november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents AQAP’s Soft Power Strategy

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 AQAP’s Soft Power Strategy in Yemen in Yemen By Barak Barfi By Barak Barfi

Reports 5 Developing Policy Options for the AQAP Threat in Yemen By Gabriel Koehler-Derrick 9 The Role of Non-Violent Islamists in Europe By Lorenzo Vidino 12 The Evolution of Iran’s Special Groups in Iraq By Michael Knights 16 Fragmentation in the North Caucasus Insurgency By Christopher Swift 19 Assessing the Success of Leadership Targeting By Austin Long 21 Revolution Muslim: Downfall or Respite? By Aaron Y. Zelin

24 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

l-qa`ida in the arabian AQAP has avoided many of the domestic Peninsula (AQAP) is currently battles that weakened other al-Qa`ida the most successful of the affiliates by pursuing a shrewd strategy at three al-Qa`ida affiliates home in Yemen.3 The group has sought to Aoperating in the Arab world.1 Unlike its focus its efforts on its primary enemies— sibling partners, AQAP has neither been the Yemeni and Saudi governments, as plagued by internecine conflicts nor has well as the United States—rather than it clashed with its tribal hosts. It has also distracting itself by combating minor launched two major terrorist attacks domestic adversaries that would only About the CTC Sentinel against the U.S. homeland that were only complicate its grand strategy. Some The Combating Terrorism Center is an foiled by a combination of luck and the analysts have argued that this stems independent educational and research help of foreign intelligence agencies.2 from the lessons the group learned from institution based in the Department of Social al-Qa`ida’s failed campaigns in countries Sciences at the United States Military Academy, such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq. While West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses true to some extent, AQAP’s policies are the Center’s global network of scholars and more the result of the realities it faces in practitioners to understand and confront a constricting Yemeni theater. Factors contemporary threats posed by terrorism and 1 Its siblings, in this case, refer to al-Qa`ida in Iraq and other forms of political violence. al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb. 2 These two attacks include the attempt by Umar Farouk 3 For a discussion of AQAP’s strategy, see Barak Barfi, Abdulmutallab to detonate an explosive device on a North- “How Attacking AQAP Influenced Its Strategy,” NATO The views expressed in this report are those of west Airlines flight as it approached Detroit on December Review 5 (2010). For biographies of AQAP’s leadership the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 25, 2009, as well as the attempt to detonate explosives-lad- and other details, see Barak Barfi, “Yemen on the Brink? the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. en packages on cargo planes bound for the United States The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen,” New America in October 2010. Foundation, January 2010.

1 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 unique to Yemen but largely absent in al-Wahhab al-Daylami, who later areas of the country that have historically other countries where al-Qa`ida operates became justice minister, made similar been disaffected by the regime’s policies. necessitate adopting a soft touch. comments, declaring, “not killing these Most of these regions are in provinces Muslims (the Socialists) leads to a where a Shi`a sect known as the Zaydis This article details AQAP’s “soft power” greater corruption.”6 preponderates. The clans there are hostile strategy at home, highlighting the to groups such as AQAP since it belongs group’s positions toward the southern AQAP, in contrast, takes a much more to the puritanical Salafi creed that loathes socialists as well as the country’s Shi`a, subdued approach toward the southern the Shi`a.8 Since making inroads with who are known as the Zaydis. As a result socialists. In an interview with a Yemeni these tribes is a herculean task, AQAP of its domestic maneuvering, AQAP is journalist, AQAP’s leader, Nasir al- has instead focused its attention on the at times less of an international jihadist Wahayshi, commented, “we know that Sunni tribal regions, which are almost group than it is just another Yemeni many of you crave freedom and reject exclusively in the south. This explains organization battling the regime in why AQAP’s bastions are located in the Sana`a and playing by ever shifting “Whereas the provinces of Marib, Shabwa and Abyan local rules. Nevertheless, this article where the population is overwhelmingly contends that AQAP’s “soft” approach Taliban enforced an Sunni. at home is merely a tactical strategy uncompromising form of since the group views itself as too weak Alienating the locals and their leaders to confront multiple enemies at this Islam, AQAP has tolerated by embracing al-Zindani’s views on the time. Indeed, AQAP remains firmly in the un-Islamic practices socialists and the ancien régime would the ideological camp of Abu Mus`ab al- hamper the organization’s ability to Zarqawi and the Taliban. of the clans that shelter operate there. As such, AQAP’s soft it. Whereas al-Zarqawi touch toward the socialists springs from The Southern Socialists political necessity rather than affection AQAP’s attitudes toward Yemen’s turned on his tribal hosts, for their cause. southern socialists and how they differ AQAP has merely engaged from those of other Yemeni Islamists The Zaydis are indicative of this soft touch. Before a in verbal spats with Although the sectarian divide between 1990 union, Yemen was divided between Yemeni tribes.” AQAP and the Shi`a Zaydis has the northern and southern states. By 1994, potential to degenerate into open conflict, the southerners, the weaker of the al-Wahayshi and his cadres have until two parties, had soured on the merger recently attempted to minimize tensions and attempted to secede. In the run- tyranny, despotism, humility and between the two groups. To this end, up to a civil war, a number of Yemeni subjugation. But you have followed an the organization has emphasized the Islamists issued fatawa (religious edicts) erroneous path.”7 Whereas al-Zindani admirable elements of Zaydism. It has denouncing the Yemeni Socialist Party preached fire and brimstone against showered praise on the progeny of the that ruled South Yemen and which was the southern socialists, al-Wahayshi Prophet Muhammad, known as ahl al- leading the secessionist charge. Chief instead adopts a gentle “fatherly” tone bayt, from which the leaders of Shi’ism among them was ‘Abd al-Majid al- toward children who have erred. descend.9 AQAP has highlighted the Zindani, Yemen’s most famous Islamist. fact that `Ali, the first Shi`a leader and He demonized the socialists, calling AQAP’s mild position does not stem fourth caliph, is one of the 10 Muslims them “idol worshippers” and compared from love of the socialists or their ideals. promised entrance into heaven.10 It has them to the Prophet Muhammad’s Instead, it derives from the realities of argued that he was wronged by the enemies in Mecca.4 He urged the Yemeni geopolitics. AQAP has adopted usurper and founder of the Umayya region’s inhabitants to “persuade this approach to curry favor with dynasty, Mu`awiyya, positions rarely Arab rulers that fighting the Yemeni southerners, which it needs for both emphasized in the circles AQAP (Socialists) is lawful, against a group popular support and tribal protection. frequents. It has gone so far as to claim of dissenting heretic infidels. Fighting The disgruntled population in the south that Yemenis “are endeared to the Zaydi it is a (religious) duty.”5 His ally, ‘Abd is hostile to the regime of President Ali school.”11 Abdullah Salih and is thus susceptible 4 Such accusations are among the worst a Muslim can to calls by groups opposed to it. hurl at his co-religionists because they paint them as en- emies of Islam. These quotes come from a speech record- Sectarian tensions equally explain 8 For Salafism, see Bernard Rougier ed., Qu’est-ce que ed on June 10, 1994, available on a cassette entitled “The AQAP’s position. The group has sought le Salafisme? (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Duty of the Islamic Nation Towards the Battle.” to establish strongholds in the tribal 2008). 5 Ibid. These are loaded terms with an Islamic signifi- 9 Abu’l-Bara’a al-Sana’ani, “The Huthis are Rafidis in cance. For the significance of the term dissenter baghi( ), on the Significance of Heresy in the History of Islam,” the Guise of the Zaydis,” Sada al-Malahim, No. 12, Feb- see Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam Studia Islamica 1 (1953). ruary 2010. For the ahl al-bayt in Islamic thought, see (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 6 Sawt al-Iman [Sana`a], June 21, 1994. Moshe Sharon, Black Banners From the East (Jerusalem: 1955), pp. 77-79; Alfred Morabia, Le Gihâd dans l’Islam 7 See the interview with Abd Illah Haydar Sha’a, avail- Magnes Press, 1983), pp. 75-82. médiéval (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993), p. 300. For the term able at www.abdulela.maktoobblog.com. This source 10 Wahayshi Interview. heretic (mulhid), see Bernard Lewis, “Some Observations will hereafter be cited as “Wahayshi Interview.” 11 Al-Sana’ani.

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AQAP’s moderate tone toward the embrace Salafism, only intensifying Although AQAP has long limited its Zaydis contrasts with that of other his conflict with the Zaydi leadership. conflict with the Huthis to the verbal Yemeni Salafists, although the two When he established a Salafist center in arena, it appears the dissidents forced its draw on a common religious heritage. the Zaydi stronghold of Sa`da in 1979, hand by turning over al-Qa`ida members The founder of Yemeni Salafism, Muqbil he again encountered resistance at the to the authorities. In late November, bin Hadi al-Wadi`i (c. 1930-2001), hands of their aristocracy and even for example, a bomb ripped through struck an uncompromising stance vis- received death threats.17 a funeral procession and pilgrims on à-vis the Shi`a sect into which he was their way to religious celebrations in born.12 He criticized the competence of Since the Zaydis posed a grave Huthi strongholds. While it is too soon their scholars13 and cast aspersions on danger to him, al-Wadi`i focused all to conclude that AQAP was behind their doctrines, saying, “it is incumbent his efforts on combating them. Yet the bombing or even offer a definitive upon a Muslim to disassociate himself until recently, AQAP considered the explanation—indeed other factors are from these innovations and deviations Zaydis an insignificant adversary. The undoubtedly involved and suggest a (of the Zaydis).”14 His adherents are organization deferred sparring with more international motive—it appears not content with rhetorical lashings; them and instead concentrated on its that retaliation spurred AQAP to take they have shattered the tombstones of chief enemies—the Yemeni and Saudi the offensive.19 Zaydi leaders and disrupted religious celebrations and prayers in their AQAP’s Two-Level Game Strategy mosques.15 “At this stage of the AQAP’s Shi`a dilemma is that its battle, where AQAP is sympathetic views toward the Zaydis Al-Wadi`i’s hostility toward Zaydism do not win it support in Saudi Arabia derives from the discrimination he still weak and the arena where it recruits and fundraises.20 In suffered at the hands of the Zaydi elite. full of adversaries, it has Saudi Arabia, the Shi`a are esteemed Since his tribe neither belonged to the as “chattel,” and little attempt is made judicial caste nor descended from the chosen pragmatism over to differentiate between their various ahl al-bayt, he could not aspire to be a ideology.” sects.21 The religious scholars denigrate religious leader in the community.16 the Shi`a, while the government This led him to abandon Zaydism and discriminates against them.22 State clergy regularly term them infidels, and 12 For a brief English account of al-Wadi`i and his the- regimes and their superpower patron. one senior cleric even said killing them 23 ology, see François Burgat, Islamism in the Shadow of al- Clashing with the Zaydis would divert was not a sin. As a result, any suspicion Qaeda (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2008), pp. the organization from its larger goal and 22-27. embroil it in local conflicts that would 19 AQAP reportedly took responsibility for the attack. 13 Al-Wadi`i warned against using their manuals in win it few friends at home and abroad. See “Al-Qaida Claims Attack on Yemen Shiites,” Associ- matters of hadith, or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, As a result, the organization’s soft touch ated Press, November 28, 2010. noting that “they have no knowledge in the science of ha- does not derive from its desire to be the 20 For AQAP’s Saudi component and monetary sourc- dith.” See his Sa`aqat al-Zilzal liNasf al-Abatil Ahl al-Rafd region’s “Good Samaritan,” but from es, see Barfi, “Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of al w’al-I`tizal (The Screech of the Earthquake to Destroy the realpolitik. Qaeda in Yemen,” pp. 3, 4, 6, 8-9. Falsehoods of the Rafidis and Mu’tazilis). 21 For historical Wahhabi enmity toward Zaydism, see 14 Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi`i, Maqtal al-Shaykh Jamil AQAP, however, has sparred with a the comments of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Latif, the great- al-Rahman al-Afghani (Sana`a: Dar al-Athar, 2005), p. splinter Zaydi movement known as the great grandson of the Wahhabi founder, Muhammad 55. The term innovation (bid`a) has historical Islamic Huthis that has been sporadically fight- Abd al-Wahhab, where he states, “We disassociate our- significance and is among the most important concepts ing the regime since 2004. The Huthis’ selves from the doctrines of the Zaydis and other innova- for Salafists. For its historical importance, see Lewis, pp. message has proved controversial in tors.” See Sulayman bin Sahman al-Najdi ed., al-Hidayya 52-53. For its use by the spiritual forefather of Salafists, Zaydi circles, and they have alienated al-Sunniyya w’al-Tuhfa al-Wahhabiyya al-Najdiyya (Cairo: Ibn Taymiyya, see Henri Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines so- leading political and religious leaders al-Manar, 1923/4), p. 98. For contemporary Wahhabis’ ciales et politiques de Taki-d-din Ahmad b. Taymiya (Cairo: of the sect. The intra-sectarian feud has complete ignorance of Zaydi practices, see the fatwa of L’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 1939), pp. rendered the rebels unable to mobilize the the kingdom’s former Grand Mufti Shaykh Abdul Aziz 228, 264, nt. 5 and 272. For its primary place in Salafist Zaydi population behind their program. bin Baz which he was forced to renounce, entitled “Opin- thought, see al-Wadi`i, Sa`aqat al-Zilzal liNasf al-Abatil ion Concerning Praying Behind One Who Confesses Ex- Ahl al-Rafd w’al-I`tizal. For its part, AQAP has sought to aggeration With Respect to the Prophets and the Pious 15 For the Salafi-Zaydi conflict, see Shelagh Weir, “A highlight the differences between the Ones.” Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen,” Huthis and the doctrines of other Zaydis. 22 For the Wahhabi-Shi`a polemic, see Isaac Hasson, Middle East Report, July-September 1997; Laurent Bon- It has depicted the rebels as Iranian “Contemporary Polemics Between Neo-Wahhabis and nefoy, Les Relations Religieuses Transnationales Contempo- proxies bent on corrupting traditional Post-Khomeinist Shiites,” Hudson Institute, September 18 raines entre le Yémen et l’Arabie Saoudite: un Salafism <>?, unpublished doctoral thesis, Institut d’Études considers the Huthis to be outside the “Denied Dignity - Systematic Discrimination and Hostil- Politiques de Paris, 2007. pale of Zaydism. ity Toward Saudi Shia Citizens,” Human Rights Watch, 16 For al-Wadi`i’s difficulties with Zaydis in his youth, September 2009. see Bonnefoy; François Burgat and Muhammad Sbitli, 17 Bonnefoy; Bernard Haykel, “The Salafis in Yemen at a 23 Adil al-Kalbani, the imam of the Grand Mosque in “Les Salafis au Yémen ou…La Modernisation Malgré Crossroads,” Jemen-Report, 2002. Mecca, told the BBC Arabic satellite channel in May Tout,” Chroniques Yéménites 10:2 (2002). 18 Al-Sana’ani. 2009, “as for their scholars, I declare them to be infidels.”

3 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 that AQAP harbors affection for the “Eastern Province,”28 but the Zaydis Choosing Pragmatism Over Ideology Shi`a and their beliefs would damage reside in Yemen’s central plateau and AQAP’s views on Abu Mus`ab al- the group in the eyes of the kingdom’s highlands. It further speaks of the Shi`a Zarqawi and the Taliban should dispel puritanical religious population. Such celebrating the festival of Ashura, but any doubt that the organization’s a stance risks drawing the ire of all the the Zaydis do not.29 It also refers to moderate positions toward the southern kingdom’s subjects in light of the 2009 market items such as headdresses that socialists and the Zaydis stem from clashes between the Saudi military and are not sold in Yemen.30 conviction rather than necessity. the Huthis, in which at least 133 Saudi Although the harsh tactics employed soldiers died.24 In fact, these references are all Saudi by al-Zarqawi led to his downfall and in nature. Saudi Arabia’s Shi`a reside sullied the reputation of jihadism in To parry such charges, the organization largely in the oases of al-Hasa and many Islamic circles, both he and the has issued articles rebuking the Qatif, located in the Eastern Province, Taliban are esteemed by AQAP as mainstream Shi`a known as the where they account for up to 33% of models to emulate. Twelvers, thus burnishing its Salafist the population.31 They also celebrate and jihadist credentials.25 In doing so, Ashura. Yet at no point does al- Ignorance of the policies of the black AQAP has adopted a division of labor Rubaysh indicate the article is speaking sheep of jihadism does not lie at the of the Twelver-Zaydi file, playing what of Saudi Arabia. He assumes his readers heart of AQAP’s veneration because a the political scientist Robert Putnam will understand the references. This number of the group’s leaders lived in calls “two level games” in addressing indicates that this is a Saudi authored Afghanistan under the Taliban. AQAP’s local and international constituencies.26 article for a Saudi audience. It also chief, Nasir al-Wahayshi, resided in the Sympathetic articles toward the Zaydis leads to the conclusion that Shi`a country during the Taliban’s entire five are penned by AQAP’s Yemenis so as polemics are distributed individually not to alienate them, while anti-Twelver in Saudi jihadist circles rather than as “This partially explains pieces and recordings are issued by the part of Sada al-Malahim where readers organization’s Saudis to target their can glean AQAP’s complex views on the why the U.S. homeland nationals. sect. Other significant AQAP diatribes is in AQAP’s crosshairs. against the Shi`a were issued by Saudis An excellent example of this is an as well, only validating the view that Attacking the superpower article by AQAP’s theological guide the organization is seeking to use wins it friends everywhere Ibrahim al-Rubaysh, who is from the kingdom’s citizens to target their Saudi Arabia.27 In a recent issue of compatriots on this delicate topic.32 and even admiration from AQAP’s journal, Sada al-Malahim (Echo of its adversaries.” Battles), he penned a diatribe against the 28 Ibrahim al-Rubaysh, “The Rafidiyya..and the Stages Shi`a. Although presumably written in of Confrontation,” Sada al-Malahim, No. 11, October Yemen, it makes no sense to Yemenis. 2009. The article speaks of the Shi`a in the year emirate.33 He was also the personal 29 They do, however, celebrate Ghadir Khumm, the secretary of al-Qa`ida leader Usama festival commemorating `Ali’s investiture. See Franck bin Ladin. Al-Wahayshi remembers Mermier, “Recit D’Origine et Rituel D’Allegeance,” Peu- his time in Afghanistan as an idyllic See www.youtube.com/watch?v=_TytRBiZaxI. For the ples Méditerranéens, 1991. period where justice and stability comments of Abdallah bin Jibrin rendering Shi`a blood 30 The passage in question speaks of purchasing an reigned, noting that “the Shari`a courts licit, see Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of `uqal in a market. The word does not exist in this context and judges did not treat anyone in the Dissent (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), p. 206. in Yemeni Arabic. In pre-modern usage, it connotes a country of the Taliban unjustly.”34 For 24 Robert Worth, “Saudi Border with Yemen is Still In- tribal chieftain. See Moshe Piamenta, Dictionary of Post- him, the severe penalties they meted out viting for Al Qaeda,” New York Times, October 26, 2010. Classical Yemeni Arabic (Leiden: Brill, 1991), p. 335 where such as beating men whose beards were 25 The Shi`a split with the orthodox Sunnis over the he states it connotes a tribal chieftain. It is used in this too short and preventing kite flying right to rule the Islamic community, or umma. The Shi`a manner in the Kitab al-Tabyin, an 18th century text on were justified.35 The Taliban are also believe in hereditary rule, holding only the ahl al-bayt tribal law. A German scholar translated the word as Sip- often cited in Sada al-Malahim as one of descended from Muhammad’s daughter Fatima and her penführer, head of the clan or tribe. See Christoph Rauch, the organizations at the forefront of the husband `Ali can claim leadership over the umma. Over “Die jemenitischen higras zwischen Stamm und Staat,” fight against the enemies of Islam. time, they too split over who was the rightful imam, or in Michael Kemper and Maurus Reinkowski eds., Re- leader. The mainstream Twelvers believe there were chtspluralismus in der Islamischen Welt (Berlin: Walter de twelve imams. The Ismailis disagreed with them con- Gruyter, 2005), p. 79. It is, however, an item people in cerning the seventh imam. The Zaydis broke off from the Persian Gulf countries find in the market. There it con- Twelvers after the fourth imam. They are considered the notes the headband worn by men. See Hamdi Qafisheh, No. 13, May 2010. Also see a recording by Muhammad al- most moderate Shi`a vis-à-vis the Sunnis. For a brief in- NTC’s Gulf Arabic-English Dictionary (Columbus, OH: Rashid entitled “I am a Sincere Advisor to You.” The or- troduction to Shi’ism, see Etan Kohlberg, “The Evolution McGraw-Hill, 1997), p. 438. ganization has made passing comments about the Shi`a of the Shi’a,” Jerusalem Quarterly 27 (1983). 31 Graham Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab in several other articles, but nothing as comprehensive as 26 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: Shi’a (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 180. the four items issued by the Saudis. The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organiza- 32 Abu Sufyan al-Azdi, “The Rafida and the Arabian 33 Wahayshi Interview. tion 42:3 (1988). Peninsula,” Sada al-Malahim, No. 12, February 2010; 34 Ibid. 27 For al-Rubaysh’s biography, see Barfi, “Yemen on the Abu Sufyan al-Azdi, “The Sunnis Between the Rafidi 35 For Taliban justice, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Brink? The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen,” p. 3. Hammer and the Collaborators’ Anvil,” Sada al-Malahim, Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 105-116.

