C h a p t e r 2

Previous works on a n a t t a d o c t rin e

Section 1

Previous studies on a n a t t a doctrine

Section 2

Pervious studies

on the relation between a n a t t a and subject

Section 3

Pervious studies on the relation between Buddhism and U p a n i s a ^

28 Section 1

Previous studies on a n a t t a doctrine

A good deal of space is required for the subject of this chapter. For, indeed, a great deal has been written about atta and anatta in early Buddhist philosophy. First of all, we will survey these studies done so far, and also inquire into the purpose behind these studies. We will also deal with the main points of controversies the subject has raised. It will be useful to begin with the various facets of the anatta doctrine. These can be broadly classified under four categories.

1, The meaning of the anatta doctrine.

2, The relation between the doctrine of anatta and the subject, in other

words, the problem of the seemingly identity of the subject.

3, Comparison with the other Indian schools of philosophies maintaining the

doctrine of‘no-self.

4, The others.

The above classification is made only for the sake of convenience of

examining the previous studies on atta and anatta. For all practical purposes,

one thesis is made by providing some approaches. For instance, when we try

29 to make anatta clear in the given scripture, we have to compare its anatta theory with those in other scriptural books. Though so many studies have been made in this case, it can be said that the fundamental purpose is to clear up the basic meaning of the anatta doctrine. But it seems they felt difficulties in defining what anatta doctrine means in general. The reason why definition of anatta seems to be difficult is the complexity of the subject as

I mentioned before.

Let us pursue the previous studies on atta and anatta in details by following the above classification.

2-1-11 Studies in the meaning of the anatta doctrine

We can find so many attempts to define and to explain what anatta means.

These studies are subdivided into three main groups; ® The anatta doctiine of

Buddhism in general, ® The anatta doctrine in a particular scripture, ® The anatta doctrine in a particular phase of period.

Let us now look at some distinctive interpretations concerning anatta theory ofiered by the eminent scholars. This conspectus will help us clear up the problems with the precise controversies they involve.

Walpola Rahida, an eminent Buddhist monk-scholar of Sri Lanka, examines anatta Aoctrme, in his famous book ‘ What the Buddha taught (1978,

Revised edition, London, Gordon Frasher). First he explains teaching ethically;

Buddhism stands unique in the history of human thought in denying the

30 existence of such a Soul, Self, or Atman. According to the teaching of the

Buddha, the idea of self is an imaginary, false belief which has no

corresponding reality, and it produces harmful thoughts of ‘me’ and ‘mine’,

selfish desire, craving, attachment, hatred, ill-wiU, conceit, pride, egoism,

and other defilement, impurities and problems. It is the source of all the

troubles in the world from personal conflicts to wars between nations. In

short, to this false view can be traced all the evU in the world.'

He further explains the notion of Soul, Self, Ego, or Atman:

What in general is suggested by Soul, Self, Ego, or to use the Sanskrit

expression Atman, is that in man there is a permanent, everlasting and

absolute entity, which is the unchanging substance behind the changing

phenomenal world."

The doctrine oiAnatta or No-soul, according to him, is the natural result of, or the coroUary of, the analysis of the five aggregates and the teaching of

' W. Rahula, What the Buddha taught, enlarged edition 1967, p.51. Another explanation about anatta is: ‘The correct position with regard to the question of Anatta is not to take hold of any opinions or views, but to see things objectively as they are without mental projection, to see that what we call ‘I’, or ‘being^, is only a combination of physical and mental aggregates, which are working together interdependently in a flux of momentary change within the law of cause and effect, and that there is nothing permanent, everlasting, unchanging and eternal in the whole of existence’ (ibid. p. 66). ^ Ibid. p.51. He psychologically observes that two ideas are deep-rooted in man: self-protection and self-preservation. For self-protection man has created Gk)d, on whom he depends, and for self-preservation man has conceived the idea of an immortal Soul or Atman, which wUl hve eternally. According to Buddhism, our ideas of God and Soul are false and empty. Nevertheless, these ideas are so deep- rooted that he does not wish to hear, nor does he want to understand, any teaching against them. This is the fact Buddha knew very well, because he said that his teaching is ‘against the current’ (patisotagami) (W. Rahula, ibid., pp.51-55).

31 Conditioned Genesis {Paticca-samuppidd). The analysis of the five aggregates (analytical method) tells that there is nothing behind them which can be taken as ‘I’, Atman, or Self, or any unchanging abiding substance. The teaching of Conditioned Genesis (the synthetic method) shows that nothing in the world is absolute and permanent.^ On the basis of this he arrives at the conclusion and defines the meaning of anatta teaching:

According to the doctrine of Conditioned Genesis, as weU as according to

the analysis of being into Five Aggregates, the idea of an abiding, immortal

substance in man or outside, whether it is called Atman, T, Soul, Self, or

Ego, is considered only a false belief, a mental projection. This is the

Buddhist doctrine of Anatta, No-soul or No-SeLf ‘

It should be noted here that he strongly opposes to the band of a few scholars who insist that the Buddha denied only a petty individual self with a small ‘s’, but did not mean to refuse the big Self with a capital ‘S’.’ He gives the name of Mrs. Rhys Davids whose opinion is tjT)ical in this regard.® W.

Rahula contends: ‘If the Buddha had accepted these two ideas [God and Soul], so important in aU reUgion, he certainly would have declared them pubhcly, as he had spoken about other things.’"

^W. Rahula, ibid. pp.51-52. ^W. Rahula, ibid. p. 55. ® He criticizes more strictly those who unconsciously seek the support of the Buddha for this need for eternal existence; ‘It is better to say frankly that one believes in an A t m a n or Self. Or one may even say that the Buddha was totally wrong in denying the existence of an Atman. But certainly it will not do for any one to try to introduce into Buddhism an idea which the Buddha never accepted’ (W. Rahula, ibid. p.56). ® W. Rahula, ibid. p.55n. ^W. Rahula, ibid. p.56.

32 Those who try to find a ‘Self in Buddhism insist that: ‘It is true that the

Buddha analyses being into matter, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness, and says that none of these things is self But he does not say that there is no self at all in man or anywhere else, apart from these aggregates [itahcs mine].’* This position, according to Rahula, is untenable for two reasons: One is that, according to the Buddha’s teaching, a being is composed only of these five aggregates, and nothing more. Nowhere has he said that there was anything more than these five aggregates in a being. The second reason is that the Buddha denied categorically, in unequivocal terms,

in more than one place, the existence of Atman, Soul, Self, or Ego within man

or without, or anywhere else in the universe.®

Examining the word d h a m m a in ‘sabbe d h a m m a anatta' (D\xg. 279) and

the word sankhara in ‘sabbe sankhara anicca’, Rahula says that the term

d h a m m a is much wider than sankhara. He maintains, ‘It includes not only

the conditioned things and states, but also the non-conditioned, the Absolute,

Nirvana.’^° He concludes thus:

Therefore, it is quite clear that, according to this statement: ‘All d h a m m a s

are without Self, there is no Self no Atman, not only in the Five

Aggregates, but nowhere else too outside them or apart firom them.”

We know a few sentences which are mentioned and discussed by the

«Ibid. pp. 56-57. ^bid. p. 57. 10 Ibid. p.58.

33 scholars and on the basis of which they try to admit Self or Soul in Buddhism.

These are mainly as follows;

(a) D h a m m a p a d a (verse 160), Atta hi attano natho.

(b) Mahaparinibbana-sutta {Dighanikaya II-3), Attadipa viharatha,

attasarana anannasarana.

(c) Ma h a v a g g a (1-4), y a m mayarh attanarh gaveseyyama.

(d) Mahavaccha-sutta {Majjhimanikaya, III-3), Vacchagotta’s question

about atta and loka.

He examined each of these sentences in details, and pointed out that

there is no hint in them at all about a metaphysical A t m a n or Self.'"

George Grimm’s interpretation is notable. His opinion on anatta

doctrine is clear. For him, anatta is only an indirect way of knowing atta.

Let us inquire into his interpretation.

Grimm says that the question ‘what is our true I was so important that

Buddha placed the answer to it in the very heart of his doctrine. As a

evidence for his statement, he mentions the Buddha’s words in the M a h a v a g g a

" Ibid. p. 58. Malalasekera and Nyanatiloka, two contemporary Thera vada monk-scholars, have a similar opinion. Nyanatiloka points out: ‘The Buddha teaches that what we call ego, self, soul, personaHty, etc., are merely conventional terms not referring to any real independent entity {Impermanence, Wheel, no. 186-187, BPS, 1973). Malalasekera states: ‘Briefly stated, the soul is the abiding, separate, constantly existing and indestructible entity which is generedly behaved to be found in man.... Buddhism denies all this and asserts that this beUef in a permanent and divine soul is the most dangerous and pernicious of all errors, the most deceitful of illusions, that it will inevitably mislead its victim into the deepest pit of sorrow and suffering {The Bu d d h a an d his Teachings, The Buddhist Council of Ceylon, 1957, pp. 33-34).

34 referred to above in C: ‘Which is of greater importance, 0 youths, to search for this woman or to search for your

This question ‘What is our true F may be approached from two sides: direct way and indirect way. Direct way is to try to answer positively as to what I am, while the indirect way is to try to answer by determining what I am not. According to Grimm, this indirect way is safer than direct way, so the Buddha preferred the safer indirect way.'^^

Now what is this indirect way of the Buddha? It is anatta method.

The Buddha has drawn this deciding line between atta and anatta, between I and Not-I, with great exactness. He explains in detail:

Further, like aU Indians, the Buddha also had sought for the Atta in the

indirect way, by taking away from the Atta everything that is not the Atta.

— And therefore he says; You teach the Atta, but I teach what the Atta is

not. You know the Atta, but I only know what the Atta is not Therefore

you are always talking about the Atta, but I only speak oiAnatta. In short,

you have the ^^^^method, the atta-vada, whereas I have the Anatta-

method, the anatta-vada.^^

Further, how does Grimm illustrate our true I, Atman, which according

to him was sought by Buddha through anatta method or indirectly, but by the

George Grimm, The Doctrine of The Buddha - The Religion of Reason and Meditation -, Edited by M. Keller-Grimm Max Hopper, 1958, Berlin, p. 114. He explains that this admonition is identical with the inscription of the temple of Delphi ‘Know yourself’ (Ibid.p.l58).

George Grimm, ibid. p . 114. The reason why indirect way is safer is: ‘positive answer to the question as to what I am, may easily raise doubts as whether I actually am that that wherein the answer asserts my essence to consist’ (ibid p. 114).

35 other Indian thinkers through a^^a^method or directly? This true / {Atta), according to him, is; ‘entirely and absolutely incognizable’,'® ‘unknowable and unfathomable’,^^ and ‘no arising and passing away’/® It is also said that my true Self lies beyond aU cognition and hence beyond the world as the sum of everything cognizable,'® that I myself am beyond the phenomenal world,and that /myself am beyond the impermanent, i.e. beyond space and time.^*

What I perceive as originating and perishing, cannot be assumed to be my Self, cannot be my I. Because if the I were identical with the disappearing object, then along with its disappearance, /also should cease to exist. But there /am ; /a m still there after the things have gone.^“ This presupposes something to exist that experiences this passing from the state of desired into the state of not desired, that therefore itself does not participate in this incessant change, but feels it as painfiil.^ And, Grimm concludes:

What I perceive to pass away within me, and in consequence of this passing

away, cause suffering to me cannot be my real essence. Now I perceive

everything that is cognizable within me to pass away, and with the advent

to this transience, brings me suffering; therefore nothing cognizable is my

'^bid. pp. 370-371. ‘6 Ibid. p.369. George Grimm, Buddhist Wisdom - The Mystery of the Self- translated by Carroll Aikins, 1978, p. 9. '®George Grimm, ibid. p. 58. George Grimm, ibid. p.9. He defines the word ‘cognize’ as ‘there is object for me’ (ibid. p.55). ^°G«orge Grimm, ibid. p. 24. George Grimm, ibid. p. 55. ^ George Grimm, The Doctrine of The Buddha - The Religion of Reason and Meditation- edited by M. keller-Geimm Max Hopper, 1958, Berlin, p. 115. “ George Grimm, ibid. p. 116.

36 real essence.

The main points of his interpretation are summarized as follows: ® To know our true / is an important doctrine of the Buddha, @ There are two ways to know our true I, viz. direct and indirect ways, ® Buddha took the indirect way to know our true Z ® Our true/is incognizable, ©Everything cognizable is not true I, that is anatta, ® Anatta teaching is an indirect method to know our true I.

Mrs. Rhys Davids holds a significant version of the doctrine that:

Buddha did not teach anatta theory. She notes: ‘The words self, man, at that time were equal terms in reUgion; the self or soul would be called man

(purusha).'-^

Buddha, opposed looking upon the self as figment,"® did not repudiate self (the very man),"' consented to higher religious teaching about Man as having in his very nature potential deity.^ The word atta, at the time of

Sakya, according to her, meant equally purusha, man, or manussa, the external visible man with inferable mind. She sometimes renders the term atti into various words such as Man, the Man himself, one in nature with

Divine. The man is not something in/of7about the man."^ According to her, the original teaching (she said: a folk-gospel, a folk-evangel) of the Buddha is

^'‘George Grimm, ibid. p.371. ^Mrs. Rhys David, Outline of Buddhism, 1938, p. 19. "®Mrs. Rhys. David, Sakya or Buddhist Origin, 1929, p. 200-201. ^^Mrs. Rh)^. David, ibid. pp.200-201. ^Mrs. Rhys. David, ibid. p. 193. ^Mrs. Rhys. David, ibid. p.205.

37 to quest Self ( = Atta, Man).^

The doctrine we know as anatta, or non-self, is a later development which grew up slowly out of the misrepresentation.^* Mrs. Rhys David explains;

For us the important fact, the well-attested truth is, that this non-selfism,

this an-atta, this disbehef in the ‘man’, as the subject, the valuer of the

object, was not of the original Sakya, but was a growth, yes, and a growth in

the sense we now call mahgnant.^'

It is said that anatta theory is a later monkish innovation under the impact of S a m k h y a ‘Analysis’, the growth of a narrow world-outlook and hostihty toward the Brahmanas.^'^ She explains the process of the later monkish innovation as follows:

We know that, in drifting apart from the mother-teacher, Brahmanism the

immanence of God as in and of the man - early Buddhism first cut out

deity from the term atta, then cut out the reaUty of the atta himself, a

She asserts that the folk-gospel of Buddha (Buddha’s message for every man) should be possessed of following three elements; (a) The man seeking to attain, and finally attaining, his welfare as man, not a welfare without man; man must be in it. (b) a quest which is positive, not negative, (c) a quest which is not something as yet inconceivable by man, but is something which he can even now comprehend, or at least conceive. According to her, anatta doctrine does not contain those three (Mrs. Rhys David, Wayfarer's Words, London; Luzac & Co., 1941, pp. 643-644. Based on, Lynn A De Silva, The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity, 1975, Colombo, p. 57). Mrs. Rhys. David, Sakya or Buddhist Origin, 1929. p.208. ^^Mrs. Rhys. David, ibid. p. 364. ^See, G.C. Pande, Study in the Origins of Buddhism, Forth Revised Edition, 1995, p.483.

38 decadent process covering centuries. 34

In short, her view on anatta is: ® Buddha does not teach anatta doctrine.

(3) The doctrine known as anatta is the later growth. (3) This later growth is, for her, monkish, frightful canker, and malignant. @ Atta means the immanent deity in man which made him a real self. ® To quest for such Atta

(Self, Man) is the original gospel of the Buddha.

Her interpretation of anatta has been criticized by some scholars. De

Silva says: ‘She is alleged to have had spiritualistic leanings which are supposed to have influenced her thinking.’ and ‘She is accused of trying to read into Buddhism the dominant philosophy of the twentieth century represented by Bergson and Coue.’^^ Edward Conze notes: ‘To regard all later

Buddhist history as a record of the degeneration of an original gospel is like regarding an oak tree as a degeneration of an acorn.’^ W. Rahula points out:

‘It is therefore curious that recently there should have been a vain attempt by a few scholars to smuggle the idea of self into the teaching of the Buddha, quite contrary to the spirit of Buddhism.’^'

Mrs. Rhys David, Wayfarer's Words, London, Luzac & Co., 1941, pp. 656-657. Based on, Lynn A De Sdva, The Problem of the Self in Buddhism an d Christianity,

1975, Colombo, p . 57. Lynn A De SUva, The Problem of the Self in Buddhism a n d Christianity, 1975, Colombo, p. 58. Edward Conze, Buddhism - its Essence and Development- 1951, p.27. He teUs his attitude as follows: ‘I set out to describe the living tradition of Buddhism throughout the centuries, and I confess that I do not know what the original gospel of Buddhism was’ (Conze, ibid. p.27). S. Collins mentions the opinion of Mrs. Rhys Davids as a typical example of those who refuse to believe that the ‘real’ doctrine taught by the Buddha is what the canonical teaching of anatta appears to be {Selfless Persons, p.7). W. Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, Enlarged edition 1967, p.55.

39 2-l-2| Some definitions given by other scholars

We will examine some definitions on anatta given by other scholars (All quotations from Japanese books are translated into English by the author).

1. Buddha then preached to them on the non-existence of the soul. The soul

{atman) which is denied is not the self of actual experience, but the permanent

nature of the soul, a reality held to be behind all the psychical phenomena

(Edward J. Thomas, The Life ofBuddha as Legend and History, 1993, p.88).

2. Not only the self, but all things are analyzed into the elements that may be

perceived in them, ‘All things are without an atmari, just as a chariot is nothing

but the totality of chariot-pole, axle, wheels, fi-ame, and banner-pole (Edward J.

Thomas, The Life of Buddha as Legend and History, 1993, p.202).

T h - ^ 0 - M O

3. The Buddhist doctrine of no-Self is one of the most basic teachings in

Buddhism. It refers to the Buddhist position that no person has a real,

permanent, and substantial Self (Akira Hirakawa, A History ofIndian Buddhism,

tr by Paul Groner, 1993, p.43).

4. Practically, inseparable fi-om the doctrine of Anicca is that oiAnatta, that there

exists no changeless ‘eternal soul’ in man {Buddhism, ed. by Richard A. Gard,

Prentice HaU International, 1961, p. 110).

5. In its core the mark of not-seLf is a simple corollary of the impermanence of

everything. There can be no lasting individuality because the skandhas have

40 neither permanence nor unity ipinda). It should be noted that in this above

basic formulas the absence of the self is confined to five skandhas, and that

nothing is said either way about its existence quite apart fi*om them. The

Buddha never taught that the self is not’, but ‘only that it can not be

apprehended’ (Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, 1962, p. 39).

6. Among all the tenets of Buddhism none has occasioned more controversy and

misunderstanding than the anattan theory, which suggests that nowhere can a

‘self be apprehended (Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, 1962, p. 122).

7. The Buddhas teach them the non-existence of a self so as to weaken their

attachment to the false view of personality and to engender in them a desire for

N i r v m a (Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, 1962, p.208).

8. It is a fundamental teaching of Buddhism that this word self does not correspond to a real fact, that the self is fictions and that therefore by our self- seeking we sacrifice our true welfare to a mere fiction (Edward Conze, A Short

History of Buddhism, 1980, p. 22).

9. The Buddha repudiated the popular conception of the individual ego. The objects with which man identifies himself, he thought, are not the true Self.

Fortune, social position, family, body and even mind are not the true Self In this sense the Buddhist theory can be called the theory of Non-Self (Hajime

Nakamura, A Comparative History of Ideas, 1975, p. 245).

10 It is commonly believed that in man there is an abiding substance called

41 the soul {atmaii), which persists through change that overcome the body, exists before birth and after death, and migrate from one body to another.

Consistently with his theories of conditional existence and universal change,

Buddha denies the existence of such soul (Satischandra Chatteijee &

Dhirendramohan Datta, A n Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 1960, p. 137).

