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1 Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations: The Case 2 of Eurasia since 1500

3 Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen

4 In this article we plead for a less state-centered definition of migration that allows us to 5 understand better the relationship between cross-cultural migrations and social change 6 and social development in the long run. Therefore, we developed a method that enables Q1 7 us to systematically compare CCMRs (cross-cultural migration propensities per capita) 8 through time and space. This CCMR method puts issues of state policies and citizenship 9 in a much broader social context. We conclude that the presentist approach to migration 10 in the social sciences is highly myopic, as it privileges migrations crossing state borders 11 over internal moves, and favors migrants who have the intention to settle for good. In 12 itself this is a legitimate choice, especially if the core explanandum is the way migrants’ 13 long-term settlement process in another (modern) state evolves. In the more empirical 14 parts of this article we have concentrated on the effects of Eurasian societies since 1500 15 that receive migrants. Sending societies and individual migrants and nonmigrants in 16 sending and receiving societies have been largely left out. Finally, and paradoxically, 17 integration and assimilation in the long run leads to diminishing opportunities of so- 18 cial development by cross-cultural experiences, because one could argue that due to 19 globalizing migrations cultures converge further and thus cultural boundaries (as is 20 already the case in migration to cities within culturally homogenous nation-states in the 21 twentieth century) become less salient or disappear entirely. Logically speaking, this is 22 also an implication of the model, presently to be developed further.

23 Introduction

24 Migrations have been part of human history from the earliest times. However, 25 international migration has grown in volume and significance since 1945 and most 26 particularly since the mid-1980s. Migration ranks as one of the most important 27 factors in global change.1 (Castles and Miller 2003:4) Q2

28 This quote from Castles and Miller’s widely used handbook summarizes quite nicely 29 the dominant perspective in migration studies among both social scientists and his- 30 torians: The most significant expression of migration are people who cross national 31 boundaries, and as such the twentieth century, and especially our own time, has wit- 32 nessed the apogee of human migrations. This view, however, implicitly reproduces the 33 entrenched conviction among many scholars in the social sciences and the humanities 34 that human behavior, including migration and mobility, changed dramatically with 35 the rise of “modern” society in the nineteenth century. This “mobility transition,”

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the DEMIG conference in Oxford on September 24, 2014, and at the WEHC in Kyoto on August 5, 2015. For a link between our cross-cultural migration approach and modern social policies, see Lucassen 2016b. We thank Chris Gordon for polishing the text and anonymous referees for their comments.

Social Science History 41, Fall 2017, pp. 1–31 © Social Science History Association, 2017 doi:10.1017/ssh.2017.19 2 Social Science History

to use a phrase coined in the seminal 1971 paper of Wilbur Zelinsky, assumes that 36 Europeans (and certainly people in other—less developed—continents) were over- 37 whelmingly sedentary until the Industrial Revolution. This idea fits well with the 38 “modernization paradigm,” as advocated by postwar functionalist social scientists 39 and historians, mostly building on Marxian or Weberian concepts of linear human 40 progress (Lucassen and Lucassen 2009). 41 Although there are strong indications that the levels of international migration (de- 42 fined in national statistics as settlement in other countries) at the end of the nineteenth 43 century (1870–1914) measured up to those a century later (1965–2000) (Gozzini 44 2006), in the longer run Castles and Miller may be right. We lack good statistics on 45 international migration before the nineteenth century, but it seems reasonable to as- 46 sume that moves across national borders increased substantially in the nineteenth and 47 twentieth centuries due to the various transport revolutions (from sailing to steamships 48 in the mid-nineteenth century, trains not much later, and—cheap—air traffic in the 49 twentieth century, especially from the 1960s onward). Furthermore, the global rise 50 of human rights regimes, anticolonialism, and antiracism movements, embodied in 51 the ideals of the United Nations and UNESCO (Hazard 2012; Jensen 2016; Mazower 52 2009), opened the Atlantic to increasing numbers of Asian and African migrants, 53 starting with flows from the colonies to the various metropoles after World War II 54 (Bade et al. 2011; Hoerder 2002; Hoerder and Kaur 2013; Lucassen 2016a; Ness 55 2013). Until that moment, Africans and Asians were largely excluded, except for the 56 millions of African slaves in the Americas. 57 With the notable exception of geographers and demographers, most scholars in- 58 terested in migration have followed this state definition, using statistics on interna- 59 tional migrations that mirror the state’s preoccupation with people who cross national 60 borders with the intention to settle. Internal migrants, migrants who move abroad 61 temporarily, such as Italians seasonal workers in Argentina after 1860 (golondrinas) 62 or high- and low-skilled organizational migrants—those whose moves are primarily 63 determined by the organization they join (missionaries, diplomats, corporate spe- 64 cialists, soldiers)—are thereby excluded from the analysis. This is closely linked 65 to simultaneous emergence of nationalism and its obsession with ethnic (or racial) 66 homogeneity, which has led to a myopic view of migration by European states and 67 their offshoots elsewhere. Nation-states increasingly became primarily interested in 68 migrants from other states who are expected to settle for good and as such become the 69 object of assimilation or integration policies. From a historical perspective, however, 70 states, and more specifically the nation-state, are not the best unit of analysis when 71 it comes to understanding the causes and effects of migrations. Not only does a 72 state perspective easily lead to “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick 73 Schiller 2003), more importantly it privileges people who cross national bound- 74 aries (international migrants) over people whose geographical mobility may be at 75 least as important, but who remain within the confines of the state. Furthermore, 76 the ideology of nation-state assumes stable and sedentary populations, expressing 77 long-term cultural and ethnic rootedness. From this perspective, migration between 78 nation-states is often perceived as disturbing the normal and the desired status quo, 79 Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 3

80 which can be redressed only by fast assimilation. That is why statistics concentrate 81 on it. Concerns about ethnic homogeneity have often given rise to restrictive im- 82 migration policies because dominant groups in nation-states expect certain immi- 83 grants to be too different to become similar, even in the long run. The exclusion of 84 Asians and other people of color in the North Atlantic (and Oceania) in the nineteenth 85 and much of the twentieth century is a case in point (Gabaccia and Hoerder 2011; 86 McKeown 2008). 87 To sum up, in the wake of the state, most mainstream migration scholars who 88 work on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have severely limited their definitions 89 of what constitutes a migrant and limited themselves largely to one-way (A to B) 90 settlers, thus ignoring return migrants, temporary migrants, and circular and internal 91 migrants. There are, however, important exceptions to this general picture. First, 92 early modernists, untouched by nation-state ideology and the focus on low-skilled 93 labor migrants, have produced many studies on internal, temporary, and organizational 94 migrants (Bade et al. 2011; Hoerder 2002). Moreover, geographers, sociologists, and 95 family historians who are interested in micromobility and who take the household as 96 their point of departure have done groundbreaking work on other forms of migration 97 and mobility.1 Their perspective, however, has had a hard time being incorporated 98 into mainstream migration studies. 99 For various reasons this self-imposed definitional limitation obstructs a better un- 100 derstanding of why people who cross cultural (but not necessarily national) boundaries 101 migrate and what the consequences are for themselves, the people they temporarily 102 join, and the people they might return to. Patrick Manning’s work in particular is 103 relevant in this respect because he argues that cross-community migrations are the 104 root cause of social change (Castles et al. 2015; Manning 2005, 2006). The basic 105 idea is that the prolonged interaction (peaceful, but also contentious, violent, and at 106 times destructive) between people with different cultural backgrounds is bound to 107 produce new ideas, insights, and practices, and thus often leads to social change, 108 in the broadest sense. How this process evolves depends on power relations, status 109 differentials, and the proneness of migrants to adapt versus the specific institutional 110 membership regime of receiving societies.2 Manning argues that social changes as 111 a result of cross-cultural migrations (CCMs) between distinct cultural communities 112 can best be measured over the longue durée, starting about 80,000 years ago. In 113 his typology of cross-community migrants, notions of power and multidirection- 114 ality are systematically anchored, as he distinguishes not only settlers (the clas- 115 sic “A-to-B-and-then-stay migrant”), but also invaders, sojourners, and itinerants 116 (Manning 2005: 8–9).

