An Examination of Regional Views on South Asian Co-Operation with Special Reference to Development and Security Perspectives in India and Shri Lanka

Home , British Ceylon, Chitty, Gamini Dissanayake, Jayewardene cabinet, Sri Lanka Law College, Vasudeva Nanayakkara

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Framing South Asian transformation: An examination of regional views on South Asian co-operation with special reference to development and security perspectives in India and Shri Lanka

Chitty, Naren, Ph.D.

The American University, 1992

UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Aibor, MI 48106

OF REGIONAL VIEWS ON SOUTH ASIAN CO-OPERATION

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENT AND

SECURITY PERSPECTIVES IN INDIA AND SHRI LANKA

Naren Chitty

submitted to the

School of International Service

of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

International Relations

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: ---

Dean of the College ___ Date 1992 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016

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NAREN CHITTY

1992

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To my parents, Alexis and Doris,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. FRAMING SOUTH ASIAN TRANSFORMATION:

AN EXAMINATION OF REGIONAL VIEWS ON SOUTH ASIAN CO-OPERATION

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

PERSPECTIVES IN INDIA AND SHRI LANKA

Naren Chitty

ABSTRACT

South Asia, centered on India and anchored in age-old

tradition, is being drawn by the Euro-American global center

toward modernization. The process of modernization promises

social mobility to aspirants to elite status who have been

shut out by the tradition of caste. Despite their liberal

instincts and the espousal of a program of 'modernization'

by ruling elites, elite aspirants find themselves culturally

excluded from elite circles of power.

At the same time these elite aspirants draw succor from

and give succor to ethno-historical constituencies which are

in the process of peripheralization by global and national

centers.

SAARC, the South Asian Association of Regional Co

operation, is a creation of South Asian governing elites in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. response to internal pressures for regional development as

well as changes in the global environment. South Asian

elites respond to contradictory voices of liberalism and

tradition when dealing with social change within their own societies and this study posits that this contradiction may

be seen in the views of South Asian scholars.

The study looks at contributions of regional scholars

on co-operation in security and development in the region in

terms of a framework, Ashoka's Wheel, constructed from

classical Hindu political and mythic thought and Western

political thought. It also looks comparatively at official

news in the two South Asian countries on which the study

concentrates - India and Shri Lanka to establish whether

political messages demonstrate the same contradiction.

Ill

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, my supervisor I owe a great

debt of gratitude, for intellectual sustenance.

To my wife and friend, Ismene, for long years of

patience and encouragement. To my daughter Sabina for giving

me a sense of purpose. To my parents, Alexis and Doris, for

giving me a global perspective.

To my brother Suren and friend Nihal Goonewardene for

invaluable support during my visit to Washington for the

defense.

To Alex at ISTI for making a molehill out of a

computing mountain.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... Ü ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS...... V LIST OF TABLES ...... viii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...... ix

GLOSSARY ...... X

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ......

Inventing the Wheel...... 1

II. LITERATURE REVIEW ......

Introduction...... 15 Approaches to Social Change . . . ,16 The Structuralism of Galtung & Wallerstein...... 2 3 The Dialectics of Lasswell ...... 25 The Evolutionism of the P l u r a l i s t s ...... 3 3 The Liberal-irony of Ro r t y ...... 35 Conclusion...... 45

III. FRAMEWORKS FOR SOUTH ASIA ......

Introduction...... 47 The Inner Wheel: Varnasarma...... 53 The Outer Wheel...... 59 The S p o k e s ...... 73 Transborder Cultures...... 81 Conclusion...... 85

IV. METHODOLOGY

Introduction...... 88 Research Aspects ...... 101 Indian & Sri Lankan Cases . .101

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Indo-Sri Lankan Relations and Regional Views ...... 107 Conclusion...... ill

V. THE INDIAN & SRI LANKAN CASES

Introduction ...... 112 "Development" & Development A n alysis...... 115 "Vocabulary" and Equilibrium A nalysis...... 120 T h e o r y ...... 123 Globalization ...... 123 Structuralism ...... 130 Pluralism...... 132 Conflict Theory ...... 134 India & Sri L a n k a ...... 136 Evolutionary Approach . . . . 138 Structural Approach ...... 151 The 1980's A p p r o a c h ...... 152 Ethnic Polarization & Transborder C u l t u r e ...... 156 Conclusion...... 163

