Is Europe's Right Wing Turn Due to Immigration?
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Open Political Science, 2020; 3: 84–96 Research Article Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem*, Nicola Pasini Is Europe’s right wing turn due to immigration? Empirical evidence from Italy https://doi.org/10.1515/openps-2020-0008 received March 17, 2020; accepted April 3, 2020. Abstract: Immigration has unquestionably gained importance in Italian public opinion over the past few years; but what has been its effect on politics? Building on a recent trend in literature, this paper appraises the effect of immigration on the success of far-right parties. We analyze the results of the elections from 2001, when immigration was still marginal, to the last elections held in 2018. Applying time-series-cross-section methods to an original dataset, we find that immigration has had a consistent effect on votes for the far-right. Interestingly, we also show that economic factors likely weigh more on far-right votes than immigration. Keywords: right-wing extremism; far-right; Italy; immigration; elections; regions. 1 Is Europe’s right wing turn due to immigration? Empirical evidence from Italy Over the last few years, immigration has gained significant relevance in the European Union. Political instability in North Africa (with the Arab Spring) and in the Middle-East (with the ongoing war in Syria), along with enduring economic disparities between North and South, have spurred large numbers of people on the roads towards the Old Continent. The repeated tragedies in the Mediterranean, the lack of a collective response to the phenomenon on the part of EU member states and the xenophobic reactions in many of the destination countries have contributed to putting the “issue” of migration at the forefront of political concerns (Ortensi et al. 2017; Van Wolleghem 2018). The various elections throughout the EU in 2017 and 2018 have shown that a good deal of the political competition was played out on migration-related issues, with far-right parties scoring very well, even in countries which traditionally feature a certain openness to diversity (Ortensi et al. 2017). Nonetheless, how much of the success of far-right parties is actually due to immigration remains a thorny question; a question which this paper proposes to address. Considering Italy as a case study, it seeks to appraise the effect of immigration – understood as the actual settlement of third country nationals in Italian territory – on people’s preference for far-right parties. Whereas the study on the determinants of people’s attitudes towards foreigners are plentiful (see inter alia Dustmann and Preston 2001; Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Card, Dustmann and Preston 2012), only recently has the focus turned to the effect of immigration on far-right parties’ electoral outcomes (Dustmann, Vsiljeva and Piil Damm 2016; Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller 2017; Becker and Fetzer 2016; Davis and Deole 2017). Most of these studies regard countries with a long-standing migration history. Conversely, little attention has been paid to countries that have become destination countries more recently. Yet, it is in these countries that the effect of sudden demographic changes is likely to produce the most dramatic political changes (Barone et al. 2016). Likewise, it is also in these countries that the effect is likely to be better appraised as the number of citizens with an immigration background1 is likely smaller than in old destination countries. Building on the growing body of evidence on the topic, this paper proposes *Corresponding author: Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway, E-mail: [email protected] Nicola Pasini, University of Milan, Milan, Italy Open Access. © 2020 Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem, Nicola Pasini, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. Is Europe’s right wing turn due to immigration? Empirical evidence from Italy 85 to investigate the impact of migration on election outcomes. More precisely, we look at the effect of the settlement of foreigners in Italian regions on the success of far right parties over the last 18 years, thus including the elections of March 2018, in which the far-right fared particularly well (see Pritoni and Vignati 2018, for an overview of the results). We find that immigration has a significant effect on the success of far right parties over the period considered, thus confirming the findings already advanced in literature. Such an effect, however, proves somehow less relevant when compared to the effect of unemployment. Empirical evidence is drawn from the application of time-series cross-section methods to an original dataset compiled for the purpose of this study. Different model specifications are tested to ensure the robustness of our results. Acknowledging the specificities of Italy’s recent history, the first section is dedicated to setting the boundaries of what we will call far-right, underlining the differences between the latter term and that of Fascism and Populism. The second section reviews the recent strand in international literature which aims at appraising the effect of migration on the vote for far-right parties. In so doing, we refine our research question and the scope of this paper. The third section defines our empirical strategy and explains our preference for random effects models over fixed effects and Instrumental Variables (IV). We also provide details on our data and estimation technique. The fourth section then presents and discusses our results. Finally, we conclude in the fifth section. 2 The contours of the Italian far-right: unpacking the “center-right” As a result of Italy’s recent history and political scene over the last sixty years, delineating the contours of the country’s far-right is a delicate undertaking. Even the term “right” is subtly avoided by its representatives, for that it resonates with Fascism in public perceptions (Ignazi 2005). Conservative parties thus self-locate themselves at the center-right of the spectrum whilst only the MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano), which claimed a direct lineage with the fascist regime, affirmed its right-wing positioning (Ignazi 1998; 2005; 2018). Analytically speaking though, the self-proclaimed center- right may (and should) be unpacked; and the parties that makes it up may be distributed on a larger array of the political spectrum. Whilst terms like Fascism, far-right or else Populism are often used interchangeably in common parlance, and even though they may overlap in reality, they remain different concepts that ought to be disentangled for the purpose of this article. Firstly, not all far-right parties share the fascist ideology insofar as they do not all rely on the palingenetic myth of national rebirth through revolution (Griffin 1994; Hainsworth 2008). Instead, they provide answers to those demands and needs generated by post-industrial and individualistic societies, responding to the identity crisis produced by their atomization (Ignazi 2003). As Ignazi (2003, 2) puts it, these “are no longer neo-fascist parties (...) they are perceived as right-extremist because they unquestionably occupy the right-most position of the political spectrum”. Secondly, not all populist parties are located at the far-right of the political spectrum, for Populism is more a communication and/ or discursive style than a consistent ideology or programmatic set of ideas (Rydgren 2005; see Gidron and Bonikowski 2013, for an interesting literature review on the topic). So what is exactly the far-right? This question has mobilized a significant amount of scholarly attention without, however, producing a unanimous definition (Mudde 1995; Eatwell 2004; Hainsworth 2008), despite consensus has been found on the fact that there exists indeed such a family of parties located at the far-right of the spectrum (Camus and Lebourg 2017). The academic production has thus led to the generation of multiple definitions over the years, which, in some instances, differ to significant extents (see inter alia Mudde 1996; Druwe and Mantino 1996; Ignazi 2003; Hainsworth 2008; Griffin, Loh and Umland 2014). An interesting, and empirically useful, approach is proposed by Ivaldi (2004), which consists in defining the core characteristics of this heterogeneous family of parties. He defines four such characteristics: i) an anti-immigration and xenophobic stance; ii) an authoritarian discourse centered on security and strength of the state; iii) an economic program which combines elements of neo-liberalism with protectionist and social claims; and iv) anti-establishment discourse and focus on the public’s demands. As Hainsworth (2008) holds, the anti-immigration characteristic appears to be the most important, to the point that some analysts prefer the term “anti-immigration parties” to that of far-right. Applying these criteria to the Italian case may prove challenging. Whereas there is little doubt that AN (Alleanza Nazionale – National Alliance) or CasaPound may be regarded as far-right political formations, the case of the Lega 86 Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem, Nicola Pasini Figure 1: Distribution of votes between parties within the far-right (%) and total score for the far-right (%) for the Lower Chamber, 2001-2018. Nota: smallest parties are represented but their label is not displayed. (Nord – Formerly known as the Northern League, now simply Lega, the League) requires some further considerations. Born as a regional party in 1991, it may have appeared as somewhat “moderate” at the outset