DOCSLIB.ORG

Command and Control of a Multibrigade Alliance Task Force

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Command and Control of a Multibrigade Alliance Task Force NATO’s Amphibious Forces Command and Control of a Multibrigade Alliance Task Force Gene Germanovich, J.D. Williams, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, David A. Shlapak, Anthony Atler, Bradley Martin C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2928 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0236-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: Photo by Robert L. Kunzig , NATOChannel. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface In 2017 and 2018, the RAND Corporation designed and facilitated a series of wargames and seminars on behalf of the Amphibious Leaders Expeditionary Symposium (ALES), a forum for general and flag officers to discuss opportunities for improved interoper- ability, command and control (C2), and utilization of amphibious forces within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With a scenario centered on confronta- tion with a near-peer competitor providing context, maritime and amphibious leaders explored how to leverage the Alliance’s existing amphibious capacity by aggregating national capabilities under a coherent C2 structure. This report provides a summary of RAND-facilitated ALES events, the method- ology employed, and the resultant observations and recommendations. We also high- light several overarching findings from the research to inform NATO’s evolving com- mand structure, upcoming exercises, and planning for collective defense. This research was sponsored by U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and develop- ment center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the intelligence community. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the director (contact infor- mation is provided on the webpage). iii Contents Preface ................................................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...................................................................................vii Summary .............................................................................................. ix Acknowledgments .................................................................................. xix Abbreviations ........................................................................................ xxi CHAPTER ONE Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 Research Question and Method ...................................................................... 1 Participants ............................................................................................. 3 Limitations .............................................................................................. 4 Report Structure ....................................................................................... 5 CHAPTER TWO Strategic Context...................................................................................... 7 Interest in a Multinational Amphibious Capability (2014–2016) ................................ 8 Recent Developments (2017–2018) .................................................................11 CHAPTER THREE The Naples Tabletop ................................................................................15 Purpose .................................................................................................15 Event Design and Execution .........................................................................15 Participant Observations and Recommendations ................................................ 27 Chapter Summary ....................................................................................29 CHAPTER FOUR The Northwood High North Seminar ...........................................................31 Purpose .................................................................................................31 Event Design and Execution .........................................................................31 Participant Observations ............................................................................ 36 Chapter Summary ................................................................................... 38 v vi NATO’s Amphibious Forces CHAPTER FIVE The Stavanger Wargame ............................................................................39 Purpose .................................................................................................39 Event Design and Execution ........................................................................39 Participant Observations and Recommendations ................................................ 48 Chapter Summary ................................................................................... 50 CHAPTER SIX Conclusion ............................................................................................53 Findings from ALES Research ......................................................................53 Potential Next Steps for NATO .................................................................... 56 APPENDIXES A. Command and Control Constructs Explored ..............................................59 B. Scenarios and Forces .............................................................................63 C. DOTMLPF-I Summary.........................................................................71 D. Comparison of Allied Maritime Headquarters.............................................81 References .............................................................................................83 Figures and Tables Figures S.1. Simplified Centralized Amphibious Task Force Construct ........................xii S.2. Steps for Exploring Command and Control as of Mid-2018 .......................xv S.3. ALES Progress and Potential Next Steps for NATO .............................. xvii 1.1. Steps for Exploring Command and Control .......................................... 2 2.1. Amphibious Forces in Europe ..........................................................12 3.1. Baseline Naples Tabletop Command and Control Construct ......................18 3.2. Alternative Naples Tabletop Command and Control Construct ..................19 3.3. Naples Tabletop Move Zero Decisions on National Caveats ...................... 22 3.4. Naples Tabletop Game Two Command Structure ..................................25 3.5. Naples Tabletop Operating Area ...................................................... 26 4.1. Notional Centralized and Decentralized Amphibious Task Forces ...............33 5.1. Simplified Centralized Amphibious Task Force Construct ....................... 40 5.2. Stavanger Wargame Geography ........................................................41 5.3. Stavanger Wargame Blue Command and Control Construct ..................... 43 6.1. Steps for Exploring Command and Control as of Mid-2018 ...................... 56 6.2. ALES Progress and Potential Next Steps for NATO ................................57 A.1. Baseline Naples Tabletop Exercise Command and Control Construct ...........59 A.2. Alternative Naples Tabletop Exercise Command and Control Construct ....... 60 A.3. Simplified Centralized Amphibious Task Force Construct ....................... 60 A.4. Stavanger Wargame Blue Command and Control Construct ......................61 B.1. Naples Tabletop Red Force List and Objectives..................................... 64 B.2. Stavanger Wargame Geography ........................................................67 B.3. Stavanger Wargame Blue Task Organization .........................................69 Tables S.1. Participants at RAND-Facilitated ALES Events ..................................... xi 1.1. Participants at RAND-Facilitated ALES Events ...................................... 4 3.1. Naples Tabletop Summary of Available Assets .......................................17 3.2. Naples Tabletop Move Zero Decisions on Sourcing ................................ 20 4.1. Alternative Amphibious Command and Control Structures ...................... 36 B.1. Naples Tabletop Summary of Available
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Should the United States Develop and Employ Strategic Information Warfare Capabilities?
