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Polit-Barometer ANALYSIS About the editor: Imprint Professor, Doctor of Philosophy, Georgi Karasimeonov is a Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Office Bulgaria Sofia lecturer at the University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Director of the 97, Knjaz Boris I St. | 1000 Sofia | Bulgaria Institute for Political and Legal Studies. From 1991 to 1998 he was Chairman of the Bulgarian Political Science Association. Responsible: Helene Kortländer | Director, FES Bulgaria Tel.: +359 2 980 8747 | Fax: +359 2 980 2438 http://www.fes-bulgaria.org Commercial use of all media, published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. Polit-Barometer GEORGI KARASIMEONOV (EDITOR) Year 18, Issue 4 – October-December 2018 n Political scandals in the ruling coalition lead to a gradual and constant erosion of elec- toral support for GERB and the United Patriots. Protests in the last few months have increased public dissatisfaction with the government, and it is obvious from all this that this trend will also continue in the coming months. Confidence in political institu- tions continues to be at a critically low level, which increases the possibility of substan- tial shifting in electoral layers as a new factor emerges on the political arena. n BSP continues to be torn by internal contradictions. Critical attitudes towards party leader Kornelia Ninova intensified after Yordan Michev was appointed editor-in-chief of the party newspaper Duma. An unprecedented petition of fifty members of the Nation- al Council of the Party led to the removal of Michev. This result shows that Kornelia Ninova faces ever-stronger internal opposition, and this could negatively affect the party in the upcoming EP elections. n Scandals in the “United Patriots” led to an expected electoral drain. Conflicts between Volen Siderov and Valeri Simeonov will probably grow worse after the return of the NFSB leader as an MP in the National Assembly. Siderov’s desire to head a general list of the patriotic formations in the European parliamentary elections in which Nikolay Barekov’s “Reload Bulgaria” party would participate does not meet the approval of his coalition partners. The only thing that is preventing the “United Patriots” from breaking down at this stage is their stay in the government. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works. GEORGI KARASIMEONOV (EDITOR) | POLIT-BAROMETER Sofia Content 1. The Political Situation . 2 1 .1 Internal policy . 2 1 .2 Foreign and European policies . 5 1 .3 Refugee crisis . 6 2. State and development of the major political parties . 6 2 .1 Social Democratic and other centre-left parties . 6 2 .1 BSP .1 . 6 2 .1 Other .2 centre-left parties . 7 2 .2 Centre-right parties . 8 2 .2 GERB .1 . 8 2 .2 Other .2 centre-right parties . 8 2 .3 Centrist parties . 9 2 .3 MRF .1 . 9 2 .3 “Volya” .2 (“Will” in Bulgarian) . 10 2 .4 Nationalist parties . 10 2 .4 United .1 Patriots . 10 2 .5 Positions of Political Parties on Foreign and European Policies . 11 3. Public opinion . 11 4. Main Conclusions and Forecasts . 11 1 GEORGI KARASIMEONOV (EDITOR) | POLIT-BAROMETER Sofia 1 . The Political Situation ment, demanding the resignation of the cabinet and a “change of the system” . The government 1 .1 Internal Policy had no move for reducing that tension other than the resignation of Valeri Simeonov . He announced The government has faced new problems during it himself after a Coalition Council meeting . He this quarter, too . The protests of the mothers of said that he was resigning due to the ongoing children with disabilities went on and even esca- media campaign against him that certain political lated, after Deputy Prime Minister called them forces were making use of . Simeonov added that “loudmouthed women with supposedly sick chil- he was not resigning under pressure, but in or- dren” . This comment was followed by a wave of der not to inflict any damage on the government, public discontent and outrage demanding his res- which he defined as exceptionally successful. He ignation . Simeonov stated that he would not hand noted that he did not want to become a millstone in his resignation and would not apologise, since for the government and would not be the person his words had been taken out of context . Instead to become the reason for the country falling into of him, Prime Minister Borissov apologised and political instability . After Simeonov’s resignation, said that he could not ask Simeonov to resign be- the mothers of children with disabilities stopped cause that would ruin the coalition . According to the protests, which decreased the tension . the Prime Minister this decision should be taken by the “United Patriots” as per the Coalition Agree- The election of a new Deputy Prime Minister in ment . The leader of “Ataka”, Volen Siderov, who Simeonov’s place led to disagreement within the has been in an open conflict with Simeonov for United Patriots . “Ataka” insisted on closing down quite