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Jackson School Journal of International Studies Edited and published by Jackon School students

Volume 7 Number 1 Winter 2017 The Jackson School Journal of International Studies

Vol. 7, No. 1: Winter 2017

Editors in Chief Isabella Brown, Adam Khan, Thomas Zadrozny

Editorial Board Kaia Boonzaier, Danny Crowley, Emily Ferguson, Freeman Halle, Isabel Nelson, Rachel Pollard, Camille Sasson, Nick Steele, Yiying Zhu

Faculty Advisor Sara Curran

Advisory Board Jessica Beyer, Sara Curran, Kathie Friedman, Wolfram Latsch, Frederick Lorenz, Deborah Porter, Scott Radnitz, Cabeiri Robinson, Susan Whiting

Reviewers Rian Chandra, Rebekah Cheng, Kathryn Draney, Bruno Schneider Fiorentini, Emily Grimmius, Leah Li, Nicole Shermer

The Jackson School Journal of International Studies publishes Spring and Autumn issues and receives generous support and financial assistance from the Center for Global Studies and Title VI grant funding from the Office of Postsecondary Education, International Education Program Services, U.S. Department of Education.

For print copies of the Jackson School Journal, please contact the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, Box 353650, Seattle, WA 98195, (206) 685-0578. Access the Jackson School Journal online at: http://jsis. washington.edu/jsjournal

The views expressed in this Journal are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the editors or the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies.

Cover photo taken by Gio Retti - Johannesburg, , June 2013 Letter from the Editor

his Winter 2017 issue of the Jackson Isabel Nelson and Rachel Pollard. Their TSchool Journal of International Studies optimism and perseverance was invaluable introduces the writing of exemplary during the changes to our editorial process students from the 2016 academic year. We this year. A warm welcome goes to our are proud to feature not only a research newest editors: Danny Crowley, Emily paper, but also interviews by members of Ferguson, Freeman Halle, Audrey Peronnet, the editorial board with prominent experts Nick Steele and Hayley Zhu. We also want in international affairs. The issue begins to thank Melinda Groenewegen for our with a detailed analysis of the history of brand new cover design. We are excited to WMD in the last century through a case see how the future of the Journal will be study of South African armament during shaped by these members of our Board. the Cold War. The article, entitled “The Finally, we extend our heartfelt End of the Safari: South Africa, the ‘Total gratitude to the faculty advisory board. Onslaught’ and a Case Study in Complete They were generous with their time and WMD Disarmament” by Jack Bishop, advice, and they were invaluable to the examines the political shifts that convinced publication process. Without the dedication South Africa to first develop WMD and then of the faculty and talents of our student also become the sole example of complete authors, peer reviewers and editors, this disarmament in modern history. issue could not have been possible. The Expert Insights section of this We invite you to turn the page issue brings to print exciting conversations and discover the ideas and hard work with renowned reporters, authors and of the whole Jackson School Journal of experts of world events. Our editors sat International Studies team. down with author and analyst Robin Wright, who has reported in over 140 countries for Sincerely, publications ranging from The Washington Post to The New York Times Magazine, Bella Brown, Adam Khan and Thomas as well as broadcasting services such as CBS Zadrozny News. In our interview, she discusses her Editors in Chief career. We also feature an interview with Emma Sky, an expert on the Middle East who served as a political advisor in . We would like to thank the members of our editorial board for their hard work in the creation of this issue, and would like to recognize last year’s new members for their flawless transition into our team: Kaia Boonzaier, Michael Land,

Jackson School Journal of International Studies Volume 7 Number 1 - Winter 2017 Table of Contents

Research The End of the Safari 6 South Africa, the “Total Onslaught” and a Case Study in Complete WMD Disarmament

Expert Insights An Interview with Robin Wright 17 An Interview with Emma Sky 23

Appendix: Bibliography 30 Research

Jack Bishop The End of the Safari South Africa, the “Total Onslaught” and a Case Study in Complete WMD Disarmament South Africa’s disarmament of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program in the 1990s is the only example in history of a state voluntarily dismantling its natively- developed WMD program. I examine the history of South African WMD development, both in terms of technical progress and geopolitical imperatives that caused the South African state to seek WMD in the 1970s and 1980s. I analyze the geopolitical factors that caused South Africa to abolish its WMD programs, including the end of the Cold War, the resolution of the constant low-intensity border conflicts that surrounded South Africa, the fall of the state and the rise to power of the African National Congress. South Africa provides insightful lessons about the reasons states choose to arm and disarm themselves with WMD – a critical and ongoing area of geopolitical controversy. these types of weapons. However, there have been promising examples of disarmament in recent decades that provide a hopeful precedent for the future. Chief among these is the case of South Africa, a state that by the 1980s had developed a nuclear arsenal and a well-funded offensive chemical and biological warfare program. By the beginning of the 1990s, the entire arsenal was disposed of and South Africa became an abiding party Photo courtesy of nuclearweaponarchive.org to numerous United Nations arms-control treaties, becoming “the first known state to ne of the most enduring issues dismantle its (WMD) weapons.”1 Since then, Oconfronting international relations South Africa is not only the first, but also the in the last several decades is reducing sole historic example of a state developing or eliminating worldwide stockpiles of its own weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons subsequently voluntariliy relinquishing of mass destruction (frequently referred them.2 The circumstances prompting to as WMD). This has been an especially pressing issue with regard to armed “rogue 1. Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen Franklin Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Bloomington: states” such as North Korea, Iran and Syria, all Indiana University Press, 2005), 1. of which are known to possess stockpiles of 2. Ibid.

6 Vol. 7- No. 1 The End of the Safari such events might be fruitfully analyzed under the British Commonwealth, but as the to understand how the lessons learned in 1950s progressed and decolonization began South Africa apply to other WMD-holding in earnest, South African policies became countries, so as to encourage meaningful more and more of a thorn in the side of the progress towards global disarmament. British government. Only a relatively small I address several questions proportion of the South African population regarding the South African WMD programs: considered themselves Commonwealth Why was there a WMD buildup leading subjects and the local Union government up through the 1980s? Why were these was dominated by colonists with Boer programs so thoroughly abandoned in backgrounds: Afrikaans-speaking settlers the early 1990s? And crucially, what can be of Dutch descent who had been absorbed learned from South Africa’s disarmament over centuries through war and annexation experience that could explain the into the British sphere of control. Many apparent failure of the vast majority of fervent right-wing Boer politicians in South disarmament efforts in the modern day? Africa harbored nationalistic ambitions to South Africa’s role in Cold War become an independent Afrikaner state.3 history, as well as the rise of apartheid and The centerpiece of this Boer cultural its resulting political alienation from the and political movement for independence international community are critical points in from British control was the “apartheid” policy this analysis. I argue that South Africa invested implemented in 1948: a system of rigorous, in WMD development programs in the face pseudo-scientific social control built around of an identified threat from communist brutally-enforced racial segregation. All of forces of a ‘total onslaught’ on South African South African society was classified into independence. In the face of this perceived three categories - black natives at the lowest threat, risks of inducing global condemnation social rung, “coloured” immigrants, usually were outweighed by the need for the consisting of Indian immigrants or those of creation of weapons of mass destruction. mixed racial backgrounds holding slightly Key shifts within the political economy higher standing and whites at the top of and geopolitical transformation set the society.4 There was no effort to conceal this stage to reduce national threat perception, racism by the South African government; triggering a binding and public resolve rather, it was legalized and institutionalized.5 never to develop or use WMD in the future. Throughout the 1950s, pro-democracy domestic groups such as the African National Independence and Apartheid Congress (ANC) began to lead large-scale To address why South Africa peaceful boycotts and protests against the developed WMD in the first place, we must apartheid policy,6 straining the South African first analyze South Africa’s geopolitical 3. Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, situation at the dawn of the Cold War. At (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964), 119. this time, the current Republic of South 4. Ibid. 114. 5. Kenneth Mokoena, South Africa and the United States: Africa was still the The Declassified History, (New York: New Press, 1993), 92.