1 See, e.g., Ravenstein 1885; Ogden and White 1989;Moch1983; Rosental 1999; Pooley and Turnbull 1998; Farcy and Faure 2003;andKok2004 and 2010. Moch is one of the few scholars to systematically combine internal and international migrations in her analysis (Moch 2003). For social scientists see, e.g., Favell 2008; Fechter and Walsh 2012; and Pooley 2013. 2 Following Benhabib (2004) we define “membership regime” as “the complex of rules, regulations, customs and values surrounding the entry and long-term settlement of migrants in a new polity” (Bosma et al. 2013: 11). 4 Social Science History

An important additional advantage of this long-term approach is that it enables 117 structured comparisons in time and space, which have so far been largely lacking due 118 to the absence of an agreed definition of what “migration” entails. Take the example 119 of young men and women from West African villages moving to Europe. They clearly 120 fall within the mainstream migration definition of international (even intercontinen- 121 tal) migrants, but the structural causes of this migration are not so different from 122 the causes of French internal migration in the nineteenth century, when country folk 123 migrated to a nearby (or more distant) city within their state, such as Bretons mov- 124 ingtoParis(deHaan2006; de Haas 2010; Massey 1990; Moch 2012). Technically 125 the latter were internal migrants, and as such they do not appear on the radar of 126 mainstream migration historians. If we trade the international perspective for that of 127 the household perspective, however, it is clear that both groups cross salient cultural 128 boundaries and that the motives of West African migrants and the functionality of 129 their strategic migration decisions within the household context were, until very re- 130 cently, similar to those of internal migrants in European countries. The big difference 131 is the obstacles nation-states put in the way of free migration during the twentieth 132 century; these have increased the risks and costs considerably (Cross 2013; Triulzi and 133 McKenzie 2013). 134 In this article, we will apply the cross-cultural perspective to Eurasia in the past five 135 centuries (1500–2000) and, additionally, we will make comparisons between large 136 territorial units, such as Western Europe, Russia, China, and Japan. This broader and 137 long-term perspective will offer us a very different view on migrations from that 138 offered by the modernization perspective and the myopic state-centered and North 139 Atlantic international migration definition. Second, and closely connected to the first 140 point, we will show why short-term and organizational forms of migration, too, are 141 of crucial importance in understanding social change. First, however, we need a clear 142 and formalized definition, typology, and quantitative method that guarantees we are 143 measuring the same thing. 144

The Cross-Cultural Migration Rate Method 145

The cross-cultural migration rate (CCMR) method calculates the likelihood of an 146 individual experiencing at least one CCM during his or her life (from a city to an 147 empire or continent), which we express as the proportion of the population in a 148 certain territory. The original formulation concentrates largely on four basic cate- 149 gories that encompass the major cross-cultural movements within a given territory 150 (T) (irrespective of scale), measured in 50-year periods (Lucassen and Lucassen 2009, 151 2014a): 152

(1) To cities (within T, generally from rural areas); 153 (2) Colonization (moving to rural areas within T); 154 (3) Seasonal (within T, generally between peasant and farmer regions); and 155 (4) Temporal Multi-Annual (TMA) (soldiers, sailors, and artisans within T). 156 Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 5

FIGURE 1. CCMR method for a given territory and period.

157 This migration typology differentiates between four forms of migration within a 158 chosen geographical unit of analysis: to cities (1); to the land/rural centers (colo- 159 nization) (2); seasonal (3); and TMA (soldiers, sailors, and tramping artisans) (4). 160 To calculate total migration rates, we also measure and include people leaving (em- 161 igration) (5) or entering (immigration) (6) that same geographical unit and who can 162 subsequently be subdivided into one of the four core types. For a full understanding 163 of the causes and effects of CCM within a given area, immigration and emigration 164 therefore must be “unpacked.” Only then can we know how many of the immigrants or 165 emigrants went to (or came from) cities or rural areas, and moved as soldiers, sailors, 166 or seasonal workers. The relationships between the six categories is visualized in 167 figure 1. 168 In relation to the population size of a given territory in a given period, the total im- 169 pact of geographical migration may be expressed in the following formula (Lucassen 170 and Lucassen 2009). 171 The CCMR method is a very crude one as it measures only the bare minimum 172 level of CCM and therefore does not address explicitly the fact that many people 173 experienced multiple different types of cross-cultural migrants in their lifetime. The 174 advantage, however, is that one can apply it at different scales, from villages and 175 regions to continents. For this article, which focuses on the comparison of Europe, 176 Russia, and similar territorial units in Asia, we have opted for the aggregate macrolevel 177 and applied the CCMR approach to periods of 50 years. Given its wide temporal and 6 Social Science History

Q3 FIGURE 2. Formula to calculate CCMRs. Note: Pi (p) denotes the probability of a person living in period p and geographical perm mult seas unit i migrating during their lifetime. Mi ,Mi , and Mi denote permanent (to cities and to rural areas), multiannual (labor migration), and seasonal cross- imm community, often long-distance, movements inside unit I, respectively. Mi is the emi number of immigrants to unit i from outside and Mi the number of emigrants from unit i to elsewhere. The notation p indicates that these migration numbers are summed over period p. Ni (p) is the average population in geographical unit i in period p. To compensate for overcounting in the migration numbers, the expression needs to be corrected by the second factor, in which Ei (p) denotes the average life expectancy in period p and Lp is the length of the period. Note that in this article we ignore the second term because we estimate Lp = 50 years ≈ Ei (p).

geographical scope and the availability of systematic sources, we believe the CCMR 178 method is, for now, the best alternative to the mainstream international approach. In 179 the meantime, it has been successfully applied to Russia (Kessler 2014; Sunderland 180 2014), China (McKeown 2014), and Japan (Lucassen et al. 2014). The Russian case 181 is of particular interest, as it highlights—among other things—the role of temporary 182 career migrants, the so-called twenty-five thousanders sent around 1930 by the Soviet 183 state to the countryside with the aim of molding the ideal “Homo sovieticus,” bringing 184 educated urbanites into contact with Russian peasants (Siegelbaum and Moch 2014: 185 165–67; 2016). 186

Cross-Cultural Migrations in Europe 1500–2000 187

So far, we have applied the CCMR method to Europe, Russia, as well as to large parts of 188 Asia, and the method and data (broken down at the level of states) have been published 189 in detail in various research papers and books (Lucassen and Lucassen 2010; Lucassen 190 and Lucassen 2014b; Lucassen et al. 2014). This exercise has produced interesting 191 results that contradict several commonsense assumptions about the level and types of 192 migration in European and Asian societies. 193 If we take Europe in the period 1500–1900, there is a broadly shared consensus 194 that a mobility transition took place in the nineteenth century as part of the broader 195 “modernization” process, which uprooted the assumed stationary nature and stability 196 of European societies (Osterhammel 2014; Zelinsky 1971: 234). Since the 1980s, 197 however, historians have questioned the supposedly sedentary and immobile character 198 of Europe, showing that the joint processes of commercialization, state formation 199 (war), and globalization since the late fifteenth century encouraged people to leave 200 their places of birth, permanently or temporarily (Bade et al. 2011; Moch 2003), 201 Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 7

FIGURE 3. CCMRs for Europe (excluding European Russia), 1501–1900. Source: Lucassen et al. 2014: table 170.