VI. INDO-SRI LANKAN RELATIONS ......

Introduction ...... 172 Non-Alignment: Regional Security & Development ...... 173 Conclusion...... 198

VII. REGIONAL VIEWS ...... Introduction ...... 201 Methodology ...... 2 02 Periodization ...... 206 Seminar Papers ...... 210 Official Views ...... 267 Conclusion...... 274

VIII. SYMBOLS FOR TRANSFORMATION ......

Introduction ...... 283 Inventing a New Framework for South A s i a ...... 290 SAARC and the New Global Framework ...... 298 Conclusion...... 300

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APPENDICES ...... 301 I. Interview with President Jayewar- d e n e ...... 301 II. Topics of "Comment" in Sri Lanka N e w s ...... 303 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 313

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Perspectival Relationships ...... 19 2. Categories of Configurative Analysis ...... 30 3. Methodology of Research...... 93 4 . BCIS Seminars ...... 110 5. Classification of Development Approaches...... 116 6. Periodization of Development Approaches...... 117 7. Non-aligned Values ...... 175 8. Muni's Types of Domestic Conflicts...... 189 9. Administrative & Ethno-historical conflicts . . . .190 10.Key Words & Phrases in Chapter T i t l e s ...... 200 11.BCIS Seminars ...... 2 04 12.Development Approaches in India & Sri Lanka . . . .208 13.BCIS seminar 1; Indo-Sri Lankan Relations...... 210 14.BCIS seminar 2: India's Relations With Her Neighbors Other than Sri Lanka...... 211 15.BCIS seminar 3: India's Role in South A s i a ...... 211 16.BCIS seminar 4: SAARC - Problems and Prospects . . .212 17.Singh's Conflict Categories ...... 249 18.Ahmed's Conflict C a t e g o r i e s ...... 249 19.Bastian's Conflict Categories ...... 2 50 2 0.SAARC S u m m i t s ...... 261 21.Values in Seminar Contributions ...... 266 22.Categorization of Leader A r t ic l es ...... 268 23.Content of Sri Lanka News L e a d e r s ...... 271 24.Content of India News Front P a g e s ...... 271 25.Comparative Content of India News & Sri Lanka News 272 26.Illustration of Popular Participation in SAARC . . .297

Vlll

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Figure Page

1. Ashoka's Wheel - A Cakkravartin Vision ...... 67 2. Ashoka's Wheel - A Dhanmnaoakkra Vi s i o n ...... 67 3. Spokes of Ashoka's Wh e e l ...... 81 4. Transborder Cultures ...... 83

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. GLOSSARY

Arthrashastra; Science of government.

Asuravijaya; Demonic conquest or total annexation.

Brahman: Spiritual leadership/teaching functional group in varnasarma.

Cakkra: Chariot Wheel.

Cakkravartin. Universal emperor.

Dharma: Order.

Dharmacakkra: Wheel of Righteousness.

Dharmavijaya: Righteous conquest.

Harijan: Man of God.

Jati: Ethnic identity groups.

Krishna: Member of the Hindu Trinity.

Kshatriya: Warrior/ruler functional group of Varnasarma.

Lobhavijaya: Conquest for economic exploitation.

Mahabharatha: Hindu epic of origin.

Mandala: Configuration.

Matsayanya: The way of the fishes or social anarchy.

Mitra: Sun.

Panchsil: See Panchaseela.

Panchaseela: Five precepts of right behaviour.

Panchayat: Indian system of grassroots local government.

Panchseel: See Panchaseela.

Rama: Incarnation of Krishna and consort of Sita.

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Ramayana: Epic story of Rama and Sita.

Ravana: Villain of the Ramayana; King of Lanka.

Rita: Universal order.

Sita: Consort of Rama.

Sudra: Laborer functional group of Varnasarma.

Surya: Sun god.

Tauhid: Islamic term for 'unity of God'.

Varuna: Moon.

Vaishya: Mercantile functional group of Varnasarma.

Varna: Orders of brahmans, kshatriyas, vaishyas and sudras.

Varnasarma: Social order consisting of the four varnas which Mahatma Gandhi interpreted as being equal.

Varnadharma: See Varnasarma.