Winter 2017 7 Jack Bishop government’s capacity to maintain control. armed troops from Communist Bloc nations This pressure came to a head in such as East Germany, China, the USSR and March of 1960, when the South African especially Cuba, which committed much of government fired into a crowd of peaceful its army on behalf of the Popular Movement protestors in the Sharpeville neighborhood for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).9 To of Johannesburg, with 69 fatalities the right-wing autocratic government and hundreds of injured victims.7 The running the Republic, this was a disturbing government officially implemented a “State sign that the Soviet Union, using Cuba of Emergency,” banishing even the pretense as a proxy, was intent on taking direct of democratic rule and establishing instead a military and political control of anticolonial military government. International reaction movements across Africa. This was a key to South Africa’s blatant disregard for UN assumption in South African regional threat human rights standards in these events assessments over the coming decades. led to a considerable decline in relations Spearheaded by the Mozambique with other UN member nations. By January Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the MPLA 1961, the newly minted independent state, in their respective countries, the communist Republic of South Africa, would make its forces wore down the Portuguese troops way in the world, alone if necessary, in with a guerrilla war that lasted throughout order to maintain its apartheid system. The the 1960s and into the 1970s. The dire course Republic would make its way in the world - of the war eventually prompted a left-wing alone, if necessary - in order to maintain the military coup in Lisbon10 that brought apartheid and formalized racial domination an end to Portuguese administration that lay at the center of the new nation. over both colonies. This was a heavy blow to South Africa: the only remaining South Africa Faces “Total Onslaught” South African ally in Africa was the white Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, minority regime in Rhodesia, which the newly formed government of the was also fighting for its survival against South African Republic found no shortage domestic communist-aligned militias. of threats and terrors. The perceived The threats did not stop there. magnitude of these threats established the The People’s Organization of South West evidence for the argument to develop WMD. Africa (SWAPO), a communist-backed Authoritarian Portuguese rule in bordering organization operating within the Republic’s Mozambique and Angola had been a borders in what is now Namibia, worked 8 great support to the Republic, but the to subvert the Republic’s control over territories were embroiled in long, bloody 6. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The wars of colonial liberation as the unpopular Autobiography of Nelson Mandela, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), 236. and cash-strapped government tried and 7. Bunting, The Rise, 175. failed to suppress native resistance militias. 8. Ibid. 175. 9. Piet Nortje, 32 Battalion: The Inside Story of South These insurgent militias were frequently Africa’s Elite Fighting Unit, (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004). 10. Leopold Scholtz, The SADF in the Border War: 1966- supported with weapons, advisors and even 1989, (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2013), 13. 8 Vol. 7- No. 1 The End of the Safari the region and, worryingly, appeared to European diplomatic support was sparing, be coordinating with the MPLA and their given their governments’ unwillingness to Cuban advisers.11 In the South African associate themselves with the apartheid heartland, groups such as the ANC were state, and the United States was increasingly resisting the Republic’s government both distracted by the escalating conflict in Vietnam. In the absence of external support, a mindset of traditional Boer “The perceived threats lay the independence and self-reliance took hold. No help could be counted on from outside grounds for the argument to to stave off the threats at South Africa’s develop WMD.” gate. The Republic would be on its own. Within South Africa, this state of crisis was accepted as a more or less permanent feature of the geopolitical landscape. It was violently and nonviolently, often evading known under several terms. First, there was retaliation by fleeing into communist- the government’s euphemistic term “State held territory in Angola and Rhodesia.12 of Emergency.” Then there was the popular To the South African government, term, Swaart Gevaar (“Black Peril”).16 Finally, growing only more paranoid as the years there was the enduring term used by the went by, these threats were neither random military to refer to the grave security danger - nor of local origin and they were not to “Total Onslaught”. In a geopolitical be ignored. All of them - the Angolan and environment where the Republic was Mozambique wars, the attacks on Rhodesia, facing a total onslaught as such on its very the international disgust with apartheid, the existence from numerous axes, almost ongoing ANC resistance at home - were the any military measure could be justified to products of a truly sinister plan, staggering defend the country. This was the rationale in complexity and size, “an attack on all used to pursue the secret and illicit fronts at once, launched from both internal development of various WMD projects. and external sources,”14 originating from one place: the Kremlin.15 South African South African Deterrent Takes Shape political and military leaders alike saw the The sense of isolation and paranoia hand of the Soviet Union (and later on, the in the South African government leading up People’s Republic of China) everywhere, to the mid-1970s is crucial for understanding manipulating the black population across why South Africa embarked on its WMD sub-Saharan Africa to rise up against 11. Nortje, 32 Battalion, 32. the South African government. South 12. Janet Cherry, Spear of the Nation - Umkhonto WeSizewe: South Africa’s Liberation Army: 1960s-1990s, Africa was the prime target of the entire (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012), 63. Communist Bloc, and the rest of the world, 13. De Wet Potgieter, Total Onslaught: Apartheid’s Dirty Tricks Exposed, (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2007), 93. in South Africa’s eyes, seemed content to 14. Bunting, The Rise, 301. 15. Potgieter, Total Onslaught, 93. let the Republic fight on alone. British and 16. Ibid.1. Winter 2017 9 Jack Bishop development programs. When the chemical weapons. To the handful of people various WMD programs started in earnest in the South African government that knew (approximately 1974-75 according to most of these programs, the WMD could fulfill sources)17 correlates with the years the any conceivable number of military or colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique political roles. One role of such an arsenal intensified to new levels. It also correlates could just serve as pure bluff, unveiled at with the ANC’s External Mission operations times of ultimate crisis but never used. outside of South Africa through its armed Or it could serve as a strategic deterrent wing, known as Umkhonto we Sizwe or to be used in certain extreme cases (such MK, an increasing commitment to violent as in the event of a direct Cuban or Soviet action against the South African state.18 invasion). Or, it could even be deployed South Africa’s response to these as a legitimate tactical weapon for use on threats was multilayered. First, it became the battle field, if the situation warranted. more involved in aggressive action against The government was careful to the domestic militant groups, SWAPO and conceal their involvement in WMD programs the ANC in South West Africa, expanding behind a smokescreen of benign research, the intensity of counter-insurgency claiming the projects were intended for operations. South African society became civil ends. South Africa’s nuclear program increasingly militarized and authoritarian had, since the 1960s, been supported by as a result of these anti-terrorist campaigns, numerous UN countries, including the solidifying the “Total Onslaught” mentality United States and France. The United States throughout much of civil society. Next, had provided the first nuclear reactor in the the military took considerable action to country, SAFARI-1, in 1965. The South African support anti-communist forces in the former government had declared that SAFARI-1 Portuguese colonies on its borders, such would form the basis of a series of nuclear as the Mozambican National Resistance power plants throughout the country. (RENAMO) and the National Union for the Subsequently South African researchers Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).19 grew their capacity to refine plutonium Support began with arms shipments and that would be suitable for a nuclear device, advisors intended to equal Cuban support explaining that such nuclear explosives for the communist MPLA,20 but the situation would be used for mining purposes. Finally, gradually consumed an increasing proportion in 1977, USSR reconnaissance satellites of the South African military. Conflict confirmed that South Africa was preparing escalated until over 36,000 Cuban soldiers an underground test of a nuclear device were operating in Angola21 against UNITA at a desert bombing range on the Kalahari and the South African Defense Force (SADF). Finally, as a result of the ever more 17. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of threatening conflict in Angola, the SADF Mass Destruction, 92. 18. Cherry, Spear of the Nation, 50. began to examine the full spectrum of 19. Potgieter, Total Onslaught, 6. 20. Scholtz, The SADF, 16. WMD technologies – nuclear, biological and 21. Ibid.19. 10 Vol. 7- No. 1 The End of the Safari Desert.22 Many foreign intelligence sources South African government purchased while predicted correctly that South Africa still a Union, gave South Africa sufficient was seeking nuclear capacity at least in WMD delivery capacity to dominate part because of “its increased isolation the entirety of the sub-Saharan region. stemming from…its apartheid policies.”23 Ultimately, combined US and Nuclear Alternatives: Biological and Soviet pressure was sufficient to halt the Chemical Warfare test indefinitely, but the world had been It was at this time that South Africa made aware that South Africa either had a developed its biological and chemical working nuclear device or was extremely warfare programs. While the nuclear close to having one. This was an open secret program operated under the auspices of civil throughout the 1980s, that the South African engineering and energy programs, the SADF government almost certainly did have specifically controlled the chemical and nuclear devices available to use.24 While many countries such as the USSR and the United States assumed this fact, no serious “Given the odd location of the punitive action was enacted against South Africa as a result of its nuclear program. The anomaly, South Africa was, in the US was not ready to undermine one of the eyes of many, the only possible only anti-communist states in Africa, and source of such a nuclear test.” much of the Soviet leadership traditionally regarded the African continent as backward and not relevant. The South African weapons programs continued unabated. biological elements under a secret program The assumptions of the intelligence known as “Project Coast,” assigned to a agencies were correct. The South African medical detachment of the Defense Forces. government did have working nuclear devices The ostensible goals of the Project intended throughout the 1980s: six operable nuclear to develop defensive countermeasures to bombs, each of them built in roughly the chemical and biological warfare. In actuality, same manner and with the same destructive some defense projects were undertaken. The capacity as the device the US dropped on Project aimed to develop offensive versions Hiroshima in 1945.25 In addition to the help of lethal chemical and biological agents South Africa secured from Western powers suitable for both domestic and foreign use. in developing nuclear technology, South Before Project Coast was deactivated Africa received its prime delivery system for in the early 1990s, concurrent with the the devices from : the RSA-4 “Jericho” fall of apartheid, significant quantities of short/intermediate-range ballistic missile. 22. Mokoena, South Africa and the United States,116. These missiles, coupled with outdated 23. Ibid. 116. but dangerous Canberra and Buccaneer 24. Ibid. 143. 25. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass bomber aircrafts of British vintage that the Destruction, 60.