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AQAP’s high regard for the Taliban AQAP has not chosen such strategies Developing Policy Options pales in comparison to their veneration out of altruism. Its sympathies lie of al-Zarqawi. He ranks in their pantheon with the black sheep’s dogma, but the for the AQAP Threat in of heroes, a notch below Bin Ladin and organization understands that these Yemen Ayman al-Zawahiri.36 The organization ideas cannot be applied in Yemen at has reproduced his writings and this time. At this stage of the battle, By Gabriel Koehler-Derrick speeches,37 and it has wholeheartedly where AQAP is still weak and the embraced the Jordanian’s stance on the arena full of adversaries, it has chosen the recent attempt by al-Qa`ida in Shi`a, a position that drew al-Zarqawi pragmatism over ideology. It simply the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to criticism from al-Qa`ida’s leadership cannot fight on all fronts and has mail package bombs likely designed to and the larger Islamic community.38 It instead focused its efforts on combating detonate in spectacular fashion over the has cited his views on several occasions foes that gain it the most admiration United States has refocused attention and urged readers to consult his works among Yemenis, without entangling the on Yemen and the multifaceted security on the Shi`a.39 It has preached al- group in superfluous feuds and causing threats that loom over the poorest state Zarqawi’s Shi`a gospel to the point unnecessary hardships. This partially in the Arab world.1 Media discussions where the words it uses to describe explains why the U.S. homeland is of the policy tools under review in the sect come straight out of his in AQAP’s crosshairs. Attacking the Washington to combat AQAP outline canon.40 AQAP’s relationship with al- superpower wins it friends everywhere a common set of assumptions and Zarqawi was so good that he allegedly and even admiration from its logic for how to proceed: increase ordered the organization to carry out a adversaries. As such, AQAP defies the military aid and training,2 escalate September 2006 attack on Yemeni oil simple categorization of fighting “far” drone activity,3 and utilize soft power installations.41 and “near” enemies. mechanisms (primarily aid for economic development) to bolster the government Despite the admiration AQAP has Nevertheless, AQAP’s calculating of President Ali Abdullah Salih.4 While professed for jihadism’s black sheep, strategy and patient foresight is a clear experts may disagree on the appropriate it has done everything it can to avoid cause for concern since it may mean balance between these tools, the adopting the policies that doomed them. that the group will not contribute to conventional wisdom suggests that some Rather, it has embraced a milder agenda. its own demise as was the case with al- combination of these three different Whereas the Taliban enforced an Zarqawi’s al-Qa`ida affiliate in Iraq. policy mechanisms will be essential uncompromising form of Islam, AQAP AQAP is a formidable adversary, the if the United States is to succeed in has tolerated the un-Islamic practices likes of which the United States has convincing the Salih government to of the clans that shelter it.42 Whereas not encountered since al-Qa`ida melted confront AQAP more aggressively. al-Zarqawi turned on his tribal hosts, away into the snow-capped mountains AQAP has merely engaged in verbal of Afghanistan’s Tora Bora. A unique This analysis is incomplete because it spats with Yemeni tribes.43 strategy will be required to defeat it. ignores the fact that large increases in economic aid and military resources Barak Barfi writes about Arab and to the Yemeni government are likely 36 See, for example, the praise the organization heaps on Islamic affairs. He was recently a Visiting to increase tensions with the political him in “Yusuf’s Seminary Peace Be Upon Him,” Sada al- Fellow with the Brookings Doha Center. opposition (which Salih has always Malahim, No. 1, January 2008. Previously, he was a producer with ABC viewed as a bigger challenge to his 37 Sada al-Malahim, No. 8, March 2009; Sada al-Mala- News affiliates in the Middle East where authority than al-Qa`ida) and with tribal him, No. 10, August 2009. he reported from countries such as Iraq leaders hostile to the Salih regime. This 38 For a partial translation of an al-Zarqawi speech and Lebanon. His articles have appeared is because these key actors in Yemen’s AQAP has twice cited, see Barak Barfi, “The Great Di- in numerous publications including the decentralized political system are likely vide,” Jerusalem Report, October 1, 2007. Washington Post and Jane’s Islamic to feel threatened by the consolidation 39 Ibrahim al-Rubaysh, “The Rafidiyya..and the Stages Affairs Analyst. of resources and power in the central of Confrontation,” Sada al-Malahim, No. 11, October 2009; Wahayshi Interview. 1 Duncan Gardham, “Parcel Bomb Set to Go Off Over the 40 In his interview with Sha’a, al-Wahayshi noted the US Police Say,” Telegraph, November 10, 2010. Shi`a engaged in “idle talk” (khuza’balat). The word is 2 Most experts estimate that this will be somewhere rarely used in Arabic, but does surface in al-Zarqawi’s around $250 million per year for a five-year period. See speeches. “US Funding Boost is Sought for Yemen Forces,” Wall 41 Wahayshi Interview. Also, for details on the attack, Street Journal, September 2, 2010. A Yemeni government see Hassan Fattah, “Suicide Attacks Foiled at 2 Oil Sites, spokesman recently stated that Yemen wants $6 billion Yemen Says,” New York Times, September 16, 2006. in total aid over two years. See “Yemen Wants Much 42 For how tribal law differs from Islamic Shari`a in More US Aid to Fight Terrorism,” Associated Press, No- Yemen, Carl Rathjens’ article still remains the best in- vember 9, 2010. troduction: “Tâgh`t gegen Scher`a,” Jahrbuch des Linden- 3 Greg Miller and Peter Finn, “CIA Sees Increased Museums, 1951, pp. 172-187. Threat from al-Qaeda in Yemen,” Washington Post, Au- 43 For AQAP’s relationship with its tribal hosts, see gust 24, 2010. Barfi, “Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of al Qaeda 4 Marisa Porges, “Saving Yemen,” Foreign Affairs, No- in Yemen,” p. 8 and the works of Sarah Phillips. vember 16, 2010.

5 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 government that will accompany large Yemeni population—even though anti- In contrast, stability in Yemen has been increases in aid. Without assurances American sentiment is widespread.8 achieved by those leaders who, while from President Salih that in exchange Currently, AQAP utilizes U.S. support militarily strong, were aware of the for U.S. aid he will engage the political for the Salih regime in its propaganda, limits inherent in Yemen’s decentralized opposition and respect their right to and Nasir al-Wahayshi, AQAP’s leader, political system. The most successful organize and protest, U.S. assistance has stated that AQAP supports the Zaydi imams were highly adept at ceding could end up backfiring. To fully secessionist southern movement.9 authority, particularly religious and appreciate this point and understand the If the Salih government engages in legal, to their Shafi’i subjects.11 While hidden trade-offs inherent in the policy formal discussions with the opposition, President Salih has ruled for decades, tools currently under consideration, recognizes the legitimacy of their he did participate in an election, a first two crucial points must be recognized: grievances and is willing to make some in this region of monarchs, in which his discrete concessions, AQAP will lose a primary rival won 20% of the vote.12 1. The Yemeni state is not failing. major propaganda and recruiting tool. Enlightened Yemeni leaders have Yemen’s decentralized political order always understood that in a rugged, and the system of tribal law (‘urf) that A Decentralized, Not Failing State rural country where tribal authority governs much of the country are too The most violent periods in the long has always been strong, a ruler must often mistaken as leading indicators arc of Yemen’s history have occurred of state failure. Nothing could be as a result of attempts to disregard “Invariably the cycle is the further from the truth. As one scholar convention and centralize political recently noted, the rural areas of Yemen power in the state. In northern Yemen same in Yemen: too much where tribal law and custom are the for almost 1,000 years, different groups centralization of power in organizing principles for daily life are took up arms against the Shi`a Zaydi better understood as “alternatively imam, the political and spiritual leader the state leads to political governed” rather than “ungoverned” of the northern Zaydi community, overreach that alienates regions.5 A far more serious challenge when he was perceived to take too to Yemen’s future than the continued much political power.10 More recently, tribal factions, who rise importance of tribal law stems from cliques such as the group of Arab up in rebellion to reassert declining oil revenues and a rapidly nationalists that deposed the imam diminishing water table that in recent in the Northern Civil War that lasted their independence and years has dipped to historic lows. from 1962 to 1970 have encountered territorial control.” Nevertheless, the Yemeni state will similar resistance when they tried to endure as long as it avoids civil war. extend their authority over that of local Policymakers must be aware that the tribes without acknowledging their policy tools under consideration will grievances. Invariably the cycle is the be willing to cede power in order to ultimately be counterproductive if they same in Yemen: too much centralization maintain it. This delicate balancing act de-incentivize negotiations between of power in the state leads to political stems from a contradictory reality that the Salih government and the complex overreach that alienates tribal factions, is essential to understanding Yemeni constellation of actors that compose who rise up in rebellion to reassert their politics: while the idea of Yemen as the Yemeni political opposition. This independence and territorial control. a territorial entity is widespread, is crucial because AQAP’s long-term it has never been associated with a survival is predicated on its ability to powerful, hierarchical state. As one manipulate the legitimate grievances of long-time Yemen expert observed, “the Yemen’s political opposition to its own 8 This generational gap and divisions between jihadists idea of Yemen as a natural unit has 6 advantage. is presented in Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Al-Qaida in Yemen: been embedded in literature and local 13 Poverty, Corruption and an Army of Jihadis Willing to practice. Unified power has not.” In 2. Anti-Americanism must not be Fight,” Guardian, August 22, 2010. A 2006 interview a country of high mountains and vast confused with support for AQAP. with the head of the opposition al-Islah party, Shaykh deserts, where even today 70% of the Many journalists and analysts write Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, provides evidence of about Yemen as if it was a readymade a more conventional split between globally-oriented ji- 11 The Shafi’is are followers of the teachings of Imam 7 recruiting factory for AQAP. This hadists such as al-Qa`ida and Islamist leaders such as Shafi’i, one of the four principle madhhabs or schools of perspective ignores the large rifts al-Ahmar who are certainly virulently anti-American, interpretation of Sunni Islam. See Bernard Haykel, “Al- that exist between AQAP and many praise Hamas in their rhetoric and are critical of the Shawkani and the Jurisprudential Unity of Yemen,” Re- former jihadists, to say nothing of the government yet are not advocates for global jihad. See vue du monde musulman et de la Mediterraneee 67 (1993), for Hussein al-Jibrani, “Asharq Al-Awsat Talks to Yemeni an excellent example of how Yemen’s most prominent 5 Stewart M. Patrick, “Are ‘Ungoverned Spaces’ a MP Sheikh Abdullah Bin-Hussein al-Ahmar,” Asharq al- jurist, Muhammad al-Shawkani, blended Shafi’i juris- Threat?” Council on Foreign Relations, January 11, 2010. Awsat, December 25, 2006. prudence in his own legal rulings to make the reign of the 6 This argument is made in great detail in Alistair Harris, 9 This statement came via a recorded message entitled, four imams who appointed him lead jurist more palat- “Exploiting Grievances: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Pen- “To Our People in the South,” from AQAP’s leader Na- able to their Shafi’i subjects. insula,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, sir al-Wahayshi. The statement was discussed in Mareb 12 “Yemeni President Wins Re-Election,” New York May 2010. Press on May 13, 2009. Times, September 24, 2006. 7 For one typical example, see Brad Lendon, “Yemen Fer- 10 The Zaydis, while nominally a Shi`a sect, are much 13 Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: tile Ground for Terror Groups,” CNN, January 4, 2010. closer to Sunnis in terms of religious practice. Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 1.

6 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 population still lives outside of major without conditions risks destabilizing makes an alliance based on “enemy of urban centers, a strong, centralized the situation if it emboldens the Salih my enemy” logic unlikely.21 state authority is viewed with extreme government to ignore the legitimate wariness and outright hostility when political grievances of its rivals and The Southern Movement it intrudes in local affairs and runs disregard the delicate balancing act that In the south, the prospects for an roughshod over local customs.14 has always been essential to Yemen’s alliance with AQAP are similarly stability. unpromising. The secessionist South Historically, rulers who ignored this Yemen Movement is composed of a fact did so at their own peril. Yemeni Yemen’s Opposition: Political Narrative and diverse mix of opposition groups from a resentment and insurgency in reaction Grievances, Not Jihadists variety of different ideological stripes, to government intrusion has been Yemen is awash in political opposition making it an unlikely partner for especially virulent against foreign to President Salih and his regime. Some AQAP. Furthermore, the South Yemen powers that interfered in Yemeni prominent members of the opposition, Movement’s grievance narrative is one of politics, particularly those colonial such as Tariq al-Fadhli, are former dispossession, insufficient oil revenues, powers that sought to bring tribal jihadists. To date, however, there is no and political disenfranchisement; regions under the dominion of the evidence to support claims that veterans state. The British, for example, had of the Soviet jihad are supporting “AQAP, however, has little influence over the far-flung AQAP en masse. An examination of the territories of Southern Arabia (their ideology and grievances of the major cleverly tried to latch onto colony in the Yemeni south) for almost opposition groups shows few avenues southerners’ anger with the entire duration of the colony. For of overlap with AQAP beyond hatred of close to 70 years, practically the only the Salih regime.18 the Salih government in interaction between southern tribal an effort to reorient them leaders and the colonial administration The Huthis was an annual visit to Aden to be given The initial drivers of the Huthi rebellion away from the project of weapons and salaries for their fighters.15 in the north stemmed from “Zaydi creating an independent It was only with the introduction revivalists who were originally fighting of airpower and the ability to bomb to protest the dilution of Zaydi identity southern state and toward rebellious villages from the safety of and influence.”19 More recently, the jihad and the establishment the skies that the British brought the conflict has become a violent insurgency most remote tribal territories under fueled by the lack of development in of an Islamic state in control.16 Sa`da Province (where most Huthis southern Yemen.” live) and as a reaction to “outside” Foreign Muslim and secular powers military incursions into Sa`da by the fared no better than the English. Yemeni military. While the animosity Traditional songs about the suffering is high between the Huthis and the their proposed solution is secession of Ottoman troops in Yemen are still secular clique surrounding President and the recreation of an independent sung in Turkey, and Egyptian Prime Salih, a strategic alliance between southern state. The most popular Minister Ali Sabri famously called the Shi`a Huthis and AQAP based on candidates for leadership roles (if the Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to send their mutual hatred for the regime is south were to become independent) are thousands of troops in support of improbable, especially given that the not jihadists, but prominent leaders the Arab nationalists who overthrew Yemeni government has reportedly of the former socialist government.22 Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr sent some “Salafists” north to fight The South Yemen Movement is clearly “Egypt’s Vietnam.”17 While the United the Huthis.20 The strongly sectarian a parochial project motivated by local States realistically has no other partner and vitriolic anti-Shi`a rhetoric that is than President Salih, aid provided an essential part of AQAP’s ideology 21 See issue 13 of Sada al-Malahim for the article by Abu Yahya al-Libi called, “We are not Houthis, nor are We 14 “At a Glance: Yemen,” UNICEF, available at www. 18 The Salih government has also alleged that the Huthis, like them,” refuting Saudi allegations that AQAP was unicef.org/infobycountry/yemen_statistics.html. the southern movement and AQAP are all in league assisting the Huthis. In the second issue of Inspire, an 15 Dresch, pp. 9-10. against the government. See al-Thawra, July 31, 2009. “interview” with Shaykh Abu Sufyan, AQAP’s vice 16 As one colonial official said, “Pacification has mainly 19 Christopher Boucek, “War in Saada: From Local In- amir, provided examples of much more virulent anti- been negotiated, backed up with retribution for the evil- surrection to National Challenge,” Carnegie Endowment Shi`a rhetoric: “The Shi`a are polytheists and therefore doer from the Royal Air Force in the air and predomi- for International Peace, April 2010. amongst the worst enemies of Islam. They speak in the nantly Arab forces on the ground.” See A.P. Cummings- 20 Laurent Bonnefoy, “Deconstructing Salafism in Ye- names of Islam but against the Muslims of ahl as-sunnah.” Bruce, “The Emergence of Aden since 1956,” Journal of the men,” CTC Sentinel 2:2 (2009). Also see Ghaith Abdul- A recent claim of responsibility (if verified) for two- at Royal Central Asian Society 49:3-4 (1962). Ahad’s interview with Khaled Abdul Nabi, former tacks against Huthis on November 25 and 27 calls the 17 Tim Mackintosh-Smith recounted hearing a Turkish founder of the Abyan-Aden Islamic Army, who said Huthis rawafid or “rejectionists” and describes them as folksong describing the suffering of Ottoman troops in that he was released from prison by President Salih on “legitimate targets” for further attacks. Yemen. See Tim Mackintosh-Smith, Travels with a Tan- condition that he would help the government to fight the 22 For an in-depth look at the southern movement and gerine: From Morocco to Turkey in the Footstep’s of Islam’s Huthis and the southern movement: “Al-Qaida in Ye- its leadership, see Stephen Day, “The Political Challenge Greatest Traveler (New York: Random House Trade Pa- men: Poverty, Corruption, and an Army of Jihadis Will- of Yemen’s Southern Movement,” Carnegie Endowment perbacks, 2004). ing to Fight,” Guardian, August 22, 2010. for International Peace, March 2010.

