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Home , Agha Saleem, Anwar Shamim, Azam Khan (general), Bilal Khan (judge), Central Jail Rawalpindi, Imtiaz Ahmed (brigadier)

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF POLITICAL PARTIES

DURING ZIA ERA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO

PAKISTAN PEOPLE PARTY (1977-1988)

Session (2008-2011)

Ph.D. History

Researcher Supervisor

Imtiaz Ahmed Abbasi Professor Dr. Muhammad Roll No: 02 Akbar Malik

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY The Islamia University of Bahawalpur DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis entitled “An Analytical Study of Political Parties During Zia Era with Special Reference to People’s Party (1977-88)” is a result of my personal and independent investigation, except where I have indicated my indebtedness to other sources. I hereby certify that this thesis has not been submitted for any other degree nor is it being submitted concurrently in candidature for other degree.

Imtiaz Ahmad Abbasi Roll No. 02 Ph.D. (History) Session: 2008-2011

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Certificate

I hereby recommended the thesis prepared under my supervision by Imtiaz Ahmad Abbasi entitled “An Analytical Study of Political Parties During Zia Era with Special Reference to Pakistan People’s Party (1977-88)” be accepted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Ph.D. in History.

Prof. Dr. Muhammad Akbar Malik Department of History The Islamia University of Bahawalpur

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APPROVAL CERTIFICATE

This thesis entitled “ An Analytical Study of Political Parties During Zia Era with Special Reference to Pakistan People’s Party (1977-88)” which has been prepared under my supervision, is hereby approved for submission to The Islamia University of Bahawalpur in partial fulfilment of the requirement of the degree of Ph.D. (History).

Supervisor: ______

External Examiner: ______

Coordinator ______

Chairman: ______

Date: ______

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To My Parents

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Acknowledgement

First, I bow my head before Almighty Allah, who give me strength and courage to conduct this study successfully. All respect for His Holy Prophet Hazrat Muhammad (S.A.W) who enlightened our mind to recognize ourselves. It is pleasure for me to express my feelings of gratitude for my supervisor Professor Dr. Akber Malik for his valuable guidance who bestowed me a glorious chance to benefit from his immense knowledge. He has always been very kind, friendly, easy to reach and helpful. Similarly, Dr. Shahid Hassan Rizvi and Dr.

Khursheed Ahmed provide me the chance to get their informative company. Moreover, I wish to express my sincere feelings towards my family for their affections. I am thankful to my wife Abida Shaheen, my daughters Khansa Kanwal and Sabahat Imtiaz, and my sons Haris

Imtiaz Abbasi, Zargham Imtiaz Abbasi who remember me in their prayers and support me to continue higher studies.

Although, all of my Ph.D class was very caring and loving but I am grateful to Mushtaq

Ahmed and Syed Tariq Shah whose care inspired me a lot during my research work.

I also thank to my friends Professor Jalil Asghar Satti, Sardar Masood Ahmed Advocate,

Mahar Javed, Zulfaqar Ali Raja, Muhammad Asim, Zia-ur-Rehman Abbasi, and Abdul

Rehman Abbasi, Saffir Ahmad Abbasi whose cooperation facilitate me to complete my research.

Imtiaz Ahmed Abbasi

Ph.D in History

Session 2008-11

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Abbreviations

COAS Chief of Army Staff

CPC Communist Party of Pakistan

HRM Human Resource Management

ICJ Intentional Court of Justice

JUI Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam

JUP Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan

NAP National Awami Party

PDP Pakistan Democratic Party

PML

PPP

SCP Supreme Court of Pakistan

TI Tehreek-i-Istiqlal

UK

UNESCO United Nation Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNICEF United Nations International Children Emergency Fund

USA of America

USSR United Soviet Socialist Republic

Z.A.B Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto

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Table of Contents

Contents Page Numbers

Abstract 1

Introduction 3 Chapter 1 11

The Role of Political Parties From 1947-77 11

Pakistan Muslim League 13

Pakistan Democratic Party 16

Tehrik-E-Istaqlal 17

National Awami Party 18

Jamaat-E-Islami 18

Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam 23

Jamiat-Ulema-e-Pakistan 24

Jeay Qoumi Mahaaz 24

Communist Party of Pakistan 25

Republican Party of Pakistan 26

Tashkand Agreement And Its Impacts 28

Failure of Democracy And Imposition of 1969 31

Martial Law of 1969 And Its Political Consequences 35

Chapter 2 39

Political Activism And The Rise of Pakistan People’s Party 39

Bhutto’s Rising of Power: 39

Bhutto And The Bureaucracy 46

Bhutto's Reforms 49

Agrarian Reforms 56

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Industrial Reforms 60

Constitutional Reform 63

Social Reform 66

Constitutional Engineering During Bhutto Regime 69

Economic And Social Change During Bhutto Regime 71

Labor Reforms During Bhutto Regime 72

Nationalization Policy of Bhutto 74

Foreign Policy of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto And His Fall 75

Chapter 3 93

Major Steps of Zia-ul-Haq And Pakistan People’s Party 93

Zia’s Attitude Towards Political Forces 93

PPP’s Leadership And Zia Regime 98

Zia-ul-Haq As President 104

Politicization of Supreme Court 106

Five Year Plan (1978-83) 109

Constitutional Engineering And The Elections of 1985 112

Nussrat Bhutto Case And Its Political Effects 115

Chapter 4 123

MRD: The Revolutionary Movement 123

The Participation of Other Parties in MRD 127

Benazeer’s Exile 143

Election of 1985 And Movement For Restoration of 152

Democracy

Chapter 5

The End of Martial Law And The Beginning of Controlled 195

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Democracy

Participation of Other Political Parties 199

Differences Between Zia-ul-Haq And Junaijo 201

End of Zia-ul-Haq Regime And The Elections of 1988 206

Chapter 6 208

Conclusion 208

Appendixes 228

Bibliography 249

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Abstract

Although Pakistan had experienced two Martial Laws before, but the Zia regime was the most crucial in the where political cleansing was occurred officially with the help of . Besides Pakistan Peoples Party, policies of General Zia-ul-Haq showed that he was against all the democratic force of

Pakistan. And, his such attitude became the reason of starting a Movement for

Restoration of Democracy. Although, the rightist political parties were supporting

Zia’s policy of Islamization, referendum of 1984 and non-party based elections of

1985, but the popularity of MRD grew up day by day. Junaijo’s demand of getting democratic powers was due to the pressure building by the MRD whose basic objective was to restore parliamentary system in original shape as described in the

Constitution of 1973. The results of 1988 election showed that, this movement was against the dictatorial politics of Zia-ul-Haq.

This study highlights the role of Pakistan Peoples Party in the politics of

Pakistan since its emergence. It covers the issues such as Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as

Foreign Minister during Ayub regime, Chairman of Pakistan Peoples Party, Civilian

Martial Law Administrator and , and Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Similarly, this study focuses upon the political environment which was designed after the military coup of General Zia-ul-Haq, where workers and leaders of Pakistan

Peoples Party were suffered a lot. After the hanging of Bhutto and implementation of

Zia’s policies of Islamization, Movement for the Restoration of Democracy started which is the case study of this research. The consequences of this movement on Zia’s referendum of 1984, non-party based elections of 1985 and Zia-Junaijo differences are also observed here. Keeping in view the organization of the study the thesis deals with the introduction consisted of the statement of the problems, justification and objectives of the study, hypothesis, research questions and organization of the study.

It is divided into six chapters. Chapter one focuses upon the role of political parties in

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Pakistan during different regimes since 1947-77. Chapter two highlights emergence and rise of Pakistan Peoples Party since 1967 and presented different policies and reforms under the leadership of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Chapter three defines imposition of MRD as revolutionary Movement. Participation of other political parties,

Benazeer’s hardships, Election of 1985 and its effects on the history of Pakistan.

Chapter four tries to evaluate the steps of Zia-ul-Haq and consequences of controlled democracy. Chapter five deals with the ending of Martial Law and the beginning of controlled democracy. Chapter six is based on conclusion, findings and recommendations.

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Introduction

As the was based on two-nation theory, the conclusion of the desiring Muslims of British to establish a separate homeland for the Muslims. This was a movement against British as well as Hindu oppression that did not allow Muslims of India to live freely according to their customs and traditions. On the other hand, the Pakistan Movement was faithfully opposed by some of religious leaders, famously called “Mullahs”. They were against the leadership as well as movement, initiated by the All India Muslim League.

After the independence of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan became the first Prime minister of newly independent country while became the first Governor General. This newly country was consisted of two wings that was called (including Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, NWFP now (), Tribal Areas, Northern Areas now (Gilgit-Baltistan and ) and (East Bengal). The government of Liaqat Ali Khan faced several difficulties in East and West of Pakistan. In the same year, India and Pakistan went for a War of 1948 that began for Indian illegal claim over the region of Kashmir. Both Liaqat Ali Khan and Muhammad Ali Jinnah were strong-minded to discontinue the riots and the refugee problems, and to make an effectual executive system for the new country. Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan did the revolutionary work for the foreign policy of Pakistan as well taking several initiatives towards the making of new constitution. In 1949, he presented the Objectives Resolution in Constituent Assembly as guided principle for the future . It had been called as "Magna Carta" in the constitutional history of Pakistan. Both the United States of America and send their invitations to Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan. However, firstly, he choose to visit United States. Moscow perceived it as a Pakistani turn towards capitalist world. So, Soviet behavior had been changed towards Pakistan although Liaqat Ali Khan tried to keep Pakistan natural in the Cold War. He then, think over the visit Soviet Union but did not make it possible due to the cold attitude of this big power.

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Same year, Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared as an official language of Pakistan and this decision was criticized in East Pakistan where Bengali language was spoken by majority of population. Governor General, Muhammad Ali Jinnah also faced serious problems from Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army; General Sir Douglas Gracey who refused to act upon his orders. General Gracey argued that Muhammad Ali Jinnah as a Governor General, is representing the British Crown and not send troops in Kashmir.

During Liaqat Ali Khan's tenure, India and Pakistan agreed to decided the Kashmir dispute in peaceful way. According to this accord, a ceasefire was enforced in Kashmir on January 1, 1949. Both the countries agreed that a free and impartial plebiscite will be held under the United Nations.

In 1948, after the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah Pakistan faced attacks from religious minorities through militant organizations and groups of West Pakistan. Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan was involved in this preche. On the other hand, Liaqat- Nehru pact was signed on 1950, which aimed at to reduce tension between Pakistan and India and to protect the religious minorities in both the countries.

In East Pakistan, Bengali people started their movement in favor of Bengali Language that converted into civil disobedience movement in 1952. In reaction of police, seven protesters had been killed and movement spread all over the East Pakistan. In the end, agreed to provide equal status to both the languages; Urdu and Bengali which even later, agreed in the constitution of 1956.

In East Pakistan, the Language Movement reached to its peak on February 21, 1952, when the police and army opened fire on the students near Medical College, protesting to receive equal status for Bengali against Urdu. Several protesters were killed, and the movement gained further support throughout East Pakistan. As a result, Government agreed to provide equal status to Bengali as a national to Bengali as a state language of Pakistan.

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In 1951, unsuccessful attempt was made by some of the civil and military elements to over though the government with the help of Communist party but this attempt had been crushed by the Pakistani Army. This attempt was called then the Conspiracy Case. The conspiracy was infact a plan to bring about communist revolution. As a result, the Government banned the registration as well as the working of Communist Party in Pakistan.

In 1958, imposed first Martial Law in Pakistan. This was a revolving point in Pakistan's history and now the system had been converted into presidential form of government. With the end of Sino-Indian war of 1962, some of Pakistani Armed Offcial made a plan to start Operation Gebralter in Kashmir. Pakistan Army send in Kashmir, which converted into direct war over Kashmir in 1965. India suffered great loss near the border of Chawinda. Pakistan had been captured some areas of Amritsar. On the request of India in United Nations, Ayub started negotiations in Tashkent with Indian Prime minister, Lal Bahadue Shastri. This accord was called Tashkent Declaration, which was opposed by Bhutto and on return to Pakistan he resigned from the cabinet of Ayub Khan, formed his own political party, called Pakistan Peoples Party.

After resigning of Ayub khan, due to huge protest in Pakistan against his rule, imposed third Martial Law all over the country and announced first general elections of Pakistan in 1970. In these elections, , led by Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman got simple majority in the National Assembly due to his six point agenda, while PPP got seats of National Assembly from Punjab and Sindh. Political crisis had been started in Pakistan for shifting the government to Awami League. Even, Yahya Khan announced that “Mujeeb will be the next prime minister of Pakistan” but Bhutto opposed it. Pakistan Peoples Party started civil disobedience movement in reaction of announcement for shifting political powers to Awami League. Mujeeb demanded separation of East Pakistan from United Pakistan. Military Operation had been initiated by the government and Mujeeb was arrested and poisoned in Faisalabad jail. Civil war had been started in East Pakistan, and India was supporting militant group of Awami League, called Mukti Bahni. In November 1971, 5

India directly attacked on East Pakistan and on December 16, 1971, Pakistan Army surrendered in front of Indian forces. East Pakistan converted into just due to Mujeeb-Bhutto political conflict.

Yahya Khan lost his control over the country and resigned. Bhutto became First Civilian Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan. He started his work on making new constitution and soon with the consent of all the members of National Assembly, got approval of new constitution from the National Assembly. This constitution was enforced on August 14, 1973 and Bhutto has become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Chaudhary Fazal Elahi was appointed as the President of Pakistan.

Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto disapproved the capitalist policies of President Ayub Khan and introduced socialist economic reforms. He announced policy of for the welfare of poor class. He also announced labor policy for the welfare of working class and declared their rights and powers of trade and labor unions.

PNA (an alliance of Jamat-e-Islami, Jamiat ulama-e-Islam Mufti mehmood Group, National Awami Party and Tehreek-e-Istaqlal) started movement against these reforms. Scholars argued that PNA movement was fully funded by the capitalist world as well as domestic industrialists of that time. So, in the elections of 1977, this movement also faced defeat but did not stop its protest and blamed rigging in the elections in favor of PPP. This sponsored movement ended with the imposition of Martial Law by Zia-ul-Haq and the dismissal of Bhutto’s Government.

Zia announced new elections within 90 days but due to the popularity of PPP and the fear of his court martial, he postponed new elections. Moreover, Bhutto was hanged on April 4, 1979 in a controversial murder case. Now, Zia announced his policy of implementing Islamic laws, called “Islamization”. Actually, this was an effort to strengthen his rule over the country.

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Pakistan Peoples Party and its Allies had understood that this is a pure politcal effort. Soon they initiated a movement for restoration of democracy, called, MRD (Movement for Restoration of Democracy). This movement got popularity within days and Zia used military power to crush this movement, especially in Sindh where gunship helicopters fired on peasants who were protesting against illegal rule of Zia.

Soon, this movement spread all over the country, and due to the fear of popular political parties, Zia announced non-party elections in 1985. MRD boycotted these elections but rightist political parties like Pakistan Muslim League and Jamat-e- Islami participated in it. Due to 8th amendment in the constitution of 1973, political system of Pakistan had been converted into semi-presidential system. Therefore, new government of Junaijo was nominal and actual powers were belonged to Zia-ul-Haq. Soon, on Afghan conflict and several domestic political affairs, Zia had several differences with Junaijo and he dismissed National Assembly in 1988. He announced new elections but again keeping in view the popularity of MRD and decided to hold these elections on non-party bases.

But, on August 18, 1988, Zia had died in plane crash near Bahawalpur and became new president of Pakistan. Elections were held on party bases which was a clear victory of MRD. Pakistan Peoples Party got simple majority and Benazeer Bhutto became first female prime minister of the Muslim world. Even, system was still semi-presidential due to 8th amendment of Zia-ul-Haq, but people of Pakistan were happy to see their elected representatives in the National Assembly.

The political parties play an important role in setting new trends and reforming the social stucture. In the west, people join a party while keeping in view its constitution and manifesto. In the third world, this tradition is weak due to the lack of political insight in the common people. In Islamic countries, like Pakistan, religion could not be separated from the politics.

In fact, the culture of political parties is very weak in our country. Most of the parties do not fulfill the basic requirements of a political party of a democratic society. On the other hand, mushroom growth of political parties has made 7

meaningless the true sense of a political party. In other reason the weak democratic traditions, promoted the imposition of Martial Law repeatedly in Pakistan.

The remarkable thing of the PPP is that it was formulated against Martial Law and dictatorship, and continued its struggle against the military rule. It was a leftist party and wanted to promote in the country. The eparchy ruled over the country from 1971-77. After that, its decline started and remained till 1988. During this period, the PPP played a significant role as an opposition party in the politics of Pakistan. Because, it was a single party which had country wide roots in the masses. So, it is necessary to analyze circumstances and activities of the PPP during this period.

Further we see that PPP put forward and perceived Islamic theme of socialism and upheld the interest of Muslim majority in various parts of the world. It always supported the Muslims of Kashmir and Palestine for their right of self-determination and unification of the Muslim world. So, it will be important to comprehend the whole struggle of this political party.

The selected period of studies for research is very important due to its, transition of from dictatorship to democracy. The research work is also be important as it would be the first research work on the role of opposition during mentioned period.

There are many political leaders whose characters, achievements and role is still hidden from the eyes of the people of Pakistan. The present study will be helpful to understand the political issue and the remedies. Anyhow, the objectives of the study were as under:

1) To critically evaluate the role of PPP as a prominent political party and opposition it performance as an opposition organization in the political history of Pakistan from 1977-88.

2) To highlight the issues related to the intellectual and international aspects of Pakistani politics. 8

3) To offer and insight full analysis of the PPP’s politics and to pin point various mile stones in its policy and structure during this period.

4) To know the value of various events, roles and personalities in the context of overall political system of Pakistan during the set period.

5) To see the impacts of Martial Law in the politics of Pakistan.

6) To know about the nature and political will of the parties, especially of the PPP during the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in Pakistan.

7) To emphasize the role of MRD and other political parties during the Zia’s Islamization, non-party elections of 1985, specially during the Junaijo government.

Pakistan Peoples Party has exposed Zia’s so-called Islamization, constitutional engineering, referendum and non-party based electoral system, for strengthen his illegal rule. Keeping in view this reality there arose some research questions which I have discussed in this study. These were as follows:

1) Why Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto established his new Political Party?

2) What was the role of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as a Civilian Martial Law Administrator and President after the Fall of Dhakka and resigning of President Yahya Khan?

3) How Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto led the country as an elected prime minister during his regime?

4) Why opposition opposed the policies of Pakistan Peoples Party?

5) Why Zia-ul-Haq feel fear to held elections within 90 days?

6) What were the causes of Bhutto’s hanging?

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7) How Zia strengthened his rule?

8) Why Junaijo was appointed as a prime minister by the Zia-ul-Haq?

9) Why political parties did not participate in the elections of 1985?

10) How MRD got popularity in the country; especially in Punjab and Sindh?

11) After the dismissal of Junaijo, what was the policy of Zia-ul-haq?

12) In the elections of 1988 weather the success of Pakistan Peoples Party was actually the success of MRD?

This research is based on historically descriptive, comparative, analytical and qualitative methods. All the data is collected from books, newspapers, journals, articles, speeches, internet and interviews of several politicians, historians and scholars.

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Chapter 1

The Role of Political Parties From 1947-77

The Political history of Pakistan is marked with unnecessary delay in constitution making, breakdown of constitutional order, political instability, Military rule, extra Parliamentary pressure and agitation for political change. Pakistan had three regular constitutions which were significantly abrogated by the military dictators1. During the years of parliamentary rule, the political parties often violated the spirit of the constitution and democracy. They got engaged in ruthless struggle for power, regional and narrow political interests and priorities which supersed the needs of political consensus building and shared decision making2. In the fifties, Pakistan suffered from a serious problem of political instability and confusion. The elected Government often resorted to authoritarian ways, using the state apparatus to suppress dissent. These tendencies were reinforced during military rule. Pakistan returned to democratic path in 1985 after long period of Martial Law. Though this transition was commendable, the performance of the political parties was absolutely unsatisfactory, raising doubts about institutionalization of the democratic process3. It is important to understand the dynamics and causes of these developments that:

1) Why Pakistan could not evolve viable political institutions and faced serious problems of political and economic management? And; 2) Why the civil and military establishment able to expand their role and become important power wielders?

There are many issues about military rule in Pakistan and there impacts on political process. Pakistan returned to democracy and its slow spectacular transition is

1Hameed Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, , 2005, p.57.

2 Rafiullah Shehab, The Politcal History of Pakistan, The University of Michigun, Michigun, 1995, p.31.

3 Christophe Jaffrelot, The History of Pakistan And Its Origins, Wimbledon Publishing, London, 2004, pp.20-23.

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another important aspect of country’s politics and democracy4. Ian Talbot states that the first decade of parliamentary politics was marked by miserable failure5. The state was governed through Government of India Act 1935, now governed through the new constitution of 1956 that was ratified the Muslim League, the only nationwide political organization had disintegrated and tradition had been established of executive dissolution of both provincial and national government. In the absence of nationwide general elections, Pakistan had to wait until 1970 for this democratic land mark6. The parliamentary system was unable to strengthen its roots. Prime Ministers moved through revolving doors of office with increasing rapidity as power slipped to Army. The political and constitutional crisis exacerbated the tension between center and provinces7.

McGrath advocated that the system which was designed by the politicians for experiencing democracy had been failed during this period. The road which was going towards Martial Law, paved with the corruption and malpractices of politicians8. Khalid Bin Sayeed traced Pakistan’s democratic failure back to the early days of Jinnah’s Governor General ship9.

Pakistan began with dominant party system. The Muslim League was the dominant party in the early years of independence while, several small parties existed in legislature and the outside. Most of these parties having weak organizational structure often fell in victim to inter-dissension and conflicts10. Actually, these political parties consisted of small interest groups and influential personalities. These political parties had also suffered due to periodic disruption of the democratic process

4 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in The Twenieth Century, Oxford University Press, London, 1999, p.12.

5 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, C.Hurst & Company Publishers Limited, London, 2009, p.14.

6 Ibid., p.125.

7 Ibid., p.126.

8 Allen McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy, Oxford univesity Press, London, 1996, p.58.

9 Khalid bin Saeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, The Pakistan Publishing House, , 1960, p.171.

10 Shoukat Ali, Pakistan: A Religio-Politcal Study, The National Institute of Historical And Cultural Research, , 1997, p.28.

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by the imposition of Martial Laws. When the political parties either disallowed to function or severe restrictions were imposed on their activities, Pakistan’s return to democracy in 1973 had provided yet another opportunity to the political parties and the leaders to perform their role in strengthening democracy and consolidating the national identity11. It was reassuring that regardless of difficulties and problems, these political parties had strived for democratic course. However, there was the need to improve their performance12. The following discussion provides a historical sketch of major political parties and their performance in political process.

Pakistan Muslim League

The Muslim League (PML) founded in 1906, is the oldest Political Party in Pakistan. It waged the Muslims’ struggle for independence, changed the political map of the sub-continent and created Pakistan. Therefore, it enjoyed a unique position in Pakistan and was the natural inheritor of state power at the time of freedom. The Muslims have great emotional attachment with the Muslim League, because its name was synonymous with the Muslim liberation movement. This phenomenon had an impact on post-independence politics. Several political parties which emerged after the independence adopted the name of “Muslim League”. These were the Jinnah Muslim League, The Awami League, the Qayuom Muslim League and the Quaid-a- Azam Muslim League13.

After independence, Muslim League formed the government in center and provinces. During its long spell of power since 1947-54, it enjoyed undisputed supremacy in politics. However, it failed to develop feasible and comprehensive program for the welfare of the people. Most of its leaders were interested in capturing office than serving the nation. They started controversies against each other rather to

11 Ibid., p.30.

12 Ibid., p.31.

13 Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul-Haq, Greenwood Publishing, Westport, 2012, p.213. Also see Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan: Role of Muslim League And Inception of Democracy 1947-54, Jang Publishers, 1997, pp.166-171.

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strengthen the country14. They were largely responsible for damaging the prestige of the party and democratic process in the country. Their differences and rivalries undermined the organization and discipline of the party and caused its disintegration. Some of its members left the party. Division of Muslim League started in 1947 and it was bifurcated the party into two parts. In 1948, the PML Council adopted a party constitution which disqualified ministers from holding any office in the party organization. When Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s name was proposed for the president, he refused. As a result, Muslim League could not get benefits from the leadership of Jinnah. Chaudhary Khaliq-uz-Zaman was elected the chief organizer and was assigned the responsibility of organizing the party at different levels. But, he could not prove himself as an alternative of the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s charismatic and dynamic leadership qualities. He was unable to run the party in more organized manner. He patronized his supporters in the provinces and the party became as his loyalist group. As the internal divisions sharpened, the PML began to lose its integrity. Due to poor state of affairs, he was forced to resign from the office as the president of the party15.

After the exit of Khaliq-uz-Zaman, PML amended the party constitution to pave way for election of as its president. The amendment was so smooth that he was easily elected as the president of the party in 1950. Even Liaquat Ali Khan could not revive and retrieve party status and reputation for several reasons given bellow:

 In fact firstly, he was too busy in government affairs rather than to pay attention in party affairs.  Secondly, party was identified and handmade of the government.

14 , The Sole Spokesman Jinnah, The Muslim League And The Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp.114-119. Also see Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul- Haq,p.218.

15 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman Jinnah, pp.120-124. Also see Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul- Haq, pp.220-221.

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 Thirdly, Liaqat Ali Khan encouraged personal affiliations in the provinces against rivals. Therefore, party was going towards division16.

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, khawaja Nazim-ud-Din became the prime minister of Pakistan and he was also elected the party president after the amendment in party constitution to facilitate him. Nazim-ud-Din was essentially weak person who showed lack of interest in running the party. He did not even nominate all the members of working committees for consulting national affairs. Gradually, it became so weak when Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad dismissed Nazim-ud- Din in 1953, and appointed Muhammad Ali Bogra as prime minister, he was readily accepted the PML president. These events exposed the worthlessness of the party organization, and shock the confidence of the people in its capabilities17.

In 1956, the constitution of the party was amended to exclude ministers from holding party offices. After this, Sardar Abdur-Rab Nishtar was elected its president. He was indeed a man having strong leadership qualities. He restored discipline of the party. After his death, Abdul Qayuom Khan was elected as new president of the PML. He kept up firm control on the activities of the PML members in the assembly according to party discipline. Under his partnership, Muslim League regained its reputation and integrity to great extent. In 1958, first Martial Law was imposed which banned all the Political activities.18

Mushtaq Ahmad highlighted the role of Muslim League in politics thus soon; party was deprived of its top leadership. Party organization was thrown out of gear by the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. The leaders of the party were neither sincere nor they possess capability to organize party on strong basis. For these reasons, party

16 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman Jinnah, pp.125-127. Also see Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul- Haq, pp.232-236.

17 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman Jinnah, pp.128-131. Also see Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul- Haq, p.152.

18 Aleem Al-Razi, Constitutional Glimpses of Martial Law: In India, Pakistan And Bangladesh, 1988, pp.141-144.

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was divided and lost its glamour and glory soon after partition19. Party was packed with yes men of the president. It could not perform its main function of controlling the policies of the government. It had not courage to place any program before the assembly. It would meet and dispersed at the sweet will of the president20.

Pakistan Democratic Party

The Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) came into existence in1969 after the merger of political parties namely Nizam-e-Islam Party, Awami League, National Democratic Front and the Justice Party. At the time of merger, these parties’ leaders were Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, Nawabzada Nasurullah Khan, Nur-ul-Amin and Air Martial respectively. They were noted for their moderate views and strong belief in the unity and solidarity of Pakistan. The PDP aimed at creating a democratic social order and Islamic values of justice, equity, freedom, universal brotherhood and human dignity in conformity with the Holy Quran and Sunnah21.

The PDP maintained a national policy at the time when several other parties had adopted regional approaches for national problems. It was a broad based party with liberal political perception and its members were lawyers, old political workers and ex-service men. In 1970 elections, the Manifesto of the party called for the grant of fundamental rights, acceptance of 1956 constitution with certain amendments in pursuance of independent foreign policy, separation of judiciary from executive, withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO, teaching of Holy Quran and Islamiat22 to Muslim children, elimination of economic and social disparity, nationalization of big industry and the need of land reforms23.

19 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Kahn Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-69, The University of Michigun, Michigun, 1971, p.199.

20 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman Jinnah, pp.178-179.

21 Nazeer Ahmed, political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead. The University of Michigun, Michigun, 2004, pp.67-69. Also see Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan, pp.132-136.

22 Islamiat mean ‘Islamic Studies’.

23 Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan, pp.170-178. 16

During 1971-77, the PDP played an active role in the opposition ranks. It was extremely critical of the PPP’s government and undemocratic and authoritarian political management. The PDP refused to accept the election results due to the charge of rigging of the election by the ruling party. It took active part in agitation against Bhutto’s government and demanding fresh elections. Nawabzada Nasurullah Khan played an important role in the movement and the PNA for resolving the political crisis. After the imposition of Martial Law by General Zia-ul-Haq, PDP joined the government24.

Tehrik-E-Istaqlal

Air (retired) Muhammad Asghar Khan is the founding father of the party. He entered in politics at the most appropriate time. In October 1968, the movement against Ayub Khan was gradually picking up pace. The students and labor agitation and demonstration against government had become regular feature. The Tehrik-e-Istaqlal(TI) gathered in its ranks various ideological and political elements comprised socialist, moderate, rightists and fewer bureaucrats. In its program the party advocated, economic amelioration, fair distribution of wealth, Islamic justice and independent foreign policy25. During the 1977 elections, it joined the PNA against the PPP. It played an important role in PNA election campaign and the subsequent movement against election rigging in 1977. The PNA and PDP combined in a military take over when General Zia-ul-Haq constituted federal cabinet representing the armed forces and the PNA, the Tehrik-e-Istaqlal refused to join and withdrew from the PNA. The Tehrik resumed its role in the opposition, when Zia-ul-Haq did not honor his promise to hold elections in 197926. It demanded withdrawal of the Martial Law, fresh general elections and restoration of the 1973 constitution. The Tehrik joined the MRD and fully participated in its activities. The Tehrik boycotted in 1985 nonparty elections in pursuance of the decision taken by the MRD but actively participated in 1988 elections. In its manifest party promised the abolition of feudal system, in

24 Ibid., pp.179-180.

25 Rafiullah Shehab, The Politcal History of Pakistan, pp.141-143.

26 Ibid., pp.161-166.

17

expensive justice, religious freedom free press, elimination of corruption, self reliance unemployment allowance and non-aligned foreign policy. But party could not fare well in the elections in spite of its long history of political struggle and well-organized party structure27.

National Awami Party

National Awami Party (NAP) was established in 1957. It was merger of six minor parties including Azad Pakistan Party, Red Shirt, Sindh Awami Mahaz and Sindh Haari Committee28. The NAP’s main objectives were the breakup of in West Pakistan, introduction of land reforms, regional autonomy, and abrogation of defense pacts with the west and adaption of independent foreign policy. Earlier, the leaders of this party opposed the demand for the creation of Pakistan and sided with the Indian National Congress (INC) in the freedom struggle. Since then, they had worked for united India. They naturally faced problems regarding finding their role in the national politics of Pakistan. It could not get support in national level by the masses over its stance of provincial autonomy regarding establishment of Pakhtunistan for the Pathans and Sindhu Desh for the Sindhees. This party was not properly organized and its different factions held opposite ideology29.

Jamaat-E-Islami

The Jamat-e-Islami (JI) was established in on August 26, 1941, as a movement to endorse Socio-Political Islam30. There were just 75 people in its first meeting. Before the foundation of Jamat-e-Islami, Sayyad Abul Aa'la Moududi was recognized for his writings regarding the role of Islam in . As an advocate of the ideological state, Moududi played a significant and debatable role during the

27 Ibid., pp.170-178.

28 Anthony Hyman, Pakistan: Zia And After, Abhinav Publishers, New , 1989, pp.210-211. Also see Peter R. Blood, Pakistan: A Country Study, Oxford University Perss, London, 1996, p.222.

29 Ibid., pp.223-224.

30 Irfan Ahmad, And Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami, Press, New Jersy, 2009, p.23.

18

regime of Pakistan Movement. His ideology had since been prominent among Islamist fundamental groups around the world, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood (a political party and organization) in Egypt31.

Abul Aa’la Moududi adopted Islamist philosophy after analyzing various factors including the Khilafat Movement, the end of the Ottoman Caliphate by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, the leadership crisis in all over the Muslim world, Influence of Indian Nationalism over Muslims, and the approach of the Indian National Congress and Hindus. At last in 1940, (when the All India Muslim League passed the Lahore Resolution, later called Pakistan Resolution) he promulgated among Muslims of British India that they are not just a nation and their purpose is not only the founding of a national government, but they are also as a preacher and messenger nation32.

Moududi wrote essays and articles about political problems. He gave comprehensive discussions regarding patriotism and opposed the propaganda of congressional scholars who were arguing that all the people of the British India were just one nation, and trying to congregate every one under the guidance of Congress against the British administration33. Moududi condemned the leaders of Indian National Congress (INC) by saying that these so-called nationalists were asking for the autonomy that he considered as worse than the British rule. He considered them equivalent to the Robert Clive, and an English author Wellesley, and several other Muslims who were following them are same like Meer Jafar and Meer Sadiq. The circumstances and situations were diverse, but he believed the natural history of the contention and sedition was the same things. He not even rejected them but also countered them by arguing that and Nationalism are not dissimilar than the Shuddhi Movement. He argued that there was no difference in consequences and everyone should refuse to accept all of them. Due to such socio-political Islamic views of Moududi, Allama advised Muslims of India to leave

31 Ibid., pp.24-26.

32 Irfan Ahmad, Islamism And Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami,pp.27-30.

33 Ibid., pp.32-33.

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Congress and join Moududi34. Hussain Ahmed Madni supported Indian Nationalism and derived his motive from the Constitution of Medina. Moududi rejected his arguments and views and said that the Charter was not about designing joint government, mutual council, shared courts, combined party, united society, united education or majority based political structure.35

Zafar Ahmad Ansari who was Joint Secretary of All India Muslim League(ALM), analyzed the essays and articles related to the topic of nationalism and reached at the conclusion that it was not only a debate but it was also a mutual slap of ideology of Congress and Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind.36 Moududi believed that the INC to be a deceitful organization and was a voice of Pundat Jawahar Lal Nehru. He said that Nehru opposed religion openly and was an opponent of any separation on foundation of religion. He argued that Nehru assessed that Muslims were morally weak and he was trying to amalgamate Islam into the Hindu religion37.

JI has been started working actively in Pakistan by willingly helping in relief camps for migrants. It amplified the societal work, started congregation covering of sacrificial animals on Eid-ul-Azha and established many clinics and hospitals.38 In 1953, JI led a movement against the Ahmadiya community (called Mirzai or Lahori) in Pakistan that became the cause of Lahore unrest in 1953, and selective announcement of Martial Law.39 Moududi was under arrest by the military operation, headed by Azam Khan and Rahim-ud-Din Khan, and punished to death on the accuse of writing a treasonable booklet about the Ahmadiya issue. He turned down the chance to enter an appeal for sympathy, expressing a first choice for death rather than looking for forgiveness. Strong public stress eventually persuaded

34 Ibid., pp.34-36.

35 Irfan Ahmad, Islamism And Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami, Press,pp.37-39.

36 Ibid., p.41.

37 Ibid., pp.51-55.

38 Ibid., pp.56-59.

39 Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And Coercion:Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan, Guenica Edition Inc, Montreal, 1989, pp.143-144.

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the government to convert his death punishment to life custody. Eventually, his punishment was canceled40.

As a consequence of insist for an Islamic state, various activists of Jamat-e- islami were sent to jail41. Even with all this, Jamat-e-islami continued its resist until Chaudhary Muhammad Ali structured and imposed the Constitution of Pakistan in 1956, which was parallel to the ideology of Jamat-e-islami. This party initiated the strong movement in support of a separate electoral system for various religious sects and communities in the era of Suharwardy’s government. However, Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy arranged a meeting of the National Assembly at Dhakka and by creating a coalition with Republicans, passed a bill for a mixed voting system in Pakistan42. In 1958, JI shaped a coalition with the Muslim League, led by Abdul Qayum Khan; and with the Nizam-e-Islam Party, headed by Chudhary Muhammad Ali. They criticized behavior of Iskandar Mirza. Due to the actions of this coalition, the status of Iskandar Mirza was strongly spoiled and seeing no potential he determined to implement Martial Law in the country43.

After the Martial Law of 1958, Muhammad Ayub Khan met with Molana Moududi and directed him not to participate in politics. When Ayub Khan left up the ban over political parties, Jamat-e-Islami was first to be energetic. Similarly, in the presidential elections of 1964–65, Jamat-e-Islami supported Fatima Jinnah (sister of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: founder of Pakistan). In 1965 during Indo-Pak war, Jamat-e-Islami helped the Ayub government for appealing of Jehad to the people, serving war sufferers and receiving economic and ethical support from several Arab countries. The leadership of Jamat-e-Islami focused upon nationalistic speeches from . Jamat-e-Islami had also the main strength in Pakistan Democratic Movement against Ayub dictatorial regime. When Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto

40 Ibid., pp.145-146. Also see Wison John, Pakistan: The Struggle Within, Oxford University Press, London, 1989, p.96.

41 Ibid., p.97.

42 Ibid., p.98.

43 Ibid., p.101.

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and Molana Bhashani raised the motto of Socialism throughout this movement, Jamat-e-Islami resisted it44.

In the manifesto for first general election in 1970, Jamat-e-Islami supported provincial autonomy (not up to six points of Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman) and stated the Quran and Sunnah as foundations of law45. Separating judiciary from government and assurance of fundamental rights of minorities was also included in this policy. A strong association with the Muslim world was suggested in foreign policy. Jamat-e- Islami was totally against the nationalization but in favor of grabbing the unlawful property. Maximum possession of land was recommended to be 100 acres and 200 acres for rainy and canal areas respectively46. So, the irregular economic circumstances can be controlled. The agenda of economic impartiality was purposed as an alternative of economic equality and promised equal jobs opportunities for unemployed people. The Bonus Share Scheme was publicized so that factory employees and human resource can own shares of their company. Some days before holding the elections, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan broke the alliance which became a reason of defeating Jamat-e-Islami who was contesting against the Pakistan Peoples Party and Awami League, having slogans of provincial autonomy and socialism. Now, Jamat-e-Islami won only four seats of National Assembly and four of Provincial Assembly47.

Jamat-e-Islami resisted till the last minute against the separatist movement of East Pakistan by the Awami League. Islami Jamiat-e-Talba (a student wing of jamat- e-Islami) organized the Al-Badar force and struggled against the Bengali nationalist army, Mukti Bahini. In this civil war of 1971, members of Jamat-e-Islami had been

44 Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And Coercion: Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan, pp.159- 160. Aso see Wison John, Pakistan : The Struggle Within, p.102.

45 Ibid., p.103.

46 Ibid., p.104.

47 Ibid., p.105. Also see Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And Coercion : Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan, pp.161-162.

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accused of vigorously collaborating with the Pakistan Army in killing millions of innocent Bangalis48.

During Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's administration, Vice-Ameer of Jamat-e-Islami Dr.Nazir Ahmad was murdered and many other activists including members of Islami Jamiat-e-Talba, were sent to jail. Several members had been politically victimized. But when, the Pakistan Peoples Party remained unsuccessful to get political power in colleges and universities, and youth started criticism on Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. That resistance became a reason of birthing many leaders who are now in the leading political parties in Pakistan49.

In 1976, Jamat-e-Islami's streets influence increased by two hundred thousand new workers when it vowed to organize marches towards Islamabad for implementing Islamic laws. In 1977, Moududi paved jointly a grand coalition of rightist religious parties and commenced a "civil disobedience campaign" leading to his detain50. Now, Jamat-e-Islami had become so influential that the Sunni (Vahabi sect) Government of intervened to protect Moududi's release by hanging the specter of revolution in Pakistan. Jamat-e-Islami had also very important position in the Pakistan National Alliance's (PNA) resistance against the Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's government before imposition of 1977 Martial Law51.

Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam

Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) was founded in 1945, and Molana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was elected its president. This party made significant contribution to the Muslim League’s victory in winning 1945-46 elections52. Its services were greatly

48 Wison John, Pakistan: The Struggle Within, p.106. Also see Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And Coercion:Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan, pp.162-163.

49 Wison John, Pakistan: The Struggle Within, p.107. Also see Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And Coercion:Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan, pp.164-165.

50 Ibid., pp.107-108.

51 Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience And Coercion:Ahmadi Muslims And Orthodoxy in Pakistan,pp.166- 167.

52 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, Brooking Institute Press, London, 2004, p.234. 23

recognized by Pakistan Muslim League leadership. This party contested election in 1970 and won seven national assembly seats. Its general secretary Mufti Mehmood defeated Bhutto in constituency from Dera Islamil Khan. It has worked and demanded imposition of Islamic Sheriah. This party has shown flexibility and tolerance in politics53.

Jamiat-Ulema-e-Pakistan

Jamiat-e-Ulema-Pakistan (JUP) was set up by the School of thought in 1948, with Molana Abdul Hamid Badauni as its president54. It wanted Islamic system in Pakistan. It enjoyed the support of Peers and Mushaikh. Its first direct participation in the election was in 1970, and it managed to win some seats. During 1977 elections, it joined the Pakistan National Alliance and introduced the slogan of Nizam-e- Mustafa (Islamic System); a slogan which became popular in the opposition against Bhutto’s Government in 1977. When the PNA joined Zia’s cabinet, JUP dissociated itself from the alliance. After that, it struggled for lifting of Martial Law and restoration of democracy under 1973 constitution. The JUP did not take part in 1984 non-party based elections. The manifesto of the party had been demanded for enforcement of Islamic laws in the country. The electoral support of this party was limited55.

Jeay Sindh Qoumi Mahaaz

Ghulam Murtaza Shah Syed was the founder of Jeay Sindh Qoumi Mahaaz(JSQM) in 1972, and its basic aim was to get separation of Sindh from Pakistan and converting it into Sindhudesh56. This demand was on same paradigm as Awami League demanded for East Pakistan. The supporters of this party claimed that federation of Pakistan was against the rights of Sindhies as well as they are

53 Ibid., p.235.

54 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan,p.180.

55 Ibid., pp.180-186.

56 Farah Hanif Sadiqui, The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan, Routledge, Oxon, 2012, p.115.

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demanding for separate country according to the Lahore Resolution of 1940, which was an actual demand of more than one state57.

After formation of Pakistan, Ghulam Murtaza Shah Syed (called G.M Syed) firstly, acted as a Chairman of Sindhi Abadi board in 1947. Then, in 1955, he was an active politician in formation of Pakistan National Party. He established Bazm-e- Sufia-e-Sindh in 1966, and in 1969, he established Sindh United Front. After separation of East Pakistan, He formed Jeay Sindh Mahaaz. He was a supporter of Pakistan’s division into several linguistic states58.

Communist Party of Pakistan

Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) was established in March 6, 1948, in Calcutta (India). During the second session of Communist Party of India, the party decided to separate its sessions for newly independent state of Pakistan. So, Sajjad Zaheer became general secretary of CPP for West Pakistan while East Pakistan Provincial Committee had also been established during this session. This party faced sanctions from the Government of Pakistan in reaction of Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case in 1951. So its leaders had been poisoned in an accuse of initiating communist revolution in Pakistan59.

CPP worked in East Pakistan with Awami League and its 23 members were elected as the member of provincial assembly in 1954. On the other hand, due to ban on its working in Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case, CPP leadership established Azad Pakistan Party in 1957, which later merged into another leftist party; National Awami Party. All Pakistan Peasants Association was initiated in 1958, from this platform. According to United States Department, CPP had 3,000 members in 1960s. CPP launched its Magazine in Urdu Language in Europe as well which name was “Baghawat” (Rebellion). During Sino-Soviet Split; a group which was favoring

57 Ibid., p.116.

58 Ibid., pp.116-117.

59 Shafique Ali Khan, The Demand for India And The Communist Party of India, Pakistan Historical Society, Islamabad, 1986, p.69.

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Chinese side, got separation from East Pakistan Provincial Committee of CPP. In 1968, during fourth session of CPP, decision was taken that there must be a separate communist party for East Pakistan. So, Communist Party of East Pakistan was established which later converted into Communist Party of Bangladesh60.

Republican Party of Pakistan

The Republican Party of Pakistan(RPP) was established by the supporters of West Pakistan province in October 195561. This was actually a separated group of politicians from the Muslim League. Dr. Khan Sahib was its first president. The formation of this party was facilitated by civil-military bureaucracy. Malik , who was the Central Parliamentary Leader of this party, became the Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1957 to 195862. Nawab Muzafar Ali Khan, Sardar Ameer Azam Khan, Meher Muhammad Sadiq and Fazal Elahi Chaudhary from Gujrat, Sardar Abdul Hameed Khan from Muzaffargarh, from Lahore, Syed Hassan Mehmood from Rahim Yar Khan, Begum Khadija from Faisalabad, Nawab Sajjad Ali Khan from and Chaudhary Abdul Ghani from Sialkot were the prominent politicians from the Punjab Province63. Qazi Fazllulah From Larkana, Mirza Mumtaz Hassan from Khairpur, Meer Ali Ahmad Khan from Hyderabad, Syed Khair Shah from Nawabshah, Peerzada Abdus-Sattar from Sukkur and Najmuddin Laghari from Badin were the famous leaders from the Sindh Province64. Sardar abdul Rasheed Khan, Noor Muhammad Khan, Jalal-ud-Din Khan and the President of the Party; Dr. Khan Sahib were from the Bannu District of North West Frontier Province (Now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)65. Similarly, Meer Ghulam Qadir Khan from Lesbela, Nawab from Dera Bugti and Sardar

60 Ibid., pp. 70-71.

61 J. Henry Korsan, Contemporary Problems of Pakistan, E. J. Brill, London, 1974, p.150.

62 Khursheed Kamal Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1958, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Islamabad, 2007, p.35.

63 Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People’s Power, W. Morrow Publications, Michigun, 1970, p.82.

64 Ibid., p.82.

65 Ibid., p.83

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umar Waleed Rind from Turbat were the renowned politicians from the Balochistan Province66.

Political parties are the core institution of the democratic process. Its significance for Pakistan is immense because the country itself is the product of a political and constitutional struggle. Political history of Pakistan has hindered in the smooth and harmonious development of the political parties. But, except for the first period of first Martial Law, they have maintained their presence on the political scene. Political parties in Pakistan have no specific method of maintaining the organization. The interrupted political process and lack of proper elections within parties have not only resulted in as unnecessary proliferation of political parties but also have impeded the emergence of responsible leadership with a national outlook. As a result, the leaders prefer to lead smaller parties with approach, and regional sectarian agenda undue derision and character assassination of the values are the major weapons especially in election campaigns. Such attitude generates intolerance and restricts the development of a stable party system and healthy polity. These political parties often have high slogans and unrealistic programs and promises. They use slogans of the topical nature to charm the politically uneducated masses in their ranks. Religious and economic issues are commonly exploited in an environment of poverty and illiteracy. The policy statements and speeches of the leaders hardly reflect any deep and serious understanding of the socio-economic problems and the ways and means to cope with these problems. It is important that the political parties develop a mature and articulate approach to socio-economic problems and engage in popular mobilization in realistic manners. The stabilization and success of the democratic process depends mainly on the quality of the political leadership and how the political parties discharge their primary responsibilities in the politics67.

66 Ibid.

67 Ravi Kalia, Pakistan: From The Rhetoric of Democracy To The Rise of Militancy. Routledge, New York, 2012, pp.15-16.

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Tashkand Agreement And Its Impacts

The year 1965 was quite eventful for Pakistan. The two most important events were the presidential elections and Indo-Pak war, both with great bearing for the Ayub regime and the future Politics of Pakistan. The presidential elections were held through the system of Basic Democracy. All the political forces in Pakistan had been opposed the indirect and party-less system of elections, but Ayub Khan rejected their demand for direct election68.

In 1965, war broke out between India and Pakistan. This war continued for 17 days and both sides were exhausted within a few days. There was the critical situation on all the sectors during the war. So, pressure built up on both countries for a ceasefire. The scene for talk was UN Security Council. Pakistan’s conditions for the ceasefire were; complete withdrawal of troops from Jammu and Kashmir, induction of an Afro-Asian UN force to maintain peace and security and a plebiscite within three months of the ceasefire. The soft spoken and mild mannered law Minister S.M Zafar was first sent to plead Pakistan case. When he was considered to be ineffective, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto went to plead Pakistan. In a passionate speech, he put forward Pakistan’s point of view over Jammu and Kashmir. His speech described ever best heard there. This speech in UN extolled his status69.

In Pakistan, the US and the Soviet representatives showed remarkable understanding in pushing through the Security Council and agreed ceasefire resolution. Surprisingly, it was French representative who unsuccessfully tried to get an anti-Pakistan resolution in biased tone. Ayub Khan attempted but failed to persuade the US to accept an active mediatory role. Even after this failure and despite advice to the contrary from certain sections of the opposition and Chinese leadership, he accepted the ceasefire resolution. The war showed actual relationship of Pakistan with the rest of world. It demonstrated that the rift that had occurred in the Muslim

68 Ghulab Mishra, Indo-Pakistan Relations: From The Tashkent Agreement To The , Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1987, p.414. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement, Deep & Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1981, p.81.

69 Ghulab Mishra, Indo-Pakistan Relations: From The Tashkent Agreement To The Simla Agreement, p.415. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement, p.82.

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world following the sign of Baghdad pact had somewhat been bridged. But, Muslim countries could provide only moral and diplomatic support, not material support to Pakistan70.

China supported Pakistan absolutely since it perceived that India had launched attack with US involvement to punish Pakistan for developing relations with . China supported Pakistan on Kashmir having no knowledge of Pakistan operation in the Kashmir, China president denounced this action as naked aggression that violated international law and threat to peace in Asia when president Ayub Khan was signing the agreement they warned him about the pitfalls in signing a peace agreement but never interfered with the process of negotiations. Ayub Khan had expected positive response from Pakistan western alliance. When India launched attack, he immediately invoked the assurance, given to Pakistan under bilateral and multilateral agreement. But, the response from allies was disappointing. However, Soviet Union showed work keenness for mediatory role mainly with the intension to keep China away from South Asian scene71. Soviet Union showed neutrality in the Indo-Pak war and other disputes. Soviet premier appealed Ayub Khan to end hostility in Kashmir and offered the Soviet good office to settle all disputes, by negotiation72.

After 17 days bloody conflicts, Soviet Union was able to convince India and Pakistan to facilitate agreement on the re-establishment of peace. He offered to participate in the meeting if desired by both sides. Ayub Khan took some time to accept Soviet offer for peace. The UN resolution of 20th September demanded ceasefire from Pakistan and India by 22th September and withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the position held by them before 5 August, 1965. It promised steps to assist towards a settlement of the political problems and underlying the present conflict Fighting between the two countries stopped on 23 September. Pakistan

70 Ghulab Mishra, Indo-Pakistan Relations: From The Tashkent Agreement To The Simla Agreement, p.416. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement, p.83.

71 Ghulab Mishra, Indo-Pakistan Relations: From The Tashkent Agreement To The Simla Agreement, p.417. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement,p.84.

72 Ghulab Mishra, Indo-Pakistan Relations: From The Tashkent Agreement To The Simla Agreement, p.418. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement, p.83.

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worked for the post war Pak-India talk to be focused on the settlement of the Kashmir dispute under the US auspices but did not succeed in this Mission73.

He took time to realize that Soviet offer had American blessing and he had no other option but to accept it74. Ayub Khan and Shastry met in Tashkent in two days meeting’s talk two leaders agreed only to tolerate the friendly links that each insisted on having with the principle enemy of the other. No formal agenda was decided before the Tashkent meeting. The talk between the two countries was not expected to be smooth affair. Ayub Khan took along with him Zulfaqar Ali Bhuttto and some other officials. When the two sides sat down to decide the agenda, both soon reached at the dead lock. The stumbling block was Kashmir. India regarded non negotiable while Pakistan insisted the settlement of Kashmir issue. The deadlock was serious, after five days of talk it was reported that the delegations might leave Tashkent without any formal agreement. The talks were saved from total collapse at the last moment when Ayub was pressurized to change his stance on Kashmir otherwise he may lose the friendship of Soviets as well. The agreement reached by the two leaders was essentially Indian drafted in which Soviets make marginal changes75.