11. Buddha said that there was no a t m a n (soul). He said that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul, they really only found five khandhas together or any one of them (S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian

Philosophy, 1922, vol.l, p.93).

12. The early Pali scriptures hold that we could nowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our changing experience. All were but changing phenomena and therefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to

me as my self (S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, 1922, vol.l,

p. 110).

13. Buddha establishes that there is nothing permanent, and if only the

permanent deserved to be called the self or Atman, then nothing on earth is

self Everything is anatta or not-self (S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy,

1929, vol.l, p.366).

14. There is no self (or Atman) or person (pudgala) or living being (sattva) or

principle of life (jiva) which is permanent (S. Radhakrishnan, Indian

42 Philosophy, 1929, vol. 1, p.384).

15. The common man is easily misled to regard his earthly personality as his true self {atman P. atti). It leads him to attribute value to this ‘I’ and everything that is bound up with it. — When, however, he knows that all this is not his true 1’ and does not touch it in reahty, then the desire is extinguished, he turns away from all earthly things, the fetters which bind him to this existence fall off and he attains Dehverance (Erich Frauwallner,

History of Indian Philosophy, tr. by V.M. Bedekar, 1973, vol.l, pp. 152-153).

16. The Deliverance ensues not because a man is conscious of or knows true ‘I’ but because a man knows everything which is falsely regarded as the ‘I’ as the

'not-I' {anatma, anatta) and thus the Desire is dissolved (Erich Frauwallner,

History of Indian Philosophy, tr. by V M. Bedekar, 1973, vol.l, p. 153).

17. In short, we can, by way of summary, say that the Buddha rejects the question of the existence of the ‘I’ because he considers it as one of the questions which lead to fruitless discussions and wranghng and deflect from the proper goal of Deliverance. But the denial of the soul is not pronounced or expressed; on the contrary where an exphcit utterance is found, the soul is only characterized as incomprehensible (Erich Frauwallner, History of Indian

Philosophy, tr. by V.M. Bedekar, 1973, vol.1, p. 178).

18. Nothing has any permanent nature of its own {nis-svabhava). — No rehance can be made on things in constant change. — Soul too has no

43 permanent self, but is a stream of ever-flowing mental events (Y. Masih, A

Comparative Study of Religions, 1990, p.214).

19. The theory of No-Ego {nairatmyavadst), the theory that the individual ego is ultimately false is also based on this doctrine. When everything is momentary, the ego is also momentary and therefore relative and false. The theory that the so-called matter is unreal, that there is no material substance

{sahghatavada) is also derived from this doctrine (Chandradhar Sharma, A

Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy 1960, p. 75).

20. The world is therefore a chain of interdependent momentary events. The soul is also not a permanent substance. It is nothing other than a stream of consciousness (Kedar Nath Tiwari, Competitive Religion, 1983, p.48).

21. Man, according to Buddhism, is neither a purely physical being, as the carvaka would say, nor he is a being with a permanent soul within him, as the other systems would insist (Kedar Nath Tiwari, Competitive Religion, 1983, p.52).

22. As the denial of the existence of the self or ego {Atta in Pali, A t m a n in

Sanskrit) is one of the fundamental and original tenets of Gotama, we must remember that this self whose existence is denied is something not subject to decay, and possessing perfect free will with power to exercise it. The

Brahmanic A t m a n is such a self but it is found nowhere in the world of our experience (Sir Charles Eliot, Hinduism and Buddhism, 1921, vol.1, p.l88).

44 23. The term anatman is usually translated as ‘non-soul’, but in reality a t m a n is here synonymous with a personality, an ego, a self, an individual, a living being, a conscious agent, etc (Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of

Buddhism, 1922, p.25).

24. Thus the analysis of the human personahty into five aggregates is intended to show the absence of a metaphysical self (an atman) as well as the presence of an empirical self (David J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist

Philosophy, 1992, p.72).

25. Thus, the Buddha spoke of 1’ or "myself (ahain) and ‘mine’ {mama), but avoided and discouraged ‘I-making’ {ahaih-kara) or ‘mine-making’ { m a m a m -

kara), both terms implying egoism (David J. Kalupahana, The Principles of

Buddhists Psychology, 1987, p.39).

26. The Buddhist doctrine of Man is summarized in a word, nairatmya

‘selflesness’, not, as usually translated, ‘soullessness’. — Two facets are well

ascertained and beyond discussion; (1) S a k y a m u n i does not admit the

existence of a Self iitmaii), a permanent individual; he teaches that the so-

called Self is a compound of material and spiritual data called skandhas; (2)

but he nevertheless teaches reward of actions in a future life (L. De La Vallee

Poussin, The Way to Nirvana, 1917, p.34).

27. How is therefore to be understood the Buddhist doctrine of ‘selflessness’?

45 Does it mean that there is no soul and no ftiture life of a soul? Certainly so, if we have in view a metaphysical entity, a soul, ... The Buddhists do not admit any soul of this kind, for according to them, it would be master of its sensations and feehng (L. De La Vallee Poussin, The W a y to Nirvana, 1917, p.55).

28. Many are the texts which preach the doctrine of Anatta. The doctrine denies that there is in the physical or mental realms anything which may properly be called one’s ‘self... (G.C. Pande, Studies of the Origins of

Buddhism, Forth Devised Edition, 1955, p.499).

29. This is itself does not mean the denial of all ‘self whatever, but only of the phenomenally of the ‘Self. What is usually denied is that any of the khandhas may be the Atta, not the existence of the Atta as such (G.C. Pande,

Studies of the Origins ofBuddhism, Forth Devised Edition, 1955, p.499).

30. The point of ‘Buddha’ is clear Atta cannot be anything impermanent.

What is denied is that anything within the impermanent world may be the

Atta (G.C. Pande, Studies of The Origins ofBuddhism, Forth Devised Edition, p.502).

31. The question of sei^existence is more problematical. It is one of cardinal

Buddhist principles that there is no ‘Self, both in the sense of there being no permanent substratum underlying the individual such as a soul and in the sense of there being any permanent substratum underlying the universe

46 (Arvind Sharma, The Philosophy of Religion - Buddhist Perspective 1995,

Oxford University Press, p. 13).^

32. Everything is not permanent, therefore there is no Eternal Self in our existence.

From this point of view. Anatta doctrine is taught (Hakuju Ui, Anattan theory iii

Early Buddhism).

33. When it is taught that everything is because of anicca and dukkha, we can

understand that all characteristics which a t m a n has, such as being eternal,

independent, the central element in the personality, and the controller of action, are

denied (Issai Hunabasi, A study of Early Buddhism).

34. Attaoi anatta doctrine means attachment. So anatta does not always mean the

negation of substantial existence (Masaji Anezaki, Konpon Bukkyd).

35. Impermanence (anicca), suffering {dukkha) and non-self {anatti) are the laws of

the existence, which are settled and ruled as D h a m m a , having no relation to whether

Buddha appeared or not (Giyuu Nisi, ‘On the meaning of anatta).

36. Impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and non-self (anatta) are different in

A. Sharma goes on to explain; ‘The former view was advanced in early Buddhism and is known as the doctrine of pudgala-sunyata. The term hterally means emptiness of the person and connotes the absence of any permanent self underlying the individual. It was further developed into the doctrine of dharma-sunyata. The term Uterally means emptiness of dhammas. The word d h a m m a here does not possess its usual connotation of normative behavior or doctrine but the more techmcal Buddhist sense of element of being or constituent of existence. According to this doctrine no permanent entity underhes the objective universe as well, just as no permanent entity undergfirds the subjective person’ (Arvind Sharma, ibid. pl3).

47 words but same in teaching that we know the way of our life and the difficulty to live in this world (Kousai Yasui, ‘Realistic side of Buddhism’).

37. Our life is not permanent. It is incessantly changing like a swift current. This

hfe exists as co-existence {paticcasamuppada), and it does not exist by itself but by

depending on others, therefore it is not Master, so it is taught that attachment to the

life is wrong (Tizen Akanuma, A study of Early Buddhism).

38. Because we do not know Impermanence and Non-self, suffering arises.

Impermanence and Non-self are real aspects of aU existence. The purpose of

Buddhist practice is to be aware of them (Masaji Anezaki, A Fundamental

Buddhism).

39. All existence is the product of co-existence, so there is no eternal existence.

Because of this, needless to say, satta or hving being is not exception of this principle

either. Self {atman, atta) as an eternal soul which is known to everybody at that

time is, in short, the product of imagination (Taiken Kimura, The Thought of Eerily

Buddhism).

40. The teaching of anatta shows us two points; 1, If we understand atta as

eternal Self which is transcendence and super-sensation, such kind of atta dose

not exist in our world. 2, If we understand atta as subject of our daily sensation,

such kind of atta is not eternal one but five skandhas (Teturo Watuji, Practical

Philosophy in Early Buddhism).

48 41. When the Buddha mentioned the doctrine of anatta, he taught, fundamentally, to get rid of our desire for possession. Well supported by this teaching, he said that the Self distinguished from others, the Self seeking for nibbana, and the Self as atman, these Self-s are not in five aggregates (Taisyu

Tagami, ‘Self and Non-self Taught by Buddha’, Komazawa Daigaku

Bukkyougakubu Ronsyu, vol.3. p.50).

42. Because they are impermanent and unsatisfactory, more over, they are to be seen as not-self; not permanent, self-secure, happy, independent self or I. They

are empty’ (sunna) of such a self or anything pertaining to such a self (P. Harvey,

A n Introduction to Buddhism - Teaching, History and Practices -, Cambridge

University Press, 1990, New York, p. 50).

43. The not-self teaching is not in itself a denial of the existence of a permanent

self; it is primarily a practical teaching aimed at the overcoming of attachment.

It urges that aU phenomena that we do identify with as ‘self should be carefully

observed and exammed to see that they cannot be taken as such. In doing this,

a person finally comes to see everything, aU d h a m m a s , as not-self, thereby

destroying all attachment and attaining Nibbana. In this process, it is not

necessary to give any philosophical ‘denial’ of self; the idea simply withers away,

as it seen that no actual instance of such a thing can be found an5where (P.

Harvey, A n Introduction to Buddhism - Teaching, History and Practices -,

Cambridge University Press, 1990, New York, p. 53).

44. The ethical implication of the idea of anat ma n is evident fi-om the early as

well as later texts. It is taken as a very efiective moral tool in order to cultivate

detachment from all sense of I-ness and my-ness {ahamkara, mamakard) - the

49 chief obstacles for spiritual pursuit (Anindita Niyogi Balslev, ‘An Appraisal of I-

Consciousness in the Concept of the Controversies Centering Around the Not-

Self Doctrine of Buddhism’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 16, No.2, June,

1988, p. 170).

45. The Buddha taught the anatta or not-self doctrine, not as a metaphysical assertion, but a strategy for gaining release from suffering: If one uses the concept of not-self to i/z.s-identify oneself from aU phenomena, one goes beyond the reach of all suffering and stress (Thanissaro Bhikkhu, ‘The Not-self Strategy'

Revised, 1998, BPS. Free distribution).

46. Hence it will be clear that while not denying the reahty of an ‘evolving saipsaric individual’ the Master positively refused to accept an eternal unchanging, ontological entity partaking of the nature of eternal Being as is understood by the Upanisadic conception of the soul or at ma n (O.H. De A.

Wijesekera, Buddhist and Vedic Studies - A Miscellany, Foreword by R.N.

Dandekar, edited by M.H.F. Jayasuriya, Delhi, Motdal Banarsidass, p. 11).

2-l-3| Previous studies - an analysis and nummary

Judging from the definitions and the explanations on anatta mentioned above, they can be classified into six main groups.

(1) A denial of eternal existence.

Everything is not permanent, therefore we cannot find any eternal Self in the existence. According to this interpretation, the concepts which should

50 be denied are the ones which have the characteristics such as being eternal, independent, the central element of the personahty, and the controller of action.® If we understand anatta doctrine of Buddhism as such, ail the concepts, which are regarded as eternal, variously named as Self Soul, and

God, are accordingly denied. If God is recognized as eternal, in consequence, anatta turns out to mean the denial of God. In fact, Buddhism has been sometimes known by the name of atheism.

(2) A Law of existence

According to this type of explanation, anatta teaching means a law of existence. Impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and non-self {anatta) are the laws of the existence, which is regarded as the way of our existence, settled and ruled as d h a m m a . It is said that three terms such as anicca, d u k k h a and anatta shovf the Law of existence from the different perspectives.

It is also said that this law of existence has no relation to whether Buddha appeared or not.

(3) A denial of attachment

Anatta teaching of Buddha aims at the denial of our attachment to eveiything. The denial of egoism or selfishness may be classified into this group. Those defilements will result in making us pain, so the attachment should be dined under the name of anatta. In plainer words the Buddha wanted to take away the very citadel of cherishing desires i.e. k a m a or tanha.

Akira A History ofIndian Buddhism, 1993, p. 44.

51 (4) A way to know true Self

According to this interpretation, anatta is only a means to the pursuit of true Self. We can not know the true Self directly, because all things that we can perceive are not true Self If we say this is Self, the Self will cease to be a self because it is perceived. Therefore, the way that we can use for knowing true Self is nothing but knowing what is not a true Self. Some scholars held that the Self searched by Buddha in indirect way is quite identical with the

Self searched by the Upanisads. George Grimm seems to be one of the typical spokesmen of this view.

(5) A strategic instrument

Teaching of anatta is given in order to o!/!s-identify oneself from all phenomena. When one identify himself with phenomena (attach to the five khandhs), he experiences suffering. So the anatta is taught to cut his attachment and to make him lead to nibbana. It is a strategy for gaining release fi-om suffering. This type of anatta was explained as strategic instrument of mental culture’, merely the chariots which take the monk to the city of nibbana, raft which ferries him to the further shore’, ‘only an instrumental status as means of psychological change’, and ‘a very effective moral tool in order to cultivate detachment’.^'

(6) An explanation by the combining of the above five explanations.

Some scholars hold that the anatta theory has no one fixed meaning but

S. CoUins, Selfless Persons, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Anindita Niyogi Balslev, ‘An Appraisal of I-Consciousness in the Concept of the Controversies Centering Around the Not-Self Doctrine of Buddhism’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, voL 16, No.2, June 1988, p. 170.

52 imply at particular places two or three meaning mentioned above. It is said that anatta means logically non-existence of eternal subject, aiming practically of avoiding attachment to any and everything.

53 Section 2

Previous studies on

the relation between a n a t t a and subject.

When anatta is regarded as the negation of atta itself which latter is something eternal playing an important role of the subject, some problems do crop up: as for example who the subject of our activity is. Further while the theory of anatta denies the very subject, theory of transmigration requires the same. Both the theories of anatta and transmigration are taught in the

Buddhist scriptures.^" It is a contradiction. Especially, the Buddhists in the time of A b h i d a m m a hterature made a heated argument as to this difficult problem.^^ And, even today, many scholars attempt to not only examine the

Regarding this point, L.De La Vallee Poussin says: ‘Here is a riddle. Here is a flagrant contradiction. On the one hand, the texts we have quoted and a large number of texts to the same effect -- on the composite nature of Man; on the chariot­ like character of Man; on the origination of consciousness, a mere sensationalism -- force upon us the conclusion that there is no Self. On the other hand, we cannot doubt for a moment that actions are rewarded in a future life’ {The W a y to Nirvana, p.47). J.P. Remon points out: ‘The anattan doctrine raises many questions such as the reality of the moral agent, the existence and nature of moral responsibility, the continuity of individuaUty (personaHty?) in the rebirth-cycle, the nature of K a m m a and the way it works, the relation of nibbana to the individual that attains to it’ {Self and Non-Selfin Early Buddhism, p. 2). David J. Kalupahana says: ‘the Buddha was unable to give a satisfactory account of human action and responsibility, not to speak of problems such as knowledge and freedom. Such criticisms were directed at him by his contemporaries as well as by some classical and modern writers on Buddhism’ (A History of Buddhist Philosophy, 1992, p.68). Genjun H. Sasaki says: ‘I will examine one of the most vehemently debated questions in connection with Buddhist Philosophy, viz., anatta (not-self) and k a m m a (action).’ M. Falk refers to this problem also, sajdng that the real antinomy is atman-karman (Genjun H. Sasaki,

54 contradiction appeared in Buddhist scriptures but also solve the problem between anatta and the subject of kamma for the purpose of harmonizing them.'*'*

These studies are subdivided as follows: ® The question between anatta and the

subject of action {kamma). For example, we cannot find any mental integration,

we cannot explain our memory, we cannot find a location where the responsibility

lies^°. ® The question between anatta and the subject of transmigration

{samsara)}^ % The relation between anatta theory and nihihsm. We can find

some questions whether anatta theory imphes nihilistic idea or not.

2-2-11 The interpretations by the scholars

We shall now look carefully into some notable illustrations regarding’ these

points.

1, Though denying the continuity of an identical substance in man, Buddha

Linguistic Approach to Buddhist Thought, 1986, p. 24). In the contemporary Theravada Buddhism, it seem to be difficult to solve the problem on the subject (See M.E. Spiro, Buddhism and Society. A Great Tradition and its Burmese Vicissitudes, London, 1971, pp.87-89). S. Radhakrishnan mentions; ‘The conception of the soul retains enough meaning to make rebirth significant. The difficulty is that, if there be no permanent soul, then punishment has no meaning. At the time of the punishment the individual is no longer the same being who committed the crime’ (S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, 1929, vol.l, p.409). C.A.F. Rhys Davids points out that the Buddha was led into an untenable situation by, on the one hand preaching the doctrine of anatta and on the other hand accepting the belief in rebirth (‘On Nirvana, and on Buddhist Doctrines of the Group the Sankharas, Kamma and the Paths’, The Contemporary Review, XXIX, pp.249-270. Based on, Lynn A De SUva, The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity, 1975, Colombo, p.42). Nakamura, Some Problems in Indian Thought, pp.93-135. The rendering ‘transmigration’ is sometimes rejected because it impUes a permanent self which transfers fi*om present life to future hfe. Silva says: ‘The word ‘transmigration’ is misleading. The Buddhist behef in rebirth or rather rebecoming must be distinguished from the Hindu behef in a transmigrating soul’ OLynn A De Silva, The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity, 1975,

55 does not deny the continuity of the stream of successive states that comprise his Ufe (Satischandra Chatterjee & Dhirendramohan Datta, A n Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 1960, p. 137).

2, The soul or ego denotes nothing more than this collection (Satischandra

Chatteijee & Dhirendramohan Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy,

1960, p. 138).

3, Non-self dose not mean no-existence of the self. It means the Self which gets out of the shell, which transcends limited self If we understand anatta as such, there is no contradiction between anatta theory and transmigration

(Hideo Masuda, ‘Anatta and Independence’, Journal of Indian and Buddhist

Studies, 14-1, p. 110).

4, It can be said that the subject of transmigration is the aggregations (R.

Fukuhara, ‘A theory of Transmigration’, Journal of Indian and Buddhist

Studies, 8-2, p.462).

5, The process of the interaction of five aggregates constitutes a human being.

One side of this marks the permanency of our existence, while the other one marks the impermanency in the form of birth, aging, illness and death. The human being existing in the form of this process of five aggregates should be regarded as the existence of anatta (J. Ueno, ‘A Logical Meaning of the anatta

Transmigration Doctrine in Early Buddhism’, Journal ofIndian and Buddhist

Colombo, p.42).

56 Studies, 7-1, p. 193).

6, It seems to be that the theory of transmigration, in the Nikayan literature, was taught for the sake of the ordinary people. It can be said that, in

Buddhism, the fundamental meaning of transmigration is not the migrating through successive births of any indivisible entity, but the suffering that we cannot get out of the process of repeated births and deaths (S. Kumoi, ‘On

Anatta and Transmigration’, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Study, 2-2, p.280).