    Should the United States develop and employ strategic information warfare capabilities? Information technologies have transformed U.S. and, indeed, international society. The ways we socialize, educate and inform ourselves, engage in business and practice our religions have been changed, and in many cases now rely, on digital information and communication. Can warfare—the defense and promotion of our national security and interests—be exempt under any circumstances from developing and employing the latest information strategies? Is this even a choice in the 21st century, much less a hard choice? Information warfare has been variously defined by different analysts but a standard general definition, as provided by the U.S. Air Force is “any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy’s information and its functions; protecting ourselves against the actions and exploiting our own information operations.” The goal of information war is now frequently described as “information dominance.” (1) Major General Kenneth Minihan, stated, “information dominance is not ‘my pile of information is bigger than yours’…It is a way of increasing our capabilities by using that information to make right decisions, (and) apply them faster than the enemy can. It is a way to alter the enemy’s entire perception of reality. It is a method of using all the information at our disposal to predict (and affect) what happens tomorrow before the enemy even jumps out of bed and thinks about what to do today.” (2) Pro: Information warfare is not a new concept that arose with the Internet. Information has always been a decisive factor in deciding the victory or defeat of one military force over another.
    [Show full text]
  • The Effectiveness of Influence Activities in Information Warfare
    The Effectiveness of Influence Activities in Information Warfare Cassandra Lee Brooker A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Research School of Business May 2020 Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Surname : BROOKER Given Name/s : CASSANDRA LEE Abbreviation for degree : MRes Faculty : UNSW Canberra School : School of Business Thesis Title : The Effectiveness of Influence Activities in Information Warfare Abstract Rapid, globalised power shifts, technological advances, and increasingly interconnected, ungoverned communications networks have resulted in the rise of asymmetric grey zone threats. The lines are now blurred between political, civil, and military information environments. The rise of influence activities is the new ‘sharp power’ in information warfare (the iWar). Western democracies are already at war in the information domain and are being out-communicated by their adversaries. Building on the commentary surrounding this contemporary threat, and based on a review of the literature across three academic disciplines of: Systems Thinking, Influence, and Cognitive Theory; this study aimed to investigate solutions for improving Australia’s influence effectiveness in the iWar. This study asked how systems thinking can offer an effective approach to holistically understanding complex social systems in the iWar; as well as asking why understanding both successful influencing strategies and psychological cognitive theories is central to analysing those system behaviours. To answer the aim, a systems thinking methodology was employed to compare two contrasting case studies to determine their respective influencing effectiveness. The successful case system comprising the terrorist group ISIS was compared and contrasted with the unsuccessful case system of Hillary Clinton’s 2016 election campaign – using a single stock of influence to determine relevant reinforcing and balancing feedback.