Winter 2017 11 Jack Bishop biological warfare agents such as anthrax, only growing more dangerous and vocal and plague, cholera and botulinum among many rising Western disapproval of apartheid was others had been stockpiled for use. Project threatening to cut off almost all remaining Coast had also taken the lead in developing foreign support for the regime. And yet, large quantities of lethal chemical agents only a few years later, all of these top-secret such as ricin, mustard gas and CX gas. As a programs and their sinister products would strange side-effect of the program, huge be disposed of, the chemical and biological amounts of nonlethal narcotics such as stockpiles destroyed and the nuclear cocaine, methamphetamine, methadone devices dismantled and neutralized with and MDMA were also produced towards full UN oversight and approval by 1993.29 the end of the 1980s under the auspices of developing “riot control” measures. Most of Bombs Away - The End of the Programs these agents were sold on the global black This is where my exploration takes a market in order to personally enrich Project turn from why and how South Africa armed commanders and to illicitly raise funding itself with WMD to why it chose to give them for weapons research that did not appear up in less than a decade. The ultimate reason on government budgets.26 Project Coast for South African WMD disarmament had effectively produced a remarkable range of very little to do with direct influence from lethal biological and chemical agents used international bodies such as the UN or the in Angola. SADF forces regularly employed United States. Rather, it was a perfect storm Project Coast chemical agents to poison of lessened threats that made the long-term wells, and allegedly used them in gas positive impacts of South Africa holding form on the battlefield against MPLA and WMD much less promising. As a result, Cuban forces.27 In several recorded cases, WMD disarmament became a more sensible advanced Project Coast poisons were used choice than it had been in previous years. domestically in attempts to murder the ANC- The first factor was the softening friendly Reverend Frank Chikane, “one of the and eventual collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 30 enemies of the state” in ways that couldn’t 1988-89. The “Total Onslaught” theory easily be traced back to the government.28 depended on the idea that the Kremlin’s hand By the mid-1980s, parts of the was behind the independence movements South African WMD development program across Africa. The moment this perceived were in place. Project Coast churned out threat was dispelled, along with the implicit biological and chemical weapons in bulk threat of a direct Soviet assault on the and the nuclear program had produced six Republic of South Africa, a huge part of the presumably working nuclear devices, with need to keep WMD stockpiled as a deterrent a seventh device under construction.31 or countermeasure to a Soviet strike vanished