some time, also joined in the calls for his res- that position, and VMRO and NFSB rejected that ignation . Simeonov, however, was supported by on grounds that it would destroy the balance, set the VMRO leader Krasimir Karakachanov and that with the Coalition Agreement . Despite those con- led to a stalemate . Valeri Simeonov staying in the tradictions, Valeri Simeonov managed to push position of Deputy Prime Minister seemed impos- through the nomination of his Head of the Political sible, particularly after in the middle of September Cabinet - Mariyana Nikolova, who had previously a new wave of protests swept through the entire worked in various expert positions in the state country – this time against the high prices for fuel, administration . “Ataka” did not accept the nomina- the increase of third-party insurance premiums tion and did not participate in the vote in the Na- and the taxes for old cars . The protesters blocked tional Assembly . Despite that, Nikolova was elect- roads, motorways and border-crossing points – ed Deputy Prime Minister . After his resignation, that made the social and political tensions even Valeri Simeonov returned to Parliament as an MP greater . People from GERB accused BSP of being and this is likely to increase the tension between behind the protests, aiming at political instability him and Volen Siderov even more . and causing a crisis in the country similar to the one of 2013 which resulted in the resignation of The problems for the “United Patriots” did not the first government of Borissov. BSP denied that stop there . The name of Deputy Prime Minister they were organising the protests but stated that and Minister of Defence Krasimir Karakachanov they supported them because the demands of and his VMRO party was involved in a corruption the citizens were just . The socialists pointed out scandal after the Chairman of the State Agency that the protests are an evaluation of the perfor- for Bulgarians Abroad (SABA) Petar Haralampiev mance of all the GERB governments over the past was arrested, due to accusations of corruption nearly 10 years, which have contributed nothing and trading with Bulgarian citizenship . According to resolving the problems of poverty and raising to information from the Prosecutor’s Office the the standard of living of the people . The growing amounts demanded from Macedonians in order protests made the political situation in the country to receive Bulgarian citizenship had been between tense, as the protests changed from being against 5,000 and 8,000 Euro . The money was collected the high fuel prices to being against the govern- by go-betweens and was given to the Chairman 2 GEORGI KARASIMEONOV (EDITOR) | POLIT-BAROMETER Sofia of SABA . Petar Haralampiev was nominated by and defending the democratic principles by each VMRO, although he is not a member of the party . and every citizen on a daily basis . The scandal grew bigger after the former Director of Bulgarian Citizenship Directorate of the Minis- In the middle of November, the European Com- try of Justice Katya Mateva accused Karakachan- mission published its report on Bulgaria within ov of funding VMRO from selling Bulgarian citizen- the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. The ship . Mateva said that she had proof of this and commission states that the country has made that she had submitted that evidence to the State significant progress on the recommendations. Agency for National Security (SANS) . In her words, The assessment with respect of Indicator 1 (In- she sent information about irregularities, but then dependence of the Judiciary), Indicator 2 (Legal she became inconvenient and was sacked by Min- Framework) and Indicator 6 (Organised Crime) ister Ekaterina Zaharieva, then Minister of Justice is positive and these criteria are regarded condi- in the second cabinet of Boyko Borissov . Deputy tionally closed . As to Indicators 3 (Continuation of Prime Minister Krasimir Karakachanov rejected Judiciary Reform), 4 (Corruption in the high levels the allegations of Mateva and said that she was of government) and 5 (Corruption locally and at sacked because she had slowed down hundreds borders) significant progress has been made and of files of applicants for Bulgarian citizenship from they are close to being implemented . The Europe- the Republic of Macedonia . This case will most an Commission believes that, if this progress is likely continue to unfold in the coming months . maintained and the country continues its efforts, the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for The institutional war between the President and Bulgaria will be ended by the end of the term of the majority in power has been going on during office of the Juncker Commission. The Bulgarian this quarter too . The mutual attacks between government published a position that this was the GERB representatives and the President have be- most positive report on the country so far, and come an everyday phenomenon .
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