Preface 1 Beyond Billiard Ball Analysis

Home , Anura Bandaranaike, Gamini Dissanayake, Lalith Athulathmudali, Ranjan Wijeratne, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Somawansa Amarasinghe

Notes

Preface

1. CHA Newsletter, Vol 6 Issue 6, December/ November 2001, p. 21. 2. It should be noted that in 2000 and 2001, that he Ministry of Defence back- tracked and refused to allow the supply of electricity into uncleared (i.e., rebel held) areas in Batticaloa – for which Rs 10.0 million was already allocated two years previously under the village development programme. CHA Newsletter, Vol 5 Issue 5, September/October 2001, p. 24. 3. This episode is dealt with in greater detail in the text. Similar in bizarre-ness, though not signiﬁcance, was the local level truce negotiated by the Red Cross in the jungles of Amparai District in June 2000, to allow a Government veterinarian into rebel-held territory to tend to an injured wild elephant. Dilip Ganguly, Associated Press, June 14, 2000.

1 Beyond Billiard Ball Analysis

1. This introduction is the reflection of an on-going discussion with Fuat Keyman of Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. It draws from Bush and Keyman (1997). 2. It is important to distinguish between conflict ‘resolution’ and ‘management.’ The former refers to the efforts to resolve or eliminate the underpin- ning grievances and irritants which sustain a conflict, while the latter applies to efforts to control or ‘de-escalate violence’ without necessarily eliminating the root causes of the conflict. Some analysts employ the term ‘conflict settlement’ to ‘indicate the formal ending of armed hostilities and the renunciation of the use of force. They believe the objective of conflict resolution to be unattainable, on the grounds that conflicts over fundamental values and needs will never be resolved to the complete satisfaction of the parties involved. In these circumstances, the best one can hope for is a settlement which ends the violence and in some small measure takes those conflicting values and priorities into account’ (Fen Osler Hampson and Brian Mandell, ‘Managing Regional Conflict: Security Cooperation and Third Party Mediators,’ International Journal, XLV, no. 2 (Spring 1990: 193). In some cases, conflict management efforts may inhibit the broader conflict resolution process. This is particularly true for cases of ‘protracted social conflict’ in which antagonists interpret the world in zero-sum terms. Any perceived gain by one side is viewed as a loss by the other. While a measure may dampen overt conflict in the short-term, it may also sustain or exacerbate conflict in the long-term. 3. For example, Buzan, People, States and Fearr; Klare and Thomas, World Security; and Seymon Brown, ‘World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security,’ in Klare and Thomas, World Security, pp. 10–26.

204 Notes 205

4. For example, Stephen Walt, ‘The Renaissance in Security Studies,’ International Studies Quarterly, 35 (1991): 211–39; and Kolodziej, ‘Renaissance in Security Studies?’. 5. For another attempt in this context, see Ole Waever, ‘Identity, Integration and Security,’ Journal of International Affairs, 48, no. 2 (1995): 389–431. 6. Jack Snyder, ‘The New Nationalism: Realist Interpretations and Beyond,’ in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds, The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 180. 7. Ibid., p. 181. 8. Edward Azar, ‘Protracted Social Conﬂicts: Ten Propositions’, in Azar and John W. Burton, eds, International Conﬂict Resolution: Theory and Practice (Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1986), pp. 28–41.

2 Learning to Read between the Lines

1. For example, the 1987 government offensive against the Tamil north of the island was preceded by prisoner swaps between government forces and the main Tamil paramilitary organization, the (LTTE, as well as by government offers to release hundreds of Tamils interned under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, in an effort to facilitate direct negotiations. A more recent example is discussed in Chapter 9 the 1994/95 peace initiative of Chandrika Kumaratunge which led to a formal ceasefire with the the LTTE. However, the high expectations and optimism of the initiative were ultimately dashed when a re-armed and reinvigorated LTTE broke the ceasefire agreement by attacking and destroying two naval craft and two SLAF Planes in April thereby initiating what came to be known as Eelam War III. The government’s response was equal in ferocity and destruction, described by Kumaratunge as ‘a war for peace.’ As discussed in greater detail in the text, both examples illustrate the ways in which conflict escalation or resistance to peacemaking is a function of intra-group politics within the Sinhalese and the Tamil communities. 2. Newcomers to Sri Lankan politics sometimes find it surprising that despite the escalating violence, which characterizes the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic divide, an array of Tamil paramilitaries have now allied themselves with the Sinhalese-dominated government – the same paramilitary groups which previously had been warring with the Sri Lankan security forces. The point made here is that the funnelling of resources across the inter-ethnic divide to sub-groups within the Tamil community has had a profound effect in the Tamil intra-group arena as these paramilitaries jostle to build a support base and increase their influence. Conspicuously, this process has included the terrorizing and brutalizing of other Tamils and Tamil-speaking Muslims by Tamil sub-groups. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999/ May-July 1992. See also Bush (1993), Hoole et al. (1992), and most publications by UTHR (Jaffna). 3. The perennially problematic issue of causality in the social sciences is increasingly being challenged and recast. For example, in a unique study of reforming an irrigation system in Sri Lanka, Norman Uphoff draws on chaos theory which ‘explores different kinds of order and causation which 206 Notes

are nonlinear and only loosely determinant, finding surprising patterns in the dynamics of open systems that match human realities better than the closed system reasoning of classical physics’ (1992: 14). 4. See Chapter 6, Critical Juncture III: 1971 JVP Insurrection and 1987 JVP Resurgence. 5. For example, the confrontation between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Eelam Peoples’ Revolutionary Liberation Front in mid-1990. 6. The distinctions between and within these groups will be examined in Chapter 3. At this stage it is sufficient to note that the Sinhalese are predominantly Buddhist and Sinhala-speaking; they constitute 74 per cent of the total population. The Tamils are predominantly Hindu and Tamil- speaking; they constitute 18 per cent of the total population. All demographic data is based on the most recent (1981) census. 7. In Sri Lanka, this would include the strong inter-communal ties among English-educated elites, particularly in the early post-colonial period. In the arena of violence it would include the episode discussed later in this book when former President Premadasa supplied arms, money and materiel to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (see Chapter 8 on the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987). 8. For such chronologies of events in Sri Lanka, see INFORM Sri Lanka Information Monitor (Colombo), and Anton Philip (1991), ‘Sri Lanka: Chronology of Events’ produced by the Sri Lanka Resource Centre in Oslo, Norway. 9. Sources of information are similarly varied and include: newspapers; archival sources; government reports; chronologies of events; human rights reports; reports of fact-finding missions; and interviews. 10. In this study, as in Allison’s essay, the use of the term ‘model’ without qualifiers should be read ‘conceptual scheme.’ 11. Refer to summary tables at the end of Chapter 9. 12. The identification of ‘mediating’ factors of ethnic conflict may prompt the question: what is being mediated? In general terms, these factors mediate and condition the social, economic and political relations between and within ethnic groups. 13. For two useful discussions of the primordial-instrumentalist debate, see James Mckay, ‘An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizationist Approaches to Ethnic Phenomena,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 5, no. 4, (1982): 395–420; and George M. Scott, ‘A Resynthesis of the Primordial and Circumstantial Approaches to Ethnic Group Solidarity: Towards an Explanatory Model,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 13, no. 3 (1990): 147–71. 14. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 66. 15. As suggested in extreme instrumentalist arguments, for example, Eugeen E. Roosens, Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenesis (California: Sage Publications, 1989). 16. Donald Rothschild, Ethnonationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 8. 17. This was the case in India when the state boundaries were redrawn in the 1950s (Horowitz 1985: 66). Lebow asserts that this was also the case in Northern Ireland (1974: 208–9) and, as discussed further below, Sri Lanka, Notes 207

too, reflects this shift in the politically salient axis of identity (Nissan and Stirrat 1990; Spencer 1990). 18. Personal interviews, Colombo, Kandy, Batticaloa, May–July 1992; 1998; 2000). See also ‘Scott’ (1984). 19. Uphoff (1990), building on Uphoff and Ilchman (1969) and (1972), provides a useful basis for conceptualizing and operationalizing political resources. He develops the following resource categories: economic resources, social status, information, force, legitimacy, and authority. The utility of this approach is that it incorporates both material and non-material resources within a single analytical (resource-exchange) framework. 20. Regarding the motivation for ethnic mobilization, I agree with Esman that the most likely cause of ethnic mobilization is a serious and manifest threat to the vital interests or established expectations of an ethnic community, its political position, its cultural rights, its livelihood or neighborhood. However, as addressed below, while defence against threat may stimulate the mobilization of collective identity, the mobilization of collective action will be affected by, among other things, the opportunities and limitations arising from the political and economic environment (Esman 1990: 54). 21. Like Tilly (1978), my use of ‘organization’ does not necessarily imply ‘formal organization.’ The more extensive the common identity and internal networks of the group, the more organized it is. ‘Mobilization processes do not have to start from scratch. They can build on pre-existing networks of informal relations as well as on preexisting networks of formal organizations, political and otherwise’ (Kriesi 1988: 362). 22. By ‘institution’ I refer to those implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations con- verge in a given area (Krasner 1983). It is important to note that while such institutions channel the expression of collective sentiments and the mobilization of resources, the institutions themselves are neither unchanging nor static. Institutions can be modified over time and used in ways that they were not originally intended. However, although institutions may be malleable, they are not completely fluid. They possess a ‘stickiness’ that can help or hinder intergroup accommodation (Krasner 1988). 23. For details on the arms transfers, see A. K. Menon. ‘The Other Battle Field,’ India Today, 15 October 1991: 99; The Hindu (Madras), 6 September 1991: 1; Frontline (Madras), reprinted in Christian Worker (Colombo), 2nd & 3rd Quarter 1991: xvi. These same supplies are now being used by the LTTE against the Sri Lankan Army, East Coast Muslims, Tamil civilians, pro-government Tamil paramilitaries, and Sinhalese settlers in the North. For other instances of Sri Lankan Government assistance to the LTTE, see Gunaratna (1993: esp. pp. 357, 359, 363). 24. Socially constructive examples of ‘cross-border excursions’ may also be found: the mutually supportive inter-ethnic relationships that developed as a by- product of the Gal Oya Water Management Project (Uphoff 1992: 119–21); pilgrimage sites shared by Hindus and Buddhists, such as Kataragama and Siripada; even cultural symbols have been shared including (somewhat incongruously) the late M. G. Ramachandran, the South Indian film star- turned-politician who was a ‘cultural hero’ not only among Tamils but also among the urban proletarian Sinhalese as well (Uyangoda 1989: 37–43). 208 Notes

25. When the notoriety of a particularly brutal Loyalist killer became a embar- rassment and liability to Loyalist paramilitaries, the (Loyalist) UDA and UVF are reported to have facilitated an assassination operation by the Provisional IRA (Feldman 1991: 59–65; 289). 26. The use of ‘India’ as a short-hand designation should not obscure the heterogeneity of Indian actors. Particularly important is the tension between the Central government in Delhi and the State government of Tamil Nadu in Madras (a state with 55 million Tamil speakers) which has led to different policies toward Sri Lanka at various points in time. 27. Early work includes: Laitin 1985, 1986; Brown 1989; Brass 1984, 1990; Horowitz 1985, 1991. 28. Susan Strange’s The Retreat of the State is an effort to push the theoretical pendulum back in the other direction. 29. It should be noted, however, that the state may not even be the dominant authority within its own borders, particularly when considering that ‘the modern state’ is a relatively recent innovation in many Third World countries compared with other authority structures. As Migdal (1987, 1988) points out, the ‘real’ politics of Third World countries lies in the struggle between the state and societal authority structures. While the state may have more material resources at its disposal, it does not necessarily have the nonmaterial resources (such as ideological support or legitimacy) needed for maintaining its authority and power. This points to the need to incorporate both state and societal structures and processes into the examination of ethnic groups in conﬂict.

3 An Overview of Sri Lanka

1. Although Ceylon was renamed Sri Lanka in 1972, this study will use ‘Sri Lanka’ to refer to the country even in the pre-1972 period. Additionally, although the government changed the spelling of the country’s name to Shri Lanka in November 1991, this study uses the former version, which remains the convention in Western publications. 2. The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) combines measures of life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy into a single index with a maximum value of 100. In the 1970s, Sri Lanka scored 82 despite a per capita income of $US179 (Lal Jayawardena in Tambiah 1992: ix–x). 3. Medicins Sans Frontier, reported in The Globe and Mail, 23 November 1992: A12. The human rights violations which accompany displacement are extensive. As a recent report puts it: ‘These people, whom the international legal jargon has reduced to the acronym IDP, do not enjoy the same rights as their fellow citizens. At best they are patronized, mostly ignored and left to their own mercy, at worse harassed, arrested, abducted, raped, tortured, executed, exploited, imprisoned’. Indeed, every single right spelt out in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is violated in Sri Lanka. CPA/CHA/LST 2001. 4. The government has invoked the Prevention of Terrorism Act (patterned on the South African model) and emergency legislation, both of which violate Sri Lanka’s obligations as a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil Notes 209

and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 5. Kelegama (1999) offers the following estimate for 1996: Army – 129,000, Air Force – 17,000, Navy – 21,000, and Police – 68,000 for a total armed forces strength of 235,000. See also Matthews 1989: 437–39. The estimate of deserters is based on newspaper reporters and interviews in Sri Lanka in 1999. 6. Sri Lanka’s Directorate of Military Intelligence estimates that 60 per cent of the LTTE fighters are below the age of 18. Another assessment of LTTE fighters killed in combat put the figure at 40 per cent, both male and female. (Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Childhood – a Continuous Casualty of the Conflict in Sri Lanka,’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1998.) If we accept the estimate from Jane’s Intelligence sources that the LTTE fighting force in 1997 was 13,200, then the number of active child soldiers on that side would be between 5,280 and 7,920. That the practice of (ab)using children as soldiers is continuing, was evident to those organizations and individuals working in the field, particularly in the LTTE controlled areas – though it is not uncommon to see Government armed Home Guards in border villages who are clearly under the age of eighteen. And, although not discussed publicly by those involved in the LTTE Sri Laukan Army–(SLA) body exchanges of soldiers killed in combat, the volume and size of the contents of the body bags add evidence the continued (ab)use of child soldiers. 7. UNDP, Mine Action Pilot Project Jaffna, 1998. p.1 8. Cited in David Dunham and Sisira Jayasuriya, ‘Is All So Well with the Economy and with the Rural Poor?,’ Pravada, vol. 5, no 10&11 (1998) 24. 9. Nisha Arunatilake, Sisira Jayasuriya, and Saman Kelegama, The Economic Cost of the War in Sri Lanka, Research Studies: Macroeconomic Policy and Planning Series No. 13 (Colombo: Institute of Policy Studies, January 2000) 10. Unlike any other guerrilla or paramilitary organization, it has a large, and seemingly limitless, supply of suicide bombers and operational suicide squads. Suicide bombers are idolized as ‘martyrs’ in gaudy public memorials found in public spaces and training camps within LTTE-controlled territory. All LTTE fighters wear an amulet of cyanide around their necks, which they vow to swallow rather then be captured. It appears that in the LTTE- controlled North, the culture of militarism and martyrdom feeds the labour needs of military machine which are replenished with the help of atrocious living conditions characterized by systemic human rights abuses by government security forces, a future characterized by hopelessness, and a noble escape through death for the Eelam cause (see Trawick 1999). A recruitment officer for the LTTE insisted that they were not pressuring youngsters to join the ranks of fighters: ‘It is not the Tigers who are recruiting young people, it is the government who are driving the children to join the Tigers’ (BBC 1998). In light of the the practice of the LTTE to use child combatants (including suicide squads), concerns have been raised about the use of these orphanages as a mechanism to fill the ranks of the so-called LTTE ‘Baby Brigades’ (Gunaratna 1998a). Even more numerous than the orphans created by the war, are the children who have lost one parent, rather than both, to the war. It was recently estimated there are 19,000 ‘war widows’ in Jaffna, of which 9,000 are below the age 35 years (CHA 2000). Both orphans 210 Notes

