Lessons and Challenges in Airport Operation

Journal of JSCE, Vol. 1, 286-297, 2013 Special Topic - 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake

LESSONS AND CHALLENGES IN AIRPORT OPERATION DURING A DISASTER: CASE STUDIES ON IWATE HANAMAKI AIRPORT, YAMAGATA AIRPORT, AND FUKUSHIMA AIRPORT DURING THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE

Shinya HANAOKA1, Yuichi INDO2, Terumitsu HIRATA3, Tomoyuki TODOROKI4, Taro ARATANI5 and Teppei OSADA6

1Member of JSCE, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Science and Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology (2-12-1, O-okayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8550, Japan) E-mail: [email protected] 2Member of JSCE, Professor, College of Foreign Studies, Kansai Gaidai University (16-1, Nakamiya Higashino-cho, Hirakata, Osaka 573-1001, Japan) E-mail: [email protected] 3Member of JSCE, Associate Professor, Faculty of Engineering, Ibaraki University (4-12-1, Nakanarusawa, Hitachi, Ibaraki 316-5811, Japan) E-mail: [email protected] 4Member of JSCE, Professor, College of Science and Technology, Nihon University (7-24-1, Narashinodai, Funabashi, Chiba 274-8501, Japan) E-mail: [email protected] 5Member of JSCE, Research Associate, Institute for Transport Policy Studies (3-18-19, Toranomon, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0001, Japan) E-mail: [email protected] 6Member of JSCE, Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Engineering, Utsunomiya University (7-1-2, Yoto, Utsunomiya, Tochigi 321-8585, Japan) E-mail: [email protected]

During the initial stage of a disaster, aircraft operate intensively and simultaneously use several airports as bases, given their mandate to promptly perform their duties. Previously, disaster management faced challenges such as insufficient airport apron space, shortage of aircraft fuel, and inadequate information sharing among various involved organizations. During the Great East Japan Earthquake, aircraft— pri- marily civilian and government helicopters—used the Iwate Hanamaki Airport, Yamagata Airport, and Fukushima Airport as bases immediately after the disaster struck. These aircraft performed tasks such as information gathering, emergency rescue, and personnel and goods transport. For this study, we inter- viewed personnel in the organizations involved in operating these aircraft and airports during the disaster. Further, we considered the operational realities of disaster response activities at each airport to identify the lessons learned and challenges met. We present our findings and detail the role of an airport as a disaster management facility and the challenges faced by an airport during a disaster.

Key Words : The Great East Japan Earthquake, airport, helicopter, lessons learned

1. INTRODUCTION ious activities such as conducting helicopter rescue operations and using commercial aircraft to provide After the Great East Japan Earthquake, airports back-up transport to land transport. Since the land began to immediately play an important role in var- transport network is expected to be severed imme-

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Airport, and Fukushima Airport were selected as case study airports. Interview surveys were con- ducted among personnel of the organizations in- volved in operating those airports and aircraft during the Great East Japan Earthquake, including each office branch of the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) and various aircraft operators. The locations of these three airports, Sendai Air- port, Ibaraki Airport and Honda Airport are shown in Fig. 1. The Sendai Airport located in the Miyagi Prefecture was seriously damaged by a huge tsunami and could not be used for one month after the Great East Japan Earthquake. The ceiling of the terminal building of Ibaraki Airport had fallen on the floor. The privately owned Honda Airport located in the Saitama Prefecture was used as a forward base. A 100-kilometer-long flight takes about 30 minutes by a helicopter.

Fig.1 Location of Hanamaki, Yamagata, and Fukushima air- ports. 2. DISASTER RESPONSE ACTIVITIES IN AIRPORT OPERATIONS diately after a disaster, such as an earthquake, a tsu- nami, or a flood, when the damage extends over a (1) Overview of the interview survey wide range of area, airports play a significant role We interviewed many organizations involved with because they are relatively disaster-resilient. The Hanamaki Airport, Yamagata Airport, and Fuku- broad range of aircraft missions during a large dis- shima Airport as listed in Table 1, regarding the aster includes: information gathering regarding the realities of disaster response activities in airport op- state of the damage, search, rescuing the injured, erations after the Great East Japan Earthquake on emergency medical transport, firefighting, personnel March 11, 2011. Using the interview results, this transport, goods transport, and so on. Many of these section summarizes for each airport: 1) the damage missions are carried out by helicopters, whereas sustained by the airport, 2) the airport operations fixed-wing aircraft are primarily utilized to transport after the disaster, and 3) the realities of disaster re- personnel and goods over a long distance. The enti- sponse activities. In addition, notable activities at ties that operate aircraft include the police; the fire each airport are described. department; disaster management agencies; opera- tors of medical helicopters; the Japan Self-Defense (2) Hanamaki airport Forces (JSDF); the Japan Coast Guard; and the a) Damage Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in The intensity of the Great East Japan Earthquake Japan. To safely and efficiently operate these aircraft, as measured on the Japanese seven-level seismic which fly in from all over the country, air stations scale was “level 6 or lower” in Hanamaki City. Ex- that serve as bases are set up at airports. During the cept for the collapsed parts of the maintenance road initial stage of a disaster, aircraft operate intensively surface, basic airport facilities such as runways, and simultaneously use several airports as bases as apron, and aviation lights sustained no damage. they must promptly perform their duties. Previously, Therefore, after confirming that no damage would challenges existed, such as insufficient airport apron disrupt operations, airport operations were resumed. space, shortage of aircraft fuel, and inadequate in- Meanwhile, some cracks appeared on the walls and formation sharing among various involved organi- floors in the passenger terminal building. Some parts zations. of the equipment mounted on the ceiling also fell and This study aims to: 1) identify the lessons and two of the three transformers were completely challenges that resulted from the operational realities damaged. Considering this damage, the terminal of disaster response activities under the missions at building was kept closed until the morning of March the airports during the Great East Japan Earthquake, 16 for restoration works and safety checks. Essential and 2) to clarify the role of the airport as a disaster utilities such as electricity was restored at 9:00 AM management infrastructure. The Iwate Hanamaki on the 13th; water and sewerage, telephone, and gas Airport (Hanamaki Airport hereafter), Yamagata were restored on the 14th, 15th, and 17th, respec-

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Table 1 List of interviewed organizations.