    [Show full text]
  • Unlocking NATO's Amphibious Potential
    November 2020 Perspective EXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE J.D. WILLIAMS, GENE GERMANOVICH, STEPHEN WEBBER, GABRIELLE TARINI Unlocking NATO’s Amphibious Potential Lessons from the Past, Insights for the Future orth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members maintain amphibious capabilities that provide versatile and responsive forces for crisis response and national defense. These forces are routinely employed in maritime Nsecurity, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), counterterrorism, stability operations, and other missions. In addition to U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and U.S. Navy forces, the Alliance’s amphibious forces include large ships and associated landing forces from five nations: France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom (UK). Each of these European allies—soon to be joined by Turkey—can conduct brigade-level operations, and smaller elements typically are held at high readiness for immediate response.1 These forces have been busy. Recent exercises and operations have spanned the littorals of West and North Africa, the Levant, the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Given NATO’s ongoing concerns over Russia’s military posture and malign behavior, allies with amphibious capabilities have also been exploring how these forces could contribute to deterrence or, if needed, be employed as part of a C O R P O R A T I O N combined and joint force in a conflict against a highly some respects, NATO’s ongoing efforts harken back to the capable nation-state. Since 2018, NATO’s headquarters Cold War, when NATO’s amphibious forces routinely exer- and various commands have undertaken initiatives and cised in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic as part of a convened working groups to advance the political intent broader strategy to deter Soviet aggression.
    [Show full text]
  • Agile Command Capability: Future Command in the Joint Battlespace and Its Implications for Capability Development
    UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT AGILE COMMAND CAPABILITY: FUTURE COMMAND IN THE JOINT BATTLESPACE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT Steven J. Harland, MPhil(Cantab), C. Psychol, FRSA Gregory Harland Ltd Surrey Research Park Guildford GU2 7YG United Kingdom Paul J. Shanahan, PhD Gregory Harland Ltd Surrey Research Park Guildford GU2 7YG United Kingdom Cdr David J. Bewick MA RN Command Development Directorate of Command and Battlespace Management/J6 Ministry of Defence St Giles Court 1-13 St Giles High Street London WC2H 8LD United Kingdom UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT AGILE COMMAND CAPABILITY: FUTURE COMMAND IN THE JOINT BATTLESPACE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT1 Steven J. Harland, MPhil(Cantab), C. Psychol, FRSA Gregory Harland Ltd Surrey Research Park Guildford GU2 7YG United Kingdom Paul J. Shanahan, PhD Gregory Harland Ltd Surrey Research Park Guildford GU2 7YG United Kingdom Cdr David J. Bewick, MA RN Command Development Directorate of Command and Battlespace Management/J6 Ministry of Defence St Giles Court 1-13 St Giles High Street London WC2H 8LD United Kingdom Command cannot be understood in isolation. The available data processes technology and the nature of armaments in use; tactics and strategy; organisational structure and manpower systems; training, discipline, and…the ethos of war; the political construction of states and the social makeup of armies – all these things and many more impinge on command in war and in turn are affected by it.2 Martin van Creveld, Command in War ABSTRACT The paper defines the Ministry of Defence (MoD) requirements for Future Command3 within the context of the United Kingdom’s (UK) Joint Higher Level Operational Concept (HLOC).
    [Show full text]
  • What Is Transformation?