and single-parent children are especially vulnerable in such precarious situations. 11. The extent of the violence was variously presented. Amnesty International reported that 1,000 people a month were being slain in JVP violence in the latter part of 1989 (New York Times (NYT), 14 December 1989: A 18). Sanjoy Hazarika of the reported that ‘at least thirty people die every day because of the civil war’ (‘In Sri Lanka, the Dainty and the Dead,’ NYT, 5 September 1989: A 11). In August 1989, diplomatic sources estimated that 30–40 people were killed every day in Sri Lanka. More than 1,000 members and supporters of Premadasa’s ruling UNP alone are estimated to have been killed since Premadasa’s election in December 1988 (Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 17 August 1989: 17). By November 1989, James Clad reported that ‘in recent months a couple of hundred murders take place every week’ (FEER, 9 November 1990: 37). He later revised his estimate to ‘300-400 bodies a week’ (FEER, 16 November 1990: 59). The Wall Street Journal reports that 15,000 have died in the last six years (30 October 1989: A 6). Ninety-four political killings were recorded on the day of presidential elections alone (December 1988) and 417 killings within the 13 days after the election (Sunday Times (London), 15 January 1989: A 3). 12. That is, vigilante squads often containing out-of-uniform security forces. 13. As discussed further below, ‘legitimate targets’ for attack or ‘disciplinary action’ went beyond security personnel and public officials. At times, it included families of security forces and all levels of public employees (such as post men and bus drivers). It came to include any non-supporter of the JVP cause and anti-social elements (such as neighborhood drunks and petty criminals), somewhat similar to the purges employed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. 14. This disintegration has included the incorporation of massacres into the military repertoire of all combatant groups. For details on recent Army massacres, see INFORM, Sri Lanka Information Monitor Situation Report (September 1992: 14; February 1993: 14), US Committee for Refugees (1991: 16, 22), and British Refugee Council, Sri Lanka Monitor (March 1992: 3; January 1992: 1). For details on Tamil paramilitary massacres (i.e. the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), see University Teachers for Human Rights – Jaffna (1991), Amnesty International (1991); Amnesty International (1993), Pieris and Marecek (1992), and Abeyesekera (1992). 15. This is evident in the work of Robert Kearney, Mick Moore, Gananath Obeyesekere, A. J. Wilson and K. M. de Silva. 16. Spencer (1990) contains a selection of scholars who challenge the rigidly bi- polar model I interpretations of Sri Lankan history. See also Kemper (1991) and Rogers (1987), and (1987a). 17. Also called ‘Indian Tamils’, ‘Hill Country Tamils’ or ‘Estate’ Tamils. Some of the less rigorous discussions of Sri Lanka, categorize Up Country Tamils with Sri Lankan Tamil. 18. Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 February 1985: 36. 19. The LTTE is the largest and most powerful Tamil paramilitary organization. It has controlled significant portions of territory in the north and east of the island. The LTTE rose to power due to the organizational and military abilities of its leader Velupillai Prabakaran and its efficiency in murdering Notes 211

opponents (individuals and other Tamil paramilitaries). The LTTE is extremely well armed and manufactures a number of its own weapons and munitions, such as mortars and rounds, rifle grenades, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and improvised torpedoes. For discussions on the rise of the LTTE, see Hellman-Rajaanayagam 1994; Gunaratna (1990a); and Hoole et al. (1992). For details on weapons, see Gunaratna (1990a: 45–57). 20. The town currently designated ‘Ampare’ or ‘Ampara’ was previously spelled ‘Amparai.’ The change from the Tamil to a Sinhala spelling reflected an influx on Sinhalese settlers in and around the town. According to the 1921 census for the district, the demographic composition was 8.2 per cent Sinhalese, 37.7 per cent Tamil, and 54 per cent Muslim (Kemper 1991: 145). This compares with the 1981 census which found 37.5 per cent Sinhalese, 20.1 per cent Tamil, and 41.6 per cent Muslim. Thus, the slight alteration in place spelling reflects a demographic shift which is politically unsettling to many East Coast Tamils. Just as the geographical designations ‘Derry’ and ‘Londonderry’ have been politicized, so have ‘Ampare’ and ‘Amparai,’ with the former connoting a pro-Sinhalese sentiment and the latter connoting a pro-Tamil sentiment. 21. For example, according to the 1981 Central Budget, the capital expenditure in the Jaffna District (approximately 6 per cent of the total population) was only 2.6 per cent of the national capital expenditure. On a per capita basis, the capital expenditure in the Jaffna District was Rs. 313, while the national expenditure was Rs 656. In addition, foreign aid allocation to the Jaffna District for the period 1977–82 was nil (CRD 1984: 15). Furthermore, as late as 1975 almost 90 per cent of industry on the island continued to be located in the Sinhalese majority Western Province (Shastri 1990: 70). Of the 40 major government-sponsored industrial units, only five were located in predominantly Tamil areas – of these four were established in the 1950s and one in the 1960s (Manogaran 1987: 130–4, 139). All of these figures are based on a period which was relatively peaceful. While such economic discrimination added to the disgruntlement of Northern Tamils and was criticized by Tamil politicians, it is the full-scale warfare since 1987 which has decimated the regional economy. A development worker who had just returned from Jaffna in May 1992 described the Northern Province as having been bombed and brutalized (by state and LTTE forces) back into a pre-industrial economy. In April 1993, a Canadian academic reported: ‘Meanwhile, the Jaffna Peninsula is locked off by the army, and life there is worse than ever. You will know that Jaffna has lost half of its population. Those that remain under the de facto Prabhakaran [i.e. LTTE] government live hellish lives.’ Bruce Matthews, personal correspondence, 29 March 1993. The area has suffered under the double burden of economic discrimination and, more recently, war. 22. For examples, see: in United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) (1991: 3), Hyndman (1985: 290) and Ponnambalam (1983: 268) 23. In an 1992 interview with Lalith Athulathmudali, former UNP Minister of National Security and founder of the DUNF, he suggested that the solution to the ‘Tamil Problem’ had to start with the military annihilation of the LTTE and that if he won the 1993 presidential elections he would ‘translo- cate’ the residents of the North (particularly the youth). It was explained 212 Notes

that they would live in ‘nice’ camps in the South and that ‘ideally’ they would have complete freedom. In this way, ‘the LTTE fish would be deprived of the life-sustaining water of public support.’ As a hurried post- script, Athulathmudali added that ‘of course’ this would be done only with the consent of the public. The assassination of Athulathmudali in April 1993 silenced one influential voice, but such sentiments continue in other extremist Sinhalese sub-groups. Personal Interview. Colombo, February 1992. 24. Also called the interior or highland Sinhalese and the West and South Coast Sinhalese. 25. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka, May–June 1992. Wet Zone Tamils live mostly in urban areas like Colombo, Kandy and Galle in the South-West quadrant of the country. This gets two monsoons a year while the rest of the country getting only one monsoon is referred to as the dry zone. 26. Personal interviews, Batticaloa, June 1992. Determination of popular sentiment in a war zone is problematic, however. Attitudes and allegiances are context-dependent according to who is asking the question and which group is ‘in control’ at the moment. As a resident of the East Coast explained with only a hint of sarcasm: ‘there is always undying support for which ever group is holding a gun to your head.’ 27. ‘Muslims sought and obtained membership and achieved positions of influence in all major national political (except Tamil) parties, particularly the [UNP] and [SLFP]. Indeed the link with the UNP has given that party the majority of the Muslim vote at every election since 1947. The UNP has always had more Muslim Members of Parliament than the SLFP. Within the Party, Colombo-based Muslims have been until very recently the dominant element’ (de Silva 1988: 208). 28. LTTE attacks on Muslims took place before 1990, but they appear to be part of a two-track strategy which included efforts to build a common front against the Sri Lankan Government. Following 1990, LTTE strategy became exclusively antagonistic towards Muslims. 29. Personal interviews. Batticaloa, February 2002 and December 2002. 30. Somasundaram 1998: 42; Manogaran 1994: 114; UTHR (J)/University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) 1994;Weaver 1988: 67; FEER 21 February 1985: 39; SLA Spearheads Sinhala Colonisation, TamilNet, 25 March 1998. 31. Such as the Dollar and Kent Farm Massacres in 1984. 32. Personal Interviews. Kattankudi, February 2002. 33. http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Asia-08.htm 34. The Up-Country Tamils are the descendants of migrants from South India brought over by the British during the past century-and-a-half to work on the tea and rubber estates in the Central Province. Approximately 80 per cent are plantation workers on tea and rubber estates and a small but an important segment is engaged in trade and business in Colombo and up- country towns (Hollup 1992: 320). Within the South Indian caste system, the majority of the Up Country Tamils are lower caste than the Sri Lankan Tamils in the north of the island. A rural development worker in the plantation area estimated that about 80 per cent of the Up Country Tamils would be low caste – of which, about 60 per cent would be harijans or Notes 213

untouchables by the Indian ranking system, and the remaining 40 per cent would be from the next highest low caste. This, as well as spatial distance and political powerlessness, has contributed to limiting the interaction between the two groups of Tamils. 35. This was recounted to me by a Jesuit Priest, Father Paul Casparsz, who worked with Bishop Nanayakara at the time. 36. The term ‘Sinhalese’ means ‘people of the lion race.’ This mythical account plays down the existence and the rights of the original (aboriginal) population of the island, known as the Veddhas. There are a few thousand descen- dents of this population facing cultural extinction more imminantly than the aboriginal population of Australia. 37. Although Max Muller initially defined ‘Aryan’ as a race, he later withdrew this definition arguing instead that ‘Aryan, in Scientific language, is utterly inapplicable to race. It means language and nothing but language, and if we speak of Aryan race at all, we should know that it means no more than X + Aryan speech.’ Max Muller, Bibliography of Words and the Home of the Aryans, (1888), cited in Committee for Radical Development (CRD) (1984: 42). 38. There is a dearth of material specifically addressing the political dimensions of caste. This section benefits from an excellent unpublished paper by Matthews (n.d. (a)). Also useful are Roberts (1992) and Jiggins (1979). 39. These are ritual occupations only. They originated in the pre-colonial period in connection with rajakariya (lit.: obligatory ‘king’s service’), caste- regulated corvee work for those who did not own wet paddy land or were not involved in rice cultivation. E.R. Leach notes ‘the Washermen are only ritual washermen, the Drummers only religious drummers; in their ordinary life, Goyigama, Washermen, Drummers and the rest are all alike, culti- vators of the soil’ (Leach (1953) cited in Matthews n.d. (a): 8). 40. Although no political party represents the exclusive interests of a particular caste, caste is always a consideration in the choice of candidates and cabinet ministers. Further, as Matthews points out: ‘since Independence every government and every political party has had a Goyigama leader, except for a brief and freakish interim leadership of the SLFP by C.P. de Silva from March–May 1960, and the present United National Party administration’ (n.d. (a): 3). The low caste background of President Premadasa was a constant, if usually unspoken, issue in domestic politics. Some argue that it better enabled him to respond to Tamil concerns, while others argued that it inhibited him from forming a solid consensus within the Sinhalese community which is a prerequisite for inter-group dialogue. 41. A.J Wilson argues that caste was a significant catalyst in JVP recruitment campaigns, especially among the Karavas and Duravas in the low-country southern districts (1974: 46). This is reinforced by Jiggins’ assessment of caste in the 1971 Insurrection. She points out that with within the ‘inner circle’ or ‘politburo’ of the movement, twelve of the fourteen were Karava (1979: 127). 42. The Buddhist sangha in Sri Lanka has three principal Nikayas (‘sects’): the Siam, the Amarapura, and the Ramanna. Matthews explains that the divisions arose primarily as a result of caste differences. (Matthews n.d. (a): 9; Matthews n.d (b): 1; Matthews 1988–89: 621). 214 Notes

43. ‘Although it is somewhat of an over-generalization, it is still fair to say that Goyigama Christians tend to be Anglican, Karavas are frequently Catholic or Methodist and other still lower castes are more often than not members of the Methodist and other Protestant denominations. Ceylon Tamil Christian society is also informally regulated by caste tradition, particularly in mar- riage custom’ (Matthews n.d. (a): 11). 44. For a thickly detailed discussion of this process, see Jayawardenja (2000) and Jiggins (1979). 45. Brahmins do not figure prominently in Tamil politics. Although they rank higher than the Vellalars in the sacred framework, they rank decisively lower in the secular sense. On the whole, they are mere employees of the Vellalar who according to Banks (1971: 67) ‘do not hesitate to discipline Brahmins whom they consider to be behaving badly’ (p. 68) and even have ‘a recognized right to interfere in the details of the temple ceremonial, particularly in the matter of temple festivals and their organization.’ 46. This is the Tamil caste equivalent to the Sinhalese Goyigama. 47. Such reports increased as the LTTE gained exclusive territorial control of regions in the North and North East. (Sri Lanka Infromation Monitor, March 1993: 8; India Today, 15 October 1991: 91. Such practices were continuing in 2001 and early 2002. Bush 2002. 48. This action was undertaken under the cover of the extreme violence of the Second JVP Insurrection (1987–90). See Chapter 6: The 1971 JVP Insurrection and 1987 Resurgence. 49. Personal interviews. Sri Lanka, May–July 1992; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002. 50. One NGO worker commented on pervasiveness of this phenomenon outside of the political arena as well, saying: ‘Factions, factions, everywhere. Even the International Youth Hostel Association is divided into warring factions.’ Personal interviews, Colombo June 1992. 51. For useful studies of the politics of patronage in Sri Lanka, see Jayasuriya (2000), Jiggins (1979) and Warnapala and Woodsworth (1987). 52. Bandaranaike’s assassin was a monk who was aided by Buddharakkhita, the chief incumbent of the influential Kelaniya Temple and the leader of the EBP (Eksat Bhikkhu Peramuna) or ‘United Monks Front,’ an ‘organization of political monks’ (Bechert 1979: 206) which had originally supported Bandaranaike in his 1956 election victory. 53. The B–C Pact was signed by Bandaranaike and S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, the leader of the Federal Party, the major Tamil political party at the time and the precursor to the Tamil United Liberation Front. 54. An incident noted by INFORM illustrates the intra-Party struggles: ‘Mrs. Bandaranaike left the island for Malaysia on March, leaving behind a letter nominating veteran SLFPer K.B. Ratnayake to act as the Leader of the Opposition, in her absence; the 45 MPs supportive of Anura Bandaranaike petitioned the Speaker to recognize Mr. Bandaranaike as the Acting Leader of the Opposition, flouting Mrs. Bandaranaike’s wishes. On [24] March, the Speaker said he would acknowledge Mr. Bandaranaike’s claim’ (Sri Lanka Information Monitor, Situation Report, March 1993). In November 1993, Anura Bandaranaike exited the SLFP and Joined the UNP as a Cabinet Minister. Notes 215

55. Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 September 1988: 38. In the belief that it was going to win the 1988–89 elections, the SLFP is reported to have offered the JVP three ministries (FEER, 27 October 1988: 30). 56. Critics argue: ‘All power in the 1978 Constitution is concentrated nearly 100 per cent in the President. He is more an Executive President. He is the Head of State, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Head of the Government, Head of the Cabinet, source of appointment to the upper tiers of the judiciary. I don’t know what is left to concentrate on him… Both Parliament and Prime Minister have been so heavily devalued that the only thing that I can think of comparing them to is our rupee’ (Colin R. De Silva, quoted in Matthews 1992: 223). 57. Matthews observes the following shift: ‘Writing about Parliament in the early 1970s, Jupp [1978] remarked that the great majority of important politicians in Sri Lanka were drawn from the “oral professions” like law, and had Anglicized backgrounds. The social and educational background of most MPs in all political parties has now dramatically shifted. For example, in 1970 an estimated 75% of members of Parliament spoke English. Now I estimate that approximately only 40% have competence in this language’ (1992: 225). 58. For a review of events, see Matthews (1992) and Christian Workerr, 2nd & 3rd Quarter (November 1991: i–xviii). 59. US Department of State (2001) Department of State Human Rights Reports for 2000, February 2001, http://www.humanrights-usa.net/reports/srilanka.html 60. Lalith Athulathmudali was the first Asian President of the Oxford Union and spoke five languages (English, Sinhala, Tamil, French and German). He was a lecturer at the University of Singapore prior to launching his political career and was able to discuss knowledgeably topics ranging from colonial history and 18th century Church politics to military and education policy. 61. Such as Premadasa’s Janasaviya program (an acronym for several words, together meaning ‘a movement for spreading adaptable resources among the people’), a poverty-alleviation program under which he has pledged to give 1.4 million families Rs1,458 each month for two years in coupons (not cash) for necessities. At the same time Rs1,042 is to be deposited monthly in a compulsory National Savings Bank account so that a family may amass Rs25,000 at the end of that period. Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 October 1988: 30; Matthews (1989: 435); and Janasaviya Programme, Implementa- tion Guidelines No. 1, Draft for Starting Work, National Housing Development Authority, Colombo, January 1989. 62. This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 9. 63. For successive failures in attempts by Tamil political parties to negotiate viable alternatives, see Wilson (1989). 64. By all accounts, the LTTE is responsible these and many other assassinations. See: Hoole et al. (1992); Law and Society Trust, State of Human Rights 2000; and regular UTHR (J) human rights reports. 65. This ethnicization has exacerbated tensions and Tamil mistrust of the security forces – helping to maintain inter-group stresses. 66. For example, the murder of Inspector Bastianpillai and a number of other police officers in 1978 (Hoole et al. 1992: 22). 216 Notes