7 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 grievances and does not fit into al- long as tensions remain high between is not AQAP’s grievance narrative that Qa`ida’s narrative of global jihad. the Salih government and disaffected motivates the vast majority of Yemenis AQAP, however, has cleverly tried individuals in regions such as Marib to fight the government. Most Yemenis to latch onto southerners’ anger with and al-Jawf, AQAP will be able to have taken up arms because of distinct the Salih government in an effort to continue this strategy. Yet if the Salih political grievances and a perception reorient them away from the project of government begins dialogue with local that politics is a dead end. creating an independent southern state leaders and is willing to engage the and toward jihad and the establishment leaders of the southern movement There is little doubt that Washington’s of an Islamic state in southern Yemen.23 in political negotiations and make Yemen deliberations will result in While it is not inconceivable that some concessions on key issues, AQAP will some mixture of additional military tribes in the south might willingly look find itself in an uncomfortable position. aid and training, an escalation of drone the other way or extend hospitality to Although it cannot be known for certain, activities, and some additional economic it is possible that at this point AQAP, aid. To the greatest degree possible, the as have so many al-Qa`ida affiliates, United States should provide, through “While there certainly are would begin to attack civilians and appropriate channels, transparent a small number of Yemenis local leaders in an attempt to dissuade proposals for economic development, collaboration and dialogue with the specific and timely releases of the who are drawn to AQAP government. Such a course could lead evidence of AQAP’s plots against the and lured by the prospect to the group’s marginalization. United States, and engage the Yemeni public through editorials and press of doing battle against The security challenges in Yemen stem conferences explaining the rationale the West and its regional from a complex array of grievances behind U.S. policy.26 that if they are to be resolved require allies, it must be stressed Machiavellian levels of political While drones will probably be brought that it is not AQAP’s engagement and negotiation by to bear in some capacity, the open source local leaders. This is a process reporting on the history of drone and grievance narrative that that the jihadists—who are master missile strikes in Yemen paints a very motivates the vast majority propagandists—cannot succeed at mixed picture. The value of the successful because they do not have a political strike that killed Abu Ali al-Harithi in of Yemenis to fight the platform. Indeed, they have rejected 2002 was undermined by U.S. claims government.” the path of political compromise to of responsibility, which eliminated any take up arms and establish an Islamic chance of plausible deniability for the state. They have only their own claims government, thus causing President of righteousness and piety to legitimate Salih enormous embarrassment. More AQAP fighters and perhaps to Anwar al- the controversial attacks that they recently, a missile strike in December `Awlaqi (whose relationship to AQAP’s claim are essential to bring about this 2009 reportedly caused significant leadership is far from clear), nothing is aspirational goal.25 They will succeed civilian casualties and was widely surer to alienate the tribes of southern only if their narrative is more credible criticized by human rights groups and Yemen than civilian casualties at the than the Salih government’s. Recently, Yemeni officials.27 A subsequent missile hands of U.S.-trained and equipped this has not been too difficult a barrier strike in May 2010 killed a deputy northern troops and the sense that to surpass. Even with all of the Salih provincial governor, again causing President Salih, their primary military government’s shortcomings and the Salih government significant rival, has access to an unlimited spigot widespread anti-American sentiment difficulties.28 Furthermore, it is local of military aid at his disposal, provided in Yemen, however, the entirety of the actors and networks outside of Sana`a by the United States. country is not an al-Qa`ida training that provide the intelligence essential camp. While there certainly are a small for drone strikes to be successful. As The Way Forward number of Yemenis who are drawn long as AQAP is operating primarily in To date, AQAP and its affiliates have to AQAP and lured by the prospect of areas outside of government control, it been diligent in attacking security forces doing battle against the West and its is doubtful the Salih government will and not Yemeni civilians. In fact, 64% regional allies, it must be stressed that it be able to provide this intelligence of the attacks claimed by AQAP and its in any consistent fashion. Moreover, predecessor organizations from 1998- Islamic Army,” “Al-Qa`ida,” “Al-Qa`ida in Yemen,” and 2008 have targeted security forces, “Sympathizers of Al-Qa`ida” using data from The Global 26 Gregory D. Johnsen has been particularly persuasive government officials or utilities.24 As Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland. An in arguing this last point. See Gregory D. Johnsen, “Ye- analysis of a second open source database, the WITS men: Confronting Al-Qaeda, Preventing State Failure, 23 See “The Southern Issue: Secession or Unity is there from the National Counterterrorism Center, shows a testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Com- another Option?” in issue 13 of Sada al-Malahim, in which slightly different perspective: of 34 incidents commit- mittee,” January 20, 2010. the author presents jihad as the right path, not political ted by Sunni extremist groups from July 2007 until June 27 “Yemen: Cracking Under Pressure,” Amnesty Inter- participation in either the North or South “apostate” re- 2010 in which there were victims, 41% were against ci- national, 2010, pp. 31-32. gimes. vilians and 42% were against military and police targets. 28 Greg Miller, Greg Jaffe, and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. 24 This figure is based on an analysis of 17 terrorist at- 25 Nelly Lahoud, “The Strengths and Weaknesses of Ji- Drones on the Hunt in Yemen,” Washington Post, Novem- tacks from 1998 until 2008 claimed by the “Adan-Abyan hadist Ideology,” CTC Sentinel 3:10 (2010). ber 7, 2010.

8 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 local leaders will refrain from Many of those who hold this view also providing such intelligence if drone The Role of Non-Violent argue that any government would be strikes are causing civilian casualties in Islamists in Europe foolish in not harnessing the enormous their regions.29 potential that a partnership with non- By Lorenzo Vidino violent Islamists holds. While some of Finally, military aid and training, their views might be offensive, they while essential, will undermine their during the last few years, European possess a unique legitimacy and street own utility if they are the catalyst that authorities have invested significant credibility more amenable to young convinces the Huthis and the leaders of resources in understanding the Muslims close to jihadist views. In fact, the southern movement that they have radicalization patterns that have led they “have a much deeper and nuanced more to gain by striking now rather scores of European Muslims to engage understanding of the ‘ecology’ in which than waiting until the military balance in terrorist activities. One particularly radical and violent movements operate” has turned decisively against them. This thorny issue has been the role of than Muslim organizations generally would risk sinking Yemen into a chaos non-violent Islamists in the process. considered more “moderate.”4 According worse than anything AQAP could hope Offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, to this argument, governments should to create on its own. Jamaat-i-Islami, Milli Görüs, so-called empower the work of these groups, non-jihadist/political Salafists, and which constitute the ultimate bulwarks The strategy devised for Yemen must other Islamist movements have in fact against violent radicalization. be one that keeps only a light U.S. established an extensive presence in footprint in the country and exploits most European countries. Although One of the most vocal proponents of the contradictions and weaknesses there are important differences in the this view is Robert Lambert, the former inherent in al-Qa`ida’s ideology, which strain of Islamism embraced by these head of the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), offers no political solutions in a country groups, it is fair to say that while they the section of the London Metropolitan swimming in political problems. The support acts of violence in regions where Police devoted to engaging the city’s greatest current danger is that through they believe Muslims are under attack, Muslim community. Lambert argues that an overly heavy intervention in Yemeni they all oppose attacks in Europe of the the “ideal yes-saying” Muslim leaders affairs, the United States provides kind plotted by al-Qa`ida and affiliated lack legitimacy in their communities and AQAP a perfect propaganda tool to networks. The two questions debated have no knowledge of radicalization. He point to the hand of the United States by European scholars and policymakers advocates “police negotiation leading as the only force sustaining the Salih have been: what is the role of non- to partnership with Muslim groups government and further exploit the violent Islamists in the radicalization conventionally deemed to be subversive grievances of the wide ranging political process? Could they become government to democracy.”5 Lambert uses as example opposition to its own ends. Pressure on partners in the fight against violent of this potential STREET (Strategy to the Salih government to engage with its radicalization? Re-Empower and Educate Teenagers), political rivals and an understanding a counter-radicalization program run that maintaining power in Yemen often The Debate Over Non-Violent Islamists by strict Salafists in the Brixton area requires ceding it to local leaders is As for the first question, one strand of of London. According to Lambert, essential to minimize the threat posed thinking considers non-violent Islamist STREET, thanks to its combination of by AQAP to both the United States and groups as “conveyor belts” for further “street skills and religious integrity,” Yemen. radicalization. This is the view of has been particularly successful in former British Home Secretary Jacqui contrasting the recruitment efforts of al- Gabriel Koehler-Derrick is an Associate at Smith, who has stated that non-violent Qa`ida-linked preachers in the area.6 the Combating Terrorism Center and an Islamists “may not explicitly promote instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, violence, but they can create a climate Danish security services share this West Point. Mr. Koehler-Derrick holds an of fear and distrust where violence analysis, arguing that in some cases M.A. in International Affairs from Columbia becomes more likely.”1 Critics challenge “it is precisely these individuals who University’s School of International and this attitude by arguing that there have the best chance of influencing the Public Affairs and a B.A. in International is “no empirical evidence of a causal attitudes of the young people who are Relations from Tufts University. link between extremism and violent in a process of radicalisation, in a non- extremism.”2 The image of a “slippery slope from political mobilisation to

anger and, finally, to violent extremism proaches to Counter-Terrorism,” Demos, 2006. and terrorism” is, according to some, 4 Peter Mandaville, “Engaging Islamists in the West,” 3 flawed and not supported by facts. CTC Sentinel 1:7 (2008). 5 Personal interview, Robert Lambert, London, Decem- 1 Alan Travis, “Time to Tackle the Non-Violent Extrem- ber 2008; Robert Lambert, “Empowering Salafis and Is- ists, Says Smith,” Guardian, December 11, 2008. lamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism 2 Rachel Briggs, “Community Engagement for Counter- Case Study,” Political Science & Politics 41:1 (2008). Terrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom,” Interna- 6 Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, “Why tional Affairs 86:4 (2010). Conventional Wisdom on Radicalisation Fails: The Per- 3 Rachel Briggs, Catherine Fieschi, and Hannah Lowns- sistence of a Failed Discourse,” International Affairs 86:4 29 Ibid. brough, “Bringing It Home: Community-Based Ap- (2010).

9 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 violent direction.”7 Lambert and the non-violent Islamist groups “do not Islamists are attempting to benefit Danish security services embrace the carry out recruitment activities for from what in social movement theory is view that, rather than conveyor belts, the purpose of the violent ‘Holy War’ known as positive radical flank effect.14 non-violent Islamists act as “firewalls.” (Jihad),” and that, to the contrary, According to the theory, more moderate An individual who embraces their wings of a political movement improve views might be considered a “radical,” they might rather claim to their bargaining position when a more in some cases espousing opinions that immunise young Muslims radical fringe emerges. Applied to non- are repugnant to the majority, but the against jihadist indoctrination by violent Islamist groups, the positive firewall represented by non-violent presenting to them an alternative radical flank effect would explain Islamists prevents that person from offer of identification...However, why the emergence of al-Qa`ida and becoming a violent radical. one has to critically ask whether other jihadist groups has led European their activities that are strongly governments to see non-violent Critics argue that while it might be directed at preserving an “Islamic Islamists more benignly and even to flirt true that most non-violent Islamists identity” intensify disintegration with the idea of establishing forms of do not become violent radicals, it is and contribute to the development partnership. The emergence of a severe unquestionable that some do. Umar of Islamist parallel societies.10 and prolonged terrorist threat, argue Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried people such as Chouet, has led European to detonate a bomb on an airplane Moreover, they argue, embracing governments to lower the bar of what is over the United States on Christmas the conveyor belt theory, there “is acceptable and endorse organizations Day in 2009, and Cüneyt Ciftci, the risk that such milieus could also holding highly controversial and anti- Germany’s first suicide bomber, are form the breeding ground for further democratic views as long as they oppose just the latest examples of militants radicalization.”11 violence in the Old Continent. whose radicalization path started with non-violent Islamist groups before Many security officials in various The French Example progressing further. The firewall effect European countries similarly accept the Chouet’s warning is echoed by of these groups is, according to critics, view that identifying the enemy only unlikely supporters of this view: social only occasional and there is no empirical in violent groups is a self-deceiving workers from France, the country evidence to support the view that it is a act. Alain Grignard, the deputy head of that first experimented with informal constant. To the contrary, according to the Belgian police’s counterterrorism partnerships with non-violent Islamist the Quilliam Foundation, non-violent unit and a professor of Islamic studies groups and where their long-term Islamist groups “advocate separatist, at Brussels Free University, calls al- impact is easier to detect. In the early confrontational ideas that, followed Qa`ida an “epiphenomenon,” the 1990s, in fact, French authorities became to their logical conclusion, lead to most visible aspect of a much larger concerned by the surge of criminal violence. At the very least, the rhetoric threat that is political Islam.12 Alain activities, unemployment and a more of radicals provides the mood music to Chouet, the former head of France’s general sense of disenfranchisement which suicide bombers dance.”8 counterintelligence service, the DGSE, that pervaded the banlieues, the housing agrees with Grignard and believes that projects that surround most French Furthermore, argue some, even assuming cities. In response, French authorities non-violent Islamists can indeed sway Al-Qaeda is only a brief episode began empowering local Muslim some individuals from becoming violent and an expedient instrument in Brotherhood-linked organizations that radicals, the long-term implications the century-old existence of the already engaged in grassroots initiatives on social cohesion and integration of Muslim Brotherhood. The true to sway young Muslims from crime and any partnership the government might danger is in the expansion of the drugs.15 The perception that non-violent enter with them would greatly offset the Brotherhood, an increase in its Islamist groups could succeed where yet-to-be-proven, short-term benefits audience. The wolf knows how to the state had failed led many French in the security field. This position has disguise itself as a sheep.13 policymakers, particularly at the local been repeatedly championed, among level, to provide financial support to others, by the German security services. Chouet’s comparison of the Muslim them.16 This security-based partnership In its annual report, the Bundesamt für Brotherhood to a wolf in sheep’s

Verfassungsschutz (BfV) has stated that clothing is echoed by many security 14 See, for example, Herbert H. Haines, “Black Radical- “‘legalistic’ Islamist groups represent an experts who fear that non-violent ization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970,” in especial threat to the internal cohesion Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, Social Movements 9 of our society.” The BfV admits that 10 “Integration as a Means to Prevent Extremism and (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company, 1997), pp. Terrorism: Typology of Islamist Radicalisation and Re- 440-441. 7 “A Common and Safe Future: Proposal for an Action cruitment,” German Federal Office for the Protection of 15 Frank Peter, “Leading the Community of the Middle Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalisation the Constitution, January 2007, p. 5. Way: A Study of the Muslim Field in France,” The Muslim among Young People,” Danish Ministry of Refugee, Im- 11 Annual report of the German Federal Office for the World 96:4 (2006). migration and Integration Affairs, June 2008. Protection of the Constitution, 2005, p. 190. 16 Dounia Bouzar, L’Islam des Banlieues: Les Prédicateurs 8 This quote is drawn from the Quilliam Foundation’s 12 Sylvain Besson, La Conquête de l’Occident (Paris: Seuil, Musulmans: Nouveaux Travailleurs Sociaux? (Paris: Syros launch publication in April 2008. 2005), p. 40. la Découverte, 2001); Marie-France Etchegoin and Serge 9 Annual report of the German Federal Office for the 13 Caroline Fourest, Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Raffy, “La Vérité sur l’Islam en France,” Le Nouvel Ob- Protection of the Constitution, 2005, p. 190. Tariq Ramadan (New York: Encounter, 2008), p. 103. servateur, February 2, 2006; Personal interview, French