Hanamaki Yamagata Fukushima Airport Airport Airport Airport

Date of February 27 July 25 December 7-8 Interview 2012 2012 2011 ・ Iwate ・ Yamagata ・ Fukushima Prefecture Prefecture Prefecture Hanamaki Transportatio Airport Airport n Policy Facilities Office Division Management ・ JCAB ・ Yamagata Unit Hanamaki Prefecture ・ Fukushima Airport Air and Sea Prefecture Branch Ports Airport Fig.2 Facility allocation map of Hanamaki airport. ・ Iwate Division Division Airport ・ Yamagata ・ Fukushima efficiently park disaster response aircraft and pas- Terminal Prefecture Prefecture Building Airport Airport senger aircraft after the disaster, four parties—the Interviewed Organizations Interviewed Co., Ltd. Office Office JCAB Airport Branch, the Hanamaki Airport of Ja- ・ Hanamaki ・ JCAB ・ JCAB pan Airlines (JAL), the JSDF, and the Prefectural Airport of Yamagata Fukushima Japan Airport Airport Hanamaki Airport Office—coordinated with one Airlines Co., Branch Branch another. Four spots on the new apron on the east side Ltd. ・ Yamagata ・ Fukushima ・ Iwate Airport Airport were assigned to JAL and the JSDF, and 19 spots in Disaster Building Co., Building Co., the old apron on the west side primarily to public Prevention Ltd. Ltd. agencies’ disaster response helicopters. Because Aviation ・ Yamagata ・ Fukushima Corps Prefecture Prefecture aircraft parking space was still insufficient, the dead ・ Iwate Air Rescue Fire and space on the west apron and the parallel taxiway that Prefectural Team Disaster were not in service were used as temporary tarmacs Police ・ J-Air Co., Prevention Aviation Ltd. Aviation for JSDF helicopters. Unit ・ Yamashin Center In addition, the JSDF utilized the garage for snow Travel ・ Fukushima removal vehicles on the east side as its command Service Co., Prefectural Ltd. Police center as well as a relief supply storage, whereas the Aviation Unit Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) utilized ・ Fukushima the fire truck garage on the west side as its staging Medical University care unit (SCU). The disaster response headquarters of the Prefectural Hanamaki Airport Office used the tively. electric power substation on the east side given the b) Airport operation after the disaster power outage issues they faced. Although the ordinance specifies that airport op- c) Experience from the 2008 Iwate–Miyagi erating hours are from 8:00 AM to 7:30 PM, the Nairiku Earthquake airport operated virtually 24 hours a day from the day An earthquake of 7.2 magnitude struck the inland of the disaster. Afterward, the airport operated from area of Iwate Prefecture on June 14, 2008 (the Iwate– 7:00 AM to 8:30 PM between April 1 and 20, from Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake), and the Iwate Disaster 8:00 AM to 8:30 PM between April 21 and May 31, Prevention Aviation Corps, the Iwate Prefectural and resumed normal operating hours from June 1. Police Aviation Unit, the Japan Coast Guard, and the Restrictions were imposed on airport usage: me- JSDF performed rescue operations using helicopters. dia-related aircraft were banned until March 31 to As issues related to receiving support from other give priority to disaster response aircraft. prefectures and ensuring mutual cooperation among In April 2009, the Hanamaki Airport began oper- aircraft of various relevant entities became clear ating a new terminal on the east side (Fig.2). How- during this event, the Iwate Prefectural Government ever, although construction of the parallel taxiway subsequently implemented countermeasures. The was completed before the disaster, it was not in ser- formulation of the “Activity Plan of Iwate Prefecture vice as of the day of the disaster (it was put in service Helicopter Operation Coordination Team” in January in July 2011). The Iwate Prefecture Hanamaki Air- 2010 is a particularly important example of such port Office, the JCAB Hanamaki Airport Branch, the countermeasures. It is a discussion forum (Coordi- Iwate Disaster Prevention Aviation Corps, and the nation Meeting for Helicopter Operation) set up Iwate Prefectural Police Aviation Unit were still within the prefectural disaster response headquarters located in the old terminal area on the west side. To where representatives of disaster response aircraft