Ayub Khan deliberately kept out Bhutto and who were opposed to any agreement on Kashmir, away from final negotiation. This enhanced apprehension of Bhutto who believed that Ayub Khan need not have succumbed to the pressure directly accused of him. The nine point agreement was signed on January 10, 1966, marked by ambiguity, was open to different interpretations. The war end Tashkent declaration influenced the politics and economy of the country a great deal Bhutto Skillfully exploited the Tashkent agreement against Ayub Khan and it contributed the decline of Ayub Khan76.

73 Ghulab Mishra, Indo-Pakistan Relations: From The Tashkent Agreement To the Simla Agreement, p.419. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement, p.85.

74 Ibid., p.85.

75 Ghulab Mishra, Indo-Pakistan Relations: From The Tashkent Agreement To The Simla Agreement, p.419. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement,1981,p.86.

76 Ghulab Mishra, Indo-Pakistan Relations: From The Tashkent Agreement To The Simla Agreement, p.420. Also see Sukhawant Singh Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement,p.87.

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Failure of Democracy And Imposition of Martial Law 1969

The first decade of Pakistan parliamentary politics was marked by miserable failure. Endless constitutional wrangling meant that state was governed under the Government of India Act 1935 until 1956. By the time, the first Pakistan constitution was ratified. The Pakistan Muslim League was the only nationwide political party had been disintegrated and tradition was set of dissolution of provincial and national government. In its judgment, Supreme Court of Pakistan legitimized the Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad’s dismissal of the first Constituent Assembly. In the absence of nationwide elections, Pakistan had to wait until 1970 for the parliamentary system. Power slipped from Karachi to Army headquarters in Rawalpindi. The political and constitutional crisis generated tension between provinces and the center. Central government was identified with Punjab because the majority of military and civil bureaucracy came from Punjab. There were the major reasons of failure of democracy in Pakistan77.

Ian Talbot has explained the causes of failure of . He wrote in this context the simplest reason of 1958 Martial Law, which depicts the politicians as bringing the country to its knees through their misuse of power corruption and factional maneuverings. The Army as an institution had its motives and intensions for interventions78.

Khalid Bin Saeed traced Pakistan democratic failure back to early days of Jinnah’s Governor General Ship and his continuation of visceral system inherited from the . The executive got more and more powerful in early years of Pakistan. Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad (1951) and President Sikandar

77 Nasim Hassan Shah, Judgement on The Constitutions, Rule of Law And Martial Law in Pakistan,Oxford University Press,London,1993,p.69. Also see Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, Routledge, New York, 2008, p.35.

78 Nasim Hassan Shah, Judgement on The Constitutions, Rule of Law And Martial Law in Pakistan,p.70. Also see Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,p.35.

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Mirza (1956–58) who were also seasoned bureaucrats were responsible for the failure of democracy in Pakistan79.

Safdar Mehmood has linked Pakistan’s weak parliamentary politics directly with the performance of Muslim League. He cites among other factors the League’s corruption, institutional weakness and dominance of land lord interests. In comparison with the Indian National Congress during early independence era, Muslim League had been failed to evolve its role for the betterment of the country80.

Ayesha Jalal has convincingly depicted the contradiction between the requirement of state consolidation and political participation in Pakistan early years. The state’s pressing financial problems and strategic insecurities are portrayed as working against the decentralization of resources, and authority which would have enables the Pakistan Muslim League to secure popular basis of support. In these circumstances, it suffered from beginning and its decay furthered strengthening the states alliance on the army and bureaucracy for the exercise of authority. There also existed conflict between center and the provinces81. Aisha Jalal concludes her analysis of the back ground to the 1958 Martial Law by maintaining that the political process in the provinces had been curbed but not entirely crushed during the consolidation of state authority around its non-elected institutions82. Ravi Shekhar explains the political failure due to the bureaucracy and Military axis supported by USA83.

In highly secretive game of musical chair which followed Liaqat’s death, disregarding all constitutional conventions. The music stopped with Khawaja Nazim- ud-Din’s transfer from governor general seat to prime minister’s, in a portentous move for future, Gulam Muhammad became the Third Governor General of Pakistan.

79 Nasim Hassan Shah, Judgement on The Constitutions, Rule of Law And Martial Law in Pakistan, p.71. Also see Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, p.36.

80 Nasim Hassan Shah, Judgement on The Constitutions, Rule of Law And Martial Law in Pakistan, p.72. Also see Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, p.37.

81 Nasim Hassan Shah, Judgement on The Constitutions, Rule of Law And Martial Law in Pakistan,p.73. Also see Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,p.38.

82 Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,p.39.

83 Ravi Shekhar Narain, The Military Factor in Pakistan, Lancer Publishers, London, 2008, p.69.

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He was an intelligent, ruthless and highly ambitious and was expected to play active role in politics; on the other hand Nazim-ud-Din was pious but indolent figure. During his two years tenure Muslim League further atrophied and tension between eastern and western wings of the country intensified. He was also eager to become president of Muslim League. Once he installed, he failed miserably in his duty. Muslim League disintegrated due to lack of proper leadership and internal rifts of the Leaguers. Problems of the country like food shortage, inflation, and unemployment remained unattended and unrest, hatred was created among the people who were waiting for the man who could solve their problems. With the decline of Kawaja Nazim-ud-Din, the parliamentary system was survived for five years more. Real power now lay with Sikandar Mirza and Ayub Khan. When Muhammad Ali Bogra took the charge of prime minister, things had already gone uncontrolled and Muslim League suffered humiliating defeat in by-elections in different parts of the country. During this period, Military establishment developed relation with U.S and received heavy aids from the U.S. In 1956, Sikandar Mirza took the post of the president. General Ayub was watching this situation very closely. The president had thoroughly exploited the weakness in the constitution and had got everywhere connected with the political life of the country, utterly exposed and discredited. However, President Mirza could not have pursued his Machiavellian policies without the help of military. General Ayub as Commander-in-Chief had been the most powerful man in 1954-1955, when integration of Pakistan had been brought about throughout right intimidation. This policy had set in motion a chain reaction that President Mirza was trying to control. Mirza and Ayub were the two dominant leaders of the civil-military oligarchy that had decided that Pakistan could govern best by tightening the grip of these two institutions on its government and people84.

Khalid Bin Saeed writes in this context that among political leaders Suharwardy was perhaps the only leader who was firmly committed to freeing the political process from the clutches of the civil-Military oligarchy. He was prime Minister during 1956–1957 and try to build coalition with other political parties. But

84 Ashok Kapur, Pakistan in Crisis, Routledge, New York, 1991, pp. 118-120. Also see Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, NBO Publishers Distributrs, New Delhi, 1985, p.51.

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Mirza felt that coalition between Awami League party and West Pakistan Republican party would weaken his position he forced Suhrawardy to resign and he was successful in his mission85.

After his resignation, when Feroz Khan Noon became the prime Minster. Suharwardy pursued his plan of forging alliance between Punjab and Bengal, something that had not been attempted before. He was able to forge alliance between the two parties at provincial level. He was shrewd enough to realize that political stability at the federal level was not possible without some kind of an understanding between the major areas of Pakistan but the fatal flaw of his plan was that Punjabi leaders were hopelessly divided. An almost insurmountable obstacle that he faced was the opposition of President Mirza and General Ayub Khan because his plan countered their interest. The landed interests and the lower Middle class would have not only cut across ethnic divisions but might have out flanked the military and civil service oligarchy. It was significant that two leading figures Suharwardy and Ayub were being supported by the USA. As early as 1958, Mirza and Ayub had separately conveyed their opinion to US ambassador that only dictatorship would work in Pakistan. The whistle has to be blown before any democratic success might be scored in the promised national elections. It was the end of the beginning of Pakistan’s experiment with democracy. Mirza in 1400 words, statement justifying the introduction of Martial Law made specific reference to the disgraceful scenes in political field. He also castigated the politicians, ruthless struggle for power, corruption and prostitution of Islam for political ends. Before the Supreme Court judgment which legalized the regime, president Mirza announced the formation of cabinet. The Youthful Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was appointed as Commerce Minster and Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Administrator. The first public strain in Mirza-Ayub relationship appeared when both made contradictory statements about lifting the Martial Law. They may also have been friction resulting from his promotion of Lieutenant General Musa to CNC of army. The catalyst of Mirza’s dismissal however, was his reported meddling in Army affairs and attempt to instigate a counter Martial

85 Khalid bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, pp.112-116.

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Law on October 27, 1958. He was dismissed with the imposition of Martial Law by General Ayub Khan86.

Martial Law of 1969 And Its Political Consequences

After the existence of Ayub Khan, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan succeeded him. Ayub believed that his exist would be orderly and Yahya would quickly stabilized the country, using existing political system as the frame work of his actions87. Morris Jaowitz had noted Ayub never developed a personal Military dictatorship but during Yahya administration, the Military came to resemble a form of cabinet government without an electorate. In the beginning however, Yahya played the collegial game to perfection and thus was able to neutralize efforts aimed at having Ayub tried for what were allegedly by serious improprieties. In his period, Pakistan improved relations with US and China, and Yahya was encouraged to use his China connection in opening the way for a Washington-Beijing dialogue. But Yayah most immediate concern upon assuming power was the future of Pakistan’s political experience with Bhutto in the wings and significant influence over ruling Junta party political activity was rapidly reinstated in 1970. In spite of the prevailing Martial Law and politicians were bold enough to make demand of elections and lifting of Martial Law. Yahya Khan was imposing upon to permit political debate and immediately question turned toward need of new constitution. Attacks on presidential system appeared to guarantee that only a new parliamentary system would be acceptable and it was this objective in mind that Yahya Khan announced the general elections would be conducted on October 5, 197088.

Muhammad Siddique says that Yahya’s preference for the parliamentary system was supported, but not without resistance89. Lawrance Ziring stated that Yahya agreed with his colleagues that one unit scheme should be scrapped and former

86 Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,pp.101-113.

87 Dilip Mukerjee, Yahya Khan's Final War: India Meets Pakistan's Threat, NBO Publishers Distriburs, New Delhi, 1972, p.3.

88 Ibid.,pp.3-6.

89 Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,p.128.

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provinces of Pakistan must reconstitute. Thus, a Legal Frame Work Order (LFO) was proclaimed on March 30, 1970. The military Junta thus established the frame work for the new political order. In the beginning, he tried to curb corruption and improve public discipline. Among other developments like the formulation of laws for food adulteration, the publications against Islam and disrespectful to Quaid-e-Azam were punishable. System of accountability was established for the accountability of civil servants who could be dismissed for inefficiency, corruption and misconduct. Yahya announced the appointment of Council of Ministers on Augest 5, 197090.

Hamid Khan says in the preparation for the resumption of political activities, a regulation was promulgated in 1969 by the CMLA, laying down rules and guidance for the conduct of political campaign. According to this regulation, no party shall propagate opinions that were against the ideology of Pakistan and security of the country. In conformity with the reforms announced in 1969, full scale political activity in Pakistan began but election had to be postponed because of destruction brought by flood91.

Around twenty four parties were in contest. Since no one knew about voters preferences, each group believed that it had a chance. However, it was quite clear that Mujeeb in East Pakistan and Bhutto in the west wing would emerge as leading political leaders. Both were good orator and took full advantage of the radio and television to put forward their programs. They spoke out against concentration of wealth in a few hands and in advocating the nationalization of the industries. Bhutto laid stress upon foreign policy in his speeches. He was critical of USA and friendly towards china and espoused Kashmir cause of self-determination. Mujeeb’s platform was his condemnation of West Pakistan for everything that was wrong in East Pakistan92.

Election resulted in an over whelming victory of Mujeeb in East Pakistan and a large majority for Bhutto in West Pakistan. Bhutto and Mujeeb both wanted to

90 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in The Twenieth Century,pp.233-237.

91 Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan,pp.74-75.

92 Dilip Mukerjee, Yahya Khan's Final War: India Meets Pakistan's Threat, pp.6-7.

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become prime minster and none of them was ready to surrender premiership. As the transfer of power delayed with the passage of time, misunderstanding between the two increased. Mujeeb started demand of separate country instead of becoming prime Minister. This situation developed due to poor policy of Yahya Khan and the role of Bhutto in transfer of power was not positive93. In January 1971, Mujeeb and Bhutto met in Dhaka and they decided power transfer issue would be solved through talks94.

Munir Ahmad has put forward the case admirably. He says that problem of power could have been decided if Yahya did not demanded to remain president. He refused to quit power and asked both parties to accept him as president. Yahya Khan called the parliament session on February 15, 1971, but Bhutto wanted it to be postponed at least for six weeks. Session again was convened in March 1971, but both leaders failed to reach on power transfer formula. Consequently, Yahya Khan banned political activities and Mujeeb was arrested in the Charge of high treason. Yahya approached small scale army operation in East Pakistan. In December, India invaded East Pakistan and disintegrated East Pakistan form the west wing95.

From the above discussion, it may be safely concluded that Martial Law proved disastrous. It caused gloom and hopelessness all over the country. People felt wounded, institutions were destroyed, economy of the country showed rapid decline, political parties and politician played fowl and they prefer power and brought country to be torn into parts. In the back drop of such holocaust and destruction, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto gained power96.

Political scenario of Pakistan, since 1947 to 1977, had several ups and downs. Till 1958, Pakistan had experienced indirect bureaucratic rule. After assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan, bureaucracy played its role without any hesitation in influencing political affairs till 1958. After 1954, military bureaucracy had also been involved in this procedure when Ayub Khan became Chief of Army Staff. After imposing of

93 Ibid., p.7.

94 P. Sukumaran Nair, Indo-Bngladesh Relations, A.P.H Publishers Corporation, 2008, p.133.

95 Peter R. Blood, Pakistan: A Country Study, Oxford University Press, London, 1996, pp. 231-232

96 Ibid., p.233.

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Martial Law, Pakistan experienced presidential system and in 1969, again Martial Law had been imposed in Pakistan by Yahya Kahn. With his resigning after the fall of Dhakka, Bhutto became Civilian Martial Law Administrator. He became first elected prime minister of Pakistan after implementation of the new constitution of 1973. And, after second general elections, he again became a democratic prime minister for second time.

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Chapter 2

Political Activism And The Rise of Pakistan People’s Party

Bhutto’s Rising of Power:

The rise of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto to the position of the highest authority is the land marked and the climax of an extraordinary political career that began in October 1958, when at the age of thirty, he firstly entered the cabinet formed by President after the abrogation of the constitution of 1956, as Martial Law was imposed in the country. Although Iskandar Mirza was replaced shortly afterwards by General Muhammad Ayub Khan, but Bhutto was retained as a minister in the latter's cabinet. As a foreign minister, Bhutto's name was linked with a policy of close association with China and Islamic countries. He was a Westernized, well-educated, young and brilliant politician who made an impression at home and abroad.1

Those who took this revolution against Ayub Khan, dig their graves when they saw that Ayub Khan gave control of the government to the Chief of Army Staff General Yahya Khan and invited him for second Martial Law. In fact, he was forced to leave the presidency after a huge protest.2 As people were trying to snatch their socio-political rights and wanted to mold the political system according to their own will and demands, Ayub Khan said in his last speech as quoted by Lal Khan:

It is my wish that the political power should persist and to be relocated in constitutional manners into the condition existing in the country. It is

1 Syed Abdul Qudoos, : Politics of Chrisma, Lahore Publishing, Lahore, 1994, p.12. Also see Anwar Hussain Syed, The discourse And politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Macmillan, New York, 1992, p.58. And Junejo Rajputs: , Jan Muhammad Junejo, Jam Sadiq Ali, Chakar Ali Khan Junejo, (Historical Description), Books Group Staff, Islamabad, 2010.

2 Stanley A. Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life And Times, Oxford University Press, London, 1993, pp.251-252. Also see Asghar Khan, We Have Learnt Nothing From History,http:/ www,urdumania,com/urdu-topics-second-Martial-Law-in-pakistan.php (accessed on December 2, 2012).

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impossible to convince the national assembly some members even may not dare to attend the assembly session. It hurts me deeply that the situation is no longer under the government control and all the government institutions have become victim of concertina terror and threats. Each issue of the country is being decided in the streets. The imposition of Martial Law was in reaction of the socio-political crises that had deep roots in the society and were hosteling capitalist system. None of the leaders opposed its imposition. Instead, they welcome it at that time when the political circumstances had rapidly changed beyond their control with the masses making a shattering impact on the politics of Pakistan. In view of the confused situation, Yahya Khan made some peace-making remarks preceding the imposition of Martial Law had brought to face an unparalleled degree of Militancy in the labour movement when the government needed to control.3

To this end, Noor Khan made statements with the reference of social and economic circumstances under which thousands of workers were not receiving good treatment.4 Zafar Shaheed wrote in this context that the labour movement which workers initiated could not be controlled or changed by the rules and regulations. Similarly, the industrial conditions in this period were as the president of the entire textile Mills complained to the government that textile industry had been besieged by labour since 1969, when Yahya Khan imposed restrictions on political activities during his initial periods and this extended to industrial activities. This state of affairs indicates no fundamental change in government policy. Indeed government was neither competent nor eager to start essential changes in the economic system that was compulsory pre-region site for hurting the sort of amicable industrial relation. In any case, government was preoccupied with the political affairs of the country which proceeded from January to December 1970 and then with political chaos which led to war with India and the formation of Bangladesh.5

3 Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto And Pakistan: 1967-1977, Oxford University Press, London, 1997, pp.175-176.

4 , Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, Oxford University Press, London, 1988, P.213.

5 Hassan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise And Realization of Bengli Muslim Nationalism, Oxford university Press, London, 1996, pp.241-242.

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The leftists in Pakistan had already faced the severe blow of the role of Communist Party of India (CPI) leadership during the national liberation struggle and the suffering of partition. The new government in Pakistan intensified its repression against them since soviet conflict further damaged the unity and growth of the leftist forces in the country. In 1960, the major conflict between the different leftist and communist parties was further marred by the Sino-Soviet Split. Although there were no ideological and theoretical contradictions and dissent, they were blindly following Chinese philosophy and Stalinist patterns that were considered as guideline for the socialist groups and parties at that time.6 But the clash between the Stalinist7 bureaucracies on national level added further uncertainty among the large number of population throughout the world even among the advance workers while creating assured opportunities for the ideas of Marxism; it further complicated the mission of revolutionary Marxism.8

At the time of the partition, the Muslim communists of the CPI joined Muslim League as if the communists were believers in the sectarian division of the people. It was not accidental that the author of the election manifesto and program of the Muslim League was communist. Danial Litifi and Stalin’s classification proved to be an ideological and political disaster for the CPI in the practical politics of South Asia. The CPI later in its various meetings condemned this mistake however, it was too late. In Pakistan, Communist Party could never become even a mssodest mass party due to its ideological policy. There was no doubt that successive government in Pakistan was essentially so weak and left the movement in the region. Hence, throughout the first five decades, every regime was against the left activists even when they were not a substantial enough force to cause any serious threat to the state and established system.9

6 Leonard Binder, Religion And Politics in Pakistan, The University of California, California, 1961, p.181. Also see Raheem Khan, Future of Communist Party of Pakistan,…..(Urdu Column), The Daily Jang, Karachi, March 20, 1971.

7 Stalin was The second President of Soviet Union.

8 John L. Esposito, Islam And Democracy: Center of Muslims-Christians Understanding, The Georgetown University, New York, 1996, P.114.

9 Ibid., pp.115-117.

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The uninterrupted repression by the state was one of the factors which to some extend hindered the growth of the communist parties in Pakistan but when and where had Bolshevik party, not been subjected to state repression. Nevertheless, they did gain a mass basis led safe socialist revolution and transformed society. The main causes of the failure of communists in Pakistan were not religion nor the organizational or individual characteristics and personalities of the leaders not to blame.10

Populism was mainly the product of the contradiction between the Stalinist ideology of two Slageism11 and the socialist aspirations and character of the mass movements that had corrupted mainly in ex-colonial countries, particularly in the post second world war period. The most significant examples have been Peronism12 in Argentina, Soekarnoism13 in Indonesia, Nasserism14 in Egypt. The phenomenon of modern populism was based on individual leaders who came to force through historical accidents and who gained support by revolutionary sloganeering and socialist rhetoric. It also reflected a certain primitive culture that gave rise to an exaggerated role and dependence on individuals as liberator and hero of the people. This extraordinary reliance and popularity get them immense political and authority to enhance their support, they could go to the extent of radical reforms. As for overthrow capitalism they neither had understanding with the revolutionary ideology and organizational structure and the ability to overthrow the old order. However, in the absence of traditional workers, they became new political traditional modes of expression of the people.15

10 Ibid,. p. 120.

11 Stageism is an ideology of three stages. First stage is democratic revolution in third world countries, second stage is economic development in these countries and the third stage is socialist revolution that happens when these countries achieve economic development.

12 Peronism means Social Justice. This was a movement, initiated by Justicialist Party in Argentina.

13 A political and economic philosophy of Indonesian first president Soekarno.

14 This was a political philosophy of the second Egyptian President Jamal Abdul Nasser. This philosophy combines the elements of Arab socialism, International non-alignment, developing world solidarity, anti-imperialism, nationalism and republicanism.

15 John L. Esposito, Islam And Democracy, Center of Muslims-Christians Understanding, pp.121-134.

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Zulfaqar Ali Bhuto was very shrewd politician, had sense of observing the mood of the masses, and also had embarked upon the need for socialism. The PPP program clicked the masses and it became the largest party of the people in the history of Pakistan. Lal Khan narrates:

The founding convention of the PPP was held at Dr. home at Lahore in 1967. The founding documents were prepared by Bhutto and J.A. Rahim. They were very radical for socialist change in the aims and objectives of the new part.16

The founding document of PPP said:

The ultimate objective of the party is the attainment of a classless society which is only possible through socialism in our time. Bhutto made very passionate and vigorous speech. In the speech he said, we have to tackle basic anomalies, change this system and put an end to exploitation. This can only be done by socialism. That is why our party stands for socialism. After founding convention, Bhutto went into full political action across the country. In fact, people desired for radical change. To galvanize those burning aspirations, he went all over the country, presenting himself as the revolutionary socialist who would lead the transformation of society through revolutionary change. In one of speech Bhutto said: “My dear friends it is said that I am a wealthy man and feudal lord. It is said that I have no right to struggle for socialism without distributing my wealth among the people. Socialism can be introduced only when all means of production are brought under state control. But even so I hereby announce that if my wealth can be of any good I will not hesitate to give it away.17

The men and women who gathered to found PPP were diverse in terms of their social identities and previous political affiliation, ideological proclivities and general characteristics. Students and anti-feudalists regarded Bhutto as a genuine progressive

16 Kalim Baahadur, Democracy in Pakistan: Crisis And Conflicts, Oxford univesity Press, London, 1998, p.322.

17 Pakistan People’s Party. www.ppp.org.pk (accessed March 07, 2013).

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democratic socialist, who would with the aid of a highly organized political party seek a socialist reconstruction of the economy and society of Pakistan.18

The PPP had emerged a broad based opposition movement held together by a single dominating figure since in power; it faced the problem which had defeated its predecessors. PPP claimed to be a revolutionary party but in the subsequent event, PPP failed to break with Past patterns of Political organization in Pakistan. Party functioning instead of elected institutions and formal structures, revolved around the utilization of patronage. The result was growing factionalism, dependent on Bhutto’s Personal support for authority and an increasing rift between the leftist groups who attached more importance to organization. They were also disillusioned by the entry of rural notables into the party. The situation might have been different if the party had been move strongly institutionalized before it came into power.19

Ian Talbot made very interesting comments on the situation. The comprehensive reorganization which took place in December 1976 still emphasized personal loyalties over effective institutionalization. Bhutto himself selected higher office holders in his secretariat and those at the district level and below unfortunately decision making power was totally been centralized and Bhutto had personalized the PPP much as Indra Gandhi stood for the Congress in India. At this juncture, PPP real decline and downfall started. As Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was surrounded and encircled by sycophants and they replaced creative thought as the key to influence in the formation of the party. Even person like J.A. Rahim who had drafted the PPP foundation, found himself out in the cold in July 1974, after he had the boldness publically to disagree with Bhutto’s handling of affairs. In third world countries like Pakistan, democracy was passing through evolutionary phase, it has been the dilemma of these countries, here personalities not institutions rule the people and they made decisions regarding the fate and future of the state. So, that was the case with PPP.20

18 Maleeha Lodhi, Bhutto, The Pakistan People’s Party And Political Devemopment in Pakistan: 1967- 1977, The University of London, London, 1980, pp.342-346.

19 Ibid., pp.346-347.

20 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, C.Hurst & Company Publishers Limited, London, 2009, pp.263-267. 44

Ziring writes that factional divisions went hand in hand with the PPP’s increasingly clientele politics. This was illustrated most clearly by the clash in Punjab between Sheikh Rasheed and Ghulam Mustaf Khar.21 , a land lord from Muzzafar Garh used the well-established techniques of harassment not only on personal rivals but on ideological opponents such as Mahmood Ali Kasuri, who protested against the party’s growing authoritarianism at both national and province level.22The rising tide of violence as seen in the assassination and attacks on opposition and PPP figures like those who died by the bullets included Molvi Shahabuddin, Khawaja Rafique and Abdus Samad Wali Khan and Asghar Khan cheated death on number of occasions.23Talbot argued that corresponding to Rashid and Khar in Punjab and Jaam Sidiq and Rasual Bakhsh Talpur in Sindh and in the frontier province, Humajaan Saifullah and Habibullah Khan.24 With the speech of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto on August 16, 1973, violence got increase.25 This seems that from the above discussion that party deterioration and downfall began soon after its foundation. Party was not given due time and right policies to establish itself on strong footing. Things began to slip from the grip of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.26

Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto failed to introduce fair and transparent democratic system rather one can say he introduced preferential politics in the country. Sindhees were disproportionately represented in the main institution of the Pakistan. This situation created various differences among Sindees,Mohajars and others ethnic groups. The situation was further exacerbated by the national government’s introduction in 1973, a new quota system for federal employment. Mohajars hold one third of the gazetted posts in the civilian bureaucracy although their share of the total population by the

21 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twenieth Century, Oxford University Press, London, 1999, pp.275- 277

22 Maleeha Lodhi, Bhutto, The Pakistan People’s Party And Political Devemopment in Pakistan: 1967- 1977, p.113.

23 Ibid., p.114.

24 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp.169-172.

25 The Daily Jang, Karachi, August 17, 1973.

26 Maleeha Lodhi, Bhutto, The Pakistan People’s Party And Political Devemopment in Pakistan: 1967- 1977, pp.390-392.

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early 1970 was very low. The resentment caused by this discrimination in favor of rural Sindhees was intensified by the extension of the application of the quota system in educational institutions and the domicile issues.27

Bhutto And The Bureaucracy

Bhutto sought to limit the power of the military and civil establishment. These unelected institutions of the Pakistan inherited and upheld the pre-independence traditions of Britian. Their disarray and disappointing role in the wake of succession of Dhakka provided him with an unparalleled opportunity for breaking with the past. But, the hopes for radical change in the traditional civil-military configuration of power were to be cruelly disappointed. Bhutto became easily reliant on both the army and the civil service.28 Hassan Askari Rizvi has detailed the steps which Bhutto take in order to establish control over the army whose myth of invincibility has been shattered in the swamp of east Bengal. Twenty nine senior officers of the military were removed from their offices within first four month of Bhutto’s assumption of power including the chief of the army staff, General Gul Hassan khan who was replaced by General and seemingly plant General Zia was to succeed him on his retirement in 1976. A commission, chaired by Humood-ur-Rehman; Chief Justice of Pakistan was set up to move into the military catastrophe in Pakistan. Its findings have never been made public. In addition Bhutto took number of measure to reduce military long term influence in the state affairs. These include the restructuring of the military high command in order to disperse power and the reduction of the tenure of chief of Army staff to three years. The most controversial reform was the creation of the Federal Security Force (FSF) under the control of federal government

27 Subarta Kumar Mitra, Political Parties of South Asia, Greenwood Publishing, Westport, 2004, pp.17.18.

28 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto:A journey of Renaissance; A pictorial record of President Bhutto's Whirlwind Tours of Africa And Middle East, Research Report, Department of Films and Publications, 1972. Also see Krishna K. Tummala, Comparative Bureaucratic Systems, Rowman And Little Field Publishing Group, Maryland, 2005, pp.251-252.

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and its duty was to assist police in maintaining law and order. This was highly professional and well equipped task force, opponents of Bhutto criticized it as an oppressive private army and its existence along with People’s guard reminded serving army officers of Bhutto’s earlier call for the replacement of a conventional force by people’s Army. Such anxieties were increased when on returning from an overseas visit Bhutto inspected a guard of honor of the people guards rather than an Army contingent. Military resentment and displeasure was expressed in the refusal to train FSF recruits. Significantly, one of the first action of Zia regime was to disband the force.29 Ziring maintains a number of clauses in 1973 constitution were particularly designed to discourage future military intervention. Its third clause serving military men were to take an oath that they would not take part in political activities of any kind. Article 245 defined high treason as an attempt to abrogate or subvert the constitution by the use of force. These clauses strengthened the legal cover provided by the 1972 Supreme Court verdict in Asma Jilani case which ruled that Yahya Khan assumption of power in 1969 was illegal and unconstitutional.30

Despite the favorable background, Bhutto always feels uneasy in his relations with army generals. He was even ready to take the wrath of left wing supporter when he exempted army officers holding from the March 1972 land reforms and made strenuous efforts to dispel any notion of Tashkent, following the July 1972 Simla Agreement.31 A people’s army could not provide security in the regional context after the raised issue by Afghan Government of Sardaar Muhammad Daud, following the over thrown of king Zahir Shah on July 17, 1973, and nuclear explosion by India in 1974. There was also need of replacement of military equipment after 1971 war with India.32 Pakistan defense expenditure rose by over 200 per cent during Bhutto era even more important reliance or army increased for internal security as well. This enabled malitary to renew their taste for power and drew their back into politics. The

29 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, Progressive Publishers, Michigun, 1976, pp.200-201.

30 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twenieth Century, p.278.

31 P. R. Chari, The Simla Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise, Manohar Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi, 2001, p.74.

32 Ibid., p.75.

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army was called for action on July 19, 1972, to restore law and order in Sindh following the language riots in the province.33

Army remained involve in Balochistan from 1973 to 1974 that caused large scale deployment of troops in Balochistan to deal with tribes, separatists, autonomists, which was disapproved by the other political parties. The use of force carried echoes of Yahya ill-conceived in East Pakistan. The tension between the federal Government and the NAP-JUl administration in was kept in check until July 1972.34 Different tribes like Marri tribe, the Balochistan National Liberation Front (BNLF) established basis in Kandahar, Baghdad as well as in Balochistan. At the height of struggle the received assistance from the Shah of who had also Baloch insurgency in Seesten-o-Balochistan Province of Iran.35

Conflict between army and separatists claimed over lives and gravely under mined the Bhutto’s regime. S.A. Qureshi writes in the context that Bhutto acknowledged the army overrode his plans for withdrawal because the generals wanted to spread their tentacles throughout Balochistan. This involvement of provided them a chance to re-establish and re-organized effective role in the politics of Pakistan.36

Talbot commented that the civil establishment had drawn adverse comments in government reports from 1950 onwards but they were highly organized and well established, and were called the sultan of Pakistan. Burki had commented that radical opinion hoped that Bhutto would make good earlier gestures toward reforms especially in the light of animosity towards bureaucracy during 1968-69 campaign against Ayub Khan. Two of the ringing slogans of the time were “Death of the Serving Kings” and “Ending of corruption”. On assuming power, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto

33 Ibid., p.76.

34 Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan And The Emergence of Islamic Militancy in , Ashgate Publishing Company, Burlington, 2005, p.40.

35 Ibid., p.41.

36 Shoukat Ali, Pakistan: A Religio-Politcal Study, The National Institute of Historical And Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1997, pp.223-224. Also see Kalim Baahadur, Democracy in Pakistan: Crisis and Conflicts, pp.114-115.

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dismissed leading civil servants associated with military government which he dubbed as one of Nokarshahi (Bureaucratic) rule by the civil servants.37 Charlas Kenedy noted that Bhutto’s reform of the bureaucracy, despite the abolition of Civil Services of Pakistan and introducing unified grade structure, key positions in the central secretariat continued to be headed by the members of the former elite cadre and the functions of civil servants were never changed by the PPP government. Bhutto’s personal control over the administration was nevertheless secured through the creation of special posts and the establishment of a lateral entry scheme administered not by Federal Service Commission but by a political establishment division. Critics claimed that it raised an army of sycophants’ appointee’s relatives of federal ministers.38 In the later period of his regime, Bhutto came increasingly to rely on the bureaucracy just as he did on army. This was unintended consequence of his institutional and socio- economic reforms for all his attempts to break with the past. Bhutto was ultimately dependent on Bureaucracy for the maintenance of his rule as had been done by his predecessors.39

Bhutto's Reforms

To appreciate the reforms instituted during Bhutto's time, some major factors must be borne in mind: the populist nature of his regime and the global tendency towards increased nationalization of economic activity. Understanding of these factors emphasizes the context of these reforms and demonstrates that similar changes were taking place in other parts of the world. Pakistan's experience was not unique but formed a part of the pattern observable in other countries facing similar conditions.40

A thorough analysis of populism goes beyond the scope of this chapter which is concerned with the policies adopted during the Bhutto regime. A few relevant

37 Soofia Mumtaz, Pakistan: The contours of State And Society, Oxford University Press, London, 2002, p.111.

38 Ibid., p.130.

39 Ibid., p.131.

40 Ali Farazmand, Administrative Reform in Developing Nations, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2002, pp.80-81.

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remarks will serve the purpose of determining the context of these reforms. The growth and emergence of populist parties show some important common features: these parties generally emerge in underdeveloped or semi-developed countries where industrial growth and capitalist development has remained stunted.41 The social impacts of industry are limited and a large proportion of the population is only peripherally touched by its growth. Some theorists have called this phenomenon an enslaved form of capitalist development. The vitality of industrial growth does not rejuvenate every walk of life; instead it burn under folds, emitting pale whiffs of smoke. Each area of its activity remains retarded: industrial plants are generally middle scale; distributive outlets are small; the infrastructure is shaky; lacking of training facilities; discipline is absent and the environment gives an impression of premature decay. Income disparities between the rich and the poor are considerable: homelessness and shantytown areas exist in bitter contrast to the palatial residences of the urban and rural rich. The literacy level is low and the facilities of sanitation and health are poor.42

Petty production and small producers dominate both the urban and rural social landscape. Rural labor consists of small farmers and tenant cultivators. In the cities, thousands of petty producers and non-producers swell the ranks of the urban dwellers. These include street-hawkers, shopkeepers, taxi drivers, bus conductors, café owners, skilled and semi-skilled mechanics, masons, printers, religious pundits, servants, beggars and of course the multitude of' the unemployed. The bazaar, rather than the factory, often controls the heartbeat of social organization.43 Hassan Rizvi says, Political parties are dominated by landed classes which the industrial classes normally handle. The industrial classes do not have independent parties; nor have the industrial

41 Ibid., p.81.

42 Ibid., pp.81-82.

43 Muhammad Abrar Zahoor, Economic Reforms Under The Government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, VDM Publishing, New York, 2011, p.120. Also see Ali Farazmand, Administrative Reform in Developing Nations, p.83.

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workers. In fact, the organizations of industrial workers are weak, and independent trade unions do not exist.44

The second feature of populist parties is their historical worthlessness and the rapidity of their growth. Economic injustice and political alienation often lead to explosions of social unrest. A generalized movement may even threaten political stability. The heterogeneous collection of masses on the streets cannot be accommodated by the political parties of landlords.45 A Populist element is formed which gathers strength as the movement builds. Its membership grows within a period of weeks and months. Its class composition is as heterogeneous as the composition of the masses on the streets. Industrial workers, peasants, shopkeepers, small industrialists, the intelligentsia, the middle classes and even enlightened or opportunistic sections of the elite class, all are to be found in its ranks. The program of the party attempts to compromise between the heterogeneous, often conflicting, interests of its membership. Thus, inherently these parties are unstable; they suffer evermore from tensions created by the diffused mob of its members.46

The third interesting feature of these parties is their organizational structure. Feudal parties, in general, are combinations of landed classes at the leadership level, and their followers who are directly under the control of each feudal lord. The source of this following lies in the economic, social and mystical way of the lords over the peasantry. There is no need for a democratic or hierarchical structure for selection of leadership. Parties of the industrial classes, on the other hand, tend to develop internal democratic structure. The existence of democratic structure is partly due to the lack that a consensus of opinion does not exist among individual units of capital as it does among landed classes. There may be competition and conflicts of interest amongst separate units of industry. Further, the industrial class attempts to cement sections of the workers to its organization, and democratic structures, at least in principle, allow political mobility within the party. Socialist and Communist Parties tend to develop

44 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, pp.210-211.

45 Ali Farazmand, Administrative Reform in Developing Nations, p.84.

46 Ibid.,pp.84-85.

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democratic centralist structure, developing ideologically trained cadres at the membership level.47

The populist parties appear to combine various characteristics, showing signs of feudal, industrial and Socialist tendencies in different aspects of their organizational structure. Between the leader and the led, a direct rapport exists. The party itself is quite superfluous in terms of being a communicational system between the leadership and the masses. Over and above the party members and the leader can speak to the masses.48 In some ways this is similar to feudal parties where file tactical leader has direct support from the populace, independent of the party. He enters the party on the basis of this support and does not acquire the support via party. Similarly, a populist leader has the direct clientage of the masses. His following exists in the masses and the party is constructed simply to win parliamentary seats, etc. Usually, therefore, populist leaders are charismatic figures. They inspire confidence, love, fear and other emotions through fiery speeches and public rhetoric. However, the articulation of the interests of diverse groupings requires a party structure. At the level of membership, the Populist Party wishes to think of its party workers as cadres as in a socialist party. This is sometimes purely populist rhetoric: sometimes it is inspired by the missionary-type zeal of populist leaders. However, the party worker lacks both training and discipline and begins to suffer self-delusion from party members upwards to the party leader, a democratic structure in file shape of capitalist/industrial parties is designed. However, the stature, at least in the eyes of the masses; is so grand that he is neither containable, nor accountable to the middle ranks of party leaders. In fact, the middle level leaders soon begin to find that it is the relationship of the party leader with the masses, independent of the party itself, on which the structure of the party exists. Thus, autocratic, democratic and socialistic tendencies' tend to exist at different level of the organizational structure.49

47 Ibid., p.87.

48 Ibid., p.88.

49 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, p.114. Also see Contemporary Forms of Slavery in Pakistan, Human Rights Watch, New York, July 1995,p.134.

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Finally, populist parties are inherently less stable. There are several conflicts in their composition, program, organizational structure and .relationship with propertied classes and the state. The conflicts constantly weaken the party. It is the task, of the leader to constantly inspire the public and keep them on the march through new ideas and slogans. However, these conflicts create fluidity in the party's ideological direction. It can serve from right to left under different pressures.50

Mehmood Says that in generally, a cohesive factor has normally been found by populist parties in the spirit of nationalism. These parties are usually far more intensely nationalistic in their public posture than other groupings. All underdeveloped countries, whether they achieved independence with or without a prolonged mass struggle, find a resurgence of national pride among their people for some time after independence. However, in many cases, this spirit is difficult to maintain. In cases where internal unity between different strata or between, people of different regions cannot be maintained, because economic reconstruction either, does not take place or results in disparities, the natural growth of nationalism was collectivity suffer. The state has to make a concerted effort to arouse the weakening spirit of nationalism. In several underdeveloped countries, a negative form of nationalism appears; reasons for mutual love are replaced by objects of common hatred. A common enemy against the collectivity is to be defended produces a common purpose. Though nationalism remains an essential part of the political discourse in underdeveloped countries, populist parties have to increase its dose due to internal pressures: the rapidity of their growth and the heterogeneity of their membership have forced them to become, at times, hysterically nationalistic.51

In fact, the multiplicity of classes and the diversity of production methods have injected populist tendencies among other political groupings as well. Various aspects of populism are to be found in nearly all parties in the less developed countries. The second factor to be considered in the assessment of Bhutto's reforms is the international tendency towards increased state control of economic activity. Since the First World War, countries at different stages of economic development, with

50Ibid.,p.156.

51 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, pp143-144.

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different historical and geographical backgrounds, have experienced a growth in the public sector.52

On the one side, there are socialist countries where revolutions resulted in the taking over of political power by parties committed to a centrally-planned economy. On their coming to power, large-scale industry and big feudal estates were nationalized. State-ownership of other sectors makes weak the economy in different countries. Then, there are the industrially advanced countries in the West. Up to the First World War, state intervention in economic activity was minimal. State administrators were mainly concerned with defense law and order, and the management of foreign affairs: State taxes were imposed to collect revenue to finance these operations. Economic activity in the, country was left to the market forces. However, since the First World War and in particular since the depression of 1929, there has been a gradual increase in the public sector. A large number of industries were brought under state-management. The arguments for state control were varied; some industries were nationalized because these were declining due to structural changes in demand; because they required heavy capital outlay and gave returns only in the long run; others because they were considered risky investments by the private sector; and still others because they had social welfare implications. In several countries, industries like steel, coal-mining, shipyards, oil .drilling, education, health, transport, telecommunication or nuclear energy were completely or partially brought under state control. Apart from this, the state also embarked upon demand management of the economy. To stabilize production at the employment, intervention by the state if the market mechanism was required. Thus, fiscal and monetary controls were required if Western economies were to achieve balanced growth and near full employment, some of these countries, the public sector accounts for nearly fifty per cent of the national output. To this, if we add the demand management and other economic policies (e.g. regional or exchange management) of the state, the element of planning in these countries becomes quite substantial.53

52 Anne O. Krueger, Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries, The Ohlin Lectures, New York, 1993, pp.54-59.

53 Ibid., pp.54-59.

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Ziring says finally, government intervention in the economy of an under- developed country is also an increasing trend. The state involves itself in economic affairs in two ways: either through a system of subsidies and taxation or through an extension of direct state control over industrial and commercial activities. There are many reasons for this phenomenon: nearly all underdeveloped countries gained their independence in the wake of a technologically advanced industrial world54. Developmental planning had to take place if these countries wished to catch up in the economic race. Even political sovereignty required a degree of economic independence. However, a large number of these countries inherited entrenched landlord classes, and weak and poorly organized industrial classes, in some cases, and even the infrastructure for the development of industry was absent. Private industry could not be expected to finance the construction of this infrastructure.55

The growth of the public sector in the economy and the strengthening of the populist tendencies in political parties is more or less a generalized phenomenon in the underdeveloped countries. Its degree and specific form may vary from country to country, but the' trend is unmistakable. In Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto entered the political arena after the end of Ayub's regime. Descended from a feudal Sindhi family, having studied at the universities of Southern California, Berkeley, and Oxford, Bhutto had in the fifties, served the Ayub regime at ministerial level. In his person he combined various qualities reflective of his background. Western influence and education had created a liberal-progressive outlook; yet he could be accused of autocratic and arbitrary behavior corresponding to his class origins.56

The Pakistan People's Party was formed in the wake of the anti-Ayub movement. The radicalized demands of the urban poor, till lower middle classes and the intelligentsia could not be adequately articulated by the old political parties. In the person of Bhutto, the heterogeneous masses found a charismatic leader; he was above them and yet he was willing to voice their feelings. Restoration of income and regional parities was the core of the economic demands of the anti-Ayub movement.

54 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in The Twenieth Century, pp.344-345.

55 Ibid., p.345.

56 Ibid., p.363.

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Then there are political demands: more liberalization, and less centralization of political power. The movement, therefore, was able to attract the urban middle classes, professionals, students and the politically deprived sections of the landed classes. Thus, very rapidly, the People's Party grew in size, carrying within its ranks a multiplicity of rural and urban classes. Its program included social and economic reforms, focused mainly on distributional aspects of the economy. It counterpoised freedom to Ayub's authoritarianism. The ambiguity of the results of the 1965 war with India allowed Bhutto to rekindle the spark of nationalism. It was this nationalistic posture which enabled Bhutto to restore dignity and pride for the nation which had suffered humiliation in the 1971 war.57

The overwhelming success of the PPP in the elections, in West Pakistan, gave Bhutto the political strength to push through policies, which a weak government could not done. The economic content of some of the major policies was compatible with the worldwide trend of expansion in the state sector.

Agrarian Reforms

Power of big landlords created impacts on green revolution and increased unrest in the rural areas. The rural poor small peasants and tenants, who constituted the silent majority of the PPP supporters, had to be appeased. Two major reforms were introduced: a new ceiling on landownership, and security of tenancy.58During the Ayub period, the legal ceiling on landownership was five hundred acres in irrigated areas and one thousand acres in non-irrigated areas. After the introduction of the Green Technology-tractors, tube wells, pesticides and high-yield seeds, productivity on both canal-irrigated and non-irrigated farms increased. The ceiling, on landownership was therefore, be reduced without a serious cut back in the individual incomes of big farmers. The excess land would obviously be sold to small peasants to

57 Ibid., pp.363-365.

58 Rashid Faruqee, Strategic Reforms for Agricultural Growth in Pakistan,The World Bank, Washington D.C., 1999, p.12. 56

raise their income levels. The new ceiling was 250 acres of irrigated land and 500 acres of non-irrigated land.59

Properly, enforced and truly implemented, this would have dealt a serious blow to the very big landlords. However, serious obstacles existed in the way of enforcing these reforms. Firstly, the restrictions of landownership by Bhutto were anticipated by the big landowners. In fact the restrictions were far less than expected. Thus even before Bhutto took power a large number of-landowners transferred the landownership to other members of the extended family, Secondly, the very big landowners who were left with large surplus areas devised an ingenious system of avoiding restrictions. They transferred ownership to some of their trusted tenants who were given lands on a long term lease agreement. 60 The lease-period covered several generations. Thirdly, productivity of land was to be assessed by revenue officers who consequently determined the productivity units owned by each landowner. Personal influence and bribery often ensured that the land's productivity would be under estimated. Just by recording half of the actual productivity, twice the area could remain under ownership.61

To ensure security of tenancy, the single most important reform was the right of pre-emption granted to tenants for the area cultivated by them. According to this, on the sale of land, which included tenant-cultivated area, the sitting tenants would have the first right for the purchase of the land cultivated by them. In the past, tenants had already been given legal protection against arbitrary evictions. However, their position remained weak when the sale of land automatically resulted in a change of masters. By giving them the first option to buy the land, the tenant-cultivators were given a choice either to accept the new landlord and his terms, or to buy the land themselves. It also afforded them the possibility of owning the land they cultivated. Thus inseparability of the tenants from the land cultivated by them became possible.

59 Ibid., pp.13-15.

60 Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring The Power Structure, p.38. Also see Rashid Faruqee, Strategic Reforms for Agricultural Growth in Pakistan, p.15.

61 Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring The Power Structure, p.39. Also see Rashid Faruqee, Strategic Reforms for Agricultural Growth in Pakistan,p.16.

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They could not arbitrarily be evicted or removed if they wish to continue as tenants in case the sale of that land which is cultivated by them.62

Apart from considerations of social justice, this reform had implemented for land-productivity: the potential inseparability of the tenant-cultivator from the land created an incentive for tenant to make improvements on the land to raise productivity in the long run. More thorough the use of fertilizers, a more productive system of crop rotation, construction of irrigational inlets, reclamation of previously uncultivable pieces of land, etc., would all raise and sustain productivity. The tenant-cultivator would establish a long-term, stable relation-ship with the land, rather than having a short-term, alienated outlook.63

On papers, these reforms make a great deal of sense. Its implementation, however, may be quite difficult. In fact, the practical effects may turn out to be diametrically opposed to what was intended. There are several reasons for this: first, the anticipation of the introduction of these reforms on Bhutto's coming to power, resulted in the mass eviction of tenants from hundreds of farms. In many cases, the landed classes expected more radical measures than those actually introduced by the Bhutto government. Thus, many landlords were illegally evicted tenants and have civil suits on their hands than to wait the introduction of reforms and the severity of which could not be gauged beforehand. The unfortunate implication of this policy was an acceleration of tenant evictions, an outcome quite opposed to the intentions of the policy-makers.64

Second, like other rural reforms, this policy underestimated the social strength of the landed classes. For decades, it has been the landlord who has controlled the means of livelihood of all the villagers, he has connections with the police, the revenue collector, and the administration; he has influence in the orbits of political

62 Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring The Power Structure, p.40. Also see Rashid Faruqee, Strategic Reforms for Agricultural Growth in Pakistan, p.17.

63 Ali Farazmand, Administrative Reform in Developing Nations, p.18. Also see Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring The Power Structure, p.41.

64 Ali Farazmand, Administrative Reform in Developing Nations, p.19. Also see Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring The Power Structure, p.42.

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power: governments change and rulers come and go, but the landlord's reign in his village remains unchallenged. The rural poor are like his subjects. It is best to be in his good books, even if it involves compromises. It is better to live under his benevolence than to incur his displeasure. Take the case of a small tenant-cultivator: the land occupied by him is being sold and he wishes to buy his part against the desire of the landowner. Firstly, he risks the landlord's antagonism. He may be living in quarters built by the landlord; he may also be in debt to the latter; there may even be a threat of violence to his family; he may be cast out by the rural community since he has been out of favor with the landlord; he also loses protect against outside forces, for example the police, the tax-collector, the public administrator, the local bank manager, the irrigation sector, the electricity supplier, etc. He now faces the problem of raising funds for the purchase of this land. His cash savings are insufficient. He may, in fact already be in debt. However, suppose that be manages to raise the money. The landlord may then decide to illegally evict him, which would mean the tenant has to seek justice through the courts. This means legal fees, court charges, and still the decision may be against him, since the landlord can afford a better solicitor or may have fiends in the local judiciary, and not only this; the civil suit may also take a long time. Indeed, it would be a determined tenant who would muster the courage to stand up for his rights.65

A third method used by landlords to get around the policy was to reclassify the mode of cultivation of their land. The local revenue has always been considered as an important government functionary who has historically remained the recipient of favors from the landed classes. One of the duties of this officer is to record arrangements of the land. It is by no means-impossible for landowners to persuade the revenue officer to record tenant-cultivated areas as owner-operated areas in the revenue books. Such miss recording can of course be challenged in courts but at high legal and personal costs, which a poor cultivator cannot afford.66

65 Ibid., pp.20-21. Also see Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring the Power Structure, pp.43-44.

66 Ali Farazmand, Administrative Reform in Developing Nations, p.22. Also see Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring the Power Structure, p.45.

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The Bhutto government's land-reforms, therefore, encountered essentially the same problems which the Ayub government faced in its agrarian policies, the problem of the social and economic power of the landed classes. In fact, the same problem has been faced in nearly all underdeveloped countries in similar circumstances. The issue of the strength of the landowner in foiling the implementation of land reforms is so universal that the sincerity of regimes insistent on introducing such reforms, becomes a little doubtful. One wonders if the purpose behind reform is a real desire for change or simply an exercise in public rhetoric.67

Industrial Reforms

The Bhutto government left its greatest mark also on the industrial sector. The main thrust of his policies was the nationalization program. Large amount of the important industry; rice threshing, vegetable oil production, and the sugar industry were all fully nationalized. Large companies in some of the other industries were also taken over. This included tractors, fertilizers, steel, etc.68

A multiplicity of reasons explains the nationalization program. Firstly, it was in the urban sector that industrialization of the Ayub period had created vast distributional inequalities. Large scale industry was concentrated in a few hands. Industrial and white-collar workers had both been excluded from sharing the wealth created by the industrialization program. Secondly, the urban areas, owing to the concentration of people and their organizational level, became the centers of vocal opposition and mass mobilization. Effective protest against government measures cannot be easily organized in geographically dispersed rural areas, in fact, political movements in the city attract the peasant who will often travel long distances to join and support an organized urban political agitation. The urban population, therefore, often provides leadership to mass movements. An important part of the active popular support for the PPP had come from the urban workers and middle classes. There was a great deal of pressure on the PPP to introduce radical industrial reforms. Thirdly, the

67 Ibid., p.46. Also see Rashid Faruqee, Strategic Reforms for Agricultural Growth in Pakistan, p.23.

68 Irving Brecher, Foreign Aid and Industrial Development in Pakistan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p.129.