Varnashramadharma: See Varnasarma.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTRODUCTION: INVENTING THE WHEEL

South Asia today, made up of Bangladesh, Bhutan,

Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Shri Lanka ^ and India, is

undergoing a process of transformation which has its impact

at every level, from individual through sub-national to

national and regional.^ This process of transformation is

accompanied by considerable violence. It is not clear as

to who will transform whom within the South Asian system or

whether there will be a mutual transformation of

protagonists leading to equilibrium within the system or

whether indeed the system itself will be transformed.

Elites who inherited pieces of the late British empire have

traditionally played a role as modernizers in South Asian

societies. Today the major protagonists in the redefinition

The Shri Lankan government changed the English spelling and pronunciation of the name of the country from Sri Lanka to Shri Lanka in the second half of November 1991. The references used in this study pre-date this change. Only in this instance and in Chapter VIII, which is normative and deals with the future, is the new spelling used.

^ Kim defines 'system transformation' as diachronic change through time with values, norms and structures as defining characteristics of a system. Values are enduring beliefs, norms are prescriptive or non-prescriptive rules and structures are compositions and stratifications [Kim 1984, 17].

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of modernization are those governing elites (links with the

global center, the World Market and International System)

and elite aspirants from the ethno-historical periphery.

Ethno-historical elite aspirants are not a uniform group in

any society. Even within a single ethnic group there are

those who employ either strategies of violence, capital

accumulation or education to move up in society. The Indian subcontinent has been governed in the post

colonial period by elites who have espoused the pluralist

traditions of British liberalism. With the passage of years

their approach has led to the expansion of interest group

politics, particularly in the democracies of South Asia. In

theory this participatory approach should lessen levels of

alienation in the periphery of society, as the stated intent

of policy is inclusionary rather than exclusionary,

attempting to increase rather than decrease the avenues for

social mobility, of reducing levels of suffering in society.

Systemic economic forces have over the years compelled

governing elites to, in turn, employ economic strategies of

import substitution and trade driven growth. The process of

globalization, with its universalizing/homogenizing push

towards the global center and pull towards the thousands of

ethno-historical mini-centers in the periphery, have given

elite aspirants, emerging from ethno-historical space, with

access to the World Market, the principle modernizing force

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at the systemic level. Capabilities having changed through

economic mobility outside the governing circles, traditional

notions of a central modernizing elite need to be re

examined.

However, in the face of increasing competition for

state distributed rewards, governing elites employ cultural

modes of exclusion. The result is a perception, in the

periphery, that avenues of mobility lead to closed gates. As the governing elite, in India as well as its Indo-centric

neighbours, coincides fairly closely with historical 'upper

caste' groups [high caste groups], the exclusionary mode

has, historically, incorporated this dimension but expressed

itself in degrees of Westernization. The English language

is an important indicator in this respect; so are other

aspects of culture such as art, music, sport and cuisine.

All these elements contribute to a culture of

administration. Administrative spaces, peopled by governing

elites, are located between the international center and

ethno-historical spaces. The ability of the international

and ethno-historical space to meet, through markets,

independently of governing elites is a problem for the

latter.

The contradictory impulses of political inclusiveness

and cultural exclusiveness within the central governing

elite are accompanied by a political tension within society

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itself, leading to changes in the composition of the

governing elite, to be more reflective of the peripheries.

There are increasing demands for what are perceived by elite

aspirants, to be keys to social mobility - such as training

in English. In Ancient India exclusion was political in that

it was enforced by the prince, through the machinery of the

caste system; One of his major duties was to maintain the

purity of caste required by Hindu culture. Today exclusion

of out-groups from power is not promoted by the state. On

the contrary the state is charged with achieving equity.

Today's exclusion in the Indian subcontinent is social

rather than political. The caste system has lost its

historical status as apartheid, or as a politically enforced

system, into a culturally generated condition which has

taken on some additional class dimensions.

Governing elites employ cultural modes of exclusion

including control over domains of language. The voices of

ethnohistorical elite aspirants are not represented in the

South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation. It is

argued that this is illustrated in the work of South Asian-

based scholars who address issues of South Asian co

operation; Such scholars do not seek to articulate the views

of ethnohistorical elite aspirants.

The flow of violence between governing elites and elite

aspirants in each South Asian state feeds on internal

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discontent of elite aspirants vis-a-vis social mobility and

economic and ethnic problems within the larger society.

Those who have succeeded either through using the

educational or economic route may not condone or support

violence, but do emphathize with their feeling of exclusion

from elite centers. The new Sinhala upper middle class in

Sri Lanka, for instance, can understand the preoccupation of

the Jathika Vimukthi Fakshaya (National Liberation Party)^

with the exclusionary practises of the old Westernized

elite.

