Revista Da Armada | 540 Sumário
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Unlocking NATO's Amphibious Potential
November 2020 Perspective EXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE J.D. WILLIAMS, GENE GERMANOVICH, STEPHEN WEBBER, GABRIELLE TARINI Unlocking NATO’s Amphibious Potential Lessons from the Past, Insights for the Future orth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members maintain amphibious capabilities that provide versatile and responsive forces for crisis response and national defense. These forces are routinely employed in maritime Nsecurity, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), counterterrorism, stability operations, and other missions. In addition to U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and U.S. Navy forces, the Alliance’s amphibious forces include large ships and associated landing forces from five nations: France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom (UK). Each of these European allies—soon to be joined by Turkey—can conduct brigade-level operations, and smaller elements typically are held at high readiness for immediate response.1 These forces have been busy. Recent exercises and operations have spanned the littorals of West and North Africa, the Levant, the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Given NATO’s ongoing concerns over Russia’s military posture and malign behavior, allies with amphibious capabilities have also been exploring how these forces could contribute to deterrence or, if needed, be employed as part of a C O R P O R A T I O N combined and joint force in a conflict against a highly some respects, NATO’s ongoing efforts harken back to the capable nation-state. Since 2018, NATO’s headquarters Cold War, when NATO’s amphibious forces routinely exer- and various commands have undertaken initiatives and cised in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic as part of a convened working groups to advance the political intent broader strategy to deter Soviet aggression. -
Turkey and Black Sea Security 3
SIPRI Background Paper December 2018 TURKEY AND SUMMARY w The Black Sea region is BLACK SEA SECURITY experiencing a changing military balance. The six littoral states (Bulgaria, siemon t. wezeman and alexandra kuimova* Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) intensified their efforts to build up their military potential after Russia’s The security environment in the wider Black Sea region—which brings takeover of Crimea and the together the six littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey start of the internationalized and Ukraine) and a hinterland including the South Caucasus and Moldova— civil war in eastern Ukraine is rapidly changing. It combines protracted conflicts with a significant con- in 2014. ventional military build-up that intensified after the events of 2014: Russia’s Although security in the takeover of Crimea and the start of the internationalized civil war in eastern Black Sea region has always Ukraine.1 Transnational connections between conflicts across the region been and remains important for and between the Black Sea and the Middle East add further dimensions of Turkey, the current Turkish insecurity. As a result, there is a blurring of the conditions of peace, crisis defence policy seems to be and conflict in the region. This has led to an unpredictable and potentially largely directed southwards, high-risk environment in which military forces with advanced weapons, towards the Middle East. including nuclear-capable systems, are increasingly active in close proxim- Russian–Turkish relations have been ambiguous for some years. ity to each other. Turkey has openly expressed In this context, there is an urgent need to develop a clearer understanding concern about perceived of the security dynamics and challenges facing the wider Black Sea region, Russian ambitions in the Black and to explore opportunities for dialogue between the key regional security Sea region and called for a actors. -
Jan 4 2016 Comp Troller
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301 -1100 JAN 4 2016 COMP TROLLER MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER) DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF COMPTROLLER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND SUBJECT: Updates to Department ofDefense Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, Volume 11A, Chapter 9, "Support oflnternational Military Activities" This memorandum updates the listing ofNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Force Integration Units and Centers of Excellence, and their assigned administrative agent, as currently published in Table 9-1 ofVolume 11A, Chapter 9. These changes will be incorporated into the next chapter update planned for June 2016. Table 9-1, "International Military Headquarter and Related Agencies and Administrative Agents Responsible for Their Support and for Support to U.S. Elements" is revised to add as A.S.m the Center of Excellence- Energy Security (ESCOE) in Vilnius, Lithuania. This change was requested in Attachment 1. The Air Force will serve as the administrative agent. In addition, Table 9-1 is revised to add six new NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) with their associated administrative agents as follows: A.2.g.(1) NFIU Sofia, Bulgaria- Air Force; A.2.g.(2) NFIU Bucharest, Romania-Army; A.4.f.(1) NFIU Tallinn, Estonia-Navy; A.4.f.(2) NFIU Riga, Latvia- Navy; A.4.f.(3) NFIU Vilnius, Lithuania-Air Force; and A.4.f.(4) NFIU Bydgoszcz, Poland-Army. These changes were requested in Attachment 2. A draft update of Table 9-1 reflecting these changes is provided as Attachment 3. -
