C h a p t e r 2 Previous works on a n a t t a d o c t rin e Section 1 Previous studies on a n a t t a doctrine Section 2 Pervious studies on the relation between a n a t t a and subject Section 3 Pervious studies on the relation between Buddhism and U p a n i s a ^ 28 Section 1 Previous studies on a n a t t a doctrine A good deal of space is required for the subject of this chapter. For, indeed, a great deal has been written about atta and anatta in early Buddhist philosophy. First of all, we will survey these studies done so far, and also inquire into the purpose behind these studies. We will also deal with the main points of controversies the subject has raised. It will be useful to begin with the various facets of the anatta doctrine. These can be broadly classified under four categories. 1, The meaning of the anatta doctrine. 2, The relation between the doctrine of anatta and the subject, in other words, the problem of the seemingly identity of the subject. 3, Comparison with the other Indian schools of philosophies maintaining the doctrine of‘no-self. 4, The others. The above classification is made only for the sake of convenience of examining the previous studies on atta and anatta. For all practical purposes, one thesis is made by providing some approaches. For instance, when we try 29 to make anatta clear in the given scripture, we have to compare its anatta theory with those in other scriptural books. Though so many studies have been made in this case, it can be said that the fundamental purpose is to clear up the basic meaning of the anatta doctrine. But it seems they felt difficulties in defining what anatta doctrine means in general. The reason why definition of anatta seems to be difficult is the complexity of the subject as I mentioned before. Let us pursue the previous studies on atta and anatta in details by following the above classification. 2-1-11 Studies in the meaning of the anatta doctrine We can find so many attempts to define and to explain what anatta means. These studies are subdivided into three main groups; ® The anatta doctiine of Buddhism in general, ® The anatta doctrine in a particular scripture, ® The anatta doctrine in a particular phase of period. Let us now look at some distinctive interpretations concerning anatta theory ofiered by the eminent scholars. This conspectus will help us clear up the problems with the precise controversies they involve. Walpola Rahida, an eminent Buddhist monk-scholar of Sri Lanka, examines anatta Aoctrme, in his famous book ‘ What the Buddha taught (1978, Revised edition, London, Gordon Frasher). First he explains teaching ethically; Buddhism stands unique in the history of human thought in denying the 30 existence of such a Soul, Self, or Atman. According to the teaching of the Buddha, the idea of self is an imaginary, false belief which has no corresponding reality, and it produces harmful thoughts of ‘me’ and ‘mine’, selfish desire, craving, attachment, hatred, ill-wiU, conceit, pride, egoism, and other defilement, impurities and problems. It is the source of all the troubles in the world from personal conflicts to wars between nations. In short, to this false view can be traced all the evU in the world.' He further explains the notion of Soul, Self, Ego, or Atman: What in general is suggested by Soul, Self, Ego, or to use the Sanskrit expression Atman, is that in man there is a permanent, everlasting and absolute entity, which is the unchanging substance behind the changing phenomenal world." The doctrine oiAnatta or No-soul, according to him, is the natural result of, or the coroUary of, the analysis of the five aggregates and the teaching of ' W. Rahula, What the Buddha taught, enlarged edition 1967, p.51. Another explanation about anatta is: ‘The correct position with regard to the question of Anatta is not to take hold of any opinions or views, but to see things objectively as they are without mental projection, to see that what we call ‘I’, or ‘being^, is only a combination of physical and mental aggregates, which are working together interdependently in a flux of momentary change within the law of cause and effect, and that there is nothing permanent, everlasting, unchanging and eternal in the whole of existence’ (ibid. p. 66). ^ Ibid. p.51. He psychologically observes that two ideas are deep-rooted in man: self-protection and self-preservation. For self-protection man has created Gk)d, on whom he depends, and for self-preservation man has conceived the idea of an immortal Soul or Atman, which wUl hve eternally. According to Buddhism, our ideas of God and Soul are false and empty. Nevertheless, these ideas are so deep- rooted that he does not wish to hear, nor does he want to understand, any teaching against them. This is the fact Buddha knew very well, because he said that his teaching is ‘against the current’ (patisotagami) (W. Rahula, ibid., pp.51-55). 