    NATO UNCLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED What is Transfor?mation NATO UNCLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED Intentionally Blank NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED What is Transformation? An Introduction to Allied Command Transformation (January 2015) NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED WHAT IS TRANSFORMATION? – AN INTRODUCTION TO ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword....................................................................................................................... i Preface......................................................................................................................... ii Chapter 1: Transformation – Definition, Strategic Environment and Role of ACT........ 1 Chapter 2: Transformation – Key Enablers & Tools..................................................... 5 Chapter 3: Transformation – Cooperation, Interaction & Engagement...................... 15 Chapter 4: Transformation – The Transatlantic Bond................................................ 25 Conclusion................................................................................................................. 26 Annex A: The ACT Command Structure Annex B: Glossary of Abbreviations NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED NATO UNCLASSIFIED – PUBLICLY DISCLOSED Foreword (by Lieutenant General Phil Jones, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation) When Allied Command Transformation (ACT)
    [Show full text]
  • JAPCC Annual Report 2019
    2019 annual REPORT Joint Air Power Competence Centre Joint Air Power www.japcc.org Competence Centre Cover picture: Satellite: © ESA /AOES Medialab; Earth: © 2012 EUMETSAT; Background: © StarLine /shutterstock © This work is copyrighted. All Inquiries should be made to: The Editor, Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC), [email protected] Disclaimer This publication is a product of the JAPCC. It does not represent the opinions or policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is designed to provide an independent overview, analysis, food for thought and recommendations regarding a possible way ahead on the subject. Release This document is releasable to the Public. Portions of the document may be quoted without permission, provided a standard source credit is included. Published and distributed by The Joint Air Power Competence Centre von­Seydlitz­Kaserne Römerstraße 140 47546 Kalkar Germany Telephone: +49 (0) 2824 90 2201 Facsimile: +49 (0) 2824 90 2208 E­Mail: [email protected] Website: www.japcc.org Denotes images digitally manipulated Follow us on Social Media JAPCC | annual REPORT 2019 1 foreword Today, NATO Air Forces stand on the verge of the at the peer­to­peer level. We must use the lessons most meaningful transformation of technology and learned from this and other exercises to evolve our capability in our history, a transformation which con­ Alliance into a connected, Joint All Domain fighting tinues to be enabled in part by the independent force that is agile and capable of acting at speed that thought and analysis from the recognized air and future conflicts will require. I have great confidence space power experts in the Joint Air Power Compe­ that our Nations and our people will work closely with tence Centre.
    [Show full text]
  • Revista Da Armada | 540 Sumário
    Revista da Nº 540 • ANO XLVIII • €1,50 MAIO 2019 • MENSAL ARMADA FUZILEIROS MOÇAMBIQUE 2019 NRP CORTE-REAL ALMIRANTE CHENS 2019 GAN19 CANTO E CASTRO LISBOA REVISTA DA ARMADA | 540 SUMÁRIO 02 Programa Dia da Marinha 2019 NRP CORTE REAL GRUPO AERONAVAL 10 04 Strategia (48) CHARLES DE GAULLE 06 Assistência Humanitária a Moçambique 08 NRP Álvares Cabral – Iniciativa Mar Aberto 19.1 12 Treinar Competências: O simulador como campo de treino 21 Academia de Marinha 22 Direito do Mar e Direito Marítimo (22) 24 Notícias 26 Vigia da História (109) ALMIRANTE 14 CANTO E CASTRO 28 Estórias (49) 30 Serviço & Saúde (5) 31 Saúde para Todos (65) 32 Desporto 33 Quarto de Folga 34 Notícias Pessoais / Convívios / Programa Homenagem aos Combatentes 35 Colóquio "O Mar: Tradições e Desafios" – Programa CC Símbolos Heráldicos CHIEFS OF EUROPEAN NAVIES CHENS 2019 – LISBOA 17 Capa Fuzileiros em Missão Humanitária – Moçambique Revista da ARMADA Publicação Oficial da Marinha Diretor Desenho Gráfico E-mail da Revista da Armada Periodicidade mensal CALM Aníbal José Ramos Borges ASS TEC DES Aida Cristina M.P. Faria [email protected] Nº 540 / Ano XLVIII [email protected] Maio 2019 Chefe de Redação Administração, Redação e Edição CMG Joaquim Manuel de S. Vaz Ferreira Revista da Armada – Edifício das Instalações Paginação eletrónica e produção Revista anotada na ERC Centrais da Marinha – Rua do Arsenal Página Ímpar, Lda. 1149-001 Lisboa – Portugal Depósito Legal nº 55737/92 Redatora Estrada de Benfica, 317 - 1 Fte ISSN 0870-9343 Telef: 21 159 32 54 CTEN TSN-COM Ana Alexandra G. de Brito 1500-074 Lisboa Propriedade Estatuto Editorial Marinha Portuguesa Secretário de Redação www.marinha.pt/pt/Servicos/Paginas/ Tiragem média mensal: NIPC 600012662 SMOR L Mário Jorge Almeida de Carvalho revista-armada.aspx 3800 exemplares MAIO 2019 3 REVISTA DA ARMADA | 540 Str 48 50 ANOS NAS FORÇAS NAVAIS PERMANENTES DA NATO DA GÉNESE ATÉ 1995 “Atuarão como um polícia de turno.