202 moving to work as domestics, tramping artisans, and casual workers in cities, as 203 mercenary soldiers in other parts of Europe, as sailors all over the world, but also 204 moving as colonists to remote areas of expanding empires, such as Russia and the 205 Ottoman and Habsburg empires. The CCMR method enables us to capture these 206 migrations and the trends over time, as visualized in figure 3. 207 These ratios, which constitute the absolute minimum total mobility at the time, 208 make clear that there was no mobility transition in the nineteenth century that justi- 209 fies the idea of a dramatic change from an immobile to a mobile society. The level of 210 migration in the first half of the nineteenth century, for example, was barely higher than 211 that two centuries earlier. Nevertheless, there was a substantial increase in the second 212 half of the nineteenth century linked to the transport revolution (cheap steamships and 213 trains) (Feys 2013; Keeling 2012), which enabled the migration of (predominantly) 214 European peasants to cities, both in the Americas (emigration) and within Europe 215 (to cities). That Wilbur Zelinsky and others were unaware of the high rate of pre- 216 1840 mobility and interpreted the increase since then as a fundamental transition is 217 explained by their myopic view of migration, which was restricted to people leaving 218 Europe and to the spectacular rural to urban migration, leading indeed to an extraordi- 219 nary degree of urbanization from the mid-nineteenth century onward. If we measure 220 only the most conspicuous categories—namely “emigration” and “to cities”—we see 221 that between 1800 and 1900 the CCMR increased eightfold (figure 4), instead of only 222 doubling as in figure 3. 8 Social Science History

FIGURE 4. Migration rates, limited to urbanization and emigration in Europe (excluding European Russia), 1501–1900. Source: Lucassen et al. 2014: table 170.

Q4 FIGURE 5. CCMRs for Europe (excluding European Russia), 1801–2000. Source: Lucassen et al. 2014: table 170. Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 9

223 Zelinsky’s focus on emigrants from Europe and on city dwellers was not a fun- 224 damental one, and in his social-geographical approach he understood that it was not 225 primarily nationality or distance that matters. Given the dearth of techniques and data 226 that are necessary to map cross-cultural movements within states, however, migration 227 scholars were forced to rely “almost solely on territorial movements as a clumsy 228 surrogate for total mobility” (Zelinsky 1971: 224). Zelinsky’s definition of migration 229 bears many similarities with ours, but he obviously did not realize how quantitatively 230 substantial temporary and organizational migration was in early modern Europe, es- 231 pecially among soldiers and sailors. Nor did he realize how long this had been going 232 on already. What he could not know at the time he wrote his seminal paper was the 233 ubiquity of seasonal, military, and maritime migration, as well as the normality of 234 temporary and permanent moves to cities, which marked and changed the lives of 235 millions of ordinary Europeans. 236 What then about the twentieth century, and more specifically our own time? Does 237 the postwar period, with its second transportation revolution (cheap air travel), and 238 the fading of exclusionary (anti-Asian) migration regimes (McKeown 2008), indeed 239 constitute the apogee of human cross-cultural mobility, as most social scientists claim? 240 When we apply the CCMR method, the twentieth century does indeed stand out, but 241 in an unexpected way. 242 In as far as there was a mobility transition, it is the first half of the twentieth 243 century that qualifies for this epithet and not the more recent period. The record 244 migration seen between 1901 and 1950 marked the culmination and acceleration of 245 three trends: emigration to the Americas (in the years running up to the end of the 246 World War I), continuing urbanization (within and between European states), and, 247 finally, the cross-cultural experience of tens of millions of soldiers, both Europeans 248 fighting and stationed in other countries and non-Europeans (especially Americans) 249 active in Europe. 250 At this point many students of migration, as well as a more broadly interested au- 251 dience, might raise their eyebrows. Why would one include soldiers as cross-cultural 252 migrants in the first place? In as far as there is interaction with others, one could argue 253 that these contacts are impersonal, violent, and often lethal, and barely involve inti- 254 mate relationships or the forging of new social ties à la Zelinsky (see also Tilly 1978). 255 Studies by military historians have shown, however, that soldiers who were sent to 256 other countries, or to culturally different regions within empires, experienced probing 257 and intensive encounters with other soldiers and civilians, and confronted them with 258 different cultures and sociopolitical systems. These interactions often had a pervasive 259 impact on the way they perceived other cultures, as well as their own, and as a result 260 this military experience changed many of them, as well as the societies they returned 261 to. Such changes might have been at the individual psychological level (including 262 traumas), but their impact often transcended the individual and their intimate circle. 263 Colonial warfare by metropolitan soldiers, for example, often strengthened racist 264 colonial relationships and stereotypes and thus influenced postcolonial rapports, as 265 in the case of Algerian migrants in France (Lucassen 2005). During the traumatic 266 and savage Algerian War (1954–62) some two million French soldiers were sent to 10 Social Science History

