CTC Sentinel Objective

NOVEMBER 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 11-12 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT CTC Sentinel OBJECTIVE . RELEVANT . RIGOROUS Contents AQAP’s Soft Power Strategy FEATURE ARTICLE 1 AQAP’s Soft Power Strategy in Yemen in Yemen By Barak Barfi By Barak Barfi REPORTS 5 Developing Policy Options for the AQAP Threat in Yemen By Gabriel Koehler-Derrick 9 The Role of Non-Violent Islamists in Europe By Lorenzo Vidino 12 The Evolution of Iran’s Special Groups in Iraq By Michael Knights 16 Fragmentation in the North Caucasus Insurgency By Christopher Swift 19 Assessing the Success of Leadership Targeting By Austin Long 21 Revolution Muslim: Downfall or Respite? By Aaron Y. Zelin 24 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts l-qaìda in the arabian AQAP has avoided many of the domestic Peninsula (AQAP) is currently battles that weakened other al-Qaìda the most successful of the affiliates by pursuing a shrewd strategy at three al-Qaìda affiliates home in Yemen.3 The group has sought to Aoperating in the Arab world.1 Unlike its focus its efforts on its primary enemies— sibling partners, AQAP has neither been the Yemeni and Saudi governments, as plagued by internecine conflicts nor has well as the United States—rather than it clashed with its tribal hosts. It has also distracting itself by combating minor launched two major terrorist attacks domestic adversaries that would only About the CTC Sentinel against the U.S. homeland that were only complicate its grand strategy. Some The Combating Terrorism Center is an foiled by a combination of luck and the analysts have argued that this stems independent educational and research help of foreign intelligence agencies.2 from the lessons the group learned from institution based in the Department of Social al-Qaìda’s failed campaigns in countries Sciences at the United States Military Academy, such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq. While West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses true to some extent, AQAP’s policies are the Center’s global network of scholars and more the result of the realities it faces in practitioners to understand and confront a constricting Yemeni theater. Factors contemporary threats posed by terrorism and 1 Its siblings, in this case, refer to al-Qaìda in Iraq and other forms of political violence. al-Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb. 2 These two attacks include the attempt by Umar Farouk 3 For a discussion of AQAP’s strategy, see Barak Barfi, Abdulmutallab to detonate an explosive device on a North- “How Attacking AQAP Influenced Its Strategy,” NATO The views expressed in this report are those of west Airlines flight as it approached Detroit on December Review 5 (2010). For biographies of AQAP’s leadership the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 25, 2009, as well as the attempt to detonate explosives-lad- and other details, see Barak Barfi, “Yemen on the Brink? the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. en packages on cargo planes bound for the United States The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen,” New America in October 2010. Foundation, January 2010. 1 NOVEMBER 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 11-12 unique to Yemen but largely absent in al-Wahhab al-Daylami, who later areas of the country that have historically other countries where al-Qaìda operates became justice minister, made similar been disaffected by the regime’s policies. necessitate adopting a soft touch. comments, declaring, “not killing these Most of these regions are in provinces Muslims (the Socialists) leads to a where a Shià sect known as the Zaydis This article details AQAP’s “soft power” greater corruption.”6 preponderates. The clans there are hostile strategy at home, highlighting the to groups such as AQAP since it belongs group’s positions toward the southern AQAP, in contrast, takes a much more to the puritanical Salafi creed that loathes socialists as well as the country’s Shià, subdued approach toward the southern the Shià.8 Since making inroads with who are known as the Zaydis. As a result socialists. In an interview with a Yemeni these tribes is a herculean task, AQAP of its domestic maneuvering, AQAP is journalist, AQAP’s leader, Nasir al- has instead focused its attention on the at times less of an international jihadist Wahayshi, commented, “we know that Sunni tribal regions, which are almost group than it is just another Yemeni many of you crave freedom and reject exclusively in the south. This explains organization battling the regime in why AQAP’s bastions are located in the Sanaà and playing by ever shifting “Whereas the provinces of Marib, Shabwa and Abyan local rules. Nevertheless, this article where the population is overwhelmingly contends that AQAP’s “soft” approach Taliban enforced an Sunni. at home is merely a tactical