    [Show full text]
  • THE CASE AGAINST Marine Mammals in Captivity Authors: Naomi A
    s l a m m a y t T i M S N v I i A e G t A n i p E S r a A C a C E H n T M i THE CASE AGAINST Marine Mammals in Captivity The Humane Society of the United State s/ World Society for the Protection of Animals 2009 1 1 1 2 0 A M , n o t s o g B r o . 1 a 0 s 2 u - e a t i p s u S w , t e e r t S h t u o S 9 8 THE CASE AGAINST Marine Mammals in Captivity Authors: Naomi A. Rose, E.C.M. Parsons, and Richard Farinato, 4th edition Editors: Naomi A. Rose and Debra Firmani, 4th edition ©2009 The Humane Society of the United States and the World Society for the Protection of Animals. All rights reserved. ©2008 The HSUS. All rights reserved. Printed on recycled paper, acid free and elemental chlorine free, with soy-based ink. Cover: ©iStockphoto.com/Ying Ying Wong Overview n the debate over marine mammals in captivity, the of the natural environment. The truth is that marine mammals have evolved physically and behaviorally to survive these rigors. public display industry maintains that marine mammal For example, nearly every kind of marine mammal, from sea lion Iexhibits serve a valuable conservation function, people to dolphin, travels large distances daily in a search for food. In learn important information from seeing live animals, and captivity, natural feeding and foraging patterns are completely lost.
    [Show full text]
  • American Armies and Battlefields in Europe 533
    Chapter xv MISCELLANEOUS HE American Battle Monuments The size or type of the map illustrating Commission was created by Con- any particular operation in no way indi- Tgress in 1923. In carrying out its cates the importance of the operation; task of commeroorating the services of the clearness was the only governing factor. American forces in Europe during the The 1, 200,000 maps at the ends of W or ld W ar the Commission erected a ppro- Chapters II, III, IV and V have been priate memorials abroad, improved the placed there with the idea that while the eight military cemeteries there and in this tourist is reading the text or following the volume records the vital part American tour of a chapter he will keep the map at soldiers and sailors played in bringing the the end unfolded, available for reference. war to an early and successful conclusion. As a general rule, only the locations of Ail dates which appear in this book are headquarters of corps and divisions from inclusive. For instance, when a period which active operations were directed is stated as November 7-9 it includes more than three days are mentioned in ail three days, i. e., November 7, 8 and 9. the text. Those who desire more com- The date giYen for the relief in the plete information on the subject can find front Jine of one division by another is it in the two volumes published officially that when the command of the sector by the Historical Section, Army W ar passed to the division entering the line.