10 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 was widely implemented, albeit never the 1990s, however, Father Delorme substantial bodies of information that as a formal policy and not across the became convinced that not all Muslim would provide a comprehensive glimpse board, and received a boost after the organizations were the same. “There is into a person’s path to radicalization. September 11 attacks on the United an Islam of the families, which is for the Moreover, while it might be relatively States.17 If during the 1990s some French most part an Islam of hospitality and easy to determine cases in which non- policymakers envisioned non-violent piety,” argued the clergyman in a 2001 violent Islamists acted as firewalls, Islamists as “social pacificators” keeping interview with Le Monde, stating that the assessing their role as conveyor belts is order inside the banlieues, the emergence majority of French Islam is as such, significantly more challenging. While of terrorism and radicalization as state “neither static nor dominating.”21 it might be true that they provide the priorities added a new responsibility, “mood music to which suicide bombers as non-violent Islamists were seen as a “What I criticize,” continued Father dance” and that they have made possible antidote to the jihadists.18 Delorme, who has worked for decades in mainstream a narrative over which Lyon’s most troubled neighborhoods, violent groups build their recruiting Yet 15 years later the results have efforts, empirically proving such an left many skeptical. They point to is the work of hardening of the intangible role is almost impossible. the fact that crime and the sense of religious identity operated by some disenfranchisement that plagued the organizations that have an interest Given this lack of empirical evidence, banlieues have not been reduced by the in discrediting such popular intuitively it can be argued that in some activities of non-violent Islamist groups. Islam; I am thinking in particular cases non-violent Islamist groups act Most importantly, others point at the at the current of the Muslim as firewalls while in others as conveyor negative social developments that their Brothers...I came to understand belts. Radicalization is a highly influence has brought. One particularly that they were dangerous when I individualized and unpredictable loud voice has been that of the women’s saw that they cut the ties between journey. Many who join non-violent association Ni Putes Ni Soumises, a the young and their families, Islamist networks will never make the feminist group traditionally linked to explaining that their parents did leap to jihadist networks and, to the the French Left. “In the 1980s [in the not practice the true Islam, that contrary, will actively challenge their banlieues], there were mixed marriages they were not on the right path. I influence. Yet many cases have shown and sexuality was treated in far less also understood that they wormed that others will make the leap. In intolerant terms,” recounted a Ni Putes their way into institutions, taking substance, the dearth of evidence on the Ni Soumises militant. As Brotherhood advantage of secularism, using the radicalization process and its lack of organizations began their government- rhetoric of secularism, but using it linearity makes conclusive assessments subsidized activities, she argued, the only as a means; for basically they on the role of non-violent Islamists social climate changed significantly: were against integration, and the almost impossible. Furthermore, some “Today, there is nothing left in these identity they sought was that of of the potentially negative implications neighborhoods: no sense of life, no love, a community of Muslims, living of partnering with non-violent Islamists nothing but prohibition.”19 autonomously in the Republic, like are not strictly security-related, a potent countervailing power.22 but rather involve broader issues of A similar view is held by Father integration and social cohesion with Christian Delorme, the liaison to the No Conclusive Evidence which most European governments Muslim community for the diocese of Any decision on the opportunity to are still grappling. As a consequence, Lyon. Since the 1980s, Father Delorme partner with non-violent Islamists positions and policies on the issue swing had been active in organizing protests would ideally be based on an almost erratically. and popular marches against the empirical assessment of their role in discrimination North Africans faced in both the radicalization and counter- Dr. Lorenzo Vidino is a Fritz Thyssen France and was among the most vocal radicalization process. Yet, in reality, Stiftung visiting fellow at the RAND backers of government support for the there is little evidence to conclusively Corporation. His latest book, The New activities of Islamic organizations in the back either the conveyor belt or the Muslim Brotherhood in the West, was banlieues, arguing that more piety would firewall argument. There is substantial published by Columbia University Press in have a beneficial effect.20 By the end of anecdotal evidence supporting both September 2010. positions simultaneously, but no government official, Paris, February 2007; Personal in- systematic, comprehensive studies terview, French government official, Lyon, June 2006. that can definitively prove either. This 17 Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the deficiency is due to a variety of factors, West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), from an only recently reversed lack of pp. 273-274. interest from the research community 18 Vincent Geisser and Aziz Zemouri, Marianne et Al- to problems in obtaining access to lah: Les Politiques Français face à la “Question Musulmane” (Paris: La Découverte, 2007), p. 117; Nicolas Sarkozy, La Issus de l’Immigration,” Le Monde, December 4, 2001. République, les Religions, l’Espérance (Paris: Éditions du 21 Philippe Bernard and Xavier Ternisien, “Il Faut Cerf, 2004), p. 100. Reconnaître la Sur-Délinquance des Jeunes Issus de 19 Fourest, p. 191. l’Immigration,” Le Monde, December 4, 2001. 20 “Il Faut Reconnaître la Sur-Délinquance des Jeunes 22 Fourest, p. 191.

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Although paramilitary action is just one There are many reasons why recovery The Evolution of Iran’s strand of Iranian influence-building in has been possible. In June 2009, the Special Groups in Iraq Iraq, it plays a particularly important U.S.-Iraq security agreement ended role in Iran’s pursuit of security-related the ability of U.S. forces to operate By Michael Knights objectives. Seeking to replicate the unilaterally in Iraq’s cities, where model used by Lebanon’s Hizb Allah, much of the fight against the Special following iran’s apparent role in kick- the Special Groups are considered a Groups has been conducted. The U.S. starting the long-delayed formation of vanguard that will leverage its record military thereafter required an Iraqi a government in Baghdad, Tehran is of resistance against the United States warrant and Iraqi military cooperation seen by many as the most influential after major U.S. forces depart Iraq in to undertake raids against the Special external power in Iraq.1 While this December 2011. As well as seeking to Groups. In the extended lead-up to may or may not be true, it is clear that hasten the U.S. withdrawal, the Special Iraq’s March 2010 elections, Prime Iran has a proven ability to commission Groups demonstrate Iran’s ability to Minister Nuri al-Maliki sought to win violence inside Iraq.2 Yet while the destabilize Iraq and may be used to favor with other Shi`a factions by using covert programs run by the Iranian pressure a future government into his direct operational control of Iraq’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods reducing the long-term presence of U.S. Counterterrorism Command to place a Force is a source of influence in Iraq, forces in the country. More broadly, virtual embargo on such raids. Lacking paramilitary operations come at a cost. the Special Groups represent a flexible the judicial evidence to hold Special The militarization of Iranian influence tool that might be used to aid Iran’s Group detainees transferred to the Iraqi is often counterproductive in Iraq, effort to prevent nationalist and former government, and facing pressure from reinforcing Iraqis’ generally negative Ba`athists from rising to the top of Iraqi Shi`a groups, the government began attitudes toward Iran.3 Tehran’s concern politics and to maintain leverage over a to release Special Group prisoners as about negative Iraqi perceptions of its new Shi`a-led government. soon as they were transferred to Iraqi paramilitary proxies has influenced custody by the United States.7 the evolution of Iranian support to the According to pre-2003 Iraqi so-called “Special Groups” of militant government reporting on Iranian proxy The military cells supported by Iran Shi`a diehards in Iraq. operations, the IRGC Qods Force had are spread across the legal spectrum, already anticipated the need to split from completely covert organizations Iranian Support to “Special Groups” its support between groups that would to political parties with deniable As the unclassified Iraqi government “work openly” and others that would connections to the IRGC Qods Force. Harmony records collated by the “work secretly” in a post-invasion They include: Combating Terrorism Center at West Iraq.6 Ba`athist reporting appears to Point illustrate, the Islamic Republic of have been well-sourced and accurate Kataib Hizb Allah Iran has been in the business of sponsoring in many respects: they correctly Kataib Hizb Allah (KH) was formed in Iraqi paramilitary proxies for 30 years, anticipated Iran’s ability to support early 2007 as a vehicle through which practically the government’s entire public organizations such as the Islamic the IRGC Qods Force could deploy its existence.4 In some cases, the same Iraqi Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the most experienced operators and its individuals run like a thread throughout paramilitary Badr Organization, while most sensitive equipment.8 Much can the entire story, from Islamic terrorists, also backing covert Special Groups. A be gleaned from the positioning of Abu to exiled anti-Saddam guerrillas, to anti- consistent feature of Iran’s patronage has Mahdi al-Muhandis (whose real name American Special Group fighters in post- been careful efforts to spread Tehran’s is Jamal al-Ibrahimi) as the leader of Ba`athist Iraq.5 Many of the historical bets across many different horses. KH. Born in Basra, al-Muhandis is an patterns of Iranian support to Iraqi adviser to IRGC Qods Force commander proxies hold true today. The Politics of Special Group Operations Qasem Soleimani. The life history of al- The armed factions that make up the Muhandis describes the arc of Iranian 1 A sober analysis of the situation is Martin Chulov, Special Groups have passed through support for Iraqi Shi`a proxies, with al- “Iran Brokers Behind-the-Scenes Deal for Pro-Tehran significant changes in the last two Muhandis starting as an exiled member Government in Iraq,” Guardian, October 17, 2010. years, and they continue to evolve. of the outlawed Da`wa Party, working 2 Probably the best primer on this issue is Joseph Felter The government security offensives with the IRGC Qods Force to undertake and Brian Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and of spring 2008 caused considerable ‘Other Means’ (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism damage to Iranian-backed networks, 7 Personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, Wash- Center, 2008). and many Special Group operators fled ington, D.C., August 4, 2010. In private conversations, 3 Good polling data is available to support the strong to sanctuaries in Iran. Since the summer U.S. intelligence personnel are candid about the limita- anecdotal and media evidence available on this issue to of 2009, these groups have been allowed tions that now face any U.S.-initiated actions against Iraq watchers. See David Pollock and Ahmed Ali, “Iran breathing space to recover and begin to Special Group operators. Gets Negative Reviews in Iraq, Even from Shiites,” The reestablish their presence in Iraq. 8 KH has been closely associated with the fielding of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 4, 2010. RPG-29 and with sensitive communications security 4 See Annex B of Felter and Fishman, which contains 6 “Study About the Disloyal Badr Corps 9,” Iraqi Gen- equipment. KH was credited with having accessed an Ba`ath-era intelligence documents. eral Security Office, January 2002, translated as part of encrypted datalink feed from a U.S. Predator unmanned 5 “Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat the Harmony records, reference number ISGQ-2005- aerial vehicle. For details, see Michael Hoffman, John to Stability in Iraq,” U.S. Treasury Department, July 2, 00038283, p. 71. Available in Felter and Fishman, p. Reed and Joe Gould, “Army: Working to Encrypt UAV 2009. 324. Video Feeds,” Army Times, December 21, 2009.

12 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 terrorist operations against the Kuwaiti Daqduq in Basra on March 20, 2007.14 Badr Organization royal family and the U.S. and French In time, al-Khazali was transferred Although the Badr Organization is a embassies in Kuwait in the early 1980s.9 to Iraqi custody and then released in major political organization with seats Al-Muhandis then joined the Badr exchange for kidnapped Briton Peter in the new parliament, it also arguably movement while living in Iran in 1985, Moore on January 5, 2010.15 Although plays a significant role in facilitating rising to become one of the Iraqi deputy far less senior in the IRGC Qods Force Special Group operations in Iraq. When commanders of Badr by 2001.10 He is hierarchy than al-Muhandis and 20 it was formed in the early 1980s, the a strategist with extensive experience years his junior, Qais al-Khazali could Badr movement was, in effect, the dealing directly with the most senior become a significant political force in first Special Group.19 A proportion Iraqi politicians; indeed, al-Muhandis mainstream politics and is being courted of senior Special Group commanders was, until the March 2010 elections, an by both al-Maliki and al-Sadr precisely such as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis are elected member of parliament, albeit because he has the capability to draw Badr personnel, with long-standing spending most of his time in Iran.11 away a portion of Moqtada’s supporters ties to current Badr leader Hadi al- Under al-Muhandis, KH has developed if he so chooses. Amiri. After 2003, Badr became the as a compact movement of less than part of the IRGC Qods Force that was 400 personnel that is firmly under During al-Khazali’s absence in prison, selected to “work openly” within the IRGC Qods Force control and maintains AAH played a delicate game, balancing new Iraq. Badr inserted hundreds of its relatively good operational security.12 the need to negotiate for the release of Iranian-trained operatives into the state detainees against the desire of many security organs (notably the Ministry of Asaib Ahl al-Haq AAH members to continue attacking Interior intelligence structure and key Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) emerged U.S. forces. Like its predecessor, Jaysh special forces and Iraqi Army units). between 2006 and 2008 as part of al-Mahdi, AAH is becoming a catch- As a result, the Special Groups have an effort by the IRGC Qods Force to all for a wide range of militants who regularly received tip-offs and targeting create a popular organization similar seek to engage in violence for a host guidance from their “fellow travelers” to Lebanese Hizb Allah that would be of ideological, sectarian or purely in the Badr movement.20 easier to shape than Moqtada al-Sadr’s commercial motives.16 Notorious Special uncontrollable Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Group commanders such as Sadrist Iran’s Changed Approach movement.13 AAH was built around breakaway Abu Mustapha al-Sheibani The period since 2003 has witnessed one of al-Sadr’s key rivals, a protégé of (whose real name is Hamid Thajeel al- a balance of Iranian successes and al-Sadr’s father called Qais al-Khazali Sheibani) and infamous Shi`a warlord failures in its proxy operations in who had consistently opposed al-Sadr’s Abu Deraa (whose real name is Ismail Iraq. On the one hand, Iran has kept cease-fire agreements with the U.S. and al-Lami) are reported to be returning up military pressure on U.S. forces in Iraqi militaries. After AAH undertook from Iran to join AAH.17 Iraq and has demonstrated its ability the kidnap and murder of five U.S. to destabilize key areas. On the other soldiers on January 20, 2007, al- Promised Day Brigades hand, Iranian paramilitary involvement Khazali was captured by coalition forces The Promised Day Brigades (PDB) are the in Iraq is widely resented by Iraqis and alongside his brother Laith Khazali and least understood of the major Iranian- has contributed to the downturn in the Lebanese Hizb Allah operative Ali Musa influenced Shi`a militant groups. In political fortunes of pro-Iranian parties theory, PDB is a Shi`a nationalist militia such as the ISCI, driving other Shi`a 9 “Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat that provides Moqtada al-Sadr’s militant blocs (such as al-Maliki’s Da`wa Party) to Stability in Iraq”; “Study about the Disloyal Badr followers a way to justify staying within to distance themselves from Iran. Corps 9,” p. 71. his organization while reserving the 10 Ibid. theoretical right to fight U.S. forces. In This trend was most clear in the early 11 See the brief article recounting a meeting with al-Mu- practice, many purported members of months of 2007 when Iran’s political handis by Thomas Strouse, “Kata’ib Hezbollah and the PDB appear to collaborate with KH and allies in Iraq issued a demarche to Intricate Web of Iranian Military Involvement in Iraq,” AAH organizers to participate in small the IRGC Qods Force to scale back 18 Terrorism Monitor 8:9 (2010). numbers of attacks on U.S. forces. its support of Iraqi militias. After 12 Personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, Bagh- Lebanese Hizb Allah’s successful dad, July 3, 2010. Also see “ISF Campaigns Against 14 U.S. Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, “Press Brief- “summer war” against Israel in July Kata’ib Hezbollah Weapons Smuggling, Rocket-Attack ing, July 2,” Multinational Force-Iraq, July 2, 2007. 2006, the IRGC Qods Force sought to Network Along Iraq-Iran Border,” press release, United 15 Ned Parker and Saad Fakhrildeen, “Iraq Frees Shiite replicate this victory in Iraq, opening States Forces – Iraq, February 12, 2010. Militant in Exchange for Briton, Followers Say,” Los An- the floodgates to provide advanced 13 For a good early study on AAH, see Marisa Cochrane geles Times, January 6, 2010. Explosively-Formed Projectile (EFP) Sullivan, “Asaib Ahl al Haq and the Special Groups,” In- 16 Personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, Bagh- munitions and other weapons to a wide stitute for the Study of War, January 13, 2009. Jaysh al- dad, July 3, 2010. range of Shi`a Islamist factions. The Mahdi was uncontrollable—to both Moqtada al-Sadr and 17 Ma’ad Fayad, “Iraq: Notorious Shiite Warlord Re- Iran—because it grew so rapidly and under such chaotic turns to Baghdad,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 18, 2010; in Iraq: General Odierno,” The Long War Journal, July 13, conditions in post-Saddam Iraq. Unlike the Badr Corps, “Iraq: Return of Sheibani’s Killer Squads,” United Press 2010. an organization designed by the IRGC Qods Force over International, September 30, 2010. 19 “Study about the Disloyal Badr Corps 9,” pp. 255-330. a period of years, JAM quickly incorporated criminal 18 Personal interview, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 20 Since 2003, the author has seen literally dozens of elements and untrained civilians into a sprawling and analyst, Washington, D.C., February 2010; Bill Roggio, U.S. and British intelligence documents highlighting the loosely-structured movement in a number of months. “Iranian-Backed Shia Terror Group Remains a Threat Badr role in paramilitary operations in Iraq.

13 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 result was internecine assassinations security and operational security are The use of professional smugglers is of two provincial governors and two aided by the compact size of cells. an age-old Iranian practice, involving provincial police chiefs in the latter half cross-border tribes and corrupt border of 2006, all Shi`a-on-Shi`a political A constant feature of Iran’s policy guards. Smuggling boats make daylight killings using EFPs. The IRGC resolved for more than 20 years has been the transits of the Hawr al-Howeiza, to narrow its support for groups to more importance of uninterrupted cross- marshes in Maysan Province, with trusted entities after rival Shi`a groups border resupply for Iran’s proxies rockets and other equipment concealed began fighting in the shrine city of in Iraq. The broad outlines of cross- under tarpaulins covered with fishing Karbala in late August 2007, which was border movement have not changed gear and fresh fish.25 On land, the key the final straw for Iraq’s Shi`a political greatly from the early 1990s in many routes continue to be the Badra area of and religious leaders.21 places. The general principle is that Wasit Province, the northern Maysan personnel and equipment move through border at multiple points, and eastern The re-think of Iranian support to Iraqi official points of entry (POE) whenever Basra (south of Majnoon and north of militants has had far-reaching effects. Shalamcheh).26 Iran’s armed forces The development of alternatives to “The most visible symbol support border crossings with a number the out-of-control Jaysh al-Mahdi is of means, including use of its own one reason why new formations such of Iran’s support is the 20- unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, as KH and AAH were developed. The long-range optics, signals intelligence need to place Iraqis in leadership roles 30 rocket attacks launched and intimidation firing to discourage is another factor, reflecting arrests of against U.S. bases each Iraqi border guard patrolling.27 IRGC personnel in Iraq in 2005-2007, which showed that it was too risky to month in Iraq, almost all Operations and Tactics deploy significant numbers of Iranian of which involve entire Iran’s support to Special Groups IRGC personnel or even Lebanese Hizb appears to be largely focused on anti- Allah operatives to Iraq.22 According rocket/mortar systems U.S. resistance operations as opposed to U.S. and Iraqi security force or components (such as to other types of sectarian and factional interviewees, the IRGC Qods Force violence. The most visible symbol of centralized its resupply operations to fuel packs) identified Iran’s support is the 20-30 rocket KH and AAH cells, adding a system as Iranian-produced by attacks launched against U.S. bases of accounting for Iranian-supplied each month in Iraq, almost all of which weapons. This meant moving from the U.S. weapons intelligence involve entire rocket/mortar systems “pull” system—where Iraqis came to specialists.” or components (such as fuel packs) ask a cell leader for weapons—to a more identified as Iranian-produced by U.S. secure and selective “push” system, weapons intelligence specialists.28 The where the cell leader would allocate IRGC has been supporting such attacks weapons to well-paid and experienced possible. For personnel, this is almost since the early 1980s, when Badr was fighters who were known to be reliable. always possible due to the primitiveness supplied with rockets to use in Iraq Each major arms cache now has a “hide of Iraq’s customs and immigration during and after the Iran-Iraq War. custodian” who signs out weapons such services and due to the combined effects Although local sourcing of rockets is as EFPs and is responsible for their of corruption and professionally-forged undertaken whenever possible, most proper use against U.S. forces and the documentation. Until the introduction rocket artillery rounds in Iraq are too minimization of Iraqi casualties. Money of U.S.-provided vehicle scanning degraded to function properly. This has continues to be provided in significant equipment, the Special Groups could led Iran to smuggle large numbers of volumes, allowing cells to be paid bring weapons and explosives into Iraq between $4,000 and $13,000 per rocket through the POE on flatbed trucks, 25 Ibid. The author also has numerous photographic or roadside bomb attack, depending on concealed beneath herds of sheep or bags and map references developed by U.S. and Iraqi security 23 24 the circumstances. Communications of cement. Even now, corruption and forces that show exact crossing routes and identify cache the slow degradation of the equipment sites and “hide custodians.” 21 Greg Hoadley, “Sadrists Fume After Karbala Clashes: make it possible to use border crossings 26 Ibid. At Least 50 Dead in Fighting; Millions of Pilgrims Flee,” to bring specialized equipment such 27 Ibid. Iraq Slogger, August 28, 2008. The added detail on Iraqi- as the milled copper cones for EFP 28 The Iranian government does not appear to be un- Iranian discussions is based on personal interviews. See munitions into the country. duly concerned about plausible deniability, deploying personal interview, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency new Iranian-produced “signature” weapons across Iraq. analyst, Washington, D.C., February 2010. The U.S. government has released many photographic 22 The most notable instance was the detention of five slideshows of newly-produced weapons systems in Iraq Iranian intelligence personnel in Arbil. See James Glanz, that are known to be manufactured by Iran. See the pre- “GI’s in Iraq Raid Iranians’ Offices,” New York Times, Central Intelligence Agency analyst, Washington, D.C., viously referenced briefing slides from Brig. Gen. Kevin January 12, 2007. February 2010. Bergner for one example. The author has many weapons 23 This section reflects interview material gathered by 24 Personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, date intelligence images that have not been released, includ- the author from a range of Iraqi security force intelli- and location withheld. The author also has unclassified ing images from caches that were kept under surveil- gence and operational personnel in Iraq during visits in documentary analyses of smuggling tactics produced by lance after having been observed entering Iraq from Iran 2008, 2009 and 2010. Also see personal interview, U.S. coalition intelligence officers. via boat.