288 operators, such as the Disaster Prevention Aviation from March 12 to the morning of March 16 to per- Corps, the Prefectural Police Aviation Unit, and the form round-the-clock restoration work. After the JSDF, gathered to coordinate operations methods. building’s safety was verified, temporary passenger The Iwate Prefectural Government also formu- flights were started in the afternoon of the 16th. lated the “Plan of Iwate Prefecture for Ensuring Safe The JSDF transported emergency supplies by air; Operation of Aircraft such as Helicopter” in January they primarily transported the DMAT through March 2011, just before the Great East Japan Earthquake. It 15 and then water, food, and household goods after stipulated the relevant entities that could use the the 16th. The Hanamaki Airport served as a transport 122.6-MHz frequency designated for communication base for relief supply to Iwate Prefecture and to the between aircraft to ensure cooperation among them. northern region of Miyagi Prefecture when the JSDF Furthermore, as part of the emergency drill that the Matsushima Base in Miyagi Prefecture was not Prefecture holds every year in September, an SCU available for use1). setup drill was conducted at the Hanamaki Airport in September 2010. The JSDF also participated in this (3) Yamagata airport drill. These experiences allowed relevant parties to a) Damage build face-to-face relationships among themselves. The seismic intensity at Yamagata Airport was d) The realities of disaster response activities “level 5 or lower” and no damage occurred to basic The director of the Iwate Prefecture Hanamaki facilities, such as the runway. The airport used a Airport Office made decisions pertaining to the op- backup generator during a power outage on the day eration of basic airport facilities by considering fac- of the disaster. The air navigation facilities incurred tors such as local arrangements made by the parties, minor damage, such as broken mounts on the ter- including the JCAB Airport Branch, the Hanamaki minal monitors of the flight service information Airport of JAL, and the JSDF, arrangements made by handling system (FIHS) and some fallen light fix- the Coordination Meeting for Helicopter Operation, tures and water leaks in the JCAB Yamagata Airport and requests from the central JCAB. Branch building. The Nippon Telegraph & Telecom The Disaster Prevention Aviation Corps, the Pre- (NTT) line dedicated to air traffic control authorities fectural Hanamaki Airport Office, and JCAB Airport was cut off until the early morning of the 14th, af- Branch were set up in the Intelligence Office within fecting some air traffic control operations. In addi- the Hanamaki Airport Office Building to jointly in- tion, the FIHS terminals were disconnected from the struct and assign spots primarily for the helicopters server from the morning to the early evening of of disaster prevention and police, and to prioritize March 12, disabling flight plan-related data entry. aircraft refueling. These arrangements were made There was no noticeable damage to the airport pas- spontaneously based on the existing structural senger terminal building. The disaster did not occur background. The Prefectural Hanamaki Airport Of- during any scheduled flight landings so no aircraft fice had the authority to assign spots, the JCAB were flying when it happened. Airport Branch had the authority to conduct wireless b) Airport operation after the disaster communication to aircraft, and the Disaster Preven- The airport was closed on the day of the earth- tion Aviation Corps and the Prefectural Police Avia- quake, as it was impossible to sufficiently inspect the tion Unit had the authority to operate the aircraft. The aviation lights during frequent aftershocks and power maximum wait time for fueling was approximately outages. The facility inspection was completed after 15 minutes because fueling arrangements were made dawn broke on the following day of March 12, and to establish a refueling system. the airport reopened at 7:59 AM. Afterward, based Speaking of refueling, the previous fueling system on a request from the Japan Fire and Disaster Man- only included one fueling company that serviced agement Agency and an inquiry from the central small helicopters. However, after experiencing a fuel JCAB, operating hours were extended to 24 hours shortage problem during the Iwate–Miyagi Nairiku starting at 7:30 PM on the 12th. After continuing Earthquake, the Iwate Prefecture signed an agree- 24-hour operations through April 7, operating hours ment with JAL’s fueling company to provide emer- were changed to 6:30 AM to 10:00 PM on April 8 gency fuel, making simultaneous refueling by two and then to the normal hours of 8:00 AM to 7:30 PM companies possible and allowing refueling to occur starting on April 29. without any problem, even during congestion. Because of a shortage of spots for some time after Given the damage to the terminal building from the disaster—given the numerous incoming and the earthquake, the airport building company re- outgoing disaster management helicopters, JSDF quested the tenants, including the airlines, to close aircrafts, and commercial passenger flights—a pol- their businesses until the building’s safety was con- icy was implemented to restrict flights except for firmed. The company then closed the airport building disaster management-related and commercial pas-

289 senger flights after March 17. Although no other option existed but to turn down many usage requests, commercial aircraft that were clearly meant to serve the public were accepted, such as air ambulances and the power line inspection helicopters of Tohoku Electric Power, even after initiating the restriction. The airport facility allocation map of Yamagata Airport is shown in Fig.3. When the decision was made to use Yamagata Airport as an alternative base Fig.3 Facility allocation map of Yamagata airport. for the Miyagi Prefecture helicopter base at the re- quest of the Japan Fire and Disaster Management other. The JCAB Airport Branch shared the 122.7 Agency, the Yamagata Prefecture Air Rescue Team MHz airport tower frequency for local operations to needed to find spots for up to 10 helicopters. Because communicate with one another immediately after the only six spots were available for small aircraft, spots earthquake when they were unable to provide air for passenger aircraft were allocated for these air- traffic operation. The US aircraft encountered no craft. Although the spots allocated for helicopters problems because they were already advised to op- were primarily used by support helicopters from erate in accordance with the rules in Japan. other prefectures, the Yamagata Prefecture Air Refueling faced no major issues, and fuel shortage Rescue Team and Police Aviation Unit always used was not a concern. Three tankers were usually their dedicated apron in front of their offices. available as fueling vehicles for airlines’ use, and all Meanwhile, the JSDF and US aircraft used the Japan of them had sufficient fuel as of the night of March Ground SDF 6th squadron apron adjacent to the 11. The tankers determined that no issue existed airport. because the outdoor tank with a capacity of 200,000 c) The realities of disaster response activities liters was confirmed to have 180,000 liters of fuel The disaster response guideline instructs agencies remaining. The Japanese government contacted the involved with the airport to gather when seismic airport and offered to supply fuel in drums if needed; intensity is 5 or higher and to launch the Yamagata however, the offer was turned down after checking Airport Joint Emergency Response Headquarters. with the fuel supply company and considering the The agencies did just that during the Great East Japan matter of storing oil drums. The airlines made ar- Earthquake. At the headquarters, discussions were rangements to ensure that flights such as temporary held regarding the extent of the damage and whether passenger flights would load return fuel at the airport 24-hour operations must begin. of departure when flying to Yamagata Airport to The operation of the apron and its usage area by avoid refueling at this airport. The Prefectural Air entity were roughly determined on the morning of Rescue Team used its own fueling vehicle for its March 12. The JCAB Yamagata Airport Branch helicopters. The fueling process experienced no wait carried out air traffic management that led up to the or congestion. apron spot, whereas the marshallers of the Prefec- d) Handling secondary transport2) tural Air Rescue Team, personnel who guide heli- The Yamagata Prefectural Government suspended copters on the apron, performed spot assignments all normal business operations after the earthquake within the apron area. To provide information to the and assigned all staff members of non-essential marshallers, the Prefectural Air Rescue Team on the businesses to transport management to collect in- ground first communicated with the landing heli- formation on aviation, railway, and bus operations. copter on radio frequency 131.925 MHz and then Regular route buses within the Yamagata Prefecture relayed the information to the marshallers using the operated on the day of the earthquake; however, all fire department’s radio. Communication between other public transport services were cancelled. An- helicopters was conducted on 123.45 MHz, the ticipating that passengers from the Miyagi Prefecture emergency frequency. would begin flocking to Yamagata on the following Through the air traffic management conducted by day, March 12, the Yamagata Prefecture established the JCAB Airport Branch, up to 17 round trips of a system to flexibly handle the situation at all times. passenger flights were made per day. Sometimes, After deciding to fully expand the initiative to passenger flights were provided with the information secure transport for a wide area, on March 13, the to give priority to disaster management helicopters. Prefecture began providing information and guiding Because the Prefectural Air Rescue Team, the Pre- individuals in need of transport by using media such fectural Police Aviation Unit, and the JSDF also use as its website and by coordinating with transport the Yamagata Airport during normal times, they providers. The basic idea for the initiative was were accustomed to communicating with one an- threefold: 1) to provide detailed information and