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industrialist class was yet in its adolescence: it had a limited history of twenty years and its historically progressive role had not yet become evident. It had grown hesitantly, with state help and foreign assistance. It had been nurtured in an atmosphere of authoritarianism. The members of the industrialist class in particular the large-scale industries were only a handful: twenty industrial houses owned eighty per cent of the large scale industry.69 The industrialist class was therefore, numerically weak, ideologically wavering and socially isolated. Unlike the landed classes, the industrialist class did not pose a threat to a popular government wishing to undermine it. Fourthly, the particular nationalization program of the Bhutto government corresponded to the worldwide tendency towards the expansion of the state sector. It is as though the development of the system could not proceed indefinitely within the framework of a private market. After initial growth, private industry appears to meet hurdles, which it cannot overcome; its expansion; therefore, is retarded. In many countries, the first burst of industrialization generates political destabilization: unbridled private enterprise creates urban centers lacking basic facilities, income disparities between the rich and the poor and regional disparities due to the geographical concentration of industry; and all these happen in a short period of a decade or two.70 The real problem is that even after the initial impetus, often the industrial take-off does not materialize. Private industry appears to have its hands tied. Its indigenous market is restricted owing to internal impoverishment, engendered in particular by the non-transformation of the rural economy. It cannot compete internationally since foreign markets are fully controlled by the big western industrialist. The size of investment required to match up to the technologically advanced multinationals is so large that private industry in underdeveloped countries often reconciles itself to the status of a poor relative in the world market. The industrial units in the underdeveloped world are more, like backyard extensions of the advanced capital.71

69 Ibid., p.130.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., p.130. Also see Christopher Candland, Labor, Democratization And Development in India And Pakistan, Routledge, New York, 2007, p.87.

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The nationalization program of a government in an underdeveloped country, therefore, aims to satisfy a number of requirements: through state-planning, the government may restore regional parities; it may support industries which face a decline due to short-term changes in demand. It may rationalize production and save the costs of competition: it may raise the scale of output as the industries are centralized and managerial costs reduced; it may allow planners to aim for social returns rather, than profits, and distribute surplus between wages and investment on social criteria instead of simple profitability: it may allow a pricing policy of goods compatible with the social needs, export policies or anti-inflationary program of the government; it may satisfy the populist demands for economic change without arousing great resistance, since the industrial bourgeoisie lacks social influence.72

The nationalization program of Bhutto's government had many such considerations. The private commercial banks were nationalized; a step which several governments of other under developed countries has also taken to control the supply of money on the one hand, and to regulate the allocation of resources within the economy on the other. Through control over the lending policy of the banking system, it is possible to channel investible funds into agriculture or dairy farming or industry, in line with the sectorial planning of the government. These controls may also be used to direct the distribution of investment among different geographical regions.73

A number of considerations were made for the nationalization of the cotton, sugar, and vegetable oil industries. The monopolistic nature of production had created a problem of high prices for some of the essential manufactured goods. This led to social unrest and put inflationary pressures on the economy. In order to have a rationalized system of prices, some of these industries were taken over by state. Some industries were being adversely affected by the recession in the world market, which started in the seventies. The cotton industry was particularly hit by the recession and its survival inflation in Western economies resulted in a rise of the cost of capital imports while the international demand for goods declining. This made growth in

72 Kalim Baahadur, Democracy in Pakistan: Crisis and Conflicts, p.188.

73 Irving Brecher, Foreign Aid And Industrial Development in Pakistan, p.132. Also see Christopher Candland, Labor, Democratization And Development in India and Pakistan, pp.88-89.

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industry extremely difficult. Thus even if the workforce problem had been overcome, a smooth growth of industry could not have taken place. In fact, it is even possible to say that whereas, a public sector industry was able to cushion the impact of the world recession due to state subsidies, the private sector might have to close-down a large number of industrial units.74

Constitutional Reform

Meluka explains that after the departure of the Ayub regime, Pakistan had its first elections on adult franchise basis in December 1970. The PPP emerged as the majority party in West Pakistan and after the creation of Bangladesh; Bhutto formed the government in Pakistan in 1972. Ayub Khan's constitution of 1962 had already ceased to exist after the imposition of Martial Law by General Yahya Khan. In April 1973, the Bhutto government promulgated a new constitution; it is relied heavily on the principles of the constitution drawn up in 1956.75

According to the 1973 constitution, Pakistan was to become a parliamentary democracy. The National Assembly members were be elected through adult franchise for a period of five years. The leader of the political party, with a majority in the Assembly, would be asked to form a government by the President who, constitutionally, was a figurehead. The prime minister would select his cabinet. A vote of no-confidence in the government by a majority in the National Assembly would result in the Prime Minister dissolving the government and calling for fresh elections.76

An important innovation introduced by the 1973 constitution was the establishment of a Senate or Upper House. The Senate would consist of an equal; number of members from each province, independent of its population strength. These would be the persons nominated by the members of each Provincial Assembly.

74 Irving Brecher, Foreign Aid And Industrial Development in Pakistan, p.133. Also see Christopher Candland, Labor, Democratization And Development in India And Pakistan, p.89.

75 Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi, Constitutional Law of Pakistan: Text, Case Law And Analytical Commentary, Vanguard, Michigun, 2002, p.1491.

76 Ibid., p.1491.

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Any bill passed by the National Assembly had to be approved by a majority in the Senate before it could become the law of the land. Similarly, any bill passed by the Senate had to be approved by the National Assembly, before being adopted as a law. The Senate offered two advantages: it could work as a think-tank consisting of people who were specialists, professionals, scientists, academics. etc. In other words, those having no electoral base could enter the supreme decision-making body in the system. Secondly, and extremely important the minority provinces had an equal status in the Senate which, therefore, could safeguard their interests. The less-populated provinces could no longer be at least in theory swamped by the majority provinces77.

Sohail Bhutti remarks that at provincial level, there were four Assemblies, one for each province. The members of these assemblies were elected on the basis of adult franchise in each province. The leader of the majority party in the provincial assembly would form the Government. This ensured a high degree of political autonomy for each province. The National Assembly could not make any change in the political leadership of provinces without amending the constitution itself by at least a three- fourth majority. The sensitive issue of self-management of the provinces, therefore, appeared to have been, in principle, resolved.78

The Bhutto government's constitutional arrangement suffered from a number of weaknesses. The overwhelming majority enjoyed by the PPP in the National Assembly tended to concentrate a lot of power in the hands of the' government which, due to the structure of the populist People's Party, effectively meant that the total point of political power rested with the party leadership, in particular with the person of Bhutto. The government could democratically change the constitution, because of its overwhelming majority in the House and the dependent status of the PPP parliamentarians on Bhutto himself who enjoyed a direct relationship with the masses without requiring the mediation of the party members. This manifested itself quite clearly when the government was able to make appropriate amendments to the

77 Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi, Constitutional Law of Pakistan: Text, Case Law And Analytical Commentary, Vanguard, Michigun, 2002, pp.1492-1493.

78 Aleem Al-Razi, Constitutional Glimpses of Martial Law: in India, Pakistan And Bangladesh, The University of Michigan, Michigun, 1988, pp.173-175.

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constitution (of course, democratically), to dismiss some of the provincial Chief Ministers, replacing them with heads of provinces selected by the government.79

The experiment of parliamentary democracy during Bhutto's period highlighted some fundamental problems, which undermine democratic tendencies in underdeveloped countries; serious political scientists largely agree that a democratic form of government may not be fully compatible with the economic and social conditions prevailing in the Third World. Historically, the landed classes have never instituted democratic rule: the cliental nature of the relationship between the rural masses and the big landowners, the nature and the selection of rural political leadership, the organization of social and economic life, all tend to develop autocratic forms of behavior and do not necessitate the development of democratic tendencies. It is not an accident, therefore, in the countries of Europe and North America, the development of democratic institutions has coincided with the emergence of industrial classes. The organization of production, the communicational links between the mass of workers and their employers, the independence of labor from the industrial employers, the mutual competitiveness between individual units of industry and the need for consensus in policy making, all tend to foster democratic ideas and institutions, however, more is required than this for the maintenance of a democratic form of government: there must exist economic stability and an ideological unity between the mass of the population, and the political leadership. The existence of socially powerful landed classes, the lack of development of independent, self-reliant and dynamic industrial classes, economic stagnation and the cynicism of the masses regarding political and economic institutions in underdeveloped countries, all weaken and undermine the development of democratic forces. It is again not an accident that nearly all underdeveloped countries have been unable to develop genuine and stable democratic terms of government.80

In the Third World countries, where democracy appears to exist, it is usually equated with electoral means of transforming of political power. Democracy

79 Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi, Constitutional Law of Pakistan: Text, Case Law And Analytical Commentary, pp.1494-1495.

80 Ibid., pp.1496-1498.

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somehow comes to life once five years, when people are invited to cast their votes. However, election once in five years from the one part of the democratic process; they should be the culmination of all uninterrupted process of democratic activity which expected to take place in between elections. If during the years preceding elections, political activity is curtailed, newspapers and media censored processions and demonstrations banned, political leaders jailed and other fundamental rights of freedom, such as the right to speak and to organize, denied, then the electoral process is devoid of democratic content. Malvlea stated that the constitution of 1973, therefore, may have been a well-meaning political document, but it could not strengthen or stabilize democratic forces and institutions in Pakistan. A time passed, the constitution was gradually eroded by social and economic pressures.81

Social Reform

According to Yousaf, the rationalization of the education system and an ambitious mass literacy program were the most important features of the intended social upgrading in Bhutto's period. All primary education was made free and this involved an increase in demand which the existing capacity could not satisfy. New schools had to be built as nearly all private sector schools and colleges, were nationalized82. The nationalization of private schools was necessitated by the need for ideological streamlining in education on the one hand and the desire to even out the social discrepancies between private and public sector schools on the other. The aims were certainly lofty and they required time and planning before positive effects could be realized. Bhutto’s regime however, did not last long enough to systematically build a uniform and integrated educational set-up which would both increase literacy rate and raise academic standards in a harmonious way in all schools and colleges. Free education (up to primary Level) for all and the nationalization of the private-sector academic institutions were also in line with the image of a populist leader who related

81 Ibid., pp.1494-1503.

82 Sohail Mahmood, Good Governance Reform Agenda in Pakistan: Current Challenges, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2006, p.54.

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to the masses through public resource to the sentiments of social justice and equality.83

In nearly all countries where governments have attempted to rationalize and equalize the educational system, the short-term effects have invariably been negative and have resulted in a downgrading of the academic standards in the beginning. Firstly, exceeding results amongst the existing institutions since it takes time for new schools and colleges to be built. The time-lag in underdeveloped countries will of course be greater due to the shortage of finances. Secondly, the effect on reputable institutions with high standards is immediate; the policy of leveling of differences lowers their standards. However, the promotion of educational standards in poorer schools takes a long time. The change in curriculum, the employment of better trained teachers and the provision of technical and scientific apparatus, etc., all require time and resources.84

The immediate effect of the Bhutto government's educational reforms was, therefore, a downgrading of the overall system, as might be expected: existing schools and colleges had an increase in student population without a corresponding increase in the provision of academic facilities. Lack of funds coupled with bureaucratic inefficiencies and the absence of integrated planning produced all ill-administered and ill-planned education system. Equally, important was the limited time that the experiment of nationalization had. Before the system could recover from the initial depression of standards and before lessons could be learnt and the lethargic bureaucratic machine could be persuaded to move in the right direction, the lease of the Bhutto government had come to an end.85

Eradication of illiteracy by the provision of free primary schooling was indeed an ambitious aspiration which appears to be rooted less in realism and more in ill- conceived idealism, if not in an exercise in image-building. Just as the advisers to the

83 Ibid., p.159.

84 Ibid, pp.57-58. Also SeeRubya Mehdi, The Islamiazation of The Law in Pakistan, Roultedge, Oxon, 1994, pp.160-161.

85Ibid., p.59.

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Ayub government and blundered in attributing economic irrationality to household- size planning of the peasants, the social reformers of Bhutto's government missed some of the equations, which underlie the problem of a low literacy rate in underdeveloped countries. To put it quite simply, free education does not generate an abundance of customers; the cost of education to the mass of poor people is not just the tuition fee. In fact, tuition fees constitute a very small part of the economic cost. Notwithstanding the costs of books, stationery and the uniform, the single most important cost of a child in school for a poor household is the loss of earnings to the family.86 Child labor is extensively used in nearly all underdeveloped countries and makes a significant contribution to the household budget. The poor household, living on the margin of economic existence, can scarcely afford to withdraw a member from the labor force and continue to bear the burden of feeding and clothing. The apparently untrained and rustic peasant may be quite aware about the lack of opportunities existing for the literate in an under-developed country. Low and uncertain returns from education have to be included in the equations of planning by governments attempting to raise literacy levels in the Third World countries.87

Burki thinks that the biggest indictment of the usefulness of a service is that, even when freely provided, it remains un-availed. Is it not possible that the lofty schemes of mass literacy designed by governments do not relate to the needs of the rural and urban poor? Perhaps the peasant requires education and training in improving productivity on the land, reducing water wastage or killing pests, and the urban unemployed require vocational courses that lead to skilled jobs. The content of literacy schemes often reflects the convoluted and vulgar notion of “education” of university degree holders, for whom the ills of poverty and underdevelopment are rooted in the inability of the masses to read and write.88

86 Ibid., p.60.

87 Rubya Mehdi, The Islamization of The Law in Pakistan, pp.161-162. Also see Sohail Mahmood, Good Governance Reform Agenda in Pakistan: Current Challenges, p.60.

88 Shahid javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, Oxford university Press, London, 1988, p.197.

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Constitutional Engineering During Bhutto Regime

Bhutto lifted the Martial Law from the country after four month of assumption of his office. He introduced interim constitution in the country. This constitution was based on 290 clauses and seven schedules and approved by those representatives who were elected in 1970 elections. The interim constitution provided for a centralized government with a presidential system at the center and a parliamentary system in the provinces.89 Burki writes in this context that by the time the national assembly started clause by clause examination of the new permanent constitution, tension escalated between PPP and the opposition parties over the various issues. On the other hand conditions started deteriorating in Balochistan very quickly. Things apparently went out of control in no time. On March 2, 1973, opposition parties grouped together over Balochistan issue to form united democratic front under Peer Pagaaro leadership. The opposition parties demanded strongly that Islamic clauses be included in the constitution and asked for more regional and provincial autonomy. The united democratic front in melodramatic fashion voted on April 10, 1973, in the favor of constitution despite its earliest walk out from the Assembly Sessions.90 There trued out to be sheered and marked contrast with Pakistan first constitution and its adoption had taken just year and enjoys the approval and consent of opposition parties. In contrast with the second it generated optimism and seeds of hope that genuine and real democratic system will be established in the country. The constitution came into operation on August 17, 1973. This constitution provided for a parliamentary system in which power would reside in the hands of prime minister and the president of the country will only be the nominal head of the state. Article 48 stipulated that he should be bound by the Prime Minister’s advice that his ordinance would not have legal sentence unless approved by the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The latter was to be elected by a majority of the 200 member National Assembly which also resided initiatory powers of legislation. The senate upper house could but not veto a bill passed by the national assembly. Its members were to be divided

89 Abdul Ghafoor Bhurgi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Falcon of Pakistan, SZABIST, Karachi, 2002, pp.122- 123.

90 Shahid javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, p.132.

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equally from four provinces and these members would be elected by combine sitting National Assembly and four Provincial Assemblies. The more prominent features of the 1973 constitution were that it ensured independent judiciary and allocation of the resources to provinces and it also guaranteed fundamental human rights under article 153 created a council of common interest to settle and resolve economic disputes between the federating units but a long list of concurrent subjects and the powers of the center to interfere in the provincial affairs, remained considerable.91 The claim that the 1973 constitution had finally resolved Pakistan long standing issues of composing differences between the provinces and the center .Bhutto despite his clear and expressed sentiments in favor of federalism was no more willing to shift power from the center to the provinces. The Islamic provisions included declaration that Islam was the state religion and only Muslim could held the offices of prime Minister and president of the country. The state was also enjoined to provide facilities and opportunities to the Muslims of Pakistan. To shape and revise individually as well as collectively to the teaching of Islam and to promote the teaching of the Quran and Sunnah, all possible efforts will be made and steps will be taken by the Government of Pakistan to teach Islamic Studies and the Holy Quran in order to ensure that the laws were in agreement with the teachings of Islam.92 Account of Islamic Ideology was to be appointed by the president as an advisory body. Simultaneously, article 34 for the first time in the history of the country introduced the new principle that steps shall be taken to ensure full participation of women in all walks of national life, because women in Pakistan constitute the half of population. No country can make progress unless its women work side by side of the man. Initial protection was also provided against the respect of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO) of 1961. Despite its limitation of Zia’s 8th amendment, like 1973 constitution has proved more durable than any of its predecessor in painting the way to safeguard and protect the rights and to pave the way for democratic Pakistan. Similarly, civil liberties as well as

91 Abdul Ghafoor Bhurgi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Falcon of Pakistan, pp.133.

92 Ibid., p.134.

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provincial autonomy have been legally overridden by extraordinary powers accorded to the rulers of state.93

Economic And Social Change During Bhutto Regime

Bhutto sought to consolidate and strengthen PPP among the people of Pakistan, including rural and urban areas of the country. F. Rehman has written that Pakistan people’s party supported the poor by policies of land and labor reforms and by the nationalization of industries, financial institutions and schools. Such reforms were condemned half-heartedly by leftist groups, associated and grouped with Pakistan people’s party who were already dissatisfied by the opportunist entry of landlords into its ranks and by Bhutto’s mere up popularity and personalization of power. At the same time the reforms created powerful enemies among the propertied classes. The economics of the country has already suffered serious setback at the hand of worldwide inflationary pressure generated by the 1973 Arab- war.94 Of savings investment and output had already declined. The devaluation of the rupee on May 11, 1972 stoked inflationary pressures, dependence on foreign aid and from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to ride over the deteriorating balance of payment situations from 1974 onwards was a mixed blessing as aid also found its way into pockets of the regime’s Islamic opponents. For a common man the rhetoric of egalitarianism sounded mere singly hollow when confronted with annual price rises twenty per cent.95

Bhutto, in his 1970 election campaign, had called for the removal of the remaining of vestiges of feudalism. The land reforms which he introduced two years later were certainly radical than Ayub’s. Craig Baxter added that maximum land ceilings were reduced to 150 acres of irrigated land and 300 acres of un-irrigated land orchards and stud, livestock and forms were brought under the tax system and it was gigantic step indeed. On the other hand, Bhutto’s law reforms efforts were not well

93 Ibid., pp.135-136.

94 James P. Farwell, The Pakistan Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability, Oxford University Press, London, 2011, pp.251-252.

95 Ibid., p.252.

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articulated and by and large they were ill conceived, though they were well intentioned. As in 1959, only a limited amount of land was ultimately made available to redistribution. This consisted of even poor quality land than before as the absence of compensation predictably encouraged and reinforced owners to retain their most fertile holding.96

The Bhutto Reforms suffered from the save irregularities in their implementation as the Land Reforms of 1959. In numerous instances the landless were made owners if the rescued areas in name only or fictitious transfers were entered. Ironically, the reforms, rather than signaling a suit in the balance of power in the favor of talents, encouraged Punjabi land lords to enter the PPP’s ranks in order to safeguard their position. The success with which large number of land lords concealed their lands as much to official patronage as administrative inefficiency Craig Baxter had pointed out that the remarkable ability of the leading land lords families to accommodate themselves to successive regimes. Despite his popular slogan Bhutto liberally dispensed PPP election tickets to the land lords in 1977.97 Those people who suffered a great deal at the hands of Bhutto under the Land Reform Legislation almost invariably came from families politically opposed. To compensate the earlier failure Bhutto announced most severe and string out land reforms on the eve of the 1977 elections, ceilings were lowered to 100 acres of irrigated land and 200 acres of an un- irrigated land. The loopholes of defining land owner ship in the form of ten years interest leaving bonds. The PPP also announced in January 1973, that land revenue would be replaced by agricultural income tax revenues and reduce tax envision by individual whose wealth in reality urban rather than rural based. These measures were suspended with the introduction of Martial Law on July 5, 1977.98

Labor Reforms During Bhutto Regime

On February 10, 1972, Bhutto announced a far reaching comprehensive and elaborate labor policy and Labor Reforms which revealed the radical influence of

96 Ibid., pp.253-254.

97Ibid., p.255.

98 Ibid., p.256.

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Muhammad Hanif, Minister for labor union power was increased with the setting of Works Councils and special Labor Courts for the resolution of industrial disputes. He introduced a compulsory system of elected shop stewards was established in factories. The workers lot was also to be improved by increasing profit sharing measures. Employers were also called on to provide cheap housing and education to matriculation level for at least one child of every worker. The state also held out the promise of old age pensions and insurance against injuries. As with the other reforms Bhutto government had to face stiff resistance and planned obduracy of vested interests and met with unseen consequences which diminished the gratitude of their beneficiaries. Emboldened by the reforms and legislation, workers fixed their muscles in series of strikes which hit production in the feebly handled newly nationalized heavy industries. A bloody confrontation ensued between the army and strikers in Karachi which precipitated the radical labor based Mairaj group broken by Bhutto.99 The fact that labor reforms did not apply to piece workers further separated PPP leftist activist as it failed to introduce a minimum wage. The extension of the definition of may lower middle class PPP supporters with the cost of pension, medical and welfare benefits and of workers participation in management decisions as brought under the purview of the reforms. The regime found itself caught between two constituencies of support and was unable to please and appear none of the two many small scale enterprises were located in Punjab in such towns as Gujrat, Wazirabad and Kamoke part of the collapse of the PPP of stronghold in the Punjab in 1977 election is attributable to the alienation of the small entrepreneurs. The erosion of business confidence hit investment which declined across the country industrial sector leading to rising unemployment for workers whose lives were already been made miserable and deplorable by spiraling the prices of the load stuffs, ironically the improved conditions, which some sections of the working class experienced for more encouragement of the export of the labor to its wanted reform program.100

99 Christopher Candland, Labor, Democratization And Development in India And Pakistan, pp.116-119.

100 Ibid., pp.120-127.

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Nationalization Policy of Bhutto

In January 1972, Bhutto government introduced the nationalization of over thirty large firms in the basic industries. These measures which kept the promise of PPP manifesto undertaking was intended to eliminate once for all poverty and discrimination in Pakistan. In reality it was more important in clipping the wings of the twenty two families than achieving the later goal, as the heavy industrial sector did not possess a dominating economic influence.101 Burki has maintained that the subsequent mismanagement of these newly nationalized industries by the board of management chaired by Dr. Mubashir Hassan not only depressed production but weakened the standing of leftist groups in the PPP. Two months latter nationalization was extended to the financial sector with the takeover of the life insurance companies. During the following November, the government setup a state life insurance corporation of Pakistan.102 The next burst of nationalization took place in and it involved ghee industry quite contrary to previous measures this affected the small industry owner who had supported the PPP in 1970. It was justified by the profiteering which had occurred in the wake of sever monsoon flooding. The confidence of small businessman in the regime was further undermined by the subsequent nationalization in July 1976 of the rice husking and cotton trading industries.103 Significantly, small traders and merchants were at the forefront of the 1977 anti-Bhutto movement. After beginning of 1974, for the people of Pakistan, Bhutto had announced the nationalization of all private banks.104Indra Ghandi motivated by similar popular ideas and had adopted this policy. The nationalization of the colleges was introduced in September 1972.105 During following month it was extended to the private school sector as middle class demand was growing rapidly in the main urban centers. No provision for compensation was provided for the owners

101 Anwar Hussain Syed, The discourse And politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Macmillan, New York, 1992, p.120.

102 Shahid javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, pp.247-248.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid., p.249.

105 Ibid., p.250.

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of colleges and schools. This policy was also opposed from missionary run institutions which traditionally maintained high academic standard and were afraid that standard would fall in the absence of sufficient support deteriorating educational standard, was indeed one further factor which encouraged urban middle class opposition to the government in 1977.106 Similarly, labor reforms, support from the poor groups did not outweigh the opposition from the personal and vested interests which government trade policies generated. However, nationalization policy was accompanied by the provision of free education for children up to the age of thirteen. It was significant achievement but the goal of universal education still was not realized while poor parents no longer had to afford fees, there was still need of their children labor.107 Added to this there was cultural resistance to sending girls to schools in the more consecrate rural areas. Enrolment rates consequently did not improve dramatically but the government stress on educational development continued to win support even from its opponents. By and large nationalization policy was not supported by the majority of trade owners of the schools and colleges and they develop deep hate and feeling of revenge against Bhutto and they have been waiting for the time opportunity. Ultimately, anti-Bhutto movement provide chance to over through Bhutto as these people were on the forefront against Bhutto.108

Foreign Policy of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto And His Fall

Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was performing efficiently as Foreign Minister since 1960, and deployed his diplomatic skills perfectly in foreign affairs, and ultimately occasioned his great victory in 1972, in Simla Summit.109 In Bhutto’s own mind his pursuit of Pakistan’s independent interest with regards to nuclear policy by going ahead with nuclear reprocessing plan ultimately presented an opportunity for an external hand to secure his downfall. The emphasis on close ties with China and the

106 Ibid., p.251.

107 Ibid., p.252.

108 Anwar Hussain Syed, The Discourse And Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, p.121. Also see Shahid javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, p.253.

109 Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1971-1994, I.B Tauris & Co, London, 1997, p.204.

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Middle East, and the nuclearization of Pakistan must all be understood in this context. China as we have already seen had become an indispensable arms supplier, by the end of the 1970s. The most spectacular example of Sino-Pakistan cooperation was the construction of the strategic Karakoram Highway, which on its completion in 1978, connected Pakistan’s Northern Area with Xinjiang province through the Kunjerab Pass .Shortly, after Bhutto came to office; he embarked on a morale-boosting tower of the Middle East and North Africa.110 The need for Pakistan to develop closer links with the Islamic world and to look westwards towards the Middle East rather than elsewhere in Asia, was a constant theme of his regime. He also sought to boost Pakistan’s self-esteem by emphasizing the break with the pre-1947 era and its earlier reliance on the United States. Pakistan thus left the Common Wealth on January 30, 1972 and the SEATO111 Security Pact on November 8, 1972, Bhutto hoped that these steps would help to pave the way for his country to become more acceptable in the counsels for the third world112. Indeed he aspired to play a leading role in this emerging international grouping by hosting the first third Muslim world summit.113

Bhutto had a pick-up of the pieces left by the Bangladesh conflict. These included the tricky issues of whether or not to recognize the new state, the need to secure the release of 93,000 prisoners of war from whom 195 were claimed war criminals and the Indian occupation of almost 6,000 square miles of Pakistan territory. Behind these problems lay the necessity for bilateral talks which India had greatly strengthened its strategic position vis-a-vis Pakistan. So, Preliminary talks were held in the spring of 1972 between Indian and Pakistani officials.114

Bhutto was quite a remarkable person: a fine writer, a captivating orator, a mass mobilizer, a bold agitator, a populist leader; he had traveled widely and had won

110 Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1971-1994, p.206.

111 South East Asian Treaty Organization was signed for protecting South-East Asian countries from the threats of Communism. United States was leading this treaty and Pakistan was its member due to the geographical and sea links of East Pakistan with other South-East Asian countries.

112 Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1971-1994, p.207.

113 Ibid., p.208.

114 Ibid., pp.210-211.

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the respect of several Third World leaders.115 Yet he was quite native in many matters of statesmanship: he was unable to comprehend fully the loci of effective power in an underdeveloped state. He challenged the power of the propertied classes and provoked the army and irritated the West. The opposition to him, which had become accustomed to his populist methods, showed immunity to his counter-attack and, instead, used his own tactics to dislodge him. Perhaps he did not conceive of this eventuality and did not adequately prepare in advance, in which case his novelty in this matter matched his brilliance in other areas.116

According to several scholars, tragedy was that during his years in power, he gradually alienated all those classes or at least sizeable sections of them which have the capacity of self, as well as mutual organization, while endearing him to the vast silent majority of the peasantry. The first to be hit by his regime were the industrialists whose enterprises were nationalized. Even those whose assets were not taken over by the state, included traders fell in victims of fears and uncertainty. The industrial workers and the urban employees demonstrated confidence towards their employers due to their wage demands, strike activity, go-slow tactics and occupation of factories, adversely affected production and profits. The business community: therefore, was quite disaffected by the state of affairs brought upon by the government labor laws. In addition the traders and the shopkeepers, historically the most conservative forces in any society, opposed the socialist aspirations of the PPP and disapproved of the erosion of traditional morality. The Mullah, custodian of the Muslim ethic, was naturally aligned with the trader and the shopkeeper. To none of these classes did Bhutto deal a bray blow. They were allowed to exist, though they were hampered their continued existence, gave them resilience so that they fought back with the field strength when cracks appeared in Bhutto's hold on power117

115 , Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak....., Pakistan Book Dipot, Lahore, 1988, p.387.

116 Ibid., pp.389-390.

117 Abdul Ghafoor Bhurgi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Falcon of Pakistan, pp.276-277. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.393-394. Further Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto And Pakistan: 1967-1977, pp.178-179.

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The list of Bhutto's antagonists does not end here. A large section of the workers and student leaders too turned against him. The popular movement, which had put the PPP into power, consisted of student radicals, lawyers, teachers, as well as urban workers. Their confidence was high and their aspirations lofty. After the initial euphoria of industrial reforms and nationalization, the government had to put an end to the demands for “move” and “better” by its own supporters. The guns aimed at that the enemies were now timed against the urban agitators. Police action to end the Tory occupations, even irritate calling in of the army to quell urban agitation, led to scenes of blood and filly. Slowly, Bhutto was losing he affection and confidence of the only class left in the cities capable of organized action. But more important than this, he had lost the zealous support of the urban activists capable of organizing grass root activity.118

The intelligence, too, was disgruntled, because Bhutto could not deliver what he had promised. Economic backwardness, the lack of organized and disciplined manpower, and the strict and merciless demands of the world economy were forces too strong to respond to the piecemeal reforms of Bhutto's government. In fact, his regime had no option but to degenerate into an oppressive machine. Given the strong tendencies of populism in the Third World, the tendency towards autocracy is invariable, and Bhutto's regime could not escape it either. Thus economic malaise concedes with the curtailment of political rights, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and the rights to agitate and organize were gradually suppressed. Politicians were banned from speak and were even harassed and intimidated. Bhutto lost support of a large section of the country's intelligentsia: the students, the teachers, the lawyers and the journalists etc.119

It is, therefore, not surprising that in his last days of despair. Bhutto was the man who even from his prison cell, mobilized and roused masses, was tillable and unwilling to live the call to rally supporters. Instead they chose the courts of laws his arena and asked his foreign friends to plead on his behalf. This was a harsh contrast

118 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.401- 402.

119 Ibid., pp.402-403.

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with the actions of the man who had in his time torn up UN resolutions to show his contempt for the injustice of international law. It is also not surprising that no spontaneous and uncontainable movements of agitation erupted upon the news of his arrest or even upon his execution.120

This split with organized civil support, so necessary for Third World civilian regimes to negotiate power sharing with the armed forces, was bound to dislocate Bhutto sooner or later. Bhutto was also an irritant in world politics. He was a capable man, more thoughtful and more knowledgeable than the Henry Kissinger of the world. He aspired to unify the Third World into some kind of block. Which could exert the pressure of international relations? He tended to be rather independent in regional policy orientation instead of being lined to one superpower. This was his image and perhaps his aspiration. Of course, the realities of world politics, the class- bound nature of Pakistan society, and the dependence of its industry upon Western technology, as well as the historical ties between Pakistan and the Western world. Yet despite these restrictions, Bhutto could not restrain himself from gestures against “imperialism” which often made him an unreliable ally of the west.121

The destabilization process could engulf the entire Middle East which at this time was both politically and economically central to the Western world. Pakistan, a traditional ally of the West, whose army had always been, equipped by the West, required playing an unequivocal and decisive role in the impending upheavals in the region. Bhutto’s fluctuating politics and his dreams of relative independence which appeared with his wish to reinforce by committing Pakistan to becoming a nuclear power were no longer acts of playful disobedience they were doing right important and gravel unwise given the global balance of forces at this stage.122

The changing political climate of the region from the mid-seventies onwards had almost sealed Bhutto's fate. His removal from office was only a matter of time.

120Ibid., p.404.

121 Ibid., p.405.

122Ibid., pp.405-406.

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His humiliation and final execution of course, not quite expected.123 Despite the disillusionment of the urban classes with Bhutto’s government, the vast majority of people in the country and the peasantry was still behind him. Bhutto could achieve an electoral victory but could not control the streets, He had the tacit to show goodwill for the millions of peasants dispersed all over the country but had lost the active support of classes which were capable to organize themselves into a power full combative force. He had shielded to the opposition the organizational power of the rank and file activist in the urban centers.124

Ghafoor Ahmed125 said about Bhutto's party that the PPP was able to win quite convincingly the elections of 1977. Of course, there were regulations. No one of these was rather amusing, as in the case where the election results in a particular constituency were amounted on television long both the official counting commenced. It was possible that Bhutto himself had not sanctioned such rigging. Though, third world rulers often display paranoia with regard to the uncertainty of the outcome of general elections. The reasons for this paranoia are manifold firstly, the degree of power enjoyed by a Third world rulers over the class of the population is comprehensibly greater than the powers of a prime minister in Western democracy, and to part with this requires immense moral courage.126 Secondly, during their reign, third world leaders, due to the autocratic nature of their ruler, rend to make so many enemies that they cannot afford to be separated from the seat of power, as this may result in their physical annihilation127. Thirdly, it is true that in some underdeveloped countries elections may take place after an interval of five to six year but apart from this privilege of casting their vote, the involvement of the masses in the democratic

123Ibid., p.407.

124 Ibid., p.408.

125 Ghafoor Ahmed was one of the popular leaders of Jamat-e-Islami at that time.

126 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.409.

127 Ibid.

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process is smallest between elections and the fundamental freedom normally remain suspended.128

It may, therefore, not be incorrect to say that no underdeveloped country has yet experienced the democratic process through its government, by the system of elections. It was a source of considerable difficulty for the political parties, including the ruling party for predicting with confidence that what will be the outcome of elections. No indicators of public opinion exist between elections. The paranoia of the rulers with regard to the outcome of elections is, therefore, not without reason129. There are, however, other reasons for electorate, even if the leadership does not sanction it. The candidates themselves, in particular those who, because of their social position have immense power in their localities, engage with malpractice. Then, there is the case of the corrupt civil servant who is almost programmed to manipulate things in favor of the ruling party.130

The charges of widespread electoral rigging by the ruling party in the 1977 elections may or may not be well founded: the important point is that the PPP was likely to win, owing to its support among the rural masses. However, countrywide elections are events of national mobilization in underdeveloped countries. The urban centers become hotbeds of agitation. The defeated opposition in 1977, consisting of an electoral alliance of nearly all the political parties in Pakistan called the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), immediately accused the government for large-scale rigging and called upon the PPP leadership to declare the election results null and wide and to make arrangements for fresh elections. The urban leaders by the traders, the shopkeepers, the Mullah and the democratically-aligned intelligentsia vehemently echoed the call of the opposition. The PNA found itself leading a mass urban government against the PPP.131 The movement was entirely reactionary in the sense that it did not have any possible economic or political program and was alarmed

128 Ibid., p.410.

129 Ibid., p.411.

130 Ibid., p.412.

131 Ibid., pp.413-414.

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solely as a reaction to the PPP. The peasants who had voted the PPP were incapable of demonstrating their strength in the form of any organized movement. The PPP had lost control of the streets and Bhutto, an experienced populist campaigner, isolated in terms of rank and file support in the urban centers. He could only resort to the army combat the mass movement on the streets.132

The deployment of the army till disorder has several implications in the third World: it signifies weakness in the ruling party; it antagonizes the masses, since the street clashes often result in bloodshed: and. perhaps most importantly, it engages the army on internal political fronts. Such was the scene in Pakistan in 1977.133

Bhutto tried to fight the opposition on two fronts, he invited the army to restore order while at the same time he tried to neutralize the opposition by accepting some of' its demands. He agreed to hold re-elections in some of the disputed constituencies or even to concede these to opposition candidates. To appease the religious factions, he banned drinking, restricted the sale of liquor, closed down betting and gambling dens and declared Friday the weekly holiday. Of course, every concession, he made, raised the morale and strength of the opposition. History turned full circle: Bhutto who, in his previous ten years, had refused to meet and negotiate with the democratically-elected leaders of Pakistan, now he was facing boycott by the combined opposition determined to wrangle him.134

On July 5, 1977, after two months of confrontation, the army took over with the declared intention of holding fresh elections within ninety days during which period the protagonists were expected to organize election campaigns.135The army take-over affected the mood of the people: Bhutto's fortune could turn at the last time. The PNA's movement, which had taken several months to build and consolidate,

132 Ibid., p.415.

133 Ibid., pp.416-417.

134 Ibid., p.418.

135 Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, NBO Publishers Distributors, New Delhi, 1985, p.34. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.419.

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could be taken on. As a leader ousted by the army, as a loser, Bhutto could turn the tables and build a counter-movement. Bhutto, the arch-populist, felt the changing pulse of the masses and decided to go on offensive. He immediately charged the army with partisan behavior and accused the opposition of being a tool in the hands of “imperialism” which conspired to take away all the gains that the oppressed and the exploited had made during his regime. It was a conspiracy planned at a global level, proclaimed Bhutto, and his voice found an echo in all corners of the country. Bhutto out of power found himself on home ground fighting a populist campaign against those whom he considered.136

This was an unexpected turn of events, as unexpected overwhelmingly victory of Mujeeb in the elections of 1970. The opposition had overestimated its strength that Bhutto can find cracks in its ranks and hijack many of its supporters. So, within hours of starting his campaign, Bhutto was restrained front taking it to the masses. Without further loss of time a case conspiracy to murder was invoked and Bhutto was arrested.137

The rapidity of events as restrictions on his political movements, his arrest, the charges and then the trial, denote that somehow Bhutto’s glorious days had been overthrew. Bhutto’s trial lasted for nearly two years. He was hanged in the early hours of April 4, 1979.138

Hassan Askari Rizvi writes in his book "The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86" that the emergence of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as Pakistan's President on December 20, 1971, in place of General Yahya Khan, was a logical outcome of the defeat in the war with India and the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Bhutto's

136 Hassan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise And Realization of Bengli Muslim Nationalism, p.420.

137 A. M. K. Maswani, Subversion in East Pakistan, Amir Publications, Dhaka, 1979, pp.154-155. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.423.

138 Chakar Ali Junejo, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A Memoir, Pakistan Publishing, Karachi, 1996, p.154. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.424.

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People Party proved a leading party in 1971 polls in the West Pakistan. His reign consists of six years from 1971 to 1977.139

Khalid Bin Saeed writes in his book, “politics in Pakistan" that an obvious cause of downfall was the rigging in elections. The resulting explosion was much big and involved too many risks and losses of human life on the part of the demonstrators to be explained alone. The PNA felt confident to capture a reasonable number of' seats in the National Assembly and thus emerge as a formidable opposition. When the results of the National Assembly polls were declared the PPP swept the PNA. The PPP success in the elections proved short lived because the PNA alleged massive ragging of the polls by the ruling party. As a mark of' protest, the PNA boycotted the provincial elections which were held on 10th March and successfully staged a country wide strike on 11th March. Encouraged by the popular response, the PNA decided to launch a mass protest of their major demands which included the scrapping of election results, the holding of Fresh polls, and the removal of the Chief Election Commissioner and the resignation of Bhutto.140

The second main cause of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's downfall was nationalization of the industries. It was apparent that big business had suffered because of nationalization. An important cementing and sustaining force was the commercial and monetary interests of the shopkeepers and merchants who were against the government because of its nationalization of big industries, declining private investment and above all nationalization of cotton ginning and rice husking mills in July 1976 which meant that the small merchants and traders could not become investors and small industrialists by investing in such mills. It was the nationalization of this rice and cotton mills that attracted the arhti’s (middlemen) of the Mandi (market) in the PNA movement. The merchant class particularly those trading in cloth had to vast network that linked cities like Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad and . It was significant that with these interlinked interests and contacts, the merchant class in

139 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, pp.254-256.

140 Khalid Bin Saeed, Islam And The Paths of Pakistan’s Political Development, http://www.scribd.com/doc/17754810/Islam-and-the-Paths-of--Political-Development (accessed March 12, 2013).

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all these cities supported the demonstrations. The refugee middle class had suffered because of shrinking job opportunities caused by decline in private investment due to the quota system of the new Government. These refugees had also their baradaries (families) in the certain cities of Punjab which accentuated or reinforce their sense of solidarity.141

Another cause of the downfall of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was that the PPP strongmen and the mohallah chairman (locality chairman) derived benefits from the government like a ration depot or a route permit and used their position to extract fines, bribes and payments from the merchant class. These sorts of grievances came through when the reporters of various newspapers interviewed the leaders of merchant groups in the walled cities of Lahore and Multan.142

The most important slogan which provoked the public against the Bhutto government was the slogan of Nizam-e-Mustafa. This slogan inspired the precisionists to face the police sticks or even bullets were the establishment of Nizam- e-Mustata.143 This was a powerful symbol because it combined the religion of Islam and the personality of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Devotion to Islam was there, but the love that the Holy Prophet's (PBUH) personality inspired for the common man was perhaps even more electrifying. This explains why the name of Haji Aftab, a cloth merchant of Lahore became a legend for leading the procession against police fire. It was the deadliest blows struck at the Bhutto regime. It was a "miracle" reason or logic could not explain that People who did not strictly follow Islam advanced to the bullets in the name of Nizam-e-Mustafa. They felt that it was

141 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.424- 425.

142 Ibid., p.426.

143 Eamon Murphy, The Making of : Historical And Social Roots of Extremism, Oxford University Press, London, 2012, p.79.

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divine help and the Islamic favor of the masses for Nizam-e-Mustafa had enabled them to overcome Bhutto.144

Mosques and walled cities provided certain advantages, for example, during the agitation, when Section 144 of P.C. banning the assembly of more than five persons was imposed, mosques where more than five persons assembled for prayers and other activities did not normally come under the purview of Section 144. When mosques became the nerve centers of the demonstrations where Bhutto and his socialism was denounced as anti-Islamic forces, members of the police and FSF did enter the mosques either to arrest or beat the demonstrators. Such action was regarded as sacrilegious and tended to provoke more violent and demonstrations. Furthermore, it was not easy for the police to close or arrest demonstrators in the walled cities where the narrow lanes and streets restricted movements of personnel and vehicles. The lower middle class, who were tinder the influence of the Jamat-e-Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Pakistan really felt that Bhutto would cause incalculable harm to the Islamic ideology. These misgivings were further reinforced by his repression.145

Bhutto appointed Zia as Chief of Staff in March 1976. General Zia was a religious man. He regularly studies some of the journals and publications of the Jamat-e-Islami. It may be noted that Zia was a refugee from East Punjab. The head of the Jamat-e-Islami was one of the prominent political leaders who applauded the imposition of Martial Law on July 5, 1977. Bhutto, while making his statement in the Supreme Court, observed: I appointed a Chief of Army Staff belonging to Jamat-e- Islami and the result is all of us.146 So, Zia's Martial Law was the end of Bhutto's regime.

144 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.425. Also see Eamon Murphy, The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical And Social Roots of Extremism, pp.79-80.

145 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.425- 426. Also see Eamon Murphy, The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical And Social Roots of Extremism, pp.81-82.

146 Ibid., pp.84-85.

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Although Bhutto constantly referred to Islamic Socialism, neither he nor the party spelled out clearly how Islam and Socialism were to be combined or were to influence each other. In the election manifesto of the PPP in 1970, the four mottos of the party were stated as: Islam is our teeth. Democracy is our policy. Socialism is our economy. All powers to the people. It was significant that in such a formulation, Islam was described only as a faith and as neither linked clearly with democracy or with the socialist economy.147 When one reads the manifesto in its details, one again finds that there is no mention of how Islam justifies or supports nationalization of certain industries or measures and objectives like land reforms and the elimination of feudalism. Where Bhutto and the PPP being deliberate in putting forward the concept of Islamic Socialism but not explaining how Islam would inspire or justice certain radical measures that the party was advocating. Did they perhaps feel that Islam as a religion or as an ideology could not be readily used? Of course this was just for purposes of creating class-consciousness and launching a class struggle.148

Bhutto was able to defeat the Islam oriented and conservative parties in 1970 elections with the help of a radical program, find a political slogan like Islamic Socialism. During 1972-77, his regime and his policies created sufficient class tension that, in turn, alarmed the conservative forces to such an extent that he was eventually overthrown through urban demonstrations in 1977.149 It is conceivable that his party had produced an intellectual and political synthesis between socialism and Islam he might not have been as vulnerable. This is a question that has never been systematically explored. The fillet remains that in the case of the conservative groups who had coalesced in the PNA movement against Bhutto and the military regime that finally toppled the Bhutto's policies had heightened class conflict to alarming Proportions.150

147 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), Pakistab Book Dipute, Lahore, 1988, p.427.

148 Ibid., p.428.

149 Ibid., p.429.

150 Ibid., p.430.

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Khalid Bin Saeed writes in his book “Politics in Pakistan” that there were certain weaknesses in Bhutto's personality. In an interview given to the well-known Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, Bhutto admitted that lie was often torn by many conflicts, which were a part of his mental make tip. He further said:

There are many conflicts in front of me. I'm aware of that. I try to reconcile them and overcome them, but I don't succeed and I remain under this strange mixture of Asia and Europe. I have a layman's education and a Muslim's upbringing. My mind is Western and my soul is Eastern.151

The main cause of his downfall was his strong desire for power. The autocratic government of Ayub Khan was his ideal way of administration. The constitution of 1973 made it clear that the key player of the entire government structure whether it is concerned with decision making process in the central government, or whether it related to matters with the provincial governments was the Prime Minister. All this clearly indicated that the Prime Minister could neither be controlled by the president nor be challenged by the Assembly.152 The latter feature was extraordinary because the spirit of parliamentary government was that a Prime Minister was both accountable and removable by the Assembly. As it has often been remarked the Government of Pakistan under Ayub was that of the president, by the president and for the president, could it be said that in the Bhutto regime the Prime Minister's position was equally dominant? It seemed that Bhutto was not satisfied even with the power of the Prime Minister awarded by the constitution. During 1975-76, he had started thinking and bringing the parliamentary system under still greater control of the Prime Minister so that tie could push certain pieces of legislation through the parliament with practically no delay or obstruction.153

When Bhutto was in full power, he organized the FSF not only to suppress such movements but also reduce the reliance in the army. Again, he was trying to

151 Khalid Bin Saeed, Islam And The Paths of Pakistan’s Political Development, http://www.scribd.com/doc/17754810/Islam-and-the-Paths-of-Pakistans-Political-Development (accessed March 12, 2013).

152 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.430.

153 Ibid., pp.431-432.

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increase his autonomy. He eliminated the monopoly of the civil service of Pakistan by throwing open top civil service jobs to all other civil servants and to those who had been brought in through lateral entry. In August and November 1973, the existing civil service cadres, including the CSP, were abolished and thousands of civil servants were amalgamated into the 22 pay grades. Even though the CSP Cadre was abolished, officers who belonged to this cadre were still occupying key positions in the centre, the provinces, urban centers and the districts. Bhutto weakened the power of these officers not only for the maintenance of law and order but also for coercing his political opponents and for rewarding the party faithful.154

The fatal flaw in this grand design was the Bhutto, while retaining the majority of the mass support particularly in Punjab and Sindh failed, to activate and mobilize the organizational support of the PPP. Being confident of the mass support he tended to de-link his political power from the populist movement, had became increasingly dependent on the coercive instruments of the state like the FSF and the armaments. He had not only analogized practically all the left-leaning leaders in his own party. When his government was faced with massive urban protest organized by mostly the petty business class under the sponsorship of the Pakistan national alliance during the spring of 1977, Bhutto had relied primarily on the FSF and the army to suppress such a movement. In such kind of political polarization which Bhutto's policies and actions had brought about, the army that had weight with the help of PNA and thus, Bhutto was overthrown at the Murree hill station.155

Actually, Bhutto had to pick up the pieces left by Bangladesh conflict. These were included on the issues of whether or not to recognized the new state, use demand to secure the release of ninety three troops captured in 1971 war and the Indian occupation of Pakistani territory. Behind these problems lay the necessity of bilateral talks with Indian which had greatly strengthened its strategic position visa Pakistan preliminary talks between the two countries in Murree during the spring of 1972, which paved to use the way for a Summit meeting, in the formal meeting between the premiers of India and Pakistan. The Pakistani President realized they are involved in

154 Ibid., pp.433-434.

155 Ibid., pp.435-436.

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high risk due to the Indian pressure, held all the story cards yet and sign of concession on his part could prove as seriously and fatally injurious, as had the Tashkent Summit for Ayub Khan.156 Bhutto had the depth of negotiating from a position of weakness in this first meeting of the two countries leaders since Tashkent that the agreement signed in the early hours of July was in Pakistan as a great triumph. The subsequent attempts by his opponent for his trial with claiming secret clause agreed to the personal acceptance of the status on Kashmir failed to return from this achievement. Bhutto reached there with smile accompanied by a large entangle which included his nineteen year old daughter Benazeer Bhutto, who was here due to Harvard summer vocations. Bhutto was ready to leave the place without an agreement rather than agree on Indian demands for an explication war pact or the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan. The talks continued for a number of days without any sign and it was a massive success of Bhutto. From Bhutto’s point of view the fact that the agreement did not included a no war pact or Pakistan recognition of Bangladesh, yet with drawl of India from Pakistani Soil was major cause of celebration and rejoice. Despite Indian hops there was no final solution of Kashmir issue but both leaders agreed that Indian and Pakistan would resolve their issue through bilateral talks, this agreement buried the dispute as an international issue which could be brought before the unified nation in terms of accepting ceasefire line as the new line of control in Kashmir. But, the similar agreement allowed the resumption of trade and communication including over fight and called for promotion of scientific and cultural exchanges. A part from Indian, Bhutto visited china and other Muslim countries and improved relations with them. He was able to convene OIC conference in Lahore in 1974. He also tried to seek to maintain good relationship between Russia and Pakistan. He raised the voice for the Muslims and third World countries on international forums.157

Bhutto had decided to hold elections in June 1976, when Rafi Raza announced on January 7, 1977, concerning to hold the national and Provincial elections, was unexpected for the public. The (PNA) was founded on 11 January comprised nine political parties emplacing the range of secular leftist and Islamist outlooks.

156 Ibid., p.437.

157 Ibid., pp.438-439.

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Surprisingly, its electioneering was focused mainly on the grievances arising from inflation of bad Government and unemployment. The move of positive aspects of its programmer was vague as over the issue of denationalization. Although a commitment to Islamization was given.158

It was also revealed that defensiveness of the government was campaigning on Islamic issues. Government also used its machinery and intimidator tactics against large crowed collected to PNA rallies. It was expected that PPP would make clean sweep in the elections. Hassan Askari Rizvi commented on announcement of elections in 1977, called a general astonishment and led to an immediate claim that the elections had been rigged. PPP had apparel captured 155 seats out of 200 National Assembly seats. The PNA immediate response was staged a nationwide strike on 11th March. The PNA movement got full swing which was to end in introduction of Martial Law159. After the 5th July, a white paper was issued listing Bhutto’s misdeeds and his counter claim of army and external support for PNA campaign set down at length. The reality seems to be that PPP victory was inflated by local officials which may have affected 30-40 seats. Bhutto was unprepared for the further accomplice and had not thought that some opponents accused the order to secure two third authorities necessary to bring constitutional change.160

No doubt Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto had a personality of convincing others, Since his arrival into politics during the rule of President Sikandar Mirza. During Ayub regime, he was foreign minister and played vital role in maintaining good relations with communist world like Peoples republic of China and Soviet Union. With opposing Tashkent Declaration, he formed his own political party, named Pakistan People’s Party, which won first general elections of Pakistan in 1970 from two provinces of Pakistan. It became second largest political party in the National Assembly after Awami League which got simple majority. Due to political crisis in shifting power to Awami Laeague, Civil war had been started in East Pakistan. With Indian support, several

158 Ibid., p.440. Also see Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto And Pakistan: 1967-1977, p.181.

159 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military And Politics in Pakistan, p.117.

