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Homegrown Terrorism” and the Preventive Approach to Investigations

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Homegrown Terrorism” and the Preventive Approach to Investigations ILLUSION OF JUSTICE Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Illusion of Justice Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions Copyright © 2014 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-1555 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org The Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School The Human Rights Institute sits at the heart of human rights teaching, practice and scholarship at Columbia Law School. Founded in 1998 by the late Professor Louis Henkin, the Institute draws on the law school’s deep human rights tradition to support and influence human rights practice in the United States and throughout the world. The Institute focuses its work in three main substantive areas: Counterterrorism and Human Rights; Human Rights in the United States; and Human Rights in the Global Economy. We have developed distinct approaches to our work, building bridges between scholarship and activism, developing capacity within the legal community, engaging governments, and modeling new strategies for progress. For more information, please visit: law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute JULY 2014 978-1-62313-1555 Illusion of Justice Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions Summary ................................................................................................................ 1 Human Rights Concerns ............................................................................................... 4 Adverse Impact on American Muslim Communities, Law Enforcement .......................... 7 Key Recommendations to the US Federal Government .................................................. 8 Methodology .......................................................................................................... 9 I. “Homegrown Terrorism” and the Preventive Approach to Investigations ............. 13 Post 9/11 Changes to Priorities and Rules Governing Federal Terrorism Investigations 14 Theories of “Homegrown Terrorism” and “Radicalization” .......................................... 16 Widespread Surveillance of American Muslims and Use of Informants ........................ 18 II. Discriminatory and Overly Aggressive Investigations Using Informants ............. 21 Identifying Targets for Investigation Due to Religious or Political Views ...................... 23 Vulnerable Targets: People with Mental, Intellectual Disabilities, Indigent People ...... 27 Vulnerable Targets: Individuals Seeking Religious Guidance ...................................... 41 Informants Ignoring Targets’ Reluctance to Engage in Terrorism .................................. 45 Informants Playing Key Roles in Generating or Furthering the “Plot” ........................... 47 Informants with Criminal Histories ............................................................................. 54 Human Rights Concerns ............................................................................................. 55 III. Broad Charges: Material Support Cases ........................................................... 60 Changes to the Material Support Statute .................................................................... 60 Waves of Material Support Prosecutions .................................................................... 62 Human Rights Concerns ............................................................................................. 74 IV. Unfair Trials .................................................................................................... 76 Prejudicial Evidence .................................................................................................. 76 Evidence from Warrantless Wiretaps under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act .. 96 Classified Evidence ................................................................................................. 107 Anonymous and Biased Juries ................................................................................... 111 Pretrial Solitary Confinement and Other Conditions of Confinement .......................... 112 1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | JULY 2014 V. Disproportionate Sentences ............................................................................ 122 The “Terrorism Adjustment” ..................................................................................... 123 Lengthy Sentences Based on Unproven Conduct ...................................................... 125 Lengthy Sentences Based on Non-Violent Conduct ................................................... 127 Lengthy Sentences in Informant Cases ..................................................................... 129 VI. Imprisonment and Treatment .......................................................................... 131 Background: Tightening of Restrictions in Response to “Prisoner Radicalization” ..... 132 Prolonged Solitary Confinement and Restrictions on Family Contact ......................... 133 Obstacles to Challenging Prisoner Classification and Seeking Transfer to Less Restrictive Facilities ................................................................................................. 152 VII. Law Enforcement Relations with American Muslim Communities .................... 164 Community Outreach and Countering Violent Extremism .......................................... 164 Necessary Alternatives ............................................................................................ 173 VIII. Full Recommendations ................................................................................. 178 To the US President ................................................................................................. 178 To the US Attorney General ...................................................................................... 179 To the Federal Bureau of Investigation ..................................................................... 180 To the Department of Justice National Security Division and US Attorneys’ Offices .... 180 To the Bureau of Prisons .......................................................................................... 182 To the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General .......................................... 185 To the US Sentencing Commission ........................................................................... 185 To Federal Court Judges ........................................................................................... 185 To the US Congress .................................................................................................. 186 Acknowledgments .............................................................................................. 188 Appendix............................................................................................................. 190 A. Cases Reviewed ................................................................................................... 190 B. Detention Conditions ........................................................................................... 198 C. Length of Time in Pretrial Solitary Confinement .................................................... 200 D. Quantitative Analysis of the Department of Justice Terrorism Conviction Dataset .. 201 E. Government Correspondence ............................................................................... 206 ILLUSION OF JUSTICE 2 Summary Muslims are a fundamental part of the American family. In fact, the success of American Muslims and our determination to guard against any encroachments on their civil liberties is the ultimate rebuke to those who say that we’re at war with Islam. —US President Barack Obama, May 23, 2013 This community is under siege. And even if they’re not under siege, they think they are. —Tom Nelson, attorney, Portland, Oregon, August 13, 2012 Terrorism entails horrifying acts, often resulting in terrible losses of human life. Governments have a duty under international human rights law to take reasonable measures to protect people within their jurisdictions from acts of violence. When crimes are committed, governments also have a duty to carry out impartial investigations, to identify those responsible, and to prosecute suspects before independent courts. These obligations require ensuring fairness and due process in investigations and prosecutions, as well as humane treatment of those in custody. However, since the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC, the United States government has failed to meet its international legal obligations with respect to its investigations and prosecutions of terrorism suspects, as well as its treatment of terrorism suspects in custory. This has been true with regard to foreign terrorism suspects detained at the US military detention center at
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