290 develop an information system for passengers, 2) to ensure that the transport system was as efficient as possible, and 3) to minimize the layover time at each location. For example, the Prefecture prepared an escape route map that summarized information on all public transport on one diagram, including the rail- ways. In addition, an arrangement was made for buses to enable supporters of the disaster area to reach the local site immediately after arriving at the airport. Fig.4 Facility allocation map of Fukushima airport. A large number of passengers rushed to the Yamagata Airport after March 12, and the airport Great East Japan Earthquake took approximately 30 terminal was filled with people on waiting lists. To minutes. Sending a notice to airmen (NOTAM: a accommodate those who could not get on a flight, notice filed with an aviation authority to alert aircraft Yamashin Travel Service, a company that handles pilots of potential hazards along a flight route or at a business at the Yamagata Airport, operated night tour location that could affect the safety of the flight) was buses that went to the Osaka and Tokyo areas from not possible because of the faulty phone and fax March 13 to 16. lines. After the inspection results confirmed that no damage was incurred that would cause interference (4) Fukushima airport with flight operations, these operations were re- a) Damage sumed. During the Great East Japan Earthquake, the To allow the disaster rescue aircraft to operate, the seismic intensity of “level 6 or lower” was observed operating hours of the runway and the terminal in Tamagawa Village, located at the Fukushima building—normally from 8:30 AM to 8:00 Airport. The basic facilities of Fukushima Airport PM—were extended to 24 hours starting on the day were not damaged, and operating the airport was not of the earthquake. Twenty-four-hour operations an issue. Although almost all windows on the airport continued through April 19, after which they were traffic control tower broke, the JCAB Fukushima reduced to 6:00 AM to 10:00 PM through May 13, Airport Branch continued aircraft support operations and then were returned to normal on May 14. Be- using the emergency aircraft communication cause the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Commu- equipment. The elevation angle of the precision ap- nications asked the news media to refrain from using proach path indicator (PAPI) was also out of align- aircraft to ensure the safety of the rescue aircraft and ment but did not affect operations, and was restored swift rescue activities, the airport turned down media the following morning. The water supply was sus- helicopters on the day of the disaster. However, pended from immediately after the earthquake strong demand from news media agencies caused the through March 14. During this period, clean water airport to begin accepting media helicopters on the was obtained from the water tank and water trucks. following day based on the rule of one helicopter per Electricity, gas, and telephone lines incurred no company. In reality, the airport was not always able major damage. The commercial power supply expe- to enforce the rule. rienced a five-minute outage immediately after the To divide the tarmac among all aircraft, the apron earthquake; however, running a standby generator was assigned to passenger aircraft; the parallel tax- enabled facilities such as air support to remain iway and grass landing area on the north side were available for use. Getting a phone connection was assigned to the JSDF transport aircraft (Fig.4). In difficult, and only about one out of ten calls went addition, the parallel taxiway and grass landing area through, even when using an emergency phone. on the south side near the Fukushima Prefecture Fire b) Airport operation after the disaster and Disaster Prevention Aviation Center were des- Airport operations were suspended immediately ignated as temporary spots to park rescue helicopters after the disaster to allow inspection of the facilities. and media-related aircraft. This arrangement was According to airport security management guide- possible because it was already agreed on at the lines, the airport is supposed to inspect the runway Hokkaido–Tohoku block joint emergency fire rescue and aviation lights after an earthquake of intensity team drill organized by the Japan Fire and Disaster level of 3 or higher; the airdrome and the elevation Management Agency, which was held at the Fuku- angle of PAPI at a seismic intensity level of 4 or shima Airport in November 2010. The agreement higher; and the power distribution facilities and the allowed using the taxiway and grass landing area as a precision of aviation lights at a seismic intensity level temporary tarmac in the event that many aircraft, of 5 or higher. Performing these inspections after the such as rescue helicopters, arrived. Using grass