North Africa (among whom was Jean-Marie Le Pen; Aldrich 1996: 297), and their 267 experiences led to a very negative image of Algerians in general. By the time these 268 soldiers, as well as colonial administrators and pieds noirs, returned in 1962 many of 269 them had developed a strong anti-Algerian sentiment that was projected at the Alge- 270 rian migrants who settled in large numbers in France in the postwar period. Clearly, 271 this attitude clouded the mutual relationship between the French and Algerians and 272 complicated the process of integrating Algerians into French society (Lustick 2007: 273 51; Shepard 2006: 229; see also Comtat 2009; Fredette 2014; Scioldo-Zürcher 2010). 274 Sending soldiers abroad could also have unexpected and transformative effects, by 275 creating, for example, a much more critical awareness of the sociopolitical systems in 276 which soldiers were socialized. Soldiers might, for example, become highly critical 277 of the military project they are required to support (a phenomenon seen among US 278 forces in Vietnam) and as a result become demotivated and undermine army moral or 279 even defect (Appy 1993: 318; Stevenson 2002). Finally, soldiers can be exposed to a 280 different societal system that makes them see their own culture in a whole new light. A 281 most instructive example is the experience of black GIs3 during, but especially after, 282 World War II in Germany, where millions of Americans were stationed for at least 283 two years as members of the occupation force and later at American bases in West 284 Germany as part of NATO forces during the Cold War (Höhn 2002). For many of 285 them, their tour of duty in Europe was their first experience outside the United States, 286 or even outside their home state. For African American soldiers this meant being 287 confronted with nonsegregated societies where, to their great surprise, they could 288 date white women and eat in restaurants alongside whites, without the risk of being 289 discriminated against or lynched. These European experiences had a huge impact and 290 made them aware that what they had learned to regard as a normal situation, was not 291 normal at all. Although the US army upheld segregation within its ranks, the absence 292 of a color line outside the barracks sparked a process of awareness and social action, 293 not only among US soldiers in Germany, but also among the black population at home 294 after the soldiers had returned and become active in the civil rights movement. Or in 295 the prophetic words of the distinguished African American writer William Gardner 296 Smith in 1947: after being treated as social equals black American GIs would “never 297 go back to the old way again” (Höhn and Klimke 2010:1). 298 Another example are the German soldiers returning from the trenches in Flanders 299 and northern France, whose experiences had made them susceptible to national social- 300 ist ideas. Many of them joined political right-wing associations (such as Stahlhelm), 301 which would change German society dramatically (Schumann 2009: part III). 302 For most migrating soldiers, their encounters with others may have had less impact 303 on their political persuasions. Still, the socialization of young men in the army does 304 have many similarities with the migration experience. Especially in multiethnic em- 305 pires, such as Russia, China, and the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, serving in the 306

3 According to Goedde (2004: 517) black GIs accounted for 6 percent of US forces in Germany, which in the entire postwar period (1945–90) would have involved almost one million individuals (for total numbers see Höhn and Moon 2010). Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 11

FIGURE 6. CCMRs for Europe (excluding European Russia), without TMA, 1801– 2000. Source: Lucassen et al. 2014: tables 170 and 172.

307 army meant temporary internal migration over large distances and the mingling with 308 people who had very different cultural, religious, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds. 309 Moreover, it meant a new socialization process in an all-male authoritarian society in 310 which radically different values and norms prevailed (Sanborn 2005). 311 Those readers who are still not convinced that the migratory experience of millions 312 of soldiers really counts when we want to understand the relationship between mi- 313 gration and social change can leave them out of the picture. The outcome of a more 314 limited definition of CCM (leaving out soldiers) or of the conventional analysis is 315 that the results appear similar, but the mechanism that produces the results is quite 316 different (figure 6). Instead of being driven by immigration from other continents, the 317 bulk of the (nonmilitary) CCMs was the result of ongoing urbanization. 318 This brings us to the second major category in the CCMR approach, one that 319 might raise eyebrows: internal migrants moving to cities. As we explained earlier, 320 the CCMR method does not distinguish between city dwellers who left a village 321 within a state and those rural folks who moved to cities in other European countries. 322 Taking Europe as our unit of analysis means that someone who moved to London 323 from Kensworth in Bedfordshire is put in the same category as a Romanian peasant 324 who decides to settle in Paris (Diminescu 2002). There are obvious differences in the 325 nature and salience of the cultural boundaries these two groups cross. And therefore, 326 the settlement process experienced by the foreign peasant due to a larger cultural 327 distance, as well as to a less secure legal status, may be more difficult and prolonged. 12 Social Science History

FIGURE 7. Total net CCMRs per category for Europe without Russia, excluding mi- Q5 grations to cities within nation-states in the twentieth century and excluding soldiers and sailors, 1801–2000 (%). Source: Lucassen et al. 2014: table 168.

Nevertheless, they also share a common primary socialization in village societies 328 and subsequently the cross-cultural experience of having to adjust to city life, with 329 different norms, values, institutions, and networks (Lucassen 2013). Moreover, until 330 World War I, cultural differences within nation-states, let alone empires, were still 331 considerable, which makes the rural-urban divide such a relevant boundary when it 332 comes to the cross-cultural effects of migration. 333 During the twentieth century, in most nation-states the process of forging cultural 334 homogeneity through education, the army, and the media (Weber 1976)wassowell 335 advanced that, certainly in North America and Western Europe, the cultural differ- 336 ences between people in the countryside and in villages had become insignificant 337 and internal rural to urban migrations should no longer be considered and counted 338 as cross-cultural. We must realize, however, that in many countries this process of 339 cultural homogenization was far from over by the twentieth century. Take, for exam- 340 ple, the migration of southern Italian peasants from the Mezzogiorno to the industrial 341 urban centers of northern Italy, such as Turin and Milan, in the 1950s and 1960s. 342 At the time, they were considered illiterate, culturally backward, and even racially 343 inferior people, whose “invasion” would cause major social and cultural problems 344 (Gabaccia 2000: 162, 168; Mignone 2008: 216; for France see Moch 2012). 345 For those who, nevertheless, would like to exclude migrants who moved to cities 346 within their own state, the CCMR method makes it possible to distinguish between 347 Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 13

348 these internal migrants and those coming from other countries. Excluding the internal 349 migrants leads to the following picture for Europe (Lucassen and Lucassen 2014). 350 After having omitted soldiers and internal migrants moving to cities, Europe’s 351 migration rates since 1850 prove remarkably stable, the only significant development 352 being the well-known increase in the number of migrants from other continents settling 353 in Europe. It is these “immigrants” who have attracted the most attention and explain 354 why so many believe that migration is a recent phenomenon. Most of them, it should be 355 noted, come from the fringes of Europe: North Africa (Morocco, Algeria) and Turkey. 356 The often-cited “globalization” of past decades has therefore left fewer spectacular 357 and exotic migration traces than is often assumed. Nowadays, people from all parts of 358 the world live in Europe, and the large majority of the “immigrants” could be called 359 “liminal Europeans,” either because they come from areas that are adjacent to Europe 360 or because they come from ex-colonies (South Asia, the Caribbean) where many had 361 already partially been socialized (largely by organizational migrants from Europe) in 362 terms of language, institutions, and partly also religion (due to conversion).

363 The Added Value

364 What do we really gain by defining migration in a different, broader, less state- 365 centered way, and how can it help to deepen our understanding of the effects of human 366 mobility? And what do these new trends, and the new categories, explain what the 367 conventional approach cannot? If we follow Manning, CCMs are key to explaining 368 “social change,” which in Manning’s definition encapsulates all aspects of human life, 369 from economic to cultural changes, especially in the very long run. In other words, 370 how people build societies, exploit natural resources, forge labor relations, classify 371 and treat one another, anchor innovation, develop worldviews, and so forth. 372 If we want to develop and quantify Patrick Manning’s loosely formulated conjecture 373 that CCM leads to social change, a good place to start are cities, because they have long 374 been “society’s predominant engine of innovation and wealth creation” (Bettencourt 375 et al. 2007: 7301; see also Glaeser 2011 and Florida 2002; Sassen 2005). In our 376 CCMR model this interaction is captured in the “to cities” variant, one of the four 377 key types of migration. The question then is, how does this interaction take place and 378 with what outcomes? To understand the impact on social change of people moving to 379 cities, we need to go beyond merely counting the number of migrants who settled in 380 or frequented cities. Their numbers need to be contextualized in terms of membership 381 regimes, and qualified in terms of skills and other forms of migrant capital. 382 In cities, people with widely different cultural backgrounds meet and influence each 383 other in a high-intensity environment, due to a differentiated occupational structure, 384 an extensive public sphere, and high population density. To understand the under- 385 lying mechanisms of CCM to cities, we suggest combining insights from several 386 mainstream theories that aim to define the most ideal conditions for forging social 387 change that leads to wealthier (and even more just) societies and, on average, produces 388 greater well-being for the population. All these theories, implicitly or explicitly, focus 14 Social Science History