At the same time a 'cousin culture' phenomenon,

operates across national borders, (between, for instance,

Sri Lankan Tamils and South Indian Tamilians)encouraging

strategies of co-operation or co-ordination of increasingly

complexity and plurality between neighbouring elite and

elite aspirant groups. This is particularly troubling in

those larger states which have had a history of violence in

The JVP fought a civil war against the Marxist-affiliated Coalition of prime minister Sirima Bandaranaike in 1972, was defeated, proscribed and its leaders placed in jail. It regrouped and attacked the establishment again in 1987 when Jayewardene was president. They continued their onslaught against the state even after Premadasa, a member of the new Sinhala upper middle class, replaced Jayewardene as president after the 1988 election. Premadasa had demonstrated considerable empathy with the JVP youth during the Jayewardene years. When they refused to lay down their arms and work the new Sinhala middle class dominated government of Premadasa, the JVP leadership was destroyed by the military.

^ The majority community of North Sri Lanka call themselves Tamils while the majority community of India's southernmost state of Tamil Nadu call themselves Tamilians in English.

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their relations with each other but it is troubling for

different reasons in the case of adjacent states with

asymmetrical power relations, such as India and Sri Lanka.

There are strategies and even institutions of co

operation which link governing elites who seek to promote

their vision of state-centric order. In South Asia the

formal instrument for regional co-operation is SAARC, the

South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation.

Symbol of South Asian regional amity, SAARC was the

political invention of the late president of Bangladesh,

Ziaur Rahman. It was Rahman who first made proposals for

regional co-operation during visits to neighbouring states, Nepal, India and Pakistan, between 1977 and 1980. This was

at a time that significant changes had taken place among the

governing elites of the region, with political leaders who

symbolized the further break up of what was one British

India, being replaced by others. Mujib Rahman of

Bangladesh, Zhulfikkar Bhutto of Pakistan and Indira Gandhi

of India were the principals at that bloody birth and they

had been replaced by Ziaur Rahman, General Zhia and Morarji

Desai respectively. Searching for peace and prosperity

Rahman proposed an institutional framework for regional co

operation.

Beginning with a meeting of permanent secretaries of

foreign ministries in 1981, SAARC grew around technical

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issues, side-stepping vexing security and political

questions. The question of terrorism, or the flow of

violence from elite aspirants to governing elites, has been

discussed by SAARC leaders at Sri Lanka's insistance,

however, because this phenomenon has a transborder existence and vexes one and all among the governing elites in South

Asia.

SAARC was formally launched in 1985 at the Dhaka summit

of heads of state or government with Bangladesh, Bhutan,

Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as members. This

group of seven states co-incides with the definition of

South Asia of this study, though Afghanistan, Burma and even

Tibet may be considered to be part of a larger South Asia.^

The SAARC charter evokes historical ties and differences of

ethnicity and culture, common goals of peace, freedom,

social justice and economic prosperity, and common problems,

as reasons for regional co-operation. Five of SAARC's six

objectives are related to economic, social, cultural and

individual development and one to mutual perceptions;

To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life;

^ Shelton Kodikara argues that the seven present members of SAARC are a natural regional sub-system (South Asian Subordinate System); They are geographically proximate, share a common colonial heritage and are Indo-centric in several ways [Gupta 1985, 30-34].

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To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realise their full potentials;

To promote and strengthen collective self reliance among the countries of South Asia;

To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems;

To promote collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural and scientific fields;

To strengthen co-operation with other developing countries (SAARC 1988b).

The Dhaka Declaration of heads of state or government

articulates the relationship between political stability and

modernization, leaving a gate open for future political and

security co-operation. This gate was entered through the

signing of an agreement on terrorism by SAARC member states.

With the formation of SAARC regionally-domiciled

International Relations scholars have addressed security,

political and economic questions raised by the new

institutions at domestic, regional and even international

levels. Some commonalities have emerged in their discourse

even though scholars view South Asian regional co-operation

from a variety of perspectives. Scholars have produced a

body of literature which is reflective of the multitude of

views within South Asia. The multi-causality and multi

dimensionality of the violent process of transformation now

taking place in South Asia has vexed regional scholars.