31 Conditioned Genesis {Paticca-samuppidd). The analysis of the five aggregates (analytical method) tells that there is nothing behind them which can be taken as ‘I’, Atman, or Self, or any unchanging abiding substance. The teaching of Conditioned Genesis (the synthetic method) shows that nothing in the world is absolute and permanent.^ On the basis of this he arrives at the conclusion and defines the meaning of anatta teaching: According to the doctrine of Conditioned Genesis, as weU as according to the analysis of being into Five Aggregates, the idea of an abiding, immortal substance in man or outside, whether it is called Atman, T, Soul, Self, or Ego, is considered only a false belief, a mental projection. This is the Buddhist doctrine of Anatta, No-soul or No-SeLf ‘ It should be noted here that he strongly opposes to the band of a few scholars who insist that the Buddha denied only a petty individual self with a small ‘s’, but did not mean to refuse the big Self with a capital ‘S’.’ He gives the name of Mrs. Rhys Davids whose opinion is tjT)ical in this regard.® W. Rahula contends: ‘If the Buddha had accepted these two ideas [God and Soul], so important in aU reUgion, he certainly would have declared them pubhcly, as he had spoken about other things.’" ^W. Rahula, ibid. pp.51-52. ^W. Rahula, ibid. p. 55. ® He criticizes more strictly those who unconsciously seek the support of the Buddha for this need for eternal existence; ‘It is better to say frankly that one believes in an A t m a n or Self. Or one may even say that the Buddha was totally wrong in denying the existence of an Atman. But certainly it will not do for any one to try to introduce into Buddhism an idea which the Buddha never accepted’ (W. Rahula, ibid. p.56). ® W. Rahula, ibid. p.55n. ^W. Rahula, ibid. p.56. 32 Those who try to find a ‘Self in Buddhism insist that: ‘It is true that the Buddha analyses being into matter, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness, and says that none of these things is self But he does not say that there is no self at all in man or anywhere else, apart from these aggregates [itahcs mine].’* This position, according to Rahula, is untenable for two reasons: One is that, according to the Buddha’s teaching, a being is composed only of these five aggregates, and nothing more. Nowhere has he said that there was anything more than these five aggregates in a being. The second reason is that the Buddha denied categorically, in unequivocal terms, in more than one place, the existence of Atman, Soul, Self, or Ego within man or without, or anywhere else in the universe.® Examining the word d h a m m a in ‘sabbe d h a m m a anatta' (D\xg. 279) and the word sankhara in ‘sabbe sankhara anicca’, Rahula says that the term d h a m m a is much wider than sankhara. He maintains, ‘It includes not only the conditioned things and states, but also the non-conditioned, the Absolute, Nirvana.’^° He concludes thus: Therefore, it is quite clear that, according to this statement: ‘All d h a m m a s are without Self, there is no Self no Atman, not only in the Five Aggregates, but nowhere else too outside them or apart firom them.” We know a few sentences which are mentioned and discussed by the «Ibid. pp. 56-57. ^bid. p. 57. 10 Ibid. p.58. 33 scholars and on the basis of which they try to admit Self or Soul in Buddhism. These are mainly as follows; (a) D h a m m a p a d a (verse 160), Atta hi attano natho. (b) Mahaparinibbana-sutta {Dighanikaya II-3), Attadipa viharatha, attasarana anannasarana. (c) Ma h a v a g g a (1-4), y a m mayarh attanarh gaveseyyama. (d) Mahavaccha-sutta {Majjhimanikaya, III-3), Vacchagotta’s question about atta and loka. He examined each of these sentences in details, and pointed out that there is no hint in them at all about a metaphysical A t m a n or Self.'" George Grimm’s interpretation is notable. His opinion on anatta doctrine is clear. For him, anatta is only an indirect way of knowing atta. Let us inquire into his interpretation.