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107mm Hesab and 122mm Grad rockets for Iranian-backed groups, EFPs are up lampposts and within T-walls or into Iraq, as well as some larger 240mm employed carefully to reduce Iraqi abandoned checkpoints to avoid the Fajr rockets.29 Although the mechanical casualties. Due to this restriction plus booms.40 Cells also show adaptability reliability of firing switches (usually the reduced number of U.S. targets on in their combination of EFP elements mechanical timers) is low—with up to Iraq’s roads, the incidence of EFP use (such as passive infrared firing half of each planned salvo often failing has dropped from around 60 per month switches) with claymore-style direction to fire—reduced U.S. air cover plus less at the height of the “surge” in 2007 to fragmentation charges.41 Large-caliber effective Iraqi ground patrolling are an average of 17 per month in the first “daisy-chained” artillery shells (122mm allowing greater numbers of indirect nine months of 2010.35 To access U.S. to 155mm) are also periodically used to fire attacks on U.S. bases.30 targets, EFP cells have activated in target U.S. vehicles. The highest quality areas where they were previously rarely Special Group bomb-maker cells active The sophistication of indirect fire attacks encountered such as in Abu Ghurayb, in Iraq appear to be based in northern is also increasing. In Baghdad and other Khalis and Muqdadiyya (in Diyala Baghdad, Basra and in the Suq ash cities, Special Groups tend to make Province), and Kirkuk. 36 Shuyukh area, a marshland market greater use of 60mm and 81mm mortars town east of Nasiriyya that was a Badr to precisely target small U.S. Joint Per incident lethality has declined stronghold throughout the Saddam Security Stations.31 Banks of Improvised significantly since 2008 due to U.S. era and a notorious den of thieves for Rocket-Assisted Mortars (IRAM) have countermeasures and less effective hundreds of years before then.42 been used to great effect against urban weapons assembly and emplacement U.S. bases in Baghdad and Amara.32 capabilities. Sporadic shortfalls in EFP A final and even murkier aspect of the Efforts have also been made to increase components are apparent in the varying Special Groups is their involvement the effectiveness of rocket attacks by sophistication and composition of with the deliberate killings of Iraqis. In launching horizontally at close range devices. Iranian-made C4, identifiable the past, this aspect of Special Group from within parked vehicles, launching through chemical analysis, is less activity has brought significant criticism at shallow angles to reduce warning frequently used in EFPs today; more onto Iran and its proxies. Although and prevent interception by close-in often the main charge is composed of some Iraqis are killed in Special Group weapons systems, or by overwhelming five to 40 pounds of unidentified bulk operations (as unintended civilian defenses with salvoes of 16-20 truck- explosive.37 The EFP “liners” (the metal deaths in rocket or roadside bombing launched rockets.33 Although indirect cone used to form the penetrator) come attacks or Iraqi Army deaths when fire attacks are largely a harassment in up to a dozen sizes, with diameters joint U.S.-Iraqi patrols are bombed), weapon, they have caused five fatalities between 2.75 inches and 16 inches.38 The deliberate targeting of Iraqis appears to U.S. personnel and contractors in the liners are largely better-quality copper to be rare and selective. Evidence from last year.34 cones, although some steel liners are arms caches suggests that Iranian- used and some multiple-array devices backed groups that stockpile EFP The other visible sign of Special have included a mix of copper and steel components and other Iranian signature Group activity are roadside bombs. liners.39 weapons (240mm rockets, for instance) At present, these are almost entirely also maintain stocks of silenced pistols targeted on U.S. military vehicles Despite the downscaling of EFP and under-vehicle magnetic IEDs plus the distinctive personal security operations, the “engineer” cells capable (“sticky bombs”).43 These assassination detail vehicles that service U.S. of assembling EFPs and mounting tools suggest that some “direct action” is reconstruction officials (which carry such attacks continue to show signs still undertaken against Iraqis to serve electronic countermeasures not seen on of adaptation. Cells in Basra, Baghdad the political agenda of Iranian proxies other vehicles). As a signature weapon and along the main Supply Route or Iran’s direct interests, or that such Tampa South (between Baghdad and action could be undertaken again in the 29 This data is drawn from Olive Group intelligence re- the Kuwaiti border) switch attack sites future. ports gathered between 2006-2010. to match the movement patterns of U.S. 30 This data is drawn from Olive Group Iraq Monthly units. The cells attempt to overcome Intelligence Report June 2010 and Olive Group Iraq U.S. countermeasures by offsetting Monthly Intelligence Report August 2010. the aiming points for devices (to take 31 This data is drawn from Olive Group intelligence re- into account the “rhino” booms on U.S. ports gathered between 2006-2010. vehicles), angling devices upwards to 32 IRAMs usually consist of 8-14 propane cylinders strike windows, and elevating devices filled with C4 explosive, propelled by 107mm rocket mo- tors. Although often inaccurate, they can be lethal. On 35 This data is drawn from Olive Group intelligence re- 40 Ibid. April 28, 2008, a barrage of 14 IRAMs killed two U.S. ports gathered between 2006-2010. 41 Ibid. personnel and injured 16 in Baghdad. For details, see 36 This data is drawn from Olive Group intelligence re- 42 Ibid. Ernesto Londono, “U.S. Troops in Iraq Face a Powerful ports gathered in 2010. 43 See the August 1, 2010 cache that was found in Zubayr, New Weapon,” Washington Post, July 10, 2008. 37 Personal interviews, U.S. intelligence analysts and near Basra. As well as 76 rockets, 15 tons of TNT and sig- 33 This data is drawn from Olive Group intelligence re- weapons intelligence specialists, dates and locations nificant amounts of bomb-making materiel, the cache ports gathered between 2006-2010. withheld. included 41 magnets for making under-vehicle IEDs and 34 Personal interview, Olive Group analyst, October 10, 38 Ibid. silenced weapons. This information is based on Olive 2010. 39 Ibid. Group Basra Daily Intelligence Report, August 1, 2010.

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Outlook for the Special Groups Fragmentation in killed during the last five years.7 Even The political situation in Iraq will Kabardino-Balkaria has succumbed have a significant effect on the further the North Caucasus to insurgent violence, with a May 1 evolution of Special Groups. If, as Insurgency bombing in the capital Nalchik killing seems likely, Moqtada al-Sadr joins key one victim and wounding another Iranian-backed parties such as Badr in By Christopher Swift 29.8 the new government, many elements of PDB, AAH and KH will probably the october 19, 2010 attack on the Until recently, Chechnya was the be drawn into the security forces as parliament building in Grozny, exception to this rule. Backed by the Badr personnel were in the post-2003 Chechnya’s capital city, underscores Kremlin, Chechen President Ramzan period. Some types of violence (such as the ferocity and tenacity of the North Kadyrov ruthlessly yet effectively rocketing of the government center in Caucasus insurgency. Timed to suppressed the secessionist insurgency Baghdad) may decline, while targeted correspond with a visit by Russian through a mixture of aggressive attacks on U.S. forces would persist or Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev, the counterterrorism tactics and repressive even intensify due to the new latitude assault killed four and injured 17. The state surveillance. Amnesties and enjoyed by such groups. Kidnap perpetrators took no hostages, issued patronage reinforced Kadyrov’s of Western contractors or military no statements, and made no demands. authority, with some rebels abandoning personnel has been the subject of Each died by his own hand, detonating the insurrection and others joining government warnings during 2010 and explosive vests during the initial attack pro-Kremlin militias. As recently could become a significant risk if U.S.- and following the ensuing firefight with as February 2009, the 34-year-old Iran tensions increase in coming years. Interior Ministry (MDV) forces.1 Chechen strongman appealed to exiled Sectarian utilization of the Special militants to return home.9 Kadyrov even Groups to target Sunni nationalist This short-lived siege followed a series appropriated religion, implementing a oppositionists could become a problem of similar attacks across the Russian state-sponsored Islamization campaign once again. If Iraqi government policy Federation. On March 29, two Dagestani in an effort to undermine Islamist and crosses any “red lines” (such as long- shahidki attacked the Lubyanka and Park Salafist activism. From prohibiting term U.S. military presence in Iraq, Kultury metro stations in Moscow, alcohol and promoting polygamy, to rapid rearmament or anti-Iranian killing 40 commuters and wounding mandating Islamic attire and religious oil policy), the Special Groups could more than 100.2 On March 31, a double education in Chechen schools, the be turned against the Iraqi state in suicide bombing in the Dagestani city result has been an uncertain mixture service of Iranian interests, showering of Kizlyar killed 12 and injured 23.3 On of superficial Shari`a and secular the government center with rockets or May 26, a suicide attack on a concert hall autocracy. assassinating key individuals. in Stavropol killed seven and injured another 40.4 Finally, on September 9, The Chechen parliament siege raises As has been shown throughout the a suicide attack by Ingush militants on serious questions about Kadyrov’s Islamic Republic of Iran’s 30-year a market in Vladikavkaz killed 16 and stabilization strategy. Despite Chechnya’s engagement in Iraq, however, other injured 140.5 relative autonomy and substantial Iraqi militant groups will continue to federal support, secessionist impulses still chart their own course and will make The frequency and intensity of these persist. It also reveals important new and break cease-fires according to their attacks illuminate a persistent, low- developments within the insurgency own interests. level insurrection. According to Russian itself. Coming just two months after Interior Minister Nurgaliev, insurgent the August 29 assault on Tsentoroi, Dr. Michael Knights is the Lafer fellow attacks in Dagestan have killed 89 police Kadyrov’s home village, the attack on at The Washington Institute for Near officers and wounded 264 in the last Chechnya’s parliament marks a shift East Policy. He has been writing on Iraq year alone.6 Similar trends are evident from the diffuse bombing and ambushes since the 1990s and is the author of four in Ingushetia, where more than 400 witnessed in recent years to a more books and the editor of one anthology police officers and 3,000 civilians were focused strategy targeting the Chechen on Saddam-era and post-war Iraq. Dr. regime. That focus, in turn, reflects Knights has operated extensively in Iraq ethnic and operational fragmentation as the head of analysis at Olive Group, a 1 “Terrorist Attack on Chechen Parliament in Grozny,” within the Caucasian Front. With security provider with more than 2,000 RIA Novosti, October 19, 2010. prominent field commanders days of consecutive operations in Iraq. 2 “Moscow Metro Bombing Masterminds ‘Will Be De- challenging separatist leader Doku stroyed,’” BBC, March 29, 2010. Umarov’s authority, the North 3 “12 killed, 23 Hospitalized in Dagestan Blasts,” RIA No- vosti, March 31, 2010. 7 “Ingushetia Militants Announce Moratorium on Kill- 4 “Death Toll from South Russia Terrorist Attack Reach- ing Police,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 6, es 6,” RIA Novosti, May 27, 2010. 2010. 5 “Chislo postradavshikh vo vremya terakta vo 8 “Nalchik Bombing Classed as Terrorist Attack,” RIA Vladikavkaze previisipo 160 chelovek,” Interfax, Sep- Novosti, May 1, 2010. tember 10, 2010. 9 Muslim Ibragimov, “President of Chechnya Calls 6 James Broder, “Gunmen Attach Chechen Parliament, Former Militants Back Home from Europe,” Caucasian 6 Reported Dead,” Voice of America, October 19, 2010. Knot, February 6, 2009.

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Caucasus insurgency may be assuming Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino- Basir al-Tartusi, the number of a more localized, compartmentalized Balkaria, and even in the Orthodox foreign fighters participating in the character. Christian enclave of North Ossetia. Caucasian Front continued to decline.13 Furthermore, Umarov’s appeals to pan- This article examines that fragmentation These conditions set the stage for Islamic solidarity failed to establish clear in three stages. First, it describes Umarov’s repudiation of the ChRI lines of command and control. Rather the formation and limitations of the in October 2007 and subsequent than augmenting the Chechen struggle, Caucasus Emirate and its military declaration of a multiethnic Caucasus Ingush, Dagestani and other militants wing, the Caucasian Front. Second, it Emirate dedicated to “establishing pursued their own local agendas under discusses the growing tensions between Shari`a in its land and expelling the a nominal Chechen figurehead. Umarov and three of the Front’s kuffar.”10 This decision de-nationalized leading field commanders. Third, it the Chechen rebellion, reducing Diffusion and Fragmentation examines the operations undertaken by Chechnya to a mere province, or vilayat, Limited capacity perpetuates these this breakaway faction, as well as the problems. As a virtual state, the implications this schism could have for “The attack on Chechnya’s Caucasus Emirate lacks the defined Islamic militancy in the wider region. territory or fiscal-military apparatus The article concludes by evaluating parliament marks a shift associated with robust, self-sustaining the role of local agendas and national from the diffuse bombing insurgencies. This explains the identities in limiting collaboration overreliance on ambushes, suicide between militants, including those with and ambushes witnessed attacks, and other provocative a common ideology and adversary. in recent years to a more operations. Unable to impose and enforce their will, local jama`ats The Virtual Emirate focused strategy targeting resort to theatrical violence aimed a Protracted armed conflict has had a the Chechen regime.” provoking authorities and educating pernicious radicalizing effect across the masses. The result is an erratic the North Caucasus. Launched in pattern of insurrection, rather than a 1992 as an anti-colonial movement, coordinated insurgency. the Chechen rebellion swiftly within the newly-established Emirate. splintered into nationalist and Islamist Prompting swift and unequivocal Equally important, however, is factions with competing agendas and condemnation from ChRI officials in the Emirate’s failure to galvanize irreconcilable ideologies. By 1996, the the West, it drew an indelible line indigenous aspirations and identities. quasi-autonomous Chechen Republic between the insurgency’s Islamist and On one level, Umarov’s homogenized of Ichkeria (ChRI) found itself mired in nationalist wings.11 Salafist tropes create common cause an internecine battle between these two among like-minded militants. They groups, with nationalists advocating Umarov’s declaration also challenged also open new avenues for self- a constitutional republic within the Chechen parochialism. Eager to attract radicalizing volunteers, including boundaries of Chechnya’s recognized foreign support and volunteers, the Muslims from other post-Soviet borders, and Islamists imagining a self-styled amir expressed solidarity societies. Yet they have not produced regional emirate that would unify the with Muslims “fighting in Afghanistan, the patterns of sustained social and North Caucasian Muslims under a system Iraq, Somalia, and Palestine” while political mobilization necessary to field of Islamic law. Renewed hostilities with denouncing the United States, the United an effective fighting force. United by Russia gradually empowered the latter Kingdom, Israel, “and all those waging a common ideology but divided into faction, with atrocities on both sides war against Islam and Muslims” as his discrete ethnic and geographic entities, reinforcing notions of a perpetual, enemies.12 The result was a shift from Umarov’s imagined community lacks existential conflict between Muslims localized forms of Islamist resistance meaningful cohesion. and non-believers. to a delocalized Salafist ideology that framed jihad in pan-Islamic and These deficiencies inform the This radicalization coincided with increasingly millenarian terms. fragmentation now evident in the the decline of traditional Sufi orders, Caucasian Front. Starting in late spring the diminution of the ChRI’s military This shift produced limited results. 2010, Chechen field commanders capacity, and the diffusion of insurgent Despite endorsements from prominent Aslambek Vadalov and Hussein Gakayev violence to neighboring Muslim- Salafist ideologues including Abu challenged Umarov’s leadership, arguing majority republics. It also undermined Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu that major decisions should be made by the moderate ChRI leadership, with a war council, or majlis, rather than by 14 regional field commanders such as 10 “Amir Dokka’s Statement of the Declaration of the decree. Joined by Ingush commander Umarov abandoning their ethno- Caucasian Emirate,” Kavkaz Center, November 22, nationalist agenda in favor of a more 2007. 13 Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters globalized Salafist outlook. By the 11 Akhmed Zakayev, “Statement by the Minister for and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment,” Stud- time Umarov assumed command of Foreign Affairs for the Chechen Republic of Ingushetia,” ies in Conflict and Terrorism 31:5 (2008). the ChRI in June 2006, the insurgency Chechenpress.com, October 31, 2007. 14 “Clarification of Emir Dokku Abu Usman in Connec- had devolved into a series of loosely- 12 “Amir Dokka’s Statement of the Declaration of the tion with the Fitna Among the Mujahedeen,” Kavkaz coordinated jama`ats operating in Caucasian Emirate.” Center, October 18, 2010.