strategy uncompromising form of since the group views itself as too weak Alienating the locals and their leaders to confront multiple enemies at this Islam, AQAP has tolerated by embracing al-Zindani’s views on the time. Indeed, AQAP remains firmly in the un-Islamic practices socialists and the ancien régime would the ideological camp of Abu Musàb al- hamper the organization’s ability to Zarqawi and the Taliban. of the clans that shelter operate there. As such, AQAP’s soft it. Whereas al-Zarqawi touch toward the socialists springs from The Southern Socialists political necessity rather than affection AQAP’s attitudes toward Yemen’s turned on his tribal hosts, for their cause. southern socialists and how they differ AQAP has merely engaged from those of other Yemeni Islamists The Zaydis are indicative of this soft touch. Before a in verbal spats with Although the sectarian divide between 1990 union, Yemen was divided between Yemeni tribes.” AQAP and the Shià Zaydis has the northern and southern states. By 1994, potential to degenerate into open conflict, the southerners, the weaker of the al-Wahayshi and his cadres have until two parties, had soured on the merger recently attempted to minimize tensions and attempted to secede. In the run- tyranny, despotism, humility and between the two groups. To this end, up to a civil war, a number of Yemeni subjugation. But you have followed an the organization has emphasized the Islamists issued fatawa (religious edicts) erroneous path.”7 Whereas al-Zindani admirable elements of Zaydism. It has denouncing the Yemeni Socialist Party preached fire and brimstone against showered praise on the progeny of the that ruled South Yemen and which was the southern socialists, al-Wahayshi Prophet Muhammad, known as ahl al- leading the secessionist charge. Chief instead adopts a gentle “fatherly” tone bayt, from which the leaders of Shi’ism among them was ‘Abd al-Majid al- toward children who have erred. descend.9 AQAP has highlighted the Zindani, Yemen’s most famous Islamist. fact that Àli, the first Shià leader and He demonized the socialists, calling AQAP’s mild position does not stem fourth caliph, is one of the 10 Muslims them “idol worshippers” and compared from love of the socialists or their ideals. promised entrance into heaven.10 It has them to the Prophet Muhammad’s Instead, it derives from the realities of argued that he was wronged by the enemies in Mecca.4 He urged the Yemeni geopolitics. AQAP has adopted usurper and founder of the Umayya region’s inhabitants to “persuade this approach to curry favor with dynasty, Muàwiyya, positions rarely Arab rulers that fighting the Yemeni southerners, which it needs for both emphasized in the circles AQAP (Socialists) is lawful, against a group popular support and tribal protection. frequents. It has gone so far as to claim of dissenting heretic infidels. Fighting The disgruntled population in the south that Yemenis “are endeared to the Zaydi it is a (religious) duty.”5 His ally, ‘Abd is hostile to the regime of President Ali school.”11 Abdullah Salih and is thus susceptible 4 Such accusations are among the worst a Muslim can to calls by groups opposed to it. hurl at his co-religionists because they paint them as enemies of Islam. These quotes come from a speech record- Sectarian tensions equally explain 8 For Salafism, see Bernard Rougier ed., Qu’est-ce que ed on June 10, 1994, available on a cassette entitled “The AQAP’s position. The group has sought le Salafisme? (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, Duty of the Islamic Nation Towards the Battle.” to establish strongholds in the tribal 2008). 5 Ibid. These are loaded terms with an Islamic signifi- 9 Abu’l-Bara’a al-Sana’ani, “The Huthis are Rafidis in cance. For the significance of the term dissenter baghi( ), on the Significance of Heresy in the History of Islam,” the Guise of the Zaydis,” Sada al-Malahim, No. 12, Feb- see Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam Studia Islamica 1 (1953). ruary 2010. For the ahl al-bayt in Islamic thought, see (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 6 Sawt al-Iman [Sanaà], June 21, 1994. Moshe Sharon, Black Banners From the East (Jerusalem: 1955), pp. 77-79; Alfred Morabia, Le Gihâd dans l’Islam 7 See the interview with Abd Illah Haydar Sha’a, avail- Magnes Press, 1983), pp. 75-82. médiéval (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993), p. 300. For the term able at www.abdulela.maktoobblog.com. This source 10 Wahayshi Interview. heretic (mulhid), see Bernard Lewis, “Some Observations will hereafter be cited as “Wahayshi Interview.” 11 Al-Sana’ani. 2 NOVEMBER 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 11-12 AQAP’s moderate tone toward the embrace Salafism, only intensifying Although AQAP has long limited its Zaydis contrasts with that of other his conflict with the Zaydi leadership.

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