160 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.441- 442.

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rebellions were attacking on Pakistan Army. In November 1971, India openly attacked East Pakistan and with the help of Awami League, fought for the separation of East Pakistan from The United Pakistan. On December 16, 1971, Pakistan Army accepted its defeat in Paltan Ground of Dhakka and East Pakistan became Bangladesh. But, till 1974, Pakistan had been accepted the separation of East Pakistan through 1st amendment in the constitution of 1973. Now, Bhutto had to refine pre-existing infrastructure of remaining Pakistan and he introduced several reforms and a system of nationalization which opposed by PNA. So, PNA started its movement in all over the country and it ended with imposition of Martial Law on July 5, 1977.

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Chapter 3

Major Steps of Zia-ul-Haq And Pakistan People’s Party

Zia’s Attitude Towards Political Forces

The subjugation during the Military rule of Zia-ul-Haq was the period of Cold War environment. The history of Pakistan indicated the massive political, biased and military suppression occurred during the military rule of Zia-ul-Haq who gave the permission of political restriction over the secular, communist, liberal, and democratic parties and groups during 1977 to 1988.1 It engaged the large-scale wash out of all political groups with left core orientation on the left-right political variety, oppression of peasants2, higher-ranked military leaders3, characterized by widespread police observation, widespread doubt of "saboteurs", custody, and subjective executions of the Pro-Soviet parties opposing the country's secret participation to arm the Afghan Mujahideen4 against the USSR in Afghanistan.5

Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Zia-ul-Haq, on July 5, 1977, arranged a plan to bring down the national and democratically elected rule of Prime minister Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto in a bloodless coup d'état6 which codename was “.7” After the imposition of military rule in Pakistan, the military tyrannical regime moved

1 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq, Westview Press, Michigun, 1991, p.26.

2 Oppression of peasants was held usually, in the rural areas of Sindh, where most of the peasants population was supporting Pakistan People’s Party.

3 Leaders those were supporting Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, were suppressed by Zia-ul-Haq.

4 Mujahideen are those militant who fight for the survival of Islam.

5 Ibid., p.27.

6 It is a French word, which means “Military Rule”

7 The code name of 1976 Martial Law was Operation Fair Play.

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quickly to spoil any opposition or prospective resistance against Zia-ul-Haq's regime, whereas, the initial public reaction against the implementation of Martial Law was limited to the drawing rooms, the harassment and resistance augmented in the run-up to the passion and the death sentence of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Afterward, the opposition and at the same time, the maltreatment became more structured with the initiation Movement for Restoration of Democracy under the leadership of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto’s daughter, Benazeer Bhutto.8

The victims of maltreatment ranged from political workers and activists to ethnic and religious minorities, intellectuals, communists, journalists, poets and to many others. Estimate of the people murdered openly on the orders of military regime or through staged trials in civil or military courts is varied in between five to twenty thousand approximately. In addition, thousands were assassinated in state supported sectarian and ethnic aggressions in incidents like Qasba-Aligarh9 Massacre where almost 400 people were raped and murdered under just two hours, in Karachi.10

On July 5, 1977, the armed forces of Pakistan speedily moved to take into custody the Prime Minister Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, inserting several other leaders and members of cabinet affiliated with Pakistan People’s Party under .11 All the party leaders were arrested; the government faced slight opposition until the death punishment for Z.A. Bhutto, announced on March 18, 197812. A non-aggressive and non-violent mass protest was started throughout Sindh and in some parts of Punjab. The protest in Nawabshah13 was crushed, is the first example of mass murder by the government where hundreds of peasants were killed by using combat helicopters on

8 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq, p.27.

9 Qasba Aligarh is a backward town in the rural Sindh where Pakistan People’s Party had vast political support.

10 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq, p.30.

11 Ibid.

12 Ravi Kalia, Pakistan: From The Rhetoric of Democracy To The Rise of Militancy, Routledge, New York, 2012, p.67.

13 This city was considered a hub for Pakistan People’s Party.

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the orders of the , Lieutenant-General S.M. Abbasi, during protest14. The imposition of curfew in Nawabshah, Sukkur, Larkana, Hyderabad and some parts of Karachi was occurred due to massive reaction of people. Thousands of PPP workers were arrested throughout Punjab and Sindh provinces. A strict ban was imposed over the Pakistan Peoples Party’s flag or its related symbol. Cities in all over the Sindh province remained in frequent state of curfew until April 4, 1979, when Bhutto was secretly hanged, without any pre-publicized date15.

There was preventive curfew in all over the Sindh province and due to the fear of reaction; curfew was imposed in Bahawalpur, Multan and several other cities of Punjab as well16. More than 51 people who were protesting in , Rawalpindi and Lahore were arrested and poisoned accused of disturbance in civil order and national disloyalty17.

President Zia-ul-Haq, on September 27, 1982, issued the administrative ruling as the Martial Law Regulation No.53 for legalize the death punishment as the prescribed penalty for any crime liable to cause uncertainty, terror or hopelessness amongst the public18. Crimes carrying a punishment under such activities, which disturbed civil law, included any work or act with intention to damage the efficiency or hamper the working of, or cause is smashing up of public possessions or the soft and smooth performance of government. Similarly, this law provided an authority to military court, on the base of police or any other inquiry administration alone may, unless the divergent is confirmed, presume that this blame has committed the crime charged. With other provisions, the announcement that was confirmed "shall be estimated to have taken effective from the date of July 5, 1977" that was the day Zia-

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., p.69.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p.70.

18 Syed F. Hasnat, Global Security Watch – Pakistan, ABC-CLIO, New York, 2011, p.119. 95

ul-Haq overthrew his predecessor elected Prime Minister of Pakistan People’s Party; Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto19.

Faraz Wahlaah who was the six years old child was waves the PPP flag during protest against Zia regime in the mid of 1980s, was declared as a youngest political hostage of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy20.During the 11 years of Zia-ul-Haq regime, several international human rights groups and organizations repeatedly pointed out and expressed concerns over the army's brutal actions to suppress disagreements21. The Amnesty International in his report which was released on May15, 1978 highlighted that:

We have so many concerns at the using of spanking in Pakistan and are troubled that this abnormal sentences are also being imposed on political prisoners for obligating acts which often come into view to be no new than use of the rights regarding freedom of expression and speech guaranteed in the constitution of 1973. The first open hanging took place in the month of March after death punishments were legalized by a military court on the issue of three civilians convicted for assassination. Overall, 16 prisoners have been sentenced to spankings for political activities.22

Further Added:

Several relatives, in whom many of them were teenagers, have been hostages until the wanted person was found. Yahya Bakhtiyar who was Attorney General during Bhutto era, was beaten up in his compartment in Quetta jail in same month. His family was received his bloodstained dress for cleaning.23

19 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), Pakistan Book Dipute, Lahore, 1988, p.352.

20 Ibid., p.353.

21Ibid., p.353.

22 Ibid., p.354.

23 Ibid., p.355.

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During commenting on Zia-ul-haq regime's repression, the Economist said:“The Pakistan army has been brutal in its crackdown”24Furthermore, a survey which was held by the Geneva based International Commission of Jurists which report was published by the Lahore bar Association, charged that:

In 1984, systematic torture was occurred in five prisons of Lahore, mainly at a prison where many political prisoners were held. Military courts are utilized increasingly to clear the accumulation of cases in regular courts. The survey published its reports that the military courts have been decided to solve cases in minutes and have been refused defendants regarding delivering their rights through lawyers. Special military courts were established that were tried serious offenses allowing defense guidance but the politicized judges often barricade the lawyers in their working.25

On November 19, 1985, the Amnesty International also blamed the Zia-ul-Haq regime of crushing, torturing and denying fair trials to political prisoners trialed by special established military courts. It cited that:

In September of 1985, more than 130 political prisoners were facing sentences were between the age of seven and 42 years after special established military courts blamed and convicted them of political crimes or politically oriented criminal crimes and offenses. The military courts frequently use as facts acknowledgments extracted by torture and at the same time, as prisoners were hung upside down and brutally beaten, given strong electric shocks, strapped to the blocks of ice, deprived of foodstuff and doze for two or three days including burned with cigarettes. Many political prisoners were held in manacles and handcuffs. People, often were tried in courts held in closed sitting and refused the right of petition to the higher court.26

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., pp.355.356.

26 Ibid., p.356.

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Hundreds of political prisoners faced prison without trail and shoot dead in such behave of military courts.27 On September 7, 1987, International Commission of Jurists once more published information that was stating that:"Several human rights abuses are continuing in Pakistan, including alleged military attacks on common villagers, despite the so-called lifting of Martial Law approximately twenty months ago."28

The ICJ29 cited according to villagers who said that their villages were attacked, raided and burgling by soldiers. Sometimes this act was accompanied by local policemen. "Several male villagers were shot to death and brutally beaten the women. In at least two cases, pregnant women had faced miscarried"30. Daily “Le Monde” (a newspaper published from Paris) wrote on August 18, 1988 that:"Surely, no defender of human rights or democracy was going to shed tears over Zia-ul-Haq's death"31.

During suppression of opposition, there is an estimate that approximately 20,000 political workers and activists were hunted down and hanged or executed during this regime, whereas, thousands had been forced to leave Pakistan for Western Europe, United States of America and Middle East, specially, just for seeking asylum32.

PPP’s Leadership And Zia Regime

Zia-ul-Haq had designed long planning to inflict the Martial Law as he became Chief of Army Staff in 197633. On numerous occasions, Zia-ul-Haq purposely covered intelligence information and tried to misguide Bhutto on various political

27 Ibid., p.356.

28 Ibid.

29 ICJ stands for International Court of Justice.

30 Ibid., p.356.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p.357.

33 Abdul Qayyum, Zia-ul-Haq And I, International Consortium of Consultants And Technical Services, Michigun, 1997, p.22.

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affairs. That’s the result that soon all the opposition parties of that time, were demanding overthrow of Bhutto’s government34. When political and civil disorder was intensified, it had been converted into massive unrest. Bhutto on advice of Zia-ul- Haq imposed Martial Law in the major cities of country including Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad35. Though, a negotiation agreement among Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and opposition was eventually reported. The negotiating theory was generated next day after the showing off armed rally by the workers of Pakistan People’s Party but Zia- ul-Haq had been planned the Martial Law carefully, because he knew that Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto had huge links in the intelligence services of Pakistan armed forces and have links with several military high ranked officers36. Chief of Air Staff, General Muhammad Zulfaqar Ali Khan and Tajamul Husain Malik who was GOC of 23rd Mountain Division, Major General Nasirullah Baber, (Director General for the ) and Vice- Syed Muhammad Ahsan, were considered to be loyal with Bhutto37. In the meantime, one intelligence unit and the army formations were stationed in the Prime minister secretariat whose purpose was to keep an eye on Bhutto's activities and movements, tapping phone calls and also keeping a record of invitees in the Prime Minister's secretariat. General K.M. Arif who was the closest ally of General Zia-ul-Haq, had tried to get together with Bhutto in different attempts, but such efforts were disillusioned by Zia-ul-Haq. Finally, on April 5, 1977, General Arif succeeded in having meeting with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto behind closed doors, enlightening the scheme against him. Bhutto remained not to persuade this and still unimpressed, reportedly asking that how his protégé Zia-ul-Haq could do such unconstitutional acts against him38. Therefore, Bhutto dismissed General K.M. Arif later due to conveying him such “wrong” information39.

34 Ibid., p.23.

35 Ibid., p.24.

36 Ibid., p.25.

37 Ibid., p.25.

38 Ibid., p.26.

39 Ibid., p.28.

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Due to showing off this intelligence information, Zia-ul-Haq clandestinely contracted with the British active duty SAS armed officers to continue a staff course for the Army human resources, while at the same time Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Muhammad Shareef silently removed naval personnel loyal to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Zia-ul-Haq ordered Bhutto's trustworthy officers to go to a staff and command course and they were not allowed to depart the course until midnight40. In the meantime, Zia- ul-Haq with his close military officers as well as Admiral Muhammad Shareef (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee at that time) arranged the coup in the evening of July 5, 197741. So, before the declaration of any accord or agreement, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and other members of his cabinet were under arrest by troops of Military Police on the order of Zia-ul-Haq in the evening. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto tried to call Zia-ul-Haq but all telephone lines had been disconnected. One army officer came in the Prime minister secretariat and arrested Bhutto. After realizing that warnings of K.M. Arif were not hoax, he was listening from that military officer that he was apologetic but has been obligatory to perform this unpleasant task of arresting him42.

Zia-ul-Haq and his military administration portrayed the Martial Law as an "impulsive reply to difficult circumstances" but his reaction was entirely contradictory43. Soon after imposing Martial Law, Zia-ul-Haq gave interview to the British journalist Edward Behr of Newsweek that:

I (Zia-ul-Haq) am the only man who took this decision (about Operation Fair Play for imposing Martial Law) and I did this after 17 Hours from listening the press statements that negotiations and talks between Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and the opposition parties had been broken down. Had an accord been reached

40 Ibid., p.29.

41 Ibid., p.30.

42 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.359. Also see Abdul Qayyum, Zia-ul-Haq and I, International Consortium of Consultants, p.32.

43 Abdul Qayyum, Zia-ul-Haq And I, p.32.

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between them, I surely would never have completed it.44

Though, during the rule of Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff, General Khalid Mahmood Arif contradicted Zia-ul-Haq's this statement when K.M. Arif noted that the Martial Law had already been structured, and the senior ranked leadership of Pakistan Army had solid information45. Therefore, he met with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto on urgent situation, stressing and trying to urge Bhutto to rush discussions with the opposition. According to K.M. Arif and several other independent experts, accounts, the discussion had not been broken down even though the Martial Law was designed. Zia-ul-Haq further argued that Operation Fair Play against Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto had been demanded by the outlook of a civil disobedient and Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was making a plan to distribute weapons among his supporters46. But, K.M. Arif strongly rejected Zia-ul-Haq's explanations on Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, and said that there was no proof that weapons were recovered or found from any of the political party's election office, the military administration in fact, did not put on trial Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto on the accuse of preparation or planning of civil war.47

Immediately, Admiral Muhammad Shareef, the Chief of Naval Staff at that time, announced his support with other navy strong officers for Zia-ul-Haq and his military government48. But General Muhammad Zulfakar Ali Khan, the Chief of Air Staff, remains unsupported, whereas, Genral Muhammad Shareef, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, remains neutral and he noiselessly expressed his mental support to the Prime Minister Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.49 Zia-ul-Haq, in 1978, pressured President Fazal Elahi Chaudhary to appoint General Anwar Shameem as Chief of Air

44 Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan; General Zia-ul-Haq's Interviews to Foriegn Media. Official documents, Directorate of Films & Publications, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1988.

45 Javed A. Siddiqi, Operation Fair Play-5 July-1977, Pakistan Publishing, Islamabad, 1985, p.211.

46 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), Dost Publishing, Lahore, 1996, p.113.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., p.114.

49 Ibid., p.115.

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Staff and in 1979, Admiral Karaamat Niazi appointed as Chief of Naval Staff. On Zia- ul-Haq's advice, President Fazal Ellahi Chaudhary appointed Admiral Muhammad Shareef as the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and principal military adviser for overlooking all the affairs of inter-services including Chiefs of the Staff of respected forces50. In 1979, the Chiefs of Army, Air Force and the Navy including the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff legalized the Martial Law as constitutional and lawful under the war-torn conditions, as well promised their support in the favor of Zia-ul-Haq51.

After arrogant power as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Zia-ul-Haq soon appeared on national television (PTV) and promised to hold new free and fair parliamentary elections within next 90 days and to shift the political powers to the civilian representatives52. He also stated that the Constitution of 1973 had not been abrogated but for the time being, it has been suspended. Zia-ul-Haq did not reliance on the civilian organizations and institutions, and legislators ensured him that his stay is necessary for the country's unity, integrity, autonomy and sovereignty. Therefore, in October 1977, he declared the delay of electoral program and decided to initiate an accountability procedure for the politicians. On national television, Zia-ul-Haq strongly defended his policy for delaying the elections and insisted that "inspection of political leaders is necessary who had involved in misconduct in their past ruling period"53. As a result, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) adopted its strategy of "retribution first, elections later". Zia-ul-Haq's strategy severely spoiled his trustworthiness domestically and internationally because he several times broke the promises. Another cause was that Zia-ul-Haq extensively assumed that once out of power the mass of PPP protests and rallies puff up and an improved performance in up-coming elections was achievable. This fear led to demand for deferment of elections by the right-wing Islamist parties and groups as well as left-wing socialist minded people and parties, who were previously allied with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto but

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., p.116.

52 Abdul Latif Masoom, Dilemmas of A Military Ruler: A Political Study of The Zia Regime, Afsar Brothers, Islamabad, 2000, p.100.

53 Ibid., p.101.

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displaced by him in the first place. Zia-ul-Haq transmitted one of the intelligence unit, known as Political Wing of ISI and sending General Tafazzul Husain Siddiqi, to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's native Province of Sindh, to evaluate whether people would agree to Martial Law54. The Political Wing of ISI also contacted with several right-wing Islamist political parties and groups, and also several conservatives regarding promising election, and offering power sharing formula with PNA. He successfully divided and alienated the secular political parties and groups from right- wing Islamist groups, parties and several conservatives, and afterward washed out each member of secular parties55.

A Disqualification Tribunal was established and several politicians who had been the members of parliament were alleged with misconduct and banned from participating in political activities at any stage for the next seven years56. A white paper manuscript was published by the military administration which was highlighting the reasons of dismissing Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto’s government57.It is reported by senior military officers that when Zia-ul-Haq met with federal secretaries for the first time as leader of the country, after military coup, stated that: "He does not acquire the legitimacy of Liaqat Ali Khan, personality of General Ayub Khan or charisma of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. It can be analyzed who have its market"58.

Nussrat Bhutto, the wife of the dismissed Prime Minister, filed a suit against Zia-ul-Haq's arrival into politics, challenging the soundness of the July 1977 military rule59. The Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled which later declared as the Doctrine of Necessity (not like the 1954 Doctrine of necessity but politicization of judiciary as happened previous in 1954) that given the seriously unstable political circumstances of the time, Zia-ul-Haq's overthrowing of the Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto government was

54 Ibid., p.102.

55 Ibid., p.103.

56 Ibid., p.104.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., p.105.

59 Bjorn Dressel, The Judicialization of Politics in Asia, Routledge, New York, 2012, p.157.

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lawful on the grounds of requirement. The ruling tightened the general's hold of the military rule. When Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto appeared face-to-face to argue his appeal in the Supreme Court, he almost convinced judges, presented his views about unconstitutionally imposed military government and its legitimization from the judiciary60.

Zia-ul-Haq As President

Despite the discharging of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto government, President Fazal Elahi Chaudhary was persuaded to carry on in office as a nominal head of the state. After completing his tenure, Zia-ul-Haq insisted to acquire the office of Presidency. So, Fazal Elahi Chaudhary resigned and Zia-ul-Haq took the office of President of Pakistan on September 16, 1978. Thus, his place was covered as the undisputed monarch of the country. Till the next six years, Zia-ul-Haq issued numerous agreements which amended the constitution and significantly expanded his political powers. Most considerably, the Revival of Constitution of 1973 Order settled General Zia-ul-Haq the authority to dissolve the National Assembly at will.

According to Aftab Qazi and Roedaad Khan:

General Zia-ul-Haq reviled Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and had used unsuitable language and verbal abuse to describe Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and his other colleagues. On April 4, 1979, after the Supreme Court sustained the death punishment as had been passed by the Lahore High Court, the ex-elected Prime Minister Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was hanged. The Supreme Court ruled with four to three judges in favor of death punishment. The Lahore High Court had given him the death punishment on accuses of the assassination of the father of Ahmad Raza Kasuri, a nonconformist politician of Pakistan People’s Party. Despite a lot of appeals of mercy from international leaders requesting General Zia-ul-Haq to convert Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's death punishment, but Zia-ul-Haq dismissed all the appeals and upheld the death

60 Ibid., p.158.

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punishment. The hanging of democratically an elected prime minister by a military ruler was condemned worldwide and by the lawyers and jurists across the Pakistan. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's trial was decidedly controversial as well.61

Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's final personal manifestation and utterances in the Supreme Court was not the long defense of his behavior; he also made a number of matters clear in front of judiciary62. He also mentioned the word "heir" for his son Meer . He said some observations which indicated that he has views according to the Sunni sect of Islam, though he was considered Shia. He also efficiently directed doubt on the dependability of key witnesses against him, for example Masud Mehmood who was the trained lawyer from U.K. and was not a police officer or FSF (Federal Security Force) chief63. He talked about repeatedly Lahori and Ahmedi connection of Masud Mehmood in his witness. He frequently brought the question of his mistreatment in the death cell. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto made it plentifully clear even ultimately he wanted either freedom from prison or death, not something in between it, and appreciated Ghulam Mustafa Khar and thanks to his lawyer Yahya Bakhtiar64.

Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's another lawyer Abdul Hafeez Peerzada filed an appeal for the releasing of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's associate Mubashir Hassan and Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto himself. The Supreme Court fulfilled that Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's execution can be valued by the President and Mubashir Hassan's case is being covenanted by the Military Justice Court led by Zia-ul-Haq, therefore, the civilian courts have no authority over hearing this petition. Abdul Hafeez Peerzada submitted the appeal to Chief of Army Staff Directorate but General Zia-ul-Haq claimed that the request application had been missed. Therefore, Zia-ul-Haq upheld the punishment and

61 Kareem Khan, Zia-ul-Haq as President, http;//www.books.google.com.pk, (accessed on March 21, 2013).

62 T. W. Rajaratnam, A judiciary in Crisis?: The Trial of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Kaanthalakam, New Delhi, 1988, p.27.

63 Ibid., p.28.

64 Ibid., p.29.

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Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was executed on April 4, 197965. Horrified and disturbed Peerzada left Pakistan for United Kingdom and did not return to Pakistan until the restoration of democracy in 198866. Before 2000, Pakistani media did not published this news that the application had been found in the record section called Directorate General for Military History, at the Generals Combatant Headquarter (GHQ) Rawalpindi. The application was published after declaring public sphere of influence when General declassified several secret documents during the decade of 1970s.67

Politicization of Supreme Court

After imposing Martial Law, Zia-ul-haq firstly appointed several judges on adhoc bases in Supreme Court of Pakistan. In fact, still he has fear that, Pakistan People’s Party has a power to collect people domestically as well as he knew that Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto has strong relationship with several heads of states and heads of governments all over the world specially with Soviet Union and China. Therefore, he wanted to remove his support on grass root level in such a pattern that he must not be blamed but this act should be considered as a judicial proceeding68. So, soon after declaring Martial Law, Zia-ul-Haq advised President Fazal Elahi Chaudhary to appoint Justice Anwar-ul-Haq as a new chief justice of Pakistan. Immediately, military administration removed chief justice Yaqoob Ali from the office of chief justice of Pakistan by force and issued orders of appointment of Justice Anwar-ul-haq as a new chief justice of Pakistan on September 23, 197769. It was just because of filed petition by Nussrat Bhutto in the Supreme Court against the arrival of Zia-ul- Haq into the politics. Zulfqar Ali Bhutto objected the appointment of new chief justice

65 Ibid., pp.30-31.

66 Ibid., p.31.

67 Tariq Aqil, Judicial Murder of Bhutto, http://sixhour.com/judicial_murder.htm (accessed March 13, 2013).

68 Ofer Raban, The Supreme Court Endorsement of A Politicized Judiciary: A Philosophical Criticque, http://adr.uoregon.edu/assets/facultydocs/ofer/scendorsementofpoliticizedjudiciary.pdf, (accessed March 14, 2013).

69 Ibid.

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and highlighted his critical character before and after dismissing his government, but Anwar-ul-Haq was made a head of that bench who was hiring the petition against military government of Zia-ul-Haq70.

So, the objection of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was overruled by the new politicized Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq and now the petition of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was yet again heard by him as the leading judge of the bench. He presided overall petition of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto while the Martial Law has been imposed throughout the Pakistan71. He played his part in declaring Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as guilty in an ambiguity murder case and announcing death sentence even accuse did not prove. When Zia-ul-Haq visited Saudi Arabia in 1979, Justice Anwar-ul-Haq became acting president of Pakistan till his comeback.72

In the beginning f 1980s, Muslim world had suffered from several controversial issues like Iran War, Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the status of Palestine. Soon after taking the power of government, Zia-ul-Haq showed his caring association with Muslim world. He very much tried to involve in international disputes related to the Muslim world. So, on January 25, 1981, he represented Pakistan in third OIC Summit, held in Mecca (Saudi Arab) in which international disputes especially issues related to Iran Iraq War, Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and status of Palestine were discussed. Zia-ul-Haq also addressed in this conference and presented several suggestions regarding solving international disputes related to the Muslim world73. He said that:

Muslim world has need of co-operation and unity for re-gaining its lost glorious status. As Muslims led the world for the centuries, so Pakistan can perform its role to united Muslims of world to get back their leading role.74

70 Ibid.

71Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Moshe Maoz, Muslim Attitude Towards Jews And Isreal, Essex Publications, London, 2011, p.197.

74 Ibid

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His suggestions were appreciated by all the participant countries. Even Iran did not participate in this summit; therefore, suggestions regarding Iran and Iraq lost their worth. In final ceremony, “Mecca declaration” announced in which suggestions given by Pakistan were included. Similarly, Pakistan also became a member country of a committee which was formed for stopping Iran-Iraq War75.

Same as earlier military governments, Zia-ul-Haq did not like the idea of Parliamentary democracy and he banned all political parties across the country. The political structure which was built by Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was destroyed, disturbed, hampered, and not existed in the 1980s. On the other hand, a new political system was still needed to manage the country where several issues were demanding fast solutions. Similarly, Zia-ul-Haq decided to establish Majlis-e-Shoora in the absence of parliament in 1980. This was the theme that the members of Shoora will be intellectuals, economist, journalists, scholars, and religious experts called “ulama” and professionalists from different fields. In fact, Zia-ul-Haq decided to replace the system of parliamentary democracy from the system of like-minded people same as in Soviet Union. Therefore, all the 284 members of Majlis-e-Shoora were nominated by president and scholars called it the government of technocrats76.

After Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's judicial murder, the demand of new election was being raised in all over the Pakistan. International community also forced Zia-ul-Haq to announce new elections77. But Zia-ul-Haq wanted to secure his position before holding the elections. A referendum was held on December 19, 1984. On the base of imposing Islamic laws, Zia tried to get the support of public through referendum and he got 95 per cent votes in his favor, but international media announced that the turnout was only 10 per cent78.

75 Ibid., pp.198-199

76 Riyaz Aḥmad Sayyid, Pakistan on Road To Islamic Democracy: Referendum 1984, Historical Research Institute, Islamabad, 1985, p.65.

77 Ibid., p.66.

78 Ibid., p.67.

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Five Year Plan (1978-83)

Military government of Zia, after one year of taking power, announced fifth five year plan in July 1978. This plan converted the development planning till 198379. The basic projections of this plan were as under:

1) To strengthen national income.

2) To solve problems related to urban areas and the development of rural areas.

3) To increase the quality of living.

4) To control the increase in population.

5) To change banking system according to the teachings of Islam.

6) To fix financial targets in the field of agriculture.

7) To get independency in fulfillment of wheat requirement.

8) To get six per cent annual growth in agriculture productions.

9) To produce cement production according the national need.

10) To enhance the production ability of Karachi Steel Mill.

11) To interlink the industrial sector with the agriculture sector.

12) To increase ten per cent annual growth in overall national development.

13) To increase 23 per cent in export productions80.

In the end of fiscal year of 1983, although Pakistan rejected the offers of American aid and IMF loans but it was failed to get these targets. Overall national growth was increased up to six per cent than ten per cent but pure independency in wheat, steel

79 Myron Wiener, The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran And Pakistan, Syracuse University Press, London, 2007, P.286.

80 Ibid., PP.287-289.

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and other productions could not be achieved. Similarly, even Zia government was claiming to impose Islamic laws and showing its intention regarding designing pure Islamic system in each department, it was failed to convert existing banking system into Islamic banking on permanent bases. This was not a proper law-making but just a presidential order that was reversed soon after the death of Zia-ul-Haq81.

It was being considered that the huge protest in Sindh disturbs the economic activities in all over the country but there were some economic measures of military government that were appreciated by the public overall. Flexibility and facilities in the entire economic sector develop the sense of security and people in the large number, including labor class, were being supported Zia government now82. These economic measures and developments are as follows:

1) Agriculture based industries were declared excluded from the taxpaying activities. Similarly, government offered same facilities to the labor and workers of the public and private industries. Therefore, the owners and the workers of factories and peasants were supported Zia’s policies of Islamization83.

2) Government offered open opportunity to import machinery for installing new industry without any duty charges84.

3) Government offered long-term loans for the development of industries85.

4) Government returned all those industries to the real owners which were nationalized during Bhutto regime86.

81 Ibid., PP.290-292.

82 Derrick M.Nault, Development in Asia, Universal Publishers, London, 1998, P.197.

83 Ibid., P.198.

84 Ibid., P.199.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid., P.200.

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5) Industrial Investment Schedule was announced for the development of private industry87.

6) Government offered the scheme of mixed-economy for encouraging new investors on the base of government partnership88.

7) Import of specific raw material and machinery was declared free from custom duty89.

8) Export Free Zone was established in Karachi for attracting overseas Pakistanis90.

9) Islamic Banking was introduced. Now, Banks were offered loans on the base of profit and lose. This was called “Muzarbat Scheme”. People in large number supported this offer. This also became a reason for increasing per capita income91.

Industrialists and owners of the factories appreciated these policies of military government because there was a clear indication of industrial development. These policies motivated labors and workers in performing their duties efficiently. Now, they were not become the part of any strike or protest. Such activities increase the production of yarn, cocking oil, sugar, cement, cycle manufacturing, cigarette production, paper manufacturing, leather industry and rubber production92.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., P.201

89 Ibid., P.202

90 Ibid., P.203.

91 Ibid., PP.203-204.

92 Ibid., PP.205-206.

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Constitutional Engineering And The Elections of 1985

After getting the office of presidency as a legitimize status, Zia-ul-haq announced first non-party based elections in February 198593. Most of mainstream political parties boycotted these elections. For this purpose, 8th amendment was introduced in the constitution which made a system semi-presidential. Now, prime minister had become an advisor of president and president had become fully authorized as well as head of the state and the government. Through this system, now, president had to appoint a person from parliament called Majlis-e-Shoora and then that nominated person had to get vote of confidence from the national assembly. So, Zia-ul-Haq appointed Muhammad Khan Junejo as a Prime Minister of Pakistan who was so simple in character. Zia wanted to choose such person who do not speak or oppose his policies94.

Before giving the power to new government, Zia legitimized his policies through constitutional engineering. 8th amendment in the constitution of 1973 delivered the power of dissolving national assembly to the president. Similarly, all the powers of appointments had given to the president through this amendment. After this constitutional engineering, new government was nominal in his working but soon, Zia-ul-Haq had several disagreements with Junejo’s nominal government95.

Pakistan had controversial relations with Afghanistan since 1947. Issues of Afghan refugees, Smuggling and propaganda about “Pakhtunistan” were the basic reasons of conflict among both the countries but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the red indication directly for Pakistan. Conspiracy of “Hold on Hot Waters” was going to be true. Now Soviet Union was directly threatening Pakistan. On the other hand, thousands of Afghan refugees entered in Pakistan that disturbed at large scale. Similarly, Soviet army’s activities were not only limited within the territory of Afghanistan but it enlarged within Pakistan in shape of

93 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, MIT Press, New York, 1988, p.86.

94 Ibid., p.87-88.

95 Ibid., p.90.

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missile attacks and air strikes. Although Pakistan protested to Afghan “Nazim-ul- Amoor” but no change occurred in Soviet behavior96.

In this situation, military government of Zia supported Afghan Mujahideen who stood against the Soviet Union. But at the same time, Pakistan wanted political peaceful solution of this dispute and withdrawal of Soviet Army from Afghanistan97. During the whole tenure of Zia-ul-haq, being a head of state, he always said that:

1) Soviet forces should leave Afghanistan without any condition.

2) There should be peaceful circumstances in which Afghan refugees would go back to Afghanistan.

3) Afghan people should determine their future by their selves.

4) There should be directly elected democratic government in Afghanistan.

5) There should be respect of Afghan territory and sovereignty98.

Even, with the American and Saudian aid, Pakistan was giving training to Afghan Mujahideen in its tribal areas but officially, military government tried to solve this problem peacefully and defended its support of Afghan Mujahideen due to external threats by Soviet forces99.

Political cleansing had been started in Pakistan firstly from 1977 to 1979, and then in 1983100. Zia as a chief Martial Law Administrator and as a president of the country tried to eliminate all the suspected rivalry against him. In reaction, a movement for the restoration of democracy had been started in the small provinces of the Pakistan, especially in Sindh that was the native province of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.

96 Peter Thomsan, The Wars in Afghanistan, Public-Affiars, London, 2002, PP.112-114.

97 Ibid., PP.115-117.

98 Ibid., PP.118-119.

99 Ibid., PP.120-121.

100 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition) , p.361.

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Such political cleansing was also opposed by the Indian ex-prime minister Indra Gandhi on August 13, 1983101.

Several senior military ranked officers such as , Muhammad Zulfaqar Ali Khan and Major General, Tajjamul Husain Malik were put in prison for treason and followed a small scale cleansing of Pakistan Army officers who were sympathetic to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto102. Zia-ul-Haq also curbed the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) by illegitimately kidnapping Jaam Saaqi and Nazeer Abbasi for the secret trial. Both Nazeer Abbasi and Jaam Saaqi were tortured and then executed into the hands of Brigadier General Imtiaz Ahmad. An open execution had become common practice for Zia-ul-Haq and the victims were senior journalists and politicians. This absolute crucial act further more radicalized the Pakistani society where narrow-mindedness for other people was reached to its maximum. Zia-ul-Haq's persecuting and cleansing forced minorities to escaped the country such as the director of Pakistan's space weapons program; Major General Eric Hall. The senior leadership of the People's National Party (PNP) took the asylum in neighboring India and in Afghanistan while many political activists and workers went away either missing or killed103. One of the distinguished case in 1981, was hijacking of the Pakistan International Airlines Boeing 720. ISI rapidly founded that the “Al-Zulfaqar” was at the back of this scheme which resulted in killing one of the military pilot104. The leader of this ring Salaam-Ullah Tipu was assassinated in prison at . Similarly, several others were assassinated by the ISI. The Chief of Afghan Secret Service (KHAD); Muhammad Najeebullah was also involved in this scheme, but soon he received his payment from the hands of Taliban in 1996, when he was cruelly beaten and then hanged on the road of Kabul in front of public105.

101 Ibid., p.362.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid., p.362.

104 Ibid., p.363.

105 Raja Anwar, The Terrorist Prince: The Life And Death of Murtaza Bhutto, Verso, New York, 1997, p.150.

114

Soon after this event, Zia-ul-Haq also started to hunt down the “Al-Zulfaqar” that was an organization formed by the children of late Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. The atrocious poisoning and casualty of Shahnawaz Bhutto who was the youngest son of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, is broadly suspected to end under Zia-ul-Haq's orders, although there was no evidences for this argument. Zia-ul-Haq's harassment of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's family forced Benazeer, Sanam Bhutto and Murtaza Bhutto to hide their selves in Arab countries, particularly Syria which provided the official residences to the Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto’s family106.

Nussrat Bhutto Case And Its Political Effects

Before analyzing Nussrat Bhutto case, we have to study what are the concepts of behaviorism and post-behaviorism. As behaviorism is a study of actions, behaviors and acts of persons, this approach has an ability to predict political behavior in future as well. This approach was introduced in 1960s and 1970s. David Easton was one of the leading scholars who advocated this approach. Behaviorism has no concern with the attitude and environment of the organization. This is only related with the behavior of the acting person107.

On the other hand, post-behaviorism is a reactionary approach of behaviorism. The advocates of this approach argue that there must be a study of behavior with special reference to the environment. Behavior of a person is varied according to the environment in which he is living or suffering. In fact, this approach was a reaction against the dominance of the behavior108.

Begum Nussrat Bhutto case against the Chief of Army Staff was also studied according to these approaches. According to the followers of behaviorism, Zia-ul- Haq’s act against the elected government was a series of PNA protest against Bhutto government. Everyone was predicting that this situation was going towards imposing

106 Ibid., pp.151-152.

107 Heinz Eulau, Behavioralism in Political Science, Transaction Publishers, New Jersy, 2011, p.109.

108 Philip L. Beardsley, A Critique of Post-Behavioralism, http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/191149?uid=3738832&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid= 21102903577701, (accessed March 16, 2013).

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of Martial Law, and Zia-ul-Haq performed his action as per prediction of the behavior of masses109.

On the other hand, the advocates of the post-behavioralism argue that hanging of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was a forceful decision according to the environment that was supporting Pakistan People’s Party which was not bearable for sustaining Zia regime. Zia-ul-Haq had realized that if Bhutto will be free and contest elections freely then it will be dangerous and harmful for his administration. His behavior was also dual during house arrest of Bhutto in Murree. He, in his each meeting with Bhutto after dismissing his government, promised him to conduct elections within ninety days, but as he was experiencing glory of the rule, he did not want to leave the government and refused to fulfill his promise of conducting elections110.

Judges, at that time, had also been forced to announce decision against Bhutto just due to the opposed environment. They had been realized that to deliver the favor in Nussrat Bhutto case to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto is actually a direct threat to their jobs as well as their lives. That’s the reason; hanging of Bhutto is called “Judicial Murder”. Judges gave the decision in favor of military arrival into the politics as legal and according to the doctrine of necessity111. Similarly, hanging of Bhutto was also considered as a decision according to the doctrine of necessity and to the scholars of post-behavioralism.

Nussrat Bhutto case was in fact, favoring the spirit of democracy but as PNA movement was criticizing pre-existing environment of the democratic government and welcoming Martial Law, it had also welcomed Martial Law. Similarly, international political environment also welcomed Martial Law because at that time, due to Cold War and Afghan situation, capitalist world was demanding the support of Pakistan Army, therefore, it also welcomed Military Coup in Pakistan. Such environment supported Zia-ul-Haq, and he without any fear, with using religious

109 Jan Mohammed Dawood, The Role of Superior Judiciary in The Politics of Pakistan, Royal Book Co., karachi, 1994, p.77.

110 Ibid., pp.77-78.

111 Ibid., pp.80-81.

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sentiments of Pakistani people, tried to legitimize his rule as well as crush the power of Pakistan People’s Party. Doctrine of necessity, announced by the judges of Supreme Court at that time, was also a part of that game112.

This decision, announced by the politicized judges of Supreme Court, created huge impacts on the political scenario of Pakistan. Some of these are as follows:

1) Judges, after this, did not ready to announce any decision against military at any time at any issue during violation of constitution.

2) People realized that, in case of military arrival, judiciary will always support military arrival.

3) The role of military into politics became stronger.

4) Political leaders are not allowed to initiate any step against the constitutional violations of Army officials.

5) The usage of religion into politics was considered essential for securing political power.

6) Coalition with theocratic powers deemed necessary for ruling over the country.

7) Interest groups and organizations realized about new approaches to pressurize elected governments for the fulfillment of their interests with the help of uneducated support of the public.

8) Courts lost their trust upon the people.

9) Illegal events were being legalized with the help of judiciary113.

112 Ibid., pp.82-83.

113 Ibid., p.84.

117

According to scholars, Nussrat Bhutto case left several other negative impacts over the politics of Pakistan and till the years, up-coming generations will face such consequences114.

Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was not declared culpable of assassination but he was sentenced to death on March 18, 1978. So, on March 12, 1978, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's former Legal Minister, Abdul Hafeez Peerada filed petition in the Supreme Court for releasing of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's Advisor for Scientific Research, Dr. Mubashir Hassan and to re-assess the death sentence to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto based on the rip decision. The Supreme Court denied Dr. Mubashir Hassan's release as he was prisoned by Military Police but it had been agreed to pay attention to the arguments. During all the 12 days of proceedings, the Supreme Court finalized that only the President of Pakistan can alter the death punishment into life imprisonment. So, Abdul Hafeez Peerzada filed an application then to the President Zia-ul-Haq. Though, Zia-ul-Haq did not take action immediately and claimed that the application had been missing115.

Emotionally crushed Abdul Hafeez Peerzada, then informed Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto about this development and Zia-ul-Haq's meaning. Therefore, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto did not look for an appeal while, he was shifted to the death cell in central jail of Rawalpindi. Now, his family appealed on its own behalf and a trial before the Supreme Court planned in next May. There was one week for Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto regarding preparation. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto issued a systematic and careful rejoinder to accuse, although Zia-ul-Haq banned its pamphlet. Chief Justice of Supreme Court, Syed Anwar-ul-Haq adjourned the court in the whole month of July 1978, allegedly because five among nine appeal court judges were eager to override the Lahore High Court’s judgment. Due to this act, One of the pro-Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto judges had been retired in July116.

114 Ibid., p.85.

115 Zaiḍ A. Bhutti, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; Shahid-i-Azam, Dost Publishers, Karachi, 1990, pp.12- 13.

116 Ibid., pp.14-16.

118

Chief Justice Syed Anwar-ul-Haq supervised all the trial, even being close to Zia-ul-Haq and even serving as an acting president, when Zia-ul-Haq was out of the country. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's lawyers managed to protect him, the right to carry out his own defence in front of Supreme Court. On December 18, 1978, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto appeared in public before a secret trial in the courtroom in Rawalpindi. So, he defended him in the court for four days without any assistance or notes117.

From the death cell, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto wrote his last letter to his daughter in which he said that:

I did not kill that man. My God is aware of it. I am big enough to admit if I had done it, that admission would have been less of an ordeal and humiliation than this barbarous trial which no self respecting man can endure. I am a Muslim. A Muslim's fate is in the hands of God Almighty. I can face Him with a clear conscience and tell Him that I rebuilt His Islamic State of Pakistan from ashes into a respectable Nation. I am entirely at peace with my conscience in this black whole of Kot Lakhpat. I am not afraid of death. You have seen what fires I have passed through.118

The appeal was concluded on December 23, 1978. So, on February 6, 1979, the Supreme Court of Pakistan issued a guilty judgment with the consent of three out of four judges. His family had just seven days for next appeal. The court arranged a stay of execution as it considered the petition. From February 24, 1979 onward, when the next court investigation began, appeals for mercy had been received from many heads of the states to Zia but argued that such appeals are simply a "trade union activity" among politicians119. On March 24, 1979, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. Zia-ul-Haq endorsed the death sentence. So, on April 4, 1979, Zulfaqar Ali

117 Ibid., pp.17-18.

118 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.366. Also see Zaiḍ A. Bhutti, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; Shahid-i-Azam, p.19.

119 Ibid., p.20.

119

Bhutto was hanged at and was buried in his native Village at Garhi Khuda Baksh 120.

Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's children, Murtaza and Benazeer tried to rally on international support regarding releasing of their father. Gaddafi of Libya sent his Prime Minister Abdus-Salam Jallood on an urgent visit of Pakistan to initiate talks with military government for the releasing of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Jallood told the journalists in a press conference that Gaddafi had offered Zia-ul-Haq to exile Bhutto in Libya. So, Prime Minister Jallood stayed in Islamabad where a special designated Presidential aircraft was waiting for Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. On the other hand, after one week, staying at airport, Zia-ul-Haq rejected the request of Prime Minister Jallood while Jalloud had met him in Rawalpindi and award about the death sentence. The entire Muslim world was quiet on the issue of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's execution, and Gaddafi was in distress after the requisition of his request and publicly sympathized Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's family for this loss. Before hanging, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto said his final words: "Oh Allah, help me for.... I am innocent"121.

April 4, 1979 was the day when Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was executed. The reaction of PPP leadership was quite disciplined at that time. There is a chronology that is showing detailed reaction against the judicial murder of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.

 On May 25, 1979, a session of Central executive committee held under the president-ship of acting general secretary Farooq Laghari, which was a first session after the hanging of Bhutto. Everyone made silent for five minute against his assassination. And, Begum Nussrat Bhutto had been selected as the next chairperson of Pakistan People’s Party122.

 On May 28, 1979, Benazeer Bhutto and Nussrat Bhutto released after a long house arrest. Firstly, they came to Karachi and then Benazeer Bhutto travelled towards Larkana by train. At every station, during travelling, she addressed to

120 Ibid., p.21.

121 Ibid., pp.22-23.

122 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.367.

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the huge crowd against the Zia regime and expressed her views on assassination of her father123.

 On June 10, 1979, she interviewed to BBC and condemned judicial murder of her father124.

 After some days, she listened that her sister is coming in Karachi. So, she left Larkana for Karachi where she met with her sister after assassination of their father. Here, due to huge crowd, usually, she addressed to the crowed whatever she was felt correct according to time, but these statements were published in every next newspaper.

Pakistan People’s Party, actually, had bearded the loss of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, and behaving legally that military government could not put any blame over its leadership against starting agitation in reaction of Bhutto’s hanging.

Although, leaders of Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) were the member of Zia’s cabinet but at the time of Bhutto’s assassination, they were opposing it. Even when Bhutto had been hanged in Central Jail Rawalpindi, within 16 days, all the leaders of Pakistan Democratic Alliance resigned from Zia’s Cabinet and argued that Zia-ul-Haq is not sincere in restoration of democracy125.

This was a crucial fact that the welcoming of Zia’s Martial Law and joining his cabinet show that all the leaders of Pakistan Democratic Alliance are strengthening Zia regime and they are all agree with the judicial murder of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Even one of the PDA minister when visited London, then he took the pen through which the order of Bhutto’s hanging was written. He showed this pen to several personalities with proud and declared this pen as an historical126.

123 Ibid.

124Ibid .,p.368.

125 Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal, Ojhri Camp Blast Near Rawalpindi, Defence Journal, p.55.

126 Ibid., pp.55-56.

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There resign from the cabinet was just a show card. Due to announcement of new elections on November 17, 1979, election campaign had been started in all over the country. PDA leaders had been started their meetings with Zia-ul-Haq. Mian Tufail Muhammad of Jamat-e-Islami, Peer Pagaara of Pakistan Muslim League and Molana Mufti Mehmood of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam were some of them.

In fact, Zia-ul-Haq had been successful to get association with the right wing political parties. He was convincing them to participate in the general elections but all these parties knew very well that Pakistan People’s Party will win these elections. Therefore, they preferred Zia regime. Due to new rule of registration, Pakistan People’s Party, like other parties, did not get its registration from Election Commission of Pakistan. Therefore, Nussrat Bhutto had been banned regarding participating in the up-coming elections. This decision was also appreciated by several political parties of right wing127.

Before one month in holding general elections, suddenly Zia-ul-Haq appeared on Pakistan Television and announced cancellation of elections plan. He strictly banned all the political activities and sponsorships in newspapers. All the leaders of political parties had been arrested in their houses. Now, Zia was claiming that the basic purpose of 1977 movement was to implement Islamic laws. Political parties are not able to legislate according to Islamic principles. So, Military Government will enforce Islamic laws in all over the country now. This decision was criticized and opposed by all the political parties even the leaders of Pakistan Democratic Alliance who were favoring every act of Zia before. Zia’s this decision discourage their momentum over trust on Zia regime and now they were feeling guilty for their support of Zia against Pakistan People’s Party128.

Zia’s usage of Islam for political purposes and for strengthen his rule was opposed by the majority of public. They had been realized Zia’s intention. Therefore, movement had been started in all over the country for the restoration of democracy. Pakistan People’s Party was the leading political party in this movement.

127 Ibid., p.60.

128 Ibid., pp.61-62.

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Chapter 4

MRD: The Revolutionary Movement

In 1977, Benazeer listened the terrible news that her father’s Government was overthrown in a Military coup by General Zia-ul-Haq and then her father was in prison in Muhammad Ahmed Khan Kasoori’s execute case, filed by Ahmed Raza Kasoori1, who was the son of Muhammad Ahmed Khan Kasoori.2 In this way, Zia-ul- Haq issued the directorial announcement that the third Martial Law Regulation enforced on July 5, 1977.3 During the whole period, it was the opinion that the charges against him, in this case were baseless, but the supporters of Zia-ul-Haq in Lahore High Court affirmed Bhutto responsible of murder case and finally he was hanged. Hanging of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto on April 4, 1979, was a great shock for his family as well as for the party workers; Soon after execution, Benazeer and her all family members were put under house arrest in Karachi.4 After that she became Co- Chairperson of PPP along with Begum Nussrat Bhutto as Chairperson in Place of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Benazeer Bhutto was young and vigorous at that time and Begum Nussrat Bhutto was in shock of her husband due to that reason she was unable to ponder on the politics as Benazeer Bhutto could. The years which followed her father’s murder created hard situation for her as well as for her family, so as a Co- Chairperson of PPP, Benazeer Bhutto, started the great effort from penitentiary for the restoration of democratic government in Pakistan5.

During this struggle consequently, including ten months in custody, she remained about five years in the lockup, which was not easy time for her because

1 Ahmad Raza Khan Kasoori is a lawyer and politician. He is a member of All Pakistan Muslim League now. In 1974, when he was driving and his father, Ahmad Khan Kasoori was sitting with him. A gun was fired and his father was dead. Bhutto got death sentence in this murder case.

2 A Politician and rival of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.

3 H. Gerdezi, Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, Zed Press, London, 1983, p.294.

4 Anwar Syed, Islam, Politics And National Solidarity, Vanguard, Lahore, 1984, p.46

5 Ibid., pp.47-49.

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during this period she also faced her father’s bereavement. After some time she was unconfined for a short period and an alliance was shaped for the restoration of democracy. The first official meeting of the leaders for the arrangement of Alliance was held at 70 Clifton Karachi on February 6, 19816.The leaders agreed and the alliance was signed named Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. The following political parties joined the alliance:

 Pakistan People’s Party

 Pakistan Muslim League (Khawaja Khair-Ud-din Group)

 Pakistan Democratic Party

 Pakistan Mazdur Kisaan Party

 Pakistan National Party

 National Awami Party

 Quomi Mahaz-e-Azadi

 Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)

 Tehreek-i-Istiqlal (TI)

 National Democratic Party7

Alliance announced a four points agenda: Ending of Martial Law; Restoration of the 1973 Constitution; Parliamentary elections; and Transfer of power to the public representatives. Soon after the establishment of MRD, Benazeer was put under arrest and sent to prison but under international stress she was released in 1984, then she left Pakistan and went to UK and started struggled for the restoration of democracy8. She

6 Ibid., p.50.

7 Anita M. Weiss Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in A Modern Society,Syracuse University Press, London, 1986, pp.136-137.

8 Ibid., p.138.

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stayed there for two years, when her younger brother Shahnawaz Bhutto was assassinated in France, she revisited Pakistan for the burial of her brother and again left the country9.

During these days she decided to continue the mission of her father, so for this purpose she once again decided to return Pakistan, to pressurize Zia-ul-Haq for the restoration of Democracy. She landed Lahore on April 11, 1986 to fulfill her promises, “The carefree girl who first left home in 1969 to study at Harvard had now twisted into a woman with an iron will, to fight the battle left incomplete by her father”10.

Basically, her aspiration was to join Pakistan’s foreign services, not to become a politician, she was of the opinion that her predisposition was not towards politics, it was her father to whom she wanted to please by joining oxford union. Benazeer Bhutto was warmly greeted by millions of peoples at Lahore airport, Zia-ul-Haq had panic from it and due to his fear he played a card of Islamization (Policy of Implementing Islamic Laws) and announced for referendum, Benazeer Bhutto hoped change for democracy in Pakistan but Zia-ul-Haq also made his clear intention that authority would be transferred to only those persons who are religious brainpower, Zia-ul-Haq’s so-called democracy shunned down when on August 14, 1986, Benazeer Bhutto was detained at her home in Karachi, when she was just preparing to attend peaceful assembly on Pakistan’s Independence day. She was given thirty days detention order and once again send to jail11. On the other hand, except Jamaat-e- Islami, all the other political parties had already joined MRD and they once again arose against the wicked killing of innocent people in lump sum and capture of thousands of people by their own military. During movement Zia-ul-Haq was bothered because he was thinking, if Benazeer Bhutto came in authority then what will be his position? So he avoided the every time. In an

9 Ibid., p.139. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.369.

10 Ibid., p.370.

11 Ibid., p.370.

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interview Zia-ul-Haq said, “It is Miss Bhutto’s superfluous impractical ambition and her attitude towards acquiring power which is objectionable”12.