Reference Model for Interoperability of Autonomous Systems
Mário Rui Monteiro Marques Master of Science in Electrical Engineering [Nome completo do autor] [Habilitações Académicas] [Nome completo do autor] [Habilitações Académicas] Reference Model for Interoperability of Autonomous [Nome completo do autor] [Habilitações Académicas] Systems Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em [Título da EngenhariaTese] Eletrotécnica e de Computadores [Nome completo do autor] Orientador: Fernando Coito, [Habilitações Académicas] Prof. Associado, Dissertação para obtençãoUniversidade do Grau de Mestre Nova de em Lisboa [Engenharia Informática] [Nome completoCo-orientador do autor]: Victor Lobo, [Habilitações Académicas]Prof. Catedrático, Escola Naval Júri: [Nome completo do autor] Presidente: Prof. Doutor Jorge Teixeira, FCT-UNL [Habilitações Académicas] Arguentes: Prof. Doutor José Victor, IST Prof. Doutor António Serralheiro, AM [Nome completo do autor] Vogais: Prof. Doutor Jorge Lobo, UC [Habilitações Académicas] Prof. Doutor Aníbal Matos, FEUP Prof. Doutor José Oliveira, FCT-UNL Prof. Doutor Fernando Coito, FCT-UNL Dezembro, 2018 Reference Model for Interoperability of Autonomous Systems Copyright © Mário Rui Monteiro Marques, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. The Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia and the Universidade NOVA de Lisboa have the right, perpetual and without geographical boundaries, to file and pub- lish this dissertation through printed copies reproduced on paper or on digital form, or by any other means known or that may be invented, and to disseminate through scientific repositories and admit its copying and distribution for non- commercial, educational or research purposes, as long as credit is given to the author and editor. To Ana, Martim e Mariana for their love and full support Acknowledgements Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Fernando Coito, and co-supervisor, Professor Victor Lobo for their guidance, patience and contribu- tion to the successful completion of this thesis work. -
A Coastal Vulnerability Assessment Due to Sea Level Rise: a Case Study of Atlantic Coast of Portugal’S Mainland
Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 27 December 2019 doi:10.20944/preprints201912.0366.v1 Peer-reviewed version available at Water 2020, 12, 360; doi:10.3390/w12020360 Article A Coastal Vulnerability Assessment due to Sea Level Rise: A Case Study of Atlantic Coast of Portugal’s Mainland Carolina Rocha 1, Carlos Antunes 1,2* and Cristina Catita 1,2 1 Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade de Lisboa, 1749-016 Lisboa, Portugal; [email protected] 2 Instituto Dom Luiz, Universidade de Lisboa, 1749-016 Lisboa, Portugal; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +351 21 7500839 Abstract: The sea level rise, a consequence of climate change, is one of the biggest challenges that countries and regions with coastal lowland areas will face in the medium term. This study proposes a methodology for assessing the vulnerability to sea level rise (SLR) on the Atlantic coast of Portugal mainland. Some scenarios of extreme sea level for different return periods and extreme flooding events were estimated for 2050 and 2100, as proposed by the European Union Directive 2007/60/EC. A set of physical parameters are considered for the multi-attribute analysis technique implemented by the Analytic Hierarchy Process, in order to define a Physical Vulnerability Index fundamental to assess coastal vulnerability. For each SLR scenario, coastal vulnerability maps, with spatial resolution of 20 m, are produced at national scale to identify areas most at risk of SLR, constituting key documents for triggering adaptation plans for such vulnerable regions. For 2050 and 2100, it is estimated 903 km2 and 1146 km2 of vulnerable area, respectively, being the district of Lisbon the most vulnerable district in both scenarios. -
Allied Maritime Command HQ MARCOM News Release
Allied Maritime Command HQ MARCOM News Release Nov. 1, 2017 Operation Sea Guardian Patrols the Eastern Mediterranean MEDITERRANEAN SEA - Four NATO ships and one submarine, provided by Bulgaria, Italy, Romania and Turkey, in cooperation with maritime patrol aircraft from Greece and Turkey, conducted focused security patrols in international waters of the eastern Mediterranean Sea as part of NATO’s maritime counter-terrorism operation, Operation Sea Guardian (OSG) October 14 to 30, 2017. The focused security patrol concentrated on gathering pattern-of-life information about maritime activities in the international waters of the eastern Mediterranean Sea from off the coast of Syria to off the coast of Israel and Lebanon in support of the Operation’s Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) task. While operating in the focus area, the ships identified 900 motor vessels, from large commercial shipping vessels to smaller fishing vessels. The group hailed 39 of those ships and were invited onboard four ships in support of building a better understanding of the activities occurring at sea in the eastern Mediterranean. The group worked in coordination with support from NATO assigned Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) to cover the area and monitor the maritime activities across the area. This information is relayed back to Allied Maritime Command and added to the NATO Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP), a common picture available to all Allies. In support of the operation, both Greece and Turkey provided tankers, HS Prometheus and TCG Akar respectively, -