7, The teaching of Buddhism reveals three kinds of standpoints: (1) The teaching of the awareness which transformed Gotama himself into the

Buddha. (2) The teaching for the sake of ordinary people varjdng abilities.

(3) The teaching of Nibbana of Buddha. The second one is taught depending on the abihty of the people, and the teaching of kamma is included in this category. It should be said that kamma theory was taught for the people who could not understand rehgious truth without it. It is, therefore, of a popular nature (M. Sato, ‘On anatta theory’. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies,

6-1, pp.52-53).

8, We should not consider both the teachings of anatta and transmigration standing on the same level in a perfect logical synthesis. Rather we should understand them as existing popularly in a practical unification (Z. Inoue,

Kamm a theory and Anatta, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 14-1, p. 164).

57 9, W h a t is that which transmign^-ates w h e n there is no permanent Self ? -- a continuous chain has been called by Wittgenstein as a criss-crossing of changing events constitutive of the empirical self or psycho-physical complex

(Y. Masih, A Comparative Study of Religions, 1990, p.230).

10, But though the Buddha denied that there is in m a n anything permanent which can be called the self, this does not imply a denial that h u m a n nature can by mental training be changed into something different, something

infinitely superior to the nature of the ordinary man, perhaps something other

than the skandhas (Sir Charles Ehot, Hinduism and Buddhism, 1921, vol.l,

pp. 219-220).

11, The general tendency among Buddhist scholars is to assume that the

aggregates serve only the negative function of denying a metaphysical self

However, a careful reading of the early discourse reveals that these five

aggregates also perform the positive function of clarifying wha t an empirical

self is (David J. Kalupahana, A History dfBuddhist Philosophy, 1992, p. 70).

12, Thus the analysis of the h u m a n personality into five aggregates is

intended to show the absence of a metaphysical self (an atman) as well as the

presence of an empirical self (David J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist

Philosophy, 1992, p.72).

13, Th e constituents of this self are the five aggregates ipaScakkhandhi). In

the context of these five aggregates, the Bu d d h a wa s not reluctant to speak of

58 ‘I’ or ‘myself {aharn) or even the ‘self {atta). Without admitting a ‘ghost in the machine’ or a transcendental apperception, the Buddha was willing to recognize the feeling of individuahty, of self (David J. Kalupahana, The

Principles ofBuddhist Psychology, 1987, p. 38).

14, There is not, a Self a permanent substantial unity, but there is a person, to be described as ‘a hving continuous fluid complex’, which does not remain quite the same for two consecutive moments, but which continues for an endless number of existence, bridging an endless number of deaths, without becoming completely diJSerent from itself (L. D e La Vallee Poussin, The Way to

Nirvana, 1917, p.35).

15, This of itself does not me a n the denial of all ‘self whatever, but only of the phenomenahty of the ‘Self. What is usually denied is that any of the khandhas m a y be the Atta, not the existence of the Atta as such (G.C. Pande,

Studies of The Origins ofBuddhism, Forth Devised Edition, 1955, p.499).

16, Thus kamma has come to carry the positive meaning and to play the role through which the not-self doctrine can be expressed (Genjun H. Sasaki,

Linguistic Approach to Buddhist Thought, 1986, p.29).

17, The conception of both kamma and anatta refers to one and the sa m e fact, differently viewed (Genjun H. Sasaki, Linguistic Approach to Buddhist

Thought, 1986, p.40).

59 18, H e also allows that the subject self is indemonstrable. O u r introspection cannot seize it, yet we must assume it, for it is the subject that sees all else.

Without it we cannot account for even the empirical self Trains of ideas, bundle, heap, collection are all metaphors, and involve a unifying agency.

Without this immanent principle the life of m a n becomes inexplicable. So

B u d d h a consistently refuses to deny the reahty of the soul (S. Radhaknshnan,

Indian Philosophy, 1929, vol.l, p.389).

2-2-2| T w o types of interpretations about the problem of the identity

W e are no w able to see, in general, two tjqaes of interpretations about the problem of the identity wh e n w e try to solve the question; the interpretation examining both the theories on the s a m e level and the interpretation examining both of them on the different levels.

(1) Th e interpretation examining both the theories on the sam e leveL

The theory of transmigration or kamma should not be regarded as a supplementary idea for Buddhism. Both the theories, anatta and transmigration (or kamma), are found in the Buddhist scriptures logically so very inseparable as to allow any sort of a contradiction between them.

The general solution of the problem is, therefore, Like this: Anatta teaching does not deny the self in our daily Life, an empirical self This t5T)e of self is the continuity^' of the aggregates, which is called of the variously by

As to the idea of continuity, L.De La Vallee Poussin says: ‘But they soon discovered the explanation when they combined the two ideas that are prominent in the oldest records of the Buddhist tradition, the idea of ‘causation’ and the idea of

60 different scholars as, the aggregations, the continuity of the stream of successive state, the process of the interaction of five aggregates, criss­

crossing of changing events, psycho-physical complex and a Uving continuous

fluid complex.

The self, which is called variously as such, plays an important role of

subject for the spiritual life, mental integration, memory, the moral

responsibility of an individual, and transmigration. T he self is not a

permanent entity but a continuos flux of the elements. W. Rahula explains

the above point in the following way:

As there is no permanent, unchanging substance, nothing passes from one

m o m e n t to the next. So quite obviously, nothing permanent or unchanging

can pass or transmigrate from one life to the next. It is a series that

continues unbroken, but changes every moment. The series is, reaUy

speaking, nothing but movement.^

It is said that the analysis of our existence into five khandhas or

elements is intended not only to show the absence of a metaphysical self but

also to ma r k the presence of an empirical self.

Yet to m a n y it still seems to be difficult to understand the theory of

transmigration without the assumption of existence of any abiding entity.

Transmigration requires the presence of a subject which continues not only in

the present life, but also in the past an d future lives. If the self stands for the

‘transitoriness’ (‘momentaneity’). These two ideas are merged in the idea of ‘continuity”(7Se Way to Nirvana, p. 50). W. Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, p.34.

61 only continuity of elements, h o w can it explain the identity of the self between present life and the Hfe after death. Let us, therefore, inquire into interpretations regarding this point.“ T. Kimura, Japanese scholar of

Buddhist studies, says:

T h o u g h the phenomena of the death, outwardly, s e e m to be the

extermination, however, as to the self itself, it keeps aggregates as

potentialities. Self realizes itself depending upon its characteristics. It

does not me a n that the aggregates are pulled down completely and rebuild

again with ne w aggregates. T he renewal of the aggregates only me a n s the

succession of the aggregates in the previous Ufe.

H e goes on to explain the identity between the former existence and this

Ufe, referring to the illustration given by Mrs. Rhys.Davids, as follows:

A - A ’ -A’’-A'"-A"... a B ■ B'-B"-B'"-S'....bC-C- C"- C " ....c D .

d E ...

This diagram indicates the process of the transmigration. F r o m ^ to shows a lifetime of hu m a n being. T h e present life accepts all the experience

of the previous life and also conceives the future hfe. The end of this lifetime

is sh o w n as A". A dotted line me a n s the death. As the result of the process

mentioned above, the ne w form B is given. Superficially, B and A se e m to be

different fix)m each other completely, but fundamentally, B contains the a,

‘'^T. Kimura, An Essay on the Thought of Early Buddhism, pp. 157-171.

62 which is an accumulation of the experience by A. Therefore, B is the change in succession to A.

H e suggests that we should not regard this subject as a spatial existence with the form which is wandering from place to place. H e does not approve of an eternal subject, but does consider a super-spatial subject to be the basis of transmigration.'’®

L.De La Vallee Poussin makes a trial of interpretation. H e told: ‘this contradiction for a long time exercised the acuteness of scholars, but it has finally been explained by the theory which has gained a fairly general approval.’ The theory which Poussin praises is the sentence of H.C. Warren’s

‘Rebirth, not Transmigration’. Then, Poussin, consulting Mrs. Rhys David’s expression, goes on to explain;®'

There is no migration {saihkrama, samkranti), no passage of an individual

from this life to another. W h e n a m a n dies, the physical organism, which

is the condition sine qua non of psychical life, dissolves, an d the psychical

life therefore comes to an end. Consciousness is only an ‘intermittent

series of psychic throbs’, associated with a hving organism, beating out

their coming-to-know through one brief span of life.®"

Let us see other explanation made by Henry Clarke Warren.®^ H e says

“ T. Watuji, is critical of this understanding on the transmigration. H e said that this interpretation makes the thought of transmigration inscrutable, and that this interpretation deprives Buddhism of the essential m e aning of transmigration {The Practical Philosophy of Early Buddhism, pp.274-276). ^‘Mrs.Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, 1914, p. 16. L.De La Vallee Poussin, The Way to Nirvana, p.48. Henry Clarke Warren, Buddhist in Ji'anslation, pp. 209-212.

63 firstly, ‘no one of these can be considered as the individual, the Ego, the self.

There is, therefore, here nothing to be reborn - nothing to transmigrate’.

A n d he examines closely the doctrine of karma, to which the faculty of being

reborn is attributed. Warren says ‘If we were to translate the word karma

somewhat fi'eely, we might call it ‘character’, and goes on to explain h ow

character’ that is no entity in itself can be reborn.

N o w here it is to be noted that the word ‘karma’ covers two distinct ideas;

namely, the deed itself, and the effects of that deed in modifying the

subsequent character and fortunes of the doer. The Buddhists say that

this subjective effect continues after death into the next hfe.’^

H e gives an illustration to m a k e the general idea of the perpetuation of

character se e m more reasonable. H e says: ‘Wh y can not a swallow’s egg

hatch out a lark? Or a lark’s a swallow?’; ‘Ho w is it that the egg of the lark

will never hatch out into any other kind of a bird than a lark, and that a

swallow’s egg must always yield a swallow? Then Warren answers: ‘A

swallow’s egg can not hatch out a lark because of the difference in heredity.’

H e arrives at the conclusion:

But of course the Buddhists do not m e a n heredity when they use the word

karma. ‘Karma expresses not that which a man inherits from his

ancestors, but that which he inherits from himself in some previous state of

existence. But with this difference the Buddhist doctrine and scientific

Henry Clarke Warren, ibid. p. 210.

64 doctrine of heredity seem very similar.”

Besides those pursuits to solve the problem mentioned above, Buddhists present their solution in the scriptures, and ma n y modern scholars give their explanations on this problem.'’'

^°Ibid. p. 211. The term bhavanga is used in order to answer this question. According to Lynn A. De. Silva, the bhavanga theory first appears in the Milndapahha without an antecedent history in the Pali Canon. It was a concept borrowed from the Sarvastivada Abhidharma (where it originally meant a link in the causal chain). The bhavanga theory was picked up by Buddhaghosa (5th century A.D.), wh o used it as a synonyin for vinnana and equated it with rebirth consciousness {patisandhi vinhan^. (C£ Lynn A De Silva, The Problem of Self in Buddhism and Christianity, 1975, Colombo, pp.47-48). W. Rahula says: ‘It is the continuity of the same series. The difference between death and birth is only a thought-moment: the last thought m o m e n t in this life conditions the first thought moment in the so-called next Ufe, which, in fact, is the continuity of the same series. During this hfe itself, too, one thought-moment conditions the next thought-moment. So from the Buddhist point of view, the question of Ufe after death is not a great mystery, and a Buddhist is never worried about this problem’ {What the Buddha taught, p.34). NyanatHoka explains: ‘According to Buddhism, there are three factors necessary for the rebirth of a hu m a n being, that is, for the formation of the embryo in the mother’s womb. They are: the female ovum, the male sperm, and the karma-ene^^ {kammaveg^ which, in the suttas is metaphorically called 'gandhabbsi, i.e. ‘ghost’. This karma-ener^ is sent forth by the dying individuid at the m o m e n t of his death. Father and mother only provide the necessary physical material for the formation of the embryonic body. With regard to the characteristic features, the tendencies and faculties lying latent in the embryo, the Buddha’s teaching m a y be explained in the following way: The dying individual with his whole being conclusively cHnging to Ufe, at the very m o m e n t of his death, sends forth karmic ener^ which, Uke a flash of lighting, hits at a n e w mother’s w o m b ready for conception. — Hence we m a y say that the present Ufe-process {uppatti-bhave) is the objectification of the corresponding pre-natal Aar/na-process {kammabahvd) and the future Ufe-process is the objectification of the corresponding present l^arma-process. Thus, nothing transmigrates fi*om the one life to the next’ (Nyanatiloka, Kamma and Rebirth, Ceylon, p.2). Lynn A. De Silva notes the traditional Theravida answer to this question: ‘To the first question [If there is no self or soul, who is it that is reborn?] the traditional Theravida answer is that the person who is reborn is neither the one wh o died nor another {na ca so na ca aMd). At death, consciousness perishes only to give rise to another consciousness in a subsequent re-becoming. The m o m e n t of dying begets the m o m e n t of consciousness in the wo m b and passes on its heritage of kamma. The renewed Ufe- flux inherits aU past experiences. Each successor has all the potentiaUties of the predecessor and more. The new being is neither absolute the same as the past one owing to its different composition, nor is he totally different because he comes within the identical strain of karma-energy (Lynn A De SUva, The Problem of Self in Buddhism and Christianity, 1975, Colombo, p.49).

65 The continuity, which is devised to explain the difficulty that the person reborn is neither the same nor different from the person wh o passed away, is illustrated with m a n y similes for the purpose of clarifying this paradox. A well-known example is that of a flame: It is like a flame that grows and burns through the night: it is not the same flame nor is it another Another example is: A child grows up to be sixty years old. Certainly, the m a n of sixty is not the sam e as the child of sixty years ago, nor is he another person.

Similarly, a person wh o dies here and is reborn elsewhere is neither the sam e person, nor another {na ca so na ca anno).

Lynn A. D e Silva classifies these similes, which aid in clarifying this paradox that the one wh o is born is neither the previous one nor yet another, into eight patterns."® A n d Arvid S h a r m a examines four popular examples.

The foUowing are some of these similes, some of which are modern, (a) Like a seal pressed upon wax at the moment of death the irarma-energy of a person is passed over to the soft wax of a new existence in another womb, (b) W h e n a m a n light a hght from another, one light does not pass over to the other, (c) A sound produces air-vibrations which by impinging on the acoustic organ of another m a n produces a sound, which is purely a subjective sensation. N o transmigration of a sound- sensation takes place (e.g. echo), (d) A wave hastens over the ocean surface rising and falhng each time by the transmission of energy. One wave does not pass into the other, but the impact of the one gives rise to the other, (e) W h e n a boy learn a verse of poetry from a teacher that verse does not pass from the teacher to the boy. (0 Light in an electric bulb is only the outward visible manifestation of invisible electric energy. The bulb m a y break and the light m a y be extinguished, but the current remains and the light ma y be reproduced in another bulb, (g) Karma is like a cable running unseen under the surface of the sea and every no w and again emerging above the surface manifesting itself to our physical sight. Each emergence is what we call a ‘Ufe time’ which in reality is the stretch of the cable’s whole length and the end is the completion of‘the cable of Kamma, and not the mere termination of one of the manifestation of a portion of the kamma-cable. (h) The birth-process of a butterfly is another illustratioa It was first an egg and then it became a caterpillar Later it developed into a chrysalis, and finally evolved into a butterfly. The butterfly is neither the same as, not totally different form, the caterpillar. Here there is continuity of the flux of life (Lynn A De Silva, The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity, 1975, Colombo, p. 45).

66 a nd discusses some problems and defects of those similes.®*^

W e find ma n y kinds of these illustrations which ma y ma k e us think that the very abundance of such similes ma y imply that the difficulty in explaining logically this anatta-vA.ent\ty problem.

(2) T h e interpretation regarding both the theories on the different levels.

The theory of Anatta doctrine and the doctrine of transmigration ultimately end in mutual contradiction. The theory of transmigration does

According to Arvind Sharma, four popular examples of simile are: (1) Let us suppose that our teacher recites a verse in the class and we memorize it. The verse which was in the teacher’s mind has no w been ‘reborn’ in our mind. But in doing so, did it leave the mind of teacher, did it transmigrate firom his mind to our mind? If it did, it should no longer be present in the teacher’s mind. Hence the correct depiction of the situation is that the verse in the mind of the teacher gave rise to the verse on our mind. (2) A more dynamic example is provided by the case in which the flame of one lamp is used to hght the flame in another lamp. The flame in the first lamp is constantly changing, yet its dynamic nature does not prevent it fi*om lighting the wick in the other lamp. However, w h e n the second lamp is ht, can one say that the flame of the first lamp has transmigrated into the other lamp? If that were the case, how could the first lamp still be ahght? Here again, then, the correct description of the situation is that the lamp in the first flame gave rise to the flame in the second lamp. These similes show that one psycho-physical organism, in ceasing to be, gives rise to another psycho-physical organism. It means that there is rebirth without transmigration. [Shrama points out that these examples present a problem. The problem he pointed out is; In Buddhist view, one organism, in ceasing to be, gives rise to another psycho physical organism. However, in these examples, the verse did not disappear fi-om the mind of the teacher; neither did the flame in the first lamp cease to exist in giving rise to the frame in the second lamp. To accommodate these facts other examples are given.] (3) O n the billiards table it is possible to hit one ball with another in such a w ay that the first baU, which is in motion, hits the second ball and in doing so comes to a complete stop. Yet, in the process of stopping it can impart aU its velocity to the second ball and so on. Similarly, one life, in coming to a complete halt can yet, in that very process, generate a new fife. [This example, he says, is better than those of the verse or the flame, but does not fuU justice to the Buddhist case. For it leaves behind a trail of static balls, while w e see the h u m a n body dissolve in real life after death. To clarify the Buddhist position further, therefore, yet another example is given.] (4) If one shouts from the precipice of a deep ravine one soon hears the echoes of one’s o w n voice. Notice now ho w one echo, in ceasing to be, give rise to the next echo. Nothing is left of the first echo. Simileirly, the second echo, in giving rise to the third, ceases to be, and yet in the very act of ceasing to be gives rise to the next echoes. Our various hves, therefore, m a y be compared profitably, from the point of Buddhist philosophy, to a series of echoes.

67 not form the essential teaching of Early Buddhism. Theory of transmigration was taught for the ordinary people, the people who could not understand religious truth without it. Those two theories, anatta and transmigration are so different that it is impossible for us to unify them. T h o u g h we meet with both the theories in Buddhist scriptures, w e should not handle t h e m on the s a m e level.

This view is based, according to T. Watuji, on a reasonable assumption.

H e asks: Are all the discourses in the Nikayas the true teaching of the Bu d d h a

himself? It is possible to suppose that the various dispositions and thoughts in the time of Early Buddhism were compiled into the different types of the scriptures, making the Bud d h a the protagonist.’ Taking philological

approach to the text, he goes on to say as follows:

W e can find the theory of transmigration in the Nikayas. But we reaUze

that this theory is found not in the texts which teach about anatta,

skandhas, and paticcasamuppada, but in the texts which have a mythical

characteristic.

He concludes that the theory of transmigration was adapted by Early

B u d d h i s m for the purpose of fighting against the hedonism, pleasure-loving

people, w h o ignore the idea of cause an d effect.