67. Fredrika Jansz, ‘Where did the third C130 go?,’ The Sunday Leaderr, 24 February 2002: 13. It was reported in many interviews in Batticaloa that in early 2001 the Sri Lankan Army extorted large amounts of money (Rs1.1 million by one estimate) from the local population to hold a ‘song and dance cultural event’ for the troops. Sources of funds included the Traders’ Association (61 leading businesses and shops) and 35 government-registered contractors, as well as schools and private individuals. Efforts were made to force locals to entertain the troops and TELO visited performers to remind them of their commitment. In the end, the LTTE called a hartel and cut electricity for the day of the performance. Personal Interviews. Batticaloa, January 2001. 68. See for example, ‘Colombo Sacks Soldiers Having Links with JVP,’ The Hindu, 20 April 1987: 1. 69. ‘An army officer has been charged under the PTA [Prevention of Terrorism Act] with helping JVP Committee member and present leader to escape to India last year. Capt. Dharmasiri Nissanka will appear before the Avissawella magistrate on April 27 for his involvement in the escape of Somawansa Amarasinghe, military sources said. Somawansa Amarasinghe and at least 200 other members of the JVP escaped to South India before some of them successfully sought political asylum in the West, reliable sources say’ (‘Army Officer Charged with Helping JVP Leader,’ The Island, 5 April 1992). See also, The Sri Lanka Monitor, December 1991: 4. 70. Sri Lanka Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, February, 2000, Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 12, 2000 71. See ‘A Wake Up Call,’ Frontline, vol 18: Issue 17, 18–31 August 2001. 72. Monks (bhikkhus) currently constitute 24 per cent of the arts enrolment, up from 8.8 per cent in 1982 (Matthews 1989: 482). 73. This was pointed out by a number of interviewees. However, Up-Country Tamil support for the JVP cause was the exception rather than the rule, motivated in a few cases by a common ‘opposition to the same oppressive system.’ Personal interviews, Kandy, May–July 1992. 74. Personal interviews, Kandy, June 1992. 75. Personal interviews, Colombo, Kandy, Batticaloa, May–July 1992. 76. EPRLF: Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front; TELO: Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization; PLOTE: People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam. 77. The paramilitary tensions are evident in most cities with a significant Sri Lanka Tamil population. Members of Tamil communities in Europe and North America are frequently harassed and forced to pay ‘donations’ to the war effort. The LTTE is particularly efficient in the collection of foreign funds both through such donations and a broader range of illicit activities (Chalk 2000; personal interviews). 78. This was brought to my attention by Dennis Cole in 1993, Coordinator of Intelligence, Immigration and Refugee Board of the Government of Canada. 79. Jane’s Intelligence (2000). Sentinel-South Asia, November 1999–April 2000, www.janes.com 80. This includes Soviet made SAM-7s ‘ purchased from corrupt government officials and insurgent forces in Cambodia, [and recently acquired] far more Notes 217

deadly and accurate, US-made Stinger missiles acquired from Afghanistan.’ Chalk 2000: 9. 81. Even old data from August 1998 reveals the place of primacy of the LTTE use of suicide bombers. Chalk (2000) estimates that it had conducted 155 battlefield and civilian suicide attacks, compared to the 50 carried out by all other groups worldwide, including Hamas, Hizbollah, the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) and Babbar Khalsa. 82. ‘Martin Comes to Tamils’ Defence,’ National Post (Toronto), 31 May 2000. See also, National Post (Toronto), 3 June 2000. 83. Ottawa Citizen, 4 October 2001. 84. Eelam People’s Democratic Party is a Tamil paramilitary group which split off from the EPRLF in 1987. The EPRLF was a major actor while it received the full backing of the IPKF and Indian government. With the departure of the Indian troops, a large portion of EPRLF members and their families have re-located to South India fearing retribution from the LTTE. Other members sought protection by joining the government side to fight the LTTE with army support. 85. However, according to the terms of the February Ceasefire, all of these groups are to be disarmed and disbanded. Art. 1.8: ‘Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day +30 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.’ Preliminary reports indicate that this is being done. Time will tell whether this is a permanent state of affairs. 86. A. K. Menon, ‘The Other Battle Field,’ India Today, 15 October 1991: 99; The Hindu, 6 September 1991: 1; Frontline, reprinted in Christian Worker, 2nd & 3rd Quarter, 1991: xvi. 87. Christian Worker, 4th Quarter, 1989: viii–x. 88. This view is candidly shared by both military and paramilitary leaders. 89. The assassination of Gandhi may be identified as a critical juncture because it appears to have radically altered the relationship of the LTTE with supporters in South India and in the Indian government. The impact of Premadasa’s assassination appears to have been ambivalent regarding major changes in inter-group or intra-group relations.

4 1948 Independence and Disenfranchisement

1. Relevant sections from the Ceylon Citizen Act, No. 18 (reprinted in Ponnambalam 1993: 75): 4 (1) a person born in Ceylon before the appointed date (15 November 1948) shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon by descent, if (a) his father was born in Ceylon, or (b) his paternal grandfather and paternal great grandfather were born in Ceylon. 4 (2) a person born outside Ceylon before the appointed date shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon, if (a) his father and paternal grandfather were born in Ceylon, or (b) his paternal grandfather and paternal great grandfather were born in Ceylon. 218 Notes

5 (1) a person born in Ceylon on or after the appointed date shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon by descent, if at the time of his birth his father is a citizen of Ceylon. 2. Citizenship was possible if the following conditions were met: that the Indians or Pakistanis possessed ‘an assured income of a reasonable amount’, had no disabilities which made it difﬁcult for them to conform to the laws of Sri Lanka, had their wives and dependent children residing with them during the required period of residence, and had renounced any other citizenship if they possessed it. The residency requirement was ten years if without a spouse and seven years if married (Wilson 1977: 30). 3. For full details, see Kurian (1989), Jayawardena (1990: 64–98); Tinker (1977); and Wilson (1977: 28–38). 4. Agreements along the way include: the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of January 1954, the Sirima–Shastri Agreement of 1964, the Indo-Ceylon Agreement Implementation Act of 1968, and the unilaterally enacted legislation in 1986 to repatriate 94,000 Plantation Tamils. 5. I have argued elsewhere that: ‘many of the ‘new’ political voices among the Plantation Tamils are from those who are increasingly disgruntled with the ability of the pro-UNP CWC, the largest Plantation Tamil trade union, to deliver ‘the goods.’ That the Plantation Tamils have in the past articulated political demands through a pro-UNP political organization has also helped to maintain political barriers between them and other Tamil sub-groups. It was estimated that the CWC has captured approximately 25 per cent of organized worker support (Personal interviews with a range of union organisers and workers, Kandy, May to July 1992). The UNP linkages of the CWC have earned it the disparaging label, the ‘mini-UNP,’ by opposing unions. In the past, political dissent and demands could be paciﬁed/defused by the adroit manoeuvring of the late leader, UNP Minister S. Thondaman, which included cracking down on opposing unions as well as delivering [some] political gains on paper such as citizenship for those Plantation Tamils who had been disenfranchised at independence. However, the death of Mr Thondaman has given rise to jostling for leadership within the CWC which has set in motion a battle for succession that challenges an element of stabil- ity within the Plantation Tamil areas. At this stage, a struggle for political control will likely take place both within the CWC and among the political groups in the Hill Country.’ (Bush 1993). 6. The idea of being ‘swamped’ is a recurrent theme in these debates. Jayawardena (1990: ff. 69) offers a sample of Sinhalese chauvinist remarks and arguments drawn from Parliamentary debates. 7. This compares with 1: 66,400 for the Sinhalese (68 MPs) ; 1: 63,831 for the Muslims (6 MPs); 1: 61,919 for the Sri Lankan Tamils (13 MPs); 1: 11,224 for the Burghers (3 MPs); and 1: 608 for the Europeans (4 MPs) (Manor 1989: 189). 8. Kumari Jayawardena places similar emphasis on both the class and ethnic motivations (though in an intellectually more sophisticated way than Ponnambalam), concluding that the Citizenship Acts ‘[brought] to a conclusion the legal manoeuvres of the Sinhala majority to exclude the Plantation workers from citizenship, thereby disenfranchising the largest section of the working class’ (1990: 81). Notes 219

9. See Jayawardena (1990: 92–95) for the voting record on the Indian and Pakistani Residents Citizenship Act (1948) and for an account of the ethnic backgrounds of those minority MPs voting in favor of the legislation.

5 1956 Election and S.W.R.D Bandaranaike

1. For example, in the economically hard times of the 1930s and the immedi- ate post-WWII period, the political status of Plantation Tamils was represented as a threat to Sinhalese labor interests. 2. At that time, the Sinhalese as a whole were less advantaged than the Sri Lankan Tamils because of lower educational opportunities. Consequently, the Sinhalese generally had less status and income associated with good employment and commercial opportunities. 3. Bandaranaike denounced UNP leaders as ‘treacherous of their race and language’ and claimed that language parity ‘would mean disaster for the Sinhalese race’ (Manor 1989: 236). A bhikkhu (Buddhist monk) from Matara expressed a similar level of emotion: ‘It is not necessary to actually assault the Tamils. If ten to fifteen youths of Matara get together and with knives about on the public road, that alone will make the Tamils run back to the north’ (quoted in Manor 1989: 236). 4 Such as loss of political confidence and material resources, increased attacks from within, defections to competing groups, escalating extremism, and so on. 5. Sir John Kotelawala was known as ‘Asia’s foremost playboy politician, the card-playing two-fisted drinker in the white dinner jacket with an eye for the ladies’ (Manor 1989: 223). He relished and cultivated the image of ‘the strong man of Ceylon’ as a tough and virile man about the town as well as a thug politician able to intimidate and coerce with private cadre of goons (ibid.). As Manor explains: Sir John’s lifestyle and public indiscretions soon made him a symbol of westernized crudity in the eyes of campaigners for indigenization. His well- publicized penchant for jodhpurs by day and dinner jackets by night, for cock- tails and extravagant entertainments, seemed alien and offensive to many Ceylonese, particularly to the Buddhist clergy. He seemed game for anything. It took scathing editorials in the press to dissuade him from riding to a recep- tion in a chariot pulled by sixty girls. In July 1954, he outraged pious Buddhist opinion by attending a barbecue where a calf was roasted on a spit, an incident which became part of the island’s folk memory and haunted him ever after. As the Buddhist upsurge gained momentum in 1955, Sir John blithely described it as ‘madness’ and blamed the monks for the decline of the faith. He seemed to represent all that the revivalists loathed, and this forced them to seek champions from outside the government (Manor 1989: 230). 6.Official photos of the first cabinet show only Bandaranaike and J.R. Jayewardene in ‘national dress.’ Death sentences for convicted Buddhist criminals concluded with ‘May God have mercy on your soul.’ Cabinet ministers gambled openly at race tracks and appeared in press photos, cock- tails in hand. None of this endeared the UNP government to the Buddhist sangha or laity (Manor 1989: 199). 220 Notes

7. Many commentators have argued that the ‘enerving and castrating effect’ of foreign rule, which separated sangha from society was actively pursued by colonial rulers – particularly, the British. Rahula Walpola was one of the most inﬂuential exponents of this argument. See Tambiah (1992: ff. 28). 8. See Walpola (1974), especially Appendix I ‘What is Politics?’, Appendix II ‘Bhikkhus and Politics’, and Appendix III ‘The Kalaniya Declaration of Independence’. Note that this was originally published in Sinhala in 1946 and had an important effect in stimulating political debate within the sangha. 9. Walpola discusses the historical precedents in his Heritage of the Bhikkhu (1974) and his The History of Buddhism in Ceylon (1956). The moral obligation is represented as follows: ‘What the mind is to the body, religion is to politics. Politics bereft of religion becomes sin and evil’ (Rahula 1974: 122). This sentiment is given operational form in the 1946 declaration of the Vidyalankara Pirivena, the monastic collage where Rahula was a senior teacher at the time: ‘Even today bhikkhus by being engaged actively in education, rural reconstructions, anti-crime campaigns, relief work, temperance work, social work and such other activities, are taking part in politics, whether they are aware of it or not. We do not believe that it is wrong for bhikkhus to participate in these activities. We believe that it is incumbent on the bhikkhu not only to further the efforts directed towards the welfare of the country, but also to oppose such measures as are detrimental to the common good’ (emphasis added); reprinted in Rahula (1974: 131–3). 10. This was especially important since the election commissioner’s recommen- dation to increase the number of polls (in order to increase access) had been ignored by the ruling UNP government. This increased the transportation problem for SLFP supporters and because polling stations were located in UNP strongholds, it increased the opportunities to impede and intimidate them as well. 11. Ironically, the EBP would later be implicated in the assassination of Bandaranaike only three years later. 12. A similar phenomenon occurred in Burma in 1917 and 1938 (Bechert 1979: 204). 13. Tambiah cautions that ‘we should be careful not to credit the EBP with a strong organizational structure for systematic and long-term action’ (ibid.). The EBP was a extremely useful to the SLFP in the short-term but it lacked the formal linkages for longer-term staying power. 14. For a Tamil Model I analysis, see Ponnambalam (1983). Government publications and pro-government publications generally offer crude variants of Sinhalese Model I analysis, see Society for Ethnic Amity (n.d.). 15. Coincidentally, his ancestors also appear to have converted to Roman Catholicism under the Portuguese, Dutch Reformism under the Dutch, and to Anglicanism under the British (Manor 1989: 11, 110; Gooneratne 1986: 3–6). 16. Manor further notes that Bandaranaike was not always comfortable in his ‘national dress.’ In 1931, it was reported that he wore socks with his sandals – a breach of custom – and that they were held up by suspenders ‘of foreign origin’ (Manor 1989: 96). He was also frequently to be seen in European suits with stiff collars and occasionally he would appear in a newspaper Notes 221

photograph in a Western suit along side his prize greyhound, Billy Micawber (ibid. 130). In the 1950s, this ambiguity was captured in a cartoon which depicted Bandaranaike clad in national dress on the left side of his body and in a European suit on the right (ibid. 97) 17. Most immediately, the violence of 1958. For details, see Vittachi (1958); Manor (1989: 286–299); and Tambiah (1992: 46–57). 18. This distinction is important because each configuration of intra-group conflict leads to a different set of political outcomes. If the conflict had been between a traditional elite and Anglicized elites, as Horowitz (1973) erroneously suggests, and if the traditional elite had won the contest, then the resulting system of government probably would have deviated from the colonially bequeathed Western model. While it would unlikely be a theo- cracy, it would have positioned the Sinhalese Buddhist elite (the sangha, vernacular literati and educators, ayurvedic practitioners and so on) in a far more prominent and influential position in the affairs of state. But as long as the dissent of the indigenous elite was channeled through an instrumen- tally indigenized elite, the Western structures of government would be main- tained, indeed reinforced, albeit in an ethnicized form. In other words, the set of outcomes in the first scenario would more likely entail a transformation of the system, whereas the second set of outcomes would more likely entail a reconfiguration of power within the existing system. 19. Frequent and spectacular disputes between Bandaranaike and other ministers were reported in Senanayake-owned newspapers. The Byzantine in- fighting is well presented in Manor’s (1989) biography of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. 20. This is literally as well as figuratively true. Bandaranaike was from a high- caste aristocratic Kandyan clan while Senanayake was from low-country aristocracy. The political significance of this is reflected in the competing networks of political and economic resources each was able to drawn upon. There was an on-going rivalry between the Senanayakes and the Bandaranaike–Obeyesekere clans; the latter had built up considerable wealth and influence collaborating with colonial authorities, while the former had led the nationalist and reform struggles against the British. Further tension was generated by the fact that the Bandaranaike– Obeyesekere clan members were long-time property owners while the Senanayakes were more recently propertied (Manor 1989: 108). The nepo- tistic structure of the UNP is outlined in Jiggins (1979: 96–110). For further details, see Manor (1989). 21. For details, see Manor (1989: 271–272). 22. For details, see Bechert (1978). 23. ‘Both Sinhala and Tamil would be used in Parliament and all laws would be promulgated in both languages. Sinhala would be the language used by all courts, government offices and local boards except in the Northern and Eastern Provinces where the language should be Tamil and the medium of instructions in the schools would be the language of the local majority. Although the resolutions rejected parity for the two vernaculars, the SLFP had accepted something very close to it. The headlines read “Sinhala Only” but the small print contained a rather different message’ (Manor 1989: 233). 222 Notes