Nato Unclassified 1 Nato Unclassified Headquarters
NATO UNCLASSIFIED HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED MARITIME COMMAND Atlantic Building, Northwood Headquarters, Sandy Lane Northwood, Middlesex, HA6 3HP United Kingdom Our Ref: Tel: +44 (0)1923 956577 NCN: 57+ 56577 Date: 02 July 2019 Email: [email protected] IAW distribution NATO SHIPPING CENTRE NEWSLETTER MAY – JUNE 2019 Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) conducted a change of command ceremony on 20 May at Northwood Headquarters to mark the change of senior leadership at the command. General Tod D. Wolters, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, presided over the ceremony as Vice Admiral Keith E. Blount, CB OBE assumed command from Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone, KBE CE who led NATO’s only standing Maritime Component Command since 2015. NATO MARCOM continues its operational activities highlighted by the training activities of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces and Maritime Security Operations. Maritime Security Operations During May and June 2019, 68 and 56 warships respectively, from France, Turkey, Spain, Greece, Canada, Albania, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Germany took part in Operation SEA GUARDIAN in the Mediterranean, supported by flights of NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). The AEW flights were provided by NATO’s own assets, while the MPA flights were provided by Greece, Spain, Italy, Turkey, France, Portugal and USA. Submarines under NATO and national operational command have also provided critical support to this Maritime Security Operation. 1 NATO UNCLASSIFIED NATO UNCLASSIFIED Operation SEA GUARDIAN is an effective way for NATO to maintain maritime situational awareness in the Mediterranean, through the knowledge of the Maritime Pattern of Life and detecting anomalies to fight crime and counter terrorism at sea. -
Ship-Breaking.Com 2012 Bulletins of Information and Analysis on Ship Demolition, # 27 to 30 from January 1St to December 31St 2012
Ship-breaking.com 2012 Bulletins of information and analysis on ship demolition, # 27 to 30 From January 1st to December 31st 2012 Robin des Bois 2013 Ship-breaking.com Bulletins of information and analysis on ship demolition 2012 Content # 27 from January 1st to April 15th …..……………………….………………….…. 3 (Demolition on the field (continued); The European Union surrenders; The Senegal project ; Letters to the Editor ; A Tsunami of Scrapping in Asia; The END – Pacific Princess, the Love Boat is not entertaining anymore) # 28 from April 16th to July 15th ……..…………………..……………….……..… 77 (Ocean Producer, a fast ship leaves for the scrap yard ; The Tellier leaves with honor; Matterhorn, from Brest to Bordeaux ; Letters to the Editor ; The scrapping of a Portuguese navy ship ; The India – Bangladesh pendulum The END – Ocean Shearer, end of the cruise for the sheep) # 29 from July 16th to October 14th ....……………………..……………….……… 133 (After theExxon Valdez, the Hebei Spirit ; The damaged ship conundrum; Farewell to container ships ; Lepse ; Letters to the Editor ; No summer break ; The END – the explosion of Prem Divya) # 30 from October 15th to December 31st ….………………..…………….……… 197 (Already broken up, but heading for demolition ; Demolition in America; Falsterborev, a light goes out ; Ships without place of refuge; Demolition on the field (continued) ; Hong Kong Convention; The final 2012 sprint; 2012, a record year; The END – Charlesville, from Belgian Congo to Lithuania) Global Statement 2012 ……………………… …………………..…………….……… 266 Bulletin of information and analysis May 7, 2012 on ship demolition # 27 from January 1 to April 15, 2012 Ship-breaking.com An 83 year old veteran leaves for ship-breaking. The Great Lakes bulker Maumee left for demolition at the Canadian ship-breaking yard at Port Colborne (see p 61). -
2020 Virtual Maritime Security Regimes Roundtable Report of Proceedings
Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 2020 VIRTUAL MARITIME SECURITY REGIMES ROUNDTABLE REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS Disclaimer: The opinions, conclusions and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, NATO or Allied Command Transformation. This product is not a doctrinal publication and is not staffed but is the perception of the author from the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE). The intent is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart information in an expeditious manner. Transforming Allied Maritime Potential into Reality 1 This document was prepared by: CDR Jorge Martínez, ESP N. This document was directed by: CAPT Todd Bonnar, MSC, RCN. Enquiries: Please direct enquiries to: Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence [email protected] or Phone: +1-757-836-2440 Copyright: This paper is copyrighted. Portions of the document may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a standard source credit is included. Any comprehensive reproduction requires written permission of the publisher. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4 Background……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4 Narrative ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4 Objectives …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4 Structure / Methodology ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………5 -