The “Total Onslaught” mentality was 26. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass stronger than ever within the South African Destruction, 114. 27. Ibid. 102. government. At this time, the Angolan War 28. Ibid.152. 29. Ibid. 121. was at its highest intensity. The ANC was 30. Mokoena, South Africa and the United States, 118. 12 Vol. 7- No. 1 The End of the Safari overnight.31 The wars on the borders were Rhodesian government and the beginning certainly still dangerous and many within of black majority rule there about a decade the South African military establishment prior in 1980,33 effectively ended the long were still skeptical of Russian and Chinese decades of frontier conflicts and border wars intentions in Africa. However, the Angolan that had been ongoing almost continually militias and domestic rebels, now on their since South Africa’s independence from own and divorced from global communist support, were no longer perceived as a sufficiently dangerous threat to require a WMD deterrent. South African leaders that “The ‘Total Onslaught’ mentality had pushed for WMD programs were hard- was stronger than ever within the pressed to defend them now that the prime South African government.” enemy and perceived architects of the “Onslaught” were no longer in the equation. The second, closely related set of factors in South Africa’s decision to disarm the British Commonwealth. This removed was the end of its involvement in the war in the tactical rationale for potentially Angola in 1988, the end of fighting in South deploying WMD on the battlefield against West Africa and the resulting departure of the Angolans or Cubans, dissolving the Cuban forces. The Angolan settlement was other prime rationale for keeping the the result of nearly seven years of UN-led programs active and their products in the negotiations, attempting to link a Cuban South African military-political arsenal. withdrawal from Angola with a South The final reason for total WMD African withdrawal from South West Africa disarmament was a deceptively simple (now Namibia). The negotiation’s final one. By the end of the 1980s, many leaders success in May of 1988 – barring a handful of the South African state were fully aware of provocations and skirmishes as the two that apartheid itself was on death’s door.34 sides disengaged – finally took away the The economy was caught in a stranglehold fuel that had allowed the fires of war in of economic sanctions and the government South West Africa and Angola to rage for so was nearing collapse from domestic unrest. long. With the Cubans gone, the long-held The only thing that could save the state from fear of MPLA hordes swarming into South total implosion was to make an alliance with West Africa spearheaded by Cuban tanks the ANC before the country became entirely and guided by Soviet advisors was now a ungovernable.35 While some in the apartheid thing of the past. Namibia would serve as 31. Mokoena, South Africa and the United States, 118. a buffer state between South Africa and 32. Scholtz, The SADF, 447. 33. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass the conflicting MPLA and UNITA, who had Destruction, 147. been left to fight amongst themselves for 34. Paul L. Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhodesian 32 War: A Military History, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, dominance of the Angolan government. 2008), 179. 35. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass This, along with the collapse of the Destruction, 147. Winter 2017 13 Jack Bishop government were willing to swallow their their deactivation had included the “end of pride, end apartheid-era policies and work the Cold War” (meaning the collapse of the with their old ANC nemeses in order to USSR) and the international agreements save the country, they were not willing to resolving Namibia and Angola in 1988.38 forget the tensions. During the height of the He made no mention of the widespread resistance movement, the ANC had included antipathy towards the incoming ANC numerous openly communist leaders (even administration within the government also Nelson Mandela was a self-proclaimed serving to prompt disarmament. De Klerk communist before his incarceration), and also took pains to establish that there was enjoyed both moral and material support “never any intention to use the devices” and from much of the Communist Bloc, including that “the emphasis was on deterrence.”39 Cuba, the USSR and China, during its time These statements are belied by two facts. fighting against apartheid. To many in The first is that if his statement were true, power, allowing the carefully-hoarded WMD the same deterrent effect could have been stockpile to fall into the hands of a group like achieved by deactivated or fake bombs, the ANC was a risk that could not be taken. while the South African bombs were by all This gave a powerful incentive to completely accounts entirely live and prepped for use.40 destroy the stockpiles. Keeping any WMD Secondly, a deterrent only works to deter intact would be tantamount to simply enemy action if enemy forces know it exists. handing them over to the same communist However, the South African government rivals that the government had been tried very hard indeed to conceal programs fighting for thirty years and whom security around its WMD policy for as long as possible, assessments had labelled for so long as tools thereby undermining the fundamental of the Soviets or the Chinese, depending logic of deterrence.41 While his speech was on the geopolitical tides of the moment. groundbreaking, it was highly selective In the eyes of some in the government, on the topic of WMD, made no mention of the ANC could not be allowed access to Project Coast whatsoever and was mostly the nuclear warheads or the vast array of imbedded in generalities about the origins biological and chemical agents that Project of the program. Nevertheless, his speech Coast had devised.36 This logic of suspicion marked the public acknowledgement of a incentivized total disarmament even further. change in South African WMD policy carried Once decided, disarmament out by both de Klerk and his successor, Nelson happened with remarkable speed. In March Mandela. This would culminate in the South of 1993, after years of rumors, South African African government signing and ratifying President F. W. de Klerk admitted in public for the first time that South Africa had 36. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass 37 Destruction, 133-341 developed “a limited nuclear deterrent” 37. Mokoena, South Africa and the United States, 172. 38. Ibid. 173. consisting of six “devices,” all of which had 39. Ibid. 173. been dismantled by 1990. In his speech, 40. Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, 60. he also explained that the reason behind 41. Mokoena, South Africa and the United States, 115.