6JVP 1971 and 1987

1. ‘Authority’ is used here in its Weberian sense: ‘the probability that a command with a specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons’ despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which that probability rests (Weber 1947: 152). 2. Although it is possible to analytically and chronologically separate the 1971 and 1987 episodes, they are treated together here to enable the examination of shifts in ideology and mobilization over time. 3. At different points in time, with varying degrees of emphasis, JVP rhetoric distinguished between Plantation Tamils (particularly as workers) and Tamils from the North and East. See for example, Samaranayake (1987). 4. Chandraprema (1989: 6) dates the ‘inception of the JVP’ ‘around 1964 when a group of youthful dissidents broke away from the pro-Peking Ceylon Communist Party.’ Gunaratna (1990: 5) suggests that the JVP began in 1966–67. 5. For examples, see Jiggins (1979: 139–42), Gunaratna (1990: 37–61, 89, 127), and Chandraprema (1991: 33–43). 6. Interestingly, the JVP rarely made direct reference to religion. ‘It realizes that no anti-Buddhist party could survive in Sri Lanka and therefore does not discourage Buddhist ‘patriotic’ activism (in fact, it is assumed that some JVP opportunists have even donned robes, including perhaps even Wijeweera himself)’ (Matthews 1989: 430). Thus, although the JVP was able to mobilize support from the sangha, particularly the young bhikkhus, mobilization was based on revolutionary or ‘patriotic’ principles rather than Sinhalese Buddhist principles per se. During the 1987 JVP resurgence, the ‘Number 3 in the organization’ was D.M. Nandasena (alias D.M. Ananda), a monk who had given up the robes in his final year of study at Peradeniya (Chandraprema 1991: 10). 7. The following statistics are from Jiggins (1979: 123). 8. Jiggins (1979) makes a convincing case that the both leadership and followers were low caste. In the inner circle or ‘Politburo,’ 12 out of 14 (or 10 out of 11 depending on one’s source of information) were Karava. 9. See Alles (1977); Matthews (1989); Obeysekere (1974); Jiggins (1979); Samaranayake (1987); Jayawardena (1990); Gunaratna (1990); and Chandraprema (1989, 1991). 10. Two recent accounts of the JVP suggest that the premature attack on police stations which eliminated the element of surprise in the 1971 insurrection was the result factional in-fighting: Chandraprema (1991); and Gunaratna (1990). 11. At the time, the Sri Lankan military services were still largely ceremonial. Political leaders neither perceived the need nor commanded the resources to radically increase the military forces. In addition, following failed military coups in 1962 and 1966, governments were hesitant to build up the military apparatus, preferring instead to rely on the police forces to maintain law and order (personal interviews with Sri Lankan Army military officers, Colombo, May–July 1992). 12. For one estimate of costs, see Gunaratna (1990: 104). 13. The events of 1971 can be labelled an ‘insurrection;’ the JVP organized its members to launch a mass attack against police stations throughout the Notes 223

country on a certain date. The preparation of the members may have been inadequate and the attacks may have been uncoordinated, but there was a sufficient level of organization and resources to enable identifiable actors to engage in a particular collective action at a particular point in time. In contrast, the events starting in 1987 lacked such structure. The JVP had only recently adopted a cell organizational structure and was in the process of reconstituting itself into an underground revolutionary movement (Gunaratna 1990: 200–201). It did not have sufficient resources to launch an insurrection. Instead, independently of JVP activity, events catalyzed political dissent within the Sinhalese intra-group arena and created ideal conditions for launching a sustained challenge to the status quo and the representatives of the state. The JVP responded to, rather than initiated, events. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement proved to be the pivotal event which galvanized the opposition from many diverse sub-groups and enabled the resurgence of the JVP. Thus, while the events of April 1971 may be accurately labelled a failed insurrection, the period from 1987 to 1990 is more appropriately identified as a period of JVP ‘resurgence.’ Although the latter episode was a ‘resurgence’ rather than an ‘insurrection,’ it was much more destabilizing and bloody. 14. On 31 July 1983, the JVP was proscribed with two other Marxist organizations, the Sri Lanka Communist Party (Moscow) and the Trotskyite Nava Sama Samaja Party. Opponents of the government and independent observers stressed the improbability of involvement by these groups. Meyer points to ‘the paradox of an attack directed against the Tamils by the JVP and the NSSP whose recent writings revealed a desire for rapprochment with the terrorists and an attempt to analyse the minorities problem’ (1984: 141). It is also unlikely that such an organized and concerted action as that in 1983 could have been planned without attracting the attention of the Central Intelligence Bureau which had claimed to have unearthed a Naxilite plot the day after the 1982 presidential elections (Obeyesekere 1984: 169). 15. Wijeweera was, however, a distant third place finisher. By percentage of votes cast, the results were: UNP 52.91; SLFP 39,07; JVP 4.19; All Ceylon Tamil Congress 2.67; Lanka Sama Samaj Party 0.88; Nava Sama Samaja Party 0.26. 16. The following statistics are from Matthews (1989: 427–8). 17. The 1987 Insurrection had a very different leadership from that of the 1971 Insurrection. With the exception of Wijeweera, the 1971 leadership was not involved in organizing for the 1987 Insurrection. After the 1971 experience they entered other areas of activity. While some continued political activities, they did so through the legal political channels (Chandraprema 1991: 2; Gunaratna 1990: 143). Some of those who had been in leadership positions in 1971 became disillusioned with Wijeweera and joined anti-JVP political parties in 1977 when it was un-banned (Chandraprema 1991: 52). Premachandra’s (1991: 6–14) biographical sketches of the JVP leadership in 1987 indicate that 16 of the 35 leaders (for whom sketches were provided) had been involved in the 1971 Insurrection but none held positions in the Central Committee or ‘inner council.’ 224 Notes

18. See, for example, the International Alert report, Political Killings in Southern Sri Lanka (Marino 1989) which includes 31 pages of the names of victims and the circumstances under which they were murdered in JVP-related violence. See also, Gunaratna (1990: 270–290). Chandraprema (1989: 30–31) writes: ‘Knives and swords are used in preference to guns to do the actual killing … guns being used only for intimidation of intended victims. Victims are very often cut to ribbons part by part … slowly. Whole families have been chopped to bits … the children often being burnt alive. Many members of the public – very ordinary people – like bus drivers, scavengers, small time shop-keepers have been shot for disobeying JVP orders. This has been done regardless of the fact that their orders were disobeyed only because of counter-orders by the armed forces.’ 19. As discussed below, the JVP initially avoided direct attacks on the military forces and, instead, attempted to recruit them to the JVP cause. 20. Each of these incidents, and those below, were confirmed in personal interviews conducted in Sri Lanka in May–July 1992. Abductions, disappearances, and hostage-taking were still occurring at that time on the East Coast and in the North. The culprits, however, were not the JVP, but government forces, pro-government Tamil paramilitaries, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Amnesty International 1993; USCR 1991; INFORM Sri Lanka Information Monitorr). Discussions with an individual involved in a project documenting disappearances and human rights abuses on the East Coast, and an examination of a computer print out of over 3,000 missing persons from the Southern Province (made available to me by a Sri Lanka-based human rights monitoring group) reveal a striking fact: the majority of individuals (who had the courage to file affidavits) know who abducted their children, parents, siblings or friends. Details are frequently available on: the security force responsible; the identity of members of the abducting group; license plate numbers of vehicles involved in an abduction; and location where the abducted individuals were initially taken. Yet prosecution of those responsible for flagrant humans abuses has been almost non-existent. 21. With a specific focus on Sri Lankan and Mozambique, Nordstrom (1992) provides an insightful anthropological examination of the construction and the use of terror as a mechanism employed by state and non-state forces for gaining or maintaining socio-political control over a population. Such ‘dirty wars’ ‘seek victory, not through military and battlefield strategies, but through horror. Civilians, rather than soldiers, are the tactical targets, and fear, brutality, and murder are the foundation on which control is constructed’ (p. 261). 22. For example, JVP leaflets have placed the following restrictions on the burial of its victims: forbidding the burial to be a ceremonial occasion; limiting the service to only two bhikkhus for no more than a half hour; forbidding the body to be transported in a hearse or to be carried more than one foot above ground level; prohibiting notices of grief, photographs or announcements; prohibiting the cremation of the body and stipulating that the burial plot must be at ground level; and limiting funeral rites to no more than ten individuals (Gunaratna 1991: 299). 23. For a detailed discussion of Udugampola’s specific allegations, see the speech by the lawyer who convinced him to write down a full statement of Notes 225

all he knew about government-related death squads: Batty Weerakoon in the Yukthiya (1 August 1993), reprinted as an insert in INFORM, Sri Lanka Information Monitor, August 1993. See also: Christian Worker (2nd & 3rd Qr.) 1992: i–ii; and the Ottawa Citizen, 11 April 1992: A 6. Udugampola, nick- named the ‘butcher cop,’ was well-known for his brutality: ‘Udugampola’s mother, brother, sister-in-law and two children were killed and burnt [by the JVP]. Subsequently, the Udugampola brothers – a DIG, another an Inspector and an Army Major vied (sic) each other in heading the anti-JVP war with their own special teams. Udugampola, who was very active in anti-JVP operations transformed the strategy of combatting the JVP from cordon and search, to search interrogate and destroy. It was he together with Brigadier Laksman Algama who first started to fight the JVP unconven- tionally’ (Gunaratna 1990: 286). His brutality was frequently mentioned in interviews with development and human rights workers on the island (personal interviews, May–July 1992). Most felt that peacebuilding and reconciliation were not possible until human rights abusers were held accountable for their actions. 24. Following the assassination of President Premadasa in May 1993 and the subsequent change in UNP leadership, secret contact was made between Udugampola and the government which resulted in their respective withdrawal of allegations and criminal charges. In August 1993, Udugampola was appointed Acting Chairman of the Port Authority with a handsome salary and allowances for housing, entertaining, and fuel. Udugampola claims that the signatures on the incriminating documents are not authentic and the UNP government appears anxious to let the whole episode drop out of sight. What makes the Udugampola–UNP reconciliation and declaimers incredible is that when Udugampola passed his press statement (based on his affidavits) over to the lawyer Batty Weerakoon, the whole episode was videotaped by a BBC correspondent in Sri Lanka. The video shows Udugampola signing his name at the bottom of every page. Opposition party members maintain their accusations that the UNP government is implicated in vigilante murders. The government is unwilling to set up a commission of inquiry into the Udugampola allegations, e.g. verification of the lists of victims, political affiliations, and circumstances of death (Sri Lanka Information Monitor, August 1993) 25. The Rajarata Rifles regiment was deployed against Tamil militants in North in 1984/85 when it went on a rampage of indiscriminate killing of civilians following the murder of some of its members by Tamil militants. Following the incident there was a mass desertion of the regiment. The government responded with the complete disbanding of the regiment, the revocation of military honours and the regiment’s colors. Personal interview with Bruce Matthews, Colombo, June 1992. See also Marino (1989: 5). 26. The 21 April 1989 issue of the JVP newspaper, Ranabima contained the following passage: ‘The main reason why the respect of the people for the Army has deteriorated is not because the shortcomings and faults of the soldiers but because the Army has been utilized in committing various crimes against the people for political motives. Service chiefs like … are responsible for this’ (reprinted in Chandraprema 1991: 294). 226 Notes

27. Death threats were sent to the families of known JVP members. They concluded as follows: ‘Is it not among us, ourselves, the Sinhalese people that your son/brother/husband has launched the conflict in the name of patrio- tism? Is it then right that you who are the wife/mother/sister of this person who engages in inhuman murder or your children should be free to live? Is it not justified to put you to death? From this moment, you and all your family members must be ready to die!. … May you attain Nirvana!’ (reprinted in Chandraprema 1991: 296). 28. It should be noted that Wijeweera was arrested three weeks before the 1971 Insurrection and spent the duration in a Jaffna prison. During the legal prosecution of the insurgency leaders, Wijeweera conducted his own defence (resulting in a transcript of over 400 pages). His fiery defence of JVP actions served to imbue the movement with a romanticized tinge in the eyes of the youth of the mid-1980s; something which helped JVP mobilizational efforts. 29. The identification of the ‘class’ basis of the JVP is problematic. It was not based particularly on the urban working class or the peasantry. Premachandra (1989: 7) describes its support base as a ‘bitterly discontented layer of rural middle class youth.’ Wijeweera, however, specified the social location of this group more explicitly when he characterizes the unemployed youth as a group waiting to enter the rural proletariat (Jiggins 1979: 125). Jiggins explains ‘the movement was thus not among rural wage labourers, but characteristically, was the expression of those either waiting to sell their labour or engaged in improving its saleability’ (ibid.). 30. The original ‘Five Lectures’ were: ‘The Economic Crisis of the Capitalist System,’ ‘Indian Expansionism,’ ‘Independence,’ ‘The Leftist Movement’ and ‘The Path the Sri Lankan Revolution Should Take.’ For details, see Gunaratna (1990: 61) and Chandraprema (1989: 71–77). 31. In the form of Indian capital domination of the Sri Lankan import–export trade, cultural ‘infiltration,’ smuggling, and so on. 32. A Sinhalese development worker in the Plantation areas explained the tension faced by the JVP vis a vis Plantation Tamils. As self-proclaimed Marxists, the JVP cannot deny the Plantation Tamil right to struggle for self-determination – as this ‘resonates ideologically with the JVP.’ However, the JVP must also recognize that its support base is in the rural villages, that is, the Sinhalese villages. Thus, according to this observer, mobilization must pander to anti-Tamil sentiment; the difficulty is in determining the cost-effective balance between support for Plantation Tamil self-determination and the representation of Plantation Tamils as a facet of ‘Indian expansionism’ (personal interviews, Kandy, May–July 1992). 33. ‘A Message to the People of Sri Lanka’ (1984), quoted in Jayawardena (1990: 150). 34. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka, May–July 1992. See also Gunaratna (1990: 131–3.) 35. Subsequently murdered in Madras by LTTE in June 1990 with 15 others members of the EPRLF. 36. It was alleged in the interview that because the Sri Lankan government feared the PLOTE–JVP connection, it provided aid to the LTTE in an attack against a PLOTE camp in Wilpattu Wildlife Park in May 1989. The Sri Notes 227

Lankan military support is alleged to have included air, sea and land transport. The dynamics here are parallel to the allegations during the impeachment procedings that President Premadasa had supplied money and material to the LTTE for use against the IPKF and IPKF-supported defence forces (see Episode V). 37. See also Gunaratna (1993: 333–4) for further instances of cooperation between Sinhalese and Tamil militant groups, including joint training in India and Sri Lanka and JVP efforts to use PLOTE connections to acquire arms from North Korea. 38. It should be noted that the number of students directly involved in pro-JVP activity was actually quite small relative to their impact. Matthews (1989: 432) estimates that in 1989 only 10–20 per cent of the students were actively involved in violence and intimidation. 39. A belief also held by A.C.S. Hameed, Minister of Education, who argued that the single primary factor contributing to student unrest was the abolition of student assemblies without providing an alternative arrange- ment for student representation (in an interview with Bruce Matthews (1989: 432). 40. ‘Legitimacy’ is used in its Weberian sense: a conviction on the part of persons subject to authority that it is right and proper and that they have some obligation to obey, regardless of the basis on which this belief rests (Weber 1947: 324). 41. Athulathmudali’s proposal is also mentioned in Chapter One. In the initial stages of ‘translocation,’ the Tamil youth could live in ‘nice’ camps in the South. Ideally, they would ‘have complete freedom’ and would enjoy ‘training programs.’ Athulathmudali argued that this way the ‘LTTE ﬁsh would be deprived of the life sustaining water of public support.’ As an after-thought, Athulathmudali added that ‘of course’ he would do all this only with the consent of the public (personal interviews, Colombo, May–July 1992).