291 landing areas as a tarmac without preparation was not JSDF aircraft. Because the flight schedule for tem- possible because the level of withstanding load must porary passenger and transport aircraft was deter- be verified in advance. It must also be ensured that mined one day earlier, coordinating the overall spots the incline is low and the ground is smooth, as it is in including the ones on the taxiway and apron was a the Fukushima Airport. struggle. Initially, the JSDF transport aircraft, along The DMAT also arrived the day after the disaster with others, also unloaded on the taxiway; however, struck and deployed the SCU in the garage for snow they switched to using the apron after some time to removal trucks. To efficiently transport patients, a improve the efficiency of ground transport to the heliport was set up in front of the garage. Air warehouse. transport of relief supplies began on March 14, and The Prefectural Fire and Disaster Prevention Avi- the cargo warehouse along with the garage for snow ation Center assigned parking spots to relief heli- removal vehicles were utilized as temporarily storage copters and small aircraft in the taxiway and the and sorting space. However, note that such utilization surrounding grass landing area on the south side by of the garage would be difficult if a disaster occurred checking the size and location of the filler neck of the during midwinter because snow removal vehicles aircraft at those locations. Aircraft parking areas cannot be parked outside. As for lodging for rescuers, were divided into two to accommodate helicopters conference rooms within the terminal building were based on type: the taxiway area for the wheel-type offered to entities such as the Japan Coast Guard. The and the grass landing area for the skid-type. In addi- off-premises parking lot was provided to the JSDF as tion, the decision was made to divide the grass a camping site. landing area into zones for rescue helicopters and c) The realities of disaster response activities media helicopters. However, in practice, confusion A disaster response headquarters was set up at the onsite ensued because the marshallers did not receive airport after the disaster. The headquarters, which information on helicopters before they landed. Be- consisted of members of the airport liaison commit- cause the marshallers made judgments by visual tee (the Fukushima Prefecture Airport Office; the inspection, they could only determine the helicop- JCAB Fukushima Airport Branch; Customs, Immi- ter’s type immediately before it was parked. More- gration and Quarantine (CIQ); the Fukushima Air- over, because the area was large, many marshallers port Building and airlines), held meetings and dis- were needed. In some cases, helicopter pilots moved cussed status updates, made decisions on extending back and forth in confusion because they did not airport operation hours, and solved problems. How- understand where to park. However, despite these ever, the headquarters was not sufficient as a venue problems, no major congestion was experienced in for coordinating the members; attendance was poor parking aircraft because the parking areas were en- given insufficient human resources in each agency visioned in advance, in the event that a large number that responded to the emergency. In addition, be- of aircraft flew in. cause a coordination meeting for helicopter operation In contrast, many complained about the refueling was not set up in the Fukushima Prefecture, heli- process. Because only one of the three refueling ve- copter operations faced poor arrangements, such as hicles at the Fukushima Airport had a nozzle for duplicate duties in certain areas. small aircraft, sometimes the wait to refuel was up to After the earthquake, whereas some regular pas- one hour. Furthermore, as relief aircraft were priori- senger flights were canceled, some temporary pas- tized, organizations with media helicopters that had senger flights operated. Furthermore, numerous hel- to wait complained. Although refueling had no effect icopters from government agencies and news media on mobilization requests, it needs to be improved flew in immediately after the earthquake; per-day because the delays interfered with urgent activities. takeoffs and landings hit a record high volume of 295 On the day of the earthquake, the staff of the Fu- on March 12 and up to 20 aircraft flew in each hour kushima Airport Building waited until the shaking during the busiest hours. In particular, 51 media subsided and then directed site users to go outside the helicopters landed at the Fukushima Airport on building, in accordance with the evacuation guide- March 12 because the Yamagata Airport and lines. The staff members checked the safety of the Hanamaki Airport were rejecting commercial heli- building in approximately 30 minutes and directed copters, including media helicopters, for some time site passengers to return inside the building. Because after the earthquake. the airport operation hours were extended to 24 hours After approaching the runway, aircraft were led to a day, services were provided around the clock in an appropriate parking spot according to the tarmac terminals through March 17. Approximately 50 segments. The Prefectural Airport Office assigned people stayed overnight on the day of the disaster; spots on the apron, the taxiway, and the surrounding therefore, supplies such as blankets were distributed. grass landing area on the north side to passenger and The next day, passengers seeking refuge outside the

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Prefecture began flocking to the airport. Passengers apron was placed in service at the start of the new on the waiting list for temporary passenger flights terminal’s operations in 2009 and that aircraft park- and refugees from the surrounding areas stayed ing capacity significantly increased when the parallel overnight in the terminal building after the disaster. taxiway—which was not placed in service even The number of lodgers increased to 330 on March 15 though it was completed—was added to the old after the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident. apron space. A series of operations related to takeoff The number decreased once the highway opened on and landing of aircraft, spot assignments, and refu- the 16th. The suspension of water supply in the ter- eling was conducted without a hitch immediately minal building continued until the 14th. Water usage after the earthquake, by following the rules agreed on was higher than usual because significantly more at the Coordination Meeting for Helicopter Opera- users were staying in the building. Although water tion. In particular, with respect to refueling, an trucks from the Tamagawa Village handled the situ- agreement for fuel supply was signed as a result of ation after the water storage tank dried out, water advance discussions with both suppliers for aircraft usage restrictions, such as limiting the use of bath- with unscheduled flights and suppliers that normally rooms at one location, were implemented. supply fuel only to aircraft with scheduled flights. Because regularly scheduled flights were suspended for four days after the earthquake, refueling was 3. THE ROLES OF, AND CHALLENGES handled smoothly during the first three days when FOR AIRPORTS DURING A DISASTER many helicopters were landing and taking off. Turning away incoming and outgoing commercial This section summarizes the lessons learned from aircraft not directly related to relief activities during the operational realities and response activities of the initial period after the disaster also seems to have each airport during the Great East Japan Earthquake, contributed to smooth operations. However, whether as described in Section 2. Based on those lessons, we the airport should turn down media helicopters that then summarize the challenges that airports face carry out important missions albeit not directly in- during a disaster and recommend the required role of volved with relief efforts is debatable. The airport an airport during disaster response. should handle the matter on a case-by-case basis through flexible operations, such as designating (1) Lessons learned makeshift aircraft parking spaces in advance. a) Hanamaki airport The Iwate Disaster Prevention Aviation Corp’s When the Iwate–Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake initial response was quick because four individuals struck in 2008, numerous missions were carried out involved had experienced the Iwate–Miyagi Nairiku at the Hanamaki Airport during the first four days Earthquake. In addition, two former members of the after the disaster. Although the period was relatively Disaster Prevention Aviation Corps and four mem- short and the number of inbound aircraft was smaller bers of the neighboring Akita Air Rescue Team compared to that during the Great East Japan joined the ground operations on the day of the dis- Earthquake, the tarmac space was insufficient and aster and the following day, respectively. Support confusion ensued related to refueling because of the from professionals experienced with helicopter op- convergence of aircraft. Learning from this experi- erations turned out to be extremely helpful. ence, the Coordination Meeting for Helicopter Op- b) Yamagata airport eration was initiated and the “Activity Plan for the Unlike the Hanamaki Airport and Fukushima Iwate Prefecture Helicopter Operation Coordination Airport, the Yamagata Airport has no parallel taxi- Team” was formulated in January 2010. In January way and it is one size smaller than the other two 2011, just before the Great East Japan Earthquake, airports. In addition, the aircraft were able to park at emergency aircraft operation rules, such as the use of the Fukushima Airport, but could not do the same on a radio frequency dedicated to common communi- the grass landing area, because the ground was cov- cation among the involved parties, were established. ered with snow during the disaster. Although 10 Furthermore, the Prefecture held an SCU setup drill spots were secured for 10 helicopters, commercial at the Hanamaki Airport in 2010 as prefectural dis- helicopters from news media and NPOs were turned aster prevention training. away because rescue helicopters from other prefec- As a result of applying the lessons learned from tures filled those 10 spots, as requested by the fire past experiences, no major confusion at the department. Yet, the 10 spots were able to accom- Hanamaki Airport occurred immediately after the modate many rescue helicopters from throughout earthquake, even though more than 100 aircraft Japan during the initial period after the disaster. landed each day. That said, the major factors that In accordance with the stipulation of the mutual mitigated confusion included the fact that the new support agreement among Hokkaido and eight