Jennings holds a somewhat similar opinion to that of Watuji. His

opinion is that the traditional idea of rebirth, which is completely

incompatible with the doctrine of anatta was later accommodated by

Buddhists under pressure fi*om Hinduism. He, for that reason, rejects all

68 passages in the Nikayas referring to rebirth as later additions. His arguments are based on the following reasons: 3) There is no phrases of wor d that can be claimed as supporting the doctrine of rebirth in the First Sermon, the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, which contains the core of the B u d d h a ’s teaching.®® 2) In three of the most important suttas, namely, the Tevijja Sutta, the Maha-parinibbana Sutta and the Sigalovada Sutta, the subject of transmigration receives no mention whatsoever. $ Rebirth is not mentioned in the crucial passages which relate to the essentials of the Dhamma. 1 In the conversion sermons which led the conversion of about sixty people and, in which probably the teaching of the Bu d d h a is found in its purest form there is nothing to establish that the Bu d d h a accepted the doctrine of rebirth.®* $ In the instructions to the First Missionaries, which is a very remarkable document, there is not even a hint regarding saiiisara (rebirth) and personal karma. ® The view that sorrow and joy are caused by what has been done before {pubbe kata-hetu) is definitely caUed heresy {titth-ayatan^. V In the

Edicts of the Emperor Asoka (circa 250 B.C.) w h o accepted the essentials of the teaching of the Bu d d h a there is no trace of the doctrine of Rebirth.®^

Regarding the wordponobhavika found in this sutta, which is usually translated as causing a re-existence or rebirth’, Jennings notes that it would appear to have been added by later hand (Based on, Lynn A De SUva, The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity, 1975, Colombo, p.53). Regarding the word sagga or heaven found in these sermons, Jennings says: ‘it means “Ught”, that is, the bliss of perfect enlightenment, and not a realm where people are reborn’ (Based on, Lynn AD e Silva, The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity, 1975, Colombo, p.54). J.G. Jennings, J.G., The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha, London: Oxford University Press, 1947 (Based on, Lynn A De SUva, The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity, 1975, Colombo, pp.53-54). According to Silva, T.A.P. Aryaratne, holds a similar view to that of Jennngs: ‘Asserting that all Buddha’s views have a rational basis, he rejects the theory of rebirth as rationally incompatible with the doctrine of anatta. According to him, m a n has only one span of Ufe to Uve with death as the final stroke of extinction’ (L)mn AD e Silva, ibid. p. 55).

69 Although question of anatta-snh^QCt has been one of the main objections, it follows from what has been observed earUer that it is very difficult to solve this question if we take the two theories {anatta and transmigration), literally, and logically. W h e n we hold fast to find logical coherence about this question, w e suspect that the original anatta doctrine w a s perhaps modified so as to be compatible with the theory of transmigration, and that the theory of transmigration is treated in such a w a y as not to contradict in any wa y with that of the anatta doctrine.

O u r purpose of studying is not to pervert the fact, but to kn o w the whole story as is taught in the text without any prejudice whatsoever. W e should not aim at making any agreement between anatta and transmigration, but should only note the efforts that have been m a d e in this direction in the long and checkered history of Buddhism. Moreover, we have to pay attention to h o w anatta theory has been influenced, in the process of historical development, by coerced agreement with the theory of transmigration.

2-2-3| So m e other questions on anatta teaching

Some other questions on anatta teaching are: anatta teaching deny a morality, anatta teaching is nihilism or pessimism, anatta teaching is denial of actuality. These questions stem from regarding anatta as the denial of aU subjects. T h e question or criticism to anatta teaching apply to the teaching of suSffa in the sam e way.

David J. Kalupahana points out the foUowings in this respect; ‘No-self

{anatta) or emptiness {sunnata), in their absolute forms, could be nihilistic

70 (uccheda), encouraging not only a life of hedonism, but also acts of self- destruction, sometimes hailed as altruism.’®^ E d w a r d Conze also says: ‘Th e other side of the Anatta-doctvine, which consists in the repudiation of everything which constitutes or attracts the empirical self, has earned for

Buddhism the reputation of being a pessimistic faith.’*^^ W e will see so m e explanation as to such type of observations.

1, According to the doctrine of no-Self the personality is in a state of flux.

However, the teaching of no-Self is not nihihstic. According to the

Suttanipata (w. 858,919), both clinging to the idea of the absence of Self

{nirattaii) and clinging to the idea of the permanent Self (attaii) are errors (A.

Hirakawa, A History of Indian Buddhism, tr. by Paul Groner, 1993, p44).

2, To say that anatta doctrine entails a denial of morahty is to misunderstand the true import of the doctrine of anatta, because the doctrine of anatta does not deny in any wa y the subject of responsibility (R. Masunaga, ‘An Essay on

Anatta and Related Matters’, p.39).

3, Anatta is not a teaching of annihilation which replaces the existence with non-existence. Far from it. It is the teaching that aims to correct the misconception which regards non-existence as existence (Hakujyu, Ui ‘Ga-ku hou-u and Ga-ku hokku’, Bukkyo Kenkyu, 1-1, pp.7-8).

David J. Kalupana, The Principles ofBuddhist Psychology, 1987, p. 39. E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India - Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy 1962.

71 4, To the second question [i.e. H o w can one deny the self and yet assert moral responsibility?], namely, can there be moral responsibility if there is no real identifiable self or soul, the answer often given is that there is moral responsibility because there is an identity or continuity in process. In the life stream the karma-energy strain belongs to no one else but the successor in the stream of being (Lynn A. De Silva, The Problem of Self in Buddhism and

Christianity, 1975, Colombo, p.49).'^'’

O n this point, SUva more fully elaborated in other pages: ‘The denial of the atman, of an unchanging, undying essence, does not me a n that the Buddha holds a nihilistic view of the total annihilation of body and mind with the extinction of tanha. That the Buddha held no extreme views - either an eternalist view or an annihilationist view - is clearly stated in the texts.’ H e takes the source of his explanation from the Puggala-Pannatti (141-145), the Dhammapada (294), and the Dhammasangani (1315,1316,1319). (Lynn A De Silva, The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity, 1975, Ck)lombo, pp.37-39).

72 Section 3

Previous studies

on the relation between Buddliism and U p a n is a d s,

W e shall observe in this chapter the pervious studies concerning the relation between the teaching of Budd h i s m and the ideas of other Indian philosophical schools. The history of comparative studies of B u d d h i s m and

Upanisads is fairly long starting with H. Oldenberg.

In 1881, H. Oldenberg published his first book ‘Buddha where he examined at length the relations between Brahmanism and Buddhism.^® Oldenberg noticed that the oldest Upanisadic ideas were clearly related to Buddhist

Oldenberg, Buddha, Sein Leben, Seine Lehre, Seine Gemeinde, herausg, BerUn, 1881 [For quotations from his book, I used the English translation by Wiliam Hoey, Buddha, His life, His doctrine. His order, Motilal Banarasidass, 1997 Delhi]. In this book, Oldenberg points out the similarity in Buddhism and Upanisads regarding desire, nescience, and the abohtion of suffering through knowledge. H e pays attention especially to the Kithaka Upanisad which, according to him is pre- Buddhistic, and had an effect on the development of Buddhist idea (ibid. pp. 31; 35, also see, J.W. De. Jong, A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America, p.31). Glasenapp points out that Kathaka Upanisad belonged to post-Buddhistic Upanisads, and was affected by the Buddhist idea {Buddhism in the Kathaka Upanisad, N ew Indian Antiquary!, 1938, pp.138-141, also see, M. Saigusa, Principal

Thoughts of Early Buddhism, vol.l, p . 71). H. N a k a m u r a states, ‘Thus, if one takes into account the resemblance in the thought, the method of expression, and the order of the presentation and solution of the problem, the conclusion follows that the Kathaka Upanisad mu s h have been influenced by the Buddhist scriptures’ {A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy, p.25). J.W De.Jong clearly summarizes the main point of Oldenberg’s interpretation: ‘Oldenberg believed that the Buddhists had probably not known the brahmanical texts but, nevertheless, he did not hesitate to state that Buddhism has not only inherited form Brahmanism ma n y of its important dogmas but also the mood of religious thought and sentiments’ (J.W. De.Jong, ibid.p.32).

73 teachings. Since 1881, a lot has been written on the relation between the

Upanisads and Buddhism. However, there is Uttle agreement on this subject.

Opinions have varied greatly, and sometimes arbitrary judgements are given.®'

Some scholars consider Buddhism as an annex of Brahmanism, while others deny any relation between the two. However, most scholars have taken the intermediate positions.“

Cf. La De Vallee Poussin, ‘Bauddhisme, 1909, p.vii (quoted in J.W. De Jong, ibid. p.31). See also, S. CoUins, Selfless Persons, p. 12. S o m e scholars have classified Buddhist studies into three or four schools, that is, the older Anglo-German School, the Leningrad School, the Franco-Belgian School, and Lai Mani Joshi added the Brahmanical School to them as the fourth one (E. Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, 1967, London, pp. 1-3. Lai M a n i Joshi, Discerning the Buddha - A Study of Buddhism and of the Brahmanical Hindu Attitude to It, Munshiram Manoharlal Pubhshers, 1983, pp. 1-12. Cf. J.W. De Jong, ibid.). Though this classifications are not made directly focusing on the theory of the self and not self, it will be worth to note them in order to kno w the trend of the interpretation given by the scholars so far. - a: The Older Anglo-German School to which T.W. Rhys Davids, H. Oldenberg and E.J. Thomas belong, put stress on the Buddha as a h u m a n teacher of morality. They emphasize the ethical and rational elements in the Buddha’s teaching. For instance, it is said that; ‘Nibbana is purely and solely an ethical state, to b^ reached in this birth by ethical practices, contemplation and insight. It is therefore not transcendental.’ The Pali Canon is often believed to have preserved the ‘pure’ and ‘original’ Buddhism which was not a rehgion or a philosophy but merely an ‘ethical system’. 2 The Leningrad School started with the work of Stcherbatsky. Rosenberg and ObenniUer are considered as members of this school. The merit of this school is that they used several texts from India, Tibet, Mongolia and China for their understanding of Buddhism. W The Franco Belgian School is represented by Sylvain Levi and Louis de la Vallee Poussin. Etienne Lamotte, Giuseppe Tucci, Edward Conze, E. Frauwallner and Andre Bareau are also regarded to belong to this school. They study Buddhism on the basis of all the available sources. The Brahmanical School, named by L.M. Joshi, studies Buddhism fi-om the standpoint of Brahmanical or Hinduistic tradition. Here Buddhism is viewed as a form or branch of Hinduism. According to Joshi, many modern western scholars of Older Anglo-German School and the Franco-Belgian School had also widely propagated certain aspects of the Brahmanical attitude towards Buddhism. S. Radhakrishnan, AK. Coomaraswamy and Louis de la Vallee Poussin are said to be prominent scholars in this school They, looking for syncretism, strengthen their belief in the hypothesis of Brahmanical origin of Buddhism. Joshi describes the characteristic of this school concerning the teaching of not self as foUows: ‘They teU us that the Buddhist Nirvana is identical with Upanisadic Brahman, that the tenet of‘not-self is a denial only of the ego, the ‘lower self, and not of the Atman, and that the Buddhists have misunderstood the Buddha’s teaching.’

74 2-3-ij T h e interpretations by the scholars regarding the Upanisadic an d Buddhist relations (1)

W e shall begin by observing the interpretations of som e of the prominent scholars about the relation of Budd h i s m to the Upanisads.

(1) S. Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan finds a close relation of Buddhism to the thought of

Upanisads. Comparing these two in general way, he states that early Bu d d h i s m is not absolutely an original doctrine nor is a freak in the evolution of Indian thought, and that it is a restatement of the thought of the Upanisads from a new standpoint.®® Buddhism, according to him, appeared in India as a historical necessity.™ B u d d h a stood forth as the spokesman of the age.’' However,

Radhakrishnan admits some distinctive characteristics of Buddhism. H e says:

S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, pp.360-361. H e also states: ‘Buddha himself admits that the dharma which he has discovered by effect of self-culture is the ancient way, the Aryan path, the eternal dharma.'-, ‘Buddha is not so m u c h creating new dharma as rediscovering an old norm.’(p.360); Buddhism, in its origin at least, is an ofehoot of Hinduism.’ (p. 361). Also see, '2500 Years of Buddhism, p. xii (Edited by R V Bapat, Forward by S. Radhakrishnan). V.P. Var m a is strongly opposed to this interpretation. Var m a says: ‘We have seen that the fundamental theme of the Upanisadic teaching {brahmatmaikyavadst) is repugnant to Buddha. — Hence, it is not correct to hold that early Buddhism is only a restatement of the doctrine of the Upanisads from a new standpoint’ {Early Buddhism and its Origins, p. 109). D. J. Kalupanaha also opposes to Radhakrishnan’s interpretation (A History of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 22). Y. Karunadasa also does not share this opinion (‘The Buddhist Critique of Atmavida and the Buddhist Ideal of Nibband, Studies in Buddhism and Culture In Honor of Professor Dr. Egaku Mayeda on his Sixty-Gfth Birthday, Sankibo Busshorin, Tokyo 1991. p.63). ™ Radhakrishnan depicts Buddha’s mind in the then India as follows; ‘Immortality m a y be unbehevable and God m a y be inconceivable, yet the demands of duty are absolute’ {Indian Philosophy, p. 359). S. Radhakrishnan, ibid. p.358. H e also says: ‘It was Buddha’s mission to accept the idealism of the Upanisads at its best, and mak e it available for the daily needs of mankind. Historical Buddhism means the spread of the Upanisadic doctrines am o n g the peoples. Buddhism, we might say, is a return of Brahmanism to its ow n fundamental principles’ (ibid. p. 471).

75 ‘To develop his theory Budd h a had only to rid the Upanisada of their inconsistent compromises with Vedic polytheism and religion, set aside the transcendental aspect as being indemonstrable to thought and unnecessary to morals, and emphasize the ethical universalism of the Upanisada.'^'

As to the idea of the self {atman/atta), he does not see m u c h difference between the Buddhist cannon and the Upanisadic Uterature. Both the teachings represent different ways for the sa m e goal. H e says: ‘Bu d d h a clearly tells us wha t the self is not, though he does not give any clear account of wh a t it is. It is, however, wrong to think there is not self at all according to B u d d h a ’.'^

H e goes on to say as foUows:

T h o u g h Buddhism and the Upanisads refuse to see ultimate reality of

substance or being in the ever changing sequence, the difference at most is

that while the Upanisads, assert a reahty beyond change or becoming,

B u d d h i s m adopts a suspense of judgment on this question."*

It is impossible to think that Buddha recognized nothing permanent in this

rush of the world, no resting-place in the universal turmoil where m a n ’s

troubled heart can find peace.'®

T he Upanisada arrive at the ground of all things by stripping the self of veil

S. Radhakrishnan, ibid. pp. 360-361. H e also says: ‘In the Upanisads w e have amazing study of an atmosphere, in Buddhism the concrete embodiment of thought in the Life of a ma n ’ (ibid.p.347). S. Radhakrishnan, ibid. p. 387. H e also says: ‘He [the Buddha] is never willing to admit that the soul is only a combination of elements, but he refuse to speculate on what else m a y be’ (ibid.p.388). Ibid. p.379.

76 after veil of contingency. At the end of the process they find the universal self

which is none of these finite entities, though the ground of th e m all. B u d d h a

holds the sam e view, though he does not state it definitely.

According to Radhakrishnan, the idea that the Buddha suspends his judgement on and refrains from making any explanation for what is something else behind phenomena,” which is the itman as stated in the Upanisadic literature. Although the B u d d h a wa s silent about it, he surely had k n e w and accepted it, and his teachings for the purpose of nibbana wa s based on it. ® O n e of the basis for his statement is a phrase in the Udana, VIII.3. His translation is: There is an unborn, an unoriginated, an unmade, an uncompounded; were there not, 0 mendicant, there would be no escape fi-om the world of the bom, the originated, the m a d e and the compounded.’™ This phrase in the Udana has been cited often by scholars w h e n they have tried to m a k e a positive interpretation on the matter of Buddhist concept of the self At a later stage I shall try to give a more precise account of this reference in the Udana.

(2) Surendranath Dasgupta states that the Upanisads discovered the self to be ananda (bliss), indestructible and eternal.He describes some distinctive features of Upanisadic idea in order to ma k e the Buddhist position clearer.

Ibid. p.379. Ibid. p.388. S. Radhakrishnan says: ‘Buddha believed in an ontological reality that endures beneath the shifting appearance of the visible world’ (ibid.p.380). Ibid. p.389. ™ Ibid. pp.379-380. S. Dasgupta, A History ofIndian Philosophy, voLl, p. 109. The material is drawn

77 T h e Upanisads doubtless considered that there were m a n y experiences which

w e often identify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is

found in the Upanisads, that there was associated with these a permanent part

as well, and that it was this permanent essence which was the true and

unchangeable self, the blissful. Th e y considered that this permanent self as

pure bliss could not be defined as this, but could only be indicated as ‘not this’,

‘not this’ (neti neti).^^

T he true self wa s with the Upanisads, a matter of transcendental experience as

it were, for they said that it could not be described in terms of anything, but

could only be pointed out ‘there’, behind all the changing mental categories.®^

Dasgupta further states the Buddhist point of view as follows; ‘We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly presupposes some such idea’; ‘If we are allowed to ma k e explicit what wa s implicit in early Bu d d h i s m we could conceive it as holding that if there was self it must be bliss, because it wa s eternal.’®^ W e find that his interpretation has general agreement with that of Radhakrishnan mentioned above. Nevertheless, w e should note here an important disagreement also. While Radhakrishnan suggests that the Buddha knew and accepted such an idea, Dasgupta states that the B u d d h a never taught it to the from Tait. Up. II.5; Brhad. Upa. IV.5.14; Kath. Up. IV. 13. S. Dasgupta, ibid. p. 110. Brhad. Up. IV.4; Chand. Up. VIII. 7-12. S. Dasgupta, ibid. p. 110. Concerning the doctrine of ignorance {avijja, avidya), he comments; ‘In Buddhist understanding, avijja means the fourfold ignorance, viz. Ignorance about sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, the nature of the extinction, and the means of bringing about this extinction. O n the other hand, in Upanisadic Philosophy, avidya means ignorance about the atman doctrine, which is sometimes contrasted with vidyi or true knowledge about the self {atmaii)’ (S. Dasgupta, ibid. p. 111). S. Dasgupta, ibid.pp. 109-110.

78 audience anjwhere, notwithstanding that he presupposed such idea. Dasgupta asserts that the point on which Bu d d h i s m parted from the Upanisach lies in the experiences of the self. H e goes on to say:

But the early Pali scriptures hold that w e could nowhere find out such a

permanent essence, any constant self, in our changing experiences.®^

But Bu d d h i s m holds that this immutable self of ma n is a delusion an d false

knowledge.[In this context, the word ‘immutable self of m a n ’ m e a n s

‘immutable ReaUty as the only abiding truth behind aU change’].

Buddha knew and presupposed the Self being bUss and eternal. Moreover, if there is Self (atmaii), it should be bliss and permanent. He, however, recognize that such Self can not be found. It can be said from Dasgupta’s statement that the word atta in the context of anatta doctrine m e a n s the Self which is bhss and eternal.

(3) Erich Frauwallner^ states that co m m o n m a n can easily be misled to regard his earthly personahty as his true self‘I’ {atma, atta). W h e n he recognizes that aU this is not his true ‘F and does not touch it in reality, all earthly things, the fetters which bind him to this existence faU off, and he attains DeUverance.