7 1983 Riots

1. ‘Militarization’ is used here to refer to the tendency for intergroup relations and conflict to be defined in narrow military terms. This typically coincides with an increase in military-related expenditures and military crack-down on civilian and combatant groups. After 1983, the Sri Lankan government began to view the ‘Tamil problem’ exclusively as a ‘military’ one. The statement by President J.R. Jayewardene illustrates the phenomenon: ‘I shall have a military solution to what I believe is a military problem. After doing so, I shall tackle the political side’(quoted in The Times (London), 26 January 1986). It is argued below that the friction within the Jayewardene administration between ‘hawks’ (advocating militarization) and ‘doves’ (advocating political solutions) was a factor in the outbreak of the riots. In September 1993, President Wijetunga expressed similar sentiments when he stated his conviction that ‘there is not ethnic conflict … one only has to overcome a terrorist problem.’ The same position was articulated by Sirimavo Bandaranaike (Sri Lanka Information Monitor, September 1993), as well by her daughter in her role as president, most evidently in her ‘War for Peace.’ 228 Notes

2. This frustration was aggravated by the perception that education and employment opportunities were being denied to them (CRD 1984: 7–13; Gunawardene 1975; Kapferer 1984; Kearney 1975; De Silva 1977; C.R. De Silva 1979). After the declaration of a state of emergency in Jaffna in 1979, the presence and activities of the ‘Sinhalese Army of Occupation’ added to the frustration of Tamil youth. For a discussion of the 1979 imposition of a state of emergency in Jaffna, see MIRJE (1980). 3. The text of the resolution is reprinted in de Silva (1986: 403–406). The Resolution concludes with the statement: ‘And this Convention calls upon the Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth in particular to come forward to throw themselves fully into the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign socialist state of Eelam is reached.’ Although the TULF officially eschewed violent means to achieve this end, its public ambivalence and provocative speeches caused many in the Sinhalese audience to doubt its commitment to a non-violent pursuit of Eelam. A number of individuals interviewed in Sri Lanka (including a former TULF strategist and Tamil academics) felt that the TULF was tacti- cally inciting the youth militancy as a means of extracting political conces- sions (such as devolution of political power) from the UNP government. It was a tactic, they pointed out, which back-fired. 4. Hyndman (1988: 83) estimates that by May 1985, there were over 100,000 Tamils from Sri Lanka in South India – an estimate confirmed in April 1985, by the Acting High Commissioner of India to Canada in a presentation at Carleton University (Canada). The Tamil diaspora is large and especially well-organized in Canada, Australia, the US, Britain, Norway, and Germany. The US Committee for Refugees (1991) estimates that by 1991 more than 210,000 had fled to the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu and at least 700,000 people from all communities had been displaced within Sri Lanka (News Release, 12 November 1991). For a general discussion of displaced persons in Sri Lanka, see CPA et al. (2001) and Thambayah (1992). 5. The full text of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other emergency regulations are available through the Law Library of Congress. See The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ‘Legislative Enactments of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka’ in force on the 31st Day of December 1980, Revised Edition (Unofficial), Volume II containing Chapters 25 to 30. Since the mid-1990s, Law and Society Trust has annually published Sri Lanka: State of Human Rights, which offers regular assessment of this, and related, security legislation. 6. Within Sri Lanka, NGOs include the Law and Society Trust, the Centre for Policy Alternatives, the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, the Centre for the Study of Human Rights, Lawyers for Human Rights and development, MIRJE, INFORM, the Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka, the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), and the Batticaloa Peace Committee. Outside Sri Lanka, the list of groups includes: Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, International Alert, Lawasia, Asia Watch, and the British Refugee Council. 7. For details, see Tiruchelvam (1999); Matthews (1987, 1993) and Islam (1987). 8. The Jaffna Public Library contained over 95,000 volumes, many of which are irreplaceable and were of great cultural value (MIRJE 1983: 17; Obeyesekere 1984: 163; Leary 1981: 32). Notes 229

9. In a Statement to Parliament (9 June 1981) on the violence in Jaffna, Gamini Dissanayake said: ‘ … there is no doubt whatever, that there was a very serious situation in Jaffna because the police force was on the verge of a virtual mutiny’ (reprinted in the Sri Lanka Resource Centre (1981: 57). 10. Gamini Dissanayake’s statement in Parliament suggests that the government lost control, but denies responsibility: ‘The duty of maintaining law and order is the responsibility of the Government, and the police force is an arm of that process, but when the police force is shot at and people are killed [by Tamil militants], the behavioral patterns of those officers who are shot at is something we cannot be responsible for’ (reprinted in Sri Lanka Resource Centre 1981: 68). 11. See for example: ‘Statement made in Parliament by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. A. Amirthalingam on 9th June 1981’ (Sri Lanka Resources Centre 1981: 9–24) and ‘Statement in Parliament by Mr V. Yogeswaran, M.P. for Jaffna’ (ibid.: 25-30). 12. The communalist rancor in Parliamentary debates of this period is illustrated in excerpts reprinted in Sri Lanka Resource Centre (1981). See also, MIRJE (1983: 16–25). 13. One poster pasted throughout Colombo read: ‘Aliens, you have danced too much; your destruction is at hand. This is the country of we Sinhalas’ (USCR 1991: 8). 14. While the violence in Ampara is generally identified as the the starting point for this outbreak, the violence there was ‘spill over’ from a sporting event in Batticaloa. The violence in Ampara was ‘communalist’ in terms of the axis of confrontation, it may not have been communalist in terms of its ‘trigger.’ According to Norman Uphoff, the violence there and in parts of Gal Oya were spontaneous, in contrast to the more structured incidents which followed elsewhere (personal correspondence, January 1994). 15. President Jayewardene seems to have recognized this fact. According to Leary (1981: 21): ‘The International Herald Tribune reported that President Jayewardene, in an interview with a Reuters correspondent on August 14, stated that attacks on Tamils in Ratnapura appeared to have been organized. The Guardian (London) reported on August 15th that ‘it seems to have been established that an unnamed group is organizing the present violence for motives of its own.’ An editorial in The Hindu (India) of 18 August, 1981 stated that ‘a close look into the riots would show that behind them is a planned and systematic effort to aggravate racial animosity.’ It was widely reported that attacks in Negombo as well as attacks against passengers on a Jaffna to Colombo train were made by organized gangs. Tamil sources stated that it could not be ruled out that people close to the government were behind the organized violence. They also claimed that police and army forces did not intervene to prevent attacks until the declaration of the state of emergency many days after the attacks began.’ 16. There were three identifiable categories of targets attacked by Tamil militants at this time: 1.) the military and police personnel stationed in the North; 2.) moderate Tamil politicians who were seen to be cooperating with the UNP government; and 3.) those identified as informers by the militants. 17. In May 1983, a Defence Ministry spokesman announced: ‘The armed forces and the police in the North are to be given legal immunity judicial and wide ranging power of search and destroy’ (Hoole et al. 1992: 58). In early 230 Notes

June The Sun reported: ‘Under such circumstances soldiers were compelled to react as during a war particularly in their role of fighting armed terrorists who had no compunction about killing servicemen or members of the public. In view of this, it has been felt that police and service-men in the North should be given the freedom of the battlefield rather than have their morale sapped through conflicts with legal niceties. This is not a peacetime situation and the police and services must be provided with adequate safe- guards when attempting to control the problem’ (ibid.). 18. On 23 July the Sri Lankan Army began an operation to remove some of the Plantation Tamils from the predominantly Tamil areas of Mannar, Vavuniya, and Trincomalee where they had resettled following the anti- Tamil riots of August 1977 and August 1981. In the early hours of the morning, an estimated 600 displaced Plantation Tamils were herded into trucks and brought to the Nuwara Eliya District (Bastian 1993: 22). This event may, or may not, be directly related to the ambush in Jaffna. It was, however, an act that was sure to provoke a negative response from Tamil sub-groups in light of the political volatility of state-sponsored settlement of Sinhalese in Tamil majority districts. Hyndman (1988: 8) reports allegations that the ambush was in retaliation for the rape of several Tamil women by soldiers. 19. The fact that the patrol was initially ambushed with a land mine is significant because it is a result of Indian government support for Tamil militants: ‘India had begun to supply the Tigers with Claymore land mines as a way of better withstanding the Sinhalese armies superiority in mobility and its increasing resort to a military solution’ (Tambiah 1992: 72). 20. Hyndman (1988) suggests that reporting of the rampage by security personnel in the newspapers in the South might have moderated the Sinhalese backlash. 21. There are many horrifying stories of the experiences of Tamil families (see for example, Kanapathipillai 1990; and Tambiah 1993). It should be stressed that there were many instances where Sinhalese and Muslim individuals and families took great risks to protect Tamil friends and strangers. Tambiah (1993) discusses some of these incidents. 22. These statements by Jayewardene were confirmed by The Guardian, 9 August 1983. Both passages are reprinted in Tambiah (1986: 25). 23. The magisterial inquiries into each incident are assessed by Hyndman (1988: 19–26). The prison authorities have been criticized for not removing the remaining Tamil detainees following the first attack. Many of the detainees, being held under the PTA, had not been charged with any criminal offence. Among the victims was a medical doctor who was the Secretary of the Gandhiyam movement. Prison officials claimed to be unable to iden- tify any individuals involved in the massacre. The corpses could not be examined by an independent coroner because after both incidents they were claimed by the Detective Superintendent of Police (Colombo) under Regulation 15A of the emergency regulations which allows state authorities to dispose of corpses. Hyndman observes: ‘From the list of those participat- ing in the inquiries it can be seen that lawyers for surviving Tamil prisoners (Mr. Yogarajah apart) were not present at the hearing. … On the second occasion [i.e. the 27 July massacre] the prisoners were all in the same build- Notes 231

ing and many of them may have had the opportunity to see who their assailants were, or to be able to provide other evidence of assistance to the inquiry’ (1988: 23). While the deaths were found to be ‘all cases of homi- cide as a result of a riot in prison’ (ibid.: 22), no one has been charged. 24. Such as Gampaha, Kalutara, Matale, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla and Bandarawella. 25. ‘Quasi-legal’ because the measures were sanctioned by emergency regulations which were often in contravention to international legal conventions. 26. The militant groups are more appropriately identified as ‘incipient paramilitary organizations’ because they had not yet acquired the size, structure, or material resources associated with full fledged paramilitary organizations. 27. Concurring with the study of the 1981 communal violence by the Council for Communal Harmony through the Media, MIRJE (1983: 18) concludes: ‘As it turned out, not only the bulk of Sinhalese people were kept in the dark and even misled in regard to the truth about events in Jaffna, but they were also, at the same time, subjected to dangerously anti-Tamil propa- ganda.’ See also Siriwardene (1984: 226–228). 28. This point was confirmed during a seminar of researchers at the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, June 1992. 29. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Director, International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES). Personal interview, Colombo, 28 May 1992. 30. Lalith Athulathmudali, then Minister of Trade and Shipping, opened his speech to the nation as follows: ‘A few days ago, my friends, I saw a sight which neither you nor I thought we should see again. We saw many people looking for food, standing in line, greatly inconvenienced, seriously inconvenienced.’ Obeyesekere comments bitterly: ‘Here was the leading intellec- tual in the government speaking of the hardship faced by Sinhalese people queuing for food [because Sinhalese mobs had burned down Tamil shops] when 70,000 Tamils were in refugee camps. Equally astounding is the fact that neither the President nor any minister of the government made an official visit to single refugee camp to console the dispossessed’ (Obeyesekere 1984: 167). 31. Many middle class Tamils were dismayed by the rationalization for the violence which they often heard from some Sinhalese: ‘if you call for separation, what do you expect?’ However, following the JVP terror of 1987–90, which coerced Sinhalese into not denouncing a repugnant political program, there was an increase in the sympathy by some Sinhalese for the victimization of Tamil civilians in the North caught between government forces and anti-government forces. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka, May–July 1992. See also Spencer (1984) and Nissan (1984). 32. The work of external agencies should not be seen as minimizing or over- shadowing the courageous role played by Sri Lankan development and human rights organizations which have consistently spoken out on behalf of victims of injustice from all communities. Despite the government clamp-down, Goonetileke (1984) lists over 400 articles written on the 1983 riots. See also Rupesinghe and Verstappen (1989) whose annotated bibliography includes over 2,300 entries. An up-dated version was subsequently published by Rupesinghe, Verstappen and Philip in 1993. 33. Identification of such vehicles and their license plate numbers is presented in various publications, for example Piyadasa (1984) and in reports of earlier 232 Notes

instances of anti-Tamil violence (MIRJE 1981: 19). Frequently, affidavits reporting abductions by security forces also include badge numbers, license plate numbers and other pieces of ‘firm evidence’ identifying those responsible. In Sri Lanka editions of Hoole et al. (1992), the government censor blacks out the license plate numbers of the Sri Lanka Transport vehicle used to transport rioters in the 1983 riots (p. 64). 34. Tambiah describes the rioters which were mobilized. They were Sinhalese males, ‘virtually all drawn from Colombo and its suburbs’ (Tambiah 1992: 74). More specifically, they were ‘the urban working class, particularly those in government factories, the laborers, small businessmen and others employed in the congested bazaars and markets, secondary school students and recent dropouts, the urban underclass of unemployed and underem- ployed, the residents of shanty towns. A more detailed enumeration would include the following ‘occupational’ categories: wage workers in factory mills; transport workers such as bus drivers and conductors, workers in railway yards and electrical installations; petty traders and workers in markets, including fish mongers and market porters; small shopkeepers and salesmen in government corporations; hospital workers and attendants; high school students and students of technical institutes and tutories including recent school dropouts’ (Tambiah 1992: 74). 35. Discussions by Tambiah (1992: 73) and Obeyesekere (1984: 160) point to the same conclusion. 36. For full details see, Christian Workerr, 2nd and 3rd Quarters 1992 (November). 37. Dissanayake subsequently split with the UNP in 1991 (after Premadasa replaced Jayewardene as president) to form the Democratic United National Front with another former UNP Minister Lalith Athulathmudali. 38. The censorship guidelines are presented and discussed in Hyndman (1988: 31–34). The guidelines established on 2 August 1983 include: #5. No statements will be permitted on any subject by political parties or political per- sonalities other than statements arranged for broadcast through State media; and #6. No comment will be permitted by any person on the present security or political situation. The continued government repres- sion of the media and freedom of expression generally gave rise to the ‘Free Media Movement’ in early 1993. A reminder of the government censor’s presence is offered in the blacked-out sections of ‘politically sensitive’ books in Sri Lanka, for example, the passages in Hoole et al. (1992: 47, 64, 66) dealing with the 1983 riots. 39. Commenting on the conduct of the armed forces during the riots, Gamini Dissanayake noted, ‘It was only when they realized that this was not a mere communal outburst that they thought of doing their duty of maintaining law and order’ (Daily News, 6 August 1983, quoted in Nissan 1984: 180).