14 Vol. 7- No. 1 The End of the Safari 42 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as of the greater geopolitical situation that well as a host of other arms-control treaties, prompted South Africa to arm with WMD. officially precluding the state from ever When that calculus changed – when the possessing nuclear weapons. This policy “Total Onslaught” was abandoned and South has been continued to the present day. Africa no longer appeared to be surrounded with enemies – it made little sense to Setting A Disarmament Precedent? indefinitely hold such risky weapons. As a At first glance, South Africa’s result, disarmament proceeded successfully experience with WMD buildup and in South Africa and continues to endure today. subsequent disarmament presents a difficult precedent to use for future disarmament The End of the Safari - Hope for the Future? efforts. South African disarmament was, to a This brings us to one of the most great degree, due to an extremely fortuitous recent and dramatic developments in global sequence of events which occurred almost disarmament: the 2013 accords signed simultaneously: the fall of the USSR, the in Geneva between the Islamic Republic normalization of relations with Cuba and of Iran and the P5+1 (composed of the 5 the MPLA regime in Angola leading to a permanent UN Security Council members, final conclusion of South Africa’s role in plus Germany), intended to ensure that the Angolan Border War and the handover Iran’s burgeoning nuclear capacity is used of power to the ANC from apartheid strictly for civil, nonmilitary purposes. This authorities. These events occurred within was a crucially important and meaningful the span of approximately half a decade and step forward for disarmament efforts in the created a fundamental shift in South Africa’s region and is a key example of disarmament threat perception. Many argue that trying to efforts proceeding in the South African translate this exact sequence of events to the style. Instead of using sanctions and contexts of situations related to Syria or North disarmament as punishment or instead of Korea as a way to promote disarmamet of letting disarmament talks become a tool their nuclear stockpiles might be impossible. for ulterior political purposes, Iran and Yet on second glance, there are the global community managed to sign a some important lessons from this case. comprehensive multilateral accord which From all the evidence presented, South emphasized explicit disarmament objectives Africa did not undertake WMD programs in exchange for clear economic and political out of a perceived need for prestige, or concessions to the Iranian government.43 to warmonger, or because it was trying This agreement mitigated part of the to mimic superpowers like the US or the economic and political pressures that had Soviet Union. Instead, it developed them been threatening the state, alleviating because its leaders perceived a dire and 42. “Profile for South Africa | NTI,” NTI: Nuclear Threat unrelentingly dangerous security situation Initiative, accessed November 09, 2015, http://www.nti.org/ country-profiles/south-africa/nuclear/. that necessitated WMD to ensure the survival 43. ”Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details,” BBC News, accessed April 01, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle- of the regime. It was the perceived calculus east-33521655. Winter 2017 15 Jack Bishop the need to have a defensive measure of or vilified for developing WMD, solidifying stockpilled WMD in the face of a perceived their threat perceptions and only frightening threat. This resolution is very much in them further, we can look forward to endless keeping with the successful disarmament repetitions of disarmament fiascoes. The strategy that played out in South Africa precedent of South Africa – the world’s only and avoided the double-edged sword that totally successful native WMD disarmament threats and punitive action can create. effort – cannot and should not be overlooked. Following in the example of South Africa’s 1990s disarmament effort, the 2013 agreement laid the foundation for the Edited By Isabella Brown recent Iran nuclear deal, more formally the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reached on July 14, 2015. The groundbreaking agreement alleviates sanctions in exchange for the curtail and prevention of regrowth of nuclear capabilities of Iran. Limits were placed on nuclear enrichment programs, plutonium production facilities were redesigned and a comprehensive system of oversight was implemented to allow for inspection, while international pressure towards Iran was alleviated.44 Complete disarmament was, however, not within the scope of the agreement. Jack Bishop is currently a first-year law In conclusion, South Africa’s student at the University of Washington experience with WMD disarmament offers School of Law, with bachelor’s degrees from an effective method encouraging states UW in Political Science, and Law, Society, and to rid themselves of WMD stockpiles. Justice. He independently wrote this paper States do not expend the monumental in the winter of 2015-2016, during his senior amounts of funding and effort to obtain year of undergraduate study. He hopes to WMD merely because they want to – merge his future legal career with his previous they do it because, like South Africa, they experience in his undergrad pursuits by perceive threats to their security. If these specializing in the fields of Public Policy or states can be brought back into the global National Security law. His research interests community and their perceptions of threat include African History, 20th-Century reduced, as was the case in South Africa and Military History and Environmental Law. recently in Iran, the threat of WMD stockpiling and usage will undoubtedly recede. If, 44. “Everything you want to know about the Iranian nuclear deal,” The Economist, April 5, 2015, accessed April however, failed past strategies continue to 10, 2016, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist- be implemented, where states are punished explains/2015/04/economist-explains-3

16 Vol. 7- No. 1 Expert Insights

Q&A with Robin Wright

Robin Wright was recently awarded Best Book on International Affairs by the Overseas Press Club for her eighth book, “Rock the Casbah.” This award-winning journalist and author has written for numerous agencies such as The New Yorker and is a former correspondent for The Washington Post. She is a joint fellow at the US Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson Center, as well as the Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dartmouth, Yale, Duke and the University of California. She has received several distinguished awards for her reporting and excellent journalism. She is the writer of numerous books focusing on the Middle East.

The Journal speaks with Wright about her background in journalism and the growth of her career. She explores her deep involvement in the Middle East, especially during times of violence and her opinions on the current state of media.

Journal: How did you get your start in journalism? What got you there? And, why a focus on foreign affairs as opposed to domestic issues?

Wright: Life is serendipity. And my father had only girls and he loved sports at the University of Michigan. He would schlep his daughters to every sporting event at Michigan. And we would often talk at the dinner table about what was the best sporting team in baseball or football, the dream teams. And when I went to college, one of the girls in the dorm where I lived was going off to join the student newspaper, and said, why don’t you come with me? I had just bumped into her in the hall. And I had no And I heard the editorial and the political interest in journalism. She was so insistent. editors talk about the work they did. Then I was on my way to the library anyway, so I the sports editor got up and I thought - thought I would just go along and listen. Revenge! I’m going to write one article

Winter 2017 17 Jackson School Journal of International Studies on sports and surprise my father. I ended a crisis to help the main correspondent up as the first female sports editor of a who’s there. I did a lot of that. And then I student paper in this country. And I broke went on a yearlong fellowship to work in the gender barrier at the Rose Bowl in Africa, as colonialism was ending in the 70s. 1970 when they told me they allowed As I said, I landed in the Middle East the only female food distributors and female day the Yom Kippur War or the Six Day War teletype operators in the press box. And broke out. No matter where I lived in the that’s a longer story. But, I eventually got in. world, I spent many years in Africa, many So, I’m a historian by training and I still years in Europe, many years as a roving consider myself a historian. But, I chronicle correspondent, but I always got sucked back contemporary history as a journalist. My into the Middle East because of some crisis. interest in foreign affairs started when my dad did a sabbatical in Europe and my sister Journal: You have traveled to so and I were in a boarding school because many different places including war he was traveling around a lot and it was a zones, so how do you balance your wonderful exposure to different cultures, personal security with pursuing a story? and languages and a sense of the world. And when I graduated from Michigan, I was going Wright: I don’t. I often wonder. I mean on to grad school and I thought it would be I’ve had a lot of close calls. For my first 30 fun, rather than work a student job, there years I covered wars and there was no such weren’t a lot of internships, to see if I could thing as, you know, training or flack jackets find a summer job with the newspaper. And, or helmets, or bulletproof cars or security I did! I worked for the Christian Science guards. You just went out and covered it. Monitor in Boston. They offered me a job And we carried our little typewriters around. when I graduated and I had such a good And we had to punch the yellow tapes that time. Journalism was totally an accident. would then go back to the wire services or Reuters. Words would end up in tapes Journal: And then, you started working on the other side, then be converted into at the Christian Science Monitor, how did word documents. There were no computers. you transition into being the correspondent Computers are fairly new in my life. that we read so much about - traveling to so many war zones, 146 countries now, Journal: Speaking of computers and how did that all of a sudden just happen? talking about journalism as a whole, obviously since the beginning of the century Wright: I was always interested in foreign we’ve seen a trend away from the traditional affairs because of the experience I had in print or news that defined your career. the eighth grade, and so I wanted to taste the world. And the Monitor was very good Wright: I don’t subscribe to a newspaper. at letting me be a fireman, which is a term for a correspondent who goes out during Journal: Where do you get your news now?