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However noone has looked at the literature with a view

to developing a framework for organization and analysis of

this regional process of transformation.* In this

connection, if level is used as an analytical tool, there is

indeed a level of analysis problem, because events at sub

state, state, regional and international systemic level seem

to appear to play causal roles of some kind or another in

ethnic conflict and domestic violence. For instance one

might argue that international lending agencies may have

contributed to Sri Lanka's ethnic violence through

conditional aid which led to market liberalization policies

which removed the safety net from beneath the poorest in

society leaving their hearts and minds easy prey to elite

aspirants. This is a political-economic argument linking the

international systemic level with the ethno-historical. One

might also argue that the ethnic insurgency in Sri Lanka may

be traced back to cultural differences between Sinhalese and

Tamils, clearly a domestic rather than international

systemic cause. This example also illustrates the fact that

approaches may attribute causality to disciplinary value

domains rather than levels, to politics, economics,

political economy or culture.

Ray Forbes, director of the Bandaranaike Center for International Studies (BCIS) remarked on this in conversations with me on two occasions, first when I visited him at BCIS in February 1990 and next when I visited him at BCIS in September 1991.

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There is a need to consciously avoid identification

with system stability when one undertakes a study of

transformation, as otherwise one will have to exclude the

possibility of internal transformative processes leading to

systemic instability and even systemic transformation. Kim

argues that "(T)he system-maintaining bias of social science

research is reflected not only in its neglect of social

change or system transformation...... " (Kim 1984, 11).

He quotes the sociologist Talcott Parsons and the political

scientist Samuel P. Huntington as having pointed to the fact

that these two disciplines neglect change and further adds

that even the international systemic approach of the 1950's

and 1960's promoted system stability, though Wallerstein

introduced macro-structural, system-transforming approaches

to international relations (Kim 1984, 11).

This study takes the view that a tidy attribution of

causality to one source is perhaps too reductionary to be of

use in understanding the process of transformation taking

place in South Asia. It is considered far more useful to

examine the process of transformation in terms of the

contributors to that process and their reciprocal fears of

change in ways unacceptable to them. It is this examination

which this study has undertaken. The objective of this study

is to provide a means of capturing this dymamic process

through developing and employing an interlocking set of

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frameworks which link the dimensions of transformation

within their international, state and ethno-historical theaters. My purpose is to explain the dynamics of change in

South Asia in the decade of the 1980's, with a view to

gaining insights into the potential shape of the future.

India is the center of South Asia geographicaly as well

as in terms of demography and culture. The overarching

framework of this study is symbolized by Emperor Ashoka's

Wheel, which allows for two interpretations of regional

order, one horizontal (circumferential) where India and its

neighbors share the rim of the wheel and the other vertical

(radial) where India is the hub and its neighbors are on the

wheel's rim.

Under the study's framework, elites, who manipulate the

flow of symbols, violence or goods and services in order to

maximize their share of these values - thereby reducing

their personal insecurity - are grouped in three broad

categories based on political cultures which sustain them,

viz. international, administrative,and ethno-historical.

These are hardly mutually exclusive and may best be

described as being ideal-typical in a Weberian sense. While

there are international, administrative and ethno-historical

spaces in all modern societies and individuals, they are

embodied in the Indian state as three tendencies

respectively: India's commitment to international law and

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the international system; the inherited view of an Indian

Raj for what was once British India; the need for the Indian

federal government to acommodate the aspirations of Indian

ethnic states without endangering the Indian Union. These

three are contradictory tendencies which sometimes result in

paradoxes of policy which may be symbolized by one of India's own modern emblems, the three-headed lion.

The study is divided into nine chapters begining with

the present introduction. Chapter I. This is followed by a

literature review in Chapter II which examines four broad

approaches to social change, viz. the structuralism of Johan

Galtung, the dialecticism of Harold Lasswell and the

evolutionism of the pluraliste as well as the normative

liberal-ironic approach of the philosopher Richard Rorty. A

discussion of frameworks for South Asia follows in Chapter

III, drawing on the non-normative aspects of the literature

review as well as on hermeneutics from classic texts of the

Indian sub-continent, in order to develop a framework for

analysis, Ashoka's Wheel. This framework, the major

contribution of this thesis, is tested in Chapter VII, in

terms of descriptions of South Asian reality by South Asian

scholars. Chapter IV, which deals with methodologies. de

scribes the epistemological construction of Ashoka's Wheel

drawing on chapter three's hermeneutic and

Galtungian/Wallersteinian empirical approaches for the

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structure of the wheel; conflict and pluralist approaches as

oppositional, describing opposing (therefore synchronous)

forces which shape power relations. It describes the

methodologies employed in relation to the three research

areas of this work, viz. the Indian and Sri Lankan Case,

Indo-Sri Lankan Relations and Regional Views, dealt with in

chapters V, VI and VII respectively.