8 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement

1. The judgment that the Agreement was unanticipated is reinforced by a review of the literature and media reports written at the time. For example, Premdas and Samarasinghe (1988: 677) write that ‘the Accord came as a sudden thunderbolt.’ This view is expressed by Professor Virginia Leary Notes 233

(who headed the 1981 International Commission of Jurists fact-finding Mission to Sri Lanka) in an address to the Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University (Canada) in October 1987. And it is the view of the author based on field work in South India from 1986 to 1987 while on a Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute Fellowship (Bush 1989). Recently, K.M. De Silva (1993) has claimed that the Agreement was the product of a negotiating process which began in 1983. This assessment is untenable for many reasons, most obviously because the issues and actors have changed since 1983, making the identification of a single negotiating process impossible. 2. For example, in Clause 2.9 of the Agreement the Governments of India and Sri Lanka committed the Tamil paramilitary organizations to the following: ‘ … A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the island within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka. Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on May 25, 1987. The process of surrendering of arms and the confining the security personnel moving back to barracks (sic) shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.’ 3. The main IPKF offensive was concentrated in the Jaffna peninsula where military confrontation with the LTTE took the form of conventional military engagements. Military confrontations on the East coast consisted mostly of hit-and-run operations by the LTTE. 4. See for example, de Silva (1991) and Kodikara (1989). 5. Including, inter alia, ballot box stuffing, impersonation, and omissions from the voters list. (‘Samarakone’ 1984). The monitoring of election violence and irregularities has been undertaken effectively by a local NGO, The Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV). For past reports, see: http://www.cpalanka.org 6. The unprecedented UNP majority won in 1977 was largely the consequence of voters’ overwhelming rejection of Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s SLFP government which had extended its mandate through emergency legislation. The rejection of the SLFP was so thorough that the TULF became the official opposition party. Regarding the possible discrepancy in a ‘first-past-the- post’ electoral system between percentage of popular vote won by a Party and the portion of seats allocated to it, ‘Samarakone’ observes: ‘it was to avoid such extreme incongruities that the government had introduced proportional representation in 1978. It was to reproduce such incongruity that it set aside proportional representation in favour of a referendum in 1982’ [emphasis in original] (1984: 84). 7. The continued anti-TULF policy of the LTTE and its ability to infiltrate into Colombo are seen in by the LTTE’s assassination of the top TULF leaders in July 1989, Appapilai Amirthalingam and V. Yogeswaran (FEER, 27 July 1989: 10–11), as well as Dr Neelan Thiruchelvam in July 1999. 8. INFORM reports that in September 1993 the government promulgation of a coastal security zone ‘barred to civilians [from] north of Mannar to Trincomalee’ resulted in over 90,000 fisher families losing their sole means of livelihood (Sri Lanka Information Monitor, September 1993). 234 Notes

9. There are many references to such training bases: Gunaratna (1990a: 48–54) Tambiah (1986: 109); O’Ballance (1989: 19, 31, 42) India Today, 31 March 1984, 15 July 1987; South, March 1985; and Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 February 1985. An especially detailed discussion of the covert involvement by Indian actors is provided by Kadian (1990: 98–109): ‘[The Sri Lankan Tamil Militant groups] activities in India were broadly under the aegis of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the Cabinet Secretariat [India’s foreign intelligence agency], i.e. directly under the Indian Prime Minister’s ofﬁce’ (p. 98). 10. While I was in Jaffna in January 1981, a Catholic priest explained to me that funding, training, and arms were being supplied to ‘the Boys’ (a generic term for Tamil militants) by the PLO, the Soviet Union, Libya, and the IRA. In a June 1992 interview in Sri Lanka, a leader in PLOTE claimed that he had received training in Lebanon in 1984 from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). He also identiﬁed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a source of support for EROS as early as 1976–77. 11. The following list draws from Marino (1987: 5). 12. The context of this episode does not detract from the heinousness of the massacre but it does point out the role of government policies in adding to ethnic tensions. Rubin (1987: 112) explains: ‘These farms had been the property of a well-to-do Tamil who donated them in 1978 for the resettlement of Indian Tamil plantation laborers who had been driven from their homes by anti-Tamil violence in 1977. The government subsequently took over the farms, expelled the Tamils, and settled Sinhalese convicts and their families there in a rehabilitation scheme. Tamils perceived the scheme as part of a government effort to settle Sinhalese in predominantly Tamil areas in order to counteract Tamil demands for control of those areas.’ 13. O’Ballance (1989: 35) claims that: ‘the government admitted that, to avoid attacks and ambushes [in early 1984], Sinhalese policemen had all been withdrawn from outlying police stations in the Jaffna Peninsula area to the two main police stations at Jaffna and Kankesanturai.’ The ultimate result of this decision could only be the strengthening of paramilitary control of these areas – which came to be known locally as ‘Tiger country,’ after the LTTE became the most powerful Tamil paramilitary organization. 14. Marino (1987: 2–8) provides a concise chronology of violence and counter- violence in the period from 1983 to 1986. 15. A comprehensive study of Sri Lankan politics from 1983 to the present has yet to be written. 16. See Frontline, Vol. 4, No. 12 (13–26 June), 1987: 4–16. For further details on the extent of the Sri Lankan military offensive, see: ‘Four Tamils Killed,’ The Hindu, 22 January 1987: 9; ‘20 Killed in Fighting in Batticaloa Dt.,’ The Hindu, 29 January 1987: 1; ‘200 Civilians Killed, Says LTTE,’ The Hindu, 31 January 1987: 1; ‘Sri Lankan Planes Strafe Village in Mannar,’ The Hindu, 7 February 1987: 9; ‘Sri Lanka Armed Forces Launch Major Attacks,’ The Hindu, 7 February 1987: 9; ‘Massive Army Operations in Mannar,’ The Hindu, 8 February 1987: 2; ‘22 Militants Die as Battle Continues,’ The Hindu, 9 February 1987: 9; ‘Massacre in Mannar,’ The Hindu, 11 February 1987: 1; ‘50 Civilians Killed, Tamil Village Wiped Out,’ The Hindu, 12 February 1987: 9; ‘Tamils Facing Starvation, Says LTTE,’ The Hindu, 14 February 1987: 1; Notes 235

‘Unacceptable Response from Colombo’ (editorial), The Hindu, 24 February 1987: 8; ‘Jaffna Operation Leaves 30 Dead,’ The Hindu, 9 March 1987: 1; ‘No Let Up in Sri Lankan Army Attack on Civilians,’ The Hindu, 11 March 1987: 1; ‘Gunships Attack School,’ The Hindu, 13 March 1987: 1; ‘Jaffna Civilians to Get Some Relief,’ The Hindu, 13 March 1987: 1; ‘20 Die in Jaffna Shelling,’ The Hindu, 30 March 1987: 1; ‘11 Patients Killed in Jaffna Shelling,’ The Hindu, 31 March 1987: 1; ‘Sri Lanka Planes Bomb Jaffna,’ The Hindu, 23 April 1987: 1; ‘Over 150 Tamils Killed as Bombing Continues,’ The Hindu, 24 April 1987: 1; ‘MPs Want Jaffna Bombing Condemned,’ The Hindu, 24 April 1987: 9; ‘Jaffna Bombed for Third Day,’ The Hindu, 25 April 1987: 1. 17. Government Forces and the IPKF were also accused of using civilians as shields from enemy fire (Rubin 1987). 18. Media reports at the time put the toll at 107 people (The Hindu, 18 April 1987: 1). O’Ballance (1989: 76) provides the figure of 127 deaths including 31 servicemen. He adds that another 60 were injured, ‘the majority being Sinhalese.’ According to de Silva (1993: 116), 130 people were ‘mowed down by automatic weapons.’ 19. Parliamentarians were apparently unaware that their government was already actually involved in the conflict, training and assisting the Tamil Paramilitaries. 20. If Pakistan provided similar aid in this fashion to the suffering Muslim residents of Kashmir, Government of India objections would have been heard around the world. 21. This was the unanimous assessment of all military and paramilitary actors interviewed by the author in Sri Lanka. It was also the view of Lalith Athulathmudali, who was Minister of National Security at the time and a close advisor of Jayewardene. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka, May–July 1992. 22. For a useful overview of the movement for an independent Tamil state of Dravidistan, see Gunewardene (1986: 125–144) and Irshick (1969). 23. There had been gun fights in Tamil Nadu among rival Tamil paramilitary organizations throughout the 1980s. In late 1986, a rash of bombings in Tamil Nadu fuelled the fear that Indian Government-sanctioned materials and training to Sri Lankan Tamil militants might be acquired by South Indian separatists: General Post Office explosion, Madurai (11 December 1986); train explosion, Tiruchi (23 December 1986); railway explosion, Madras (29 December 1986); and the Wallajah Road explosion, Madras (1 January, 1987). 24. Athulathmudali, the Minister of National Security at the time of the Agreement, claimed that India intervened precisely because Sri Lanka was ‘winning’ in the ‘Tamil War’ and that Indian pressure increased after the Army’s victory at Vadammarachichi (north-east of Jaffna). Athulathmudal claimed that at this point, the Indian High Commission in Colombo said to him: ‘Under no circumstances will we allow you to take Jaffna.’ 25. Eelam People’s Democratic Party is a Tamil paramilitary group which splin- tered off from the EPRLF in 1987. 26. ‘As the Indians waited patiently for the weapons, the Jaffna-based LTTE attacked two Eastern Province militant groups, [PLOTE] and [EPRLF], as 236 Notes

leaders of the two groups were on their way to a ‘peace conference’ with the LTTE. A round of attacks and counter-attacks followed, leaving more than 150 dead. The conflict demonstrated the durability of a long-standing political rift between Jaffna Tamils and their Eastern Province counterparts who have long complained of the Jaffna penchant for trying to dominate Jaffna political affairs’ (Pfaffenberger 1988: 143). Sustained attacks on members of PLOTE and EPRLF caused an unspecified number of casualties. Similarly in Vavuniya, on 22 September, the LTTE killed about 18 PLOTE members in an attack on the latter’s camp (Rubin 1987: 45–6). O’Ballance (1989: 97) reports that 66 people died in Tamil paramilitary feuding ‘and over 70 Tamil separatists of various groups surrendered to the police for their own safety. In the face of such LTTE deadly hostility, many other members of the EPRLF, TELO and PLOTE either surrendered to the authorities with their arms, or disappeared deeper underground.’ 27. On completion of basic paramilitary training all LTTE forces are ceremoni- ously presented with a cyanide capsule which is worn on a thong around their necks. They pledge to fight until the last bullet and then swallow the cyanide rather than be captured by the enemy. There have been questions raised about how the 17 LTTE captives retained their cyanide after their capture. 28. Rubin (1987: 50) provides details: ‘In late August, in response to the release of several thousand Tamil detainees by the government, the LTTE freed the three policemen. One soldier, perhaps a Muslim, was subsequently let go, leaving eight Sinhalese soldiers in [LTTE] custody. The militants had offered to arrange visits by the family of the prisoners, had taken journalists to see them, and had promised to treat them well. Within hours of the suicides … however, the LTTE executed the prisoners and dumped their bodies at the Central Bus Stand in Jaffna.’ 29. ‘… at nearly seven percent of the men who fought, the rate was almost twice as high as in the wars against Pakistan. … Sources in South Block confirm that the ratio of officers to men of other ranks killed in Sri Lanka is at an all time high’ (India Today, 31 January 1988, cited in Austin and Gupta 1988: 16). 30. ‘It should be a short, sharp exercise and our boys should be back soon’ (Rajiv Gandhi, quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 August 1987). 31. Initially, the IPKF successfully performed its peacekeeping task: ‘to halt and reduce the manifest violence of a conflict through the intervention of military forces in an interpository role’ (Harbottle 1979). With the commence- ment of offensive military confrontation to disarm the militants, its role ceased to be one of peacekeeping. 32. As noted in Chapter Two, according to the 1981 Census, the ethnic composition of the Eastern Province was Sinhalese 24.8 per cent, Tamil (all sub- groups) 41.57 per cent, and Muslim 31.5 per cent. 33. Clause 2.2: ‘During the period which shall be considered an interim period (i.e.) from the date of elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in para. 2.8 to the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3, the Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one adminis- trative unit, having one elected Provincial Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.’ Notes 237

34. Such tactics continue to be used by the LTTE. As in the Balkans, civilians are not simply caught in the crossfire, they have become targets. This is a view shared by UTHR – Jaffna (1991: 22) and USCR (1991: 2). 35. In Batticaloa, for example, it was reported that 79 per cent of the voters risked Tiger reprisals and went to the polls (The Economistt, 26 November 1988: 32). 36. The LTTE was not always the most powerful paramilitary. Until the mid- 1980s, no particular paramilitary was dominant. At that time, PLOTE lost the favor of the Indian government for publishing anti-Indian pamphlets and for attempting to smuggle a cargo of weapons into India without tacit government permission. It thus began to atrophy due to diminished Indian Government patronage. TELO was weakened by the murder of its leaders in the Welikade prison massacre in 1983 and further hampered by subsequent assassinations by the LTTE. Continued LTTE assassinations of paramilitary and political opponents ultimately established it as the foremost Tamil paramilitary organization. 37. For example, during the SAARC Conference in Bangalore in 1986, the Tiger leader, Prabhakaran, was flown from Madras in an Indian airforce plane for meetings with Indian officials who were simultaneously meeting with Jayewardene. It is also well-known that the late Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, M.G. Ramachandran, enjoyed a close relationship with Prabhakaran. 38. ‘Though India is not formally backing this group, it is believed to be supported by the Indian intelligence agency known as RAW (the Research and Analysis Wing). RAW is keen not only to protect the Tamils who cooper- ated with India, but also to stop the Tigers from lording it over the north- east again … . According to the Sri Lankan government’s intelligence agency, the Tamil National Army’s men arrived at the camps [vacated by the IPKF] in Indian lorries and helicopters. They had been trained by Indians and carried Indian weapons’ (The Economistt, 11 November 1989: 71). For detailed discussions, see Gunaratna (1993) and Kadian (1990). 39. This is a view that was candidly shared by both military and paramilitary leaders. Personal interviews, Sri Lanka, May–July 1992. 40. For details of the LTTE–UNP discussions, see: The Economistt, 31 March 1990: 65; FEER, 25 May 1989: 28 and 29 June 1989: 27–8; and India Today, 15 May 1989: 88–9. 41. Following the IPKF pull-out, the LTTE attacked all Tamil competitors and the Sri Lankan security forces which had been confined to barracks as part of an agreement it had signed with the Government. 42. For details on the arms transfers, see A.K. Menon. ‘The Other Battle Field,’ India Today, 15 October 1991: 99; The Hindu, 6 September 1991: 1; Frontline, reprinted in Christian Worker, 2nd & 3rd Quarter 1991: xvi. 43. Lalith Athulathmudali, who led the impeachment attack against President Premadasa in Autumn 1991 alleged that the list of UNP supplies to the Tigers included: 4000 T56 automatic rifles (the Chinese equivalent to AK47s), 38 vehicles (Pajero Jeeps which had formerly been used by the IPKF), cement (though Athulathmudali admitted that he did not yet have documentary proof of this), communications equipment, and Rs90 million (of which the vouchers for Rs25 million had so far been traced). Personal interviews, Colombo, May–June 1992. 238 Notes

44. The ﬁrst incident is reported by the UTHR – Jaffna (1991). It was also recounted to the author in the course of discussions with residents of Batticaloa. The murder of the policemen is reported in Amnesty International (1991). 45. The Agreement received strong support from the parties on the left – the United Socialist Alliance formed in 1987 by the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), the CP, the Nawa Sama Samaj Party (NSSP) and the Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya (SLMP). However, these parties were electorally mar- ginal and had very limited popular support. Two small but prominent groups of intellectuals supported the Agreement as well – the MIRJE and the CRD. 46. As a means of ensuring full Party support, Jayewardene had each UNP MP sign an undated letter of resignation with the understanding that it could be accepted at any time at the President’s discretion. For a discussion of this and other measures employed to ensure obedience, see Matthews (1992). 47. See, for example, Gunaratna (1987: 18–26); O’Ballance (1989: 31, 61–63, 67, 77); and Hoole et al. (1992: 75–98). 48. For example, the April 1985 formation of the ENLF (Eelam National Liberation Front) which included Eelam Research Organizations of Students (EROS), TELO, and the EPRLF; and in May 1987 the formation of the ENDLF Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (EWDLF) which joined the EPRLF and PLOTE. 49. From the early 1980s to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, there had been direct, though covert, military assistance to Tamil paramilitary organizations from the governments of Tamil Nadu and the Central Government in Delhi (personal interviews, Sri Lanka, May–July 1992; Hoole et al. 1992: 345–347; Rao 1989). This fact, and the ‘natural linkages’ across international boundaries (cultural, economic, historic), underscores the continuous international elements of ‘domestic’ politics in Sri Lanka.