Unwillingly, under International stress and the MRD, Zia-ul-Haq had to release on September 10, 1986, but many people stayed behind in jail13. This struggle was strengthen against Zia-ul-Haq by PPP along with other political parties under Benazeer’s leadership. Lubna Rafique wrote, while PPP gained its full strength as single political institution in Pakistan, on the other hand Zia-ul-Haq denied these facts, “Bhutto strike back against this by saying that her party was speaking of vengeance, but for nation building”.14

After a long struggle Zia-ul-Haq announced the elections, the superior step taken by him, through which he made Junaijo the Prime Minister, that step once again gone into the darkness when he eliminated the assemblies on May 29, 1988, after that he announced that the new election will be held on November 16, 198815. This news was the hope of democracy for Benazeer and other political parties but Zia-ul-Haq publicized on July 21, 1988, that the elections would be held purely on nonparty basis; the reason was that the PPP has popular support, there was a reason behind the elections on non-party base. Chandio A. Meer Ali writes: “Zia-ul-Haq preferred the non-party elections because he was well-aware of the reality that nonpolitical and non-committed people are easy to control as compare to political and affiliated people. So he wanted that elected member of assemblies had no political link as well as membership of any political party or faithfulness to any political leader.” Benazeer went to the courts and she confronted Zia-ul-Haq’s non-party based elections because she was of the opinion that in this way the military law of Zia-ul-Haq will come to an end and the democracy will be restored, she wrote, “Just as a inferior cannot blossom in a desert, so political parties cannot prosper in a dictatorship.”16 In this way the

12 Ibid., pp.370-371.

13 Ibid., p.372.

14 Ibid., p.373.

15 Mohammad Habib Khan, Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan The University of Michigan: Director Bureau, 1989, p.115.

16 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.374. 126

democracy is vital for the political parties where they can work freely without any hindrance and perform their political activities in a good manner, on the other hand, in dictatorship there is no way for the political parties because history witnessed that the dictators tried their most excellent just to extend their rule instead of giving opportunities for the democratic environment. It was Benazeer Bhutto, for about thirty months she continued to assemble world opinion for the restoration of democracy and violation of human rights by Zia-ul-Haq17. He wanted to keep Benazeer away from competing elections and the election date was suggested by keeping in the view the pregnancy of Benazeer Bhutto, so that she may not be capable for election campaign.18

The Participation of Other Parties in MRD

MRD was an alliance of nine political parties. Most of those political parties who had commenced movement against Bhutto were the part of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy against Zia-ul-Haq.19 Muslim Fundamentalist antagonism parties like JUI, Centrist opposition Parties like Muslim League, Nationalist Opposition parties like National Awami Party (NAP), Leftist political Parties like Qoumi Mahaz Azadi, Mazdour Kassan Party, PPP, all kinds of parties had connected the alliance. Jamaat-e-Islami had also divided on the issue of the support of Zia-ul- Haq’s command. Though Jamaat was not the part of the alliance but it considered that it promoted the agenda of MRD, due to the criticism of Professor Abdul Ghafoor and Munawaar Hasan on Zia-ul-Haq rule.20

The movement has divided the scholars into two different sections, one adopts that the people of Punjab did not cooperate with the movement. The movement established to be an important landmark in the politics of Sindh but its collapse lay in its powerlessness to aggravate a response in Punjab. If the Punjab had participated in

17Ibid., p.375.

18 Ibid., p.376.

19 K. L. Kamal, Pakistan: Democracy At The Cross Roads, The University of Michigan: Yuraj Publishers And Ditributors, 1990, p.41.

20 Ibid., pp.41-42.

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the movement, Zia-ul-Haq would not be able to stay.21 They give the following reasons:

1) Al-Zulfaqar Organization (AZO) established the responsibility of the hijacking to Meer Murtaza Bhutto, the elder son of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as the leader of the organization. He himself issued the press announcement and took all the responsibilities. After this incident many questions were raised about the leadership of the MRD.22 According to Aitazaz Ehsan, “Government propagated that it was the scheme of the PPP leadership whom conspiracy took place against the army and Pakistan. The hijacking of the plane and particularly, the murder of army Captain Tariq by the hijackers left negative impression in Punjab”.23 It degraded the tempo of the movement that had taken the shape of a Sindhi uprising bordering on a Sindhi nationalist insurgency against the Pakistan Army, particularly in Punjab. A large number of leaders and workers of PPP and MRD were captured. But policy towards the public was dissimilar in Sindh and Punjab. This was the reason that the roads and streets of Punjab were not closed throughout the Movement for Restoration of Democracy. But in Sindh, people were fighting against the army. They even did not allow Zia-ul-Haq to land in Dadu”.24

2) According to Husain Bakhsh Naraijo, “No doubt PPP Punjab participated in the Movement for Restoration of Democracy and their leaders and workers were also captured, but they could not be successful to rally the common man against the government. It was a well laid plot and energetic campaign of Zia- ul-Haq administration to create a division between the Sindhees and the and to press Punjab and Sindh based PPP. By such division between the people of the country, military administration wanted to extend its rule. They gave more privileges to the people of the Punjab as evaluated to Sindh.

21 Ibid., p.43.

22 Verinder Grover, Pakistan: Government And Politics, Deep And Deep Publishers, New Delhi, 2000, p.130.

23 An Interview with Aitazaz Ehsan, The Daily Jang, Islamabad, Decemebr 21, 1984.

24 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition) , p.377.

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The conduct of the officers as well as the army Jawans, towards the Sindhees, was humiliating and impertinent. It was due to the reason that the majority in the army belonged to Punjab and Zia-ul-Haq was afraid of the rebellion from this province. The Punjab was silent at the time when movement was at its peak in Sindh. It was proliferated by the Martial Law authority that Sindhi people were fighting for the freedom, not for democracy. They chanted a slogan against Pakistan in the rallies and the pageant of Movement for Restoration of Democracy.”25

3) During interview, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei said, “If the Punjab had contributed in the movement Zia-ul-Haq would not been able to stay.”26

4) The movement established to be an important landmark in the politics of Sindh but its failure lay in its inability to provoke a response in Punjab.27

5) Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei also said that it left many impacts on the country and particularly on the politics of Sindh. The citizens of Sindh considered Pakistan as Punjabistan.28

6) during an interview accepted this very fact in these words, “The Pakistan army and Martial Law were measured to be equal with the Punjab. Sindhies who were in mainstream, felt that their interests were no longer secure in the hands of Martial Law and the army dominated Punjab”.29

25 Ibid. , p.377.

26 Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi, Politician And Parliamentarian: Selected Speeches, 1962-1990, Alvi Publishers, Lahore, 1997, p.21.

27 Ibid., p.377.

28 Ibid., p.22.

29 Ibid., p.379.

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7) As Akbar Zaidi said, “The 1983 and 1986 engagements of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, due to lack of support in other provinces was labeled a “Sindhi Rebellion”.30

8) Sayed also acquired that point: “During the autumn of 1983, when complaining in Sindh were getting strength and creating huge impacts in Punjab, Mrs. Indra Gandhi showed her sympathy with those who against the military rule. In the reaction, military government projected such statements of Indra Gandhi as PPP-Indian relationship and argued that this agitation has Indian support.”31

9) If the people of Punjab contributed in the movement, Zia-ul-Haq might have decided to hold the elections and left the power. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei said, “If Punjab supported the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, Zia-ul-Haq would have left the power and army may gone back to the barracks”.32

10) Aisha Jalal has also of the opinion that Movement for Restoration of Democracy failed to catch fire in the majority province of Punjab. The government had exerted influence over the local politics.33 She has the idea that, “policies of this era regarding segmental support became a cause of socio-economic development by industrialists and commercial groups.”34

These are the blames given to the people of Punjab by the writers as well as the politicians of other provinces. It is said that the people of other provinces did not show so much interest as the Sindhi people had showed. They used to show Sindhi association which had been launched for the redressed of Sindhi accusations and

30 Ibid., p.379.

31 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1990, p.162.

32 Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi, Politician And Parliamentarian: Selected Speeches, p.23.

33 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy And Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative And Historical Study, Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 1995, p.83.

34 Ibid., pp.83-84.

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removal of their sense of deprivation.35 Due to Sindhi tag, the movement lost its national appeal. It is fact that the landowners and the industrialists did not play role in ignite the people of Punjab but the real power of PPP was middle and inferior middle class. The workers and the trade unions of Punjab were offended against the rule of dictator. In the major cities of Punjab, like Lahore, Faisalabad and Multan, MRD was very successful in assembling the people. The Punjabis faced the cases and remained in jails due to their support of Movement for Restoration of Democracy.36 In fact the movement was not as admired in Punjab as in Sindh but the people of Punjab rendered valuable services for the restoration of democracy during Zia-ul-Haq regime. The efforts can be examined as below:

1) In Punjab, on March 26, 1981, the MRD met at Lahore and passed a motion against amendments in the constitution of 1973.37 The leaders issued the declaration that Zia-ul-Haq had abrogated the constitution of 1973 and was therefore, a co-worker. Same statement came from Baluchistan. These meetings also congratulated those judges who had refused to take pledge.38

2) The middle and inferior middle classes in Punjab showed the harmony with PPP and tried to achieve the results at the platform of Movement for Restoration of Democracy.39

3) In Faisalabad, the lawyers fully disturbed against Zia-ul-Haq regime and supported the Movement for Restoration of Democracy. The prominent leaders from Faisalabad were Chaudhary Taalib Hussain, Zaman Khan, Badruddin Chaudhary, Chaudhary Ummar Draaz, Shams-ul-Islam Naaz, Ahmed Saeed Awan, Fazal Husain Raahi, Ghiyas-ud-din Janbaaz. The people of Multan also strengthened the movement like Ch. Arshad, Mukhtar Ahmed

35 Ibid., p.379.

36 Ibid.

37 John L. Esposito, Islam And Democracy, Center of Muslims-Christians Understanding, The Georgetown University, Gergetown, 1996, p.117.

38 Ibid., p.118.

39 Ibid.,p.379.

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Awan. From Lahore, Aitazaz Ehsan and Mahmood Butt were the well-known and eminent personalities40. On October 19, 1983, the attorneys organized “a protest day against the Martial Law rule”. In Lahore, they struggled to take out a march but police created difficulties through throwing stones and bricks. A clash took place in the premises of Lahore High Court. The role of Talat Yaqoub (a lawyer) was very extraordinary in Lahore Bar Association. She used to shout at the male dominated Lahore Bar Association, chuck off her glass bangles and challenged the power and authority of police. Few lawyers were injured and few captured by the police.41

4) The student’s turbulence was started in Dargai42, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan and Quetta. One student was wounded and some were captured by the police.43 The students also contributed in the movement through strikes in the institutions, predominantly in universities. The students in the Frontier province were the first who come to the streets. The protests also broke out in the institutions of Multan, Sheikhupura, Bahawalpur and Quetta.44

5) The doctors of Rawalpindi started to join MRD and arranged discussions on the demands the movement on February 27, 1981.45 Near about twenty doctors were prisoned by the government in a reaction. One this action of government, the doctors all over the country decided to go on strike and insisted the release of the prisoned doctors. They endangered that the strike would go on until their demand was not met.46

40 Ibid., p.379.

41 Ibid., pp.379-380.

42 This is a small city near Mardan which is famous for the training of armed officials. This area is located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

43 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years, p.121.

44 Ibid,pp.379-380.

45 Ibid., p.123.

46 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.380.

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6) In February 1983, the leaders of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy convened in Lahore under the tight security from the government side. It was a violation of Martial Law regulations47. The leaders decided to observe a “Political Prisoners day”. The police dispersed this convention by force.48

7) Movement for Restoration for Democracy enrolled the services of Labor groups and unions. It was an attempt to activate the Labor classes against the tyrannical rule of Zia-ul-Haq. Due to new labor reforms of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and the motto of Islamic Socialism of Pakistan Peoples Party had created soft corner in the hearts of labor groups and unions. The Pakistan Railway workers union passed resolution to resist against the government of Zia-ul-Haq and support the slogans of Movement for Restoration of Democracy.49 On October 26, 1983, factory and railway station workers took out the rally in Lahore and shouted anti-Martial Law and anti-Zia slogans. In the march, near about ten thousand workers participated. Police tried to hold them but the leader of workers, Basheer Zafar, was indignant. Police tried to confine them to the railway premises. The workers became harsh, disparaging and burnt buildings, buses, cars and several petrol pumps. They also burnt the portraits and photos of Martial Law administrator.50

8) The successful refuse of the 1984 referendum caused the Movement for Restoration of Democracy to miscalculate their next step.51 Being confident of public opinion, MRD boycotted the non-party based 1985 elections.52

47 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's politics: The Zia years, p.123.

48 Ibid., p.380.

49 Muthiah Alagappa, Civil Society And Political Change in Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, p.362.

50 Ibid. , p.380. Also see Muthiah Alagappa, Civil Society And Political Change in Asia, p.363.

51 M. D. Dharamdasani, Pakistan Under Democratic Regime, Shalimar Publishers, House, New Delhi, 1994, p.111.

52 Ibid., p.380.

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From 14 to 16 September in 1984, the meeting of the leaders of Movement for Restoration of Democracy held in Lahore and they strongly willed to boycott any elections which were not clean, liberated, fair and according to the constitution of 1973.53 They also pledged to form an electoral alliance in any future elections in which the MRD would take part and after the election to stay together in the government. Later on, the central committee of MRD met from 18 to 19 January 1985.54 Their main desired was that the elections should not be held under Zia-ul-Haq rule and that the 1973 constitution had to be restored before the elections. They also demanded that Military rule must be lifted before elections and political prisoners must be released. It was also their proposal that elections must be held on party bases. The leaders decided that if these conditions were not accepted, they will not participate in any election under Martial Law. All the political parties which have joined Movement for Restoration of Democracy not only denied to participate in the elections which were going to be held under the supervision of military government but also refused to accept the results of the elections.55

9) Asghar Khan had a different opinion about elections of 1985. He mentioned the names of those districts in his book “My Political struggle” where the turnout was very short in Punjab.56 Among those districts were Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sahiwal, Faisalabad, Vehari, Multan and Sargodha. The turnout in these areas was near about 30 per cent but the election commission announced that 52.9 per cent votes had been casted in the National Assembly polls.57

10) The female section of Movement for Restoration of Democracy was also very active. In Faisalabad, Lahore and Gujranwala, female workers of MRD

53 Ibid., p.381.

54 Ibid., pp.380-381.

55 Ibid., p.381.

56 Mohammad Asghar Khan, My Political Struggle, Oxford University Press, London, 2008, p.26.

57 Ibid., p.27.

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disseminated fruits in the jails to the workers. Ameena Zamaan, Shahida Nafees, Nasreen, Rukhsana Zahour, Nafees Siddiqi, Mrs. Tahira Mazhar Ali Khan, Mumtaz Noorani were the prominent personalities.58 Women’s Action Forum led by Mahnaaz Rafi arranged a demonstration in Lahore on February 12, 1983 and 200 women participated here. The police used tear gas and button charges for dissolving the women. Aitzaaz Ehsan’s mother and wife were put under house arrest in Lahore. On September 24, 1983, the workers women took out a procession against the military ruler in Lahore.59 During this procession, the police captured fourteen women including Asma Jilani. Even the literary women also contributed in the movement against Zia-ul-Haq government. Atiya Dawood wrote the poetry against the oppression of opposition during this rule.60

Fahmeeda Riaz showed hesitation about the atrocities of Zia-ul-Haq era and the military courts in her poetry.61 Actually, Zia-ul-Haq government tried to decrease the social status of women through his so-called policies according to Islam. All the organizations of women protested against military dictator and his policies. In these organizations, APWA and Democratic Women Association were incredible.62

11) On August 14, 1988, MRD planned a public gathering in Rawalpindi against the military rule of Zia-ul-Haq. The gathering used mantra against military dictator, while the leaders also challenged Zia-ul-Haq and his policies. They were addressing and telling the crowd that the time of the departure of dictator had drawn closer.63 Malik Qasim mentioned the departure of Zia-ul-Haq in his speech and Tikka Khan, general secretary of PPP, spoke against the “Jalandhri

58 Ibid., p.381.

59 Ibid., pp.382-383.

60 Ibid., p.383.

61 Ibid.,p.123.

62 Ibid., p.383.

63 Ibid.,p.213.

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Group”.64 They also made it clear that they were not against the institution of army but against those who were defaming the institution through incorrect policies.65

12) In Punjab, the jails of Sahiwal, Multan, Lahore and Faisalabad were used for keeping the leaders of Movement for Restoration of Democracy. The government kept limits to the leaders for at least two to four months.66 In these months, they were sent from one lockup to other. Benazeer Bhutto had been brought to Karachi jail from Sukkur. Rafee Butt and Fazaley Bhattee were sent to Gujranwala jail from Rawalpindi. Mian Mahmood Ali Kasoori had been shifted from Kot Lakhpat to Sahiwal jail. Aitzaaz Ehsan from Multan to Lahore and Qayyoum Pahat from Lahore to Multan. Asaaf Vardag had been sent to Bahawalpur jail from Faisalabad. Omar Kasoori and Khurshid Kasoori were moved to Kot Lakhpat from camp jail Lahore. Mehnaaz Rafi was moved to Kot Lakhpat jail from Lahore. In Faisalabad, Few leaders of Pakistan Peoples Party were regulation abiding gentlemen who went into command of the police with grace while few went to underground.67

In the district of Faisalabad, the workers were arrested by Police. Chaudhary Ummar Daraaz, Sayed Zulfaqar Bukhari, Zamaan Khan went into the police supervision and faced the jails. In those days, Major Arif (DIG Prison) was the friend of Zamaan Khan (due to this relation, the wife of Zamaan Khan could easily manage the breakfast, lunch and dinner in the jail. She appreciates the system of jails of those days).68 Dr. Saleemi who had remained the elected secretary of Chenab Club was a doctor in jail (Faisalabad) and provided the treatment to the prisoners in a proper way.

64 Ibid., p.384.

65 Ibid., pp.384-385.

66 Ibid., p.385.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.,p389.

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Due to the fear of the government few leaders of Movement for Restoration of Democracy disappeared from the scene for time being so that the police could not capture them. Chaudhary Talib Hussain, Captain Nisar Akbar, Ahmad Saeed Awan, Faisal Saleh Hayaat, Badar-ud-Din, Rana Aftab Ahmad Khan and Chaudhary Zaheer-ud-Din were among those leaders who disappeared from the scene and went underground. Ghulam Mustufa Khar was also locked up and sent to the central jail of Faisalabad where he remained for four months. The orders of the home secretary regarding Khar were very severe and orders were passed to keep him in separation.69 The agents of the special branches were deputed in the jails for awareness of the visitors who came to see the detainees. In spite of all these measures, the divisional administration adopted a mild manner towards him because the divisional commissioner had been a secretary of Mustafa Khar when he was governor of Punjab. In Lahore, Kaswar Gardezi, Malik Qasim, and two sons of Muhammad Ali Qasoori were arrested by the Lahore police. Mian Mahmood Ali Qasoori was also arrested and sent to Kot Lakhpat jail. Khurshid and Omar Kasuir were in camp jail in Lahore. The police of Sindh also captured the political workers. Over fifty persons had been captured in Karachi. There were also in Mardan70 political workers suffered the torture of police department.71 Kaneez Fatima, a labour union leader was also prisoned in Mardan on March 23, 1981. Fazil Rahu who was MRD leader, was axed to death in his home village. Bashir Riaz, former editor of “Ammal” in London, acknowledged the threatening calls.72

The captured workers suffered from the military courts which were established by Zia-ul-Haq. The military courts awarded lashes and custody to citizens for contribution in the protest rallies against the military rule. The most of the PPP workers turn off to death and imprisonment declared by military courts. The

69 Ibid., p.386.

70 A city of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

71 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.386.

72 Ibid.,p.337.

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example of Hala Town can be quoted here.73 In 1983, more than fifty persons were awarded lashes and custody by the military courts in the Hala Town. Similarly, eighteen political prisoners were trialed by a military court in Rawalpindi.74

13) Punjab government handles the movement very watchfully and carefully, and therefore, it petered out sooner than expected. The chief minister of Punjab, Mian , adopted a very severe poster towards the bureaucracy and warned them that if the Movement became succeeded, the existing officers would be restored with capable officers who were waiting for their postings.75 He even convened the meeting of the commissioners and suggested them to eliminate the movement at every cost. The chief minister called the meeting of his cabinet on the issue of Movement for Restoration of Democracy. The ministers and the MPAs, like Ghulam Haider Wyen, Sardarzada Zafar Abbas from recommended that the movement be crushed with an iron hand. A decision was taken to pick up all leaders of the opposition.76

14) The workers were under attack by Zia-ul-Haq government. In the torture cells, they were given very harsh time through severe punishments. Baldia Centre, Division 555 in Karachi was notorious, the headquarters of the central Intelligence Agency in Karachi” Lahore Fort, Birdwood Barracks in Lahore, Mach jail and Khalli camp were the renowned persecute centers where the supporters of Movement For Restoration Of Democracy and PPP were kept.77 PPP lawyer of Peshawar, Kanwar Abbas, was tormented by the police and he had to admit in hospital for treatment. Sherbaz Mazari was captured in forest rest house in Multan district and during his capture, he suffered from heart

73 Ibid., p.386.

74 Ibid.,p.390.

75 Bidanda M. Chengappa, Pakistan, Islamisation, Army And Foreign Policy, APH Publishing, London, 2004, p.2.

76Ibid., p.3.

77 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), Dost Publishing , Lahore, 1996, p.312-333.

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attack. Haji Yousaf Lacewala died in Karachi jail on September 5, 1983. Imdad Chandio had been beaten in Larkana police station. Even few met their death in the torture cells, like Nazir Abbasi, Hameed Baloch, Annayat Maseh, Gul sher Khan, Lala Asad, whose dead body had been taken from military agony cell.78

15) Students had also participated in this movement very forcefully.79 They even launched protests in the universities and colleges. The Zia-ul-Haq government closed all universities of Pakistan for few days so that the weight of Movement for Restoration of Democracy might be minimized. The cases were registered against the students of universities and student Unions were banned by the Zia government.80

16) The incident of the high jacking of a plan of Pakistan International Airline opened a new episode of oppressive activities against MRD and PPP workers. In different cities, police arrested the people and kept them in prison. In Kot Lakhpat jail, fifty four persons were charged with criminal scheme and sedition for their alleged involvement with Al-Zulfaqar.81 All of them were condemnation to life detention along with forty others in absentia, including Meer Murtaza and Shahnawaz. Jahangeer Badar (Additional secretary general of the PPP Punjab), Shaukat Mehmood (General Secretary), Nazim Shah (Finance Secretary), Mukhtar Awan (a former minister) and Faisal Hayat (Landowner) were captured by the police and tried to establish their links with the affirmatively occurrence representation.82

In Multan, like Dr. Anwar Hussain, Anees Advocate,and Abdul Rauf were the supporters of PPP. The police arrested most of the activists from Multan in a

78 Ibid.,p.386.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid., p.387.

82 Ibid.,396.

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suspicion.83 The workers went underground due to the fear of imprison. Anwar Hussain took shelter in the house of his pupil, Mehdhi Abbasi Khan. Mohsin Naqvi also remained in that house for many days. In Sindh, Lala Assad (Later on, he was fired by the police), the vice president of the Sindhi student’s wing, and Naseer Baloach who was the representative of PPP in the gigantic Karachi steel Mill, was also captured by the police. Lala Assad was being sought as a leader of Al-Zulfikar. Pervaz Ali Shah, a leading member of PPP Sindh; was also restricted at that time when he was playing cricket with his son. Qazi Sultan Mahmood, general secretary of the PPP in Rawalpindi city, was captured again and imprisoned in Rawalpindi jail, then Gujranwala jail and then to the Lahore Fort. The government agencies even did not leave the women and arrested them. Nasira Rana’s husband was the member of MRD and the police required to arrest him who was in Karachi at that time. She was arrested from Lahore and kept in Lahore fort. Begum Arif Bhutti’s husband had been a provincial minister as well as revenue minister for the Punjab. The police wanted to capture her husband but he was not at home at that time. That’s why, police captured and interrogated her, Farkhanda Bukhari and Mrs. Safooran became the political prisoners and spent few days of their lives in torture cell due to their loyalties with MRD and PPP. The issue of high jacking was also planned by Zia-ul-Haq command for gaining multiple purposes.84 Firstly, he tried to divide the members of MRD on the issue of high jacking and secondly he put the responsibility on the shoulders of Murtaza Bhutto. Thirdly, he used to squash the political leaders. So it was not Punjab which played role in the failure of the Movement but a lot of other factors also contributed it which uncovered the mentality of the people of Sindh.

1) According to Monte Palmer, “The attraction of gaining access to state power and support were far more tempting than the fascination of individuals and parties”.85 The government tried to steal the politicians for partnership with the

83 Ibid., p.387.

84 Russel, Murtaza Bhutto, http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=2fqeMAEACAAJ&dq=murtaza+bhutto&hl=en&sa=X&ei=8mF_U sL2KenJ4ATZsYCIAw&ved=0CDgQ6AEwAg.

85 Monte Palmer, Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity, And Challenges, Rowman And Littlefield, New York, 2008, p.127.

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state and this strategy weakened the disciplines of the political parties. Even the workers of PPP greeted Zia-ul-Haq, during his first tour to Sindh, after the assassination of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Few councilors of PPP who had been elected in the elections of local bodies in 1979 also met with Zia-ul-Haq in Sindh. Even the son of PPP Sindh chief was also one of them. Benazeer Bhutto who was house arrest at that time tried to convey message to the management of PPP that they should issue the direction to the councilors for not meeting with Zia-ul-Haq but all her efforts proved in vain. The rewards of the government compelled the councilors to infringe the morality of the party.86

2) The Sindhi landowners adopted a gentle attitude towards the Zia-ul-Haq due to his policies regarding land reforms.87 Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei and Abid Zuberi used to stress on the negotiations with government. Abid Zuberi wrote a letter to Malik Qasim who was the acting secretary general of MRD. In his letter, he stated that, “A continuation of the movement would endanger the feudal socio-economic order and the present social order should maintain”.88

3) Arrival of Benazeer Bhutto in Pakistan, as a Sindhi leader, had become unbelievable for Pakistani politicians. Her domineering style in party decisions and with the party workers annoyed those people who had struggled against Zia-ul-Haq rule under MRD.89 In the coming elections, she was eager for her party and not to campaign on MRD tickets. She wanted to contest elections without the support of MRD. She wanted to convince the MRD that they were nothing without PPP and on the other hand she assured the party leaders that they owed their political existence to her. While the leaders of MRD wanted the indemnity that each component of MRD would get a share in the spoils of

86 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.387- 388.

87 This attitude was the reason of starting movement against Bhutto government. Due to his land reforms according to his Islamic Socialist ideology, thousands of landlords hated him.

88 Ibid., p.388.

89 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.343.

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triumph.90 On the other hand, she did not have faith on those party leaders who were associated to her father and were secretly hobnobbing with the generals. She was convinced to be as the only inheritor of the magnetism of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and could easily manage the masses and party singlehandedly. It was also remarkable that petty rivalries had also developed among the PPP leaders.91

4) The opposition parties showed lack of harmony due to ideological differences, common jealousies, and conflict of leadership. Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman (Not Punjabi, a Pashtun) who was captured on February 24, 1981, passed the declaration that he joined the movement and signed its declaration in his individual capacity and as the representative of JUI. It was the reason that the workers of JUI were not imprisoned. Even the role of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei (a Sindhi) was being in use with doubts. He was not captured by the government during the whole circumstances. He was also known for his pro- government leanings. He was ready to make out Zia-ul-Haq as the head of state.92

5) In a meeting with Pagaara, Chaudhary Arshad and Molana Noorani on March 2, 1982, it was decided that Zia-ul-Haq should form a national government with himself as the head and this national government should hold election. The leaders of MRD did not like such sort of meetings with pro-Zia-ul-Haq political and social gatherings.93 Few members of MRD were frightened of Pakistan Peoples Party’s electoral strength. Even the workers of PPP were irresolute in joining the movement due to Jatoei’s meetings with American officials and army officers. But with the interference of Benazeer Bhutto, they decided to join against Zia-ul-Haq government. JUI’s chief purpose to Benazeer’s candidature for Movement for Restoration of Democracy convener

90 Ibid., p.344.

91 Ibid., p.344.

92 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.389.

93 Ibid.,p.246.

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ship on the appeal that she was a woman. But on the interference of Wali Khan, he was convinced.94

There is no blinking the fact that MRD got momentum in rural areas of Sindh and the military tyrant fully tried to press it but the people of Punjab who were committed with PPP and democracy also made sacrifices and faced the atrocities of the Martial Law era.95 The bogus cases were registered against them, they were detained in torture cells and jails, they faced the military courts and some even went underground and left their houses. No doubt, the literacy rate in Punjab was far better than the Sindhi people, that’s why they had a lot of key posts in army and it was very difficult for Sindhi people to abide it. There was no alternative for the government officers to obey the orders of the immediate boss. Similarly, the feudals of Sindh as usual played a depressing role when the Movement had got impetus. The landlords always protected the rights of dictators through direct or indirect ways.96

Benazeer’s Exile

Towards the end of 1983, it was finally determined by the government that they would allow Benazeer Bhutto to go away from the country.97 She made arrangements with mixed emotions. Since Zia-ul-Haq ousted her father in June 1977, she had planned to return democracy to Pakistan.98 Even when she was in solitary imprisonment in Sukkur Prison, she had been a sign of opposition to the Zia-ul-Haq government. She was forced to departure the country even for the justified reason of medical concentration, seemed in some ways that she was abandoning the grounds of PPP and MRD. If she did not have the operation of her contaminated ear, she could

94 Usama But, Pakistan's Quagmire: Security, Strategy, And The Future of The Islamic-Nuclear Nation, Continuum International Publishing Grup, New York, 2010, p.22.

95 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.390.

96 Ibid.,p.406.

97 Michelle Parent, : She Once Had A Dream, Publish America, New York, 2009, p.419.

98 Corinne J. Naden, Benazir Bhutto, Marshall Cavendish, London, 2010, p.73.

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lose her hearing.99 The illness might spread, and foundation nerve can damage elsewhere. She had already embarked on experiencing complexity with balancing her health. There were a number of false starts like Benazeer Bhutto and her sister Sanam Bhutto. Lastly, they were permitted to go abroad by an Air-France flight at 2:30 AM on January 10, 1984.100 Five and a half years of harassment and imprisonment ended, and Benazeer Bhutto was finally truly free, for the first time, since her arrest on September 29, 1979. As Benazeer Bhutto left Pakistan, her future was doubtful. But her determination to continue the fight against Zia-ul-Haq was as strong as ever. Her escape took her to Geneva (Switzerland), where she stayed in exile. It was a family meeting heightened by a phone call from her brothers Shahnawaz and Meer Murtaza Bhutto. She had no direct contact with her brothers since they had left Pakistan shortly after Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto had been deposed in 1977.101 Her brothers married while they were living in Afghanistan and now, they were living in France. Meer Murtaza Bhutto visited Benazeer Bhutto next day in Geneva and transported his eighteen month old daughter, Fathi, to see her aunt. As much as Benazeer Bhutto enjoyed to see re-united her family, it was necessary for her to go London for ear operation.102

London was also the most logical place for any determined labour against Zia- ul-Haq. There were about 400,000 in England, many of whom had run away from the fear of jails and torture of the Zia-ul-Haq’s administration. At first, Benazeer Bhutto was planning to have her ear operation and then to come back Pakistan as soon as she could. She felt it her accountability,103 but the events forced her to think again. After the successful ear operation, Benazeer's recovery was very slow and painful. The doctor who operated her, felt that she might have a follow-up operation after nine months. Her arrival in England had caused a meeting with overseas Pakistanis that Zia-ul-Haq would most likely not allow her to leave Pakistan

99 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.390.

100 Ibid.,p.398.

101 Ibid., p.390.

102 Ibid.,p.423.

103 Ibid., pp.390-391.

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again. In London, she would be free to focus world notice on the dilemma of those who were still in the jails.104

When she was strong enough to maintain the fight, she moved into dwelling in the Barbican, a well-known apartment building in London. Her residence became the unofficial foreign headquarters of the PPP. Here, Benazeer Bhutto waged a war of words associated with Zia-ul-Haq and his henchmen.105 She took up the dilemma of a number of political prisoners who were faithful to her father's memory and the party. The extra bedroom in Benazeer Bhutto's residence was used as an office. Benazeer Bhutto and those who supported her set up a letter-writing movement and detailed information gathering networks so that they could continue alongside each other of the condition in Zia-ul-Haq's jails. There were only some victories during this time. The PPP had always been a assorted partnership of groups and interests detained together at first by the charisma of their leader; Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, and then by their opposition to Zia-ul-Haq. In London, Benazeer Bhutto was forced to deal as best she could with the various factions of the party. It was a cheek to her dedication to the reason that many of the leaders of the party seemed more anxious with their own positions than with the plight of their brethren suffering in the jails of Pakistan. Many of these men had held high positions within her father's government and must have found it hard to try to discuss for power with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's thirty year old daughter.106

Benazeer Bhutto was constant in her efforts on behalf of those still in Pakistan. She traveled throughout the Europe, negotiating with concerned people in and out of government, and with all those Pakistanis who were living in Europe. Because of her efforts, Benazeer Bhutto received an enticement to speak to the Carnegie donation for International Peace in Washington, D.C., in April 1985.107 She accepted the enticement and used the chance, with the support of her friend Peter Galbraith, to the

104 Ibid., p.391. Also see Corinne J. Naden, Benazir Bhutto, Marshall Cavendish, London, 2010, p.74.

105 Ibid., p.75.

106 Ibid., p.391.

107 Ibid.

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lobby in Washington against the Zia-ul-Haq government and for human and constitutional rights in Pakistan.108

Benazeer Bhutto was granted the chance to speak before the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee that could lead to characterize the entitled demonstration, where she thanked Senators Pell and Percy for their efforts on her behalf to describe the committee the conditions within Pakistan.109 At that time, the American Senate was debating whether to continue aid to Pakistan even though the country's continuing efforts to build up nuclear weapons. Earlier, the Reagan government had been able to get around the law which prohibits the United States of America from giving military assistance to any country that has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Benazeer Bhutto said to the committee that the cutting off aid would help no one and that aid should be linked with the conditions of human rights. Pakistan did get its ease, but the United States did nothing to stalk the rush of oppression that reserved Zia-ul-Haq in power and his political adversaries in jail or in oust.110

In addition to her visit to Washington, she was invited to address before the European Parliament. She traveled to Strasbourg (France) in June 1985, where she again affirmed her case against the Zia-ul-Haq’s military rule and for return of democracy in Pakistan. Although, the European Parliament has little real political power, Benazeer Bhutto found many concerned listeners among its members. When in London, Benazeer Bhutto continued to direct the Pakistan People’s Party in the fight against Zia-ul-Haq era. The harsh message that she and her generation learned was that Zia-ul-Haq was impermeable to pressure from the world community. As long as, United States saw Zia as the frontline guard against the USSR,111 he could do as he desired. To struggle and keep the opposition to Zia-ul-Haq animate, Benazeer Bhutto, along with Basheer Riaz and the others who were helping her in London, published a journal in Urdu; the official language of Pakistan called Ammal (which means

108 Ibid., pp.391-392.

109 Ibid., p.391.

110 Ibid., p.76.

111 United Soviet Socialist Republic

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accomplishment), asked to make clear her conduct, the journal was circulated to organizations and governments who might be able to put pressure on Zia-ul-Haq and the official media. It was also circulated among the Pakistani society around the world and smuggled through them into Pakistan. Ammal, even found its methodology more sound into the hands of the prisoners by trying to protect, their wish in a nearby disappointing situation. Zia-ul-Haq's agents in England would disburse the calligraphers who transcribed the text for the printers, not to work for the journal. They also tried to influence the publisher not to publish it.112

Despite the efforts made by Zia-ul-Haq to bann Ammal, Benazeer Bhutto and those working with her were capable to keep it issuing. In the meantime, in Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq was manufacturing moves that looked like he planned to return the country to civilian rule. In December 1984, he had detained a national vote on a suspiciously worded referendum. Although, thousands of people stayed away from the polls in objection and protest, Zia-ul-Haq called the means of entrée in the referendum, consent from the people to carry on his rule for five more years ahead. Zia-ul-Haq, then called for the elections of national assembly but without constitution, the national assembly would serve according to his desire. On February 21, 1985, Benazeer Bhutto called for refuse and boycott of the national assembly elections on the ground that Zia-ul-Haq's ban on the working of political parties invalids the elections. The boycott had partial achievement. Though, many of the candidates who were close to Zia-ul-Haq defeated including seven members of his cabinet. In March 1985, Zia-ul-Haq held to his promise and appointed a civilian prime minister, Muhammad Khan Junaijo. All the scene was designed by Zia-ul-Haq that was also criticized in the United State. Several members of Congress were more speaking in opposition instead of providing aid to Zia-ul-Haq's military rule. Despite the changes, the authority of the government still rested determinedly in the hands of Zia-ul-Haq, who retained the status of president and chief of the army staff. During this time, the tricks of Al-Zulfaqar tapered off. The Bhutto brothers, Shahnawaz and Meer Murtaza, had been expelled in 1983 from their base of operation in Afghanistan. They were both still crucial for the Zia-ul-Haq’s government. They had in fact, settled down in

112 Mary Englar, Benazir Bhutto: Pakistani Prime Minister And Activist,Compas Point Boks, Minneapolis, 2006, pp.59-61.

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Europe and were no longer involved with Al-Zulfaqar, which had become non- functional. Although, there has never been any proof to link Benazeer Bhutto or the PPP with Al-Zulfaqar, Benazeer Bhutto was drawn into the conspiracy at a very private level.113

In July 1985, the Bhutto family met each other for a break on the French Riviera. All four children, Shahnawaz Bhutto, Sanam Bhutto, Meer Murtaza Bhutto and Benazeer Bhutto were there with their mother. Shahnawaz Bhutto, Sanam Bhutto, and Meer Murtaza Bhutto; all had their spouses and children with them. It was a happy occasion; only a little dampened by the harms that Shahnawaz Bhutto was having with his Afghan wife, Rehana. Shahnawaz had been on the edge of seeking a divorce but had been discussed about it with his eldest sister, Benazeer. All the Bhuttos’ returned to their different places to change for the evening. Meer Murtaza returned to the small residence that Benazeer Bhutto along with her mother and sister were hiring, with the news that Shahnawaz and Rehana were fighting and there was no hope of compromise. Early the next morning Meer Murtaza returned to his brother's residence and found him dead. A long inquiry followed and it was determined that Shahnawaz had been offended. On July 18, 1985, in fact because of her efforts on behalf of the people of Pakistan, the second male member of the Bhutto family died.114

Shahnawaz Bhutto and Meer Murtaza Bhutto both carried vials of toxic so that they could entrust suicide if they were ever prisoned by Zia-ul-Haq. The toxic, in its straight state, would kill almost immediately. Though, Benazeer Bhutto was able to gain knowledge from secret sources that the toxic would cause an unhurried and painful death. The French authorities were able to decide that Shahnawaz Bhutto took the toxic in a thinned shape and died unhurriedly in the presence of his wife Rehana. She had run away to the United States. No one was ever emotional with administering

113 Ibid., p.63.

114 Ibid., p.392.

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the grave for him, but his family and several others consider that he was assassinated.115

His family went for filing alleges of murder in the French court against some unknown persons. Several inside and outside of Pakistan believe that the two Afghani sisters who married with Shahnawaz and Meer Murtaza, were actually agents of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The murder of Shahnawaz Bhutto set off a touching outpouring in Pakistan. Thousands of followers visited the Bhutto house at 70 Clifton in Karachi to offer prayers to the second sacrifice of the Bhutto family.116 In all over Sindh province, where the Bhutto family funeral grounds are located, thousands of people began making their way towards Al-Murtaza in order to attend the upcoming funeral.117 The government-controlled newspapers tried to disgrace Shahnawaz Bhutto by claiming that he died due to medicine and alcohol aggression, were burned in protest. Zia-ul-Haq, whose hold was slipping on the country and who had freshly squeeze a coup attempt from his junior officers in the military, stated openly that Benazeer Bhutto was free to return to Pakistan without any limits. He, even, offered his condolences to the Bhutto family for the murder of Shahnawaz Bhutto. It was tough for any person in the opposition to trust on the word of Zia-ul- Haq, because it was the time of revolving down, but Benazeer Bhutto felt that she had to return Pakistan for her brother's memorial services. When she returned, Zia-ul-Haq had mounted a huge security attempt to keep as many people as possible away from Benazeer Bhutto and the memorial service.118

He also put several PPP leaders in jail so that they cannot be able to be there in the memorial service. Zia-ul-Haq must have felt worried by the Shahnawaz's loss, became the congregation points for those who opposed his rule. When Benazeer Bhutto was lastly being able to hold Shahnawaz Bhutto's body back to Pakistan on August 21, 1985, she was welcomed at Karachi Airport by approximately one

115 M. G. Chitkara, Benazir, A Profile, APH Publishing, New Delhi, 1996, p.18.

116 Ibid., p.392.

117 Ibid., p.19.

118 Ibid., p.20.

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thousand seriously armed soldiers supported by armored personnel delivery service. Zia-ul-Haq had effectively reserved the public crowd away from the memorial service of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. This time, though, he was powerless to control the emotional masses. When Benazeer Bhutto landed with the dead body of her brother at Moenjodaro Airport of Larkana, ten thousand mourners welcomed them. The whole eighteen miles way from the airport to the Bhutto House at Al-Murtaza was lined with people waving black flags.119 There were many green, red and black buntings of the banned PPP in the mass as well. The prayer service, the element of the Muslim funeral ceremony, had to be detained in a sports arena and was attended by twenty five thousand men120. Some analysts estimated that fifty thousand people had attended the funeral ceremony in Larkana.121

Following the funeral ceremony, Benazeer Bhutto pledged her hold to the fight to reinstate democracy in Pakistan. She also confirmed openly that she was staying in Pakistan to take for granted the leadership of the Pakistan People’s Party. It observed that there was a tempting force pouring Benazeer Bhutto into the political front position. After the funeral ceremony, Benazeer Bhutto, along with some friends and relatives, came back to 70 Clifton in Karachi. Early on the sunup of August 27, 1985, a memorable scene was once again showed out. Zia-ul-Haq's police enclosed 70 Clifton, stated it a sub jail, and handed over Benazeer Bhutto a ninety days custody order. Zia-ul-Haq was unable to keep his guarantee and prisoned her.122 On December 30, Zia-ul-Haq lifted up the Martial Law. Several politicians and scholars perceived this as another positive step toward a revisit of democracy. Feeling international pressure, Zia-ul-Haq had nine months earlier established a counseling national assembly. Although, political parties were still banned, several seats in the assembly were won by those people who were faithful to the PPP, and nine of Zia-ul-Haq's cupboard members unsuccessful to get elected. Many from opposition refused to

119 Ibid., p.393.

120 Ibid., p.134.

121 Ibid., p.21.

122 Ibid., p.393.

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contribute Zia-ul-Haq's strategy as long as he sustained to direct the military and hold it as a danger for anyone who went too far in questioning the government.123

The first factual test of Zia-ul-Haq's new liberalization happened when ground-breaking demonstrations broke out in all over the country. The protests on January 5, 1986, celebrated the fifty eighth birthday of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.. Benazeer Bhutto characterized the changes as craftiness cover planned to persuade the West, particularly the United States that human rights and democracy were returning to Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq had placed the year of 1990 as the date for the next national elections. Benazeer Bhutto and the PPP, along with the other political parties started the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, hoped to force Zia-ul-Haq to calendar elections sooner and to give them the chance to crush him in open and complimentary elections. Shortly, after the lifting of Martial Law, Benazeer Bhutto and a number of her colleagues, in London, decided that they must return back to Pakistan. Some of those performing their functions with her in London had pending cases against them in Pakistan, and their return will be decided by the Zia-ul-Haq. Benazeer Bhutto knew it was a fault to give Zia-ul-Haq an opportunity to plan for her entrance, so the actual date for the trip was kept in secrecy.124

This time returning to Pakistan, Benazeer Bhutto visited Pakistan three times. She also visited Washington, Moscow, and made a religious pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. Benazeer Bhutto claimed that her visit to Washington was to gain attention for upcoming test of democracy in Pakistan. Majority believe that she has gone Washington to assure those in supremacy that if she was successful in her plan of democratically overthrow of Zia-ul-Haq, she would support United States interest. Without the inferred approval of Washington, it was doubtful that Benazeer Bhutto would be able to confront and stand against Zia-ul-Haq. Her visit to Moscow, at the invitation of a women's organization, was seen as a sign of Benazeer Bhutto's political confidence. The tour to Moscow placated many of the left-leaning members of her party who viewed the United States as part of the dilemma because of their long-term

123 Ibid., p.23. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.393.

124 Ibid., p.395.

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support for Zia-ul-Haq. In addition, it probably strengthened her position with United States, who would desire to stay Benazeer Bhutto out of the Soviet sphere of influence.125 It was at this time that Benazeer Bhutto caught the eye of the media. Her imminent and optimistically successful return to Pakistan made magnificent news. Benazeer Bhutto took benefit of the media’s notice to confront Zia-ul-Haq's agreements of liberties. She appeared on several television channels in Europe and the United States and was interviewed by the BBC on the radio programme. The BBC put her on the air in both English and in Urdu; the official language of Pakistan, for transmit over the BBC associates in Pakistan.126

As the scheduling for Benazeer Bhutto's return has been made she began to pay attention that at return to Pakistan, she may be shooted. Hopeful reports came from all over the country, and one of the Bhutto family servants at 70 Clifton awfully tried to contact Benazeer Bhutto in London. When she finally got the message of her importance disappointed to know that the man and his young niece had been viciously murdered. Majority considered that Zia-ul-Haq ordered for their murder due to opposing his rule. Now, she could not weight more and on April 11, 1986, return to Pakistan.127

Election of 1985 And Movement For Restoration of Democracy

This part consists of the politics of Sindh after the Movement for Restoration of Democracy which was followed by presidential referendum of 1984 and then non- party elections of 1985. These confrontations had profound impact on the future politics of the country. Proposal of Muhammad Khan Junaijo as Prime Minster by Zia-ul-Haq and then the dissolution of his government and the assemblies in 1988, are the events having collision on the nationalistic politics. Zia-ul-Haq announced on Radio and Television on January 12, 1985, that the elections of National Assembly

125 Ibid., p.393.

126 Tariq Islam, Democracy The Only Way For Pakistan: Interviews of Benazir Bhutto, Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Archives, SZABIST, Karachi, 2008, pp.53-54.

127 M. G. Chitkara, Benazir, A Profile, p.24. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.394.

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and Provincial Assemblies would be organized on 25th and 28th February 1985 respectively. Previously, he declared general elections two times but could not be materialized. This time he satisfied his guarantee and the elections were held on due dates on non-party and separate electorate basis. These elections were the result of the pressure of MRD. There were some motives that Zia-ul-Haq preferred the non-party elections, one of them was the popular support of PPP which may be resulted in its victory. Second reason was that he did not want to see a strong parliament and active members of Assembly, because he knew very well that non-affiliated members would be weak as compare to convicted members. The detached voters also would come against the PPP as large number of the Hindus living in rural areas of Sindh, and majority of them were the voters and supporters of Pakistan People’s Party, which is a liberal and secular political party. Separate electorate rushed a large portion of the vote bank of the PPP.128

The first hazard to Zia-ul-Haq appeared in 1983, when Sindh upraised against his tyrannical and demanding rule. Before this, there was no major problem for Zia- ul-Haq regime. Even the returning of Bhutto did not create a threat to his rule as was created by MRD in 1983. Christina Lamb also narrated that: “The greatest threat to Zia-ul-Haq came in 1983 when the PPP directed the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy to topple him”.129 Though the MRD was cruelly crushed through a fearful force but afterwards many measures to minimize annoyance of the masses.130

When Zia-ul-Haq ousted Bhutto from the power Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) supported him. But during and after movement of 1983, the scenario was completely changed and majority parties of PNA joined the MRD against the Martial

128 Report on the General Elections, 1985: Detailed result of election, Election Results, Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1987. Also see Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.394.

129 Iftikhar Haider Malik, Culture And Customs of Pakistan, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, 2006, p.18.

130 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.394- 395.

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Law Government131. Christina Lamb wrote that “most of the MRD members had previously belonged to the PNA movement which helped to push Zia-ul-Haq to power and he was jolted by its preliminary success. Realizing he needed more than force to stay on top”.132 Zia-ul-Haq searched out the constitutional means to lengthen his rule.133 According to the statement of Hamid Khan:“He did not want to face a national election and risk of recruitment of people against him by the political parties. He knew that he could not be elected in fair election. Support in the elections was not so easy and not without risks and dangers. So, ingenious system was made by his brilliant and contriving advisors. A referendum was to be held for a vote of support to the process of Islamization (Policy of Implementing Islamic Laws). Who would against Islam? The affirmative and positively vote was deemed to have given him a term of five years as President”.134

Zia-ul-Haq declared the referendum and through this, he wanted to get the vote and to sustain the people’s sport for the Presidency, for another five years term. He took this step because he was terrified from the political and public representatives. Even he did not have any trust in the members; they would be elected on non-party basis elections.135Mushahid Hussain counts the step of referendum as the “most significant political move by the President being his maiden challenge in seven and half years to seek a constituency beyond the armed forces”.136The referendum was held on December 19, 1984. According to Mushahid Hussain: “the aim of the referendum was to elect Zia-ul-Haq as the President of Pakistan for a additional period of five years after the Martial Law was lifted”.137

131 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's , M.E. Sharpe, Islamabad, 2006, p.86.

132 Ibid., p.86.

133 Ibid., p.87.

134 Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, London, 2005, p.56.

135 Ibid.,p.395.

136 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's Politics: The Zia years, p.261.

137 Ibid., p.262. 154

A complicated and puzzling type question was asked from the voters that if they want Islamization and peaceful transfer of power to the elected representatives they tick “Yes” and “Yes” means that Zia-ul-Haq has been designated as President for five years after the lifting of Martial Law.138

General K.M. Arif has also given his opinion regarding the referendum:

The question put to the voters was ‘Do you endorse the process initiated by the President of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq for bring the laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunction of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan and are you in act of kindness of the constitution of that progression and for the smooth and logical transfer of power to the elected representation of the people? Every voter was mandatory to answer Yes or No.139

Zia-ul-Haq used all means to guarantee that people would participate in the referendum and cast their votes in column of “Yes”. He used limited Waderaas and influenced persons as well as the name of Islam to extend his crucial rule and regulations. The question was that do you want to implement the Islamic laws in the country or not. It was very complex to any Muslim to say “No”. Therefore, the majority of the people had determined not to cast their vote in the referendum.140 Before the referendum, Zia-ul-Haq addressed to the nation on December 1, 1984, and said: “If the majority of the voters and electorate responds to this question in Yes, it means that the people of Pakistan have expressed confidence in the present

138 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.395. Also see Saha, C. Saha, Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, 2001, p.30.

139 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.395.

140 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.395. Also see Saha, C. Saha, Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries, p.31.

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government, and authorized his policies and have elected Zia-ul-Haq (as President) for the next five years”.141

Daily “Nawa-e-Waqt” in its edition of January 1, 1985, a strong supporter of the Islamization and Martial Law in the early days of Zia-ul-Haq, also observed his policies and wrote “It is a sour truth and bitter reality that we talk of Islam as a fashion, while our deeds are apart from Islam”.142 The people did not cast their vote in the referendum. They got decision for boycott of the referendum in general and the people of the rural areas of Sindh in meticulous did not respond to the appeal of the government. Very few people went to the polling stations to cast their votes. Even the Waderaas and local administration tried and mandatory to the people that they should go to the polling stations and cast their votes but people neglected them. Hamid Khan quoted the entire situation of complications in these words, “All the polling stations gave an abandoned look and the government staff on duty stuffed the ballot boxes with affirmative votes”.143

Before the referendum, Zia-ul-Haq visited several cities of the country and prejudiced the people that they should cast votes in his favor. The huge number of people was seen in the meetings and gatherings of Zia-ul-Haq, but they were powerfully brought. “The turnout of the people during the campaign meetings was heavy. The confined administration ensured that the referendum was completely failed in the country and mainly in Sindh Province. The independent observers reported that only two to three per cent of the voters participated in the referendum but government claimed that more than 90 per cent of the voters participated and from which 97 per cent voted in the favor of the policies of Zia-ul-Haq.144 The Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan announced that the polling regarding this act was fair, orderly and out of 34,992,4256 registered voters, 21,750, 902 (about 62 per cent) had cast their ballots. And 21,253,758 (97.7 per cent of the total polled) answered in

141 Ibid., p.28.

142 The Daily Nawa-e-Waqt, Islamabad, January 1, 1985.

143 Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan, p.57.