18 Vol. 7- No. 1 Wright: Well I’ve got an online subscription wisdom may not be true at all. The to The New York Times. But, the first thing danger is that when someone’s tweeted I do in the morning is look at Tweetdeck. it and then it becomes fact because it Tweetdeck is a twitter program. And it gives gets picked up and circulated. It is a great you the option of building columns. You have danger that news may be corrupted. your main feed, which is home, and there are notifications. Then I have everything on Iran Journal: With the Boston Marathon in one column, another on Syria, ideas and bombing that was a huge problem. issues, animals because I’m an animal nut, There was some tweet about something Iraq, Egypt, South Africa. And you see, you that was picked up by so many others, set it up for accounts that you want to follow then all of sudden they’re searching for on those subjects. You find accounts that you someone who doesn’t actually exist. like. What’s nice about it, is just like Twitter, if you like somebody’s feed you just click on, Wright: Remember Richard Jewel at the and just add them to your list. You’ve got to Atlanta Olympics? It ruined his life. There’s a build a list originally, but it’s very easy to add real danger. And, not only that, but it used to be just based on accounts you like. But you just that newspapers invested in correspondents build it, it’s very easy. You go onto Tweetdeck who had a sense of the world. Now you and you go down to the little devices down find a lot of kids going out into war zones here and you set up a whole new list. In that without security, without backup, without way, I don’t have to troll through 600 twitter having invested in the world, without the accounts to find out what’s going on. I still get resources to do it right. I worry a lot about the the original. If I wanted to see them, they’re journalism standards of foreign coverage. all still here but then I break it up. With links it’s much easier to find stuff in the region. Journal: Shifting focus to your extensive It used to be that the Western press was reporting and your writing of multiple the only one who covered things without well-regarded books, what do you seek to censorship and that’s not true anymore. achieve with your work and your writing?

Journal: What do you see as the future Wright: My dad had a great expression of new media, such as this where we can that he taught both his kids and his now reach out to non-Western media but students. He was a law professor and he we also have people who are only going said “to understand any issue, you have to to Twitter, or only going to Buzzfeed and get on top of the world and look down.” He websites that aren’t maybe as substantial? meant that you had to try to get beyond your own personal emotional attachments Wright: Well that’s the dangerous part, and try to see the bigger picture. I always that they don’t have the same commitment, try in my books not to tell people what the same high standards, same verification, to believe, but to write narratives about that myths get created and conventional people who are doing things and to let them

Winter 2017 19 judge for themselves, what’s good and bad, often tell students, you have to know one what they want or don’t want. I like to tell hundred percent of the story to tell five stories about people and be the medium percent of it. I don’t just find one person, between people who are curious and want and go oh, they’ve got a compelling story to know, but don’t have the direct access and I’m going to use that as my narrative. I that I do. And, I want to be fair to everybody. interview hundreds, sometimes thousands of people over the course of many years. Journal: Do you see your work as being When I find someone who epitomizes or influential? You talked a bit about yourself embodies a trend at the time, I use that being an outsider towards the insiders, person’s story but it’s not just one story I trip maybe, who are forming the policy. Do on and say hey that’s interesting, and that’s you see yourself as informing them or do going to be my narrative. It’s very hard to you see yourself informing the public, find those people who reflect a moment. or where do you see your role in that? Journal: In your previous book before that, Wright: Just informing anybody. “Dreams and Shadows”, you talk about the “budding culture of change” in the Middle Journal: Your most recent book, which East and how, I think you described it, the is “Rock the Casbah”, offered personal Green Revolution is only the beginning stories of the Arab Spring. What criteria do of the beginning. Do you feel the rise you have when you choose these people of ISIS changes your perception at all? to talk in particular and why do you feel like that is a really great way to approach Wright: Americans are an impatient people telling their stories as opposed to telling and we want things to change overnight, we a broader, general view of the region? want to turn a light switch on or off. It’s like we go in and we can oust Saddam Hussein in Wright: And, a very boring approach. a matter of weeks, and then we expect that we can create a democracy from nothing. Journal: True. Overnight! Change takes a hell of a long time. Look at the United States. We went through Wright: People relate more to human a civil war to end slavery, and it took us a stories than they do to facts. And if you century to get a civil rights act that ensured intersperse the facts with the human that blacks could vote. Women couldn’t vote stories, then sometimes it’s a much more a century ago. We are still, in the United powerful way to communicate something States, in the process of entrenching our new, something important, something own democracy. We had far more than every that is producing change. I know I read other Middle East country in the region does human stories. Everybody’s got a story to today. When you look at the Soviet Union, tell. The hard part is finding people who it ended in 1991, and yet, a quarter century actually reflect the moment. You know, I later, you still have a former Communist

20 Vol. 7- No. 1 KGB officer in power who may be there until one of which can be a Latin language. So, 2024. Or, for example, take South Africa. I learn Spanish or French as one language lived in South Africa during apartheid. I was and then take on Chinese or Urdu or Arabic in the day it blew up in 1976. I went or Japanese or something that gives you a back fifteen years later and watched Nelson different alphabet, a different construction, Mandela walk to freedom. And yet, a quarter access to a different culture. And even if you century later, the average black is worse off don’t become fluent in it, even if you take today than he was during apartheid. The life it for a few years, you will have enough of expectancy is down by almost a decade. I an exposure to another culture that you no sometimes worry that the people in the ANC longer think of it as the “other” and once you want to make a one-party state. That kind of can bridge that and get beyond just that change takes a long time. Venezuela was the kind of Western identity, Europeans, North first democracy in all of Latin America. Yet, Americans, and instead have an appreciation in the 1990s, it elected a strongman, Hugo for other parts of the world, then you’re much Chavez, who was in power until he finally better prepared for the globalization that will died of cancer. It’s one of the most unstable define your life. And my biggest fear is that countries on the continent now. Democracy most American students aren’t doing that. is not a straight projection. Once you empower people you aren’t always going Journal: Do you see a future generation, to know the future vision of democracy. maybe following in your footsteps? How people use their newfound rights and responsibilities is harder to control. For us Wright: Yes, but I’m a historian by training, to expect that any country in a region that and I do it through journalism. I do it by has been dominated by military dictators writing books. I go back and forth between and autocratic monarchs for decades, if not academics, newspapers, magazines, think centuries, can become a democratic state tanks. Currently, I write for the New Yorker but overnight, just because their young people I also am in two think tanks in Washington that rise up in protest, is an illusion. This is going deal with foreign affairs. You need to multi- to be a long, troubled process that won’t task. This is no longer a one job minimum. finish in my lifetime, and maybe not yours. You need to be able to do multiple things.