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Tohoku prefectures that the Yamagata Prefecture Table 2 Types of airport facilities and classifications of shall be the organizer of relief efforts in case the administrative operators in Japan. Miyagi Prefecture is affected by a disaster, the Yamagata Prefecture took aggressive measures to Location Type of Facility Administrative Operator Air Runway, Taxiway, National government, designate the Yamagata Airport as an escape gate for Side Apron, Lighting facili- Local government, Airport victims. JAL, which operates regular flight routes out ties operator of the Yamagata Airport, began operating temporary Air navigation facili- National government ties (except lighting passenger flights the day after the disaster, as did All facilities) Nippon Airways (ANA), even though it normally Ground-handling Airline does not operate regular flights. Therefore, the equipment Land Air traffic control and National government Yamagata Prefecture focused its efforts on stream- Side aviation information lining access for these temporary passenger flights receiving facility and operated buses that directly connected Sendai Terminal building Airport building company Parking lot Public organizations, Local Station located at Sendai City as prefectural capital government, Airport build- city in the Miyagi Prefecture and Yamagata Airport. ing company In addition, night tour buses traveled to the Tokyo Oil depot Refueling company and Osaka areas from the Yamagata Airport to transport victims who stayed at the airport and could tasks—for the prefecture as an organization to pro- not get on a flight. They provided victims and sup- vide in-house training for airport specialists is not porters smooth travel from the airport, and even of- easy. In contrast, staff members in the national gov- fered one-stop information not just on air travel but ernment manage one airport after another on job on all public transport to victims who arrived at the rotation to gain experience; they are in charge of airport. This was a great achievement. airport management as specialists. In fact, the airport c) Fukushima airport responded immediately to the disaster without a hitch Many commercial aircraft—primarily media hel- because one of the JCAB Fukushima Airport Branch icopters—that were turned away from the Hanamaki staff experienced the 2004 Chuetsu Earthquake and Airport and Yamagata Airport flew to the Fukushima the 2005 Miyagi Earthquake. Therefore, involvement Airport, including approximately 40% of the inbound of the national government is essential to maintain aircraft on March 12. The experience gained from the disaster management functions at the airport. Hokkaido–Tohoku block joint emergency fire rescue team drill was put to good use during the congestion (2) The required role of the airport during a immediately after the disaster. The shortage of spots disaster and recommendations was solved by having skid-type helicopters utilize the a) Cooperation among airport organizations grass landing area in addition to the parallel taxiway. As shown in Table 2, several organizations are Because training was conducted for helicopters involved in the administration and operation of air- landing and taking off in an emergency during this ports in Japan. During normal operations, the ap- drill, the level of withstand load, as well as the low propriate organizations manage cooperation among incline and smoothness of the ground, were already these facilities based on a division of roles. Cooper- verified. ation is also managed through an organization such However, in some cases, aircraft had to wait nearly as the airport operation coordination during events one hour to refuel because, unlike at the Hanamaki that differ from the norm. Because the cooperation of Airport, no operational agreement was in place be- these organizations within the airport is most im- tween the airport administrator and flight operators in portant in situations such as a significant disaster case of a large disaster, and only one private supplier causing sudden and major confusion, efficient daily provided fueling service. In addition, situations ex- communication and training are essential. At the isted in which more than one organization conducted Hanamaki Airport, the individuals in charge of the the same activity in a given area because no single matter continued working for three years to make organization coordinated aircraft operations. arrangements related to aircraft operations based on In general, airport experts are rare among prefec- the lessons learned from the Iwate–Miyagi Nairiku tural staff members. According to the Fukushima Earthquake in 2008. Because the Great East Japan Prefecture Airport Office, staff members engaged in Earthquake occurred immediately after the ar- road construction sometimes become responsible for rangements were completed, the effort paid off. airport management simply because both fields fall Other airports are also encouraged to take on a sim- under civil engineering. Even though only individu- ilar effort. als with experience can handle airport opera- Key airport operations during a disaster are air tions—because doing so often involves special traffic control, spot assignment, and refueling.