144 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.396.

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the confirmatory and only 316,919 in negative. The 1,80,227 ballots were found to be invalid. It was the declaration of the government but people said that referendum was a big cheat. According to several scholars, the result of the referendum in which people were asked whether they supported the actions undertaken by the government to Islamize Pakistan, was an embarrassment for the government. The audiences were approximately 10 per cent.145

MRD made a call against referendum but Jamaat-e-Islami and Peer Pagaara fully supported the military government. Jamaat-e-Islami supported Zia-ul-Haq due to close relations of its leader, Mian Tufail Muhammad with Zia-ul-Haq, as both of them belonged to Arian clan of Jullundur. Their cultural, social and economic background was same. Peer Pagaara supported Zia-ul-Haq and his government as a man of Military. This was admitted on the basis of commitment more than one occasion or big deal that he was an agent of the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the armed forces.146

After collapse and the malfunction of referendum government was under pressure. Mushahid Husain, in 1990, wrote that it was after the referendum that the President made overture to the MRD; for the first time even according to the legitimacy and recognition of the opposition alliance by allowing its leadership to meet the Abbotabad summit in January 1985.147 It was an impact of referendum that Zia-ul-Haq agreed to allocate the power with the politicians. For that purpose he contacted to the politicians and other non-political landlords and industrialists to get help from them for the coming general elections that would be held on the non-party or irregular basis. Zia-ul-Haq was not ready to hold the elections on the party basis because he was frightened from the support of PPP and political power. Due to this fear Zia-ul-Haq made amendments in the political parties Act 1962 in January, a month before the election of 1985. Zia-ul-Haq guaranteed from those amendments that no important leader of the Pakistan People’s Party would be elected in the non- party election even in his individual capacity. The presence of such persons and

145 Ibid.,p.407.

146 Saha, C. Saha, Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries,p.29.

147 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years,p.268.

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politicians in the National Assembly or in any Provincial Assemblies or Senate could cause problems and difficulties to him. He took such type of actions and changes to protect the assemblies from the politicians which were related with the Pakistan Peoples Party in past.148 Hamid Khan stated as under:

The Political Parties Act provided that any person who had at any time after December 1, 1971, been office bearer or even a member of the executive committee at the national or provincial system of a political party which had neither been registered nor declared qualified to participate in elections by October 11, 1979, would not be qualified for a period of seven years to be elected or selected as a member of parliament or any Provincial Assembly. However, the members of the federal commission (selected by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq and his underlings) were not to be hit by the above mentioned disqualification. It was further provided that any person who had been a federal minister or minister of State, any advisor or provincial minister at any time between December 1, 1971 and July 5, 1977 (during Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto regime) would not be qualified for a period of seven years to be elected as a member of the parliament or provincial Assemblies. These provisions undoubtedly and noticeably ensured that the whole leadership of the Pakistan People’s Party was disqualified from being elected to the parliament or the provincial assemblies.149

Zia-ul-Haq made plan to meet the politician as well as the non-political feudals, industrialists and traders. He wanted to produce the group of his supporters who would contest the elections and after winning, support him on any issue and matter without asking any question. He was victorious in his strategy; many power- hungry Waderaas and Chaudharies welcomed the offer of Zia-ul-Haq and guaranteed him that they would entirely contribute in the forthcoming general elections and assist him.150

148 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.396- 397.

149 Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan, p.57.

150 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.403.

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After declaration of timetable for the elections, MRD and its component parties declared that they would boycott the elections. Jamaat-e-Islami and Muslim League (Pagaaro) completely participated in the elections. Jamaat-e-Islami did not obtain the countable support in the elections. It won just eight seats, four from Lahore and Karachi, and four from the rural areas of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).151 Though, Jamaat-e-Islami contested on sixty seats of National Assembly. In comparison to the religious parties Muslim League Functional (Peer Pagaara group) won 42 seats of National Assembly, whereas, the nonconformists of PPP won 38 seats. In 1985 elections, majority of the ministers of the Zia-ul-Haq cabinet were got defeat.152 In these elections, MRD and its component parties boycotted the elections. According to Aitazaz Ehsan, “Though Benazeer herself favored to participate in the elections and said that space should not be left for the enemy”.153

But the local leadership of the MRD and PPP decided to boycott the elections. Benazeer honored the decision of the leaders of the MRD and appealed to the people of the country for boycott. The participants of the ex-PPP MNAs and MPAs in the general elections ignored the appeal of the MRD and PPP for the boycott. It increased the moral support of the military government. It was the big upset for the leadership of PPP and particularly for Benazeer Bhutto. Several Waderaas and the feudal families participated in the elections, majority of them were unknown in the politics. People did not respond to the appeal of the boycott and participated in the election process. About 44.7 per cent people of Sindh and 59.4 per cent people of the Punjab participated in the elections. In general, 51.98 per cent people cast the vote in the elections.154 The elections turnout was really surprise for all the political groups, the military, the candidates and the opposition.155

151 Filippo Osella, Islamic Reform in South Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p.479.

152 Ibid.,p.456.

153 Corinne J. Naden, Benazir Bhutto, p.83.

154 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.396- 397.

155 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, And America's War on Terror, pp.63-64. 159

People participated in the elections but they rejected Zia-ul-Haq rule. The bulk of the ministers of Zia-ul-Haq cabinet were defeated and also majority of the members of the Majlis-e-Shoora could not be successful in the election. Benazeer commented that the voting was a resounding rejection of Martial Law and Zia-ul- Haq’s policy of Islamization. Six out of nine Cabinet Ministers who contested for the National Assembly were defeated, as were many of his other associates. “The candidates backed by the fundamentalist religious parties, in the provincial elections, also failed badly. In contrast, candidates who had claimed association with PPP in spite of our boycott did remarkably well, winning fifty out of fifty two seats”.156

The elections held were totally free and fair, because the government did not interfere.157 The main proof was that majority of the ministers were defeated in the elections. Zia-ul-Haq did not allow rigging in the elections because he already succeeded in his policy that main opposite party PPP and its allies boycotted the elections. Anyone who would win in the elections eventually will join the team of Zia-ul-Haq. The second reason was that “era believed in bullet and not ballot and it only wanted a democratic cover, not democracy.”158

Zia-ul-Haq was extremely happy when Movement for Restoration of Democracy announced to refuse and boycott the general elections of 1985. It was good news for him that after the boycott by MRD there was no one in opposition to confront the government in the forthcoming elections. In the referendum, people supported the MRD and other parties but in the general elections people ignored the appeal of boycott and participated in the elections. MRD received great delay and could not succeed to induce the people for boycott of the non-party elections. Zia-ul- Haq and his administration were very happy about the results and turnout of the elections. Unlike the referendum, the people entirely participated in the elections. Over twelve hundred candidates contested for the 207 seats of National Assembly for

156 Filippo Osella, Islamic Reform in South Asia, p.480.

157 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.406.

158 Ibid., p.407.

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the Muslim population.159Turnout was so much large because the candidates persuaded the voters. They appealed and convinced voters and used the personal as well as the religious relations. In rural areas of Sindh, Waderaas were most influential but even then they sent their women to the ladies voters to encourage them to cast the vote in their support. The turnout of the voters in Punjab was more than other provinces.160 Total turn-out of the voters in the National Assembly elections was 53.67 per cent of which 60.16 per cent in Punjab, 40.62 per cent in KPK 44.38 per cent in Sindh and 37.44 per cent in Balochistan.161The turn-out was increased in the provincial elections due to the result of the National Assembly elections as well as due to the small constituencies and more number of candidates. It was 57.39 per cent nationwide from which 62.31 per cent in the Punjab, 48.22 per cent in KPK, 50.53 per cent in Sindh and 46.89 per cent in Balochistan.162After the elections, The Daily Pakistan Times on March 3, 1985 reported concerning turn-out that:

The mass participation of the people in the elections, an average of 55 per- cent which is comparable with the best turnout anywhere and has resulted in the total isolation of the proponents of negative politics which have done immense harms to democracy and the political process in the country in the past. Relatively heavy turnout was definitely a plus for the era because it allowed everyone to contest individually and local political rivalries played a big role in ensuring a big turnout but to interpret it as a vote against political parties was not right. Soon after the appointment of the Prime Minister, the treasury benches had to join the Muslim League for better discipline in the house.163

The turn-out in the elections was unforeseen for all. Government and pro- government politicians and adversary leaders were astonished on the elections results.

159 Report on The General Elections, 1985: Detailed Result of Election, Election Results, Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1987.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid.,p.124.

162 Ibid.,.p.204.

163 Pakistan Times, Islamabad, March 3, 1985.

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The component political parties of the MRD were convinced that the people would react to the request of boycott of the elections as in referendum. Government also guessed that bulk of the voters would not cast their votes.164 The huge turn-out in the elections was the result of the unremitting Martial Law and outlawed political activities. The people wanted political activities, and the elections were its source. Other point which motivated the people to cast the vote in the elections was the promise of lifting of the Martial Law after the elections. The rivalries among the Sindhi Waderaas were one of the main reasons of audience in the province of Sindh. Some Waderaas bought votes from local chiefs of the clans and small landlords. One of the example is of Haji A. Meer Bux Junaijo who won the provincial seat from Khairpur Nathan Shah, District Dadu, buying the votes from the local leading persons and head of the Bradaris.

An Economist Shahid Kardar also favored this idea by saying that: “A major factor was the price in the rural Sindh for 20 or more votes, Rs.10,000 considering the amount of poverty and households which could deliver 20 votes, facing no real alternative choice, were willing to vote for Rs.10,000, as it ease the burden of the poverty”.165

So, the money also played key role in the turnout in the elections of 1985. The political activists augmented and Benazeer Bhutto realized that only way to resist against previous government was to manage the concentration of masses. The purchasing of votes put an unenthusiastic impact on voters that they did not see the program or agenda and character of the candidate while casting the vote. It was not good symbol for the country. These conditions and acts were not good for the society because in this way the corruption increased in the country. The members who invested in the elections would try to get money back from public resources. It was seen, when Junaijo government gave cash to the members in the name of development of their constituency. It was first time in the history of the country that development funds were directly given to the assembly members, and it was on the wish and will

164 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.407.

165 Shahid Kardar, The Gathering Economic Crisis And The Dwindling Options, Group 83, Islamabad, p.11.

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and honesty of the members how they operate the funds, either in suitable or wrong way.166

There was dissimilarity in the turnout in all the four provinces. The landowners and owners of the properties of the Punjab and KPK participated in the elections themselves or put up the candidates of their own preference. But, this was not the case in Sindh and Balochistan. The tribal chiefs of Balochistan were not more attracted in the elections. The Sindhi landlords were divided into two camps; one and large camp supported the line of MRD, while the other camp was struggling to put up themselves in the proposed structure. Pakistan People’s Party was loser in this game that many members of PPP contested in the elections who were elected in 1977 election on PPP tickets.167 According to Aitazaz Ehsan: “Even Benazeer talked and directed many of them directly not to participate in the elections but they ignored all the instruction and directions of their leader”.168

PPP expelled at least thirty one members in Sindh those were contested in the elections.169 As the general elections of 1985 were on non-party basis, therefore, the political issues were not on the agenda of the elections. It left the unconstructive impacts on the Pakistani poor society, such as the base of election campaign on the bradari (caste system), tribe, race, language, grouping or sectarianism as well as on some local issues. So it shaped the racial and sectarian issues in the politics of the country. Tribes, clan, sects and ethnicity were the factors that appeared to be the frame of reference for the voters in the recent electoral contest170.Era claimed that the elections had purpose to take step forward the process of Islamization with the contribution of the people. But, it was not seen during the elections. Greater part of the applicants talked about the limited issues and convinced the people on their

166 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.396- 397.

167Ibid., p.397.

168 Ibid.,p.399.

169 Ibid., p.406.

170 Ibid.,pp.432.

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personal and bradari (caste) relations171. A scholar Rai Shakeel Akhtar comments on the elections as: “Elections primarily concerned were with the local issues and seldom took up bigger national issue. Islam, Economy, Democracy, Foreign Affairs, Martial Law, etc. were not part of electioneering. These elections reduced national politics to municipal level”.172 After the party less election there were many ethnic groups came into being as a powerful groups such as MQM, PPI, Pashtoon Federation, Sindh National Alliance and other nationalist as well as ethnic groups.173Benazeer Bhutto, who was a federalist politician, believed in strong federation and was against the nationalist movements of Sindh and other provinces of the country. Though, she boycotted the elections due to the non-party basis, she comments on the impact of the elections as under:

The non-party elections held by the military administration had furthered the country’s disintegration. By banning political parties, the military administration forced candidates to campaign not on a stage of political ideals, which transcended regional and ethnic boundaries, but on the basis of personal identification. Vote for me because I am a Shia like you, candidate in these elections told their ingredients and participators. To get the attention they raised their slogans “Vote for me, I am a Punjabi.174

So, the remarks of Benazeer Bhutto show that elections of 1985 grew the ethnic and sectarian line in the people of the country. The feudal class was victorious in the elections. They easily won the elections, in the absence of any political program, by convincing the voters through the bradari system and used the power of criminals to gain the vote by force. In the rural areas of Sindh province the landlords were powerful, due to their economic hold and their private forces. Many dacoits were also under their control. It was clear when the foreigners were kidnapped by the dacoits and than they were returned through the Sindhi Waderaas. Government did

171 Anthony Hyman, Pakistan: Zia And After, Abhinav Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, p.89.

172 Rai Shakil Akhtar, Media, Religion And Politics In Pakistan, Oxford University Press, London, 2000, p.164.

173 Ibid.,p.187.

174 Ibid., p.399.

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not touch them because they favored by the military regime. So, in the elections a new elite class came into being which was non-political as well as the opportunist. There was no political affiliation of those elected members and nor they were under any discipline, so they were easy to control. Therefore, Zia-ul-Haq was happy to make them the junior partner in the power structure. As the elections were on non-party basis so there was no concept of the majority or minority. However, one thing was clear from the results, that people of the country in general and particular of Sindh, rejected the candidates who were close to Zia-ul-Haq’s military government. The majority of the ministers of the Zia-ul-Haq cabinet were defeated. It showed that Sindhi people did not support to Zia-ul-Haq. He claimed that the turnout showed that the people supported the policies of his government, whereas, the fact was that, five out of nine, his cabinet members were defeated, and sixty three members of Advisory Council lost the elections. Only nine of its fifty candidates won”.175 It showed the hatred of the people of Sindh towards the Zia-ul-Haq rule.176

The province of Sindh was more affected from this incident. MQM177 became powerful and the ethnic riots took place throughout the province. Moreover, the regional and nationalist organizations became more powerful after the non-party elections. It proved when local body elections were held in 1987.178 The urban areas of Sindh province were completely won by the ethno-nationalist as well as the regional organizations. It was in the interest of the military and feudal ascendancy. People were divided into bradari system, in other words called whole family or clan on sectarian lines. The political issues such as foreign policy, economic policy and the question of the integrity of the country went into waves. Members came into assemblies without political agenda and programme. Political bribe and corruption was increased. After the election process, Zia-ul-Haq promulgated the Revival of Constitutional Orders (RCO) on March 2, 1885. The new constitutional measures

175 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.399.

176 Mary Englar, Benazir Bhutto: Pakistani Prime Minister And Activist, p.92.

177 MQM Stands for Mutahida Qaumi Movement Led by Altaf Hussain.

178 Ashraf Tariq, Panic in Karachi: Altaf Hussain, MQM And Underground Mafia,Daily Hot News International, 1999, p. 245.

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were taken place to protect the Martial Law and secure the power of the President.179 According to the new modification, the executive authority “Shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers’ assistants to him”.180 A new provision was added to further strengthen the hands of the President. It stipulated that “if any question arises whether any matter is or not a matter in respect of which the President is by Constitution empowered to act in his discretion, the decision of the President in this discretion will be final and the validity of anything done by the President shall not be called question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in this discretion”.181

It means before the sharing of power, Zia-ul-Haq ensured the power of the President and protected his all actions, which were taken by him from July 1977, because he was not ready to lose his grip.182 It was the reason that he did not relieve the post of Chief of Army Staff till death. He kept both of the descriptions in his hands. Benazeer rightly said about it “The office of Chief of Army Staff and the President of Pakistan has subordinated the Parliament to the arbitrary will of the military commander”.183The remarks of Zia-ul-Haq also clarified the power of Prime Minister in the eyes of Zia-ul-Haq “Prime Minister would be the executive head and I would be supreme executive”.184 Zia-ul-Haq nominated Muhammad Khan Junaijo for the Prime Ministership. But before getting the vote of confidence from the National Assembly, the election of the Speaker of the National Assembly shocked the President and his team, when official candidate Khawaja was defeated by Fakhar Imam. Safdar was very close to Zia-ul-Haq, his overwhelm in the elections showed that even the members of the National Assembly did not support to

179 Constitution of 1973, 8th amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1985.

180 Ibid.,p.77.

181 Ibid., p.78

182 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.407.

183 Ibid., p.400.

184 Ibid., p.407.

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the policies of Zia-ul-Haq.185After the alteration in the constitution it was the power of the President to appoint the Prime Minister from the members of the National Assembly. Because there was no party in the assembly, so there was no question of the majority and minority. It depended on the will of the President to appoint any one from the National Assembly for the Prime Minister ship. Those powers were given to the President according to the RCO. Similarly, the provincial governors were empowered to nominate the Chief Ministers from the respective assemblies. So, after the implementation of RCO the National Assembly became powerless and dependent even in the election of the Prime Minister.186 Hamid Khan wrote about it “That was exactly what Zia-ul-Haq wanted; divided and dependent assemblies, with all power gravitating in his own hand and in the hands of his nominated Governors”.187

On one side, the appointment of the Prime Minister by the President was totally against the parliamentary system and dignity of the Assembly.188 While on the other hand the selection of the Chief Minister of the Province by the Governor was totally denial to provincial autonomy and contradictory to the principle of federation and violation of the will of the people. The Governor was the representative of the federal government. To appoint the executive of the province at his own will was to disgrace the vote of the people of the province.189

There were many names for the future Prime Minister such as Nawabzada Abdul Ghafoor Hooti, Khattk, Meer Zafarullah Jammali, Elahi Bakhsh Soomro, Makhdoomzada Hassan Mahmood and Hamid Raza Gilani. The names from the Punjab and KPK were not considered due to their large share in armed forces. Zia-ul-Haq himself was Punjabi and Chief of Staff belonged to KPK. The name of Zafarullah Jammali of Balochistan was also under consideration but

185 Shoukat Ali, Pakistan: A Religio-Politcal Study, The National Institute of Historical Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1997, p.239.

186 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, The University of Michigan Michigan, 2004, p.166.

187 Hamid Khan, Constitutional And Politcal History of Pakistan, p.315.

188 Ibid., p.400.

189 Ibid., pp.400-401.

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finally it was rejected due to his inexperience and the favor and support of Sindh in the politics of the country. The selection of Sindh Province for the Prime Minister ship also was the result of the peoples struggle against Zia-ul-Haq’s military government.190 Finally, two names; Ellahi Bakhsh Soomro and Muhammad Khan Junaijo, for prime minister ship were selected from the Sindh. It was also confirmed by Lieutenant General Jahan Dad Khan as, “The candidate in the field were Ellahi Bakhsh Soomro and Muhammad Khan Junaijo. I was asked to give my recommendations for the future Prime Minister of Pakistan. I recommended Muhammad Khan Junaijo as the first choice”191. A meeting of MLAs was held in which the names of Ellahi Bakhsh Soomro and Muhammad Khan Junaijo were selected for the next Prime Minister of the country. President also agreed with the recommendations of MLAs.192

K. M. Arif wrote: “On March 18, 1985, a small exclusive meeting was held in the President’s office. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Sahabzada Yaqoob Khan, General , Major General Abdul Waheed and I attended it. The President apprised the group for the recommendations made in the conference and asked for the comments. The group endorsed the MLAs’ views. Soomro was preferred to Junaijo.”193Finally, Zia-ul-Haq appointed Muhammad Khan Junaijo as Prime Minister of the country on the recommendation of Peer Pagaro. Ellahi Bakhsh Soomro also confirmed it in these words during his interview on KTN194 that: “President informed me that my name was suggested for the Prime Ministership, but Peer Pagaara did not agree”.195

Muhammad Khan was unknown and unpopular in the masses of the country. Before that he had been the member of the cabinet in Ayub Khan’s government. The

190 Ibid., p.401.

191 Ibid., p.402.

192 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.407.

193 Ibid.,p.418.

194 KTN is a private television channel which broadcast programs in .

195 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.168.

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main merit beyond the selection of Muhammad Khans Junaijo was Sindhi. He was the most confidential personality for Zia-ul-Haq. He completely supported to Zia-ul-Haq government during the Movement for Restoration of Democracy. Zia-ul-Haq also preferred Junaijo because he had no relations with the army. Zia-ul-Haq was afraid that if he elected the Prime Minister from KPK or Punjab, there were possibilities that he might have developed relations with the army generals. It was another reason that he preferred Prime Minister from the Sindh.196 The recommendation of Peer Pagaara were important for Zia-ul-Haq, because Peer Pagaara belonged to the native province of Bhutto. He was powerful person in Sindh due to the large number of his Mureeds (followers) and militant organization. Many observers agreed to it. Craig Baxter rightly wrote about the selection of Muhammad Khan Junaijo as the Prime Minister of the country, because he was Sindhi and it was his merit for the selection197. After the Movement for Restoration of Democracy of 1983, Zia-ul-Haq was afraid of uprising any movement from Sindh. Therefore, he tried to compensate the Sindhees in the government formation. Junaijo was a minor political figure, but had a major qualification that he was from Sindh.198The first session of newly elected National Assembly was held on March 23, 1985. President Zia-ul-Haq addressed to the session and highlighted to the members of the Assembly that they would not link themselves to any political party. In his address he officially nominated Junaijo as Prime Minister. After the selection of the Prime Minister the process of the formation of the government completed. After getting the vote of confidence from the National Assembly, Muhammad Khan Junaijo announced, “Democracy and Martial Law could not exist together”.199 This declaration and after the resolution from National Assembly and three provincial assemblies for lifting the Martial Law was alarming for Zia-ul-Haq. He became conscious from the representatives of the peoples. It was also the reason that even after lifting the Martial Law on December 30, 1985 he did

196 Ibid., p.169.

197 Craig Baxter, Pakistan on The Brink: Politics, Economics, And Society, Lexington Books, London, 2004, p.69.

198 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, pp.169-170.

199 Junejo Rajputs: Muhammad Khan Junejo, Jan Muhammad Junejo, Jam Sadiq Ali, Chakar Ali Khan Junejo, Historical Description, Books Group Staff, Islamabad, 2010, p.435.

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not vacate the post of Chief of Army Staff.200Zia-ul-Haq succeeded to constitutionalize his action in the name of 8th amendment in the Constitution of 1973. According to this amendment, President became powerful than the Prime Minister. He had in power to appoint the Prime Minister and also to dissolve the National Assembly without the consent of the Prime Minster. The power to appoint the Judges of Supreme Court and the chiefs of the three armed forces went into the hands of the President.201After the dissolution of National Assembly, it was the discretion of the President to form the caretaker government. The number of the senate members’ rise from 63 to 87. The seats were reserved for the women in the National Assembly. Any amendment in the constitution was to be passed by two third majority of the National Assembly and Senate. Governors were authorized to appoint Chief Ministers from the members of the respective assembly and they must get the vote of confidence with in sixty days. Separate electorate system for the minorities was became the part of the constitution according to the eighth amendment.202

After 8th amendment, the President became powerful person of the State and no one has right to ask the question from him. He was not responsible to the Assembly and everybody was at his (the president’s) mercy and he was at the mercy of providence alone.203 At this occasion, he gave the statement that my ministers are answerable to me and I am answerable to God only. Benazeer wrote about the 8th amendment as: His amendments reconfirmed his Presidency for five years and not only gave him the sweeping power to personally appoint his own Prime Minister, the chiefs of the armed forces and the four provincial Governors, but also to dismiss the national and Provincial assemblies at will.204

From the selection of Muhammad Khan Junaijo as Prime Minister, Zia-ul-Haq showed that he was not against the Sindhees. Muhammad Khan Junaijo affiliated with

200 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.407.

201 Constitution of 1973, 8th amendment in The Constitution of Pakistan 1973, p.123.

202 Ibid.

203 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.407.

204 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.403.

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Peer Pagaara but he was not active against Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. “Prime Minister Junaijo does not have a committed anti-Bhutto identity in the public at large, nor has he done anything in the past to win the Movement for Restoration of Democracy’s censure”.205 Zia-ul-Haq disheartend form Junaijo in his first meeting and declared before him 'He has decided to appoint you as a Prime Minister of the country, in the reply Junaijo did not say the words of thanks to Zia-ul-Haq, which was expected by him. Zia-ul-Haq was more conscious when Junaijo asked him “When would be Martial Law lifted?” So from that day line of the differences was appeared.206

Muhammad Khan Junaijo worked as messenger or middle man between the parliament and the military rule from 1985 to 1988. Junaijo government continued to face the largest gathering of political parties and decided to launch a campaign against the whole process of transition”.207 After the successful visit of United States, he had been assured for the support by American government. He took actions not acceptable to the military government. Prime Minister in his first major move after returning from a highly successful tour of the United States in July 1986, removed the two star Generals and placed a senior Police Officer of his choice as the head of the Intelligence Bureau.208

The selection of the Prime Minister by President and selection of the Chief Ministers by the respective Governors was according to RCO. The Chief Ministers of the three provinces for example, KPK, Punjab and Balochistan were selected from the respective assemblies, but the was selected from the government employees. According to Jahan Dad Khan there were more than one names for example, Peer Sibghatullah Shah Rashdi son of Peer Pagaaro, Shafqat Ali Shah Jamote, Meer Aijaz Ali Talpur and Ghous Ali Shah for the Chief Ministership. Except Ghous Ali Shah others were the members of the Sindh Assembly. Finally, the name of Ghous Ali Shah was finalized as the Chief Minister. Peer Pagaara wanted his

205 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.170.

206 Ibid., pp.170-171.

207 Ibid., p.171.

208 Ibid., pp.171-172.

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son for it but he was not cleared from the agencies due to some reasons, than he was agreed for Ghous Ali Shah.209

He was elected from Ghotki, District Sukkur.210 The seat was vacated by the brother of Sardar Ghulam Muhammad Khan Mahar. Ghous Ali Shah was elected unopposed on May 14, 1986. Although, other six persons also were interested to contest the elections, but government did not allow them to file the nomination papers. Meer Atta Ullah Khan Bulo, Dr.Mumtaz Ahmed Bulo, Rustam Khan Laghari, Peer Nadir shah Jillani, Noor Muhammad Khan Ghori and Azizullah Khan Laghari were interested to file the nomination papers on the PS-3 Ghotki.211 Even two persons entered in the Returning Officer’s office for this purpose but the police captured them and they were unrestricted when time was over. The selection of Ghous Ali Shah was basically the choice of President Zia-ul-Haq. Anees Jillani wrote about it, “It is said that Ghous Ali supported the President in the late seventies when few Sindhees openly sided with the military era”.212The appointment of the Chief Minister of the province was highly criticized by the democratic people of the province as well a by the people of the country. No doubt it was not illegal according to the constitution of 1973, but not right politically when the Chief Ministers of the other provinces were appointed from the elected members of the Assemblies. The selection of Ghous Ali Shah also showed mistrust of Zia-ul-Haq rule on the elected representatives. He did not trust on the elected members of the assembly though they were elected according to his implemented laws.213 There was no political ground of Ghous Ali Shah or his political party, so he was fully dependent on Peer Pagaara. Therefore, he paid a high price for it. Jahan Dad Khan wrote about it as: “he had to pay a heavy price to the

209 Ibid., p.173.

210 Ibid.,p.187.

211Ibid.,p.173.

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid., p.174.

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Peer in the form of housing plots, land, agencies and prized posting for certain officials on the Peer’s recommendations”.214

After the end of Martial Law new Governors were appointed on January 1, 1986. All the Governors were civilian but in Sindh, the same military Governor was sustained. All three Governors except Sindh belonged to their respective provinces. So, the questions raised among the Sindhi people that why the military Governor was not changed in the province of Sindh? Why he was non-Sindhi? So, this action of the government created the hatred feelings towards the army and Zia-ul-Haq era.215 K.M. Arif wrote: “Regionalist Sindhees protested that province had received step-motherly management”.216

Not only the regionalist Sindhi but also the PPP; a federal party and other political parties were reproachful those behaviors towards Sindh.217 The nationalist and regionalist organizations raised this issue among the masses and used it politically. It went against the interest of the federalist politics and thinking.218The policies of Ghous Ali Shah were not favorable for the integrity of the country, because he encouraged MQM in Sindh, which was purely ethnic organization.219 Shafqat Mahmood wrote about Sayed Ghous Ali Shah in his column, “Syed Ghous Ali Shah is accused of deliberately allowing ethnicity to emerge as a fault line in Sindh politics”.220The policies of Ghous Ali Shah were not even contrasting by the Governor of the Province. K.M. Arif narrated that “The Governor of Sindh; Lieutenant General Jahan Dad Khan did not oppose the triple edged strategy adopted by the Chief Minister, diminishing the influence of JI and encouraging the MQM”.221

214 Ibid.

215 Ibid., p.175.

216 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.408.

217 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.175.

218 Ibid., p.176

219 Ashraf Tariq, Panic in Karachi: Altaf Hussain, MQM And Underground Mafia, p.245.

220 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.177.

221 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.408.

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Both, the selection of Chief Minister and the persistence of army Governor raised many questions in the mind of the people of the Province.222Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junaijo was seriously working for lifting the Martial Law. He thought that Martial Law and democracy could not run together so he was in struggle to settle down all the problems smoothly. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad writes that Prime Minster Muhammad Khan dealt with the session of the Senate on July 6, 1985, that “Under Martial Law, civilian government would not work properly and I would not become partner in the prolonged Martial Law”.223 These words of Muhammad Khan showed that he wanted the Martial Law to be lifted as soon as possible. In this regard, Junaijo moved to stable close relations with the political parties including Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party.224 The politics of the province divided into many lines due to long Martial Law period. There were federal as well as nationalist parties existed in the province. The religious as well as ethnic parties also came into the politics and the law and order situation was in the worst conditions. The dacoit’s activities were at high scale. None dared to travel after the sunset on the roads of the province. Even people were kidnapped from the towns during the daylight. The ethnic riots were continued in the cities of Sindh particularly in the capital of the province. Hundreds died in the racial violence between the Muhajirs, Punjabis, Pashtoons and Sindhees.225The development of ethnic politics and degeneration of urban community in Sindh were perhaps the most significant political developments under the Junaijo government. The whole province of Sindh presented a scene of rising inter-ethnic rivalries due to colonization of Pashtoons and Punjabis, and their domination over jobs and business. As a by-product of Afghan war, Gun culture226 and drug mafia

222 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.177.

223 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War on Terror, p.121.

224 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.406.

225 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, And America's War on Terror, pp.123-124.

226 Gun Culture was also called Kalashank of Culture in Pakistan. 174

introduced in Karachi which spread the use of violation in pursuit of ethnic goals to an unprecedented level.227

Though it was the result of Martial Law era but Zia-ul-Haq told, “It was the result of the civilian government. Ghous Ali Shah directly and indirectly supported to the political line of MQM. For example, MQM was against the settlement of the Punjabis and Pashtoons in Sindh”.228 The same thinking was of Ghous Ali Shah and on May 2, 1987, he said in Sukkur, “the migration of the people of the other provinces to Sindh would be banned”. Ghous Ali Shah openly supported to MQM on 8th November, he said that: “MQM is the result of injustice in economics and Punjabi- Pashtoon Itehad (PPI) is the creation of Drug Mafia”.229 It was clear favor and encouragement of a party and demoralization of the others by the Chief Executive of the province. It was the result of the support of Sindh Government that MQM with the majority seats of the local bodies in Karachi and Hyderabad.230The police and other law enforcing agencies supported to the PPI because the majority of the police official and other law enforcing agencies belonged to Pashtoons and Punjabis. So, in that occurrence the law and order situation of the province could not be improved. The politics of the province was divided along the ethnic lines, which in turn damaged the unity and reliability of the country.231

Benazeer Bhutto wrote about the law and order situation of Sindh as, “In the parts of interior Sindh, people no longer traveled after dark, because the roads were taken over by gangs of bandits armed with automatic weapons and rocket launchers. Large landlords and industrialists all over the Pakistan began to maintain private armies to protect themselves and sometimes to launch attacks on their competitors.232 She

227 Ashraf Tariq, Panic in Karachi: Altaf Hussain, MQM And Underground Mafia, p.245.

228 Ibid., p. 267.

229 Ibid., p. 276.

230 Ibid., p. 283.

231 Ibid.,p.245.

232 Ibid., p. 246.

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further wrote on the same page of her autobiography that even in the mosques, villagers took refuge were spared”.233

Government machinery absolutely failed to control the activities of the dacoits in the province. Dacoits attacked on the central jail Sukkur on March 24, 1986, and 37 criminals and dacoits were escaped from the prison. At least 27 from them were given punishment to death by the military courts.234 The free availability of the weapons in the secret markets and the Afghan camps were also the main cause of the violence and lawlessness in the province. It was the phenomenon that even the guns were definitely available on rent in the cities on hours.235Due to law and order situation and ethnic violence, Ghous Ali Shah was asked by the federal government that he should submit his resignation.236 Finally, he submitted his resignation on April 6, 1988, and Akhtar Ali Qaazi became new Chief Minister of Sindh on April 11, 1988. After it, Ghous Ali Shah issued the statement that due to fights for the rights of the province he was asked for the resignation. Additionally, he said that he opposed the construction of Kala Bagh Dam237, and demanded fairness and justice for Sindh on the allocation of water resources. He was in opposition to the colonization of the public of the northern villages and towns in Sindh province. He also initiated the operation against the drug suppliers and drug mafia in Suharab Goth.238

As a whole, the three years period of Ghous Ali Shah remained as nastiest period for the Province of Sindh. The situation of law and order was not good. Ethnic and sectarian riots remained continue in his time. Hundreds were killed and thousand injured in riots in the urban areas of the Province.239 The rural areas totally were under

233 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition),p.406.

234 Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, NBO Publishers Distributors, New Delhi, 1985, p.191.

235 Ibid., pp.191-192.

236 Ibid., p.193.

237 This dam was opposed by nationalist parties. The location of this dam is in Noshehra (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Nationalist parties claim that it would be a reason of drying canals in Sindh.

238 Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, p.194.

239 Ibid., p.195. 176

the control of the dacoits. The dacoits kidnapped the people in the daylight; ethno- nationalist politics grew in his tenure. The federal politics was reduced and inadequately supported in the province.240Though, the Movement for Restoration of Democracy was crushed by Zia-ul-Haq’s military administration. But, it was its force that Zia-ul-Haq became ready to give share to the civilians. In this regard, general elections held on February 25, 1985, on non-party basis. In the consequences of those elections, elected government came into being on March 23, 1985.241 Movement for Restoration of Democracy did not accept the Junaijo government as autonomous government and launched the movement against Zia-ul-Haq and his nominated government of Junaijo in 1986.242The semi-democratic government of Junaijo took several steps against the leaders of MRD, ousting Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei from Punjab in September 1985.243 The Government imposed ban on his entry in the Punjab. The leaders of the MRD were not allowed to hold the public meeting in Lahore on September 23, 1985. MRD leaders faced new challenges after the elected government, because a large number of the politicians joined or supported government. On the other side MRD was not as organized as it was in 1983 and differences also appeared between the leadership. MRD was divided on the matter of the registration of political parties, provincial autonomy and on the making of the new constitution. Air Martial (Retired) Asghar Khan; the leader of Tahreek-e-Istiqlal favored the registration while other leaders opposed it. , Ghous Bakhsh Bazinjo and Rasool Bakhsh Paleejo demanded for a new Constitution.244

After the lifting of Martial Law, Benazeer Bhutto felt secure and decided to come back. She returned to Pakistan on April 10, 1986, and selected Lahore for

240 Ibid.,206.

241 Report on the General Elections, 1985: Detailed result of election, Election Results, Election Commission of Pakistan.

242 Suranjan Das, Kashmir And Sindh: Nation-Building, Ethnicity, And Regional Politics in South Asia, K.P. Bagchi and Co., New Delhi, 2001, p.119.

243 Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi, Politician And Parliamentarian: Selected Speeches, 1962-1990, p.86.

244 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.407- 408.

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landing. The nationalist segments of Sindh criticized Benazeer Bhutto for this decision and said that she ignored the Sindhi people who struggled for the restoration of democracy in 1983.245 A large number of her supporters reached Lahore airport and welcomed her. It was an unprecedented welcome in the known history of Lahore. Thousands of her supporter were gathered in her rally in the city of Lahore. She crossed the nine miles in nine and a half hours. She addressed a crowd at various parts of the city. She also visited the other cities and towns of the Punjab and was received by large crowds. As a result she became more confident and it was said “She could take over the Governor House and the government buildings in Lahore that day, if she wanted”.246Benazeer Bhutto reached Karachi on May 3, 1986: a big crowd of the people welcomed her on the airport. A big banner was inscribed with a slogan that “Benazeer Bhutto is the Guarantor of the integrity of the Federation”.247In the end of political visit, Benazeer announced that 5th July would be celebrated as a Black-Day throughout the country.248 PPP leader N.D. Khan addressed in the public meeting and said if the government would not ready to hold the fresh elections in the end of the year they would launch the protest movement against the government. The same view was issued by Benazeer on 7th July that “We do not recognize the elections of 1985 if government would not prepare for fresh elections we shall launch a movement for the elections on party basis this year”.249The new policy of the Pakistan People’s Party was insisting for the new elections on party basis and restoration of the original Constitution of 1973. described the position as:

The real dilemma for the PPP leadership was how to force the era to hold the midterm elections under the 1973 Constitution. In the aftermath of her volcanic tour of Pakistan in April 1986, Benazeer called for autumn elections

245 Suranjan Das, Kashmir And Sindh: Nation-Building, Ethnicity, And Regional Politics in South Asia, p.1120.

246 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.408.

247 Ibid., p.410.

248 Corinne J. Naden, Benazir Bhutto, p.132.

249 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.410- 411.

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in the same year. In pursuit of her demand for election, she enlisted the support of other Movement for Restoration of Democracy parties and called for the agitation from September 20, 1986.250

After the huge gatherings and appealing rallies, Benazeer decided to start the confrontation against the government. She announced that if government would not hold the elections in September they would launch the movement on September 20, 1986.251 But, movement was started before it on August 14, 1986, when government did not allow PPP for the public rally at Minar-e-Pakistan, Lahore. The clash started between the workers of the Pakistan People’s Party and law enforcing agencies. The day of independence changed into a violent day all over the country. Karachi and Lahore were the centers of clash between the police and the workers of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy. At least three people died and more than fifty were injured.252 Benazeer was captured on 15th August. Her capture was followed by demonstration and protest rallies all over the Province. The clashes and riots between the police and the workers of PPP continued in the cities. People targeted the public property, particularly railway stations, police stations and banks. In Karachi a police station was fired in the Chakiwara area of Layari, strong hold area of Pakistan People’s Party. On the same day, the angered mob attacked on jail at Thatta in which at least 48 prisoners were escaped. Police firing on the processions caused many people killed and injured. The clash between the law enforcing agencies and the workers of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy were in epoch, both attacked on each other. On 17th and 18th of August at least nine people were killed including two police constables.253

A big procession was arranged at Khesana Mori near Hyderabad. At least two demonstrators Gul Muhammad and Hakim Ali Wassan were died on spot and many were injured in the police firing. After that mob went to police station to register the FIR against the culprits but police denied to register the case and captured the

250 Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985, Vanguard, London, 1987, p.243.

251 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.411.

252 Ibid., pp.411-412.

253 Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, pp.124-125.

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villagers. After that police attacked on the village and misbehaved with women and captured them. On the same day a youth Naeem Khatri died when police opened fire on procession in Badin.254It was a new strategy of the law enforcing agencies that if some persons of any village were involved in an anti-government action, the whole village would be punished. Police and law-enforcing agencies attacked the village of Thaheem in District Sanghar. Many people were injured including an eight years old baby Noor. Police captured all the male residents of the village. On 23rd of August, police repeated the same action in the village Birhmani near Dadu. Police fired on the villagers and at least 5 people including 80 years old Chhutto Birhmani and 10 years young boy were killed.255

The police action on the villages of Taeeb Thaheem, Ahmed Khan Birhmani, and in Khesana Moori; Sadiq Machhi were identified. They attacked and treated the villagers as an army of enemy. The situation in Sindh was like a guerrilla war. Even the leadership of MRD was surprised. Many leaders of MRD openly said that they have no relation with MRD. JUI leader Moulana Fazal Rehman openly said that “it was the show of PPP”. The militant war was started in Sindh. The demonstrators attacked public property and the police stations. At least 50 people were killed in the movement. More than 10,000 workers of the MRD were captured in one day on August 13, 1986.256This movement was more violent than the movement of 1983. The people of the Sindh were more concerned in the movement as compare to the other provinces of the country. So the Sindhees were deeply felt isolated and hopeless from the people of other areas. Army used the crucial measures to oppress this movement of the people of Sindh, as compare to use in the Punjab. There was no violence in the Punjab except the Lahore incident on August 14, 1986, when 3 persons were died.257 After that military avoided the use of bullet and tear gas on the procession in the cities

254 Ibid., p.125.

255 Ibid., p.126.

256 Ibid., p.127.

257 Ibid., p.128. 180

of the Punjab. Correspondingly the attitude of the people was also different in both the provinces.258 Anees Jillani described it as under:

The differences in the style and intensity of the agitation in the province of Sindh and Punjab are striking. In Punjab some main PPP leaders have escaped capture too far, while this is not the case in Sindh. In Punjab, protests are confined to urban areas while in Sindh, unlike the 1983 agitation, it is intense both in rural and urban regions; in Punjab students and working class are not as active as in Sindh: in Punjab middle business men, shopkeepers and commission agents are opposed to the agitators while in Sindh, they are generally cooperating with them; in Punjab, the commitment of the protestors is not as deep as in Sindh and consequently Punjabis are more apprehensive of captures the police generally than the Sindhees.259

When the movement turned into aggression and violence, the leadership of PPP decided to stop the movement. This time, Benazeer herself decided to led the movement and she was disheartened from people of Punjab as she was expecting much from them. As a result she issued the report on October 8, 1987, which “we would not want to clash and blood violent, therefore, we withdrawn from the dead line for the fresh elections”.260PPP led democratic movement and played leading role in the MRD. Hundreds of its workers were died and injured and thousands were sent to jails and flogging by the military administration. Therefore, people of Sindh were not happy with the new strategy of Benazeer. The change in the policy towards the military era raised many questions in the minds of the people of the country in general and the people of Sindh in particular. She followed the policy of wait and watch.261 Poor participation of the people of Punjab in the movement of democracy raised

258 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), pp.412- 413.

259 Anees Jillani, Advance Towards Democracy: The Pakistani Experience, Progressive Publishers, Islamabad, 1991, p.75.

260 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.413.

261 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's politics: The Zia years, p.113.

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nationalism in Sindh.262As compare to 1983 movement of MRD, the people of Sindh contributed dimly in the movement of 1986. It was due to ethnic and sectarian division and share of power which Waderaas have taken from the army. In this movement the Sindhi Waderaas did not take interest as they took in 1983. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei did not participate in the movement while in 1983 he played a leading role.263 Mumtaaz Ali Bhutto, uncle of Benazeer Bhutto, also opposed the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, and demanded for a new constitution on the basis of the confederation. Even many other close relatives of Benazeer Bhutto also left Pakistan People’s Party and joined the army era. At least 30 members of Parliament during Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto government from Sindh joined Zia-ul-Haq’s military administration “which would be described as the assemble party”.264There was a poor sharing of the urban middle class in the movement; though, it was more as assess to 1983. This time, the people of the Karachi and Hyderabad said “Khuda Hafiz” (Good Bye) to Islamic fundamentalist and orthodox parties such as JI and JUP. Now they supported to newly born ethno-nationalist organization, Muhajir Quomi Movement (MQM). The leader of the MQM, Altaf Hussain appealed to the Muhajirs that they would support neither Movement for Restoration of Democracy nor government. This type of appeal went in the interest of the government and used it against the democratic forces.265During the Movement for Restoration of Democracy, there was a very crucial situation of the whole province. None was secure in the rural areas also. The dacoits attacked on the villages and took hostage persons for the ransom.266 Even the government officials denied traveling by road. Anees Jillani covered entire circumstances and defined, "Prime Minister when traveling in Sindh prefers to go by air than by road. Payment of ransom for the hijacked victims by government bodies, high officials, feudal lords, and common man has become a routine affair there. Attacks on the army personnel and cantonments have given the whole situation a new

262 Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, p.129.

263 Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi, Politician And Parliamentarian: Selected Speeches, 1962-1990, p.92.

264 Ibid., p.413.

265 Rasul Bux Rais, Ethnic Politics in Sindh, H.N. Publishers, Karachi, 1997, p.34.

266 Ibid., p.35. 182

dramatic turn. The traditional image of dacoits is shattered by these attacks on the army because there are no financial incentives involved. A simple explanation of these attacks could be that there is some sort of insurgency”.267

According to Hussain Bakhsh Narejo, in such a situation, there was no uprising against the state. However, it was against the military government. The hatred feelings and sense of scarcity and deprivation among the Sindhi people against the military rule was there. So, they completely participated in the anti-military movement. No doubt some attacks on military personnel in Sindh happened. It was done by the dacoits because they showed that they are in position to attack on armed forces and also sent the message to the youth political workers that they would select the way of militancy for their rights. Some political workers also met dacoits and they tried to induce them that they participate in the movement but they did not answer and supposed that “politicians are not sincere with the people”.268

It was the pressure of MRD that Junaijo had been trying to give the jobs to the Sindhi people, particularly Sindhi speaking who played a basic role during the MRD in 1983, and also in struggle for the restoration of real democracy and of original shape of the Constitution of 1973. “Junaijo wanted to reduce the nationalist thinking in the people of Sindh through jobs for the unemployed youth and they became active in the nationalist politics”.269Movement for Restoration of Democracy of 1986 left many impacts on the politics of country, particularly in Sindh. After it, the popular party of Sindh; Pakistan Peoples Party withdrew from its anti-imperialist role. Benazeer Bhutto who was also described the conditions in her wall-less cage and called the book “Daughter of Destiny” in honor of Benazeer, openly condemned those workers who chanted the slogans against America. After it, Benazeer and other leadership of PPP said “Khuda Hafiz” to the resistant move and struggle and selected the way of compromising.270 The role of the Sindhi Waderaas and feudal lords proved

267 Anees Jillani, Advance Towards Democracy: The Pakistani Experience, p.128.

268 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), p.413.

269 Ibid., pp.413-414.

270 Ibid., p.414.

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that they were not honest to the democracy nor with the people. They only were trying to take share in the power structure. When Zia-ul-Haq’s government agreed to give them share in power structure, they made line to connect the government.271The leftist and the nationalist politics increased during those days.272 of Rasool Bakhsh Paleejo, Watan Dost Inqalaabi Party, and some small groups such as Sindh Dost Inqalaabi Party had successfully introduced themselves to the masses. When the leftist nationalists grew in the nationalist politics of Sindh, military administration felt it against their interest and tried to disperse them or use them according to their interest.273

The urban middle class of Sindh supported MQM, which selected the anti- Punjabi line and established close relations to Jeay Sindh Tahreek. So, military administration felt threat to their interest in Sindh and tried to generate racial and ethnic tension and disturbed the harmony of the people.274If the people of urban and rural Sindh had united themselves and moved against the government, it would have been very difficult for the government to suppress the movement. So before unity the government had succeeded to create the atmosphere in which the riots were started in the city of Karachi, first between the Muhajirs and Pashtoons and then Muhajirs and Punjabis. The sentiments of the people were diverted into ethnic riots. The Sindhi nationalist leader, Qadir Magsi said, “It was the trailer, actually government wanted to prepare and organize the Muhajirs and Punjabis against the Sindhees”.275 According to him, “It was proved true in 1987 when MQM occupied the local bodies of Karachi and Hyderabad and started the quarrels with Sindhees”.276

271 Rasul Bux Rais, Ethnic Politics in Sindh, p.35.

272 Surendra Singh, Politics of Regionalism in Pakistan: A Study of Sind Province, Kalinga Publications, New Delhi, 2003, p.115.

273 Ibid., p.116.

274 Ibid., p.117.

275 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition),p.414.

276 Ibid.,p.434.

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So it was the successful strategy of Zia-ul-Haq rule to divide the political parties on the ethnic basis. In this way he had successful to prevent the anti-army movement. Even the PPP student’s wing, Sindh Peoples Students’ Federation (SPSF) also got involved into ethnic riots.277 Zia-ul-Haq was greedy of power so he was against the popular government. He was also against the parliamentary and federal form of government. Therefore, he wanted to implement the presidential and unitary form of government, but he could not do it due to the pressure of the masses. When Junaijo tried to restore the status of the parliamentary government, Zia-ul-Haq broke up the Assemblies and dismissed the Junaijo government.278 Shahid Javed Burki quoted the words of Zia-ul-Haq as under:

It was mistaken on my part to have accepted the advice of some of my colleagues that a parliamentary system of some kind is the only political system that would work in Pakistan. I should have gone for a presidential form of government. After all, it is working in other countries. I am also not so sure whether a federation based on a four provinces is suitable for Pakistan. We should perhaps divide the country into twenty or so managerial units but have a unitary form of government at the center.279

It was clear from the above statement of Zia-ul-Haq that he was not in the support of Parliamentary Government and nor sustain Federal system of the state. The dissolution of the assemblies and notice of the government was the result of the differences between the handpicked civilian Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan Junaijo and the Army President Zia-ul-Haq. Though, Junaijo was his own choice and selection, he did not want to work as a puppet Prime Minister, was much interested in the traditional magnificence of his appointment, as he was in the public manifestation of the exercise of power. He tried to show that ‘he is a powerful and independent in

277 Muhammad Soaleh Korejo, A Testament of Sindh: Ethnic And Religious Extremism A Perspective, Oxford University Press, London, 2003, p.136.

278 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead,p.185.

279 Shahid javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77, Oxford University Press, London, 1988, p.267.

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his rule.280 It is shown from the declaration of Muhammad Ali Durrani, which was quoted by K.M. Arif in these lines:

In October 1986, Brigadier Muhammad Ali Durrani that was Military Secretary to the President was posted back to the army. When he made his farewell call on the Prime Minister Junaijo, he amazed him by saying; I am trying to run the country in accordance with the formation. If the President did not like this establishment, he could have promulgated similar to that of Sri Lanka.281

The seed of the differences grew even before taking the oath by Muhammad Khan Junaijo as Prime Minister. When Zia-ul-Haq called Junaijo and congratulated him on winning the elections of National Assembly seat and also declared that he selected him as next Prime Minister of the country. Zia-ul-Haq expected that when he would declare the name of Junaijo before him he would say thanks for it. But Junaijo did not say words of thanks to Zia-ul-Haq. After that he was mindful and was not happy on his selection.282 K.M. Arif narrated:

The President met Mr. Muhammad Khan Junaijo in his office in the President’s House at 8 PM on the same evening. The COS was also present. Warmly greeting Mr. Junaijo, General Zia-ul-Haq congratulated him on his election to the National Assembly and said ‘I have determined to suggest you as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The disclosure caused no surprise to Mr. Junaijo. The Peer Pagaara and the MNAs had already spilled the beans to him. Without the shadow of emotion appearing on his face, Junaijo heard Zia-ul-Haq in an offhand manner. Without expressing a word of thanks, he said unexpectedly that Mr. President, when do you plan to lift the Martial Law? Shocked at the lack of straightforward courtesy shown to him, General Zia-ul-Haq kept his cool and said casually Martial Law is now in your support. It will help you to settle down in your high scheduled time. I will lift it whenever you are in control of the situation. The relationship between

280 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead,p.186.