Strategic Landpower in NATO Vital for U.S
Association of the United States Army Voice for the Army—Support for the Soldier October 2014 Strategic Landpower in NATO Vital for U.S. Security Allied Land Command is the leading advocate for soldiers and land forces in NATO, responsible for ensuring their effectiveness and interoperability. Lieutenant General Frederick B. Hodges, USA Commander, NATO Allied Land Command* Introduction Today’s global security environment is defined by its complexity, unpredictability and the increasing momentum of human interaction; it is the essence of the joint and combined force to remain trained and fully ready to meet any challenge. Strategic land- power—the application of land forces (Army, Marine Corps and special operations forces) toward achiev- ing strategic outcomes across the range of military operations—provides a critical hedge against this un- certain future. The role of strategic landpower is to shape and prevail within the human domain, creating conditions that stabilize people’s daily dealings with one another and generate momentum to bring about and combined-arms capabilities to dominate the en- the nation’s strategic objectives. vironment; and winning decisively when called. The Army is sustaining its commitment to maintain strong Even as the Department of Defense (DoD) rebal- relationships and interoperability with its proven ances its posture to the Asia–Pacific region, Europe partners in NATO. A large part of this effort is on- will continue to require a strong commitment from going by means of NATO’s Allied Land Command the United States, including responsive, adaptive and (LANDCOM). Established in 2012, it is the newest regionally engaged forces to maintain security and single-service command of NATO’s military arm and stability. -
Allied Joint Doctrine for Air-Maritime Coordination
NATO STANDARD AJP-3.3.3 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR-MARITIME COORDINATION Edition A Version 1 DECEMBER 2014 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION Published by the NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO) © NATO/OTAN INTENTIONALLY BLANK NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO) NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION 2 December 2014 1. The enclosed Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.3.3, Edition A, Version 1, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR-MARITIME COORDINATION, approved by the nations in the MCJSB, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 3703. 2. AJP-3.3.3, Edition A, Version 1, is effective upon receipt. It supersedes AJP-3.3.3, which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedure for destruction of documents. 3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to member nations and Partnership for Peace countries, or NATO commands and bodies. 4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60. , Edvardas MAZEIKIS Major General, LTUAF Director, NATO Standardization Office INTENTIONALLY BLANK AJP-3.3.3 Allied Joint Publication-3.3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air-Maritime Coordination Edition A Version 1 Allied Joint Publication-3.3.3 (AJP-3.3.3), dated December 2014, is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff Director Concepts and Doctrine I Edition A, Version 1 AJP-3.3.3 INTENTIONALLY BLANK II Edition A, Version 1 AJP-3.3.3 RECORD OF RESERVATIONS CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS General DEU, USA Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. -
2019-Cutting-The-Bow-Wave.Pdf
TRANSFORMING ALLIED MARITIME POTENTIAL INTO REALITY Disclaimer: The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, CJOS COE, NATO, ACT or any other government agency. This product is not a doctrinal publication and is not staffed but is the perception of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities and real-world events. The intent is to share knowledge, support discus- sion and impart information in an expeditious manner. Front Cover: F-35C prepares to make landing on USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). Source: MCSN Amber Smalley Back Cover: F-35s onboard HMS Queen Elizabeth. Source: UK Defence Journal 2 www.cjoscoe.org Publisher’s Note Message from the Director Development of the NATO VADM Bruce H. Lindsey, USN 38 Amphibious Task Force utting the Bow Wave is 4 CDR Jose Conde, PRTM LTCOL Jos Schooneman, RNLM an annual publication Message from the Deputy Director Anti-Satellite Capabilities and Military by Combined Joint C CDRE Tom Guy, RN 41 Operations Operations from the Sea Centre 6 CDR Neculai Grigore, RON of Excellence, United States “Red Storm Rising” Basics of Space Support to NATO Fleet Forces Command, Building CAPT Todd Bonnar, MSC, RCN 45 Operations NH-39 in Norfolk, Virginia. For 9 CDR Robert Waggoner, USN publication purposes, all articles NATO’s Return to the North Atlantic Air Defense in the North and materials submitted become Mr. Stephen J. Flanagan LTCOL Roberto Patti, ITAF the sole property of CJOS COE.