9 2002 Ceaseﬁre Agreement

1. This chapter draws on the field work and subsequent report prepared for DFID Sri Lanka in early 2002 (Bush 2002). 2. Perhaps most interestingly, in the process of conducting field work for this chapter, it was possible to encourage successfully the adoption of multi- leveled perspectives into the discussions and decisions of the international community as they sought to nurture and support peace before and after the signing of Ceasefire Agreement – suggesting the policy relevance of a two-level approach. (Bush 2002; Bush 2001a; Bush 1999) 3. Thus, for example, immediately prior to, and following, the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement, G.L. Pieris (Minister for Constitutional Affairs, and chief architect of the peace process) held a detailed briefing with the Press, the donor community, and the Mahanayaka, while the Prime Minister flew straight from the signing ceremony in the Vanni to Batticaloa to address the troops. Comments supportive of the Peace Process are reported regularly in the local media. In other words, the support of potential spoilers of the peace process was very specifically cultivated. Notes 239

4. The bombing appeared to be in protest against the Sarvodaya Movement’s effort to organize a peace meditation in Anuradhapura (14 March 2002). 5. In two waves, LTTE strike teams penetrated the high-security complex at Katunayake at 3.30 a.m. and destroyed a total of 11 aircraft and damaged three. Three passenger aircraft – two A 330s and an A340 – of Sri Lankan Airlines and eight Air Force military aircraft - two Israeli built Kfirs, a Ukrainian MiG-27, two Mi-17 helicopter gunships and three-Chinese K8 advanced training aircraft – were destroyed. Two other passenger aircraft – an A320 and an A340 – were badly damaged. See ‘A Wake Up Call,’ Frontline, Vol 18: Issue 17, 18–31 August 2001. 6. According to an Apparel Industry Executive quoted in the USAID supported study by Price Waterhouse Coopers, Sri Lanka Competitiveness Study, September 1998. 7. Kelegama (1999) offers the following estimate for pro-government forces in 1996: Army – 129,000, Air Force – 17,000, Navy – 21,000, and Police – 68,000 for a total armed forces strength of 235,000. However, this figure does not include the tens of thousands of village militias (or ‘Home Guards’); nor the pro-government Tamil Paramilitary Organizations; nor the estimated 30,000–40,000 army deserters who may, or may not, have kept their weapons. Further, any calculation of island-wide armed labour force must include the LTTE, estimated to be 13,200 (40–60 per cent of whom are estimated to be under the age of eighteen, Sentinel South Asia 2000). Related to the size of the armed forces, is the bloated size of the military budget. In a recent and rigorous study on the costs of the war in Sri Lanka, it has been estimated that from 1982 to 1996 defence expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure has increased from 3.1 to 21.6 per cent. As a percentage of the GDP, the defence budget has increased from 1.1 to 6.0 during the same period of time (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, and Kelegama 2000; National Peace Council/Marga 2001). Thus, military expenditures dwarf combined expenditure on education and health, the consequences of which affect availability and access to basic social services by all Sri Lankans (especially children). See Bush 2000a for an overview of the impact of militarized violence on children in Sri Lanka – inside and outside of the conventionally defined ‘war zones.’ 8. The details in this paragraph are based on an interview with a member of the foreign diplomatic community who was present at G.L. Peiris’s briefing to the diplomatic community on 24 February 2002. 9. The details in this paragraph are based on an interview with a member of the foreign diplomatic community who was present at G.L. Peiris’s briefing to the diplomatic community on 24 February 2002. 10. Peace Support Group Press Release, 19 July 2002, ‘PSG Calls on all Parties to Strictly Abide by Ceasefire,’ Centre for Policy Alternatives, http://www.cpalanka.org 11. Though as discussed elsewhere, relations with Tamil populations in the South – particularly the Hill Country and Colombo – were also characterized by oppressive, sometimes abused, security measures. 12. Field Interviews, Batticaloa District, February 2002. 13. The details of this assault were widely reported in the media. See for example: Sambandan 2000. 240 Notes

14. ‘Taxes in the north and east: Tigers openly flout truce agreement,’ ColomboPage News Desk, Sri Lanka. 27 June 2002. http://www.colombopage.com/#Saturday64004 15. Field Interviews, Colombo, Kandy, Batticaloa, February and December 2002. 16. In a particularly heart-rending case, the father of two scholastically oriented teenaged boys in the East was approached by the LTTE to donate Rs 5- million – despite years of donations and moderate support to the Eelam cause. When he pointed out that he was unable to pay even if he sold everything (as would have been clear from the bank statements the LTTE had in their hands), he was told to choose which son he would donate to the cause. When I left him, he was still unsure about what he would do. Field Interviews. Batticaloa, February 2002. 17. Father Harry Miller. Batticaloa. February 2002. 18. http://www.colombopage.com 9 July 2002. 19. Field Interviews, Colombo, February and December 2002. 20. ‘Diplomats based in Colombo are preparing to visit Jaffna,’ [ColomboPage News Desk, Sri Lanka] 2002 March 25: Colombo: Reports said a group of around 30 foreign diplomats based in Colombo is preparing to visit Jaffna on Thursday. The diplomats intend to have firsthand experience of the situation in the peninsula after the implementation of the ceasefire. The group is also expected to look into measures that needed to be taken to improve common amenities in Jaffna. These diplomats are from countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, France, Italy, India and Canada. 21. Most publications by University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) include extensive details of LTTE killings. See UTHR (J) 1998. 22. According to the terms of the February Ceasefire, all of these groups were to be disarmed and disbanded. Art. 1.8: ‘Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day 130 at the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away from the Northern and Eastern Province.’ This process was initiated within the time frame of the Agreement. 23. These specific villages were identified by families in the East as well as local and international development and humanitarian NGOs 24. While conducting interviews in the Eastern Province, I heard the stories of two boys who were pulled out of a van of a recruiter who was in the process of transporting them into an uncleared area; and the story of a young boy who was in hiding after having escaped from training camp and walked through the jungle back to his village. Both stories came from very credible sources. February 2002. The indicator that this is public knowledge is when it is reported on the front page of the New York Times, see 6 January 2003 A1, A6. 25. Discussions in this section rely on intensive discussions with Muslim community leaders in the Eastern Province in February 2002. 26. This includes the Muslim Home Guard armed by the Government of Sri Lanka ostensibly to protect Muslim villages from attacks by the LTTE. However, being poorly trained and equipped, they were easy targets for experienced fighters of the LTTE, and there are stories of their fleeing Notes 241

attacks on Muslim civilians only to launch reprisal attacks on unarmed Tamil civilians. Another armed faction within the Muslim community is Jihad. 27. This section draws directly on the excellent fact-ﬁnding mission report by the Centre for Policy Analysis (2002). 28. http://www.colombopage.com 09 July 2002. 29. http://www.colombopage.com 10 July 2002 30. Patricia Lawrence. Telephone interview. 1 July 2002 31. The JVP’s strength in the Parliament climbed from one to 16 MPs in the preceding seven years. In October 2000, it polled 5.99 per cent of the total valid votes – a ﬁgure which climbed to 9.10 for the 2001 Election. Whereas, the JVP polled 518,774 votes countrywide in 1999 elections, it received 815,353 in December 2001. The JVP achieved this by exploiting the PA’s political crises and internal divisions 32. Field Interviews, Colombo, Kandy, Batticaloa. February and December 2002.

10 Fitting the Pieces Together

1. Some analysts employ the term ‘conflict settlement’ to ‘indicate the formal ending of armed hostilities and the renunciation of the use of force. They believe the objective of conflict resolution to be unattainable, on the grounds that conflicts over fundamental values and needs will never be resolved to the complete satisfaction of the parties involved. In these circumstances, the best one can hope for is a settlement which ends the violence and in some small measure takes those conflicting values and priorities into account’ (Hampson and Mandell 1990: 193). 2. Often nudging states towards becoming terroristic themselves. As the military strategist, Martin Van Crenfeld put it: ‘he who fights terrorists for any period of time is likely to become one himself’ (1990). 3. The term ‘protracted social conflict’ was coined by Edward Azar to refer to ‘situations which arise out of attempts to combat conditions of perceived victimization stemming from: (1) a denial of separate identities of parties involved in the political process; (2) an absence of security of culture and valued relationships; and (3) an absence of effective political participation through which victimization can be remedied’ (Azar 1986: 30). The conflict in Sri Lanka meet these criteria. 4. The term ‘conflict mediating’ is used self-consciously to refer to mechanisms that manage, resolve, or settle conflicts and disputes non-violently as they arise. These are distinct from ‘conflict dampening’ mechanisms which have as their primary objective the limitation of the level of conflict using whatever means are deemed most effective, whether violent or non-violent. For example, in South Africa the apartheid system was certainly successful in dampening anti-apartheid challenges, but it did so through direct and indirect mechanisms of violence – using everything from security forces, to urban planners, to structural violence of poverty, illness, and illiteracy. 5. N.B. These would be indicators of prevalence, not efficacy. 6. One of the strongest sentiments that came out of a number of interviews with Athulathmudali was his adamant belief that any ‘solution’ must begin 242 Notes

with the ‘total military annihilation of the LTTE’ (personal interviews, Colombo, May–July 1992). 7. As Foreign Minister in 1988, Ranjan Wijeratne told Western correspon- dents: ‘We have to deal with terrorists in the most ruthless manner … we have taken a hard line. There is no question about that.’ Acting in his capacity as deputy defence minister, Wijeratne announced a series of measures to deal with the growing JVP violence and control in the south: ‘We have given orders to shoot at sight, arrest, detain, or deal with inciters including trade union officials, strikers and all troublemakers attempting to disrupt normal life’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 July 1989: 13). 8. Just prior to the signing of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, the rhetoric of Sinhalese political leaders became increasingly antagonistic, as illustrated in the speech in parliament by Prime Minister Premadasa on 24 April 1987: ‘When the lives of our people are in danger, we are not prepared to go in for a political solution … any friend who tells us to find a political solution will be considered as the biggest enemy’ (The Hindu, 25 April 1987: 1). 9. On 7 October 2001, American and British aircraft began bombing Afghanistan. While the Bush regime may define the world in ‘post-9–11’ terms, the central point of reference for much of the rest of the world is ‘10–7’. The uncritical appropriation of ‘9–11’ terminology, is a mark of the success of the Bush regime’s domination of political discourse. 10. This was further enshrined in the Constitutions of 1972 and 1978. 11. Article Nine of the 1978 Constitution states: ‘The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana.’ 12. ‘Ethnicization’ is used to refer to the process by which the potential auton- omy of state actors is increasingly harnessed in the pursuit of the particular- istic interests of a specific ethnic sub-group. 13. Warnapala and Woodsworth specifically address this in their 1987 monograph, ‘Welfare as Politics in Sri Lanka.’ 14. In interviews in December 2002 in Batticaloa with individuals who were being intimidated and extorted by the LTTE, I was particularly struck by the aggression shown towards one Tamil development worker because he had married a foreign woman, as well as the frequent challenges to a victim’s ‘Tamil-ness’ if they did not support the LTTE – i.e. cough up contributions, in cash or in kind. 15. A violation of what is otherwise known as the Law of Equifinality. 16. Although the number of people displaced by violence in Sri Lanka increased dramatically after the 1983 riots, the intimidation of Sinhalese out of the North began in the late 1970s. Some Sinhalese ethnic mobilizers have attempted to justify the 1983 riots as retaliation for the dislocation of the Sinhalese from the North. 17. For example: Centre for Policy Alternatives; the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies; Law and Society Trust; Sarvodaya; the National Peace Council; Peace and Community Action; Family Rehabilitation Centre; Satyodaya, INFORM, Lawyers for Human Rights and Development; Organizations for the Parents and Families of the Disappeared (OPFMD); Centre for the Study of Human Rights; the International Centre for Ethnic Studies; INPAC; the Batticaloa Peace Committee, the Mothers Front, the Notes 243

Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Centre for Society and Religion. These NGOs include workers from all ethnic communities. 18. As happened to the Christian Children’s Fund of Canada (CCF) which was accused of attempting to send supplies to the LTTE in the North. Accusations in the government-run newspapers persisted even after the shipment in question was found to contain nothing suspicious or incriminating. Death threats and intimidation were directed to the head of CCF in Colombo. See The Ottawa Citizen, 24 November 1991: B6. 19. The definition of an NGO by the government was so vague that it could include any actor or agency not formally associated with the government. 20. Médecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have consistently raised concern over the shortage of medicine in the Vanni due to blocking by the Sri Lanka army, and in early May 2000, the surgery of the Mallavi hospital and two branches of the Mullaithivu hospital were particularly hampered by a severe shortage of medical supplies in the Vanni. 21. Field Interviews. Colombo, Batticaloa, Kandy, 17–28 February 2002. 22. Examples of the former are listed in Jayasuriya (2000) and Warnapala and Woodsworth (1987). Examples of the latter are found in any Human Rights report which includes a discussion of conditions in LTTE controlled areas – for example publications and reports by University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna). A recent but classic example is offered in local media reports of 17 March 2002 which noted the following: ‘LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran has issued a strict warning to his followers that any violators of the truce signed with the government would be punished severely. He has told political leader Thamil Selvan that he would not hesitate to punish any cadres violating the ceasefire, even with death. Selvan told journalists who met him in Wanni over the weekend that the leader was very clear on his instructions.’ www.lankapage.com 23. In the current context, I am referring to the militarization of relations between government actors and Tamil sub-groups. During the 1987–90 JVP resurgence, relations between the government and Sinhalese sub-groups were similarly militarized. A Sri Lanka development worker in Colombo reported that the experience of government and JVP violence by Sinhalese civilians in Sinhalese majority areas has softened some attitudes towards the plight of innocent Tamil civilians caught in the cross-fire in the North and East (Personal interviews, Colombo, May–July 1992). 24. The British Refugee Council reports that ‘police units regularly extort up to Rs 30,000 in bribes to release suspects. [Those] too poor to pay, stay in jail’ (Sri Lanka Monitor, February 1993: 3). The same system is employed by the LTTE. While conducting interviews on the East Coast, I met with a busi- nessman who had been released from LTTE custody in order to raise the rest of his ransom (personal interviews, May–July 1992). From Fall 2001 to early 2002, there was a considerable increase in the scale and scope kidnappings: scale in terms of the excessively exorbitant demands for ransom money and scope in terms of the number and status of those being kidnapped – some of the most prominent businessmen and community leaders have been specifically targeted and affected. According to a human rights worker who 244 Notes

approached the military authorities concerning the kidnappings s/he was told that there was nothing they could do, because they feared destabilizing the security environment during the precarious ceasefire. One community leader in the East suggested that many of these extortionist activities might have been the actions of LTTE individuals rather than the organization as a whole. The motive behind them might may have been to collect the resources necessary to allow them to leave the country before the next phase of the military-political game. A kind of pension scheme that fits the modus operandi of the organizational culture of the LTTE and paramilitary organizations generally. 25. There is a danger that this may well contribute to producing the opposite outcome than was intended: increased support for groups which use terror in the pursuit of political ends. 26. The British Refugee Council offers a more conservative estimate. In a report published at the time, it estimated that ‘in the last eight months of 1993, Sri Lankan authorities arrested 8,000 Tamils in Colombo, of whom an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 remained in detention in December [1993] … [Y]oung men without jobs or relatives in the capital and who do not possess National Identity cards, which Tamils find difficult to obtain, are particularly vulnerable … [A]ccording to sources in Colombo, police there ‘run flourishing extortion rackets,’ demanding large sums of money from relatives seeking to secure detainees release’ (USCR 1994: 6). 27. See Bush (1993), Abeysekere (1992), and Pieris and Marecek (1992) for examples of the Muslim Home Guard involvement in retaliatory massacres of Tamil villagers following attacks by the LTTE. 28. http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Asia-08.htm 29. It should be noted that, in any given episode, a particular mediating factor or set of factors may be more or less salient. 30. For example, the rise of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, and the mobilizational tactics of the JVP in both 1971 and 1987. 31. For example: the material benefits acquired by the LTTE through its imposition of a ‘taxation’ and ‘tariff’ scheme in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka and the grey and markets inside and outside the war zones as a result of restricted access and the prohibition of goods. 32. For discussion of ‘war weariness’ and ‘hurting stalemate,’ Zartman (1985); on collective learning, see Nye (1987); and on ‘re-perceptualization,’ see Keashly and Fisher (1990). Bibliography