S. Dasgupta, ibid. p. 110. ^ S. Dasgupta, ibid. p.111. H e also says: ‘The Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But how was it [the true Self] that the existence of this self was so widely spoken of as demonstrated in experience? To this the reply of the Buddha was that what people received there wh e n they said that they perceived the self was but the mental experience either individual or together’ (S. Dasgupta, ibid. p. 110). M a x Hopper mentions Frauwallner’s interpretation in the preface to George

79 Frauwallner says that these Buddhist ideas are ultimately in unity with the view taught by the philosophy of the Upanisads. Th e Upanisads tell the importance of knowing this true Self (atma), and the knowledge of the true Self is regarded as decisive for obtaining Deliverance. Early B u d d h i s m appeared as one a m o n g others without any special peculiarities and ne w features which can be arranged easily in the general process of development.*’ He adds to note that such

Buddhist teachings correspond with the Atman doctrine of the Upanisads, especially with that of Yajriavalkya.*® Mentioning B u d d h a ’s second sermon to his first five followers, Frauwallner points out a similarity between B u d d h a ’s teaching of anatta in his second sermon and Yajnavalkya’s statement. Both the

teachers teach that everything different from Atman (true Self) is sorrowful, and

that all that is sorrowful cannot be the true Self*®

It will n o w be clear, at the first glance, that the Buddhistic interpretation of

the Soul belongs to the same stream of development which had its origin in

the Upanisads,^

H e also points out the similarity between the two systems, namely, the

G r i m m ’s ‘ The Doctrine of the Buddhd (pp. 1-5). E. Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 188. O n the soul theory of Buddhism, he also says; ‘the oldest Buddhism gets easily into the line of development which leads from the Upanisads to the Epic’ (ibid. p.45). E. Frauwallner, ibid. voLl, p. 185. H e also says; ‘I have not doubt in assuming the same views regarding the natxure of the soul and Deliverance lie at the basis of Buddha’s teaching, as the idea created in connection with the Fire-doctrine of Upanisads’ (E. Frauwallner. ibid.p.l85); ‘Because this doctrine ofYajnavalkya, as the intimate connection of its legendary exponent with King Janaka of Videha shows, had its home in the East, near the ho m e of the Buddha. The time-distance between them both need not be very great’ (E. Frauwallner, ibid. p. 188). E. Frauwallner, ibid. p. 154. E. Frauwallner, ibid. p. 184.

80 decisive definition of soul as being incomprehensible and inexpressible. H e quotes a verse firom the Udana (VIII. 1) as one of the examples to interpret the

Buddhist soul theory in this way. O n the other hand, he admits a distinctive

feature of the Buddhist soul theory contrasting with that of the Upanisads.

It is not said here that a m a n shall kn o w the true 1’, but that he need not take

for the ‘F {atma, P. atta) what is not ‘I’. The Dehverance ensures not because a

m a n is conscious of or knows the true ‘F but because a m a n knows everything

which is falsely urged as the ‘F as the ‘not-F (anatma, P. anatta) and thus the

Desire is dissolved.®'

Both the systems teach the s a m e ideas, the only difference being that in

Buddhism they are expressed through the negative formulation. To put his

assertion more briefly, in Bu d d h i s m and in Upanisads, the goal is the same but

the ways to indicate it are different.

(4) David J. Kalupahana holds that one of the typical trends in India at the

time of the Buddha was a search for the ultimate objectivity in philosophical

explanation. H e gives examples of groups being enthusiastic in this search by

pointing out the four major schools, viz., Brahmanism, Materialism, Ajivikism,

and Jainism. H e says that the Bu d d h a criticized and rejected their ideas.®"

Abandoning the search for ultimate objectivity, the B u d d h a had to renounce

Ibid. vol.1, p. 153. ‘The Buddha was compelled to avoid these extremes if he were to say anything new and original’ (D.J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 53).

81 most of the explanations of reality presented by his predecessors. The

Brahmanical notion of self (atman), the Materialist and Ajivika conceptions of

nature (svabhava), and even the Jaina theory of action {kiriya) appeared to

h i m to be too metaphysical.®^

Concerning the theory of the atta and anatta, Kalupahana explains: ‘For the

Buddha, the more menacing metaphysical issue w a s the cogito or the transcendental apperception of the rationalist, which was also implied in the

Upanisadic notion of self (atman).’ He points out that the most important method utihzed by the Bud d h a to get rid of the metaphysical self is the analysis of the process of sense experience, for instance, the theory of twelve spheres

{ayatana),^* and the theory of the stream of thought.®^ H e states again; ‘The above analysis of sense experience alone would suffice as a refutation of the

Brahmanical notion of the self and world as eternal and incorruptible entities

(atwan).’^-, ‘The stream of though, consciousness, or experience discussed above is intended by the Buddha as a m e a n of avoiding the metaphysical notion of self

(atman) propounded by the Upanisadic thinkers.’*’"

D.J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 53. H e explains; ‘His [the Buddha’s] doctrine had to steer clear of notions of permanent existence and nihilistic non-existence, strict determinism and chaotic indeterminism’ (p.53); ‘the Buddha found that they were indeed dominated by one or the other, or a combination, of the foUowing attitudes or perspective, (1) faith or confidence (saddha), (2) likes or preferences (ruci), (3) tradition (anussavd), (4) reflection of form (alara-parivitakka), (5) delighting in the contemplation of views (ditthi-nijjbinakkhanti). Here the Buddha emphasizes that a theory accepted on the basis of these attitudes or perspectives is not necessarily true.’ (This explanation is depending on the discourse in MN.vol.2, p. 170] (D.J. K^alupahana, ibid. p.31). D.J. Kalupahana, ibid. p.29. D.J. Kalupahana, ibid. p. 28. ^ D.J. Kalupahana, ibid. p.59. H e also says; ‘In the early discourse, the caste system remains the second most criticized theory, next to the doctrine of atman'(ihid. P-27). D.J. Kalupahana, The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, p. 28.

82 Kalupahana thus interprets the Buddhist teaching of anatta as an opposition to the notion of the Upanisadic self and he heretic svabhava. H e further says that the denial of a permanent entity as posited by the Upanisadic thinkers did not lead the Buddha to the other extreme of denying personal continuity, as it did the Materialists.

(5) Vishwanath Prasad Varma, in his book entitled Early Buddhism and Its

Origins, m a k e s a close study on the relations between the doctrine of Bu d d h i s m and that of the Vedas and Upanisads. Though he traces some of the influences of the Upanisads, upon early Buddhism,®’’ he emphasizes the deep rupture between the two systems.Let us mark closely his explanation, which form one of the pecuhar interpretations showing a gross gap between the two systems.

H e mentions the interpretation of some philosophers and scholars wh o had m a d e an inquiry into deep af&nities between the teaching of the Bu d d h a and the doctrine of the Upanisads. According to him, they are Gaudapada, Sadananda and Kumarila, M a x Muller, Bloomfield, Rhys Davids, C.A.F. Rhys Davids,

Pointing out the importance of middle way taught by the Buddha, Kalupahana states: ‘the Buddha considered this anatma-vada itself another extreme, because while denying the transempirical or nonempirical ‘self, the Materiahsts also denied empirical consciousness, which for the Buddha was a reahty. Therefore, the Buddha continued to use concepts such as ‘I’ {ahaih), you’ {tvarh), and ‘self {atta), but without either implying the existence of a transempirical reahty or denying personal continuity’ (D. J. Kalupahana, Causality. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 184). H e also says that it is certainly true that dominant conceptions of Indian culture which were contained in the Vedas and the Upanisads are taken up and incorporated by Buddha in his system (ibid.p. 109). As the influence of the Upanisack upon early Buddhism, he points out the following characteristics, viz., pessimism, monasticism, the concept of karma, the ethical disciphne and the theory of Yoga (V.P. Varma, Early Buddhism and Its Origins, 1973, Munshirum Manoharal Publishers, N e w Delhi, pp. 92ff). H e states that the Buddha’s personal hfe of renunciation of the comforts of home hfe at the early age of twenty-nine shows that in his emotional and cathartic make-up he was a Hindu of Hindus (VP. Varma. ibid. p. 9). V P Varma, ibid p.82.

83 Stcherbatsky, Keith and B.M. Barua, besides them the Sraddhotpada Sutra of

Asvaghosa is mentioned as an example which has strong resemblance to the teachings of the Upanisads}^^

In contrast to these scholars, V a r m a puts stress on the differences in teachings of the two systems. H e says: ‘It is not only gross exaggeration but mistake to state that early Bu d d h i s m is only the extension and fulfillment of the

teaching of the Upanisads. In spite of some common concepts and ideas, the

difference in the orientation of the Upanisads and the Tripitaka is i m m e n s e and vital.’ Then he criticizes Radhakrishnan wh e n he understands the Buddha as

a democratic teacher of ethical universalism in a sense that Buddhism helped to

democratize the philosophy of the Upanisads}^^ Varma comments: ‘We have

seen that the fundamental theme of the Upanisadic teaching

ibrahmatmaikyavada) is repugnant to Buddha.’; ‘Hence, it is not correct to hold

that early Buddhism is only a restatement of the doctrine of the Upanisads fi*om

a new standpoint.’ In another place, he criticizes Radhakrishnan’s statement

that: ‘it is wrong to think that there is no self at all according to the Buddha...

Buddha is silent about the Atman enunciated in the Upanisads... Buddha

consistently refuses to deny the reaUty of the soul.’^”"* V a r m a n a m e d

Radhakrishnan’s interpretations as ‘ vedantiGcatioii, and asserts that these

understandings are untrue, commenting that: ‘If in his heart of hearts Buddha

did adhere to the concept of spiritual real, w h y was he shy of saying so?’ ‘°'^

VP. Varma, ibid. pp.78-79. VP. Varma, ibid. pp. 109-110. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Pbilosopby, voLl, p. 147. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid. pp.386-389. 105 Y p Varma, ibid. pp. 144-145. V a r m a is critical of the western scholar’s interpretations. H e says, ‘I marvel at the monumental intellectual industry of the western Indologists but I a m constrained to think that their conclusions are

84 T he following statements express most clearly V a r m a ’s understanding on the attasLnd anattam relation to the Upanisadic idea;

The denial of the soul in the Buddhist philosophy of anatmavada was a great

break from the Upanisadic tradition. The very term anatman is deliberately

designed to assert the great break from the Upanisadic tradition. There is no

place for a soul in the teaching of Buddha.

Buddha refused to accept the concept of the soul as a spiritual monadic

substance. The Upanisadic conception of the identification of the psychic self

and cosmic-transcendent self also failed to satisfy him.‘°'

H e states the differences of the two in m a n y places, by using rather radical expressions such as: ‘the deep rupture in the two systems’; ‘Bu d d h a ’s hostihty to the Upanisadic Brahman and the Vedic and Brahmanic G o d and deities’:'°®

‘critical anti-Vedic tradition’; ‘represent a frontal attack of Bu d d h i s m on the prevailing absolutist metaphysics’; ‘the radical, almost unbridgeable gap

sometimes vitiated by biases and prejudice...’ (ibid. p.xxii); ‘But I a m also of the opinion that Western Indologists like Oldenberg, Keith and C.A.F. Rhys Davids have failed to understand the essential spirit of ancient Indian thought in spite of their gigantic scholarship’ (ibid.p.xxvi). Here, to know Buddhist anatmanism, he gives some suttas in the Nikayas. They are: the verse of Vajira in the Therigaths, the Simha Sutta of Samyutta Nikaya, I, 42; Majjhima Nikaya, I, 138 (V.P. Varma. ibid. p.84). V.P. Varma, ibid. p.37 It unmistakably points out the deep rupture in the two systems of Upanimds and early Buddhism. Thus, there is no place in early Buddhism either for the personal Go d of the Upanisads or for the symbolic method of concentration (V.P. Varma. ibid. p. 82). Buddha belongs not to the tradition of the Vedas, Brahmanas and the Upanisads, but to this critical anti- Vedic tradition whose views are occasionally refereed to in the sacred hteratvu-e but never elaborated upon (V.P. Varma. ibid.p.83). This neutralization of the spiritual soul, as inculcated in the Upanisads,, by

85 between the Upanisads and early Bu d d h i s m ’.'" H e also comm e n t s about Jaim\

‘Th e negation of the soul as a substance w a s revolutionary doctrine in m a n y senses. It indicated that the challenge represented by Bu d d h i s m wa s far more radical than that of Jainas because the latter beUeved in the habitation by the soul in all kinds of substances.’""

V a r m a admits ‘sohd positive teaching’"^ in early B u d d h i s m in spite of the critical attitude to contemporary Brahmanism and the negative phraseology such as anatman, nairatmya and nirvana. But he further points out that the stress on the positive elements in Buddhism certainly does not me a n that early Bu d d h i s m should be represented as another branch of the Upanisadic teachings.

W e should draw attention to his statement wh e n he mentions whether or not the Buddha had a deep knowledge of the Vedas and Upanisads. H e comments on this point as follows;

It is not certain that B u d d h a had any deep knowledge of the Vedas and

Upanisads. In the six years which he spent as a wanderer and seer, previous

to his enhghtenment, he does not confront any profound spokesman of

idealistic wisdom. S o m e of his later biographies speak of hi m as being fully

conversant with the school of metaphysical philosophy. But from a study of

the Tripitaka Hterature this claim is not substantiated."^

reducing it to a complex of five psycho-physical processes as maintained in the doctrine of the namarupa skandha represents a frontal attack of Buddhism on the prevailing absolutist metaphysics (VP. Varma. ibid.p.86). VP. Varma. ibid. p.91. VP. Varma. ibid. pp.86-87. For instance: The lofty structure of the ethico-religious idealism of early Buddhism emphasized rigorous moral endeavors and yogic practices. This was a deep positive note of the teaching (VP. Varma, ibid. p.xxii). VP. Varma, ibid. p.79.

86 I a m only stating that there is nothing in the Tripitaka literature to prove that

Buddha had any profound acquaintance with the metaphysical teachings of

the T^cfes and the Upanisads}^^

H e goes on to say that it is impossible to find any Upanisadic ideas in the

Brahmajala sutta (DN.2),“® and that geographically in Ma g a d h a the mfluence of the Brahmin teachers was not probably as strong as in Middle India.

Here, w e should question about two points. Firstly, is it possible to find, in the Nikayan hterature, any teachings which clearly showed the Buddha’s hostility to the Upanisadic Brahman, G o d and deities. Secondly, w h e n he says the B u d d h a radically criticized the teaching of Upanisadic notion of Self, but on the other hand, he mentions that the Buddha did not have a knowledge of these

Metaphysical Philosophy, the question is whether it wa s possible for the Bu d d h a to criticize the Upanisadic theory without a knowledge of it. M. Saigusa, as for the first question, comments that it is questionable that Va r m a uses so often the word ‘against’ (to the Vedas and Upanisads) wh e n he tries to give emphasis to the greatness an d uniqueness of the Buddha."*

(6) L. D e L a Vallee Poussin describes the time of the B u d d h a as an epoch of spiritual effervescence."® H e states that the ascetics including the Sikyamuni

V.R Varma, ibid pp.79-80. V.P. Varma, ibid. p. 80. ‘Punjab and the Middle country have been the main centers of the Vedic and Upanisadic culture. But the early Buddhists made Magada and also Kosala the center of their propaganda’ (V.P. Varma, ibid. pp.335-337).

M. Saigusa, Principal Thoughts of Early Buddhism, vol.1, p . 154. There were discussions and ideological tournaments. Scores of ascetics claimed to be discoverers of the Path, UteraUy ‘ford-maker’, w h o had found a ford across transmigration, or they claimed to be buddhas, that is ‘awakened one’, ‘enlightened one’ (L. De La Vallee Poussin, The Way to Nirvana, p.8).

87 aimed at something that is beyond the worlds, and they were in the same class as regards the disciples of salvation. It is said that though they are, in m a n y respects, widely different from one another, they are sisters b o m form the s a m e parents, namely disgust with the Life and love of mystery.

Then, Poussin points out the characteristics of Bu d d h i s m in the following four points; ® the definition of Ma n given by Sakyamimi and his disciples, © the idea of transmigration and the factors that govern transmigration, ® the aim to be reached or dehverance, ® the Path leading to deliverance.The third characteristic should be kept in the mi n d as we propose to examine the Buddhist teaching of the atta and anatta. H e says, ‘for the rivals of Sakyamimi, dehverance is either the merging of the individual Self in the great Self, or som e mystical state of the Self; while Sakyamuni takes a merely negative view of dehverance: the Buddhist dehverance or Nirvana is only cessation of rebirth and misery’.

In another place, Poussin explains the doctrine of the Upanisads, as follows;

‘Wh e n desire ceases, the mortal becomes immortal; he attains Brahman on earth.

H e w h o is without desire, w h o is free from desire, w h o desires only his o w n Self

Something that is beyond the worlds, that is, ‘hypercosmical’ (to translate the Buddhist idiom, lokottara), a mysterious ‘somewhere’, a ‘somewhere’ that is eternal and free from sorrow, and which is called sometimes ‘dehverance’ {moicsa, mukti, apavarg^, sometimes ‘happiness’ {nirviti, nailisreyasa), sometimes Nirvana, that is ‘refreshment’ or ‘peace’ (L. De La Vallee Poussin, ibid p. 7). S o m e are monist, pantheist or mystical {Upanisads, Vedanta, Yoga)] some purposely atheist and rationalist {Jainism, Buddhism, Saihkhya) (L. D e La Vallee Poussin, ibid. pp. 7-8). The rivals of Sakyamimi beheve that God, or gods, or destiny or sacrifice are of greater or less importance. Sakyamuni, on the contrary, teaches that transmigration depends on the actions of Ma n himself (L. De La Vallee Poussin, ibid. p.31). The rivals lay mu c h stress on sacrifice, penance, ecstasies and esoteric wisdom, as means to deliverance. With Sakyamuni, the essential part of the Path is the understanding of a few very truths, ‘Life ends in death, Everything is misery’ (L. De La Vallee Poussin, ibid. p. 32).

88 which is identical with the universal Self, he obtains the accomplishment of his desire in the possession of his Self. H e is the universal Self and goes into the universal Self

Moreover, Poussin goes on to state his understanding about the Buddhist idea of self:

It is not probable that the primitive Buddhists ever heard of these theories:

the Self {atmaii) which they k n o w and reject is the individual Self and they

never mention the Nirvana of the individual Self in the great Self But their

doctrine of the Path m a y be shortly described as a secularization of the

Upanisad teaching: to free oneself from desire, while ignoring the universal

Self and denying the hu m a n Self.'"'^

(7) C. A. F. Rhys Davids spent nearly fifty years in the study of Buddhism. I have already noted earUer her interpretation of the atta and anatta fully, so here

1 need only note some points of her interpretation in respect of the Buddhist relation to the Upanisadic hterature. W h e n we pay attention to her writings, as

V a r m a puts it, w e notice that she changed her interpretation concerning the

L. De La Vallee Poussin, ibid p. 140. A n d he also says: ‘On the other hand, the Buddhist path is a ‘rationalization’ of a number of practices which were c o m m o n at this time a m o n g ascetics of very faith and aspiration’ (L. De La Vallee Poussin, ibid. p. 140). V a r m a says, in Early Buddhism and its Origin (pp.156-157): ‘But m y o w n impression about the researches of C.AF. Rhys Davids is that they are fuU hair- sphtting verbal dialectics and rely on imagination. She is willing to stretch words and phrases to yield meanings at which the original speakers would be staggeringly surprised. Her fantastic thesis of an original positive Buddhism and a later monkish asceticism is ridiculous. Furthermore, she has not brought forward any single authentic passage which would convincingly show that Buddha believed in the spiritual and substantialistic character of the soul.’

89 relation between Upanisads and Buddhism. In her earlier studies,'^ she understood that anatta doctrine w a s directed against the notion of a soul. She says that the soul negated by anatta was not only a persistent, encouraging, blissful, transmigrating super-phenomenal being, but also a being wherein the supreme Atman or world soul w a s immanent, one with it, in essence a n d as a bodily or mental factor issuing its fiat.