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Tarkhan Gaziev, Vadalov and Gakayev Parochial Priorities The re-localization of Chechen sought greater autonomy, including the At first blush, the troika’s repudiation resistance carries serious consequences appointment of an independent Chechen of the Caucasus Emirate suggests a for the Caucasus Emirate. On one level, amir. resurgent Chechen nationalism. Exiled the troika’s withdrawal exposes the ChRI officials initially welcomed the weaknesses in Umarov’s multiethnic These challenges precipitated a split, with the London-based Akhmed coalition. Although neither faction has leadership crisis. On July 24, Umarov Zakayev describing Vadalov as a fellow come to blows, their rhetoric and mutual resigned and appointed Vadalov as his patriot who rejected Umarov’s strategy recrimination suggests little room for successor.15 Citing health concerns, of targeting civilians.21 Some Russian meaningful collaboration. The move also he explained that “the jihad should analysts adopted a similar view, noting isolates smaller insurgent groups such be led by younger and more energetic that collaboration between Zakayev’s as Yarmouk in Kabardino-Balkaria and commanders.”16 This announcement was ChRI and Vadalov’s faction could Kataib al-Khoul in North Ossetia from a watershed, illuminating operational open the way for a revitalized Chechen Jama`at Shari`at in Dagestan. These and perhaps even generational secessionist movement.22 conditions invite new alignments. With differences long obscured by triumphant Umarov increasingly dependent on jihadist rhetoric. Yet within days, the Such speculation remains premature. Gubdensky and other Jama`at Shari`at Emirate’s Kavkaz Center information Although Vadalov, Gakayev, and Gaziev commanders, Dagestan could become agency reported that Vadalov’s repudiated Umarov and abandoned the the locus for future Emirate operations. appointment was merely a proposal. Emirate, they still espouse a radical On August 4, Umarov repudiated his Islamist agenda. Moreover, their close These observations focus greater resignation, calling it “completely and continuing collaboration with attention on indigenous factors—on the fabricated” and arguing that it was “not the foreign Arab fighter Khaled Yusef aspirations that inform Islamic militancy possible to step down” given conditions Muhammad al-Emitat (also known and the resentments that fuel it. The in the North Caucasus.17 as Muhannad) indicates a strong fact that senior Chechen commanders Salafist outlook. These facts indicate would repudiate the Caucasus Emirate The ensuing struggle drew clear lines fragmentation, not transformation. reveals an ethnic parochialism at odds between two increasingly irreconcilable Rather than reverting to secular with cosmopolitan notions of jihad. Far factions. Led by Vadalov, Gakayev nationalism, the troika is merely from subordinating themselves to a pan- and Gaziev renounced their allegiance pursuing a more parochial agenda. Islamic enterprise, the troika appears to Umarov.18 Umarov subsequently to be selectively adapting globalized issued orders dismissing this newly- This agenda involves a simplified ideologies to their own highly localized formed troika from their offices within target set. Unlike Umarov, who speaks agenda. the Emirate. The Emirate’s supreme of liberating Astrakhan and the qadi also intervened, with Seyfullah Volga region,23 the troika emphasizes The net result is a change in policy Gubdensky issuing a statement Chechnya and the Kremlin-backed and strategy, rather than a reversion confirming Umarov as the insurgency’s Chechen regime. On September 3, to ethno-nationalist ideology. Yet the sole legitimate leader. “[A] single for example, Vadalov and Muhannad outcome may ultimately prove much the province of the Caucasus Emirate released a video confirming their role same. By distinguishing themselves as has no right, according to Shari`a, to in the August 29 Tsentoroi operation.24 an essentially Chechen endeavor, the appoint or remove the amir,” Seyfullah On October 20, the MVD implicated troika elicits support from a discrete, argued, “and if they try to do so, they Gakayev’s forces in the attack on the concrete community with a long history become bugats and sinners.”19 Yet by Chechen Parliament.25 Combined with of grievances. By targeting Kadyrov, August the damage was already done, propaganda reviving ethnocentric terms they give those grievances a tangible, with more than 20 local commanders such as “Ichkerii” and “Nokhchii,” these immediate outlet. Informed by nearly flocking to the troika’s banner.20 operations suggest a re-animation of two decades of chronic, persistent the same intra-Chechen struggles that conflict, the troika’s parochialism may 15 “Amir IK Dokku Abu Usman obyavil o svoem preem- once dominated the North Caucasus succeed where Umarov’s pan-Islamism nike. Im stal Amir Aslambek,” DhamaatTakbir.com, insurgency. failed. July 24, 2010. 16 “CE’s Emir Dokku Abu Usman Resigned and Ap- org, August 2010. Christopher Swift is Fellow at the University pointed Aslambek Vadalov Emir of the Caucasus Emir- 21 Marina Golovinina, “New Chechen Rebel Leader is No of Virginia Law School’s Center for National ate,” Kavkaz Center, August 1, 2010. Terrorist, Says Ally,” Reuters, August 3, 2010. Security Law. His forthcoming book examines 17 “Emir of the Caucasus Emirate Dokku Abu Usman 22 “Akhmed Zakayev svyazal ukhod Umarpova c pot- the role of local insurgencies in al-Qa`ida’s Cancels His Resignation, Calling it Fabricated, and ereii doveriya boevikov,” Lenta.ru, August 3, 2010. global jihad. Makes Special Statement on this Occasion,” Kavkaz Cen- 23 “Caucasus Emirate’s Emir Dokka Abu Usman: ‘We ter, August 4, 2010. Will Liberate the Krasnodar Territory, Astrakhan and 18 “Aslambek Vadalov Resigns as Deputy Emir of Cau- the Volga Lands…’” Kavkaz Center, March 8, 2010. casus Emirate,” Kavkaz Center, August 13, 2010. 24 “Amirii mudzhakhedov Ichkerii,” Chechenews.com, 19 “CE Supreme Judge, Emir of Dagestan Province Sey- September 3, 2010. fullah: ‘Emir Dokku Abu Usman is the Sole Legitimate 25 “Probable Organizer of Grozny Attack Named by Ruler,’” Kavkaz Center, August 13, 2010. Chechen Government,” Russia Today, October 20, 20 “Madzhis Amirov Vilaiata Nokhchiichov,” Daymohk. 2010.

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Assessing the Success of Yet despite its policy importance, Despite these ferocious casualties, leadership targeting remains the Grossdeutschland Division was Leadership Targeting understudied. This is especially true able to continually replace leaders of leadership targeting in Iraq and and remained a coherent and effective By Austin Long Afghanistan, and it is in part due combat unit, serving as a mobile reserve to the high levels of secrecy that for much of the Eastern Front until war is fundamentally a clash of surround these efforts as well as the almost the end of the war.8 organizations. Organizations provide general difficulty in evaluating the the vital mechanisms that mobilize and effects of such targeting on clandestine What explains the Grossdeutschland convert resources into combat power organizations operating in war zones. Division’s ability to remain an as well as applying that combat power More can be done, however, to develop effective combat force despite loss of 1 against the enemy. This is true not only both the theoretical understanding of leadership? The answer is that it could of conventional militaries, but also of these efforts and also the empirical efficiently and effectively replace its 2 insurgent and terrorist groups. One picture of what has and is happening in lost leaders due to institutionalization.9 operational technique deployed against Iraq and Afghanistan. Institutionalization requires two insurgent and terrorist groups seeks elements. The first is the existence of to destroy or cripple the organization This article begins with the hierarchy and specialization in the by targeting senior and mid-level argument that the key variable in organization. The second is that authority leadership. In particular, this technique determining the overall effectiveness and position in the organization derives has been a major component of the U.S.- of leadership targeting is the level of from that hierarchy. These two factors 3 led campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. institutionalization of the organization allow the organization to routinely and This technique, termed leadership targeted. Moreover, this is true not smoothly replace lost leaders. targeting, has attracted a modest only of insurgent or terrorist groups amount of recent scholarship seeking to targeted, but also of groups opposed to This process is so normal and routine 4 evaluate its effectiveness. such organizations that are targeted by in conventional military organizations insurgents or terrorists. This argument that it is simply taken for granted. Yet it is then illustrated by evidence and is also applicable to other organizations vignettes from Iraq. such as insurgent groups or anti- 1 Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Wat- insurgent militias. These organizations man, “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” In- The Importance of Institutionalization are not equally institutionalized, ternational Security 11:1 (1986); Martin van Creveld, Fight- In combat, whether conventional or and therefore variation in the effects ing Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 not, all organizations lose leadership of the loss of leadership should be (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982). at various levels. On the Eastern expected. This leads to a simple testable 2 Mary Anderson, Michael Arnsten, and Harvey Averch, Front in World War II, for example, hypothesis. Organizations that are well- Insurgent Organization and Operations: A Case Study of the German Army suffered massive institutionalized should be expected to the Viet Cong in the Delta, 1964-1966 (Santa Monica, CA: losses among its officer corps. Omer suffer only temporary disruption from RAND Corporation, 1967); Nathan Leites and Charles Bartov estimates that from May 1942 to losing leadership, while groups that Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on In- May 1945, the elite Grossdeutschland are poorly institutionalized should be surgent Conflicts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, Division suffered casualties among crippled or even collapse when subjected 1970); Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics its officers equivalent to three or four to a leadership targeting campaign. 5 of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University times its initial complement. Yet even Press, 2007); Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War this is an understatement of the scale The coding used for “institutionalization” in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer- and speed of leadership casualties will be based on whether an organization sity Press, 2008). among the division’s frontline combat exhibits functional specialization, 3 Graham Turbiville, Hunting Leadership Targets in Coun- units. The division’s Sixth Grenadier hierarchy, and bureaucratic processes 10 terinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations (Hurlburt Company had 10 different leaders from for conducting operations. An Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, July 26 to September 5, 1943. During 2007); Michael T. Flynn et al., “Employing ISR: SOF the course of fighting on March 8-9, 8 For an overview of the division’s operations, see James Best Practices,” Joint Forces Quarterly 50 (2008); Seth 1944, the company had three different Lucas, Germany’s Elite Panzer Force: Grossdeutschland 6 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Af- commanders. In November 1942, the (London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1978). ghanistan (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010); Mark Urban, 2nd Battalion of the division’s 2nd 9 On the institution for replacing lost German Army offi- Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the SAS and Infantry Regiment “lost its commander, cers, see William S. Dunn, Heroes or Traitors: The German the Secret War in Iraq (London: Little, Brown, 2010). adjutant, as well as all company and Replacement Army, the July Plot, and Adolf Hitler (West- 4 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effec- platoon commanders in the course of port, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 1-14. tiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies 18:4 one single Russian artillery barrage 10 The coding is binary, with each of the three attributes 7 (2009); Michael Freedman, “The Headless Horseman: A which lasted only twenty minutes.” either coded as present or absent. This is clearly an ab- Theoretical and Strategic Assessment of Leadership Tar- straction, as these attributes are actually continuous geting,” paper presented at the 2010 International Stud- 5 Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45: German Troops rather than binary. However, this abstraction should be ies Association Convention; Alex Wilner, “Targeted Kill- and the Barbarisation of Warfare (New York: Palgrave, valid for at least a plausibility probe of the hypothesis. ings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence 2001), p. 16. Functional specialization is coded based on the pres- in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Studies in 6 Ibid., p. 17. ence or absence of specialized sub-units (such as those Conflict and Terrorism33:4 (2010). 7 Ibid. focused on recruitment or finance) and/or a division

19 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 organization that possesses these Yet in 2004 other organizations on the wasta of Shaykh Nasir and attributes will be coded as “well- existed and were at least as potent in Muhammad Mahmoud Latif, with little institutionalized,” while one that terms of raw manpower and assets. evidence of institutionalization. does not will be coded as “poorly One organization in particular was institutionalized.” The remainder of the Falluja Shura Council, headed by AQI’s response to this resistance was this article tests this hypothesis with a Abdullah Janabi, a prominent cleric. to unleash its own leadership targeting series of vignettes from Iraq.11 Yet unlike AQI, which was seeking campaign, which killed both Shaykh to institutionalize, the Falluja Shura Nasir and nearly killed Mohammed The Iraqi Case Council relied heavily on Janabi’s Mahmoud Latif, who was forced to In Iraq, Anbar Province was the personal gravitas and charisma (wasta) flee Iraq. In the same time period, Abu heartland of the Sunni insurgency from to hold the organization together. There Khattab was killed along with other AQI 2003-2007. The insurgency in Anbar is no evidence it developed functional leaders. The effects of these leadership had multiple organizations, with some specialization or more than a very loose losses varied greatly. AQI continued more institutionalized than others. Al- hierarchy, much less any bureaucratic to grow in strength in 2006, while the Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) was, in 2004, a new Anbar People’s Committee collapsed organization but one that was rapidly “Well-institutionalized and other tribal leaders were cowed institutionalizing, creating hierarchy into ceasing resistance against AQI, at and specialization through a system organizations such least temporarily.14 of amirs (leaders), who by 2006 were as AQI have proven functionally specialized and existed in The situation in Ramadi began to a hierarchical order with bureaucratic extraordinarily resistant to change in the summer of 2006 when processes for conducting operations even sustained leadership some tribal leaders were able to (as evidenced by copious captured mitigate AQI’s ability to target them by documents and computer records).12 For targeting efforts, suffering allying with the United States.15 These example, AQI in a given town or region disruption but able to tribal leaders, along with U.S. forces, would be led by an overall amir, who was continued to target AQI’s leadership. supported by an administrative amir, a continually replace lost Yet AQI remained combat effective, military amir, a media amir, and possibly leaders.” even preparing to launch a massive others depending on the time and place. assault on Ramadi in June 2007.16 There were also specific sub-units within the organization dedicated to bringing AQI successfully targeted one of the foreign fighters into the country and procedures. Janabi, along with AQI’s main leaders of the Ramadi resistance, to generating revenue through various Omar Hadid, was one of the primary Shaykh Sattar al-Rishawi, in late 2007, licit and illicit activities. These amirs leadership targets when coalition forces but by that time the U.S. military had both directed local cells beneath them launched Operation al-Fajr (The Dawn) enabled some institutionalization to and reported to more senior leadership. to retake Falluja in November 2004. the resistance (principally by having In short, by 2006 at the latest AQI was Omar Hadid was killed and Janabi was tribesmen join the police or quasi- a well-institutionalized organization. forced to flee Iraq and has not returned. police units called Provincial Security As a result, the Falluja Shura Council Forces).17 Shaykh Sattar’s death in late collapsed, while AQI regrouped in other 2007 therefore had substantially less parts of Iraq, including Ramadi and al- effect (although it did provoke frictions 13 of labor among leaders along functional lines (e.g. the Qaim. among potential successors) than it military staff system with officers focused on person- likely would have had a year earlier. nel, intelligence, operations, logistics, etc.). Hierarchy is In Ramadi, AQI, led by an Iraqi known Leadership targeting has continued by coded based on the presence of clear chains of command as Abu Khattab, came into conflict both sides in 2010, with AQI continuing and reporting derived from position in the organization with local tribal leaders as well as to show resilience while anti-AQI rather than personal charisma or traditional authority. other insurgent groups. By the end of Bureaucratic process is coded based on the presence or 2005, this conflict had turned violent, 14 “Marine Corps Assessment of Iraq Situation,” Wash- absence of record-keeping, standard operating proce- with AQI engaging in skirmishes ington Post, February 2, 2007; “AQI Situation Report,” dure, creation and distribution of codes of conduct or les- with members of the nationalist 1920 declassified, translated internal AQI document, available sons learned. An organization where all three are present Revolution Brigade affiliated with the at www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/IZ-060316-01-Trans.pdf; is coded as highly institutionalized; all others are coded cleric Muhammad Mahmoud Latif, and Toby Harnden, “US Army Admits Iraqis Outnumber as poorly institutionalized. with tribal elements including the Anbar Foreign Fighters as its Main Enemy,” Daily Telegraph, De- 11 In addition to specific citations, these vignettes are People’s Committee affiliated with the cember 3, 2005; “Tearing Down al-Qaida in Iraq,” press amplified by the author’s personal experience and inter- prominent Shaykh Nasir al-Fahadawi. briefing, Multi-National Force-Iraq, December 2006. views in Iraq in 2007-2008. Like the Falluja Shura Council, the 15 Austin Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival 50:2 12 On AQI organization, see Jacob Shapiro, “Bureaucrat- Anbar People’s Council relied heavily (2008); John A. McCary, “The Anbar Awakening: An Al- ic Terrorists: Al Qaida in Iraq’s Management and Financ- liance of Incentives,” Washington Quarterly 32:1 (2009). es,” and Anonymous, “Smuggling, Syria, and Spending,” 13 “Two Locals Headed Fallujah Insurgency,” Associ- 16 Ann Scott Tyson, “A Deadly Clash at Donkey Island,” in Brian Fishman ed., Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleed- ated Press, November 24, 2004; Carter Malkasian, “Sig- Washington Post, August 19, 2007. out: Al Qaida’s Road In and Out of Iraq (West Point, NY: naling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of 17 Alissa Rubin, “Sheik’s Allies Vow Revenge for His Combating Terrorism Center, 2008). Fallujah,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 29:3 (2006). Killing,” New York Times, September 15, 2007.