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Allison, Graham, 12–13, 16, 206n Brass, Paul, 10, 12, 22, 33 Amirthalingam, A., 30, 60, 63, 121, Buddha Jayanthi, 95 229n, 233n Buddhist clergy, see Sangha Annuradhnapura Massacre (1985), Buddhist Revival Movement, 86 139 Burma, 220n Ariyaratne, Dr A.T., 157 Aryan race, 213n Canada, 66, 67, 165, 228n, 240n assassination, 29–30, 32, 56, 57, 58, Casparsz, Paul, 213n 60, 63, 64, 67, 71, 85, 94, 119, caste, 48–53, 101, 102, 110, 111, 202, 120, 123, 139, 145, 157, 169, 185, 212n, 213n, 214n 202, 214n, 215n, 217n, 225n, and Tamil paramilitaries, 51–3 233n, 237n, 238n, causality, 10–11, 205n Athulatmudali, Lalith, 43, 58, 59, Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of 2002, 117, 152, 153, 185, 210n, 215n, 42, 44, 59, 66, 70, 156–76, 181, 227n, 231n, 232n, 235n, 237n, 186, 190, 192, 205n, 217n, 241n 238–44n Azar, Edward, 8, 34 Ceylon Citizenship Bill, 41, 45, 217n, 218n Balasingham, Anton, 169, 171 Ceylon Tamil Congress, 81–2, 136 Balkans, xviii, 237n Ceylon–UK Defence Agreement Bandaranaike, Anura, 57, 102 (1948), 70 Bandaranaike, Sirimavo, 57, 63–4, Ceylon Workers’ Congress, 77, 146, 103, 104, 117, 152, 214n, 227n, 218n 233n Chandrasekeran, P., 53, 54 Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D., 55, 56, Chelvanayakema, S.J.V., 214n 84–98, 99, 101, 117, 180, 186, child soldiers, 30, 67, 165, 168, 209n 196, 200, 202, 214n, 220n, 221n, China, 71, 144 244n Citizenship Bills, 76–7, 189 Bandaranaike Katanayake Airport class, 35, 39, 50, 58, 110, 114, 126, Attack (2001), 63, 158, 168 134, 181, 202, 218n, 226n, 231n Batticaloa Peace Committee, 168 conflict management vs conflict B–C Pact / Bandaranaike– resolution, 204n, 241n Chelvanayakam Pact, 56, 94, costs of war, 31 214n coups d’état, 61 B-Specials (Northern Ireland), 193 CTC/ Ceylon Tamil Congress, 75 Betrayal of Buddhism, 96 Bhikkhus (Buddhist monks), 64, 86, demobilization, 16, 194 89, 94, 96, 105, 142, 152, 216n, demography, 35, 40, 42, 79, 101, 220n, 222n, 224n within Armed Forces, 60 Black Cats (vigilante group), 54, 65, deserters, 30, 62, 157 106 Dharmapala, Anagarika, 46 Bopage, Lionel, 110, 111 disenfranchisement, 73–83, 180 Bosnia, 3, 6, 7, 8 Dissanayake, Gamini, 58, 120, 229n

261 262 Index

Donoughmore Commission, 78–9 colonial rule, 29, 38, 45 double minority complex, 36 and myth, 45–8, 127, 213n Druckman, Daniel, 201 Hogan, Paul, xiv DUNF/Democratic United National Hameed, A.C.S., 227 Front, 58, 59 Hollingworth, Steve, 61 Dunham, David and Sisira Jayasuriya, Home Guard, 30, 43, 153, 193, 209n, 158 240n, 244n Dutta Gamani (King), 47 Horowitz, Donald, 3, 20, 92, 203

EBP/ Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna (United identity, 3, 5, 39, 206n Front of Monks), 89, 220n and conﬂict, 195–7 education, 30 ,38, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, contingent identities, 20–3 47, 48, 49, 53, 101, 110, 186, formation, 4–7, 8, 10, 11, 155 228n mobilization and politicization, emergency regulations, 30, 118, 124, 17–23, 45–8, 55–6, 65, 182, 128, 137, 140, 162, 189, 190, 186, 194, 196 192–4, 205n, 208n, 216n, 228n, and legitimation, 9, 46, 187 229n, 230n, 231n, 233n India, 24, 51, 69, 70–71, 103, 113, environmental scarcity, 7 135–155, 161, 191, 206n, 208n, Eelam War III, 156, 205n 234n ENDLF/ Eelam National Democratic India–Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 Liberation Front, 149, 238n (‘Indo-Lanka Accord’), 36, 54, 57, ENLF/ Eelam National Liberation 64, 70, 71, 105, 115, 135–55, 157, Front, 238n 181, 191, 223n, 232–8n, 242n EPDP/ Eelam people’s Democratic India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Party, 68, 145, 146, 154, 217n, Agreement, 191 235n inter–intra-group relations, xvii–xix, EPRLF/ Eelam People’s Revolutionary 10, 12, 14, 18, 21, 24, 32, 33, 34, Liberation Front, 66, 68, 69, 145, 53, 56, 61, 81–3, 91–4, 112, 114, 146, 149, 150, 151, 154, 168, 115, 125, 130–34, 142, 146, 206n, 216n, 217n, 226n, 235n, 177–203 238n IPKF/ Indian Peacekeeping Force, 24, EROS/ Eelam Research Organization 36, 55, 61, 66, 68, 71, 135, of Students, 154, 234n, 238n 144–55, 181, 191, 227n, 233n, Esman, Milton, 207n 235n, 236n, 237n ethnic cleansing, 36, 41, 42, 187, 188 Israel, 67, 71

Federal Party, 80, 90, 94, 136, 187, Jaffna Public Library, 228n 214n Jayrawardene, J.R., 47, 56, 57, 58, 64, 70, 87, 94, 103, 104, 115, 118, Gandhi, Rajiv, 29, 50, 61, 71, 143, 122, 124, 126–7, 131, 132, 136, 146, 149, 153, 217n, 236n, 238n 142, 143, 144, 149, 152, 153, 155, Gal Oya Water Project, 207n, 229 200, 227n, 229n, 230n, 235n garment industry, 158 Jiggins, Janice, 91, 102, 226n JVP/ Jathika Vimukti Peramuna Hakeem, Rauf, 171–6 (People’s Liberation Front), 12, Hisbullah, M.L.A.M., 173 32–33, 53, 57, 62, 63–66, 68, history 99–117, 133, 144, 146, 150, 151, anachronistic renderings, 33–5, 109 152, 153, 157, 175, 179, 180, 182, Index 263

213n, 216n, 222n–227n, 231n, multidimensional approaches, 4 241n, 242n, 243n, 244n thick description, 16 two-level critical juncture Karikalan, V, 174 approach, 15–17 Kataragama, 207n Miller, Father Harry, 168, 240n Kattankudi Mosque massacre of 1990, militarization, 227n 43, 169 military expenditures, 31 Kent and Dollar Farms Massacre military remittances, 30, 158 (1984), 139, 212n Mohamed, M.H., 173 kleptocracy, 7 monks, see bhikkhus Kotelawala, Sir John, 85, 87, 88, 92, Movement to Protect the Motherland, 95 152 Kumaratunge, Chandrika Muslim, 36, 37, 39, 40–4, 68, 76, 129, Bandaranaike, 23, 51, 57, 63, 66, 131, 147, 169–75, 181, 187, 188, 156, 157–61, 175, 185, 205n, 207n, 212n, 235n, 240n, 244n 227n National Framework for Relief, landmines, 30, 63, 112, 113, 123, 130, Rehabilitation, and 139, 158, 230n Reconciliation in Sri Lanka (3–R LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Framework), 190 Eelam), 14, 29, 30, 31, 36, 37, 38, Northern Ireland, 3, 6, 7, 13, 14, 22, 40, 41, 42, 43, 52–5, 60, 63, 65, 24, 77, 184, 188, 192–4, 196, 200, 66–70, 112, 119, 135, 137, 141, 206n, 208n 142, 144–6, 147, 147–55, 156–76, Norway, Government of, 161, 191 181, 182, 184–6, 190, 191, 194, 199, 205n, 207n, 210n, 216n, O’Neill, Terence, 200 217n, 233n, 234n, 235n, 236n, opportunity structure, 17, 25–6, 94–8, 237n, 239n, 240n, 243n, 244n 115, 182, 194

Mahavelli Water Project, 42 PA (Peoples’ Alliace), 57, 62, 66, 156, Manor, James, 20, 81, 85, 87, 90, 174–5 221n Pakistan, 144, 235n, massacre, 43, 106, 107, 108, 123, 124, Palestine, 13, 67, 167 139, 141, 142, 145, 147, 148, 151, Palestinian Liberation Organization, 169, 170, 210n, 230n, 234n 234 Mathew, Cyril, 50, 117, 120, 122, pass system, 159 128–9, 132, 185 Peace Support Group, 239n Matthews, Bruce, 55, 57, 64, 105, 112, Perumal, A., 149 115 Pieris, G.L., 160–1, 238n, 239n media, 62, 68, 121, 123, 125–7, 128, Plantation Tamils, see Up-Country 132–33, 139, 147, 152, 153, 166, Tamils 170, 181, 189, 230n, 231n, 232n PLOTE, 53, 66, 68, 145, 146, 154, MEP/Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, 216n, 226n, 234n, 235n, 237n 84–98, 196 Ponnambalam, G.G., 75, 90 methodology, xvii, 12–28, 156, 182, Popular Front for the Liberation of 194–5, Palestine, 234n billiard ball models, 3–9, 10, 195 population displacement, 30, 36, 42, indicators, 15 43, 51, 77, 117, 118, 125, 138, large-N studies, 12 148, 171, 188, 208n, 228n 264 Index

Posen, Barry, 8 Sinhala-Only language policy, 41, 44, poverty alleviation programmes, 158, 84, 87, 89, 90, 94, 97, 101, 117, 215n 200, 221n Prabhakaran, V., 145, 151, 162, 165, Siripada, 207n 166, 167, 169, 171, 174, 210n, SLFP/ Sri Lanka Freedom Party, 54, 237n, 243n 55, 57, 58, 68, 84–98, 106, 116, Premadasa, Ranasinghe, 29, 57, 58, 117, 118, 121, 146, 152, 153, 185, 59, 64, 68, 71, 85, 106, 117, 132, 200, 220n, 221n, 223n 142, 150–1, 152, 184, 185, 199, SLMC/ Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, 206n, 217n, 232n, 242n 44, 146, 171–6 proscription, 104, 111, 112, 115, 121, SLMM/ Sri Lanka Monitoring 127, 133, 137, 163, 181, 188, Mission, 161, 162, 165 223n South Africa, 14, 71, 208n Sri Lankan Security Forces, 30, 36, 52, Radzek, 168 60–3, 103, 107, 147, 157, 158, Rajarata Riﬂes, 225n 160, 162, 164–5, 182, 209n, Ramachandran, M.G., 207n, 237n 217n, 222n, 225n, 229–30n, Rattwatte, Anuruddha, 62 231n, 237n, 238n, 243n realism, 4–9 suicide bombers, 29, 30, 31, 67, 157, referendum of 1982, 57, 83 164, 209n, 217n, repatriation, 77, 111 resource mobilization and Tamil diaspora, 66, 165, 216n, 228n competition, 17, 23–5, 85–6, Tamil Eelam, 36, 38, 55, 59, 115, 119 92–4, 108, 114–15, 155, 182, 194, Tamil Madrasi Regiment, 148 riots of 1915 (Anti-Muslim), 41 Tamil Nadu, 39, 50, 51, 66, 70, 137, riots of 1958, 94, 101, 221n 138, 141, 143–4, 149, 159, 207n, riots of 1983, 38, 49–50, 51, 63–4, 208n, 217n, 226n, 228n, 234n, 104, 112, 115, 118–34, 136, 137, 235n, 238n 149, 179, 181, 188, 197, 198, Tamil National Army, 237n 232n, 242n Tamil paramilitaries, 30, 32, 33, 36, 42, riots of 1983 and economic 50, 53, 55, 60, 61, 66–70, 108, 109, liberalization, 130–31 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 119, 121, Rothschild, Donald, 22 122, 123, 125, 127, 135, 136, 137, Rwanda, xviii, 3, 6, 7 138–141, 144–6, 149–51, 154, 184, 187, 194, 205n, 207n, 225n, 234n, Sangha, (Buddhist Clergy) 68, 86, 89, 235n, 237n, 240n, 243n 95, 152, 186, 213n, 221n, 222n, Tamil paramilitary feuding , 66–9, 238n 139–41, 145, 206n, 226n, 235n SAARC Confernece (1986), 237n Tarrow, Sidney, xv, 25 security/ insecurity, 3, 4, 7–8, 196 tautology, 8, 26 segregation, 188–9 TELO, 51, 61, 66, 68, 69, 145, 146, Senanayake, D.S., 55, 75, 78, 86, 154, 168, 216n, 235n, 237n 92 Thamilchelvam, 171, 243 Senanayake, Dudley, 55, 92, 221n Thamil Selvan, see Thamilchelvam Sinhala, 36, 86 Thondaman, S., 218n Sinhalese Buddhism, 36, 45, 64, Tilly, Charles, 13, 16, 24, 207n 84–98, 186 Tiruchelvum, Neelan, 30, 60, 223n Sinhalese Nationalism, 36, 45, 117, TNA, 68, 69, 149, 151, 168 128, 186 trade unions, 80, 122 Index 265

TULF/ Tamil United Liberation Front, Vikalpakandayama, 113, 30, 55, 59–60, 119, 120, 121, 123, violence, 29, 43, 127, 136, 137, 140, 146, 187, violence, patterns, 11–12, 31, 33, 214n, 228n 37, 66, 103, 118, 120–5, 128–34, 138–41, 145–6, 153, Udagampola, P., 106, 107, 224–5n, 157–8, 171, 183–4, 188, 210n, UNP/ United National Party, 50, 54, 224n, 229, 234–5n, 235n, 57, 58, 79, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 236n 90, 92, 94, 95, 96, 112, 116, 117, violence, post-election, 14, 118, 120, 123, 126, 128, 130, violence and shifting identities, 22 131–4, 136, 142, 146, 148, 149–52, 153, 174, 175, 181, 185, Walpola, Rahula 86, 220n 188, 200, 218n, 220n, 223n, War for Peace, 156, 175, 185, 205n, 225n, 233n, 241n 227n Up-Country Peoples’ Front, 54, 77 War on Terror, 3, 7, 163–4, 185, 242n, Up-Country Tamils, 35, 39, 44, 49, 244 50, 53–4, 65, 73, 83, 108, 109, war weariness, 163, 202 111, 112, 113, 118–20, 180, 182, Weerakoon, Batty, 225n 210n, 212n, 216n, 221n, 226n, Weerawansa, Wimal, 66 230n, 239n Welikade Prison massacre, 124, 230n Uphoff, Norman, xiv, 17, 23, 205n, Wickramasinghe, Ranil, 59, 156–62, 207n, 229n 165, 174, 175, 181, 185 UTHR (Jaffna)/ University Teachers Wijeweera, Rohana, 100, 103, 104, for Human Rights (Jaffna), 66, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 222n, 210n, 212n, 238n, 240n 223n, 226n vigilantism (see also Black Cats), 65, Yogeswaran, V., 229n, 233n 106, 107, 125, 210n,