But in her later studies,'"® she interpreted that the teaching of anatta wa s a later accretion of monastic origin, and that B u d d h a ’s teaching on atta wa s sa m e with that of the Upanisads,}^ She says that it is far more likely that the original speaker of the verse used atta in the sense in which the original speaker of the Upanisads, used atman. Further, it is said that it is far less likely that the

Sakyan used atta in pitaka as compilers came to use it, much later.She asserted that the Bu d d h a did not preach the ‘no-self (soul) theory at aU, but that it wa s a later monkish innovation under the impact of the Samkhya, the growth of a narrow world-view and hostihty towards the Brahmana^}^^

(8) H. Von Glasenapp, although approves of a mutual influence of Vedanta and

B u d d h i s m in later time (especially since the Christian era), states that originally

In her publications in the first period (the nineteen-tenths), this type of interpretations is found. For instance, 'Buddhism - a Study of the Buddhist Norm (1912) and ' Buddhist Psychology (1914). C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, p.32. See, also V.P. Varma, Early Buddhism and its Origin, p. 155. In her pubhcations after the latter half (nineteen-twentieths), she stressed on this type of interpretation on anatta. For instance, 'Gotama the M ad (1928); ‘Sakya or Buddhist Origin^ (1928); 'A manual of Buddhisnd (1832); ‘OutHne of Buddhism - A Historical Sketch - ’(1938). A n d she had m a n y writings published in this context (see also, V.P. Varma, ibid. p.l56n). C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Sakya or Buddhist Origin, p. 208. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Amity, K B . Pathak Commemoration Volume, pp.60-61 (quoted in VP. Varma, Early Buddhism and its Origin, p. 156). Cf. N.N. Bhattacharyya, Buddhism in the History ofIndian Ideas, p. 39.

90 the two systems were diametrically opposed to each other, the Atman doctrine of the Vedanta and the Dharma theory of Buddhism exclude each other/*’ He criticizes interpretations put by the scholars such as George Grimm/^"*

Guenther,’^® Otto Rosenberg, Th. Stcherbatsky and Louis de la Vallee Poussin‘S on a question of the atta and anatta. In addition, he says his interpretation as follows: ‘As far as I can see there is not a single passage in the Pali Canon where the word atta is used in the sense of the Upanisadic Atman}^" By teaching that there is nowhere in the world a persisting Atman, the Buddha has not asserted that there must be a transcendental Atman (i.e., a self beyond the world).

As to what extent the knowledge of Upanisadic texts m a y be assumed for the canonical Pali scriptures, Glasenapp states: ‘Th e n u m b e r of passages in the

Pali Canon deaUng with Upanisadic doctrines is very small. It is true that early

B u d d h i s m shared m a n y doctrines with the Upanisads {Karma, rebirth, and

Uberation through insights), but these tenets were widely held in philosophical

H. Glasenapp, ‘ Vedanta and Buddhism - A Comparative Study’ (The Wheel PubUcation, No.2, BPS. 1978, Kandy, Sri Lanka). He says: ‘The Vedanta tries to establish Atman as the basis of everything, whilst Buddhism maintains that everything in the empirical world is only a stream of passing Dhammas (impersonal and evanescent processes) which therefore has to be characterized as Anatta, ie., being without a persisting self, without independent existence.’ Glasenapp states: ‘The fact that in the Pili Canon all worldly phenomena are said to be anatta had induced some scholars of the West to look for an Atman in Buddhism.’ A n d he takes up G r i m m ’s understanding as one of such tendencies, stating as foUows: ‘Gr i m m concludes that there must be an eternal ego-substance that is free from all suffering, and above aU cognizabihty. This is a rash conclusion’ (H. Glasenapp, ibid. p. 9). Gleisenapp states: ‘Where Guenther has translated anattan or anatta as “not the self” one should use “a self’ instead of “the self,” because in the Pali Canon the word atman does not occur in the sense of “universal soul.’” (H. Glasenapp, ibid. p.8). Commenting on Poussin’s statement, Glasenapp says: ‘In the Hght of these researches, all attempts to give to the Atman a place in the Buddhist doctrine appear to be quite antiquated’ (H. Glasenapp, ibid. p. 11). The editor of this paper makes a supplementary explanation on his statement: ‘Except in a few passages rejecting it [Upanisadic Atman], as the one quoted by the author’ (H. Glasenapp, ibid. 8). H. Glasenapp, ibid p. 10.

91 \

5 ^ circles of those we can no longer regard the Upanisads as the direct source from whiai q Buddha had drawn.’*®®

i / 2-3-2| The interp etations by the scholars regarding the Upanisadic and Buddhist relations (2)

In this section, I shall examine and summarize some interpretations given

by other scholars w h o wrote about the relation of Bu d d h i s m to the Upanisads

with regard to the theory of the atta and anatta.

George Gr i m m states that Bu d d h a ’s doctrine oinot-1{anatta-vada) taken up

in contrast to /-doctrine {atta-vada) of the Vedanta dose not m e a n a denial of the

AttL Buddha sought for the Atta in an indirect w a y by taking a w a y from atta

everything that is not the Atta. According to Grimm, the Buddha is ‘the true

Brahmin w h o had completely realized the ideal of the Upanisads,, a n d his

doctrine is the flower of Indian thought.

A. K Coomaraswamy and I. B. Homer, in the Book entitled ‘ The Great

Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, explain that the Buddha’s theory of anatta

consists of the two Selves, viz., the Great Self and the Little Self This idea of

the two Selves is supposed to be depending on the method of understanding as

‘early Vedanta was of no great importance in Magadha, at the time of the Buddha andMahavira...’ (H. Glasenapp, ibid p.10.6). G r i m m explains about anatta-vada as follows; ‘The Buddha rejects the Atta-vada as well as the Loka-vada. ...he only rejects the Vada about the Atta, every doctrine about the I, as we U as he rejects only the Vida about the Loka, every doctrine about the world as such {The Doctrine of the Buddha, pp.370-371). Distinction is also made of the ‘Great Self from the ‘httle self, and of the ‘Fair Self from the ‘Foul self, the former blaming the latter w h e n wrong is done (A.K Coomaraswamy and I. B. Horner, The Great Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, p. 33).

92 presented by C. A. F. Rhys D a v i d s . A phrase in A N 'atta piattanam upavadati is explained as ‘the Great Self upbraids the Little self wh e n wha t should not be done is done’/‘“ They point out that in the whole of the Buddhist canonical hterature it is nowhere stated that there is no Self; in fact the Self is both explicitly and implicitly asserted.’^ According to them, the B u d d h a did not deny a God, neither denied a Soul, nor denied Eternity,and the Buddhist point of view is the same as the Brahmanical one

E.G-A, Holmes states that wh a t is negated in the Nikayas is only the atta that consists of the five aggregates, so the B u d d h a was convinced of the concept of Atman}*'^

H. Saddhatissa says that w e should not place atta {Pali) and atman

{Sanskrit) in the same category. T h e word atman has mu c h longer history than atta, so that the word atman has profounder imphcation than that of the word

atta. For this reason, w e should pay thoroughgoing attention to it wh e n we try

to interpret the word anatta appearing in the texts. According to him, the

Buddhist teaching should be understood as a negation of permanent indwelling

self or essence of any kind. H e implicitly states that the B u d d h a did not deny

C. A F. Rhys Davids, Buddhism - Its Birth and Dispersal -, p. 70. A.K. Coomaraswamy and I. B. Horner, ibid. p.36. In addition, they state, ‘The Buddhist is expected to “honor what is more than self’, and this “more” can be the “Self that’s Lord of self, and the goal of self’. B y using the idea of two selves, they also say that the remedy for self-love is Self-love (ibid. p. 22). Ibid. pp. 32-33. Ibid. p.33. Ibid.p. 18. Concerning the knowledge of the Buddha about the Godhead Brahma, they point out; ‘It has been asserted that Buddhism knows only of the personal God Brahma and nothing of the Godhead Brahma:, this would have been strange indeed in India of the fifth century BC, in one wh o had studied under Brahman masters, and in scriptxiral contexts that are so often reminiscent of the Brihmanas and Upanisack’ (ibid. p.31). E.G.A Holmes, The Creed of Buddha, John Lane, N e w York, 1908, pp.l65f.

93 the existence of Atman}'^

J. Shinha, criticizing the interpretation of anatta by scholars, such as S.

Radhakrishnan, E.G.A. Holmes and A. B. Keith, states that the Buddha negated the existence of Atman and accepted only a phenomenal self and phenomenal world.

T.R.V. Murti points out that w e can see a rivalry between B u d d h i s m and the Upanisadic doctrine of atman. According to him, anatta taught by the

Buddha should be understood as the negation of atman.^^

K N . Jayatilleke, taking up a dialogue in the Majjima Nikaya (1.232), states that the Bud dh a in advocating the theory of anatta follows a pattern of argument very similar to that used by Prajapati. H e points out the similar expressions in the both systems, eso aham asmi in the PaZz passage and ayam aham asmiin the

Chandogya Upanisad (8.II.I). However, he explains the m a i n difference in the attitude between Prajapati and the Bu d d h a as follows;

Th e former assumes the existence of an atman and on failing to identify it with

any of the states of the personahty, continues to assume that it must exists

within it and is not satisfied with the results of the purely empirical

investigation, while the latter as an Empiricist mak e s use of the definition of

the concept of the atman without assuming its existence (or non-existence) and

is satisfied with the empirical investigation which shows that no such atman

exists because there is no evidence for its existence.

H. Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics, pp. 133. J. Shinha, A History ofIndian Philosophy vol. II, pp. 294f T. R. V Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism - A Study of the Madhyamika System, 1955, p. 17,19-20. K.N. JayatiUeke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 39.

94 K N . Upadhyaya criticizes the researchers w ho display their ingenuity in constructing a positive soul theory on oft-emphasized anatta-dj^ctrine of the

Buddha, and wh o are in favor of reading the Upanisadic conception of the soul into the Buddhist doctrine of anatti^°~ According to Upadhyaya, they are

Radhakrishnan, Frauwallner, M a x Hopper, Mrs. Rhys Davids, and so on.'“

Then he expresses his opinion that the Buddha showed that nothing permanent a nd blissful is to be found in any or all of these various constituents, and that the notion of such a self cannot but be regarded as rooted in ignorance or lack of proper knowledge.Examining many passages in the Nikayas describing

B u d d h a ’s teaching of anatta, he points out that the positive interpretations of trying to read Upanisadic a^/na/2-doctrine in early Bu d d h i s m are not only not in conformity with the fundamental Buddhist ideas, but are flagrantly contradicted by the exphcit utterances of the Master.

KN. Upadhyaya, Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgita, p.302. W e find Upadhyaya’s criticism against these scholars in ma n y places of his book, e.g.; ‘It is evident fi-om the above-mentioned views that Buddha’s repeated teaching of the anatta-Aoctrme has been constructed by these scholars veritably as an imphcit atta- doctrine, indistinguishable from that of the Upanisads’ (ibid. p. 305); ‘It is only ignoring some important passages, misconceiving others and disregarding the contextual suggestions of some of them that they ascribe such a positive metaphysical concept of the soul to Buddha’ (ibid. p.307); ‘they mainly foUow the same Hne of argument and refer mostly to the same Pali passages in support of their views’ (ibid. p. 307); ‘the scholars wh o do not shake off their egoistic Une of thinking, seem to miss this basic point of the Master and try to discover a self or “I” besides and beyond the five aggregates’ (ibid. p.308); ‘They, thus, try to m a k e out that Buddha’s criticism of the self is directed only against what they call the “Httle” or “small” self and not against the true or great self (ibid.p.319). He mentions George Grimm, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy & I.E. Horner, and Guenther as the scholars holding the same interpretation (KN. Upadhyaya, ibid. pp. 302-323). K N . Upadhyaya, ibid. pp.296-297. K N . Upadhyaya, ibid. p.305. His refutation of such interpretations is found in the following statements: ‘Thus the attempts of the scholars to discover some kind of the self beyond or beside the five aggregates is shown to be baseless’ (ibid. p.310); ‘But here we find Buddha stating definitely in so ma n y words and through so ma n y analogies, especially through the analogy of the plantain tree [SN.IVp.l68; MN.Lp.233], that after stripping oneself of layer after layer of contingency, nothing as essence of the self is left, and is aU empty, void or non-self (ibid.p.312); ‘We do not

95 Th. Stcherbatsky, though his chief sources are not the Pali literature but the Abhidharma, interprets the central concept of B u d d h i s m as a radical rff pluralism, which means a plurahty of separate elements without real unity.

This radical pluralism is explained as anatma-dharma theory,'^ which according to him, is mentioned in the oldest set of Upanisads,,^°~ especially in the Katba

Upanisad}^ He explains that ‘souUessness’ {nalratmya) is but the negative

expression, indeed a synonym, for the existence of ultimate realities

{dharmata)}^^

Sures Chandra Baneiji admits, altogether, a deep influence of Vedic

hterature and Upanlsade, on Buddhism. He says, ‘the Buddha utilized the

ancient Aryan path’ and ‘his reUgion w a s old wine in a n e w bottle’.*®® In this

find any passage anywhere in the Pah Canon which m a y prove the acceptance of a metaphysical self in early Buddhism’ (ibid. p. 321). This anatma-dharma theory is also termed ‘the dhrmata, 'anatman’ and ‘nairatmya’ in his book (Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p.70). According to Stcherbatsky the originahty of Buddhism consists in its anatmavada, dhsurmavada, samskaravada and pratiyasamutpada (See, Varma, Early Buddhism and its Origins, p.79n). ‘The possibility is not precluded that the foundation stone of the anatma-dharma theory was laid before Buddha... Bud d h a m a y have adopted and shared a doctrine which he found somewhere in that philosophical laboratory which was the India of his time’ (Stcherbatsky, ibid. p.68). Interpreting the thought of the Katha Upanisad (iv.l4), he states that it is evidently strongly opposed to the monistic view of an immortal soul {atmaii), and favors instead a theory of separate elements (ibid. p.68). The Katha Upanisad read: yathodakam durge vrstam parvatesu vidhavati, evam dharman prthak pasyaihs tan evanuvidhavati (As water rained upon a height flows down in various ways amo n g the hills; so he who views things as varied runs after them [distractedly]) . However, V.P. Va r m a criticizes this interpretation stating as follows: ‘The assertion of Stcherbatsky with reference to soullessness in the Kadiopanisad is too ingenious and even artificial’ (Varma, ibid.p.143, see, also p.79n). N.N. Bhattacharyya also mentions Stcherbatskys interpretation in his book {Buddhism in the History of Indian Ideas, pp. 42-43). Th. Stcherbatsky, ibid. p. 25. Sures Chandra Banerji, A Companion to Indian Philosophy, p. 137. H e also explains the similarity in the two systems as follows: ‘Buddhism reveals great indebtedness particularly to the Upanisada. It shows remarkable similarity with the Upanisadic teachings, particularly in the following matters. - contempt of ritualism, hfe is fuU of suffering escape fi:om which is possible by attaining Nirvana or Moksa, indifference to Pfeticauthority and ritualistic practices..., impermanence

96 respect, he is in agreement with the account of Mrs. Rhys Davids and S

Radhakrishnan/®^ He, however, points out that there are some basic differences in Upanisads, and Buddhism, the one being, the soul theory. H e states that the recognition of soul as an immutable reahty in the Upanisads, marks their difference from Buddhism which does not admit any permanent reality. He also says that the Buddha did not recognize a universal c o m m o n reality for all individuals.'®^

Paul Horsch'®^ states that there are no positive relations between early

Buddhism and Upanisads}^'* H e says that if the B u d d h a had been affected by the ideas of Upanisads, he would have denied even the absolute Brahman. H e investigates the Anattalakkhanna-sutta in order to answer the question — what does the word means for the B u d d h a and his followers, and points out that anattavada did not aim at a negation of the non-individualistic absolute Atman, but a negation of animistic behef in the individual atman which is immortal and completely unrestricted.

M. Saigusa devotes many pages, at his book 'Principal Thoughts of Early

of the world and the individual self (ibid. pp. 137-138). H e quotes some phrases from he books of S. Radhakrishnan and Mrs. Rhys Davids to show an agreement with their explanation. Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, pp.83- 85; Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol. I. p.361. Ibid p. 138. Paul Horsch, Buddhismus und Upanisaden, Pratidinam, Iranian and Indo- European Studies Presented to Franciscus Jacobus Kuiper on His Sixtieth Birthday. Edited by J.C. Heesterman, G.H.Schockker, I.V.Subramoniam, The Hague/Paris 1968, pp.362-477. Unfortunately, I could not have a copy of his thesis, so all of the material and quotation are based on M. Saigusa’s study in Japanese (M. Saigusa, Principal Thoughts of Early Buddhism, voLl, pp. 170-183). Horsch states; ‘The early Buddhism had no knowledge about Upanisadic texts. O n the other hand, they know at least the na m e of Simkhya^yoga, Niti, Three Vedas (except Atharva- Vedd). W e can see the fact that so ma n y ideas (ditthi) attributed to brahmanaa are mentioned in the Pah Canon, but there is no case in which we can find distinct influence of any Upanisada. It seems that those ideas in Buddhist literature can be traced either to Vedaa or to the speculations of heretical thinkers {sramanas)' (M. Saigusa, Principal Thoughts of Early Buddhism, vol.l, p. 182).

97 Buddhism (3 vols.)’, for stating clearly the relation between B u d d h i s m a n d the

Upanisads. H e examines carefuUy the interpretations of T.R.V. Murti, B. Barua,

V.P. V a r m a and Paul Horsch, and prefers to agree with V a r m a and Horsch in

their understanding of the relation between the two systems. Saigusa states:

‘Th e teaching of anatta in early B u d d h i s m is not an antithesis to the Atman

doctrine taught in the old Upanisads,.’^^-, ‘The Buddha or early Buddhism did not

protest against the concept of atman itself but evaded to regard it absolute or

metaphysical concept.’’®® T h e n he concludes that the B u d d h a and his followers

did not have an exact knowledge of the old Upanisadic doctrine,'®' and that they

did not hold the idea of self as a metaphysical concept. In this regard, they

clearly differ from the Upanisadic thinkers whose greatest concern was the

pursuit of a substantial reahty.

A. Hirakawa points out that it is impossible to conclude whether the

Buddha repudiated the Upanisadic idea of atman or not, with the help of

material w e find in the Agama. H e says that we can only say that there was

difference in the level wh e n they try to interpret the atta {atman).

P.T. Raju states that the Buddhists refused to caU the ultimate principle as

Atman, but the concept of Nirvana played an important role in their system.

Th e word nirvana is explained as indescribable and unmoving. He further

states: ‘The Mahayana emphasized it strongly, and an impartial reader can see

that the VijSanavadins, one of the schools of the Mahayana, conceived it nearly in

M. Saigusa, ibid. voL 1, p. 145. M. Saigusa, ibid. voLl, p. 165. M. Saigusa, ibid. voLl, p.66. M. Saigusa, ibid. voLl, p. 145. In addition, he says; ‘Buddhism seems not to intend to negate the some philosophical ideas of the sel^ but intend to negate [the wrong notion ofl the self ordinary person instinctively holds (A Hirakawa, ‘Mu g a to Syutai’, in Jiga to Muga,

98 the same terms as those of the atman an d the Brahmaif'^ of the Upanisads.’^'^^

W e notice that the teaching of early Bu d d h i s m is compatible in general with that of the Upanisadic thinkers, though the terminology used by the Buddha was different from that used in the Upanisads.

O. H. De. A. Wijesekera clearly points out that the Buddhist notion of anatta is incompatible with the Upanisadic doctrine of the Atman and Brahman.