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Working on arrangements and regular training are disasters. However, it is difficult for disaster re- important to ensure that the JCAB Airport Branch in sponse headquarters to give specific and detailed charge of air traffic controls and provides infor- instructions to the aviation department because a mation; that the local government acts as airport general administrative organization is seldom in- administrator; and that aircraft operators and man- volved in aviation activities. As a result, each or- agers of airport facilities can quickly handle a series ganization seems to be doing what it can on its own of flight operation tasks, even in an emergency. without fully understanding which organizations are Furthermore, coordination among fuel suppliers, doing what. distributors, refueling companies, and the airport To some extent, it is unavoidable for each organ- administrator is necessary in diversifying sources of ization to independently and immediately respond aircraft fuel and securing procurement routes during after a disaster because quick decisions and actions an emergency. are required. However, a mechanism to share mini- b) Cooperation among organizations that operate mum useful information, such as activity status, with aircraft each organization is probably necessary. In addition, Aircraft that are required to take quick action dur- after a certain period and after setting up a temporary ing the initial period of a disaster include government organization, if an aviation taskforce team can be aircraft, such as those in the JSDF and Japan Coast established within the disaster response headquar- Guard, local police, fire department, and paramedics; ters, a system with a chain of command to allow disaster response, medical, and media helicopters; sharing information, implementing measures, and and so on. Commercial aircraft that provide emer- providing instruction across organizations would gency transport and regular service also play an im- enable the launch of more effective aviation activi- portant role. After the Great East Japan Earthquake, ties. Another effective measure is to hold discussions Japanese aircraft were not the only ones that flew in. and trainings in advance for the aviation taskforce US military forces played a significant role in the team in preparation for a large disaster. search and rescue mission and emergency services, c) Communication between aircraft during a and other foreign military aircraft and commercial disaster aircraft flew in to transport relief supplies. Because During a disaster, many organizations launch the JSDF and foreign military forces are structured to flight activities simultaneously and their activities undertake activities in a self-contained manner are concentrated in a specific area. Although certain without requiring support from others, they have rules exist to ensure flight safety, securing a common significant capacity to take action. Meanwhile, be- communication method among aircraft and between cause the daily experiences of the local government’s aircraft and the ground station is ideal to gather in- aviation unit make it extremely familiar with the area formation and conduct rescue activities more safely. affected by a disaster, this unit demonstrates great With respect to communication among aircraft, the competence for collecting information on the disaster JSDF aircraft and commercial aircraft use different area and implementing emergency response radio frequencies during normal periods. The ground measures. Assistance from other local governments station and aircraft are able to communicate through and helicopters of the police, fire department, and a radio frequency specified by each airport if the disaster management are quickly deployed in ac- airport is public. However, non-public airports and cordance with the agreement between the neighbor- heliports that more commonly use a company wire- ing prefectures and through instructions issued by the less network to communicate are less accessible to National Police Agency and the Ministry of Internal outside parties. Furthermore, securing regular Affairs and Communications. Furthermore, news communication methods in a temporary landing field coverage activities to communicate disaster situa- set up outside the airport is difficult. tions to the Japanese public and foreign countries are In these cases, some radio frequencies can be used undertaken by a number of incoming helicopters during emergencies; however, for a large disaster from newspaper and television companies. such as the Great East Japan Earthquake, no prede- In this way, aircraft operations are deployed within termined means of communication existed between a certain area through the involvement of various JSDF aircraft and commercial aircraft, and between organizations. Therefore, implementing a compre- the government aircraft providing emergency ser- hensive system that coordinates all organizations vices and commercial aircraft, such as media heli- immediately after a disaster is virtually impossible. copters. Given its experience with the Iwate–Miyagi Understandably, each involved organization handles Nairiku Earthquake, the Miyagi Prefecture used the the situation by dispatching a liaison to the disaster 123.45 MHz frequency, which allows for commu- response headquarters and collecting information not nication not only between disaster management hel- just for a particular earthquake, but also for other icopters, but also between aircraft and the ground