Chapter V examines the governing elites approaches to

development in the Indian and Sri Lankan cases in the post

colonial period. The examination is set within the context

of globalization, with the universalizing "push" of the

World Market at the center and particularizing "pull" of

ethno-historical cultures at the periphery. In it I have

looked at the two cases through a form of Lasswellian configurative analysis, examining and periodizing the

changing meaning of 'self-reliance' (through the political

economic focus of development and the cultural focus of

language) in relation to alterrations among elites and elite

aspirants.

Drawing on the periodization of the previous chapter

and the Ashoka's Wheel framework developed in earlier

chapters, in Chapter VI we examine Indo-Sri Lankan relations

in the post-colonial period in terms of the development and

security aspects of the vocabulary of non-alignment, through

a literature review of selected regional scholars.

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Chapter VII looks at regional views in terms of the

framework of the study, using regional seminar contributions

and official publications of India and Sri Lanka as sources.

Chapter VIII is normative and makes broad policy

suggestions.

Regional terms present a particular problem as the same

word, for instance panchaseela (pansil, panchsil, panchseel)

or five principles of conduct, may have different English

spellings in different countries. I have therefore resorted

to employing my preferred spelling for such words except

where they appear in quotations, where I spell the word

exactly as it appears in the quotation.

This study is a redescription of South Asian reality as

the process of self re-invention takes place within South

Asian societies. Chapter II discusses the nature of social

re-invention: Who does it to whom and what might be done

about it by those who reflect on such matters.

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LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

In the introduction to this work it was stated that

South Asia was undergoing a process of violent

transformation today and that it was not clear as to who

will transform whom and whether any subsystemic

transformations will be accompanied by a systemic

transformation. It was further argued that descriptions of

the present process from within an unmodified reductionist

approach would not be adequate prescriptions. Nor would

they provide adequate platforms for normative

redescription. The grafting of an expansive approach,

relying on textual analysis, would provide the necessary

synopticism and holism. This literature review provides the

component parts for the reductionary face of

Ashoka's Wheel, the framework of analysis which is

developed in Chapter III, as well as the basis, through

the liberal-ironic philosophical approach of Richard

Rorty, for the concluding normative chapter. The

expansionary face is layered on over the reductive

framework developed in Chapter III. It examines

important contributions, later to be used in Chapter III,

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from within three approaches to social change/stability as categorized by Kenneth Boulding in his article entitled

"Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung": Structural,

dialectical and evolutionary (Boulding 1977, 76). These

contributions are, drawn from Johnan Galtung (structural),

Harold Lasswell (dialectical) and several pluraliste such

as Alvin Rabushka & Kenneth Shepsle, Mancur Olson, Kenneth

Boulding, Crawford Young (evolutionary). They are discussed

in the wider context of social change theory. From Johan

Galtung we draw the concepts of 'center-periphery',

'association', 'organization' and 'structural violence'.

From Harold Lasswell we draw the concepts of 'governing

elites', 'value pyramids', 'influentials' and

'configurative analysis'. From the pluraliste, a diverse

group, one draws the concepts of cultural and political

entrepreneurship and interest group politics. Chapter III

develops a Galtungian framework which incorporates the

traditionally distinct conflict or dialectical approach

of elite theorists and the interest group approach of

pluraliste. However we begin the journey with a discussion

on approaches to social change.

Approaches to Social Change

Stability and change are inseparable concepts.