281 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.409.

282 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.188.

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the President and his nominated Prime Minister started on an icy note.283

It was the first gathering of Junaijo and President but it did not left good impression on President. The question about the lifting of Martial Law by Junaijo in his first meeting with Zia-ul-Haq created many questions in the mind of the President. Then in the session of the senate on July, 6 1985, Junaijo addressed to senate and said that: “in the presence of the Martial Law civilian government could not work properly, and we would not the party to prolong the Martial Law.”284Though the Martial Law was lifted on December 30, 1985, even then the President was powerful than the Prime Minister due to 8th amendment. Muhammad Khan Junaijo as a civilian designated Prime Minister wanted to hold authority on the government departments but it could not bear by the authoritarian President, Zia-ul-Haq. After it he watched the activities of Junaijo very keenly.285According to K.M. Arif, “Zia-ul-Haq-Junaijo honeymoon was shot lived. Zia-ul-Haq soon found power slipping from his grasp. Mr. Junaijo found himself politically hamstrung by the label of being the handpicked candidate of an oppressive ruler”.286

The civil and military relations were not always smooth under Junaijo. One retired general chose to response on the Prime Minister‘s remarks in his second budget speech in which he said “we will put Generals in Suzuki.”287 Prime Minister wanted to have full grip on government. Therefore, he took the measures in the civil as well as in the military affairs. Zia-ul-Haq could not bear his interference in the military affairs. Junaijo’s attempt to exert some control over military discipline and appointments was even more difficult for Zia-ul-Haq to swallow.288

During those days, the foreign office of the government was very important because of Afghan crisis and American aid. President wanted to control on the foreign

283 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.410.

284 Ibid., pp.410-411.

285 Ibid., p.411.

286 Ibid., p.467.

287 Ibid., p.412.

288 Ibid.,p.419.

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office and foreign policy. Prime Minister as head of the government was trying to control all over the government folios. So in that seesaw Prime Minister replaced foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqoub Khan. President felt excluded from foreign policy matters because Yaqoub Khan was known as a man of President. So on this issue the difference between the President and Prime Minister became sharp. After this President issue the statement to the Washington Post, “he effectively took charge of foreign policy, particularly the Afghan issue and became its principal spokesman, if not its architect”.289

Just after lifting the Martial Law in 1985, relations between the President and the Prime Minister turned into mistrust on each issue. Both tried to undermine each other, and the clash of personality started between the staff of the President and Prime Minster. Mushahid Hussain Sayed illustrated this situation as: “After the end of Martial Law in December 1985, battle over procedure and personnel started in earnest between the Prime Minister and President”.290

The replacement of Information Secretary, Lieutenant General Mujeeb Rehman, by Junaijo breeds more differences between them. At that time federal secretariat was in trouble. There were two authorities at a time. The employees of the secretariat were so confused, when two instructions reached to their table in different shapes and authorities. Due to that confusion they could not work in proper ways.291 K.M. Arif narrated it as that “Many federal secretaries complained that at a time they receive divergent orders directly from the President and the Prime Minister, which create problems for them”.292

It was also noted by Zia-ul-Haq that Benazeer criticized only on him not to Junaijo. “Round Table Conference” on Afghan crisis was convened by Junaijo in 1987. This conference increased the discrepancy between both of them. In this conference all the parties including PPP were invited. Benazeer Bhutto agreed to

289 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's politics: The Zia Years, p.199.

290 Ibid., p.200.

291 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.191.

292 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.411.

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attend the conference on the wording that “Zia-ul-Haq would not participate in the conference”. Prime Minister accepted it and Zia-ul-Haq ousted and was not invited. It was big shock for Zia-ul-Haq.293 Taken from account of Shahid Javed Burki who narrated it as:

The first major clash between the two centered on the question of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. General Zia-ul-Haq and the Inter Services Intelligence favored a military solution. They believed that only a military victory over Kabul would put power in the hands of the Mujahideen leaders supported by Pakistan. Junaijo was in favor of a negotiated settlement, arguing that the soviet willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan and had obtainable Pakistan with an opportunity that would be unconsidered to ignore.294

The differences pointed out during Round Table Conference, which was held to solve the Afghan crisis.295 Muhammad Waseem described it in these lines, “It is in this perspective that the growing tension between the President and the Prime Minister can be under stood. Ever since the latter’s initiative in holding the Round Table Conference with all political parties, largely by passing the President and the signing of the ‘Geneva Accord, the President felt increasingly insecure about his future”.296So, the contradiction increased day by day between the Army General and the civilian Prime Minister. During that cold tussle an American delegate came to audit the weapons, which were sent by American government for the Afghani Jehadi Organizations. Before audit an incident took place at Ojharri Camp on April 10, 1988, in which thousands of missiles flew all around in a radius of 10 miles, affecting the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad and causing deaths and serious injuries of hundreds of people.297

293 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, pp.193-194.

294 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq,p.312.

295 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.197.

296 Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985, p.124.

297 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.199.

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In the result one hundred people were killed and approximately 1100 were injured. The people of Rawalpindi and Islamabad were in trouble in the explosion of the Ojharri Camp. In this incident 7000 tons of arms and explosive were destroyed. Two days later two-member Enquiry Commission was formulated. Lieutenant General Imran-ullah Khan was the head of the Commission. They have to investigate the causes leading to the incident of the fire in the ammunition depot; to point out the security lapses and join the responsibility. It was also the responsibility of the Commission to advise the measures to prevent such kind of accidents in the future. Commission worked jointly with some military experts and technical persons. Finally, it submitted their report to government on April 22, 1988. The report of the Commission was not disclosed. Five member ministerial committee under the Chairmanship of the Defense Minister, Muhammad Aslam Khattak was also formulated to examine the report of the Commission. Qazi Abdul Majid Abid, Meer Ibrahim Baloch, Malik Naseem Ahmed Aheer and Rana Naeem Mahmood were the members of the Committee. “Some members of the ministerial committee wanted strict action against all those responsible for dereliction of duty including the policy makers. Akhtar Abdul Rehman who headed the ISI Directorate till March of 1987, and his successor Major General .298 Akhtar Abdul Rehman opposed every high level investigation and emphasis on the departmental investigation. Zia-ul-Haq’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sayed Rafaqat also said that General Akhtar opposed any high level inquiry.299 Zia-ul-Haq was not happy on the ministerial committee to examine the Imranullah report and further investigation. The President was not happy either and wished to file the Imran Report. So, after the Imran Report, Junaijo held Akhtar accountable to establish the bullets depot in the heavily populated area. So, the difference between President and Prime Minister further increased on the issue of the investigation of the Ojharri Camp incident. Muhammad Khan Junaijo said that the heavy responsibility of the accident goes to the Akhtar Abdul Rehman, because he established the depot of the weapons and kept it long time in the populated areas between the two cities. It was disclosed by the Junaijo that General Hamid Gul accepted the responsibility for the accident and had volunteered to be removed him

298 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition),pp.411-412.

299 Ibid., p.412.

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from service.300 Muhammad Khan Junaijo wanted to punish the persons who were responsible for the accident. In the light of the reports Prime Minister hold the responsibility on Akhtar Abdul Rehman. K. M. Arif wrote, “Zia-ul-Haq wanted to protect Akhtar and Hamid Gul. The period was situating for a showdown between the President and the Prime Minister”.301Muhammad Khan Junaijo did not like Akhtar and “talked to Zia-ul-Haq about replacing Akhtar”.302 The enquiry report of Ojharri gave the chance to Junaijo to take action against him. Akhtar Abdul Rehman, Director General of ISI was nominated as a main accused of the accident. He was very close to Zia-ul-Haq. On the other hand, Zia-ul-Haq felt the statement a threat from him, and decided to dismiss the Junaijo government.303

Safdar Mahmood noted the gulf between President and Prime Minister Junaijo in these words: “Their differences were fostered by policy conflict on such issue as the Geneva Accord on Afghanistan and Ojharri camp blast”.304 The dispute became serious matter between the Prime Minister and President, when it was decided by Junaijo that Federal Public Accounts Committee of National Assembly would also keep check on the military officials. It was not tolerated by the President as a Chief of Army Staff and military officials. The contradiction was arisen between the President and Prime Minister.305Muhammad Waseem quoted it as under:

The very principle of answerability of the civil and military bureaucracies to the public responsibility was suspected in the eyes of the President. For example in April 1988 the Federal Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly under the Chairmanship of Sahabzada Muhammad Ali Shah had submitted its report to the Prime Minister. It recommended a debate in the

300 Ibid., p.413.

301 Ibid., p.414.

302 Ibid.,417.

303 Ibid., pp.419-421.

304 Ṣafdar Mahmud, Pakistan: Political Roots And Development, 1947-1999, Oxford University Press, London, 2000, p.307.

305 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.415.

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parliament over the issue as well as its promotion in the press. The President found it all very disgusting. He grew increasingly intolerant of what he considered the system of bringing state functionaries into disrepute. Therefore, he decided to scrape not only the Junaijo Government but also the whole parliamentary framework.306

Zia-ul-Haq openly expressed his views against Junaijo and showed his abhorrence against him. In a private dinner at Army House on May 23, 1988, just six days before the knocked out Junaijo and the National Assembly, Zia-ul-Haq remarked to the guests “Have you noticed how arrogant Junaijo has become. He even walks and behaves like Bhutto”307. These remarks of the President showed his anger on Junaijo308. Eventually, the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved on May 29, 1988. During those days, Prime Minister Junaijo was on a visit of China. Before the return of Prime Minister, Zia-ul-Haq dissolved the National Assembly and dismissed the Junaijo government. While dismissing the Junaijo government, the President announced that “it had failed to keep law and order and execute Islam in the country. Later he also gave corruption and economic decline as reasons for his action against Junaijo”309.After dismissal of Junaijo government, Zia- ul-Haq addressed to the nation on May 30, 1988, and stated it as “The Prime Minister was compelled to succumb to unwholesome political pressure, which led to rampant corruption, nepotism and ill administration, finally leading to a complete breakdown of morality and law and order in the country”310. Muhammad Khan Junaijo did not challenge the dissolution of the Assemblies in the court nor went to the people. The politicians were divided on dissolution of the assemblies. Some supported and some criticized the decision. Benazeer Bhutto and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoei supported the decision of Zia-ul-Haq and demanded for the fresh elections in due time on party

306 Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985, pp.208-209.

307 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.415.

308 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.208.

309 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.416.

310 Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan; General Zia-ul-Haq's interviews To Foriegn Media, Official Documents, p.258.

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basis. Tufail Ahmed of Jamaat-e-Islami, who was very close to Zia-ul-Haq, said that it was time when the rate of the daily usage things was raised the government, lost its control on the administration. He predominantly indicates it in the Nationalist Conference known as ‘Sann Conference’, which was held in Sann District Dadu on May 20, 1988311.No doubt, there was no pageant or a demonstration was launched against the decision, but some fears became in the minds of Sindhees due to the dissolution of assemblies and discharge of the centralized and provincial governments. The Sindhi people felt that there was no place in the power structure for the Sindhees. They thought that their first elected Prime Minister was hanged and the second was dismissed and sent back to Sindh. Zia-ul-Haq dismissed the Junaijo government after the dissolution of the assemblies he selected the eight ministers in new caretaker government from the Junaijo cabinet. He also appointed Nawaz Sharif as caretaker Chief Minister of Punjab and Fazal-e-Haq as Chief Minister of KPK. In Sindh, the circumstances were entirely changed. He did not assign caretaker Chief Minister of the province, and the only Sindh province was without the Chief Minister. Zia-ul-Haq appointed General (Retired) Rahim-ud-Din as a Governor of the Sindh Province. He was non-Sindhi. The inferiority complex increased among the Sindhi people and hatred thought grew up in the province. These questions raised in the minds of the people that while the Chief Ministers were appointed in rest of the provinces, why not in Sindh?312.The Sindhi and Punjabi feudal lords and Waderaas once again were thrown out from the power construction. They tried to gain the confidence of the army administration to facilitate them in the new set up. A new race was brought up between them to change the political loyalties. This action of the General also went in the interest of the separatists and secessionists. They propagated that there was no place for the Sindh in the political structure. If any Sindhi is elected or selected he is totally dependent on the will of the army. While in the army there is no share of the Sindhees. Therefore, Zia-ul-Haq selected Junaijo and dismissed him313.The discriminative behavior also continued even after the general elections. All the Chief Ministers of the three provinces were selected from respective Assemblies.

311 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), p.416.

312 Ibid., pp.416-417.

313 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, pp.214-215.

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But, in Sindh, a non-elected member was selected as Chief Minister of the Province. After lifting Martial Law the civilian Governors were appointed in all the three provinces, but in Sindh the military Governor was not replaced. The same story was also repeated when the assemblies were dissolved. The concerned Chief Ministers were nominated in three provinces but Sindh was under the rule of Governor. So due to that and other injustice the nationalist sentiments prospered in the Province314.

In fact, this movement had weaken the rule of Zia-ul-Haq and he had been suffered from several crisis. His own designed non-party system had also been buried with his own hands due to unpopularity of public as well as his own conflicts with his so-called representatives of the public. So, he dismissed National Assembly and announced new elections.

314 Ibid., pp.215-216.

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Chapter 5

The End of Martial Law And The Beginning of Controlled Democracy

Through the elections of 1985, Zia-ul-Haq wanted to legalize his autocratic behavior. Therefore, firstly he introduced 8th Amendment and then after querying strong political powers along with having a status of army chief, he introduced controlled democracy in the country. The reasons of introducing this system were as follows:

1) In the referendum, people of the country followed the Movement for Restoration of Democracy and boycotted the referendum of 1984; it was the defeat of Zia-ul-Haq, who preferred the Non-Party elections.

2) Other major reason was the popular support of PPP for MRD and Zia-ul-Haq did not want PPP to come as force in the National Assembly.

3) Nonpolitical and non-committed people have become the members of the National Assembly.

Zia-ul-Haq favored the non-Party elections because he know very well that non-political and non-committed people would be easily managed as compare to the political or affiliated people. So, he wanted that the people who become the members of the assembly would not be the member of any party nor affiliated with political leaders. The Waderaas and several members of the feudal families contested the elections, and the majority of them were unknown in the politics. People did not response to the MRD’s appeal of the boycott, as they responded in the referendum. The turnout in the elections was about 44.7 per cent in Sindh and 59.4 per cent people of the Punjab were participated in the elections. In general, 52 per cent people casted their votes in these elections. The elections turn-out was really surprising for all the political groups, the military, the candidates and the opposition. No doubt that people

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casted the votes in the elections but they rejected Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime.1The majority of the ministers of his cabinet and the members of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) were lost their seats. Benazeer commented:

The voting was a resounding rejection of Martial Law and General Zia-ul- Haq’s policy of Islamization. Six out of his nine Cabinet Ministers who ran for the National Assembly were overpowered, as were many of his other associates. The candidates backed by the fundamentalist religious parties, only six out of sixty-one candidate of the Jamat-e-Islami won their seats. In contrast, candidates who had claimed connection with PPP in spite of our boycott did remarkably well, called winning fifty out of fifty two seats. 2

The elections were free and fair and government did not hamper. The main proof for it that majority of the ministers were defeated in the elections. Zia-ul-Haq Regime did not rigging in the elections because they already successful his policy that his main opposite party PPP and their allies were boycotted the elections. So there was no need Zia-ul-Haq to interfere in the elections. 3 The second reason was believe in regime of bullet and not ballot. Zia-ul-Haq regime only wanted a democratic cover, not democracy.4 Zia-ul-Haq and his friends were very happy about the result and turnout of the elections. Even major parties boycotted the elections and appealed to the people for boycott. People discouraged the appeal of the boycott and participated in the elections. Over twelve hundred candidates contested for 207 National Assembly Muslim seats5.The promise of lifting of the Martial Law after the elections was one of the main reasons of the participation of the people in the elections. People participated in the elections because they were against Martial Law and in favor of democracy. Elections were first step for democratic government, even on Non-Party basis. The

1 Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Greenwood Publishing, Westport, 2012, p.159.

2 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... (Urdu Edition), Pakistab Book Dipute, Lahore, 1988, p.423.

3 Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul-Haq, p.160.

4 Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, The University of Michigan, Michigun, 2004, p.219.

5 Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-Ul-Haq, p.161.

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convincing to voters by Candidates also played vital role in the participation. They used their personal, brotherly, religious and ethnic relations to convince the people to cast their vote. Some Waderaas bought the votes from the local chiefs of clans and the small landowners. It was one cause of turn-out in Sindh province. Haji Amir Bux Junaijo won the provincial seat from District Dadu by purchasing votes from the local influenced persons. An economist, Shahid Kardar also described that the major factor was the price in the rural Sindh for 20 or more votes Rs. 10,000, considering the extent of poverty, households which could deliver 20 votes, facing no real substitute choice, were prepared to sale their vote. It also eased the burden of the poverty. So the money also played a vital role in the turnout of 1985”6.The purchasing of votes was unenthusiastic mark of the non-party elections, which increased corruption in the country. The members who won the elections by purchasing the votes, they would use all means for their personal interests7. It proved when Junaijo government decided that development fund would be given to the elected members, and it was first time in the history of the country that development fund directly goes in the accounts of the assembly members. It was on the will and honesty of the members that they utilized the funds in proper way or not8. The landlords of Punjab participated in the elections themselves or put up the candidates on their own choice. The same position was in KPK, but it was changed in Sindh and Baluchistan. The tribal chiefs of Baluchistan were not more interested in the elections, and the landlord class of Sindh was divided into two groups. A large camp supported the line of the MRD, and other camp was trying to accommodate the proposed structure9. As the general elections of 1985 were on non-party basis, therefore, the political issues were not in the program of the elections. It left negative impact on the society, such as the election campaign was based on Baradrism as well as on local issue. So it created the ethnic as well as sectarian issues in the politics of the country10. Omar Nouman narrated that, “Tribe,

6 Shahid Kardar, The Gathering Economic Crisis And The Dwindling Options, Group 83, Islamabad, 1986, p.11.

7 Ibid., pp.11-12.

8 Ibid., p.12.

9 Jesse Russell, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq,pp.161-162.

10 Ibid., p.162. 197

race, cult and ethnicity were the factor that appeared to be serving or framers of reference for the voters in today’s electoral contest”11. The same remarks have been quoted by Dr. Tahir Amin about 1985 elections. He stated:

The most important consequence of the party less election has been that the political campaign predictable revolved around sectarian, ethnic and tribal sectarian problems in the absence of any program. Regime claimed the elections had one recommend taking forward the process of Islamization with the participation of the people. But it was not seen during the elections, majority of the candidate were talk about the local issues and convinced to the people on personal and ethnic and tribal relations.12

Rai Shakil Akhtar comments on the elections of 1985 as under:

Elections mainly concerned with local and common issues and rarely took up any bigger national issue. Islam, economy, Martial law, foreign affairs, etc. we’re not part of electoral campaigns. These elections became a reason of reducing national politics to municipal level13.

Mostly, all the scholars and social scientist are agreed with this point that the non-party elections left the harmful impact on the politics of country, particularly on the politics of Sindh province14.It was the impact of the party-less elections that ethnic politics increased and many ethnic groups became more powerful. MQM, PPI and Pushtoon Federation were the result of the elections. Benazeer Bhutto, a federalist politician, who believed in strong center comments: “The non-party elections held by the regime had furthered the country’s fragmentation”15. By banning political parties, the regime forced candidates to campaign not on a platform of political ideals, which

11 Omar Noman, The Political Economy of Pakistan, 1947-85, KPI, Islamabad, 1988, p.192.

12 Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic And International Factors,Institute of Poliy Studies, Islamabad, 1988, pp.218-219.

13 Rai Shakil Akhtar, Media, Religion And Politics In Pakistan, Oxford University Press, London, 2000, p.164.

14 Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead,p.187.

15 Salman Taseer, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bachchpan Se Takhtah-e-Daar Tak..... p.429.

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transcended ethnic and regional boundaries, but on the basis of individual identification like:

 Vote for me because I am a Shia like you

 Vote for me because I am a Punjabi like you, and

 Vote for me because I am Sindhi like you16

Dr. Tahir Amin wrote about it as under:

Opportunist local holders principally the land owning rural class emerged victorious in the elections and the regime was more than happy to make them a junior partner in the power game both at the center and in the provinces.17

As a result of non-party elections, the ethnic, regional as well as religious issues were increased in the country. It went in the interest of separatists, as well as in the interest of religious fundamentalists. The people of the country divided into clan, caste and sects. The political issues such as foreign policy, economic policy and the question of the integrity of the country went into wave. Members came into assemblies without political plan and agenda. Political inducement and dishonesty was increased as a result of non-party elections18.

Participation of Other Political Parties

As the General Elections of 1985 were non-party based, almost 1300 candidates contested these elections. Turnout was approximately 52.92 per cent. All the members of parliament cannot show their political affiliation therefore, all the 207 members were declared as independent candidates. There were 21 seats reserved for women from which 9 seats were reserved for minorities and total seats were 237.19

16 Ibid., p.430.

17 Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic And International Factors, p.220.

18 Ibid., p.219.

19 Rana Zia-ul-Haq, Jamhooriat: Tallwar Se Tez Tar...... (Urdu Edition),Usman Publishers, Bahawalpur, 1990, p.161.

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Before holding these elections, Zia-ul-Haq holds a referendum all over the country to legitimize his presidency. There was a question on which people had to vote either they like presidency of Zia-ul-Haq or not20. The question for referendum was:

Do you agree with the act of President General Zia-ul-Haq which he initiated for the implementation of Islamic laws according to Quran and Sunnah in Pakistan? Do you agree to continue this procedure and want to deliver political power to the real representatives of the people.21

This was a common question and no one can deny the need of Islamic laws. Therefore, if military government claimed that Zia got 96 per cent of votes from total registered votes, then it can be possible. After getting this so-called legitimization, Zia announced non-party elections in Pakistan for the basic purpose to remove the political influence of PPP and its allies. On the other hand, MRD decided not to participate in these elections. As this news spread, military administration started arresting the leadership of MRD22. As the mainstream political parties had boycotted these elections, Pakistan Muslim League, Jamat-e-islami and other members of Majlis-e-Shoora became happy to see an open ground. Candidates, affiliated with right wing political parties, participated in these elections as independent candidates. There was almost 50 per cent turnout23.Nine ministers of Zia’s cabinet also contested these elections but only three were succeeded to win. Jamat-e-Islami participated with full intenstion but it succeeded to win only six seats of the parliament. Most of the elected members of parliament were the previous members of Majlis-e-Shoora and some were belonged to Pakistan Muslim League and Jamat-e-islami24.

20 Ibid., p.162.

21 Ibid., p.162.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., p.163.

24 Ibid.

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Differences Between Zia-ul-Haq And Junaijo

Zia-ul-Haq was greedy of power so he was against the popular government. He was against the parliamentary and federal form of government. Therefore, he wanted to implement the presidential and unitary form of government. But he could not do it due to the pressure of the masses. When Junaijo tried to restore the status of the parliamentary government, Zia-ul-Haq dissolved the Assemblies and dismissed the Junaijo government25. In this regard Shahid Javed Burki quoted the words of Zia- ul-Haq as under:

It was mistake on my part to have accepted the advice of some of my colleagues that a parliamentary system of some kind is the only political system that would work in Pakistan. I should have gone for a presidential form of government. After all, it is working in other countries. I am also not so sure whether a federation based on a four provinces is suitable for Pakistan. We should perhaps divide the country into twenty or so administrative units but have a unitary form of government at the center26.

It was clear from the above statement of Zia-ul-Haq that he was neither in favor of Parliamentary form of Government nor supported the Federal system of state. The dissolution of the assemblies and dismissal of the government was the result of the differences between the handpicked civilian Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan Junaijo and the Army President, Zia-ul-Haq. Though Junaijo was his own choice and selection, he did not want to work as a puppet Prime Minister and was much interested in the ceremonial splendor of his appointment, as he was in the public manifestation of the exercise of power. He tried to show that he is a powerful and independent in his rule27. It is shown from the statement of Muhammad Ali Durrani, which was quoted by K.M. Arif as under:

25 Ibid., p.163.

26 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq, West View Press, Michigun, 1991, p.355.

27 Rana Zia-ul-Haq, Jamhooriat; Tallwar se Tez Tar...... (Urdu Edition),p.163.

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In October 1986, Brigadier Muhammad Ali Durrani, Military Secretary to the President, was posted back to the army. When he made his farewell call to the Prime Minister Junaijo, he surprised him by saying I am trying to run the country in accordance with the constitution. If the president did not like this constitution, he could have promulgated one similar to that of Sri Lanka.28

The seeds of the differences grew even before taking the oath by Muhammad Khan Junaijo as Prime Minister. When Zia-ul-Haq called Junaijo and congratulated him on winning the elections of National Assembly seat and also declared that he selected him as next Prime Minister of the country. Zia-ul-Haq expected that when he would declare the name of Junaijo before him he would say thanks for it. But Junaijo did not say words of thanks to Zia-ul-Haq. After that he became conscious and felt uneasy on his selection29. K.M. Arif narrated:

The President met Mr. Muhammad Khan Junaijo in his office in the President’s House at 8:00 PM on the same evening. The Chief of Army Staff was also present. Warmly greeting Mr.Junaijo, General Zia-ul-Haq congratulated him on his election to the National Assembly and said, I have decided to nominate you as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The revelation caused no surprise to Mr. Junaijo. The Peer Pagaaro and the MNAs had already spilled the beans to him. Without the silhouette of emotion appearing on his face, Junaijo heard General Mhammad Zia-ul-Haq in an unconcerned manner. Without expressing a word of thanks, he said unexpectedly, Mr. President, when do you plan to lift the Martial Law? This was a shocked question for General Zia-ul-Haq. He kept himself cool and said casually, Martial Law is now in your support. It will help you to settle down in your high appointment. I will lift it whenever you are in control of the situation. The relationship between the President and his nominated Prime Minister started on an icy note.30

28 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition), Dost Publishing, Lahore, 1996, p.418.

29 Rana Zia-ul-Haq, Jamhooriat; Tallwar se Tez Tar...... (Urdu Edition),p.164.

30 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition),p.420.

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It was the earliest meeting of Junaijo and President but it left not good impression on President. The question about the lifting of Martial Law by Junaijo in his first meeting with Zia-ul-Haq created many questions in the mind of the President. Then during the session of the senate on July 6, 1985, Junaijo addressed the house and said that “In the presence of the Martial Law, civilian government could not work properly, and we would not be the party to extend the Martial Law”31.

Although, the Martial Law was lifted on December 30, 1985, even then the President was powerful than the Prime Minister due to 8th Amendment in the constitution of 1973. Muhammad Khan Junaijo as a civilian elected Prime Minister wanted to hold power on the government but it could not be tolerated by a dictatorial President, Zia-ul-Haq. After it he started watching the activities of Junaijo very eagerly32.According to K.M. Arif:

The General Zia-ul-Haq-Junaijo honeymoon was shot lived. General Zia-ul- Haq soon found power slipping from his grasp. Mr. Junaijo found himself politically hamstrung by the label of being the handpicked nominee of an autocratic ruler.33

During those days, the foreign office of the government was very significant because of Afghan crisis and American aid. President wanted to control the foreign office and foreign policy. Prime Minister as head of the government was trying to control all the government folios. So in that seesaw Prime Minister replaced foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqoub Khan. President felt excluded from foreign policy matters because Yakub Khan was known as a man of President. So, on this issue, the difference between President and Prime Minister became sharp. After this, President issued a statement to Washington Post, “he effectively took charge of foreign policy, particularly the Afghan issue and became its principal spokesman, if not its architect”34.

31 Rana Zia-ul-Haq, Jamhooriat; Tallwar se Tez Tar...... (Urdu Edition),p.164.

32 Ibid.

33 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition),p.421.

34 Rana Zia-ul-Haq, Jamhooriat; Tallwar se Tez Tar...... (Urdu Edition),p.165. 203

Just after lifting the Martial Law in 1985, relations between the President and Prime Minister turned into mistrust on each issue. Both tried to undermine each other. So the clash of personality started between the staff of the President and Prime Minster. Mushahid Husain Sayyed described this situation as: “After the end of Martial Law in December 1985, battle over protocol and personnel started in earnest between the Prime Minister and President”35.The replacement of Information Secretary, Lieutenant General Mujeeb Rahman by Junaijo grew more differences between them. At that time, federal secretariat was in trouble. There were two authorities at a time. The employees of the secretariat were so confused, when two instructions reached to their table in different shapes and authorities. Due to that confusion they could not work in proper ways. K.M. Arif narrated it as “many federal secretaries complained that at a time they receive divergent orders directly from the President and the Prime Minister, which create problems for them”36.It was also noted by Zia-ul-Haq that Benazeer was criticizing him not to Junaijo. “Round Table Conference” on Afghan crisis was convened by Junaijo in 1987, which increased the differences between both of them. In this conference all the parties including PPP were invited. Benazeer Bhutto agreed to attend the conference on the wording that “Zia-ul-Haq would not participate in the conference”. Prime Minister accepted it and Zia-ul-Haq was not invited. It was a big shock for Zia-ul-Haq37. Shahid Javed Burki narrated it as:

The first major conflict between the two centered on the question of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. General Zia-ul-Haq and the Inter Services Intelligence favored a military solution. They believed that only a military victory over Kabul would put power in the hands of the Mujahideen leaders supported by Pakistan. Junaijo was in favour of a negotiated settlement, arguing that the soviet willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan and had presented Pakistan with an opportunity that would be imprudent to ignore.38

35 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan's politics: The Zia years, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1990, p.390.

36 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition),p.423.

37 Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead,pp.173-174.

38 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq,pp.263-264.

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The differences became sharp on Round Table Conference, which was held to solve the Afghan crisis39. Muhammad Waseem described it in these lines:

It is in this perspective that the growing tension between the President and the Prime Minister can be under stood. Ever since the latter’s initiative in holding the Round Table Conference with all political parties largely by passing the President and the signing of the ‘Geneva Accord, the President felt increasingly insecure about his future.40.

So, the disagreement increased day by day between the Army General and the civilian Prime Minister41. On the other hand, during that cold tussle, an American delegate came to audit the weapons, which were sent by American government for the Afghan Militant Organizations. Before audit an incident took place at Ojharri Camp on April 10, 1988 in which thousands of missiles and projectiles flew all around in a radius of approximately 10 miles, affecting the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad and causing deaths and serious injuries to hundreds of people42.

As a result, almost one hundred people were killed and about 1100 were injured. The people of Rawalpindi and Islamabad were in trouble in the explosion of the Ojharri Camp. Regarding these measures against the responsible persons of the Ojhari camp incident, Zia-ul-Haq had kept a gulf of differences with Muhammad Khan Junaijo43. Zia-ul-Haq showed his harsh behavior against the demands of inquiry by the Muhammad Khan Junaijo and expressed his opinion during a private dinner and said that Junaijo is acting as Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto44.So, on May 29, 1988, he dissolved the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies. After dismissal of Junaijo government, Zia-ul-Haq addressed to the nation on May 30, 1988, and stated that Junaio had been failed in implementation of Islamic laws as well as to maintain the

39 Rana Zia-ul-Haq, Jamhooriat; Tallwar se Tez Tar...... (Urdu Edition),p.165.

40 Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985, Vanguard, London, 1987, p.186.

41 Rana Zia-ul-Haq, Jamhooriat; Tallwar Se Tez Tar....., p.166.

42 Ibid., pp.166-167.

43 Ibid., p.167.

44 Ibid., p.168.

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situation of law and order. Muhammad Khan Junaijo did not challenge the dissolution of the Assemblies in the court nor went to the people. The politicians were divided on dissolution of the Assemblies. Some supported and some criticized the decision. Benazeer Bhutto and supported the decision of Zia- ul-Haq and demanded for the fresh elections in due time on party basis45. Feudal lords were, once again, supporting the decision of Zia-ul-haq because they want to become the part of power structure. Caretaker chief ministers, appointed by Zia-ul-Haq were also following his policy and working as his right hand. But, his discriminative attitude towards Sindhess had been exposed to them and they started agitation against Zia-ul-haq46.

End of Zia-ul-Haq Regime And The Elections of 1988

Zia-ul-Haq dissolved the National Assembly on May 29, 1988, and argued that Junaijo Government had been failed to maintain law and order situation, implementation of Islamic laws and involved in corruption. Zia-ul-Haq promised for new elections within 90 days. Moreover, Zia once again declared that up-coming elections will be on non-party bases. But, sudden death of Zia-ul-Haq in plane crash near Bahawalpur, turned the political scenario of Pakistan. Elections were held on November 16, 1988, but these were on party bases47. There were now two mainstream parties after the end of Zia regime. At one end, there was Pakistan People’s Party which was led by Benazeer Bhutto while on the other hand; there was an alliance of rightist political parties which was led by Nawaz Shareef. This alliance had adopted a name of “Islami Jamhoori Itehad” or Islamic Democratic Alliance. Nawaz Shareef contested this election from Lahore while Benazeer contested this election from Larkana. Pakistan People’s Party won 94 seats of National Assembly while Islamic Democratic Alliance got 55 seats. Overall, Pakistan People’s Party got 7,488,934 votes while Islamic Democratic Alliance got 5,883,298 votes. Turnout was 37.6 per cent in favor of Pakistan People’s Party while 29.6 per cent in favor of Islamic

45 Ibid., p.168.

46 Ibid., pp.168-169.

47 Ibid., p.170.

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Democratic Alliance48.Although Nawaz Shareef tried a lot for putting pressure on President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to nominate him as prime minister. He claimed that he had a simple majority while acquiring support of independent candidates and members of MQM. But, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan observed carefully and finally, he nominated Benazeer Bhutto as a Prime Minister of Pakistan on December 4, 1988. She was a first female Prime Minister of a Muslim country49.Other political parties also participated in these elections from which Pakistan Awami Itehad got 3 seats, 2 seats, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (Fazlur Rahman Group) 7 seats, National People’s Party (Khar) one seat, Pakistan Democratic Party one seat, Balochistan National Alliance two seats, Jamiat ulama-e-Islam (Darkhasti Group) got one seat and independent candidates got 40 seats in the National Assembly. With this electoral process, Parliament has been designed according to party based political system. Even, constitution existed still on the basis of Zia’s amendments and political system of Pakistan was still semi-presidential but now, Martial Law had been ended and elected government has been installed. Scholars say that this was a sacrificed travelling of Pakistan People’s Party from its 2nd democratic period to 3rd democratic period which faces blood sheds and crucial circumstances50.With the death of Zia-ul- haq, his dictatorial rule had officially been ended but his amendments in the constitution were remained present and system was remained semi-presidential. People of Pakistan were happy to see their own representatives in the National and Provincial Assemblies. Zia had been failed to satisfy people of Pakistan through his own so-called Islamization and non-party system. So, he was struggling for satisfying Pakistani people with announcing new elections but his life did not permit him to rule more on Pakistan and he had been died in plane crash. The basic objective of MRD had been fulfilled with the announcement of party based elections after Zia’s death. Pakistan People’s party won these elections and Benazeer became the female prime minister of Pakistan and it was a first instance all over the Muslim world.

48 Report on the General Elections, 1988, Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1990.

49 Nafisa Hoodbhoy, Aboard The Democracy Train: A Journey Through Pakistan's Last Decade of Military Rule, Anthem Press, London, 2011, p.38.

50 Ibid., p.39.

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Chapter 6

Conclusion

Pakistan, since its emergence, was facing administrative problems in its both wings. Although, Quiad-e-Azam and his close allies had qualitative abilities but after them, it was exposed that Muslim League has become a self interest group. This had been divided in almost 14 sub-groups and each group was trying to defeat others. Even, in the life of Jinnah, he faced criticism in both the wings, after the making of Pakistan. A problem of declaring Urdu as an official language was a big challenge for Muslim league in East Bengal (later East Pakistan). Similarly, the affiliation with other states like Hyderabad Deccan, Junagarh, Kashmir and Manawadar was also a problem because the colonial military of Pakistan had been refused to obey Jinnah’s order regarding attacking on Kashmir. Army chief of that time argued that Jinnah is governor general and, therefore, he is an appointee of British Queen. So, he is an obedient for direct order of British Queen regarding attack on Kashmir.

After the death of Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan faced bravely several administrative problems as well as politicization from bureaucracy of that time. At the time of presenting Objectives Resolution in the First Constituent Assembly on March 12, 1949, he faced a huge criticism from all those people who were claiming that Jinnah was a supporter of secular state but this effort is making Pakistan a theocratic state. After the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan in Rawalpindi, KhawajaNazim-ud- Din became Prime Minister of Pakistan. This was the phase when conflict for getting strong political power started in Pakistan. Newly appointed Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad was a bureaucrat and at several occasions he tried to counter the policies of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din. Firstly, he dismissed the government of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din and then during the government of Muhammad Ali Bogra, to observe the Bogra Formula, he dissolved first constituent assembly as well. At that time, politicization of judiciary had been opposed in favoring the act of dissolving first constituent assembly by governor general, Ghulam Muhammad through doctrine of necessity.

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At last second constituent assembly succeeded to make new constitution for the country, implemented on March 23, 1956. This constitution was remained implemented up till October 7, 19958. It was abrogated by Ayub Khan with the orders of Iskandar Mirza, president of the country at that time. The role of Ayub Khan was started since 1954, when he became Defense minister along with chief of army staff. This position facilitated him to strengthen his status in the politics of Pakistan. After imposing Martial Law in the country, firstly, he established a judicial committee which has a work of observing public opinion for making new constitution. But at last, without considering public opinion, he designed a new constitution under the supervision of his shadow cabinet and with the consultation of his subordinate governors of East and West Pakistan; he implemented this new constitution through a presidential order. On June 2, 1962, this newly constitution had been enforced. Another reforming act of Ayub Khan was to introduced his system of Basic Democracy on May 1, 1959 but soon during the election of president, this secret was exposed that the BD members were in fact elected as an electoral college for president. Even Fatima Jinnah participated in the presidential election against Ayub Khan but due to politicization of BD members, he became president.

Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was a foreign minister in the cabinet of Ayub Khan. Durng his ministry, Pakistan resolved his border disputes with China as well as Pakistan’s relations with Soviet Union were under consideration. But on Tashkent declaration, after the war of 1965, he resigned from the cabinet of Ayub Khan and formed his own political party, named Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

This was a starting of PPP when it initiated its policies against the policies of Ayub Khan. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was prisoned for this move. On the other hand, Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman who was a leader of Awami League and supported Fatima Jinnah in East Pakistan during the elections of presidency in 1965, presented his six points which got popularity in East Pakistan. Due to massive protest against Ayub Khan, he resigned from presidency and invited Chief of Army Staff, Yahya Khan for controlling the government. In fact, Ayub Khan buried in his own constitution, with his hands and did not shift the political power to the speaker of National Assembly. Yahya Khan firstly, announced Legal Framework Order through which he restored

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the provinces of Pakistan as well as announced first general elections all over the country.

Election campaign had been started in all the five provinces of Pakistan. Awami League had acquired popularity in East Pakistan, while PPP was famous in Punjab and Sindh provinces. On the other hand, KPK and Balochistan were under the political influence of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (Hazarvi group) and National Awami Party. Results were the same as the popularity of these poltical parties. Although, Awami League got majority in National Assembly but PPP got seats from Punjab and Sindh. Now, the conflict had been generated among these political parties regarding shifting of power. Even, once Yahya Khan announced that the Mujeeb-ur-Rehman will be the new prime minister of Pakistan, but PPP opposed this announcement and started protest all over the Sindh province. PPP started agitation against this decision and initiated civil disobedience in Sindh. As a result, Yahya Khan did not call the session of National Assembly on the demand of Awami League. This decision was perceived as exploitation of rights by Awami League and on March 23, 1971, Mujeeb-ur-Rehman waved the flag of Begladesh. This action was considered mutiny against the soverignity of Pakistan. Military started operation against Awami League on March 25, 1971, and Mujeeb-ur-Rehman arrested and prisoned in Faisalabad central jail. Civil war had been started in entire East Pakistan. Thousands of Bengali people were migerating towards West Bengal where India provided training against Pakistan Army and sending them back to East Pakistan for fighting against it. This war was continued and in November, India directly attacked on East Pakistan. A regular war among Pakistan and India had been started due to lack of air link and civil disobedience, Pakistan Army with 93,000 soldiers forced to surrender, at Paltan ground in front of Indian Army on December 16, 1971, and East Pakistan became Bangladesh.

Yahya Khan lost its control over the government and resigned on December 20, 1971, and transferred all the political powers to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Now, Bhutto had become first Civilian Martial Law Administrator as well as President of Pakistan. This was a starting of Bhutto rule which was on three phases:

 As a Civilian Martial Law Administrator and President (1970-73).

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 As a Prime Minister of Pakistan (1973-76).  As a Prime Minister of Pakistan (1976-77), which ended with the implementation of third Marial Law, imposed by Zia-ul-Haq on July 5, 1977.

During this period, he performed several magnificent acts as well as introduced reforms in socio-political sectors of Pakistan. He sought to consolidate and strengthen PPP among the people of Pakistan, including rural and urban areas of the country. F. Rehman has written that Pakistan people party supported the poor by land and labour reforms and with the nationalization of industries, financial institutions and schools. Such reforms were condemned by the leftist groups associated with PPP who were already dissatisfied by the opportunist entry of landlords into its rank. At the same time the reforms created powerful enemies among the propertied classes. The economics of the country has already suffered serious setback at the hand of worldwide inflationary pressure generated by the 1973 Arab-Israel war. The devaluation of the rupee on May 11, 1972, stoked infiantiary pressures. Dependence on foreign aid and from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), to ride over the deteriorating balance of payments situations from 1974 to onwards, was a mixed blessing as aid, also found its way into the pockets of the regime’s Islamic opponents. For a common man the rhetoric of egalitarianism sounded mere singly hollow when confronted with annual price rises twenty per cent.

Bhutto, during 1970 elections campaign, had called for the removal of the remaining of vestiges of feudalism. The land reforms which he introduced two years later were certainly radical than Ayub’s Land Reforms. Craig Baxter added that maximum land ceilings were reduced to 150 acres of irrigated land and 300 acres of un-irrigated land, orchards and stud, livestock and forms were brought under the tax system and it was gigantic step indeed. On the other hand, Bhutto’s law reforms efforts were not well articulated and by and large they were ill conceived though they were well intentioned. As in 1959, only a limited amount of land was ultimately made available for redistribution. This consisted of even poor quality land than before as the absence of compensation predictably encouraged and reinforced owners to retain their most fertile holding.

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The Bhutto Reforms suffered from irregularities in their implementation as the Land Reforms of 1959. In numerous instances the landless were made owners if the rescued areas in name only or fictitious transfers were entered. Ironically, the reforms, rather than signaling a suit in the balance of power in favor of talents, encouraged Punjabi land lords to enter the PPP’s ranks in order to safeguard their position. The success with which large number of land lords concealed their lands as much to official patronage as administrative inefficiency. Craig Baxter had pointed out that the remarkable ability of the leading land lords families to accommodate themselves to successive regimes. Despite his popular slogan Bhutto liberally dispensed PPP election tickets to the land lords in 1977. Those people who suffered a great deal at the hands of Bhutto under the Land Reform Legislation almost invariably came from politically opposing families. To compensate the earlier failure Bhutto announced most severe and string out land reforms on the eve of the 1977 elections, ceilings were lowered to 100 acres of irrigated land and 200 acres of an un-irrigated land. The loopholes of defining land owner ship in the form of ten years interest leaving bonds. The PPP also announced in January 1973, that land revenue would be replaced by agricultural income tax revenues and reduce tax envision by individual whose wealth in reality urban rather than rural based. These measures were suspended with the introduction of Martial Law on July 5, 1977.

Similarly, in January 1972, Bhutto government introduced the nationalization of over thirty large firms in the basic industries. These measures which kept the promise of PPP manifesto undertaking was intended to eliminate once for all poverty and discrimination in Pakistan. In reality it was more important in clipping the wings of the twenty two families than in achieving the later goal, as the heavy industrial sector did not possess a dominating economic influence. The subsequent mismanagement of these newly nationalized industries by the board of management chaired by Dr. Mubashir Hassan, not only depressed production but also weakened the standing of leftist groups in the PPP. Two months later nationalization was extended to the financial sector with the takeover of the life insurance companies. During the following November the government setup a state life insurance corporation of Pakistan. The next burst of nationalization took place which involved ghee industry quite contrary to previous measures, this affected the small industry

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owner who had supported the PPP in 1970. It was justified by the profiteering which had occurred in the wake of sever monsoon flooding. The confidence of small businessman in the regime was further undermined by the subsequent nationalization in July 1976, of the rice husking and cotton trading industries. Significantly, small traders and merchants were at the forefront of the 1977, anti-Bhutto movement. After beginning of 1974, for the people of Pakistan, Bhutto had announced the nationalization of all privately waned banks at the beginning of 1974. Indra Ghandi motivated by similar popular ideas and had adopted this policy. The nationalization of the colleges was introduced in September 1972. No provision for compensation was provided for the owners of colleges and schools. There was opposition to the policy owner of the institutions opposed this forcefully. This policy was also opposed from missionary run institutions which traditionally maintained high academic standard and they were afraid that standard would fall in the absence of sufficient support deteriorating educational standard was indeed important factor which encouraged urban middle class opposition to the government in 1977. Similarly, labor reforms, support from the poor groups did not outweigh the opposition from the personal and vested interests which government trader policies generated. However, nationalization policy was accompanied by the provision of free education for children up to the age of 13, it was a significant achievement but the goal of universal education still was not realized while poor parents no longer had to afford fees, there was still need of their children labour. Added to this there was cultural resistance to sending girls to the schools in more consecrated rural areas. Enrolment rates consequently did not improve dramatically but the government stress on educational development continued to win support even from its opponents. By and large nationalization policy was not supported by the majority of trade owner of the schools and colleges and they develop deep hate and feelings of revenge against Bhutto. They were waiting for the time opportunity to seek revenge from Bhutto, and anti-Bhutto movement provide chance to over through Bhutto, as these people were on the forefront against him.

Zia-ul-Haq had designed long planning to inflict the Martial Law as he became Chief of the Army Staff in 1976. On numerous occasions, he purposely covered intelligence information and tried to misguide Bhutto on various political affairs. As a result, all the opposition parties were demanding overthrow of Bhutto’s

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government. When political and civil disorder was intensified, it had been converted into massive unrest. Bhutto on the advice of General Zia-ul-Haq imposed Martial Law in the major cities of country including Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad. Though, a negotiation agreement among Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and opposition was eventually reported. The negotiating theory was generated next day after the showing off armed rally by the workers of PPP but Zia-ul-Haq had been planned the Martial Law carefully, because he knew that Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto had huge links in the intelligence services of Pakistan armed forces and have links with several military high ranking officers. Chief of Air Staff, General Muhammad Zulfaqar Ali Khan and Major General Tajamul Husain Malik who was GOC of 23rd Mountain Division, Major General Nasirullah Baber, DGMO (Directorate General for the Military Intelligence) and Vice-Admiral Syed Muhammad Ahsan, were considered to be loyal with Bhutto. In the meantime, one intelligence unit and the army formations were stationed in the Prime minister secretariat whose purpose was to keep an eye on Bhutto's activities and movements, tapping phone calls and also keeping a record of invitees in the Prime Minister's secretariat. General K.M. Arif who was the closest ally of Zia-ul- Haq, had tried to get together with Bhutto in different attempts, but such efforts were disillusioned by Zia-ul-Haq. Finally, on April 5, 1977, General Arif succeeded in having meeting with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto behind closed doors, enlightening the scheme against him. But, Bhutto remained not to persuade this and still unimpressed, reportedly asking that how his protégé, Zia-ul-Haq could do such unconstitutional acts against him. Therefore, Bhutto dismissed General K.M. Arif later due to conveying him such “wrong” information.

Due to showing off this intelligence information, Zia-ul-Haq clandestinely contracted with the British active duty SAS armed officers to continue a staff course for the Army human resources, while at the same time Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Muhammad Shareef silently removed naval personnel loyal to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and his government since the starting of his ranked post. Zia-ul-Haq ordered Bhutto's trustworthy officers to go to a staff and command course and none was allowed to depart the course until midnight. In the meantime, Zia-ul-Haq with his close military officers as well as Muhammad Shareef (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee at that time) arranged the coup in the evening of July 5, 1977. So, before

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the declaration of any accord or agreement, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and other members of his cabinet were under arrest by the troops of Military Police on the order of Zia-ul- Haq in the evening. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto tried to call Zia-ul-Haq but all telephone lines had been disconnected. One army officer came in the Prime minister secretariat and arrested Bhutto. After realizing that warnings of General K.M. Arif were not hoax, he was listen from that military officer that he was sorry but has been forced to perform this unpleasant task of arresting him.

Zia-ul-Haq and his military administration portrayed the Martial Law as an "impulsive reply to difficult circumstances" but his reaction was entirely contradictory. Though, during the rule of Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of Army Staff at that time, Khalid Mahmood Arif contradicted Zia-ul-Haq's this statement when K.M. Arif noted that the Martial Law had already been structured, and the senior ranked leadership of Pakistan Army had solid information. Therefore, he met with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto on urgent situation, stressing and trying to urging Bhutto to rush discussions with the opposition. According to K.M. Arif and several other independent experts, accounts, the discussion had not been broken down even though the Martial Law was designed. Zia-ul-Haq further argued that Operation Fair Play against Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto had been demanded by the outlook of a civil disobedience and Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was making a plan to distribute weapons among his supporters. But, K.M. Arif strongly rejected Zia-ul-Haq's explanations on Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto, and said that there was no proof that weapons were recovered or found at any of the political party's election office, the military administration in fact, did not put on trial Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto on the accuse of preparing planning of civil war.

Immediately, Muhammad Shareef, the Chief of Naval Staff at that time, announced his support with other navy strong officers for Zia-ul-Haq and his military administration. But Muhammad Zulfakar Ali Khan, the Chief of Air Staff at that time, remains unsupported, whereas, Muhammad Shareef, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, remains neutral and he noiselessly expressed his mental support to the Prime minister, Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. Zia-ul-Haq, in 1978, pressured President Fazal Elahi Chaudhary to hire General as Chief of Air Staff and in 1979, Admiral Karamat Niazi hired as Chief of Naval Staff. On Zia-ul-Haq's advice, President Fazal Ellahi Chaudhary appointed Admiral Muhammad Shareef as the 215

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and principal military adviser for overlooking all the affairs of inter-services including Chiefs of the Staff of respected forces. The Chiefs of Army, Navy, and the Air Force, in 1979, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff legalized the Martial Law as constitutional and lawful under the war- torn conditions, promised their support in the favor of Zia-ul-Haq as well.

After arrogant power as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Zia-ul-Haq soon appeared on national television and promised to hold new free and fair parliamentary elections within next 90 days and to shift the political powers to the civilian representatives. He also said that the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan had not been abrogated but for the time being, it has been suspended. Zia-ul-Haq did not reliance on the civilian organizations and institutions, and legislators ensured him that his stay is necessary for the country's integrity and sovereignty. Therefore, in October 1977, he declared the delay of electoral program and decided to initiate an accountability procedure for the politicians. On national television, Zia-ul-Haq strongly defended his policy for delaying the elections and insisted that "inspection of political leaders who had involved in misconduct in their past ruling eras". As a result, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) adopted its strategy of "retribution first, elections later". Zia-ul-Haq's strategy severely spoiled his trustworthiness domestically and internationally. He several times broke promises. Another cause was that Zia-ul-Haq extensively assumed that once out of power the mass of PPP protests and rallies puff up and an improved performance in up-coming elections was achievable. This fear led to demand for deferment of elections by the right-wing Islamist parties and groups as well as left-wing socialist minded people and parties, who were previously allied with Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto but displaced by him in the first place. Zia-ul-Haq transmitted one of the intelligence unit, known as Political Wing of ISI and sending Brigadier General Tafazzul Husain Siddiqi, to Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's native Province of Sindh, to evaluate whether people would agree to Martial Law. The Political Wing of ISI also contacted with several right-wing Islamist political parties and groups, and also several conservatives regarding promising an election, and offering power sharing formula with PNA the government with Zia-ul-Haq. He successfully divided and alienated the secular political parties and groups from right-

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wing Islamist groups, parties and several conservatives, and afterward washed out each member of secular parties.