20 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 groups (known as the Sons of Iraq) are Conclusion reporting defections to AQI at least The foregoing is suggestive at best but Revolution Muslim: in part because U.S. forces and the does support the hypothesis. Well- Downfall or Respite? government of Iraq are not acting to institutionalized organizations such mitigate AQI’s leadership targeting.18 as AQI have proven extraordinarily By Aaron Y. Zelin resistant to even sustained leadership A final vignette illustrates the differing targeting efforts, suffering disruption in july 2010, Zachary Chesser was effect of leadership targeting on but able to continually replace arrested in the United States for trying well-institutionalized versus poorly lost leaders. In contrast, poorly to join Somalia’s al-Shabab terrorist institutionalized organizations. On June institutionalized organizations, both group. His arrest brought attention to 26, 2008, a major meeting of shaykhs, insurgent and anti-insurgent, appear a U.S.-based extremist group operating vulnerable to leadership targeting. in the New York City area, known as “This does not mean Revolution Muslim, of which Chesser was This does not mean that leadership a member.1 Chesser’s arrest, however, that leadership targeting targeting has no effect on well- appears to be the apex that disguised the has no effect on well- institutionalized organizations. It is seeming decline of Revolution Muslim. still disruptive at a minimum as even After suffering a series of leadership institutionalized the effective replacement of leaders is problems and disputes, Revolution organizations. It is still not instantaneous. Furthermore, such Muslim was increasingly used by UK- efforts also exert a suppressive effect based extremists seeking to skirt British disruptive at a minimum on leaders, as they must undertake hate speech and incitement laws by as even very effective extensive security measures to avoid using the U.S.-based Revolution Muslim being targeted. Yet these are tactical website to distribute their literature replacement of leaders is and operational rather than strategic and notifications of public events.2 not instantaneous.” effects. In terms of President Barack The violent calls by British extremists Obama’s declared goal of “disrupting, eventually led to the shutdown of the dismantling, and defeating” al-Qa`ida, Revolution Muslim website in November leadership targeting, whether carried 2010. Shortly after, Revolution political figures, and coalition forces out by special operations forces in Muslim’s leader said that the group in Karma, a small town northeast of Afghanistan or drones in Pakistan, had been disbanded, and he announced Falluja, was struck by a suicide bomber can create disruption and temporary the creation of a new, supposedly more (presumed to be an AQI affiliate). The dismantling, but it cannot defeat the moderate organization, called Islam blast killed several prominent Iraqis organization. Policy. and Americans, including the respected mayor of Karma and a U.S. Marine For policymakers, this in turn suggests Since this transition is recent, it is too battalion commander.19 The battalion that expectations and resource early to determine whether Revolution commander was almost immediately allocation should be managed with an Muslim will follow in the footsteps replaced, on an interim basis, by one of eye to the institutionalization of both of the British group al-Muhajiroun his subordinates. In contrast, the attack hostile and allied organizations. If by returning to confrontation merely created turmoil in the local tribe, the al- confronted by poorly institutionalized under a different name, or if it will Jumayli. While it did not kill the tribe’s insurgent organizations, leadership follow a model closer to groups such shaykh, it substantially intimidated targeting can have a substantial effect and discredited him. After some and should be resourced accordingly. 1 See, for example, Paul Cruickshank’s article in the CTC deliberation, during which the tribe’s However, dedicating massive resources Sentinel that provided a detailed explanation and analysis ability to act was limited, the shaykh to leadership targeting of well- of the roots of the Revolution Muslim group in the United was effectively sidelined in favor of a institutionalized groups, while under- Kingdom, its evolution in the United States, and how the respected kinsman of a more martial resourcing efforts to protect poorly organization had led to recent arrests of American jihad- bent. institutionalized but useful anti- ists. See Paul Cruickshank, “The Growing Danger from insurgent organizations, appears sub- Radical Islamist Groups in the United States,” CTC Sen- optimal. tinel 3:8 (2010). 2 The United Kingdom’s policing of websites that host Austin Long is an Assistant Professor at the extremist content is much stricter than in the United School of International and Public Affairs States, where the First Amendment provides significant 18 Jane Arraf, “Two Iraq Al Qaeda Leaders Killed: Did and a Member of the Arnold A. Saltzman protection to extremist discourse. For example, when They Really Get Abu Omar al-Baghdadi?” Christian Sci- Institute of War and Peace Studies at speaking about the extremist content of Yemeni-Ameri- ence Monitor, April 19, 2010; Timothy Williams and Du- Columbia University. He was previously can cleric Anwar al-`Awlaqi, UK Baroness Neville-Jones raid Adnan, “Sunnis in Iraq Allied With U.S. Quitting to an Associate Political Scientist at the said, “The websites in which feature his [al-`Awlaqi] ter- Rejoin Rebels,” New York Times, October 16, 2010. RAND Corporation. While at RAND, he rorist message would categorically not be allowed in the 19 Hannah Allam and Jamal Naji, “3 Marines Among served in Iraq as an analyst and adviser UK. If they were hosted in the UK they would be taken Dead in Attack on Iraqi Tribal Leaders,” McClatchy to Multinational Force-Iraq’s Task Force down.” For details on that quote, see Jim Wolf, “Britain Newspapers, June 26, 2008; Sam Dagher, “SUVs and 134/Detention Operations and the I Marine Urges U.S. to Take Down Extremist Websites,” Reuters, Rifles,”New York Times, January 23, 2009. Expeditionary Force. October 26, 2010.

21 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12 as Hizb al-Tahrir, Tabligh Jama`at, or even greater role in the dissemination only three in the United States.11 For the Muslim Brotherhood by adopting of content on the Revolution Muslim example, Muslims Against Crusades, a less hostile posture. This article website, moving the group in an even an al-Muhajiroun successor group, recounts the factors that led to the more radical direction and eventually organized an event in Westminster recent demise of Revolution Muslim, causing the website’s demise. titled “One Law for All…Shar’iah while also providing insight on its new [sic]” in June.12 The Muslims against incarnation, Islam Policy. Rise of British Influence Crusades also announced an “Emergency The content on Revolution Muslim’s Demonstration” on the Revolution Leadership Disputes website could be divided into four Muslim website in late July in response Revolution Muslim was founded categories: news, original articles, to an alleged report, which is not cited by Yousef al-Khattab3 and Younes upcoming events, and propaganda on the website, regarding the murder Abdullah Muhammad4 in late 2007 materials. When Revolution Muslim of innocent Muslims.13 The Revolution and early 2008.5 In late 2009, al- first came online in 2008, much of its Muslim website also started posting Khattab resigned as amir (leader) of more content from Islam4UK and from Revolution Muslim, reportedly due Shaykh Omar Bakri Mohammed, the to the radical direction that Younes “It appears that the founder of al-Muhajiroun who is now was taking the group.6 Al-Khattab overzealousness of exiled in Lebanon but still active with subsequently promoted Abdullah as- British jihadists. Additionally, only one Sayf as the new amir while Younes was British extremists helped of the three events announced in the away in Saudi Arabia. Upon Younes’ lead to the demise of United States were actually organized return to the United States in April or associated with Revolution Muslim. 2010, however, he forcefully retook the the Revolution Muslim Moreover, during this period there was reins of leadership and removed as-Sayf website.” no longer information or content about from the organization because of as- “Street Daw’ah” events in the New York Sayf’s Sufi leanings. Younes designated city area. himself as the sole amir.7 content highlighted key daily news

Exacerbating the leadership disputes, articles, which they called Akbar al-Yawm 11 The British events, along with the date the announce- three members of the group were (news of the day), along with its “Street ment was posted on the Revolution Muslim website, arrested in the United States in June and Daw’ah” (outreach) efforts in the New included: “International Day in Support of Victims of July 2010. On June 6, Carlos Eduardo York City metropolitan area. Examples Torture, the London Guantánamo Campaign,” June 25, Almonte and Mohamed Mahmood of the larger “Street Daw’ah” events 2010; “Ummah Rise: Demonstration to Defend the Sym- Alessa were apprehended while trying included boycotting Starbucks due to bols of Islam,” June 30, 2010; “Ummah Rise,” July 21, to leave the United States to join al- the company’s alleged ties with Israel, 2010; “UK Women Only Conference; Burqa or no Bur- 8 Shabab. Similarly, on July 21, Zachary protesting the sentencing and alleged ka? 11th July 2010,” June 29, 2010; “Islamic Conference: Chesser was arrested for the same mistreatment of Aafia Siddiqui, and an State Terrorism: 24 July 2010,” July 7, 2010; “Football 9 crime. Following Chesser’s arrest, outreach event in front of Wall Street Tournament,” July 25, 2010; “Demonstration: Today, Younes went “underground,” likely following the collapse of the economy in 5th August,” August 4, 2010; “Shariah4Pakistan - Dem- due to fear of further law enforcement 2008 to highlight the injustices of the onstration Against Traitor: Asif Ali Zardari in London,” 10 action. While Younes was underground, capitalist system. The website posted August 19, 2010; “Slave to the Streets - Today, 27th Au- British jihadists seemingly took an many writings from Yemeni-American gust 2010 - Ramadhan Conference,” August 25, 2010; cleric Anwar al-`Awlaqi, as well as “International Burn the American Flag Day 2010: Dem- 3 Yousef al-Khattab is a Jewish convert to Islam from speeches from Jamaican cleric Abdullah onstration In Response To Burn The Quran Day On 9/11 New Jersey. al-Faisal. @ 1pm,” September 11, 2010; “Conference: Ramadan-The 4 Younes Abdullah Muhammad is a convert to Islam, Month of Victory,” August 31, 2010; “Muslims Confront and he reportedly received a degree in international af- Although Revolution Muslim’s website Pope Benedect XVI - Saturday 18 September Demonstra- fairs from Columbia University. had always featured content relevant to tion in London,” September 18, 2010; “Islamic Revival 5 According to J.M. Berger, the Revolution Muslim both the British and American Muslim Conference,” November 2, 2010. The U.S. events, along website domain was registered in December 2007. The extremist scenes, beginning in April with the date the announcement was posted on the Revo- website went live in January 2008 and was originally a 2010 that content had more of a British lution Muslim website, included: “Protest Netanyahu in forum, but was later changed to a blog format in April bent. Since April, the Revolution New York City,” July 6, 2010; “Stand with Lynne Stew- 2008. Muslim website highlighted 15 events art - The Lawyer of Omar Abdul Rahman,” July 14, 2010; 6 For more details, read al-Khattab’s explanation on his and protests in Britain, in contrast to “Global Islamic Conference: Today, 31st July 2010,” July personal website, available at www.yousefalkhattab. 30, 2010. com/p/why-i-left-revolution-muslim.html. 10 For more on the da`wa activities mentioned, see: 12 Al-Muhajiroun (which now goes under other alias 7 Ibid. “Starbucks Boycott Trailer,” Revolution Muslim, Feb- names) was founded by Omar Bakri Muhammad who 8 Perry Chiaramonte, C.J. Sullivan, Murray Weiss, and ruary 18, 2008; “Protest – Court Hearing for Aafia Sid- fled London following the 7/7 attacks and was recently Chuck Bennett, “Bloodlust of NJ ‘Jihadists,’” New York diqui,” Revolution Muslim, August 25, 2008; “A Rally arrested in Lebanon. Currently, Anjem Choudary leads Post, June 7, 2010. for Aafia Siddiqui and Other Muslim Political Prisoners al-Muhajiroun and the group’s current primary alias is 9 Andrew Lebovich, “The LWOT: FBI Arrests ‘Revolu- in America!” Revolution Muslim, May 4, 2010; “Dawa “Muslims Against Crusades.” tion Muslim’ Writer; Gitmo Prisoner Forced to Return to Tour – Wall Street,” Revolution Muslim, September 23, 13 “Emergency Demonstration,” Revolution Muslim, Algeria is Missing,” Foreign Policy, July 22, 2010. 2008. July 26, 2010.

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It appears that the reason for the Nevertheless, it appears that the On November 20, Younes released increase in content related to the United overzealousness of British extremists a new treatise for Islam Policy, Kingdom is that British Muslims were helped lead to the demise of the titled “On Crafting Islamic Policy: using the U.S.-based Revolution Muslim Revolution Muslim website. On The Methodology of Islamic Social website to skirt recent hate speech and November 3, one of the website’s users, Science.”21 It would be a worthwhile incitement laws that have hampered Bilal Ahmad, published a “hit list” of study for practitioners to compare this their activities in the United Kingdom. UK parliamentary members who voted new tract with Younes’ essay titled “By In 2006 and 2007, British authorities for the war in Iraq.18 Two days later, All Means Necessary,” which he wrote passed two laws that made it increasingly the Revolution Muslim website was on December 7, 2008. This might shed difficult to distribute material that could suspended, reportedly by its hosting light on whether Islam Policy is truly be viewed as hate speech or incitement company at the prompting of U.S. and breaking from Revolution Muslim or to crime or terrorism. The Racial and UK government officials.19 continuing that cause using innuendo Religious Hatred Act of 2006 amended and less confrontational tactics. the Public Order Act of 1986 by adding The Dawn of Islam Policy Part 3A, which prohibits “a person who On November 12, more than a week Conclusion uses threatening words or behavior, or after the suspension of the Revolution Although Revolution Muslim’s website displays any written material which is Muslim website, Younes returned to is down and Younes seems to be taking its threatening, is guilty of an offence if the public spotlight. He announced the successor group in a new direction, the he intends thereby to stir up religious formation of a new group, Islam Policy, Britons who helped create Revolution hatred.”14 into which Revolution Muslim would Muslim are still using U.S.-hosted be absorbed. Younes also said that the websites to disseminate their content.22 Although the intent of the hate speech days of abrasive outreach activities This tactic could become an innovative law was not necessarily established were over, and that a new strategy had model for other European jihadists who to curb anti-Christian or anti-Jewish to be adopted. The suspension of the live in countries with strict hate speech rhetoric, it created an issue for Revolution Muslim website apparently and incitement laws. British Muslim extremists who were made Younes realize that he needed distributing such materials on the to take the U.S.-based extremist scene Despite the apparent decline internet.15 Furthermore, a year and a in a new direction: “I have been going of Revolution Muslim and its half later, the Serious Crime Act of 2007 through some personal alterations with confrontational tactics, the domestic legislation passed, replacing the British regard to physical, mental and spiritual terrorism threat to the United States common law crime of incitement with space and was eager to alter some of the has not diminished. The recent case a statutory offense of encouraging or approach I had been being informed of of Somali-American Mohamed Osman assisting crime.16 Along with the former when this recent spate of bad news hit.”20 Mohamud, who attempted to detonate law, it became harder for al-Muhajiroun Younes said that the Islam Policy website what he believed was an explosives- successor groups (such as Islam4UK, will focus more on educating individuals laden vehicle near a tree-lighting The Savior Sect, and al-Ghuraba) to so that they can better understand the ceremony in Portland on November 26, cross the boundaries of hate speech or issues important to Muslims and thus is demonstrative of this. Lessons from incitement using UK-hosted servers, make more coherent arguments to past extremist movements show that as UK hosting companies apparently promote their ideological beliefs. many of Revolution Muslim’s more remove such content quickly. As a radical followers may not agree with result of these laws, British Muslim Younes’ seemingly less confrontational extremists have used foreign web direction. Indeed, this is one reason why servers, including those in the United Almonte, Alessa, and Chesser chose to States, to disseminate their content.17 travel to Somalia to fight with Somalia’s Revolution Muslim was part of this 18 “MPs That Voted for War on Iraq,” Revolution Mus- al-Shabab. For them, fighting the jihad trend. lim, November 3, 2010; Bilal Ahmad, a member of Isla- with words was not enough. m4UK (a successor group to al-Muhajiroun), was ar- rested on November 10 for publishing the hit list post. Aaron Y. Zelin is a research assistant in the Ahmad was charged under the The Racial and Religious Department of Politics at Brandeis University 14 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (c. 1), United Hatred Act of 2006 since his post was actionable incite- and maintains a blog at Jihadology.net. Kingdom Statute Law, February 16, 2006. ment. Most cases are merely “incitement,” so the police/ 15 The law that passed in 2006 was the third time the security services prefer monitoring the individuals since UK Parliament attempted to pass it into legislation. The they do not represent an immediate threat. For more, see Labor Party first tried in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime “Man Arrested over Website Listing Iraq War MPs,” and Security Bill and later in the 2004-2005 Serious Or- BBC, November 10, 2010. 21 “IslamPolicy.com – On Crafting Islamic Policy: The ganised Crime and Police Bill. 19 James Gordon Meek and Alison Gendar, “Local Jiha- Methodology of Islamic Social Science,” Islam Policy, 16 Serious Crime Act 2007 (c. 27), United Kingdom Stat- dist Website Tied to Terror Thugs Returns Under New November 20, 2010. ute Law, October 30, 2007. Name, IslamPolicy.com,” New York Daily News, Novem- 22 To name a few, the following websites, which are 17 The reason U.S. web hosting companies are espe- ber 21, 2010. based in the United Kingdom, are hosted on web serv- cially popular (compared to hosting companies in other 20 “Announcement from IslamPolicy.com - on Transfer ers in the United States: Salafi Media; Muslim’s Against countries) is because they are more reliable and have less from RevolutionMuslim,” Islam Policy, November 12, Crusades; Izharudeen; Authentic Tawheed; and The Ta- downtime. 2010. wheed Movement.

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Recent Highlights in October 3, 2010 (UNITED STATES): October 4, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A The U.S. State Department issued a U.S. drone strike killed at least eight Terrorist Activity travel alert for U.S. citizens in Europe militants in Mir Ali in North Waziristan due to increased concern about the Agency of the Federally Administered October 1, 2010 (GLOBAL): Usama possibility of a large-scale al-Qa`ida Tribal Areas. A number of German bin Ladin purportedly released a new attack on the continent. According nationals were reportedly among the audio message, titled “Pauses with to the Los Angeles Times, “Intelligence dead. – Voice of America, October 4 the Method of Relief Work.” In the officials in the U.S. and Europe have message, Bin Ladin criticized flood said an increase in activity in recent October 4, 2010 (PHILIPPINES): The relief efforts in Pakistan, saying, weeks suggests that a small cell of United States assured the Philippines “Millions of children are out in the potential terrorists hiding in North that it will maintain its military open air, lacking basic elements of Waziristan, a Pakistani tribal region, presence in the country until the al- living, including drinking water, is preparing an attack [in Europe] that Qa`ida-linked Abu Sayyaf Group is resulting in their bodies shedding could be as spectacular as the 2008 defeated. – AFP, October 4 liquids and subsequently their death.” raids in Mumbai, India, that killed He said there was a need for action 166 people.” – Los Angeles Times, October 4 October 5, 2010 (FRANCE): French against climate change, saying that authorities arrested 12 men suspected global warming was causing “great October 3, 2010 (ITALY): Officials in of having ties to al-Qa`ida and catastrophes throughout the Islamic France announced that Italian police terrorism. – Jerusalem Post, October 5 world.” - Reuters, October 1 arrested a French national in early September suspected of having links October 5, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): October 1, 2010 (IRAQ): Ali al-Maliki, to a network recruiting fighters for NATO forces announced the the chief of security for southern Iraq, Afghanistan. The man, identified capture of a Taliban leader “directly warned that the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) as Riahd Hennouni, was arrested involved” in the kidnapping of New plans to attack “a number of oil facilities” in Naples in southern Italy. Italian York Times journalist Stephen Farrell in the country. – UPI, October 1 newspapers reported that Hennouni in September 2009. The militant was is 28-years-old, of Algerian origin, identified as the Taliban’s district October 1, 2010 (PAKISTAN): and a possible member of al-Qa`ida. leader for Chahar Darah district in Approximately 20 militants destroyed – AP, October 3; CNN, October 4 Kunduz Province. He was captured in at least 27 NATO supply trucks in Takhar Province. – CNN, October 5 Shikarpur in Sindh Province. – The October 3, 2010 (PAKISTAN): News International, October 2 Assailants on motorcycles sprayed October 5, 2010 (SAUDI ARABIA): bullets at 28 NATO oil tankers near Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula October 2, 2010 (GLOBAL): Usama bin Islamabad, causing the tankers to (AQAP) threatened to launch new Ladin purportedly released a second catch fire. Six people were killed in the attacks against Saudi royal family audio statement in two days, again attack. – The News International, October 4 members. AQAP warned, “We say warning of the dangers of climate to the tyrants that we can get you in change. Bin Ladin discussed the cost October 4, 2010 (JORDAN): A Jordanian your offices, we can get you in your and equipment necessary to build military court sentenced Nabil bedrooms. I advise you to check before embankments to control flooding. Mohammed Amer to life in prison for going to bed that there’s no suicide He also criticized affluent Muslim leading a cell that plotted attacks against bomber or bomb in the room.” – AFP, countries for not providing more the country’s army and intelligence October 5 assistance to Pakistanis in the wake of services. Nine others were jailed for 15 catastrophic flooding. – New York Times, years in prison as part of the plot, which October 6, 2010 (YEMEN): A rocket- October 2 involved plans to kidnap the children propelled grenade struck a British of intelligence officers. – BBC, October 4; diplomatic vehicle in Sana`a, wounding October 2, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. Bloomberg, October 4 three people. The vehicle was carrying drone strike killed nine militants from Britain’s deputy ambassador to Yemen, the Badar Mansur group in Datta Khel October 4, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Fionna Gibb. She escaped unhurt. The of North Waziristan Agency in the Approximately 20 tanker trucks attack occurred on Khawlan Street in Federally Administered Tribal Areas. carrying fuel for NATO troops in the capital. Authorities suspect that – New York Times, October 2 Afghanistan were attacked at a depot in al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula Islamabad. At least three people were was responsible. – AFP, October 5; Daily October 2, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. killed during the pre-dawn incident. The Telegraph, October 7 drone strike killed eight militants in Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility. Datta Khel of North Waziristan Agency – Voice of America, October 4 October 6, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): in the Federally Administered Tribal Afghan and NATO forces killed 20 Areas. It was the second drone strike October 4, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Two Taliban fighters in Takhar Province. of the day. – New York Times, October 2 gunmen on motorcycles torched two – UPI, October 7 NATO supply trucks in Baluchistan Province. – Voice of America, October 4