TABLE 1. Main stream theories aimed at explaining social change in cities

Approaches Leading Scholars Focus On Key Variable

Institutional economics Douglas North et al. Economic institutions Membership regimes (Economics) Citizenship (Political Daren Acemoglu and Political institutions Membership regimes Science) James Robinson Diversity (Urban Studies) Richard Florida/ Saskia Cultural infrastructure Membership regimes Sassen Diversity (Social Katherine W. Phillips et al. Organizations Membership regimes Psychology) Labor (Economics) Robert Lucas/ Edward Skills Migrant’s capital Glaeser Different Family systems Kathryn Lynch/Jan Kok Sociocultural institutions Migrant’s capital (Demography) Cross-cultural exchange Margaret Jacob/ Alida Agents of globalization Migrants’ capital and (History) Metcalf (trade, religion, membership regimes science)

on cities as cradles of innovation, economic growth, and social and cultural change. 389 The concept of CCM (and especially the “to cities” variant) is, we believe, ideally 390 suited to function as an interlinking principle for these different approaches and may 391 contribute to uncovering the dynamics underlying such an “innovation engine” (Bet- 392 tencourt et al. 2007: 7301). We selected the following six most mainstream theoretical 393 angles from economics, political science, sociology and social psychology, demog- 394 raphy, and history. 395 As the table 1 shows, there are basically two variables that determine to what 396 extent migrants to cities can stimulate social change. The first one is what we call 397 “membership regimes” of receiving societies, which determine to what extent new- 398 comers are able or likely to interact with natives and how that interaction is structured 399 (Lucassen 2013). In cases of highly asymmetrical relationships, for example slav- 400 ery, but also where migrants are concentrated in ghettos or foreign miners in South 401 Africa, interactions are few, unequal, and limited, and consequently social change 402 is slow. At the other end of the continuum interactions are intensive, with ample 403 opportunities for people with different cultural capital to develop new ideas on a level 404 playing field. Such interactions occur in many contexts, not least on the shop floor. 405 It is therefore important to look at the (gendered, ethnic, social, etc.) composition of 406 organizations as well. The degree of “open access” not only varies in general, it can 407 also differ from one dimension to the other: Newcomers may be treated equally in 408 economic institutions, whereas political citizenship is denied. Finally, it is not only 409 the degree of openness that matters, but also the mere availability of certain urban 410 institutions, such as the cultural infrastructure, which is so central in the work of 411 Margaret Jacob (2006) on the early modern period and Richard Florida (2002)onthe 412 present. 413 Other scholars, like Henry Lucas, focus on the human capital of migrants, argu- 414 ing that cities are ideal environments for new immigrants to share or accumulate 415 Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 15

416 the skills required by modern production technologies (Lucas 2002). The higher 417 the level of skills migrants bring, the better for economic growth for example, and 418 from there the spin-offs for other developments in cities. Cultural capital also mat- 419 ters and may introduce new ways of thinking, norms, and values and foster social 420 change in other realms. And, vice versa, cities may change the prevailing cultures 421 of migrants, such as family systems, because they offer alternative institutions that 422 reduce risks of unemployment or sickness, as argued by Lynch (2003). Migrants, 423 however, might also want to preserve their culture, or aspects (religion, caste, lan- 424 guage, etc.) of it, and resist full assimilation or integration by marrying predomi- 425 nantly within their own network (Kraybill and Olshan 1994; Lucassen and Laarman 426 2009; Shibutani and Kwan 1965), or, as in the case of the Amish, isolate their entire 427 lifestyle. 428 We believe that our CCM approach is well suited to link these various strands of 429 literature and theory in one coherent conceptual model. Before presenting this in full, 430 we first return to Manning’s definition of “social change” and the somewhat similar 431 neo-evolutionary approach of Ian Morris, whose most recent work sets out to explain 432 differences in “social development” between different parts of the world in the some- 433 what shorter, but still considerable, time span of 15,000 years. Morris defines “social 434 development” as the ability of social groups to master their physical and intellectual 435 environment and “get things done in the world” (Morris 2013: 3). Or, more precise, 436 social development is “the bundle of technological, subsistence, organizational, and 437 cultural accomplishments through which people feed, clothe, house, and reproduce 438 themselves, explain the world around them, resolve disputes within their communi- 439 ties, extend their power at the expense of other communities, and defend themselves 440 against others’ attempts to extend power” (ibid.: 5). To measure and quantify social 441 development Morris distinguishes four characteristics: (1) energy capture (efficient); 442 (2) social organization (complex, measured by city size); (3) war-making capacity; 443 and (4) information technology (literacy, printing). 444 It should be stressed that social development can be evaluated very differently and 445 is not intrinsically “good” or “bad.” Not only does such a value judgment depend 446 on one’s position and interests, it also hinges on how one appreciates the impact in 447 the short or long run. The Creolization in Latin America following the very unequal 448 encounters and interactions between Spanish and Portuguese invading migrants and 449 the native populations is an example of social and cultural change. However, it came 450 at a huge cost, and furthermore people may value its outcome very differently. The 451 same is true for the impact of Austrian political entrepreneurs, like Adolf Hitler, 452 who introduced a specific Austrian anti-Semitic mass-action populism in German 453 politics that had been developed in fin de siècle Vienna by politicians such as the 454 Christian Socialist Mayor Karl Lueger (Geehr 1990). No one can deny that the inter- 455 action of migrants such as Hitler with German politicians led to political innovation, 456 but by far the most will wholeheartedly deplore the consequences of this particular 457 example of CCM. 458 Although both Manning and Morris are primarily interested in evolutionary changes 459 over a very long period, their approach is also useful if we want to understand 16 Social Science History