Disqualification Tribunal was established and several politicians who had been members of parliament were alleged with misconduct and banned from participating in political activities at any stage for the next seven years. A white paper manuscript was published the military administration which was highlighting the reasons of dismissing Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto’s government. It is reported by senior military officers that when Zia-ul-Haq met with federal secretaries for the 1st time as leader of the country after military coup, he stated that: "He does not acquire the legitimacy of Liaqat Ali Khan, personality of Ayub Khan or charisma of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto. It can be analyzed who have its market.1"

Nussrat Bhutto who was the wife of the dismissed Prime Minister, filed a suit against Zia-ul-Haq's arrival into politics, challenging the soundness of the July 1977 military rule. The Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled, which later declared as the Doctrine of Necessity (not like the 1954 Doctrine of necessity but politicization of judiciary as happened previous in 1954), that the seriously unstable political circumstances of the time, Zia-ul-Haq's overthrowing of the Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto government was lawful on the grounds of requirement. The ruling tightened the general's hold of the military rule. When Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto appeared face-to-face to argue his petition in the Supreme Court, he almost affirmed his agreement with the judges, presented his views about unconstitutionally imposed military government and its legitimization from the judiciary.

Despite the discharging of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto government, President Fazal Elahi Chaudhary was persuaded to carry on in office as a nominal head of the state. After completing his tenure, Zia-ul-Haq insisted to acquire the office of Presidency. So, Fazal Elahi Chaudhary resigned and Zia-ul-Haq took the office of President of Pakistan on September 16, 1978. Thus, his place was covered as the undisputed monarch of the country. Till the next six years, Zia-ul-Haq issued numerous agreements which amended the constitution and significantly expanded his political

1 Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, The University of Michigan, Michigun, 2004, p.189.

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powers. Most considerably, the Revival of Constitution of 1973 Order settled Zia-ul- Haq the authority to dissolve the National Assembly at will. According to Aftab Qazi and Roedaad Khan:

General Zia-ul-Haq reviled Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and had used unsuitable language and verbal abuse to describe Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto and his other colleagues. On the 4th of April 1979, the ex-elected Prime Minister Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was hanged, after the Supreme Court sustained the death punishment as had been passed by the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court ruled with four to three judges in favor of death punishment. The Lahore High Court had given him the death punishment on accuses of the assassination of the father of Ahmad Raza Kasuri, a nonconformist politician of Pakistan People’s Party. Despite a lot of appeals of mercy from international leaders requesting General Zia-ul-Haq to convert Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's death punishment, but Zia-ul-Haq dismissed all the appeals and upheld the death punishment. The hanging of democratically an elected Prime Minister by a military ruler was condemned worldwide and by the lawyers and jurists across the Pakistan. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's trial was decidedly controversial as well2.

Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's final personal manifestation and utterances in the Supreme Court were not the long defense of his behavior; he also made a number of matters clear in front of judiciary. He also mentioned the word "heir" for his son Meer Murtaza Bhutto. He said some observations which indicated that he has views according to the Sunni sect of Islam, though he was considered Shia. He also efficiently directed doubt on the dependability of key witnesses against him, for example Masud Mehmood who was the trained lawyer from U.K. and was not a police officer or Federal Security Force (FSF) chief. He talked about repeatedly Lahori and Ahmedi connection of Masud Mehmood in his witness. He frequently brought the question of his mistreatment in the death cell. Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto made it plentifully clear even ultimately he wanted either freedom from prison or death, not something in between of it, and appreciated Ghulam Mustafa Khar and thanks to his lawyer Yahya Bakhtiar.

2 Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.193.

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Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's another lawyer Abdul Hafeez Peerzada filed an appeal for the releasing of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's associate Mubashir Hassan and Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto himself. The Supreme Court fulfilled that Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto's execution can be valued by the President and Mubashir Hassan's case is being covenanted by the Military Justice Court led by General Zia-ul-Haq; therefore, the civilian courts have no authority over hearing this petition. Abdul Hafeez Peerzada submitted the appeal to Chief of Army Staff Directorate but Zia-ul-Haq claimed that the request application had been missed. Therefore, Zia-ul-Haq upheld the punishment and Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was executed on April 4, 1979. Horrified and disturbed Peerzada left Pakistan for United Kingdom and did not return to Pakistan until the restoration of democracy in 1988. Before 2000, Pakistani media did not published this news that the application had been found in the record section called Directorate General for the Military History, at the Generals Combatant Headquarter or shortly called GHQ. The application was published after declaring public sphere of influence when General Pervez Musharraf declassified several secret documents during the decade of 1970s.

After imposing Martial Law, Zia-ul-haq fristly appointed several judges on adhoc bases in Supreme Court of Pakistan. In fact, still he has fear that Pakistan People’s Party has a power to collect people domestically as well as he knew that Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto has strong relationship with several heads of states and heads of governments all over the world specially with Soviet Union and China. Therefore, he wanted to remove his support on grass root level in such a pattern that he must not be blamed but this act should be considered as a judicial proceeding.

Soon after declaring Martial Law, Zia-ul-Haq advised President Fazal Elahi Chaudhary to appoint Justice Anwar-ul-Haq as a new chief justice of Pakistan. Immediately, military administration removed chief justice Yaqoob Ali from the office of chief justice of Pakistan by force and issued orders of appointment of Justice Anwar-ul-Haq as a new chief justice of Pakistan on September 23, 1977. It was just because of filed petition by Nussrat Bhutto in the Supreme Court against the arrival of Zia-ul-Haq into the politics. Zulfqar Ali Bhutto objected the appointment of new chief justice and highlighted his critical character before and after dismissing his government but Anwar-ul-Haq was made the head of that bench who was hearing the petition against military government of Zia-ul-Haq. 219

The objection of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was overruled by the new politicized, Anwar-ul-Haq and now the petition of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was yet again heard by him as the leading judge of the bench. He presided overall petition of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto while the Martial Law has been imposed throughout the country. He played his part in declaring Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto as guilty in an ambiguity murder case and announcing death sentence even accuse did not prove. When Zia-ul-Haq visited Saudi Arabia in 1979, Anwar-ul-Haq became acting president of Pakistan till his comeback.

Same as earlier military governments, Zia-ul-Haq did not like the idea of Parliamentary democracy and he banned all political parties across the Pakistan. The political structure which was built by Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto was destroyed, disturbed, hampered, and not existed in the 1980s. On the other hand, a new political system was still needed to manage the country where several issues were demanding the fast solutions. Similarly, Zia-ul-Haq decided to establish Majlis-e-Shoora in the absence of parliament in 1980. This was the theme that the members of Shoora will be intellectuals, economist, journalists, scholars, and religious experts called Ulama and professionalists from different fields. In fact, Zia-ul-Haq decided to replace the system of parliamentary democracy from the system of like-minded people same as in Soviet Union. Therefore, all the 284 members of Majlis-e-Shoora were nominated by president. So, scholars called it the government of technocrats.

Benazeer Bhutto who was facing a hard situation after the death of her father, became Co-Chairperson of Pakistan People’s Party while her mother became Chairperson of respective party. To see crucial rule of Zia-ul-Haq, she started her great efforts in the shape of Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan. During this struggle consequently, including 10 months in custody, she remained about 5 years in the lockup, not easy time for her because during this she also faced her father’s bereavement. After some time she was unconfined for a short period and during that period an alliance was shaped for the restoration of democracy. “The first official meeting of the leaders for the arrangement of Alliance was held at 70 Clifton Karachi on February 6, 1981.The leaders were agreed and the alliance was formed and named Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD).

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Alliance sponsored a four end program: Ending of Martial Law; Restoration of the 1973 Constitution, Parliamentary elections, and Transfer of power to the public representatives. Soon after the establishment of MRD, Benazeer was another time under capture and sent to jail but under international stress she was released in 1984, after that she left Pakistan and went to UK and worked for MRD from there. She lived there for hardly two years, when her younger brother Shahnawaz Bhutto was assassinated in France, she revisited to Pakistan for burial of her brother and again she had to leave the country.

During these days she decided to continue the mission of her father, so for this purpose she once again planned to comeback to Pakistan, to pressurize Zia-ul-Haq for restoration of Democracy in the country. She landed in Lahore on April 11, 1986, to fulfill her promises, “The carefree girl who first left home in 1969 to study at Harvard had now twisted into a woman with an iron will, to fight the battle left incomplete by her father3”.

Basically, her aspiration was to join Pakistan foreign services, not to become a politician, she was of the opinion that her predisposition was not towards politics, it was her father to whom she wanted to please by joining oxford union. Benazeer Bhutto was warmly greeted by millions of peoples at Lahore airport, Zia-ul-Haq had panic from it and due to this fear he played a card of Islamization (Policy of Implementing Islamic Laws) and announced for referendum, Benazeer Bhutto hoped a change for democracy, but Zia-ul-Haq also made his clear intention that authority would be transferred to only those persons who are religious brainpower, General Zia- ul-Haq’s so called democracy shunned down when on August 14, 1986, Benazeer Bhutto was detained at her home in Karachi, when she was just preparing to attend peaceful assembly on Pakistan’s Independence day. She was given thirty days detention order and once again she was send to jail. On the other hand, except Jamaat- e-Islami all the other political parties had already joined MRD. They once again arose against the wicked killing of innocent people in lump sum and the capture of thousands of people by their own military. During movement Zia-ul-Haq was bothered because he was thinking, if Benazeer Bhutto came in authority then what

3 Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.195.

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will be his position? So he every time avoided the elections in Pakistan, while giving an interview Zia-ul-Haq replied, “It is Miss Bhutto’s superfluous impractical ambition and her attitude towards acquiring power which is objectionable4”.

Unwillingly under International stress and the pressure of MRD, Zia-ul-Haq had to release Benazeer on September 10, 1986, but many people stayed behind in jail. This struggle was strengthen against Zia-ul-Haq by PPP along with other political parties under Benazeer’s supervision. Lubna Rafique wrote: While PPP gained its full potency as single political institution in Pakistan, on the other hand Zia-ul-Haq denied these facts, “Bhutto strike back against this by saying that her party was speaking not out of vengeance, but for nation building5”.

After a long struggle Zia-ul-Haq announced the elections, the superior step taken by him through which he made Junaijo the Prime Minister, this step once again gone into the darkness when Zia-ul-Haq eliminated the assemblies on May 29, 1988, after that he announced that the new election will be held on November 16, 1988. It had the hope of democracy for Benazeer and other political leaders but Zia-ul-Haq publicized on July 21, 1988, that the elections would be held purely on nonparty basis; the reason was that the PPP has popular support, there was a reason behind the elections on non-party. Chandio Ameer Ali writes: “Zia-ul-Haq preferred the non- party elections because he was well-aware of the reality that nonpolitical and non- committed people are easy to control as compare to political and affiliated people. So he wanted that elected members of the assemblies had no political connection as well as membership of any political party or faithfulness to any political leader”, now Benazeer went to the courts and she confronted Zia-ul-Haq’s nonparty based election, because she was of the opinion that in this way the military law of Zia-ul-Haq will come to an end and the democracy will be restored. She wrote, “Just as inferior cannot blossom in a desert, so political parties cannot prosper in dictatorship6”. In this way the democracy is vital for the political parties, where they can work freely without any hindrance and perform their political activities in a good manner, on the

4 Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.197.

5 Ibid., p.198.

6 Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead, p.202.

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other hand, in dictatorship there is no way for the political parties because history witnessed that the dictators tried their most excellent just to extend their rule instead of giving opportunity to the democratic environment. It was Benazeer Bhutto, who from about thirty months continued to assemble world opinion for the restoration of democracy and violation of human rights by Zia-ul-Haq. He wanted to keep Benazeer away from the elections, and the election date was suggested by keeping in view the pregnancy of Benazeer Bhutto, so that she may not be capable for election campaign.

Although, Zia-ul-Haq designed non-party electoral system just to strengthen his rule but soon, he realized that this system has been failed to strengthen his powers. Junaijo Government was demanding autonomy for justifying its character as a representative of the public but Zia did not like it. As a result, Zia-ul-Haq dissolved the National Assembly on May 29, 1988, and argued that Junaijo Government had been failed to maintain law and order situation, implementation of Islamic laws and involved in corruption. Zia-ul-Haq promissed for new elections within 90 days. Moreover, Zia once again declared that up-coming elections will be on non-party bases. But, sudden death of President Zia-ul-Haq in plane crash near Bahawalpur, turned the political scenario of Pakistan. Elections were held on November 16, 1988, but on party bases.

Now there were two mainstream parties, at one end there was Pakistan People’s Party led by Benazeer Bhutto while on the other side, there was an alliance of rightist political parties led by Nawaz Shareef. This alliance had adopted the name of “Islami Jamhoori Itehad” or Islamic Democratic Alliance. Nawaz Shareef contested this election from Lahore while Benazeer from Larkana. Pakistan People’s Party won 94 seats of National Assembly while Islamic Democratic Alliance got 55 seats. Overall, Pakistan People’s Party got 7,488,934 votes while Islamic Democratic Alliance got 5,883,298 votes. Turnout was 37.6 per cent in favor of Pakistan People’s Party while 29.6 per cent in favor of Islamic Democratic Alliance.

Although, Nawaz Shareef tried a lot and pressurized President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to nominate him as prime minister. He claimed that he had a simple majority with acquiring support of independent candidates and the members of MQM. But, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan observed carefully and finally, nominated Benazeer

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Bhutto as Prime Minister of Pakistan on December 4, 1988. Now, She was a first female Prime Minister of a Muslim country.

Other political parties also participated in these elections in which, Pakistan Awami Itehad got 3 seats, Awami National Party 2, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (Fazlur Rahman Group) 7, National People’s Party (Khar) one, Pakistan Democratic Party one, Balochistan National Alliance two, Jamiat ulama-e-Islam (Darkhasti Group) one and independent candidates got 40 seats in the National Assembly. With this electoral process, Parliament has been designed according to party based political system. Even, constitution was existing still on the bases of Zia’s amendments and political system of Pakistan was still semi-presidential but now, Martial Law had been ended and pure democratic government had been installed. Scholars says that this was a sacrificed travelling of PPP from its 2nd to 3rd democratic period which faced blood sheds and crucial circumstances.

With the death of Zia-ul-haq, his dictatorial rule had officially been ended but his amendments in the constitution were remain present and system was semi- presidential. But the people of Pakistan were happy to see their representatives in the National Assemblies. Although, Zia had been failed to satisfy the people of Pakistan through its own so-called Islamization and non-party system. He was struggling to satisfy the Pakistani people by announcing new elections but his life did not permit him to rule more on Pakistan and he had been died in plane crash. The basic objective of MRD had been fulfilled with the announcement of party based elections after Zia’s death. PPP won these elections and Benazeer had become the first female prime minister of Pakistan and in all over the Muslim world.

Keeping in view the major questions of research after critically analyzing the facts, following findings has been traced:

1) All the political parties in Pakistan formed by the politicians just for the sake of their personal interest, not for the nation.

2) Military direct involvement into politics was started when Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra appointed Chief of Army Staff, Ayub Khan as Defence Minister.

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3) Due to the weak process of constitutionalization, politicians were being considered as fail to run the political affairs.

4) PNA politicized religion against the “Islamic Socialism” of Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto.

5) Sardars and several tribal chiefs became rivals of Bhutto due to 4th and 5th amendment in the Constitution of 1973, against Sardari system in Balochistan.

6) Bhutto could not judge the dual character of Zia-ul-Haq.

7) Even negotiations had been finalized between government and opposition but Zia took over the government according to plan and justified his arrival in the politics, arguing failure of Bhutto government.

8) Zia used religion and religious parties, like Jamat-e-Islami, to strengthen his rule.

9) Judges self-created doctrine of necessity supported undemocratic and dictatorial norms during Zia regime.

10) Zia forced Sindhi supporters of Pakistan People’s Party for initiating civil war against the federation of Pakistan open fire through army helicopters on protesters in Qasba Aligarh.

11) The process of Islamization was actually a framework for strengthening Zia’s rule.

12) Majlis-e-Shura was an undemocratic gathering of like-minded religious people who were supporting Zia regime.

13) Non-Party based elections were an effort to sustain Zia’s supremacy over political system.

14) Eighth amendments in the constitution of 1973, made Prime Minister and his cabinet a puppet in the hands of president.

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15) Military generals were considered superior than the representatives of the people during Zia regime.

16) Basic purpose of dissolving Junejo Government was a conflict of politics among Muhammad Khan Junaijo and General Zia-ul-Haq and initiating inquiry on Ojhari Camp issue.

17) Although MRD got popularity all over the country but Zia did not want to show any pressure on him through his gestures. So, he once again announced non-party based elections after dissolving Junejo Government.

18) Ghulam Ishaq Khan as a successor of Zia did not follow his hated policy and announced party based elections which was in fact a success of MRD.

In the end, after Critical Study following recommendations have been suggested for healthy political activism in an ideological state like Pakistan.

 The basic aim of establishing any political party should be to serve the nation. Similarly, people should vote for that political party which clearly manifested its policy over national issues.

 Military should be far from politics. Similarly, politicians must solve their problems by negotiations, and not try to get help from military.

 In flexible democracies, process of constitutionalization is being continued according to the needs of time. So, political interest must not be involved in this process.

 There should be proper legislation against declaring “Kafir” or “Non-Muslim” to the opponents by any political or religious party.

 Parochial Sardari System must be eliminated from Balochistan. So that, native Baloch people would get opportunities of education and other basic necessities of life without any socio-political and cultural barriers.

 Merit must always be considered during appointments, even for the appointment of the army chief. 226

 Religion must not be used for gaining political benefits.

 Judiciary must be accountable if it uses the doctrine of necessity.

 Government must not oppress any community by force and must try to resolve their problems in democratic way. Otherwise, seeds of separation can be grown once again like East Pakistan.

 Each policy or rule must be imposed in a democratic way according to the will of people.

 Parliament or Majlis-e-Shura must be a gathering of peoples’ representatives which elect through general elections. There should not be any spoiled system.

 Party-based elections which provide pure manifestation of politicians and people easily realize that policies of political party are based on national interest.

 Prime minister is in fact a leader of the whole nation. So, he must be constitutionally powerful according to parliamentary norms.

 There should be accountability of all the public representatives or officials even that of the military generals. No one must be above the law.

 Democracy must never be derailed, and it should be strengthen with the passage of time for its continuity.

 Although, there are always several differences among political parties in any of the political system but these must be resolve through negotiations, according to the constitution. Unconstitutional efforts of any political party regarding its political interest can derail the democratic process.

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Appendix 1 Manifesto of Pakistan People’s Party

General aims:

The ultimate objective of the party’s policy is the attainment of a classless society, which is possible only through socialism in our time. This means true equality of the citizens, fraternity under the rue of democracy in an order based on economic and social justice. The aims follow from the political and social ethics of Islam. The Party thus strives to put in practice the noble ideal of the Muslim Faith.

The party accepts the possibility of a mixed economy, the existence of a private alongside a nationalized sector. However, it is within the public sector that all the major sources of the production of wealth will be placed. The private sector will offer opportunities for individual initiative in the areas of production, where small enterprises can be efficient. Monopoly conditions will be abolished, so that private enterprise will function according to the rules of competition.

Nationalization of Industries in the public sector will be all basic and key industries. The principal ones are:-

1. Iron and steel 2. Non-ferrous metals 3. Heavy engineering 4. Machine tools 5. Chemicals 6. Ship building 7. Motor car assembly and manufacture 8. Equipment for electrical power production, distribution and use. 9. Electronics 10. Production of arms, ammunition and armaments for defence. 11. Cement 12. Paper

To these will be added the new industries which must be established to enable the autonomous growth of the national economy. For example, it will be necessary to manufacture agricultural machinery and equipment in Pakistan, and the commonly used hand tools.

All major industries will be nationalized. This will mean taking over into the public sector, textile and jute mills over a certain production capacity. In private ownership these have been sources of excessive profits, inefficient productions, wastage of resources and unhindered exploitation of workers.

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In the public sector will be not only the large scale production of electrical power, but also all other sources of energy supply, namely, nuclear material, gas, oil and coal.

All exploitation of mineral wealth, both mining and ore-processing will be in the public sector.

The public sector will completely contain the following and major means of public transport, namely railways, shipping and airways. It will also take over public road transport.

Large scale export trading, such as of Jute and Cotton will be conducted by state corporation.

Rights of workers:

As a necessary part of their employment in factories, the worker must be provided with housing and adequate means of transportation to their place of work. They will be entitle to paid holidays, and recreation camps will be opened where they can spend their holidays in healthy surroundings. They will have the right to training facilities for improving their skills. Hospitals and free medical attention will be incorporated in the system of works’ welfare.

A system of minimum wages, reckoned according to the cost of living, will be enforced both in the public and the private sector.

Princely states:

No region of Pakistan will be permitted to be governed in the manner of a princely state. All political agencies will be brought in line with the general legal administration of the rest of Pakistan.

Financial measures:

The possession of money institutions in the hands of private parties is the source of exploitation, which uses national wealth and private deposit to create money for the financing of monopoly capitalists. All big industries have been set up entirely on bank loans, which means, on the money of the depositors. Such loans can be said to have been the misappropriation of public money by the bankers. To this sort of abuse, which is inherent in any system where banks are in private hands, there has been added the control of banks in cartels belonging to industrialist families.

Unless the State taken hold of all the banks by making them national property, it will not able to check inflation. The state’s financial policy is at present a prisoner of the bankers.

All banks and insurance companies will be forth-with nationalized.

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Reform of Taxation System. The establishment of a socialist order will, naturally, change the present form of taxation, which wealth with the privileged classes.

Agrarian Reform:

The Party stands for elimination of feudalism and will take concrete steps in accordance with the established principles of socialism to protect and advance the interests of the peasantry.

The promotion of self-help groups and co-operatives is the best way to help the cultivators to improve their lot.

Patterns of Proprietorship: The breaking up of the large estates destroy the power of the feudal landowners is a national necessity that will have to be carried through by practical measures, of which a ceiling is only a part, the size of the agricultural estate will be limited by the ceiling, the norm being the ownership of a minimum of 50 to 150 acres of irrigated land, the maximum varying from tract to the tract and being determined on the basis of quality of soil, present productivity and the availability of irrigation facilities.

Education:

Primary and secondary Education will be free up to matriculation and primary education will be compulsory and free. A 5-year programme will be formulated by the end of the which all the necessary schools must be built and the primary school teachers trained. Free housing will be provided for such teachers, and their children will be exempted from secondary school boarding fees if they opt for the profession of teaching.

More secondary schools must also be established, with the aim that in due course education will become compulsory upto a prescribed age and level of secondary school education.

Among the compulsory subjects in schools, mathematics will be accorded the place of honor and taught by the most scientific modern methods.

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Appendix 2 THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS OF 1970 National Assembly Seats From All Pakistan

Name of Parties Votes Percentage Seats (N) AL 37.2 160 PPP 16.6 81 CML 7 7 QML 4.5 9 JI 6 4 Others 21.7 23 Independent 7 16 Total 100 300

National Assembly Seats From Punjab Province And Its Regions

Name of Parties Votes Percentage Seats (N) PPP 41.7 62 CML 12.7 7 CVML 5.1 2 QML 5.4 1 JUI-WP 5.2 0 JUP 10.0 4 JI 4.7 1 NAP-W 0 0 PDP 2.3 0 Others 1.2 0 Independent 11.7 5 Total 100 82

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National Assembly Seats From Sindh Province And Its Regions

Name of Parties Votes Percentage Seats (N) PPP 44.9 18 CML 6.8 0 CVML 1.8 0 QML 10.7 1 JUI-WP 4.9 0 JUP 6.9 3 JI 10.5 2 NAP-W 0.1 0 PDP 0.4 0 Others 1.7 0 Independent 11.3 3 Total 100 27

National Assembly Seats From NWFP Province And Its Regions

Name of Parties Votes Percentage Seats (N) PPP 14.3 1 CML 4 0 CVML 0.6 0 QML 22.6 7 JUI-WP 25.5 6 JUP 0 0 JI 7.2 1 NAP-W 0.3 0 PDP 18.5 3 Others 0.7 0 Independent 6.3 7 Total 100 25

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National Assembly Seats From Baluchistan Province And Its Regions

Name of Parties Votes Percentage Seats (N)

PPP 2.4 0

CML 11 0

CVML 0 0

QML 10 0

JUI-WP 20 1

JUP 0 0

JI 1.2 0

NAP-W 2.4 0

PDP 45.2 3

Others 1.0 0

Independent 6.8 0

Total 100 4

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Appendix 3 THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS OF 1977 National Assembly Seats From All Pakistan

Name of Parties Votes Percentage Seats (N) PPP 58.6 155 PNA 35.8 36 Others 0 1 Independent 0 8 Total 94.4 200

National Assembly Seats From Punjab Province And Its Regions

Name of Parties Votes Percentage Seats (N) PPP 61 107 PNA 35.5 8 Others 0 0 Independent 0 0 Total 96.5 115

National Assembly Seats From Sindh Province And Its Regions

Name of Parties Votes Percentage Seats (N) PPP 61.6 32 PNA 32.2 11 Others 0 0 Independent 0 0 Total 93.8 43

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National Assembly Seats From NWFP Province And Its Regions

Name of Parties Votes Percentage Seats (N)

PPP 39.6 8

PNA 48 17

Others 0 0

Independent 0 0

Total 87.6 26

National Assembly Seats From Baluchistan Province And Its Regions

Name of Parties Votes Percentage Seats (N)

PPP 49.2 7

PNA 0 0

Others 42.4 0

Independent 0 0

Total 91.6 7

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Appendix 4 NOTIFICATION

Islamabad, The 21st, March 1977 No. F.13(1) 77-Elsx (I). - In pursuance of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 20 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (LXXXV of 1976), the Election Commission of Pakistan hereby publishes the names of the candidates returned to the National Assembly of Pakistan as a result of un-contested election from the constituencies mentioned below against the name of each candidate:- Sr. No and Name of Name Father's Name # Constituency 1 2 3 4 Mr. Mohammad Haji Muhammad 1 NA-1 Peshawar-I Yousaf Khattak Kulli Khan Arbab Mohammad Arbab Sher Ali 2 NA-2 Peshawar-II Jehangir Khan Khan Mr. Aftab Ahmad Ghulam Haider 3 NA-3 Peshawar-III Khan Khan Begum Naseem W/o Abdul Wali 4 NA-4 Peshawar-IV Wali Khan Khan Maulana Abdul Al-Haj Maruf 5 NA-5 Peshawar-V Haq Gul Khan Mir Afzal K.B. Sarfaraz 6 NA-6 Mardan-I Khan Khan Mr. Mohammad 7 NA-7 Mardan-II Allahdad Khan Yousaf Khan Begum Naseem W/o Abdul Wali 8 NA-8 Mardan-III Wali Khan Khan Mr. Ali Gohar Khan Zaman 9 NA-9 Mardan-IV Khan Khan Maulana Habib 10 NA-10 Kohat-I Saida Gul Gul 11 NA-11 Kohat-II Molvi Naimatullah Azizullah Mr. Mohammad Gohar-ur- 12 NA-12 -I Jadoon. Rehman Jadoon Air Marshal (Retd) Rehmatullah 13 NA-13 Abbottabad-II Asghar Khan Khan F.M. Mr. Goher Ayub 14 NA-14 Abbottabad-III Mohammad Khan Ayub Khan Mr. Mohammad Haji Mohammad 15 NA-15 Mansehra-I Haneef Khan Akbar Khan

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Mr. Fakhruz Badi-uz-Zaman 16 NA-16 Mansehra-II Zaman Khan Khan Mansehra- Haji Faqir Niamatullah 17 NA-17 cum-Kohistan Mohammad Khan Khan Khalifa Maulana Mufti 18 NA-18 D.I.Khan Mohammad Mahmood Siddique Maulana Maulvi Abdur 19 NA-19 Bannu-I Sadrushaheed Rahim 20 NA-20 Bannu-II Mr. Ahmad Jan Shah Wali Khan Miangul 21 NA-21 Swat-I Miangul Amirzeb Jehanzeb 22 NA-22 Swat-II Haji Fazl-e-Raziq Abdul Mustaan Mr. Fateh Khan Bahadur 23 NA-23 Swat-III Mohammad Khan Sultanat Khan Moulvi Khosh Chitral-cum- 24 NA-24 Mohammad Wali Mohammad Swat-cum-Dir Khan Khan Malakand Mr. Gauhar 25 NA-25 Protected Sharifullah Rehman Area-cum-Dir Sahibzada 26 NA-26 Dir Shahzada Safiullah 27 NA-27 Tribal Area-I Mr. Baroz Niamat 28 NA-28 Tribal Area-II Mr. Baz Gul Mohammad 29 NA-29 Tribal Area-III Mr. Shamsul Haq Ahmed Shah Sardar Habibullah 30 NA-30 Tribal Area-IV Gulain Khan Major Mir Bad 31 NA-31 Tribal Area-V Mr. Said Khan Shah Mr. Abdus Subhan Mohammad Jan 32 NA-32 Tribal Area-VI Khan Khan Tribal Area- 33 NA-33 Haji Gul Sher Haji Jammal VII Tribal Area- Haji Mohammad 34 NA-34 Mr. Nur Sher Khan VIII Shah Raja 35 NA-35 Federal Capital Mr. Zahur Ahmad Mohammad Ali Khan Col. (Retd) Habib 36 NA-36 Rawalpindi-I Capt. Allah Dad Khan 37 NA-37 Rawalpindi-II Mr. Abdul Aziz Allah Ditta

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Bhatti Bhatti Syed Ali Asghar Syed Balawal 38 NA-38 Rawalpindi-III Shah Mr. Nazar Hussain 39 NA-39 Rawalpindi-IV Feroz Khan Kiani Kiani Mr. Abdul Qayyum Mohammad 40 NA-40 Rawalpindi-V Butt Sharif Mr. Ahmed Fazal Karim 41 NA-41 Campbellpur-I Waheed Akhtar Akhtar Campbellpur- Sardar Shaukat Late Sardar 42 NA-42 II Hayat Sikandar Hayat Ghulam Mohy- Campbellpur- (Pir) Syed Safi-ud- 43 NA-43 ud-Din Lal III din Badshah Dr. Ghulam Haji Mohammad 44 NA-44 Jhelum-I Hussain Akbar Khan Sardar Sardar Khizar 45 NA-45 Jhelum-II Mohammad Hayat Khan Khan Mr. Masood-ul- 46 NA-46 Jhelum-III Abdul Qayyum Hassan Bhatti 47 NA-47 Gujrat-I Mr. Zafar Mehdi Ch. Mehdi Ali Mian Mushtaq Mian Noor 48 NA-48 Gujrat-II Hussain Ellahi Pagganwala Mr. Ata Elahi Fazal Elahi 49 NA-49 Gujrat-III Chaudhry Chaudhry Mr. Mohammad 50 NA-50 Gujrat-IV Noor Ahmad Sardar Khan 51 NA-51 Gujrat-V Ch. Ghulam Rasul Ch. Khuda Dad Mr. Mohammad Mohammad 52 NA-52 Gujrat-VI Siddique Malik Nazim Mohammad 53 NA-53 Sargodha-I Ahmad Aheer Malik Khan 54 NA-54 Sargodha-II Mr. Karam Bakhsh Maula Bakhsh Nawab Mr. Mohammad 55 NA-55 Sargodha-III Mohammad Zakir Qureshi Hayat Qureshi Khan Bahadur Mehr Khuda Dad Mehr 56 NA-56 Sargodha-IV Khan Mohammad Yar Khan

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Mohammad 57 NA-57 Sargodha-V Mr. Hafeez Ullah Abdullah Malik Noor Hayat Malik Feroz 58 NA-58 Sargodha-VI Khan Noon Khan Noon Malik 59 NA-59 Sargodha-VII Sultan Ali Noon Malik Amir Nawabzada Malik 60 NA-60 Mianwali-I Mohammad Muzaffar Khan Khan Mr. Amir Abdullah Mohammad 61 NA-61 Mianwali-II Khan Hayat Khan Mr. Ghulam Ali Mohammad 62 NA-62 Mianwali-III Hussan Khan Khan Sardarzada Sardar Ghulam 63 NA-63 Jhang-I Muhammad Ali Mohammad Shah Shah Mehr Ghulam Mehr Shamsul 64 NA-64 Jhang-II Haider Haq Mr. Faisal Saleh 65 NA-65 Jhang-III Mahmood Hayat Hayat Syed Zulfiqar Ali Syed Mubarik 66 NA-66 Jhang-IV Bokhari Shah Sahibzada Hazrat Hazrat Sultan 67 NA-67 Jhang-V Mohammad Nazir Noor-ul-Hassan Sultan Sahib Sahib Mian Hafiz Mian Mohammad 68 NA-68 Lyallpur-I Mohammad Atta Ullah Abdullah Mian Abdul 69 NA-69 Lyallpur-II Mian Zahid Sarfraz Qayyum 70 NA-70 Lyallpur-III Ch. Nisar Akbar Ch. Ali Akbar Rana Sakhawat Ali Rana Riasat Ali 71 NA-71 Lyallpur-IV Khan Khan Ch. Mohammad Ch. Asghar Ali 72 NA-72 Lyallpur-V Anwar Ali Khan Khan Major (Retd) Mian Abdul 73 NA-73 Lyallpur-VI Moeen-ud-Din Bari Ch. Imtiaz Ahmad Ch. Sardar 74 NA-74 Lyallpur-VII Gill Mohammad Gill Khan Shahadat Ali 75 NA-75 Lyallpur-VIII Haji Nizam Din Khan Mr. Ghulam Nabi 76 NA-76 Lyallpur-IX Khuda Bakhsh Chaudhry

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Mian 77 NA-77 Lyallpur-X Mr. Asad Masood Mohammad Hussain Rai Hafeezullah Rai Saadullah 78 NA-78 Lyallpur-XI Khan Tariq Khan Mr. Mohammad Mian Abdul 79 NA-79 Lyallpur-XII Bashir Ahmad Haleem 80 NA-80 Lyallpur-XIII Ch. Bashir Ahmad Ch. Allah Bux Syed Inayat Ali 81 NA-81 Lahore-I Mr. S.M. Masood Shah Mian Mr. Khalid Latif 82 NA-82 Lahore-II Mohammad Kardar Latif Kardar 83 NA-83 Lahore-III Mian Ehsan-ul-Haq Ch. Abdul Haq S. Abdul 84 NA-84 Lahore-IV Dr. S.M. Yaqub Rahman Mian Amir-ud- 85 NA-85 Lahore-V Mian Salah-ud-Din Din Malik Mohammad 86 NA-86 Lahore-VI Khuda Bakhsh Akhtar Mr. Muhammad 87 NA-87 Lahore-VII Mehar Din Rashid Malik Mehraj 88 NA-88 Lahore-VIII Mahi Khalid Sardar 89 NA-89 Kasur-I Sardar Ahmad Ali Mohammad Ali Major Rehmat Ch. Dilawar 90 NA-90 Kasur-II Khan Khan 91 NA-91 Kasur-III Mr. Shafaat Khan Dhundal Khan Sardar Asghar 92 NA-92 Kasur-IV Mr. Amjad Masood Ali Mr. Manzoor 93 NA-93 Sheikhupura-I Khuda Bakhsh Hussain Malik Mushtaq 94 NA-94 Sheikhupura-II Ghulam Qadir Ahmad Sheikhupura- Mr. Mohammad Noor 95 NA-95 III Arif Mohammad Sheikhupura- Mr. Shamim Ch. Mohammad 96 NA-96 IV Rai Rashid Ahmad Rai Hussain 97 NA-97 Sheikhupura-V Khan Khan 98 NA-98 Gujranwala-I Ch. Ghulam Haider Ch. Hayat

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Cheema Mohammad 99 NA-99 Gujranwala-II Mian Saif Ullah Attaullah Khan Khan Ghulam 100 NA-100 Gujranwala-III Ghulam Hussain Dastgir Mian Mian Azhar 101 NA-101 Gujranwala-IV Mohammad Hassan Shaffi Malik Mahdi Muhammad 102 NA-102 Gujranwala-V Hassan Asghar Khan Mian Shahadat Muhammad 103 NA-103 Gujranwala-VI Khan Nawaz 104 NA-104 Sialkot-I Qazi Zaka-ud-Din Qazi Saraj Din Mian Mian Masud 105 NA-105 Sialkot-II Mohammad Ahmad Hussain Ch. Khan 106 NA-106 Sialkot-III Ch. Sultan Ahmad Bahadur Fateh 107 NA-107 Sialkot-IV Mr. Muhammad Khan Niazi Mr. Hamid Nawaz Shahnawaz 108 NA-108 Sialkot-V Khan Khan Mr. Ghulam 109 NA-109 Sialkot-VI Sarwar Khan, Muhammad Din Advocate Mr. Anwar Aziz 110 NA-110 Sialkot-VII Dr. Abdul Aziz Chaudhry Syed Abbas 111 NA-111 Multan-I S. Altaf Hussain Hussain Shah Mr. Rifat Hayat Gul Mohammad 112 NA-112 Multan-II Khan Khan Ch. Nawazish 113 NA-113 Multan-III Ch. Barkat Ullah Ali Makhdum Makhdoom 114 NA-114 Multan-IV Muhammad Sajjad Murid Hussain Hussain Qureshi Qureshi Syed Syed Hamid Raza 115 NA-115 Multan-V Muhammad Gilani Raza Gillani Sh. Khuda 116 NA-116 Multan-VI Sh. Khizar Hayat Bakhsh Maulana Hamid 117 NA-117 Multan-VII Shaida Ali Khan Ali Khan

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Ch. Allah Dad 118 NA-118 Multan-VIII Ch. Abdul Rehman Khan Brig. Syed Said 119 NA-119 Multan-IX Mr. Rizvi Ali Shah Rizvi 120 NA-120 Multan-X Mr. Taj Ahmed Sultan Ahmed Mr. Mohammad Mohammad Yar 121 NA-121 Vehari-I Nawaz Khan Alias Khan Khichi Dilawar Khan Alhaj Mian Riaz Nawab Allah 122 NA-122 Vehari-II Ahmad Khan Yar Khan Agha Saleem Khursheed 123 NA-123 Vehari-III Khurshid Ahmed Khalifa Maulana Mufti 124 NA-124 D.G. Khan-I Mohammad Mahmood Siddique Nawabzada Sardar Farooq Sardar 125 NA-125 D.G. Khan-II Ahmad Khan Mohammad Khan Mir Murad Mir Balakh Sher 126 NA-126 D.G. Khan-III Bakhsh Khan Khan Mazari Mazari Mr. Mohammad 127 NA-127 Muzaffargarh-I Ghaus Bakhsh Ibrahim Muzaffargarh- Nawabzada Nawab Saifullah 128 NA-128 II Nasrullah Khan Khan Dr. Dost Muzaffargarh- 129 NA-129 Mohammad Mithan Khan III Buzdar Muzaffargarh- Malik Qadir 130 NA-130 Malik Allah Yar IV Bakhsh Muzaffargarh- Sardar Mohammad Sardar Bashir 131 NA-131 V Behram Khan Ahmad Khan Mr. Abdul Aleem Mohammad 132 NA-132 Sahiwal-I Sardar Shafi Sardar Mohammad Sardar Fazal 133 NA-133 Sahiwal-II Naseem Haq Ch. Muhammad Ch. Nawab 134 NA-134 Sahiwal-III Khan 135 NA-135 Sahiwal-IV Rao Khurshid Ali Rao Niaz Ali Mr. Mohammad 136 NA-136 Sahiwal-V Abdul Haq Saeed 137 NA-137 Sahiwal-VI Mian Mohammad Hafiz Fateh

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Yasin Khan Mohammad Mr. M. Hashim Ch. Mohammad 138 NA-138 Sahiwal-VII Khan Ali Khan Mr. Ahmad Saeed 139 NA-139 Sahiwal-VIII Ahmad Khan Khan Sir Sadiq Shahzada Saeed- 140 NA-140 Bahawalpur-I Mohammad ur-Rashid Abbasi Khan Abbasi Mr. Shuja Ullah Major Hafiz 141 NA-141 Bahawalpur-II Shaikh Ullah Shaikh Brigadier Alhaj Prince Salahuddin 142 NA-142 Bahawalpur-III Mohammad Ahmad Abbasi Abbas Abbasi Bahawalpur- Sahibzada Noor Hazrat Mian 143 NA-143 cum- Hassan Abdul Ghaffar Bahawalnagar Fateh Bahawalnagar- Mr. Rafique 144 NA-144 Muhammad I Muhammad Shah Shah Bahawalnagar- Mr. Mohammad 145 NA-145 Haji Abdul Haq II Afzal Wattoo Bahawalnagar- Mr. Mohammad 146 NA-146 Ali Ahmad III Afzal Wattoo Rahim Yar Khawaja Jamal 147 NA-147 Ghulam Rasul Khan-I Muhammad Makhdoom Rahim Yar Makhdoom 148 NA-148 Mohammad Khan-II Hameed-ud-Din Karam Shah Makhdoom Rahim Yar Makhdoom Noor Mohammad 149 NA-149 Khan-III Muhammad Shah Akhtar Hussain Shah Rahim Yar Sardar Ghulam 150 NA-150 Bilal Khan Sardar Khan-IV Asghar Khan Mr. Ali Hassan Muhammad 151 NA-151 Sukkur-I Mangi Ibrahim Mangi 152 NA-152 Sukkur-II Agha Ghulam Nabi Dur Mohammad Sardar Ali Sardar Ghulam 153 NA-153 Sukkur-III Mohammad Mohammad Khan Khan Haji Noor Sardar Dadan 154 NA-154 Sukkur-IV Mohammad Khan Khan Lund Lund

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Mir Mehraa Khan Mir Behram 155 NA-155 Jacobabad-I Bijarani Khan Bijarani Haji Khair 156 NA-156 Jacobabad-II Adam Khan Mohammad Khan Ali Nawaz 157 NA-157 Nawabshah-I Mr. Abdul Fatah Memon Haji Ghulam Mr. Ghulam 158 NA-158 Nawabshah-III Rasool Khan Mujtaba Jatoi Sayed Shabbir Sayed Hassan 159 NA-159 Nawabshah-III Ahmed Shah Bux Shah Haji Qabool 160 NA-160 Nawabshah-IV Noor Ahmad Shah Mohammad Shah Syed Qaim Ali Syed Ramzan 161 NA-161 Khairpur-I Shah Ali Pir Syed Abdul Pir Syed Ahmad 162 NA-162 Khairpur-II Qadir Shah Shah Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Sir Shah Nawaz 163 NA-163 Larkana-I Bhutto Khan Bhutto Sardar Ahmed Mir Muhammad 164 NA-164 Larkana-II Sultan Khan Mr. Mumtaz Ali Nabi Bux Khan 165 NA-165 Larkana-III Bhutto Bhutto Makhdoom Makhdoom 166 NA-166 Hyderabad-I Ghulam Mohammad Zaman Mohammad Maulana Shah Maulana Abdul 167 NA-167 Hyderabad-II Ahmed Noorani Aleem Siddiqui Mr. Mohammad 168 NA-168 Hyderabad-III Khuda Bux Shaukat Mir Ghulam Ali 169 NA-169 Hyderabad-IV Mir Aijaz Ali Khan Khan Talpur Syed Syed Umed Ali 170 NA-170 Hyderabad-V Muhammad Shah Hassan Shah Haji Fateh Haji Najmuddin 171 NA-171 Badin-I Mohammad Khan Khan Haji Abdullah Haji Ahmad 172 NA-172 Badin-II Halepota Halepota Pir Ghulam Rasool 173 NA-173 Tharparkar-I Pir Jehan Shah Shah Jillani

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Mr. Khadim Ali Syed Allahdino 174 NA-174 Tharparkar-II Shah Shah Mr. Niaz Allah Bux Khan 175 NA-175 Tharparkar-III Muhammad Khan Wassan Malik Sikandar Malik Sardar 176 NA-176 Dadu-I Khan Khan 177 NA-177 Dadu-II Rais Allan Khan Gaji Khan Mr. Liaquat Ali Abdul Hamid 178 NA-178 dadu-III Khan Khan Jatoi Haji Fatehuddin 179 NA-179 Sanghar-I Ghulam Shah Shah Rais Ali Rais Atta 180 NA-180 Sanghar-II Mohammad Mohammad Maree Khan Maree Mr. Muhammad Haji Mohammad 181 NA-181 Thatta-I Khan Soomro Usman Soomro Khan Bahadur Mr. Muhammad Khair 182 NA-182 Thatta-II Yousif Khan Muhammad Chandio Khan Chandio Sardar Sher Baz Mir Murad Bux 183 NA-183 Karachi-I Khan Mazari Khan Mazari Mr. Mahmood Muhammad 184 NA-184 Karachi-II Azam Farooqi Rashid (Late) Mr. Mohammad Abdul Hafeez 185 NA-185 Karachi-III Hassan Haqqqani Haqani Mr. Ghafoor Shaikh Khuda 186 NA-186 Karachi-IV Ahmad Bakhsh Mr. Musheer Pesh 187 NA-187 Karachi-V Imam Imam Mr. Abdul Sattar Sardar Allah 188 NA-188 Karachi-VI Gabol Bux Gabol Mr. Mohammad 189 NA-189 Karachi-VII Haji Tayyab Hanif Air Marshal (Retd) Rehmatullah 190 NA-190 Karachi-VIII Asghar Khan Khan Syed Munawar Syed Akhlaq 191 NA-191 Karachi-IX Hassan Ahmad Shah Faridul Shah Bashirul 192 NA-192 Karachi-X Haque Haque Mr. Abdul Hafeez Abdul Sattar 193 NA-193 Karachi-XI Pirzada Pirzada

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Mr. Tahir Mirza Abdullah 194 NA-194 Quetta-I Mohammad Khan Khan Mr. Yahya Haji Abdul 195 NA-195 Quetta-II Bakhtiar Krim Bakhtiar Sardar 196 NA-196 Quetta-III Mr. Wazir Ahmad Mohammad Usman Mir. Taj Mir Jafar Khan 197 NA-197 Sibi-I Mohammad Khan Jamali Mir Abdul Nabi Haji Faqir Ali 198 NA-198 Sibi-II Jamali Jamali Mir Ahmad Yar 199 NA-199 Kalat-I Mr. Mohyuddin Khan Mir Mehrab 200 NA-200 kalat-II Mir Amanullah Khan

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Appendix 5 THE RESULTS OF THE NON-PARTY BASIS ELECTIONS OF 1985

Distribution of Seats in National Assembly

Party Votes Seats Independents 207 Seats reserved for women - 21 Seats reserved for non-Muslim minorities - 9 Invalid/blank votes - Total 52% 237

Provincial Assemblies

Provinces Muslim Minorities Women Total Balochistan 40 3 2 45 NWFP 80 3 4 87 Punjab 240 8 12 260 Sindh 100 9 5 114 Total 460 23 23 506

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Members of The Various Political Parties Taking Part In The Elections of 1985

Parties NWFP Punjab Sindh Balochistan PPP 10 31 32 6 PML 13 55 22 66 JI 7 34 18 2 TI 1 12 0 1 JUP 1 8 4 0 JUI 4 2 2 0 Progressive PP 0 4 1 0 MKP 1 0 0 0 NAP 0 2 0 0 PDP 0 1 0 0 NDP 1 0 0 0 Inqilabi Mahaz 0 1 0 1 PML (ZS) 0 1 2 0 Himayat-e-Zia 0 2 0 0 TKN 0 1 2 0 Masawat Party 0 1 0 0 Pakhtoon Itehad 0 0 1 2 Sawad-e-Azam 0 0 3 2 NAP (PK) 0 0 0 0 ICP 0 0 3 1

248

Bibliography

Primary Source

Official Documents

Constitution of 1973. 8th Amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1985.

Report on the General Elections, 1985: Detailed Result of Elections. Election Results, Islamabad: Election Commission of Pakistan, 1987.

Report on the General Elections, 1988. Islamabad: Election Commission of Pakistan, 1990.

Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad. President of Pakistan; General Zia-ul-Haq's Interviews to Foriegn Media. Official documents, Islamabad: Directorate of Films & Publications, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1988.

Journals

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Bakhtiar, Nelofar. "Islamization And Women Empowerment During Zia Regime." Interdisciplanry Journal of Social And Humanitarian Studies, 1993.

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Sehgal, Ikram ul-Majeed. Ojhri Camp Blast Near Rawalpindi. Rawalpindi: Defence Journal, Volume 9, Issues 1-3, 2005.

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Newspapers

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Secondary Source

Published Books

Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War on Terror. Islamanad: M.E. Sharpe, 2006.

Ahmad, Irfan. Islamism And Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami. New Jersy: Princeton University Press, 2009.

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Ahmad, Nazeer. Political Parties in Pakistan: A Long Way Ahead. Michigan: The University of Michigan, 2004.

Akhtar, Rai Shakil. Media, Religion And Politics In Pakistan. London: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Alagappa, Muthiah. Civil Society And Political Change in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Ali, Shoukat. Pakistan: A Religio-Politcal Study. Islamabad: The National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1997.

Al-Razi, Aleem. Constitutional Glimpses of Martial Law: in India, Pakistan And Bangladesh. Michigan: The University of Michigan, 1988.

Amin, Tahir. Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic And International Factors. Islamabad: Insitute of Policy Studies, 1988.

Anwar, Raja. The Terrorist Prince: The Life And Death of Murtaza Bhutto. New York: Verso, 1997.

Arif, Khalid Mehmood. Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah..... (Urdu Edition). Lahore: Dost Publishing, 1996.

Aziz, Mazhar. Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Baahadur, Kalim. Democracy in Pakistan: Crisis And Conflicts. London: Oxford univesity Press, 1998.

Baxter, Craig. Pakistan on The Brink: Politics, Economics, And Society. London: Lexington Books, 2004.

Bhurgri, Abdul Ghafoor. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Falcon of Pakistan. Karachi: SZABIST, 2002.

Bhutti, Zaiḍ A. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; Shahid-i-Azam. Karachi: Dost Publishers, 1990.

Binder, Leonard. Religion And Politics in Pakistan. California: The University of California, 1961.

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Bindra, Sukhawant Singh. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent To Simla Agreement. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publishers, 1981.

Blood, Peter R. Pakistan:A Country Study. London: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Brecher, Irving. Foreign Aid And Industrial Development in Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Burki, Shahid javed. Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1970-77. London: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Burki, Shahid Javed. Pakistan Under The Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq. The University of Michigan: Westview Press, 1991.

But, Usama. Pakistan's Quagmire: Security, Strategy, And The Future of The Islamic-Nuclear Nation. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010.

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Chari, P. R. The Simla Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 2001.

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Chitkara, M. G. Benazir, A Profile. New Delhi: APH Publishing, 1996.

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Englar, Mary. Benazir Bhutto: Pakistani Prime Minister And Activist. Minneapolis: Compass Point Books, 2006.

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Eulau, Heinz. Behavioralism in Political Science. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2011.

Farazmand, Ali. Administrative Reform in Developing Nations. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002.

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Gerdezi, H. Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship. London: Zed Press, 1983.

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Islam, Tariq. Democracy The Only Way For Pakistan: Interviews of Benazir Bhutto. Karachi: Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Archives, SZABIST, 2008.

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Palmer, Monte. Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity, And Challenges. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.

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Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A Journey of Renaissance; A pictorial Record of President Bhutto's Whirlwind Tours of Africa And Middle East. Research Report, Department of Films And Publications, 1972.

Interviews

Ehsan, Aitazaz, Interview by Imteaz Abbasi. Role of Pakistan Peoples Party During Zia Regime (January 03, 2012).

Meer, Rasheed, Interview by Imteaz Abbasi. Role of Political Parties During Zia Regime, with Special Reference to Pakistan Peoples Party (January 12, 2012).

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Raban, Ofer. The Supreme Court Endorsement of A Politicized Judiciary: A Philosophical Criticque. http://adr.uoregon.edu/assets/facultydocs/ofer/scendorsementofpoliticized judiciary.pdf (accessed March 14, 2013).

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