According to him, though it is clamed that the Buddha remained sUent on the metaphysical questions, he did not always remain silent, and has expressed some opinion on the fundamental metaphysical questions.''" Criticizing the scholars w h o hold positive interpretation on anatta teaching,he states: ‘Hence, it will be

edited by Hajime Nakamura, 1963, Kyoto Japan, pp.408-411). H e explains: ‘Wh a t one realizes through self-purification is pure nirvana, some nonmoving indescribable essence, which is not the same as the psycho-physical being" (P.T. Raju, The Concept of Man, p. 256); ‘Somehow, through ignorance, the psycho-physical personality is formed; and w h e n it is analyzed away, the original nirvana, Sunya, or VijHana is realized’ (ibid. p. 361). P.T. Raju, ibid. p.254. However, Raju points out the difference in the motives behind the derivations in both systems: ‘The Upanisadic account is that of the lower coming out of the higher. The motive here is to exhort m a n to realize the higher. The Buddhist account is that of the derivation of misery. The Buddhists are not interested in forms of reahty like matter, hfe, mind, reason, and atman, they are interested in showing how misery has come to be’ (P.T. Raju, ibid. p.259). Concerning the Buddha’s silence to the question of existence of atman, he points out; ‘His followers, however, interpreted his silence as denial and held that the atman does not exist’ (P.T Raju, ibid p. 256; see also, The Philosophical Traditions of India, p. 119). O.H.De.A. Wijesekera, Buddhist and Vedic Studies, p.8. Here, he mentions a phrase in Sn. 1119 as one of examples which shows Buddha’s definite position, and states that the Buddha expressed himself quite clearly wh e n he answered inquisitive Mogharaja with a categorical negative. Then Wijesekera comments as follows: ‘We cannot fail to see here that the Buddha beheved the Atman or World-Soul (or world- ground) to be a mere fiction of the imagination, even though the Atman whose reality is refuted here is not the individual soul {atmaii)’ (ibid. p.8); ‘It is claimed by some that the Buddha wisely remained silent on these ultimate questions. But, unfortunately for them, the evidence of the Canon does not support this view’; ‘Master [Buddha] would have expressed some opinion or other on the fundamental metaphysic of problems of the day’ (ibidp.7). Further, Wijesekera mentions a story of Vacchagotta’s question as a good evidence that the Buddha did not always keep silent on the ultimate questions. H e says that the Buddha explained his attitude for Ananda after Vacchagotta had left. The interpretations by S. Radhakrishnan {^Indian Philosophy, voLl, p.460) and

99 clear that while not densdng the reality of an evolving samsaric individual the

Master positively refuted to accept an eternal, unchanging, ontological entity partaking of the nature of eternal Being as is understood by the Upanisadic conception of the soul or

E.J. Thomas, mentioning an interpretation of Oldenberg, states that we do not know that the Upanisads had any connection with the region or social conditions in which Buddhism originated.*^® As to the Upanisadic teaching of

Atman and Brahman, he points out, ‘Bu d d h i s m mak e s no mention of Brahma

(neuter) as the one reahty, or of any identity of this with the atman!^'^

J.P. Remon, insisting repeatedly that the Buddha did not taught absolute

anatta, points out as follows: ‘These teachings can be set into a coherent system of thought, which does not differ in its general hnes from what other systems

which maintain the reahty of the self teach on atta or its equivalent.’* " 77). 82-^0

Mrs. Rhys Davids {The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism, pp.49, 279) are criticized here as based on a prejudiced view’ (Wijesekera, ibid. p.8). Wijesekera, ibid. p. 10. He further explains: ‘Agency as such [Atman, Isvara, and Brahma[ is here denied not only to the macrocosmic Atman but even to the individually reflected atta or the microcosmic soul’ (DN.III.28; MN.I.327; MN.II.68; MN.III.19): ‘The famous skandha analysis of the early Nikayas (e.g., DN.II.297) refutes the notion of an Atman both in the external world {bahiddha rupd) and in the individual {ajjhattarupa, vedana, sahna, saiiskhara, viMana), asserting that there is no atta in the eye, ear, etc. (DN.I.29;MN.III.282) in direct contradiction to the Upanisadic notion of the Unseen Seer, the Unheard Hearer, etc., the Atman residing in the individual as ultimate agent of all actions, perceptions etc. {Brhad. Up. iii.7.15-23)’ (Wijesekera, ibid. pp.261-262). E.J. Thomas, The Elistory of Buddhist Thought, pp.90-91. Cf E.J. Thomas, The life ofBuddha, p. 191. E.J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, p.96. H e continues to say: ‘The Brahma that we find so often mentioned in Buddhist writing is a personal god ruHng over a separate region of the universe, and b o m and reborn as inevitably as any other being. But this Brahma is never brought into relation with the Buddhist theory of the self (E.J. Thomas, ibid. p.96. See also, pp.90-91, 91n, 98- 99). J.R Remon, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism, p. 149. As to some differences between early Buddhism and the other systems are discussed in p. 154. The similarities with the thought in the Samkhyakarika is mentioned in p. 156, with the thought in the K>ga-5t7ira5of Patanjali in pp. 156-157, with the thought of Jainism in p. 157.

100 Christinas Humphreys rejects the Threavada interpretation of anatta as meaning unqualified non-self. H e states, ‘Bu d d h i s m does not deny the existence of God or Soul, though it places its o w n meaning on those terms. By God the

Buddhist means T H A T fi’om which the universe was born, the Unborn of the

Udana, and by soul that factor in the thing called m a n which moves towards

Enlightenment.’*'®

Monier Williams describes the B u d d h a as a Hindu of the Hindus and remained a Hindu to the end. The B u d d h a never seriously thought of founding

a n e w system in direct opposition to Brahmanism and caste, and even his order

or fraternity of monks was a mere imitation of an institution already established

in India.

R.D. Ranade states that all the main rudiments of Buddhism including the

doctrine of denial of Soul are present in embryo in the Upanisads}^

Anindita Niyogi BaJslev understands that Buddhist anatta doctrine is a

feature which distinguishes it from the traditional Brahmanical formulations.

H e states; ‘It is precisely this essential difference that plays a crucial role in

designating Buddhism as Anatmavada — the negative particle 'aii being added to

a term which is the other na m e of Brahmanism.’^^'^

Christmas Humphreys, ‘Soul or no Soul’, Ceylon Daily News Vesaka Annual, 1961,p. 13 (Based on the quotation by Lynn.A.De. SHva, TTie Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity, p.60). M. WUhams, Buddhism - In its Connexion with Brahmanism and Hinduism, and in its Contrast with Christianity, p.71. c£ pp. 93 ft R.D. Ranade, A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy - Being An Introduction to the Thought of the Upanishads, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1986, Bombay, pp. 133-134. Anindita Niyogi Balslev, ‘An Appraisal of I-Consciousness in the Concept of the Controversies Centering Around the No-Self Doctrine of Buddhism’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, voLl6, No.2, June, 1988, p. 168. In this paper, he is critical of Mrs. Rhys Davids’s understanding of Buddhism because she maintain that anatta teaching is a misunderstanding or a later interpolation by Buddhist scholars w h o cherished hostility against the Brahmanical tradition, and also critical of the

101 E. Conze points out; ‘The prospect of complete self-extinction, welcomed by the true Buddhist, seems so bleak and arid to ma n y students of the Dharm a that they dre a m up a ‘true Self which, they say, will be reahzed by the extinction of the false, empirical self. This misinterpretation has proved so popular in

Europe that one may be tempted to regard it as either an expression of the typical concern of modern Europeans for “individuahty” and “personahty”, or as a remnant of the Christian behef in an immortal “soul”.’'®^

G.C. Pande states; ‘It is clear that Buddha owed much to contemporary

Sramana and Brahmana thought from which he derived the ideas of Saihs^a, of

the not-selfhood of body and mind, and the absolute and ineffable nature of the

ultimate principle.’ Further, he says that the attitude of Buddha towards

Nirvana is reminiscent of Upanisadic absolutism.

Lai M a u i Joshi clearly points out the difference between B u d d h i s m and

Brahmanical thought. He states: ‘In the Advaita Vedanta view, Hberation

consists in reahzing and recovering the lost identity of the self with the Ultimate

Reahty {Brahman), in Buddhist view, hberation consists in realizing the

unreality of the self and in eradicating every trace of individuahty. The

formidable gulf between the Brahmanical itmavada and the Buddhist

anatmavada, between the Upanisads an d the Tripitakas, is very clear indeed.’^®^

R. Zaehner says that the denial of self me a n s merely ‘the ehmination of ego’,

and that there is a Self, or Real Self behind the (small) self or ego. According to

statement of J.P. Remon because he attempted to read directly some form of itmavada in the Nikayan literature (Anindita Niyogi Balslev, ibid. p. 173). E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India - Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy - Munshiram Manoharal Publishers, 1996, p. 122. G.C. Pande, O r i^ s of Buddhism, pp. 556-557. Lai Ma n i Joshi, Discerning the Buddha - A Study of Buddhism and of the Brahmanical Hindu Attitude to It- 1983, N e w Delhi, pp. 104-105.

102 his interpretation, the Buddha recognized that there is an eternal being

transcending time, space and change.'®®

2-3-3 Pervious studies — an analysis an d su m m a r y

Taking a general view of a large n u m b e r of studies on the relation between

Bu d d h i s m and other thoughts, especially those of Upanisadic hterature, w e n o w

see the fact that there is little agreement as to their exact relations. A t the

sa me time, a survey of previous works on this subject brings to hght the problems

with which w e have to deal in the following chapters. In this section, let us

summarize these studies and point out some underlying problems concerning the

interpretation on the relation between both the traditions. Here w e have six

distinctive tjT^es of interpretations. Let us ma r k them.

1, The Buddha knowingly accepted Upanisadic idea -> taught the same in

different language.

The B u d d h a had k n o w n the Upanisadic doctrine of Atman / Brahman, he

accepted it, and explained it in his o w n way. So the teaching of anatta / atta

taught by the Buddha should be regarded as being identical with the

Upanisadic notion of Atman / Brahman. The interpretation of S.

Radhakrishnan can be distinctly classed under this head.

2, The Buddha was unaware of the Upanisadic idea -> yet his teaching independently resulted in a like idea.

Cf S. CoUins, Selfless Persons, p.9.

103 Although the Buddha was not aware of the idea of Upanisads, his teaching

originated in the same thought-culture in which the thought of Upanisach

arose. There is thus no wander that his teachings should ultimately resulted

in a form having a striking resemblance to the Upanisadic doctrine oiAtm an /

Brahman in general.

3, The Bu d d h a did not accept the idea of Upanisads, but a like phraseology wa s used -> His doctrine wa s definitely different but he never intended to oppose the

Upani^dic ideas.

The Buddha had the knowledge of the Upanisadic doctrine, but did not want

to oppose the idea of Atman /Brahman. T he Bu d d h a did ma k e use of certain

expressions or terms used in the Upanisadic hterature, but his teaching was

quite different from that of the Upanisads.

4, The Buddha did not accept the Upanisadic idea but did not intend to oppose it.

The Buddha was not aware of these ideas of Upanisads thus the question of

opposing those ideas does not arise. Anatta / atta was taught independently,

without having any relation to the Upanisads. As his teaching was not

compatible with the Upanisadic monistic thought in the course of time it

eventually resulted in staunch opposition of that thought. To this type

belongs the interpretation of Paul Horsch.'*®

H e m a y be classified into this type wh e n he states the following: ‘The Buddha did not have knowledge of Upanisads. He taught anatta depending on his ow n principal and individual experience, having no relation to the idea of Upanisads. If the Buddha had been influenced by the idea of Upanisads, he would have denied not only the concept of Atman but also Brahman (See. M. Saigusa, The Principal thoughts in

104 5, Th e Bu ddha knew the Upani^dic idea, did not find it acceptable and therefore opposed it He purposely used the word anatta to deny the Upanisadic

atmavada.

The Buddha had the knowledge of the Upanisadic idea, and noticed the

falseness of Upanisadic understanding of Atman / Brahman. Then he taught

anatta as an antithesis to it. It can be said that he intentionally opposed to

the notion of Atman / Brahman taught in the Upanisads. This is the

interpretation ofV.P. Varma, O.H.De.A. Wijesekera, and T.R.V. Murti.*®'

6, The Buddha himself did not have Upanisadic Atmic theory However, his

followers tried to read his anatta teaching as his cardinal doctrine and

juxtaposed it against the Upanisadic doctrine of self

The Buddha did not have any knowledge of the Upanisadic idea, and he

taught a/iatia / atta depending on his o w n experience. But, sometime after

Sakyamunis, demise, when the teaching of the Upanisads became known to

the disciples of the Buddha, they ca m e to understand the differences between

teaching of their Master and that of Upanisadic philosophy. With a view to

highhghting this marked difference they while compiling the Buddhist

scriptures juxtaposed their Master’s Anatta doctrine in opposition to the

Upanisadic doctrine of Atman.

Early Buddhism, vol. 1, p. 178). J. Imanisi also states that the Buddhist anatta theory can be understood as a criticism against the thought of the Upanisads (‘The Concept of Atman in Anatma-

105 2-3-41 The major controversial points underlying the those problems

T h e observation of the previous wo r k and discussion in the last few sections have sh o w n the core of all questions, which has been discussed mu c h without any definite answer. Those central issues are focussed on what the term anatta means, and its relation, if any, with the doctrine of the UpanisadB. For the present, it m a y be useful to look more closely at some of the central issues. I propose to pose three questions in this regard the answers of which will facilitate a better understanding of Buddhist teaching of atta and anatta.

<1>

Firstly comes the fundamental question whether the Buddha knew the

Upanisads, and whether there w a s a close relation between two streams in his time. This question forms the basis of our research with which w e can study whether there was any Upanisadic influence on the origins of Buddhist thoughts which led to the formation of the anatta teaching.

H. Oldenberg gave m u c h thought to this question. His interpretation about the relation between the two systems differs in his two famous books, i.e.,

'Buddha - His life, His doctrine, His order - , (1882)’, and 'The Doctrine of the

Upanisads and the Early Buddhism, (1908). It should be observed that

Oldenberg tried to find intimate relations between the Upanisads and Buddhism in his first book, however, in the latter he tried to break off Buddhist connection with the Upanisads,. H e states, in his latter book, as follows: ‘Th e old Buddhistic literature, closely related and adjacent to the old Jaina literature, moves in the opposite direction of the Brahmanic— it must at least appear so in the beginning

vadd <1>, Hokkaido Journal of Indological and Buddhist Studies, No.5, 1990, p.62).

106 — and essentially on a separate ground.’ Th e differences in the two systems are explained by him on the basis of the language, the geographical ambiences, the chronological aspects of the literatures, the life of the old thinkers, a n d the spiritual movement.'*® However, recent studies'®® have argued against the

Oldenberg’s interpretations on the language and the geographical gap.

E.J. Thomas and E. Lamotte have much in common with the views expressed by Oldenberg about the relation between the two traditions. Paul

Horsch, as I have mentioned before, is quite emphatic in denying a positive relation between Buddhism and Upanisads. A. Hirakawa, M. Saigusa, and V.R

V a r m a also express a negative opinion on the issue. Naosiro Tuji points out that w e can find only a few phrases in early Buddhist Uterature that clearly refer to

Upanisadic philosophy. H e mentions the Tevijja-sutta as an example of texts in which Upanisadic philosophy is refereed (Kath. Up. 6,12; Kena. Up. 3; Mund. Up.

3.1.8).'"”

W e can summarize Oldenberg’s explanation as foUows: ® The language - on the Brahmanic side, it is a type of hterary classical Sanskrit, and the sacred texts of Buddhism were originally composed in the dialect of the Magadha-kingdom (of southern Bihar), the Pa/i-dialect (primary stage of Meirathi?). I) The geographical evidence -the old homelands of the Brahmanical thinkers were situated to the west, to be more exact, to the northwest, of the confluence of both the mighty rivers the Ganga and the Yamuna. O n the other hand, the homelands of the Buddhism were in the east. '3) The chronological aspects of both these literatures — Compared with the older layers of the Upanisa(k, it is absolutely sure that even the first beginnings of the Buddhistic hterature are of later origin, in fact, of mu c h later origin. ® The life — the life of old thinkers, as ascribed in the Upanisada, was spent only in villages (just a beginning of an urban development). In the age of old Buddhism, a number of significant cities form the focus of public and spiritual life and of cultural progress. ® Spiritual movements — The Upanisade, form a secret learning and was a strictly protected heritage of the few. The old Buddhistic texts were for the multitudes and multitudes of people (The Doctrine of the Upanisads and the Early Buddhism, pp. 185-187). C£ E.J. Thomas, The Life of Buddha, p. 124, The History of Buddhist Thought, p. 83. M. Saigusa, Principal Thoughts of Early Buddhism, vol.l, pp. 47-51; E Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, p. 7; Kogen Mizuno, A Grammar of the Pali Language, pp. 20-26. Naoshiro Tuji, Veda and Upanisads, Sogensha, pp. 183-184. H e also states that

107 H. N a k a m u r a states that, in the early Buddhist scriptures, we can find a lot of statements about vedas and the various branches of them, but we can not find statements directly connected with the Upanisad&}^'^ O n the other hand, in the introduction of his recently published book, he states that it is surprising to see striking resemblance between early Buddhist and old Upanisadic thoughts concerning some of the accounts. Then, after examining the Tevijja-sutta and

the Brahmajala-sutta, N a k a m u r a explains the situation of the time of the

Sakyamuni as foUows:

During the period which the early Buddhist texts were recorded in writing, no

independent school to be called the Vedanta school with a developed and

« organized philosophical system, had been formulated yet. However,

brahmins wh o devotedly followed the Upanisadic doctrines, existed here and

there throughout the land; and the various philosophical theories of the

Upanisads were quite widely disseminated. Consequently those intellectual

trends are mentioned in the Buddhist texts and are rejected as pernicious

Views.

the criticism of anatman theory appeared in the Maitri Upanisad, 7.8 can be seen as the statement against the Buddhist idea. H. Nakamura, A History ofEarly Vedanta Philosophy, p. 133. In another book, he comments: ‘We can know that Buddhism had intimate relation with the religious schools being popular at the time of the Buddha, however it is said that it had no intimate relation with the Upanisack. The origin of Buddhism probably had relation to the people wh o opposed the Vedic religion and try to think in a ne w light [For instance, the thinkers called as ‘titthiyas’ in the Nikayas, such as Purana Kassapa, Makkhali Gosala, Ajita Kesakambala, Pakudha Kacchayana, Sanjaya BelattMputta and Nigantha Nataputta {The Origins of Early Buddhism [Gensi Bukkyo no Seiritv\, pp. 57; 61). C£ A K Wader, ‘On the Relationships between Early Buddhism and Other Contemporary Systems’ (BSOAS. 1956, xviiiyi, pp.43-63). H. Nakamura, Gotama Buddha, Syunjusya, Tokyo, 1992, p. 10. H. Nakamura, A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy, p. 139.

108 Lai Mani Joshi points out; ‘if the Buddha borrowed anj^hing from any source, it w a s from the non-Vedic ascetic sages, munk, and iramanas,! In addition, he states that there is no evidence whatsoever for the behef that ‘the

Buddha was born a Hindu’.

O n the other hand, some scholars hold the idea that the Buddha had a definite knowledge of the Upanisads, and so admit an intimate relationship between the two systems. The observations of Oldenberg in his second book

Buddha, of Radhakrishnan, and of Mrs. Rhys Davids stand out in this respect.

It is sometimes stated as an evidence of their intimate relation that the B u d d h a frequently had occasion to meet various philosophers of the Upanisads and other schools. Kumarila, an orthodox a Hindu thinker, declares that even the

Buddhist view of Subjectivism, momentariness, and non-self theory derived their inspiration form the Upanisads.^^

That the Buddha did not have deep knowledge of Upanisadic ideas does not always m e a n that he had never been influenced by the thought of Brahmanical systems. Here we should note that the Buddhists were in the stream of the sa m e historical development in India. S. Radhakrishnan illustrates skillfuUy a situation at the time of the Bu d d h a as ‘Immortahty ma y be unbehevable and Go d m a y be inconceivable, yet the d e m a n d s of duty are absolute’. I suppose that

Lai Man i Joshi, Discerning the Buddha — A Study of Buddhism and of the Brahmanical Hindu Attitude to It - , 1983, N e w Delhi, pp.47-48. H e also states: ‘our suggestion is that the authors of these texts had taken over their great doctrine form non-Vedic murvs and sramaaas, and that almost all the great sages and philosophers of the oldest Upanisads were contemporaries of the Buddha and Mahavira.’ O.H.De.A Wijesekera, Buddhist and Vedic Studies, p. 7. H e states; ‘Especially, in Sn. 1117 and 1119, the term here, which, as the old commentary Niddesa points out, must refer to the macrocosmic Atman as held in Brahmanic philosophy and its several manifestation or derivatives {attaniyena va). Vijnana matra ksanabhanga nairatmya iti vidinam api upanisatprabhavatvam {Tantravartika, 1.3.2.)