developments in past centuries. Nevertheless, we propose to modify their typologies 460 and categories to make them more suited to the measurement of social development in 461 the past and at the same time make them more value neutral. A way out is offered by 462 the “human capability” approach of Drèze and Sen (2013: 292 ff.), which looks at per 463 capita income, GDP,health (longevity, mortality, and fertility), literacy and education, 464 gender patterns, and savings, investments, and trade. These indicators overlap with 465 the UN Human Development Index, which was developed in 1990 by the Pakistani 466 economist Mahbub ul Haq and the Indian economist Amartya Sen. It summarizes 467 three dimensions (life expectancy at birth, knowledge and education, and standard 468 of living) in a single index number, ranging in 2015 between 0.287 (Niger) and 0.94 469 (Norway) (Human Development Report 2015: table 4). Finally, economic historians 470 have measured similar indicators to map global developments in “well-being” over 471 the past two centuries.4 472 If we then integrate the various (long- and short-term) indicators and ask the ques- 473 tion to what extent migration and migrants have caused social change or develop- 474 ment in the societies of departure and arrival and how it impacted migrants and 475 nonmigrants, we should have to distinguish between individual indicators (wages, 476 gender, and income inequalities, health and education) and collective indicators 477 (with variables such as GDP, social organization, and political institutions). Such 478 a scheme has the advantage that we can look separately at changes for migrants 479 at destination—on whom most studies concentrate—but also look at the effects 480 on the region that migrants left, and might return to, or remain in contact with 481 (through sojourning, transnational ties). Moreover, we can also include the effects 482 of migration and cross-cultural contacts on those who stay put, either at destina- 483 tion or origin. Finally, at a more collective, societal level this approach offers us 484 the opportunity to detect more structural—and often more long-term—changes in 485 the social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics of sending and receiving 486 societies. 487 A combination of both perspectives (migration and social change or development) 488 opens a new panorama enabling us to understand the role migration plays in the 489 development of human societies in the long and short run. When we link this to our 490 CCMR method, we could argue that migration is an important variable because it 491 enables processes of circulation (of ideas, goods, and people) in two crucial ways. 492 First, migrants are crucial as carriers of labor power (forced or free), either to work in 493 cities, in agriculture, on plantations, or as soldiers and sailors. And second, migrants 494 are carriers of ideas, goods, and various kinds of capital, which can vitalize (or slow 495 down, depending on the content of their ideas and capital) societies. If we want to 496 understand the process of social change (Manning) or social development (Morris), 497 migration can be fruitfully studied as an explanans. 498

4 Van Zanden et al. 2014. The report looks at GDP per capita, real wages, education, life expectancy, human height, personal security (crime, e.g. the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, in 2012: 1 for the Netherlands, 6 for the United States, 26 in Russia, and 42 for South Africa), political institutions (democratic participation), environmental quality, gender inequality, and income inequality. Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 17

499 Building a Theoretical Model

500 Cross-Cultural Migrations

501 The CCMR method may be a good place to start for mapping the extent of circularity 502 in general, but it also offers a starting point to study in more detail the circulation 503 of people and ideas at lower levels of abstraction and for smaller units of analysis. 504 To do this, and to understand the effect of different forms of “cross-cultural migra- 505 tion,” we need to go beyond merely quantifying the proportion of the population 506 that experienced at least one cross-cultural move during their life. A first step in 507 developing a middle-range theory in which CCM is studied as a root cause of social 508 change/development is to attribute “weights” to the four basic types of CCMs (to 509 cities, colonization, seasonal, and TMA). 510 In general, it seems reasonable to assume that migrations to cities have a greater 511 impact and potential for change than colonization because cities offer much more 512 opportunity for interaction and harbor a much greater variety of cultures. Second, we 513 assume that seasonal migrations do change receiving societies, as they enable the rural 514 population at destination to move to cities, but it seems that by far the biggest impact of 515 seasonal migration was felt in the societies at origin, to which the migrants return each 516 year. Due to the commodification of the labor power of peasants as seasonal migrants, 517 their earnings are often invested at home and thus stimulate commercialization and 518 monetization processes by linking these economically less developed regions to the 519 market economy. TMA migrations, finally, may have considerable influence both at 520 origin and destination (as we saw with the example of black American GIs), but 521 this depends very much on the specific situation. Less fuzzy is the role of highly 522 skilled organizational migrants, such as missionaries, scholars, and technical experts. 523 Notwithstanding their limited numbers, especially in colonial settings their power 524 and status were a crucial lever in forging change (in terms of language, religion, 525 ideas, and human capital). These considerations, which must be checked against each 526 specific situation, could lead to the application of “weights” for the impact of social 527 change induced by migration. We propose the following scale: 0 is no effect on social 528 change/development, 1 small, 2 medium, and 3 large, limited to positive effects and 529 limited to the collective, societal, level. 530 To illustrate how weights can be attributed in a specific case, let us look at the de- 531 bate on the divergence in economic development that emerged between northwestern 532 Europe and China from the eighteenth century (and possibly even earlier) and that 533 was followed by a slow convergence some two centuries later (Bourguignon 2015). 534 As we will argue later, “adding weights,” large-scale in-migration to cities—which 535 had begun in northwestern Europe as early as the sixteenth century—had a much 536 more transformative economic and cultural effect than Chinese colonists moving 537 to the periphery of the empire. Moreover, the cross-cultural effects in Europe were 538 further deepened by widespread seasonal and temporary (TMA) migration, not least 539 in the regions of origin to which many of them returned. Having been exposed to 540 different market economies, hierarchies, and material and spiritual values at their 541 destination, these temporary migrants had a more significant impact in northwestern 18 Social Science History

TABLE 2. Attributing “weights” for the positive effects to the four CCMs at the collective, societal, level

At origin At destination

To cities 1 3 Colonization 0 1 Seasonal 2 1 TMA Artisans 3 3 Sailors 1 1 Soldiers in peacetime 1–3 2 Soldiers during wars 1–3 0

Europe during the early modern period—given constant international warfare and 542 the demand for intercontinental sailors—than in China. Only after the 1970s, when 543 China’s policy of economic liberalization unchained the countryside and led to spec- 544 tacular urbanization, was there a transformative impact of CCM on Chinese society. 545 These considerations then lead to the following weights (table 2). 546 This would mean that with similar CCMRs in, for example, Europe and China 547 until the mid-twentieth century, the transformative effects of CCMs at destination in 548 Europe would still be larger because its CCMR consists to a much greater extent of 549 migration to cities and TMA. 550

Migrants’ Capital 551

As the example of organizational migrants shows, to predict the impact of CCMs we 552 should map the characteristics of the migrants in terms of symbolic capital (status), 553 human capital (skills), social capital (networks), cultural capital (language, religion, 554 worldviews), and military capital (power). Migrants to cities with high levels of human 555 capital will cause changes different from those with low skills, and the same is true 556 for migrants with deviant ideas. To hypothesize about the conditions under which 557 change takes place, the CCMs therefore have to be “enriched” with migrants’ capital. 558 As an example of human capital, one could take migrants to cities. It matters whether 559 they have acquired useful skills at origin, such as commercial skills (as peddlers) (van 560 den Heuvel and Ogilvie 2013) or technical skills (as artisans), or whether they were 561 predominantly peasants. Moreover, we would also like to know to what extent people 562 who moved to cities already had past urban experiences and specific technical skills, 563 as was the case with many English workers who moved (temporarily or permanently) 564 to North American industrial urban centers (Baines 1985; Berthoff 1953). However, 565 as we indicated earlier, the nature and level of interaction between migrants and settled 566 populations can also be limited due to the social and cultural capital of migrants, who 567 for various reasons might want to foster their own networks and culture. 568 Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 19