    [Show full text]
  • Earthwork Management at Petersburg National Battlefield
    Earthwork Management at Petersburg National Battlefield Dave Shockley Chief, Resource Management Petersburg National Battlefield June, 2000 ******************************************************************************************** TABLE OF CONTENTS ******************************************************************************************** Acknowledgments…….………………………… i Foreword………………………………………... ii Introduction…………………………………….. iii Map of Petersburg National Battlefield…… iv I. Historical Significance A. Earthworks……………………………………….………………………………… 1 B. Archeological Components………………………………………………………... 2 II. Inventory of Existing Earthworks A. Definitions of Earthworks………………………………………………………..… 3 B. Prominent Earthen Structures…..…………………………………………………... 4 C. Engineers Drawings and Current GPS Maps ……………………………………… 6 III. Management Objective……………………….………………………………………….. 23 IV. Conditions/Impacts Affecting Earthworks A. Preservation of Structures and Features………………………………………….… 24 B. Interpretive Values……………………………………………………………….… 33 C. Sustainability……………………………………………………………………..… 34 D. Visitor Accessibility………………………………………………………………... 35 E. Safe Environment…………………………………………………………………... 36 F. Non-historic Resources…………………………………………………………….. 37 G. Additional Issues…………………………………………………………………….38 V. Fundamentals for Earthwork Management at Petersburg National Battlefield A. Tree Removal……………………………………………………………………… 39 B. Erosion Control……………………………………………………………………. 39 C. Seed Selection……………………………………………………………………… 39 D. Hydroseeding…………………………………………………………………….…
    [Show full text]
  • Dlgn-38 Nuclear Guided Missile Frigate
    U. S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFFICE STAFF STUDY GN-38 NUCLEAR GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE > DEPARTMENTOF THE NAVY Contents Page SUMMARY 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION System description Status of acquisition Reduction in quantity Scope 2 WEAPONSYSTEM STATUS System cost experience Appropriated and obligated funds System schedule experience System performance experience Selected acquisition reporting 3 COST ESTIMATING AND PROGRESSMEASUREMENT 10 Establishment of baseline 10 Cost estimate 10 Basic construction 11 Change orders 12 Government furnished equipment 12 Future characteristic changes 13 Escalation 13 Target to ceiling 13 Schedule estimate 13 Performance estimate 14 Progress measurement 14 Shipbuildimg contract 15 cost 16 Schedule and performance 20 Progress payments 20 Revised budget and cost control system 20 Project Manager’s use of reports and meetings 21 Government furnished equipment 21 Conclusion 23 ABBREVIATIONS CGN Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile Cruiser DLGN Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile Frigate DOD Department of Defense GAO General Accounting Office GFE Government Furnished Equipment NAVSHIPS Naval Ship Systems Command Newport News Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Virginia PERT Program Evaluation Review Technique SAR Selected Acquisition Report SPD Ship Project Directive SUPSHIP Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Newport News, Virginia , 1 , . SUMMARY DLGN-38 NUCLEAR GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE SYSTEM DESCRIPTION-- The DLGN-38 class is a nuclear guided missile frigate which will operate offensively in the presence of air, surface, or subsurface threat. This class ship will operate either independently or with nuclear or conventional strike forces and provide protection to these forces and other naval forces or convoys. The currently approved DLGN-38 class consists of three ships, DLGNs-38, 39, and 40.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkey and Black Sea Security 3
    SIPRI Background Paper December 2018 TURKEY AND SUMMARY w The Black Sea region is BLACK SEA SECURITY experiencing a changing military balance. The six littoral states (Bulgaria, siemon t. wezeman and alexandra kuimova* Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) intensified their efforts to build up their military potential after Russia’s The security environment in the wider Black Sea region—which brings takeover of Crimea and the together the six littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey start of the internationalized and Ukraine) and a hinterland including the South Caucasus and Moldova— civil war in eastern Ukraine is rapidly changing. It combines protracted conflicts with a significant con- in 2014. ventional military build-up that intensified after the events of 2014: Russia’s Although security in the takeover of Crimea and the start of the internationalized civil war in eastern Black Sea region has always Ukraine.1 Transnational connections between conflicts across the region been and remains important for and between the Black Sea and the Middle East add further dimensions of Turkey, the current Turkish insecurity. As a result, there is a blurring of the conditions of peace, crisis defence policy seems to be and conflict in the region. This has led to an unpredictable and potentially largely directed southwards, high-risk environment in which military forces with advanced weapons, towards the Middle East. including nuclear-capable systems, are increasingly active in close proxim- Russian–Turkish relations have been ambiguous for some years. ity to each other. Turkey has openly expressed In this context, there is an urgent need to develop a clearer understanding concern about perceived of the security dynamics and challenges facing the wider Black Sea region, Russian ambitions in the Black and to explore opportunities for dialogue between the key regional security Sea region and called for a actors.
    [Show full text]