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U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL Carter Smith YMCA 2018 Southeastern High School Model United Nations YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN Dear Delegates, This year’s Staff would like to welcome you to SHSMUN 2018! With the belief in mind that MUN is FUN, we hope that you are as excited as we are for November 17-19. Our primary goal is to ensure that this Conference is the best one yet while maintaining the most authentic experience for you, our esteemed delegates. To accomplish our goal, we are constantly striving to evolve and improve in all the ways we can think of. For you, this means that General Committee procedure will run more smoothly, note passing will be easier, and committee sessions will be as amazing as they have always been, if you put the work in. Hard work is a tradition at SHSMUN, so we hope to inspire you through these topic guides to be as prepared as possible to debate and collaborate on your topics. Most of the research and work of a Model UN delegate should come before the Conference in order to give your skill a chance to shine through in committee. We encourage you to really delve into your topics and country’s positions early on so that your Conference experience can be as fruitful as possible! Whether this is your first year at SHSMUN or your fourth, no matter the committee you decide to participate in, you have the unique opportunity to learn about, understand, and advocate for another country’s position, one that you might not agree with. To be able to do this and do it well is a vital skill for the increasingly interconnected world we live in today, and what better place to practice it than right here at SHSMUN 2018! With all of this in mind, please do not hesitate to contact your chair or any other Conference Staff members with your questions relating to topics, committee, or the Conference in general. We wish you the best of luck in your work, and we cannot wait to see all of your efforts pay off at the Conference come November! Best of luck, Lauren Tolbert Carter Smith Secretary-General Director-General [email protected] [email protected] Emily Perez Karlyn Simcox Under-Secretary-General General Committee President [email protected] [email protected] P.S. Make sure to keep up with the latest SHSMUN news and updates by following our social media accounts! Instagram Twitter Snapchat @tnshsmun @tnshsmun @tnshsmun UNSC | 1 YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN Table of Contents Parliamentary Procedure Cheat Sheets 3 Sheet 1: Overview of Common Points and Motions 3 Sheet 2: The Parliamentary Procedure Basics 4 Letter from the Chair 5 Committee History 6 Topic A: Integrating Human Capital into Conflict Transformation 7 Introduction 7 Background 8 Current Situation 10 Committee Directive and Jurisdiction 11 Questions to Consider 11 Suggested Sources 12 Topic B: The Situation in Yemen 13 Introduction 13 Background 13 Current Situation 15 Committee Directive and Jurisdiction 18 Questions to Consider 18 Suggested Sources 19 Topic C: Combatting Abuses in the Sinai Peninsula 20 Introduction 20 Background 21 Current Situation 22 Committee Directive and Jurisdiction 24 Questions to Consider 25 Suggested Sources 25 UNSC | 2 YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN Parliamentary Procedure Cheat Sheets Sheet 1: Overview of Common Points and Motions May Requires Pro-Con May Be Vote Motion or Point Interrupt Second? Debate Amended? Required Speaker? Chair’s Point of Order Y N N/A N Discretion Chair’s Right of Reply Y N N/A N Discretion Suspend the Simple N Y N/A Y Meeting Majority Limit/Extend Simple N Y 1/1 Y Debate Majority Limit Speaker’s Simple N Y 1/1 Y Time Majority Introduce Simple N Y 1/1 N Amendment Majority Introduce Simple N Y 2/2 N Resolution Majority Enter Voting 2/3rds N Y 2/2 N Procedures Majority Divide the Simple N Y 1/1 N Question Majority 2/3rds Table N Y 2/2 N Majority Take from the Simple N Y 1/1 N Table Majority Simple Caucus (ALL) N Y 1/1 Y Majority Simple Roll Call Vote N Y 1/1 N Majority Suspend the 2/3rds N Y 2/2 Y Rules Majority UNSC | 3 YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN Sheet 2: The Parliamentary Procedure Basics Remember! 1. Any time you speak, you must begin by saying your name and country. 