109 they shared this type of situational background w h e n they sought their goal.

W e should only replace the word ‘absolute’ by ‘emancipation’ in the sentence quoted from Radhakrishnan to mark the Buddhist standpoint.

It is necessary, at this point, to note the following three points regarding the relation between Upanisads, and Buddhism.

(1) It is very difficult to find any suttas in the Nikayas from which we can

know the fact that the Buddha had deep knowledge concerning brahmanical

ideas, especially Upanisadic doctrine of Atman or Brahman.

(2) We, however, can find m a n y expressions in the Nikayas which are closely

akin to the terms used in the Upanisadic literature.

(3) Then foUows the question whether these expressional similarities between

Nikayas and the Upanisads represent ideological identity.

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The second question is whether or not the Buddha taught something beyond phenomena. A great deal of effort has been made to demonstrate that the Buddha, in spite of his teaching of anatta, taught that there Ues a certain reality behind the phenomenal appearance which is perhaps identical with

Upanisadic Atman or Brahman. The argument is something like this: The

B u d d h a emphatically explained that every thing is anatta. But the word anatta in question simply means that the five aggregates are not atta. B y this the

Buddha did not deny the existence of some reahty being at the back of the p h e n o m e n a represented by the five aggregates.'®^ Thus the teaching oi'anatta

I9T y p Varma says; ‘One school of interpretations would argue that Buddha only

110 is merely a strategic denial of the wro n g identification of the aggregates with the self. This something real existing behind phenomenal appearance is called by various nam e s by the scholar’s according to their interpretations, viz., Atman,

Brahman, the Great Self, the true Self, the Ultimate Self, the world Self, the

absolute Self, the ultimate reality, and God, further it is often figuratively explained as ‘the great ocean’.

The following are ideas often mentioned as supporting the assumption of certain positive existence behind the phenomenal world:

(1) Th e B u d d h a ’s silence over the some metaphysical questions is construed to

m e a n an impHcit afiirmation of something real. They try to read positively

the implication of Bu d d h a ’s refusal to answer.'®®

(2) The ultimate reahty cannot be expressed by positive words but could be

indicated by negative expressions. Therefore, the B u d d h a used several

negative expressions (i.e. what is not Atman) in order to exhort the disciples

to reahze the positive Atm an}^

meant to deny that the phenomenal categories are the self but he silently meant to assert the selfhood of something super-phenomenal’ (VP. Varma, ibid. p. 145). Concerning the existence of God or the transcendental Reahty, this type of interpretation about Buddha’s silence is illustrated as foUows: ‘They have suggested that the reality of God was not rejected by the Buddha, and that ‘silence’ which he maintained in this respect has to be understood as an imphcit or tacit acceptance of the indescribabihty of God’ (Lai Man i Joshi, Discerning the Buddha, p. 141). 199 ‘'j'jjg absolute is not a matter of empiric£il observation’ (S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, voLl, pp.682-683); ‘But the conception of the absolute as something unkn o w n and incomprehensible, without beginning or end, without shape, substance or dwelling-place, is too exalted for ordinary people. So, the Upanisada indulge in positive description to satisfy the interests of reUgion and ma k e kno w n that the unutterable absolute is none the less positive in character. W M l e the Upanisada did not dare to be loyal to the tremendous admission of the incomprehensibihty of the absolute, Buddha, more consistently, refuses to apply any category of the empirical world to the absolute reality’ (S. Radhakrishnan, ibid.p.683). K Bhattacharya gives a similar interpretation, see, ‘L’ Atman Brahman Hana le Bouddhisme Ancien’, Paris, E F E O (Cf. S. Collins, Selfless Persons, p. 10). This question is discussed in detail by

111 (3) T h e Bu d d h a strongly repudiates one of his disciples wh o held an annihilistic

doctrine.

(4) Noting the fact that m a n y people were converted to Buddhism in the sixth

century B.C, w h e n the faith in the great gods Vimu and ^iva, the Sun-God

were rising into prominence, it is likely that the Bu d d h a also held a belief in

the reality of existence. Because a philosophy which denied the reahty of

an ultimate spirit would not have impressed and attracted the people at the

time of the Buddha.^*”

W e shall look into an interpretation given by J.P. Remon, as a tjT)ical example to read positively something real behind ph e n o m e n a in the teaching of early Buddhism. H e states that the teaching of anatta teUs us ‘what the self is not’, which is a negative assertions of a superior kind of reahty.*”^ In other places, he n a m e d this reality as ‘the very self of person involved’, ‘the reality of atta in an absolute way’, and ‘the highest existential value in m a n ’.'”“

Expressing his disapproval of the interpretations given by the conventionahst (as he calls) such as Nyanaponika and K.N. Upadhyaya, he describes the following four ways in which one ma y tiy to we a k e n and even to nullify the meaning of the term atta [as the highest reahty]. T h e four are: ® Bu d d h a ma d e use of the term atta only when he spoke to laymen and unlearned people, who could never understand the doctrine of absolute anatta. © The Buddha dehvered two kinds of teaching, esoteric and exoteric. ® B y searching for texts in the Nikayas in which the tern atta can be interpreted only in a conventional way. ® By

J.P. Remon, cf. Self and Non Self in Early Buddhism, p. 179. See, Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol.1, pp.678-679. J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 178.

112 juxtaposing atta teaching of Buddha to the texts where the anatta doctrine is propounded. In this case, the texts referring to atta would constitute the thesis, while the texts referring to anatta vfoulA provide us with the antithesis.^^

K. Bhattacharya, mentioning the statements of S. Radhakrishnan, Plotinus,

Schopenhauer and Jaspers, as well as of Indian and Buddhist texts, attempts to show that ‘Real’, or ‘Absolute’ of all these systems is the same, indescribable

‘spiritual Atmaii, whose nature is best grasped and expressed by silence.“°‘‘

A.K. Coomaraswamy and LB. Horner states: ‘In short, it is quite certain that the B u d d h a neither denied a God, a Soul, [nor] denied Eternity.’'®^ A n d they conclude that; the Self is both explicitly and implicitly asserted.’'”®

According to them, there can be no doubt that in the grammatically ambiguous expression brahma-bhuto which describes the condition of those who are completely liberated, it is Brahma [neutral] and not Brahma [masculine] that must be read, thus one wh o is wholly aw a k e d has become a Br a h m a n [neutral].

Mrs. Rhys Davids,'”® S. Radhakrishnan,Keith,^“ Grimm, A.K. Coomaraswamy,

J.R Remon, ibid. p. 148. J.P. Remon, ibid. pp. 12-17. K. Bhattacharya, ibid. (Cf. S. Collins, Selfless Persons, p. 10). A K Coomaraswamy and I.B. Horner, ‘The Living Thoughts of Gotama the Buddhd, p33. A.K. Coomaraswamy and I.B. Horner, ibid. p.33. A K Coomaraswamy and I.B. Horner, ibid. p.31. They quote some phrases from the Nikayas as an evidence for his interpretation, for example; Itiv. 57; Sn. 293, 479, 508, 518, 519; DN. vol.3, p. 84; SN. vol.1, pp. 141-145; A N .vol.1, p. 226; Mil pp. 75- 76; DhpA. voL2, p. 60 (See, A. K C o o m a r a s w a m y and LB. Horner, ibid. p. 31-32). LB. Horner, in another book, states that the term atta is also used as the logical opposite of not-Self i.e., as Self She also says; ‘Ma n was not to be regarded as That Self which is the Highest, but as potentially capable of becoming even as That Self (Atta and Anatta, Studies in Comparative Religion, 7 (1), 1971, p.32. A n d see, Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected -A Study of the Arahan - London, 1936, p.l03X Her view is discussed by P. Harvey in his book ‘ The Selfless Mind, p. 1995. According to her interpretation, the first Sakyans had their ow n notion of Deity as Dharma, ‘the great self wh o is to be revered’ {The Birth of Indian Psychology, pp. 44, 279. See also O.H.De.A. Wijesekera, Buddhist and Vedic Studies, p. 8). W e can read his positive interpretation about something else in his book.

113 Lynn A. De. Silva,"'' R. Zaehner and Christmas Humphreys take a similar view.

E. Conze, though does not see the Upanisadic universal Atman as accepted

in early Buddhism, yet holds that the Bu d d h a did not deny the Self but held that

it can not be apprehended. According to Conze, Buddha mentioned the Self in

his discourses to materialists, and non-existence of self to egoists.

O n the contrary, some scholars oppose such interpretation of reading

something real behind phenomena. For the moment let us consider the

statement of K.N. Upadhyaya who gives many pages of his book for the

discussion of this problem. H e criticizes the interpretations given by the

scholars such as Frauwallner, Radhakrishnan,"'^^ Grimm, M a x Hoppe, Mrs. Rhys

Davids, A.K. Coomaraswamy and LB. Homer. Upadhyaya says that they have

misunderstood the term anatta, and puts the case as follows; ‘The y display their

ingenuity in construction a positive soul theory, on the oft-emphasized anatta-

doctrine (the doctrine of souUessness) of Bu d d h a and try to establish that like the

Upanisacb Bu d d h a also preached the sa m e identification of the self reahty and

Nibbana.’'^^ And further he states; ‘It is evident from the above-mentioned

especially in pp. 388-389. Let m e take one example, he says: ‘Buddha emphasizes the fact that we transcend experience w h e n we make assertions about the permanent soul behind phenomena’ (S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, p. 387). Keith recognizes that a positive philosophy affirming the reahty of the absolute, the self and nirvana, can be traced to the Canon, but he is reluctant to attribute it to the Buddha himself and so gives the credit for it to ‘a section at any rate of his early followers’ (Radhakrishnan, ibid. vol.1, p.690. C£ A B . Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, pp.63-64). Lynn A De Sdva points out: ‘If ma n is really anatta, God is indispensable for his salvation’ {The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity, p. 128); ‘God is really known in the abyss of one’s being, in the realization that one is anatta and therefore cannot depend on himself for his salvation’ (Lynn A De Silva, ibid. p. 126). E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 39; 127; 208. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, vol.1, p.388. K N . Upadhyaya, Early Buddhism and Bhagavadgita, p.312. K N . Upadhyaya, ibid p.302. H e also expressed his disapproval of such interpretations of these scholars as follows: ‘[They] are favor of reading the Upanisadic conception of the soul into the Buddhist doctrine of anatta (KN.

114 views that Buddha’s repeated teaching of the anatta-&octrine has been constructed by these scholars veritably as an implicit atta-ds)ctr\ne, indistinguishable from that of the Upanisads.'^^^

H e states that these scholars se e m to miss the basic point of the Master and try to discover self or /besides and beyond the five aggregates.''® H e examines some passages in the Nikayas in order to show that their attempts to discover some kind of the Self beyond or beside the five aggregates are baseless. H e closely examines the following passages to oppose to the positive interpretation of the self: SN. vol.3, pp.46, 68, 115, 116, 142-144; SN. vol.4, pp.54, 166-168, 174;

M N . vol.1, p. 136.-'"

Then, Upadhyaya adduces four passages which represent conventional meaning of atta in the Nikayas, namely, DN.vol.1, p.202 (in which it is said that the word atta is used as the current modes of speech); SN.vol.1, pp.14-15 (in which it is said that the m o n k w h o had become Arahant might use the expression; ‘I say, this is mine’); SN.vol.1, p. 11 (in which it is said that Beings are only na m e s [designations] for expression); and SN.vol.1, p. 135 (the statement of a n u n Vajira).''® W e m a y note that J.P. R e m o n refers to these four passages in order to refute Upadhyaya’s explanations."'^ Y. Karunadasa’s following opinion

Upadhyaya, ibid. p. 303); ‘After having read the Upanisadic self into the Pali texts, it was only natural for these scholars to follow the same Upanisadic line of thinking in equating the self with Nirvand (KN.Upadhyaya, ibid. p. 304). K.N. Upadhyaya, ibid. p. 305. H e goes on to says: ‘It is not only not in conformity with the fundamental Buddhist ideas, but it flagrantly contradicts the exphcit utterance of the Master’; ‘Not forsaking the egoistic line of thinking, they continue to look for an atta (self) somehow and somewhere in ma n and thus disregard the clear declaration of the Master that aU elements are soulless {sabbe dhammi anatta, Dhp.279)’ (KN. Upadhyaya, ibid. pp.305-306). K.N. Upadhyaya, ibid. p.308. K N . Upadhyaya, ibid. pp. 308-312. K N . Upadhyaya, ibid. pp. 317-318. J.P. Remon, The self and Non Selfin Early Buddhism, pp. 13-16.

115 is noteworthy:

M a n ’s present predicament, as Buddhist understands it, is not due to his fall

from an origmal state of perfection, for Bu d d h i s m speaks of no such original

state of perfection. Nor is it due to his estrangement from his true self

because no such self is assumed. Nor is it due to his habit of identifying his

true self with what is not the self, because the very idea of the self is an

unnecessary assumption."”

T.R.V. Murti,” ^ Nyanaponika“ " and V.P. V a r m a also assert that the B u d d h a

never taught any Absolute behind phenomena. Varma concludes as follows;

There are a few stray references in the Tripitakas which may, indirectly,

indicate the possible belief of Bu d d h a in an Absolute. But the overwhelming

evidence of the general bulk of the Tripitakas is against the ascription to

Bud d h a of any behef in absolutism.

The interpretations concerning this question m a y be divided into four

types.

Y. Karunadasa, ‘The Buddhist Critique of Atmavada and the Buddhist Ideal of Nibband, in Studies of Buddhism and Culture In Honor of Professor Dr. Egaku Mayeda, 1991, Tokyo, p. 54. H e also states; ‘what is emphasized here ia not deliverance of the self, but deliverance from the self-notion’ (ibid. p.55). T.R. V. Murti says that the Buddha had never taught the Absolute {Brahmaii). Cf. M. Saigusa, Principal Thoughts of Early Buddhism, voLl, p. 149. ■" Cf J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 171. ^ V.P. Varma, Early Buddhism and its Origins, p. 33. Varma also states: ‘Beyond the psycho-ph}rsical organism or namarupa-skhandha, Buddha would refuse to acknowledge any other subtler metaphysical entity’ (ibid p. 147).

116 L Th e Bu d d h a expUcitly taught something real behind phenomena, i The Buddha accepted (was aware of) something real behind phenomena.

Tho u g h he did not taught it exphcitly, but taught it implicitly, a Th e B u d d h a accepted (was aware of) the existence of something real behind

phenomena. However, he did not taught it either explicitly or implicitly.

Th e reasons w h y the Buddha did not teach m spite of his awareness of it are

explained as: (i) It is inexpressible; (ii) H e wa s indifferent to it: (iii) It wa s not

beneficial for the purpose of nibbana\ (iv) It lead one to dispute.

X The Buddha did not accept anything being real behind phenomena.

Therefore, he denies such idea because it really does not exist.

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Some people try to understand Buddhist theory of anatta adopting a firamework of the two selves, such as The Great self and the Little self This interpretation is based on the following argument. The B u d d h a ’s criticism of the self {anatta teaching) is directed only against what is called the httle self, and not against the Great self The negation of the httle self results in the affirmation of the Great self.

Mrs. Rhys David understands early Buddhism fi*om this point of view.~^

Radhakrishnan""' also refers to two types of selves, the surface self and the true self. A.K. C o o m a r a s w a m y and I.B. Horner, in their book ‘ The Living Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, discuss at length the issue by collecting a n u m b e r of passages in the Nikayas under the heads, the Great Self and the Small Self

Commenting on a passage in AN, 'atta pi attanam upavadati', they state that Self

Buddhism: Its Birth and Dispersal, p. 70.

117 upbraids the self when what should not be done is done,""*' It is said that the remedy for self-love {atta-kama) is Self-love {atta-kama).~~‘ They translate

‘sabbe dhamma anatta as all things are un-Self-isness’. According to their understanding, Self can be found behind sabbe dhamma. The term Self is the ultimate reahty being compatible with Upanisadic Brahman. It is easily understood that these scholars regard the Great self in question being the sa m e as the Upanisadic Atman or Brahman. At another place, they use a similar framework for understanding the issue by dividing the Nikayan references under two heads, i.e., in the pragmatic terms (DN.vol2, p.63) and in terms of truth

(Ud.66; Therig.l80).“ ®

U p a d h y a y a is opposed to this type of interpretation. H e points out that the clarification m a d e by the Master hardly leaves any room for a metaphysical exploitation on a purely Unguistic analysis."'’ H e says as follows;

T he disciples of the Bud d h a or the researchers of early Buddhism, w h e n they

read Buddhist literatures in which a positive approaches to atta(i.e., to tame

and train self) and negative approaches to atta {anatta, non-self teaching) are

taught together, have tried to find a satisfactory answer to this inconsistency.

Th e wa y of understanding by using a notion of two selves seem to be a result of

the effort of scholars to find a satisfactory answer to it.

Cf 2500years of Buddhism, p.xii. AN. vol.l. pp. 57-58. See, A.K. Cooma r a s w a m y and I.B. Horner, The Living Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, p.36. They comment on the some other phrases in the Nikayas [AN. voLl, p. 149] from the point of view of two selves; ‘The self knows what is truth and what is falsity, and the foul self cannot hide its evil deed fi-om the Fair.’ A.K. Coomaraswamy and I.B. Horner, ibid. p.22. ^ A. K Coomaraswamy and I.B. Horner, ibid. p.20. ^ KN . Upadhyaya, ibid. pp.318-319.

118 E. Conze states that the notion of true Self is a misinterpretation which has proved so popular in Europe. Then he explains how such interpretation arose.

The prospect of complete self-extinction, welcomed by the true Buddhist,

seems so bleak and arid to ma n y students of the Dharma that they dream up a

true Self which, they say, will be reahzed by the extinction of the false,

empirical self.'^°

The interpretation adapting the two selves has been a well-used framework

in the history of Buddhism. In Mahayma literature, distinction had been ma d e

between two kind of being, i.e., being in the ultimate sense {paramirthasat) and

being in the conventional sense {samvrtisat}. As we shall see in the seventh

chapter, this wa y of understanding by using the two sense-s has it s roots in the

statement in the Milindapanha.

N o w the questions are: In early Buddhist texts, can we find any sentences

that mention the Great Self which could be identified with something real behind

phenomena. Alternatively, are there any indications in the Nikayas in which

they are tacitly taught? The scholars wh o try to read positive conceptions such

as Great Self in the Nikayas often quote mostly the sa m e PiZz'passages in support

of their interpretations. Therefore, I shall examine these phrases with m u c h

attention in the following chapters. These passages are:

E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 122.

119 (D Th e verses in the Udana. Especially, VIII. 1,3,10;^‘ (Itiv.II.lO)

'S) M N . vol.1, p. 137, 140. In this sutta, the Buddha repudiated the view of annihilations that was attributed to him.

5; Th e Mahaparinibbana-sutta. DN . vol.2, p. 100, and also SN. vol.3, p.42; SN. vol.5, p. 163. In these suttas, the Bu d d h a exhorted his disciples to kn o w and practice self-rehance, atta-dlpa viharath^ atta-sarana, anamasarana.

i The passages in the Dhammapada, 156, 160, 161, 165, 236, 238, and 380.

S Vinaya, Mahavagga, the expression ‘attanam gaveseyyama.

5/ The Nagara sutta, SN. vol.2, pp. 106-107. The B u d d h a says that he has seen an old path, an old road, which was traversed by the supremely

enlightened ones of former time.

7 ) T he following statements are also sometime cited as evidence for positive

interpretation of doctrine: Vin. vol.1, p.23; DN. vol.2, p. 100; DN . vo.2,

p. 120; SN. vol.1, pp.57, 71-72; SN. vol.5, pp. 143, 163; AN. vol.1, pp. 57, 126,

149; AN. vol.5, p.88.

S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, pp.379-380, 688-689.

120