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October 6, 2010 (PAKISTAN): October 8, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. October 12, 2010 (YEMEN): Qasim Approximately 77 NATO supply tankers drone strike killed six militants in the al-Raymi, a leader of al-Qa`ida in the were attacked by militants in Nowshera Miran Shah area of North Waziristan Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), said in District of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Agency in the Federally Administered an audio recording that the group has Province. Some 54 tankers were Tribal Areas. – CNN, October 8 created a new army to free Yemen of completely destroyed in the incident. “crusaders and their apostate agents.” – The News International, October 8 October 9, 2010 (PAKISTAN): The new army has been named the Approximately 30 militants attacked Aden-Abyan Army, and al-Raymi October 6, 2010 (PAKISTAN): NATO supply tankers in Bolan district vowed to overthrow the government Militants attacked a NATO truck of Baluchistan Province, destroying of President Ali Abdullah Salih. – Wall terminal in Quetta, Baluchistan 29 tankers. – The News International, Street Journal, October 13 Province, destroying 20 oil tankers. October 10 – The News International, October 7 October 12, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): October 10, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban militants fired a rocket at a October 7, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Afghan President Hamid Karzai told U.S. helicopter in Kunar Province, U.S. Admiral Michael Mullen, the reporters that his government is in wounding eight soldiers and killing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of talks with the Taliban in hopes of an Afghan interpreter. – AFP, October 12 Staff, said that the U.S. military will finding a political settlement to the “continue to raise the pressure and country’s conflict. He said, “The October 12, 2010 (IRAQ): The Islamic certainly seek to kill or capture the Taliban, those of whom who are State of Iraq threatened to kidnap top two [leaders] in Al-Qaeda.” He Afghans and the sons of Afghan soil “wives, daughters and sons” of Iraqi also said that al-Qa`ida “has been who have been driven to violence by politicians and ministers unless the significantly diminished over the various factors beyond their control... government freed the family of Abu course of the last two or three years we want them to come back to their Ayyab al-Masri, who was killed in but by no means are they no longer country. They are like kids who April 2010. – AP, October 12 lethal.” – AFP, October 7 have run away...from the family. But those who are a part of Al Qaeda and October 12, 2010 (PAKISTAN): October 7, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): the other terrorist networks who Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza A suicide bomber killed one German are ideologically against us or who Gilani said that peace talks between the soldier in Baghlan Province. – BBC, are working against Afghanistan Afghan government and the Taliban October 7 knowingly and out of the purpose of cannot succeed without the assistance hatred and enmity, those of course we of Pakistan. Gilani told reporters that October 7, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Two have to work against.” – Christian Science peace talks cannot happen “without suspected suicide bombers killed at Monitor, October 11 us because we are part of the solution. least nine people at a crowded Sufi We are not part of the problem.” – AP, shrine in Karachi, Pakistan’s most October 10, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. October 12 populated city. – Reuters, October 7; CNN, drone strike killed seven militants at October 8 a compound in Shewa district of North October 12, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Waziristan Agency in the Federally Militants killed three anti-Taliban October 8, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Administered Tribal Areas. – Dawn, tribal elders in Mohmand Agency of The U.S. Immigration and Customs October 10 the Federally Administered Tribal Enforcement announced that Areas. – AP, October 13 Mohammed Warsame, who pled guilty October 12, 2010 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida in the United States in May 2009 to in the Arabian Peninsula released the October 13, 2010 (PAKISTAN): providing material support to al- second issue of its English-language Pakistani police arrested seven Qa`ida, has been deported to Canada. magazine, Inspire. The issue includes militants who were allegedly planning Warsame, who was born in Somalia, two articles from Yemeni-American to assassinate the country’s prime trained at an al-Qa`ida military camp cleric Anwar al-`Awlaqi. The issue minister in a gun and suicide attack at and attended lectures delivered by offers a number of tips on how to his house. The suspects are accused of Usama bin Ladin. He is a naturalized kill Americans in the United States, being members of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. Canadian citizen. – Fox News, October 8 including opening fire on lunch-hour – AP, October 14 crowds in Washington, D.C. to “knock October 8, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A out a few government employees.” October 14, 2010 (SOMALIA): Somali suspected suicide bomb ripped through – AP, October 12; NPR, October 12 President Shaykh Sharif Shaykh a mosque in Takhar Province, killing Ahmad named Somali-American 20 people including the governor of October 12, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed as Kunduz Province. – AP, October 8 The trial of accused terrorist Ahmed prime minister. The country’s previous Ghailani opened in New York City. prime minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Ghailani is accused of involvement in Sharmarke, resigned on September 21, the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy 2010. – New York Times, October 14 in Tanzania. – Voice of America, October 12

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October 15, 2010 (NORWAY): October 17, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): operations in Pakistan have taken Norwegian authorities released David NATO airstrikes killed Abdul Jamil, a “serious toll” on al-Qa`ida. – AFP, Jakobsen from custody after the who was identified as a Taliban leader October 20 Supreme Court rejected an attempt by for two districts in Baghlan Province. the police to keep him in detention. – CNN, October 19 October 19, 2010 (RUSSIA): Militants Jakobsen, who is an Uzbek national, attacked the parliament building in was one of three suspects arrested in October 17, 2010 (MAURITANIA): A Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, killing July 2010 for involvement in a terrorist Mauritanian court jailed two militants four people. – RIA Novosti, October 19 plot connected to the same al-Qa`ida linked to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic operatives behind plots to target the Maghreb. – AFP, October 17 October 20, 2010 (UNITED STATES): New York subway system and a mall Zachary Chesser, who is 20-years- in the United Kingdom. According to October 17, 2010 (TAJIKISTAN): old, pled guilty in the United States the Associated Press, “Prosecutors Tajik security forces reportedly to trying to help Somalia’s al-Shabab later revealed that Jakobsen had been killed three Islamist militants. An terrorist group and for threatening a police informant in the case, but he Interior Ministry official said that the writers of the “South Park” still faces terrorism charges because the three militants had trained at a television show for their depiction of the allegations against the group rely terrorist camp in Afghanistan and the Prophet Muhammad. Chesser, who partly on events that took place before were operating in Tajikistan’s Rasht is from Virginia, faces up to 30 years he approached police last year.” The region. – UPI, October 17 in prison. – ABC News, October 20; Christian Norwegian court ruled that Jakobsen Science Monitor, October 20 is not a flight risk. – AP, October 15 October 18, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban fighters attacked a checkpoint October 20, 2010 (MAURITANIA): A October 15, 2010 (SWEDEN): in Helmand Province, killing nine Mauritanian court sentenced Khadim Authorities charged two men of private security guards. All of the Ould Semane to death for his role in Somali descent with plotting terrorist guards were Afghan citizens. – al- a militant group linked to al-Qa`ida attacks in Somalia. Prosecutors allege Jazira, October 18 in the Islamic Maghreb. According to that the men are linked to al-Shabab. Reuters, “Two other members of the – Voice of America, October 15 October 18, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide group, Sidi Ould Sidna and Marouf bomber drove an explosives-laden Ould Haiba, also were sentenced to October 15, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemeni vehicle into a U.S. military convoy in death, though both previously had authorities arrested a man accused northern Iraq, killing an Iraqi soldier. been sentenced to death in May for of financing al-Qa`ida in the Arabian – AFP, October 18 their roles in the killing of four French Peninsula. The man, identified as a tourists in 2007.” – Reuters, October 20 Yemeni expatriate living in Saudi October 18, 2010 (IRAQ): A bomb Arabia, was apprehended at Sana`a ripped through an Iraqi government October 21, 2010 (PHILIPPINES): A International Airport. – CNN, October 16 convoy in Baghdad, killing an official. bomb exploded aboard a passenger bus – AFP, October 18 in the southern Philippines, killing October 15, 2010 (PAKISTAN): nine civilians. – AFP, October 21 Approximately three separate U.S. October 18, 2010 (PAKISTAN): drone strikes killed 13 militants Multiple U.S. drones killed at least October 22, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): in North Waziristan Agency of the six militants in the Datta Khel area A bomb ripped through the vehicle Federally Administered Tribal Areas. of North Waziristan Agency in the of a district governor for Nangarhar – CNN, October 16 Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Province. The governor, identified as – Dawn, October 18 Khorsheed, was killed. – AFP, October 21 October 17, 2010 (WESTERN EUROPE): French Interior Minister October 18, 2010 (PAKISTAN): October 22, 2010 (PAKISTAN): The Brice Hortefeux told reporters that Police killed a suicide bomber United States announced that it will Saudi Arabia’s intelligence services driving an explosives-laden vehicle release a $2 billion military aid package are warning of a new terrorist plot in Lakki Marwat District of Khyber- to Pakistan over a five-year period. targeting Europe. Saudi officials said Pakhtunkhwa Province. – The News Marking the announcement, Secretary that the threat comes from al-Qa`ida International, October 18 of State Hillary Clinton said, “The in the Arabian Peninsula. – CNN, United States has no stronger partner October 17 October 18, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemen when it comes to counterterrorism sentenced Saleh al-Shawish to death efforts against the extremists who October 17, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): for being an al-Qa`ida bomb-maker threaten us both than Pakistan.” – al- Taliban fighters attacked a and for preparing suicide bombers. Jazira, October 22 construction company in Farah – Reuters, October 18 Province, kidnapping 20 workers. October 22, 2010 (TURKEY): – al-Jazira, October 18 October 19, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Prosecutors in a Turkish court accused Leon Panetta, the director of the U.S. a man, only identified by his initials Central Intelligence Agency, told A.K., of having ties to al-Qa`ida and the media that the CIA’s heightened of trying to help militants shoot down

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Heron military drones in Afghanistan. October 23, 2010 (RUSSIA): A suicide Afghanistan region to kill Americans. The 23-year-old mathematics student bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle Ahmed moved to the United States allegedly had software designed to killed one policeman in the southern in 1993 and lived in Ashburn, calculate angles of fire and coordinates Russian republic of Dagestan. – RIA Virginia. According to a Reuters of the drones. Authorities also found Novosti, October 23; NTD Television, October 25 report describing the indictment, hydrogen peroxide, gunpowder and “From April to October 25, Ahmed other bomb-making materials in the October 24, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemen’s allegedly conducted surveillance, suspect’s house. – Wall Street Journal, foreign minister estimates that there videotaped, photographed, and October 23 are some 400 al-Qa`ida fighters active drew diagrams of the Arlington in the country. – AP, October 24 Cemetery, Courthouse, Crystal City October 23, 2010 (GLOBAL): Al- and Pentagon City Metrorail stations Qa`ida spokesman Adam Gadahn October 25, 2010 (UNITED STATES): and offered suggestions about where released a new video message, calling Omar Khadr pled guilty in a U.S. to place explosives to kill people in for Muslims living “in the miserable military court to killing a U.S. simultaneous attacks planned for suburbs of Paris, London and Detroit” Army sergeant during a battle in 2011…He allegedly told an agent posing to carry out attacks there. “It is the Afghanistan. Khadr, who has been as an al Qaeda operative that an attack duty of everyone who is sincere in his detained at Guantanamo Bay for eight executed between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on desire to defend Islam and Muslims years, will be sent to Canada in a year the Washington Metro would cause today, to take the initiative to perform to serve out his sentence as part of his the most casualties.” – Reuters, October 28 the individual obligation of jihad...by plea agreement. – AP, October 25 striking the Zio-Crusader interests,” October 27, 2010 (PAKISTAN): he said. – CBS News, October 23; Fox News, October 26, 2010 (TURKEY): U.S. drone strikes killed at least six October 25 Turkish authorities announced that militants in North Waziristan Agency they detained 12 people in Istanbul of the Federally Administered Tribal October 23, 2010 (GLOBAL): Yemeni- suspected of providing support Areas. – AFP, October 27 American cleric Anwar al-`Awlaqi to al-Qa`ida militants fighting in released a new video message, saying Afghanistan. – Reuters, October 26 October 27, 2010 (SOMALIA): An al- that Islam is in “severe need for Shabab firing squad publicly executed guidance in these dark situations.” October 27, 2010 (GLOBAL): Usama two teenage girls in Beledweyne on Only excerpts of the video were bin Ladin purportedly released a new charges that they had spied for the released. – CNN, October 23 audio message, threatening to kill government. The girls were reportedly French citizens for their country’s 15 and 14-years-old. – Voice of America, October 23, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): support of the U.S.-led mission in October 28 Four Taliban militants disguised Afghanistan and for banning face- as policemen and women launched covering Muslim veils. “How can it be October 28, 2010 (FRANCE): a suicide attack against a United right that you [the French] participate France announced that it could Nations compound in Herat city. in the occupation of our lands, support begin withdrawing its troops from According to Voice of America, the Americans in the killing of our Afghanistan as early as 2011. French “Witnesses said the four militants women and children and yet want to officials insisted that there was arrived at the U.N. compound in a live in peace and security?” he said. “absolutely no link” between the car packed with explosives. Accounts “It is a simple and clear equation: As announcement and an October 27 from Afghan officials and U.N. you kill, you will be killed. As you threat delivered against the country workers indicated that two of the capture, you will be captured. And by Usama bin Ladin. France has attackers blew themselves up in the as you threaten our security, your approximately 3,500 troops deployed car, and a third man wearing a suicide security will be threatened. The way in Afghanistan, mostly east of Kabul. vest killed himself as he entered the to safeguard your security is to cease – Christian Science Monitor, October 28; Radio compound. Afghan police shot and your oppression and its impact on France International, October 28 killed the fourth attacker.” No one our nation, most importantly your inside the compound was injured, withdrawal from the ill-fated Bush October 29, 2010 (GLOBAL): Authorities although at least two Afghan police war in Afghanistan.” – AP, October 27 disrupted a major international guarding the facility were wounded. terrorist plot involving explosives in – Voice of America, October 23 October 27, 2010 (UNITED STATES): packages mailed to the United States U.S. authorities arrested a Pakistan- from Yemen. They were able to disrupt October 23, 2010 (PAKISTAN): born, naturalized U.S. citizen in a the plot due to intelligence provided Authorities announced the capture of sting operation where the suspect by the Saudi Arabian government, Rehmatullah, identified as a former believed he was part of an al-Qa`ida which gathered the tip from an al- bodyguard to Pakistani Taliban plot to bomb the Washington, D.C. Qa`ida militant who had surrendered leader Hakimullah Mehsud. He was subway system. The suspect, Farooque to Saudi authorities. On November 5, apprehended in Orakzai Agency of the Ahmed, also told authorities that al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula Federally Administered Tribal Areas. he had trained himself in firearms (AQAP) claimed responsibility for the – CNN, October 23 and hand-to-hand combat and was plot. The AQAP statement said, “We planning to travel to the Pakistan- will continue to strike blows against

27 november 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 11-12

American interests and the interest of CTC Sentinel Staff America’s allies.” – CNN, October 29; CNN, November 5; Voice of America, November 1 Editor-in-Chief Erich Marquardt October 29, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide Senior Editor, CTC bomber attacked a café in Balad Ruz in Diyala Province, killing at least Editorial Board 25 people. The café is known to be COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. popular among Shi`a Kurds. – Reuters, Department Head October 30; AFP, October 29 Department of Social Sciences (West Point) October 29, 2010 (PAKISTAN): COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. Militants set fire to a NATO supply Deputy Department Head truck 12 miles south of Quetta in Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Baluchistan Province. – AFP, October 29

LTC Reid Sawyer October 29, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Militants Director, CTC opened fire on a NATO supply truck 174 miles south of Quetta in Baluchistan Christopher Heffelfinger Province. – AFP, October 29 FBI Fellow, CTC October 29, 2010 (MOROCCO): Moroccan security officials announced that they recently disrupted two radical Islamist cells linked to al- Contact Qa`ida in the country. The cells were Combating Terrorism Center reportedly plotting attacks in Morocco U.S. Military Academy and recruiting fighters to send to Iraq. 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall One of the cell members is a Yemeni West Point, NY 10996 national who allegedly has close ties Phone: (845) 667-6383 to al-Qa`ida. – Reuters, October 29 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ October 30, 2010 (INDONESIA): Indonesian authorities announced * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 that they detained Taufik Marzuki, a suspected terrorist behind a number of attacks in Sumatra. Taufik, the head of the Islam Defenders Front of Aceh, was captured last month. – Jakarta Post, October 30 support The Combating Terrorism Center would October 31, 2010 (IRAQ): Nine like to express its gratitude to its financial militants wearing suicide vests supporters, for without their support and stormed the Church of Our Lady shared vision of the Center products like of Salvation in Baghdad’s Karrada the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If district. Police entered the church you are interested in learning more about and killed eight of the militants, while how to support the Combating Terrorism the ninth detonated his suicide vest. Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. At least 52 people, including civilians edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at and members of the security forces, West Point’s Association of Graduates at were killed. – Telegraph, November 1; al- 845-446-1553. Jazira, November 2

October 31, 2010 (TURKEY): A suicide bomber detonated explosives at the popular tourist spot Taksim Square in Istanbul, injuring at least 30 people. The bomber targeted a bus The views expressed in this report are those of full of police officers. The Kurdistan the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Workers’ Party denied involvement in the Department of the Army, or any other agency the attack. – Guardian, October 31; Voice of of the U.S. Government. America, November 1

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