569 Membership Regimes

570 The third analytical tool necessary to build a theoretical model is the notion “member- 571 ship regime,” which links the CCMRs and migrants’ capital to the prevailing complex 572 of rules, regulations, customs, and values surrounding the entry and long-term settle- 573 ment of migrants in a new polity.5 The reason for including the opportunity structure 574 of the receiving polity is that the impact of CCMs depends largely on the freedom 575 of newcomers to deploy their human and cultural capital at the receiving end in 576 interaction with those present. “Moving to cities,” to give just one example, occurred 577 in many ways. Once in a city, migrants might be confronted with a highly segregated 578 polity, or one that is characterized by a relatively “open access regime” (North et al. 579 2009). The degree of openness of the receiving society, which following the CCM 580 logic might be a city (migration to cities), an agricultural frontier, a plantation or labor 581 camp (migration to land), an army, shipping company (TMA), or a commercial wage 582 labor market (seasonal), determines to a large extent the opportunities for exchanging 583 (and accumulating) ideas and human capital. Membership regimes are important be- 584 cause they determine the extensity, intensity, and equality of the interaction between 585 migrants and the native population. If migrants are completely isolated, for example as 586 slaves in labor camps, the chances of cross-cultural interaction are extremely limited, 587 whereas in situations in which we can speak of “open access,” as with foreign mer- 588 chants in early modern Amsterdam and London, or with the creative class in the global 589 cities of today (Gelderblom 2014; Sassen 2005), the opposite is the case. In between 590 these two extremes are the millions of ordinary men and women who have flocked 591 to European cities since the sixteenth century and who, together with those already 592 there, became part of a vibrant public sphere, broadly accessible urban institutions, 593 with greater scope for individualistic agency; in combination, these stimulated social 594 and institutional innovation (de Moor 2008; de Moor and van Zanden 2008; Lucassen Q6 595 and Willems 2012). 596 One type of membership regime often overlooked in migration studies is where 597 migrants set the rules. Although “invader migration” might lead to major changes 598 (positive as well as negative) for those already present at the destination, highly 599 asymmetrical power relations can nevertheless also limit social change/development. 600 Take the example of Spanish conquistadores in Latin America in the fifteenth and 601 sixteenth centuries, who imposed Spanish as the main language and Catholicism as 602 the dominant religion. At the same time, between the sixteenth and the nineteenth cen- 603 turies they shipped millions of slaves to the Caribbean (Wood 2011). These migrants 604 were not only exposed to hardship and death, they were also forced to convert, learn 605 the language of their masters, and give up most of their original culture. Although 606 slaves had more agency than has long been assumed and were to some extent able to 607 hold on to their cultures and contribute to various forms of Creolization,6 the extent of

5 In the end, we will also have to include membership regimes at origin, because they have an impact on the various forms of capital of the migrants, as the example of the black American GIs shows. 6 Price 1979; Metcalf 2005; Hawthorne 2010;Pargas2015. For a good summary of the discussion on “social death” versus the reproduction of African cultures, see Sidbury 2011. 20 Social Science History

FIGURE 8. Schematic representation of the relationship between CCM and social change. social change was one-sided. In both cases (the Amerindians and the African slaves) 608 the result of the interaction seems predominantly to have involved the imposition of 609 the invaders’ culture rather than the creation of new outcomes. 610 In figure 8 we have summarized the three analytical building blocks necessary 611 to formulate a middle-range theory that aims at explaining the impact of CCMs on 612 receiving (and sending) societies in terms of social change or social development. 613 The final step at this point would be to unpack “social development” using the four 614 dimensions adduced by Ian Morris (energy capture, social organization, informa- 615 tion technology, war-making capacity) and link these to the three analytical building 616 blocks. For the moment one could say three things in this respect. As for CCMs there 617 seems to be a logical connection between “migration to cities” and social organization 618 and between TMA and war-making capacity. As for migrants’ capital, this is highly 619 relevant for energy capture and information technology, as the skills and ideas of 620 migrants will be instrumental in forging changes in these domains. Finally, it seems 621 reasonable to assume that the more “open access” membership regimes are, the greater 622 the impact CCMs will have on social development. 623

Eurasian Comparisons 624

Nourished and inspired by the theoretical models of Manning and Morris, in the 625 remainder of this article we will apply some of these preliminary thoughts to the 626 aggregate results recently published in a volume in which the CCMR method is 627 Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 21

FIGURE 9. CCMRs in Europe (without Russia), Russia, China, and Japan, 1601– 1800. Source: Lucassen and Lucassen 2014a: 31.

628 used to map migration in Eurasia (Lucassen and Lucassen 2014b). A closer look at 629 developments in Eurasia shows that comparisons in time and space at the aggregate 630 level are the most useful for identifying broader trends and generate new questions, 631 which then must be tested at lower levels of abstraction. In the following figure, 632 total CCMRs for Europe, Russia, China, and Japan are visualized. They show a 633 growing divergence from the eighteenth century, with rates in East Asia decreasing 634 considerably and those in Europe and Russia remaining stable (see figure 9). 635 As figure 10 shows, this gap widened even further in the nineteenth century before 636 slowly converging, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. For China, 637 Japan, and Russia, the steep increase cannot be explained by immigration from abroad. 638 Instead of “immigration,” which was very low in all three cases, CCMs in Asia 639 consist predominantly of people moving to cities. In other words, whereas large parts 640 of Europe had already become urbanized—primarily by migration—between the 641 seventeenth (the northwest) and nineteenth centuries, the take-off in Russia and East 642 Asia took place mainly in the twentieth century (Japan was a notable exception, with 643 early urbanization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). A second important 644 difference between Europe and the other three large Eurasian territories relates to 645 colonization. 646 People who migrated, often forced or encouraged by the state, to sparsely populated 647 frontier areas formed a significant component of CCM in Russia and East Asia, which 648 is explained not only by the relatively low population density in these three states, but 649 also by the fact that we are dealing here with empires that constantly expanded their 22 Social Science History

FIGURE 10. CCMRs in Europe (without Russia), Russia, China, and Japan, 1801– 2000. Source: Lucassen and Lucassen 2014a: 33 and 394. European rates have been ad- justed following Lucassen et al. 2014: table 170.

territory at the expense of nomadic tribes in Central Asia and, to consolidate their 650 conquests, had a great interest in populating the newly acquired frontier provinces 651 with people from the center. Most of these colonists were farmers, or soldiers turned 652 farmers, and therefore fit the category of colonization. Apart from the Habsburg 653 and Ottoman empires (which both collapsed during World War I), state formation 654 in Europe was in contrast distinguished by a fierce competition between territorial 655 and later nation-states, with little space for colonization. This produced constant 656 warfare and hence a huge demand for soldiers, often from other countries (Tilly 657 1990). Together with millions of sailors who manned Dutch, Portuguese, British, 658 French, and Spanish ships on a quest for riches in Asia and the Americas during the 659 first phase of globalization following the discovery of the Americas and the route to 660 Asia via the Cape of Good Hope, these TMA migrants constitute about 60 percent of 661 all CCM prior to the nineteenth century. 662 The trends over time in the different Eurasian regions tell us several interesting 663 things. First, and this is in line with the general historical development, the European 664 ratios are not only much higher than those in East Asia, at least until the mid-twentieth 665 century, they also display different forms of cross-cultural contact. In Europe, migrants 666 to cities and migrants as soldiers and sailors (TMA) dominate. In both cases, we can 667 speak of an intensive mixing of people from different cultural backgrounds in spaces 668 with a high population density. Moreover, due to the generally open-access nature of 669 Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 23