2. Before you ask questions to a delegate, you must say, “Does the delegate yield to a possible series of questions?” and if they yield, you may then ask up to three questions. Speakers’ List: add yourself if you wish to speak on the topic. If you are on the docket, you are automatically added. When on the Speakers’ List, you may yield your time one of three ways: • To the chair: Chair absorbs the rest of your time. • To questions: Other delegates may ask you up to three questions. • To another delegate: Another delegate may speak for the rest of your time. Caucuses: • Moderated caucus: a way to hear from multiple delegates for short periods of time; set a total speakers time, an individual delegate speaking time, and a topic • Roll Call Caucus: The Co-Chair will take roll, and every delegate will be given thirty seconds to speak on their position. • Unmoderated caucus: unregulated time to work on super-resolutions; stay on task. Points: • Point of Order*: Used if a delegate incorrectly uses parliamentary procedure. • Point of Inquiry: Used to ask questions about parliamentary procedure or clarify what is going on; also used to ask for other delegates to speak louder, for boys to ask to remove their coats, to ask to change temperature of the room. • Right of Reply*: If another delegate directly slanders your country, you can use this to refute their claims and defend your nation. *You may interrupt the speaker for these points Introductions: • Amendments: In order to change or add anything to a resolution already introduced, you must send it to the dais and then move to introduce it. o Friendly amendments: The author(s) of the resolution(s) favor it and it is immediately added to the resolution. o Unfriendly amendments: The author(s) of the resolution(s) do not favor it, and it is put to a vote in committee. • Resolutions: 25% of the committee must be signatories, then send it to the dais and move to introduce it. Ways to Vote (Resolutions and Amendments) • Simple Placard Vote: Delegates raise their placard to cast their vote (default). • Roll Call Vote: The Co-Chair will take roll and each country will say their response. • Vote By Unanimous Consent: If the entire committee is in favor of a resolution or amendment, you may suspend the rules and vote by affirmation. UNSC | 4 YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN Letter from the Chair To the Security Council, Hello! My name is Carter Smith, and I have the honor of being the President of the Security Council at SHSMUN 2018. This will be my fourth year at SHSMUN and second year on staff; prior to this, I served as the ECOFIN chair and was an ECOFIN delegate for two years (If you couldn’t tell, I really enjoy economics). Although I may not have conventional Security Council experience, SHSMUN 2017’s exhilarating SecCo crisis inspired me to pursue this position, and I hope that I can provide each you an unforgettable memory this November. However, when I’m not preparing for SHSMUN, I find time to pursue my love for consuming copious amounts of coffee, volunteering, Science Olympiad, Kanye West, and anything related to space. Narrowing down my list of favorite shows is difficult, but Seinfeld, The Office, and Black Mirror would definitely be my top 3. I cannot wait to meet each of you and bond over many hours of intense SecCo debate! All committees at SHSMUN challenge you to think critically and to thoroughly understand your country’s position, but none compare to the added realism that comes along with the Security Council. As SecCo delegates, you must solve the most challenging and complex issues facing the international community, keeping in mind that your solutions that have legitimate, binding power. When I chose this year’s topics, I wanted to focus on emerging conflicts and issues that have a real possibility of evolving into a far worse problem. In the past, the Security Council has often only addressed global issues once they have reached a point of no return; however, this year’s topics present you with a unique opportunity to develop comprehensive solutions that confront the underlying tensions behind many conflicts. Security Council demands unparalleled diplomatic and collaborative skill, something that I’m confident all of you will bring to SHSMUN 2018. I expect a strong understanding of your country’s positions, analysis of past SecCo decisions, and advanced knowledge of parliamentary procedure to allow for efficient debate to take place. Furthermore, thorough research of the topics and their international implications is necessary for SecCo to pass resolutions. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me using the information I have provided below. I look forward to lively debate this November! Sincerely, Carter Smith 2018 Security Council President / Director-General [email protected] (423)244-1050 UNSC | 5 YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN Committee History The Security Council first convened in January of 1946 as one of the six principal organs of the United Nations (UN). Created as part of an effort to replace the ineffective League of Nations, the Security Council’s mandate is to maintain international peace and security.
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