Journal: What advice do you have for Journal: Thank you so much. Jackson School students who are looking to pursue either journalism or foreign affairs? Interview By Thomas Zadronzy & Rachel Pollard Wright: Journalism; find another profession. Foreign affairs, look, I think every student in every discipline, to be part of globalization, which will define your lifetime, you need to have two languages, and only

Winter 2017 21 Expert Insights

Q&A with Emma Sky

Emma Sky is the current Director of Yale World Fellows and a Senior Fellow at ’s Jackson Institute. As an expert in Middle Eastern studies, Sky is a longtime journalist and author. She just published her newest book, “The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq.” She previously served as an advisor o the Commanding General of the US Forces in Iraq from 2007 to 2010, having previously served as advisors to both the Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in and to the US Security Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process. In 2003, she was the governorate coordinator of Kirkuk for the Coalition Provisional Authority. She has published numerous articles and worked in the Middle East.

This interview explores how her past education and work led her to working in Iraq during the war, as well as how her experiences in Iraq shaped her newest novel.

Journal: How did your education and your schooling prepare you for the work you do?

Sky: I think my education taught me how to think. It taught me to be critical. It taught me to be inquisitive and I think that held me in good stead. But, I feel most of what prepared me for my career is what I gained outside of the classroom, particularly from travel. I spent a lot of time traveling, a lot of time overseas, seeing things from different perspectives, seeing how different groups, communities, different peoples viewed the world - that was hugely helpful. Just much more outside the classroom then I understand that your views are shaped did inside the classroom. a lot by your circumstances. If your circumstances are changed, your views can Journal: How did your fascination with change. My education was important in the Middle East develop? terms of analytical skills, but I learned so

22 Vol. 7- No. 1 Jackson School Journal of International Studies Sky: My first experience in the Middle the White House lawn - the Oslo Accords. East was straight out of high school. I I decided I was going to move out to went to work on a kibbutz in Israel. Now, Jerusalem and I would help. I would do people know about kibbutz again because my bit to help bring about peace in the Bernie Sanders spent time on a kibbutz. Middle East. I assumed I would stay there That experience was really informative for five years until there was peace. It was a for me. My job was with the cows. I got fascinating time, at the beginning, because up each morning, collected the cows and you saw people’s opinions change. You milked the cows. In the evening, I would had leaders who were talking about peace be sitting around the campfire with young and people wanted to work towards that. people from all over the world talking You could see Palestinian public opinion about the meaning of life and how to bring change. You could see Israeli public opinion about world peace. It was almost an ideal change. Things started, for a time, to move community. I could see how people from all in the right direction. People wanted to different backgrounds could live together meet each other, and there would be and work together and could see how all these projects that would bring kids, their worlds could be. So that was a really Israeli kids, Palestinian kids together. I’d wonderful model. I just thought wow, the do projects that would take Israelis and Middle East, all I knew about the Middle Palestinians to Northern Ireland to look at East was the kibbutz. Well that to me was the experience there and people would the Middle East. I was studying classics and think we’ve got nothing in common with I decided I’m going to change my degree them. After a few days, they’d say ‘oh my and I’m going to study about the Middle god, it’s like looking in the mirror.’ When East, because I want to help bring about you look at another person’s conflict, peace in the Middle East. That’s when I anything is better than violence! Then you changed to Middle East studies. I went to realize, yes anything is better than violence. study in Egypt as part of my degree and I So, getting to meet people was critical. A spent most of the rest of my career in the lot of people-to-people relations. If you Middle East. know people and meet people of the same background, for example Israeli teachers Journal: You worked in Palestinian and Palestinian teachers or Israeli lawyers territories for a decade, managing projects and Palestinian lawyers, then they’re to develop Palestinian institutions and to meeting as equals. You could see that promote co-existence between Israelis and people would see each other as human Palestinians. Can you tell us a bit about how beings. They’d have read the same books, your work promoted this co-existence and they’d been to the same movies, they had what outcomes you saw from your work? things in common. Showing that side, in the 90s, there were a lot of efforts in that Sky: This was in the 1990s, and in 1993 direction. But, the assassination of Rabin, Rabin and Arafat signed agreements on really, had this terrible effect. I think it’s one

Winter 2017 23 Expert Insights of the most successful assassinations of all Basra and somebody would meet me and time because it really did change the course take me to the nearest hotel and everything of history. After Rabin was assassinated, would become clear. I didn’t know what my Israelis became much more fearful. The job was going to be. But when I arrived in extremists could always undermine the Bazaar, no one was expecting me. I thought peace process and the amplify the risks to myself – well, I’ll try Baghdad. I got to that were necessary for peace. There were a Baghdad, hung out there for a week, and number of Palestinian attacks on buses and they said try the north. I wandered around Israelis grew more fearful and things broke in the north and eventually ended up in down. But it didn’t have to break down. I Kirkuk. In Kirkuk, I was told I was now the think it shows that leaders really can make government coordinator, responsible for a difference. That people’s opinions can the province and reporting to Ambassador change. That peace is possible. But the Bremer. It was like being a colonial opportunity was missed, unfortunately, administrator. But, I had no idea that when I with devastating consequences. left the UK, that’s what my job was going to be. I had no idea at all. I know this sounds Journal: What pressed you to travel to crazy, but that’s how crazy it was. It was just Iraq and volunteer? not planned. People like me just turned up and were given these huge jobs to do. You Sky: Well I was very much against the Iraq think I had no experience to do this, I didn’t War, and I thought here’s my opportunity have the skills to do this. But I did as best I to go out to Iraq to apologize to everybody could. But it was a very free-for-all sort of for the war and to help them rebuild their environment. country. The British government sent out an email asking for volunteers, for three Journal: So how did you find your way months. They said it would just be three during that time? months before they handed the country back to the Iraqis. I thought, I’ve got Sky: I really had to figure it out. I had no these skills from working between Israel job description. The bosses in Baghdad and Palestine, let me volunteer. I’ll go and were far too busy with what’s going on apologize, do my little bit and that will be in Baghdad. We were just left to our done. I had no idea what my job was going own devices. I drew on everything that to be. I had no sense. But I loved the Middle I’d learned in my life. I spent all my days East. I just wanted to be back in the Middle meeting with different Iraqis and listening East. to their grievances, trying to understand their concerns and trying to mediate Journal: When you got there, what type between all the different groups. That of work did you do as a volunteer? was my experience up to that day. In my experience, it was all about understanding Sky: Well, I was just told, you know, get to the politics and the grievances and that

