden Age of Espionage First, let’s compare cyber war with cyber espionage. Cyber espionage has existed for more than a generation. Foreign intelligence services leverage the ubiquity, vulnerability, and interconnectivity of computers – and they are getting better at it every day. The best book on this topic remains The Cuckoo’s Egg, in which Cliff Stoll, a system administrator at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California, traced a $0.75 accounting error all the way back to a German hacker working for the Soviet KGB.
    [Show full text]