295 station as a means of communication between air- plies for flight passengers, support staff such as craft during a disaster. The Fukushima Prefecture did policemen and fire and disaster management similarly. Meanwhile, the Iwate Prefecture used the helicopter operators from other prefectures, and 122.6 MHz frequency, which commercial aircraft support staff involved in airport operations; can also access freely, as the communication fre- (10) Establishment of a structure to quickly accom- quency between aircraft during a disaster. However, modate the activities of rescue aircraft at com- this frequency does not allow communication with mercial airports that restrict access from JSDF the ground station. Although separate radio fre- aircraft and military aircraft from other coun- quencies are considered easier to use because no tries in normal times. interference occurs in such a setup, setting up a single In addition, conducting regular training to activate frequency that can be monitored by all aircraft in- these measures is necessary. As previously men- volved in communication among aircraft and be- tioned, the Fukushima Airport applied the outcome tween the ground station and aircraft must be con- of the Hokkaido–Tohoku block joint emergency fire sidered because numerous aircraft from various or- rescue team drill held approximately four months ganizations converge to a specific area during a dis- before the disaster, and used the taxiway and grass aster. landing area that are not normally used for parking, d) Preparation and training for disasters to accommodate additional aircraft. The Hanamaki Airports played an extremely important role as Airport quickly and effectively utilized area facilities emergency support bases after the Great East Japan such as the old terminal area for conducting disaster Earthquake. There were situations in which lessons training every September, and for holding SCU setup learned from past experiences were applied, and yet training with the JSDF immediately before the dis- the temporary convergence of aircraft immediately aster. These regular training sessions paid off when after a disaster could not be handled properly. Based various missions were conducted during the disaster. on the realities of disaster response activities in Sec- The results of such daily training sessions were tion 2, the following items are required for the proper demonstrated in various missions related to this operation of airports during a disaster: earthquake. The daily efforts of the involved parties (1) Establishment of a structure to operate the air- who repeated training and who focused on operating port 24 hours a day; the airport as a disaster management base allowed the (2) Arrangements with former staff members with aircraft to demonstrate their capabilities. This ex- expertise in aviation/airport to provide support ample effectively illustrates the benefits of repeat and act as supplement personnel; training when the need arises, which should be em- (3) Identification of the extent to which various ulated by other airports. aircraft—JSDF aircraft, Japan Coast Guard air- e) Establishing airports as disaster response bases craft, fire and paramedic helicopters, disaster prepared to handle disasters management helicopters, medical helicopters, This study showed that the airports that were media helicopters, and scheduled commercial primarily focused on their role as a commercial air- flights—can be accommodated, along with set- port may be effectively used as a disaster manage- ting their order of priority; ment base. Unlike railways and roads that secure (4) Identification of aircraft parking spots and their transport through a continuous physical network, air usage during a disaster; transport is characterized by its wide connectivity to (5) Spot assignment rules for scheduled flights, both domestic and international destinations, made fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters during a possible by maintaining nodes at the airport. disaster; Japan is vulnerable to natural disasters such as (6) Means and channels for securing fuel, execution typhoons and torrential rains, in addition to periodic of agreements for fuel accommodation, refuel- Tonankai earthquakes. Therefore, preparing the na- ing procedures, and their order of priority; tion’s airports as disaster response bases is recom- (7) Coordination among parties involved in airport mended. Specifically, preparation of the following operation, such as airlines, ground-handling facilities is suggested. Because these facilities will companies, the airport building company, and not be used regularly, establishing them as mul- refueling companies; ti-purpose facilities rather than special facilities for (8) Identification of public transport to various des- disaster management is recommended. tinations that are not normally serviced, such as (1) Ensuring the availability of aircraft parking affected areas, major neighboring cities, and space: In addition to using the tarmac to handle neighboring airports, in addition to transport to ordinary flights, ensure that spaces such as the airport and to the city; grass landing areas (the shoulder part) are (9) Identification of lodging spaces and food sup- available, which can be used for parking in the

296 event that numerous aircraft fly in during a dis- stage after the occurrence of a disaster, as well as for aster. In addition to drainage, these spaces must what purpose these facilities should be coordinated. have the soil-bearing capacity to park aircraft when needed. Furthermore, giving access to large trucks is needed to ensure that refueling is 4. CONCLUSION possible. (2) Ensure the availability of spaces for temporary This study interviewed various organizations in- storage of fuels in drums, in addition to using volved with the Hanamaki Airport, Yamagata Air- regular fuel tanks. port, and Fukushima Airport and summarized the (3) Ensure the availability of temporary lighting operational realities faced by various organizations, facilities to enable night work on the tarmac. and the disaster response activities implemented by (4) Ensure the availability of storerooms to sort and these organizations during the Great East Japan store relief supplies. Earthquake. The objective is to articulate the lessons (5) Ensure the availability of spaces for setting up learned from past experiences and the challenges an SCU. faced by an airport during a disaster. This study also At least one airport in the Hokkaido, Tohoku, presented recommendations for preparing and estab- Tokai, Chugoku/Shikoku, and Kyushu regions can lishing disaster-responsive base airports. In addition, be designated as a disaster management base airport this study revealed that helicopters and other aircraft with disaster management functions to ensure that play significant roles during a disaster. each region is prepared for disasters. Because the Efficient communication to quickly share the in- airports in high demand are more likely to be used for formation generated onsite among different organi- commercial aircraft operations during a disaster, zations is necessary. These organizations then need positioning other airports as disaster management to engage in discussions to clarify their respective base airports is recommended. The airport must as- roles and take actions based on this information. To sume the role of an emergency transport base im- make this series of actions possible in an emergency, mediately after a disaster. At the same time, how it training and preparation must be conducted regular- can quickly return to its role as a normal commercial ly. By proving that airports play a significant role airport must be considered. during a great disaster, this study provided invaluable Because a disaster can strike anywhere and at any insights from a perspective different from those time, conducting training is essential to enabling gathered when viewing airport operations in normal these disaster management base airports to cooperate times. and respond to an emergency. Simultaneously, neighboring airports, heliports, and other airfields ACKNOWLEDGMENT: This study represents should be positioned as support facilities. Likewise, part of the results obtained in the research project regular simulations and training on aircraft operation entitled, “A Study on the Airport Operation for by utilizing these various facilities during a disaster Various Aircraft Activities during a Disaster” by the should be conducted. In particular, because airports Aviation Policy Research Association. As we pro- are required to handle the media during the initial ceeded with this research project, we received great stage of a disaster, designating airports other than the support from the JCAB as well as from agencies in disaster management base airports to handle media the Iwate, Yamagata, and Fukushima Prefectures, helicopters is recommended. During the Great East such as airport administrative offices, prefectural Japan Earthquake—based on a request from the police aviation units, fire department aviation units, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications airlines, and terminal building companies. We take issued on the day of the disaster—the privately this opportunity to express our deepest appreciation owned Honda Airport located in the Saitama Pre- to these agencies that provided documents and data fecture was designated and utilized as a relay point and responded to our interview. for support helicopters as a forward base because it was equipped with night lighting facilities. The REFERENCES Honda Airport immediately responded to the request 1) Kiminarita, T.: Responses to the Great East Japan Earth- and prepared to accommodate helicopters. This ex- quake at Iwate–Hanamaki Airport, The 12th Airport Tech- ample shows the effectiveness of crossing the pub- nology Report Meeting of the Civil Aviation Bureau, pp. 38– 43, 2011. (in Japanese) lic–private line to utilize nearby airports. Clarifying 2) Yamagata Prefecture: Records on the Great East Japan the roles of disaster management base airports, Earthquake for Public Transport, 2012. (in Japanese) neighboring airports, heliports, and other airfields throughout the region is probably necessary, as is (Received July 19, 2013) conducting various simulations on how and at which

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