24 Vol. 7- No. 1 Jackson School Journal of International Studies everybody wanted justice. They just had place, and I really wanted to acknowledge different interpretations of what was justice. that because I think in Iraq, we saw the Can you have peace before justice, or best of ourselves. Sometimes you see the justice before peace? There’s no handbook, worst, but sometimes you really see the there’s nobody like, here’s the handbook on best. I really fell in love with Iraq. I loved how to be a colonial administrator. Those the country. I loved the people. I wanted handbooks didn’t exist. Just trying to do to just portray Iraqis as real people with the best each day to just break even each their hopes and their fears, as we wouldn’t day. see them as victims or terrorists, butas real people. So that’s why I wrote it. Journal: In your novel, “The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Journal: You’ve spent a lot of time in the Iraq,” you discuss the mistakes and the Middle East, but now you teach Middle achievements of both the Bush and Obama Eastern politics as a professor. What drove administrations during the . How you to decide to become a professor and did your experience in Iraq influence your not travel? writing? What were your intentions behind your writing? Sky: It was an accident. I never set out to be an academic or to be a professor. I don’t Sky: When I left Iraq, I was angry, and I have a PhD. When I came out of Iraq, I had really struggled to make sense of what it to testify before the Iraq inquiry and the UK had all been for. I thought that all of this, inquiry. That inquiry was set up to examine all of these young lives lost - we lost four what happened in Iraq so that we learn the and a half thousand soldiers, the Iraqis lost right lessons. I went before this panel, they one hundred sixty thousand, I thought questioned me and interrogated me, and I what had it all been for? I thought the only gave my evidence. At the end, one of the way to make sense of the loss is by trying interrogators, a British historian named to learn the right lessons. I think we honor Sir Lawrence Freedman, handed me his the dead by trying to take the right lessons business card and said you should come and from this war. I felt I’d witnessed so much teach. I had not even thought of teaching. during my time in Iraq, I had been there for I went to teach at King’s College London a very long time, I witnessed so much, that I for a year in the war studies department. thought I’d got a duty to record it. I thought I was also invited to give a lecture at Yale if by writing this book, I could help us learn by Jenna McCrystal who teaches there. I the right lessons and I’d honor the lives that went and gave a lecture. I was then asked were lost. I wanted to acknowledge the if I wanted to come and teach at Yale. It’s huge effort that had gone into Iraq, trying not that I set out to teach, I’d been asked to give hope to Iraqi people for a better to teach because I’d had these experiences future. Lots of young Americans did so that people find, at one level interesting, much to try to help Iraq become a better but there’s a lot that can be learned from

Winter 2017 25 them. other information known to the country. I teach by trying to get students to feel, to Journal: In your lectures, how do you empathize, to put themselves in the shoes portray all these experiences to your of other people. students? Journal: Do you think you will ever Sky: It’s difficult because most students become directly involved with the Middle were kids when the Iraq War happened. East again? When 9/11 happened, you don’t have a memory of it. They’ve grown up with the Sky: I’ll go back and visit, because I love financial crisis, not with the war. My whole the region, I love the people. I don’t know memory, my life, has been so shaped by this if I’ll live there again, and I don’t know if I’ll war. To start with, let’s have, maybe, some work there, if I’ll work in the Middle East distance from it. To try and think, wow, this again, I don’t know. I’m scarred. does sound a little bit crazy. This does sound really different. I do a lot, in my teaching, Journal: What advice do you have for a lot of role playing, because I think it’s students at the Jackson School who are really important to try and understand wanting to pursue foreign affairs? why people do what they do the way they do. What’s it like to wear somebody else’s Sky: I think it’s to get as much experience clothes, stand in somebody else’s shoes? In as you can and not to say, look I work in Israel and Palestine, I also do role playing. defense, or I work in development or I Even with the Iraq War, the decision to go work in diplomacy, you want to try and get to war, I have students play different roles. experience across different areas because One student will play Bush, one plays Blair these issues are really, really complex. and the other plays the Chief Prosecutor, There’s no easy solutions, you’ve got to try trying them for war crimes. The students and think broadly and take initiative. There debate whether those leaders should be are many different ways to contribute, held to account for the decision to go and to participate in foreign policy, and to war or not. And it’s very easy to really just try. If you’re a student at the Jackson condemn, and to be sitting in Bush’s seat, School, you don’t have to think of your and it’s 9/11, the attack happens and you’re career like, what am I going to do for the terrified of another one and you might next thirty years? You could have three or react. I want the students to just see that four different careers in those thirty years. leaders try and make the best decisions Try different things, learn different things based on the information that they have and keep going. You’ve got to be prepared at the time, and the information is not for a lot of knocks. You don’t see many perfect, and it’s very easy to see how they successes. But to keep trying and to keep move into confirmation bias. They become thinking what it is that you can do, what’s convinced of something, they ignore all your personal contribution to try and make

26 Vol. 7- No. 1 the world more peaceful.

Journal: Thank you.

Interview by Rachel Pollard

Winter 2017 27 Jackson School Journal of International Studies

Appendix: Bibliography

The End of the Safari

Barnard, Anne and Sengupta, Somini. “Syria Is Using Chemical Weapons Again, Rescue Workers Say,” The New York Times. May 06, 2015, Accessed November 09, 2015. http://www. nytimes. com/2015/05/07/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-weapons.html?_r=0.

Bunting, Brian, The Rise of the South African Reich. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1964).

Cherry, Janet, Spear of the Nation – Umkhonto WeSizwe: South Africa’s Liberation Amry: 1960s- 1990s, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012).

E. Purkitt, Helen and Franklin Burgess, Stephen, South Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005).

Entous, Adam and Barnes, Julian, “Syrian Chemical Disclosure Falls Short of U.S. Count.” Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2013, Accessed November 09, 2015, http://www.wsj. com/news/articles/ SB10001424052702304526204579101444249673518.

“Everything You Want to Know about the Iranian Nuclear Deal,” The Economist, April 5, 2015, Accessed April 10, 2016, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist- explains/2015/04/economistexplains-3.

“Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details,” BBC News, Accessed April 01, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-33521655.

Krishnadev Calamur, “A Nuclear Threat from North Korea,” The Atlantic, September 15, 2015, Accessed November 09, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2015/09/a-threat-fromnorth-korea/405367/.

28 Vol. 7- No. 1 Bibliographies Mandela, Nelson, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994).

Mokoena, Kenneth, South Africa and the United States: The Declassified History, (New York: New Press, 1993).

Moorcraft, Paul and McLaughlin, Peter, The Rhodesian War: A Military History, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2008).

Nortje, Piet, 32 Battalion: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Elite Fighting Unit, (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004).

Potgieter, De Wet, Total Onslaught: Apartheid’s Dirty Tricks Exposed, (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2007).

“Profile for South Africa | NTI,” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative, Accessed November 09, 2015. http://www. nti.org/country-profiles/south-africa/nuclear/.

Scholtz, Leopold, The SADF in the Border War: 1966-1989, (Cape Town: Tafelberg).

Winter 2017 29