670 cities and armies (especially in Western Europe) (Davids and Lucassen 1995;deVries 671 1984; Lucassen 2013) and the on average relatively high level of human capital of the 672 migrants (Bade et al. 2011; van Lottum 2011; van Lottum et al. 2011), these CCMs 673 were characterized by multiple interactions with a high impact. It seems reasonable to 674 assume that this caused considerable social change/development and stimulated so- 675 cial development: knowledge, ideas, and labor floated freely and the intense (military 676 and otherwise) competition between cities and between states promoted economic 677 growth and the accumulation of technological expertise (Davids 2008; Mokyr 2002). 678 All four features of social development mentioned by Morris, especially social orga- 679 nization, war-making capacity, and information technology, made important advances 680 and largely explain the widening gap in terms of military power and wealth between 681 Western Europe and large parts of Asia. 682 In Russia and China, even when the total CCMR was high (as in Russia), the build- 683 ing blocks differed. As noted earlier, colonization had been much more important, 684 but this type of CCM most probably had much less of a transformative effect (see 685 table 1). Not only was it more extensive than intensive, often there was little, or highly 686 asymmetrical, interaction with the people already present in the frontier areas. The 687 same is true for seasonal migrations, whereas people moving to cities constituted a 688 much smaller part of the total. On top of this we need also to realize that Russian 689 and Chinese cities were much more segregated along religious and ethnic lines, and 690 so cross-cultural interactions in urban spaces were less frequent and intense than in 691 Western Europe (Lucassen 2013; see also Rowe 1984: 213–15). In China, this limited 692 access to urban institutions and consequently higher levels of spatial and social segre- 693 gation have continued during the recent revolutionary phase of mass urbanization. Due 694 to the distinctions between rural and urban administrative units (the hukou system), 695 rural migrants who settle in cities are to a large extent de facto excluded from urban 696 citizenship and services (housing, welfare, including schools for their children) and 697 channeled into the secondary (low-paid and offering no prospect of upward social 698 mobility) tier of the labor market (Shen 2014; Swider 2011;Whyte2010; Zhang and 699 Wang 2010).

700 Adding Weights

701 As discussed before, a final step in our CCMR approach is to add weights to the four 702 different categories, based on the expected potential to forge change. In figure 11 we 703 apply the multipliers from table 2 (3 for “to cities” and 2 for TMA). This highlights 704 the spectacular economic developments seen in Japan (since the end of the nineteenth 705 century) and China (after the 1970s) much better than in figures 8 and 9, but also 706 reflects better the stabilizing influence of the transition from the Ming to the Qing in 707 China in the mid-seventeenth century. 708 Finally, to return to the Great Divergence debate, figure 11 shows an interesting 709 correlation between CCM and economic development from the beginning of the sev- 710 enteenth century. The divergence between Europe and China was further exacerbated 24 Social Science History

FIGURE 11. Weighted CCMRs for Europe, China, and Japan 1600–2000.

during the first half of the twentieth century, only to be reversed in the second half 711 of that century, when unprecedented numbers of Chinese started moving to cities. 712 This massive flow should not simply be regarded as the necessary “cannon fodder” 713 for China’s industrialization and urbanization process, it also forged structural insti- 714 tutional and social changes in the relationship between citizens and the state (Tang 715 and Holzner 2007) and between family members. 716 Although family systems in villages had undergone changes even before World 717 War II, the revolutionary process of urbanization since the late 1970s speeded up 718 the process of individualization, partly replacing family and kinship by much more 719 heterogeneous urban communities as the prism of social organization (Daming and 720 Yingqiang 1997;Ngai2005). Apart from a greater stress on consumption and as- 721 pirations of a better life, the high mobility of young people also has consequences 722 for China’s patriarchal family system. As recent anthropological studies show, young 723 migrants are now starting to defy a centuries-old tradition of accepting a partner 724 selected by their mutual families, forcing the bride to move into the husband’s house- 725 hold. Being far away from home and less controlled by family ties, young Chinese 726 migrants in booming cities have begun to make their own individual choices and to 727 settle on their own (“neo-locality”). In other words, many migrants no longer accept 728 marriage as a contract between two families, but rather between two individuals (de 729 Moor and van Zanden 2008: 6; Jacka et al. 2013; Nansheng 2010; Zhang 2009). 730 Although it is too early to tell how structural this trend is, it is a telling example of 731 how CCM can lead to significant social change. 732 Theorizing Cross-Cultural Migrations 25

733 Conclusion

734 In this article, we argue the need for a less state-centered definition of migration to 735 understand better the relationship between CCMs and social change or social devel- 736 opment in the long run. We have therefore developed a new definition of migration 737 that enables researchers to systematically compare CCMRs through time and space. 738 This CCMR method is not blind to political factors. Far from it. But it puts issues of 739 state policies and citizenship in a much broader social context. We can thus conclude 740 that while the opening quote, taken from Castles and Miller, might not be completely 741 off the mark, it is highly idiosyncratic and myopic, as it privileges modern migra- 742 tions crossing state borders over internal moves, and it—implicitly—seems to favor 743 migrants who intend to settle for good. Theirs is a legitimate choice, especially if 744 the core explanandum is the way the long-term settlement process in another modern 745 state evolves. 746 If one is more interested in social change over time, wrought by CCMs and their 747 effect on both migrants and on sending and receiving societies, then such a definition 748 is inadequate. Moreover, even if one limits oneself to long-term settlement (in terms 749 of assimilation, integration, or otherwise) (Alba and Nee 2003; Foner and Lucassen 750 2012; Lucassen 2005), the gaze of the state falls short as well, because the power 751 and interest of territorial states in controlling migration is a very recent phenomenon 752 and in most states emerged—at least in Western Europe and North America—in the 753 late nineteenth century with the “nationalization” and “bureaucratization” of interna- 754 tional migration (Rosental 2011), resulting in a statist migration control regime around 755 World War I (Lucassen 1998; McKeown 2008). Before that, migration controls were 756 exerted much more at the level of cities or, especially in empires (such as Russia), 757 internally (Garcelon 2001; Torpey 2000). Especially in early modern Europe, mem- 758 bership regimes were built locally, and so for comparisons over time that are intended 759 to reveal the similarities and differences in the settlement process of migrants with 760 our current world the nation-state model has severe limitations. 761 The second result of this article is the development of (admittedly) preliminary 762 ideas on how to construct a middle-range theory that links the different kinds of CCM 763 as distinguished in the CCMR method to social change and social development. The 764 three analytical building blocks we propose and that we linked to the four dimensions 765 of social development suggested by Ian Morris are, of course, open to discussion. For 766 the moment, the model seems to work, at least at the aggregate level, but the proof of 767 the pudding is in the eating at the meso- and microlevel. 768 In the more empirical parts of this article we have concentrated on the effects 769 of societies receiving migrants, in this case Eurasia between 1500 and the present. 770 Individual migrants and nonmigrants in sending and receiving societies have been 771 largely left out. Finally, and paradoxically, integration and assimilation leads in the 772 long run to diminishing opportunities for social development through cross-cultural 773 experiences. A possible consequence could be the slowing down of social change, 774 or even a kind of “cultural involution” (after Geertz 1963), as due to globalizing 775 migration cultures converge further and thus cultural boundaries become less salient 26 Social Science History

or disappear entirely (as was already the case in migration to cities within culturally 776 homogenous nation-states in the twentieth century). Logically speaking, this is also 777 an implication of the model, presently to be developed further. 778

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