Indeed, stability is the framework for the operation of

change. Chaos is the canvas for order. Attributes of

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stability and change are visible at every level of human

consciousness of reality. It was Auguste Comte who saw the

merit in dealing with stability and change differently. He

argued that there should be two different sociological

perspectives each of which could accommodate one state

of society, i.e., either the 'statical' or the 'dynamic'

state. He named these perspectives Social Statics and

Social Dynamics respectively. While Comte viewed the

development of civilization as an evolutionary process

based on "the action of Man upon his environment" (Comte

1973, 27) he saw:

(I)n intellectual evolution a preponderant principle. If the intellectual point of view was the chief in our statical study of the organism, much more must it be in he dynamic case...... If the statical analysis of our social organism shows it resting at length upon a certain system of fundamental opinions, the gradual changes of that system of fundamental opinions, the gradual changes of that system must affect the successive modifications of the life of humanity: and this is why, since the birth of philosophy, the history of society has been governed by the history of the human mind (Comte 1975, 2)

Nineteenth century 'evolutionists' believed that

the unfolding process of development seen in living

organisms must also be mirrored in society. Every society

was viewed as having potential and change was what allowed

societies to develop that potential. Diffusionists on

the other hand argued that even primitive societies are

known to have indulged in cultural borrowing from

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neighbors and that therefore development and change were

externally generated. The concepts of 'modernization',

'development' and 'europeanization' are intimately connected

with this debate. Anthropological Functionalism, developed

by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, was a response to this

debate between nineteenth century evolutionists and

diffusionists. Malinowski explained the presence of similar

cultural elements in different primitive societies as being

the product of "the contribution of or function performed

by each item for the maintenance of the cultural ensemble"

(Smith 1973, 3). Anthropological functionalism of the

1920's and 30's was succeeded by 'normative

functionalism' which sought to marry the anthropologists

structural functional approach with Emile Durkheim's notion

of normative integration of societies and the action frame

reference of Max Weber.

Normative functionalism accomplished this difficult feat of synthesis, by putting the main emphasis on the stabilizing effect of norms (and institutions) which in the action frame of reference are held to govern expectations between interacting individuals. A society in which norms produced this stability and equilibrium, was able to fulfill its major functional imperatives socialization, reproduction, education, integration and so on. But norms in turn 'specify' more basic symbols, attitudes and beliefs; and this central system of 'values' (as these attitudes etc. were termed) is a prerequisite of any ongoing social system (Smith 1973, 3)

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A central value system underlies the norms of each

institutional sphere into which society is differentiated.

The central value system acts as the cohesive web which

unites the normative systems of each institution and

provides pathways for mutual reinforcement. The ability of

some institutions to influence others and their members has

an impact on sectoral norms and through them on the

central value system with possible consequences for the

stability-change relationship in society. Anthony Smith

argues that functionalism expanded the scope of theory from

Table 1. Perspectival Relationships

EVOLUTIONISTS DIFFUSIONISTS I I ANTHROPOLOGICAL FUNCTIONALISM 1 NORMATIVE FUNCTIONALISM 1 NEO-EVOLUTIONISM (SOCIOLOGY/ANTHROPOLOGY)

MARXISM- -CULTURAL STUDIES- — POSTMODERNISM (LIT)

(POL. ECON.) INTN. LAW

NEOFUNCTIONALISM

INT. POL. ECON. INTERDEPENDENCE" (WORLD POLITICS) INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS NEO-REALISTS

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a societal to a global framework, in response to criticism

that functionalism was status-quo oriented, ignored creative and destructive social dialectic and did not take into

account dysfunctional and autonomous institutions. The

new functionalism, born in primeval political economy,

nurtured in anthropology and sociology, entered the study

of global society as 'neo-evolutionism'•

The problem of stability and change at

international level is addressed in the late 1980's and outset of the 1990's by a variety of disciplines with

converging interests. International Relations, with its

history of a dominant power and state oriented realist

approach, has begun to examine international norms and

institutions through the concept of 'international regimes'

and the 'anarchy problematic' drawing eclectically on

Thomas Hobbes, Hedley Bull, Jurgen Habermas and Clifford

Geertz. The traditional challengers to orthodoxy, the

'idealists' have re-emerged as Neo-functionalists who now

argue that there must be a deliberate political act

which will bring about social integration through technical

and economic cooperation. Economists have promoted the

concept of 'interdependence' as an inter-disciplinary

ecumene. New Political Economy (within International

Political Economy) and International Law also look at

the question of 'international regimes'. World Systems

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Theory , also within International Political Economy, and

the various disciplines contributing to Cultural Studies,

have begun to look into the question of global culture.

Mostly informed by the Frankfurt School, sociologists and

literary scholars, including those working with the post

modernist tradition, have begun to engage Immanuel

Wallerstein in a debate on the nature of the World

System/Global Culture.^ As the figure provided above shows,

all these areas are converging in terms of focus even if

workers in respective domains are not always aware of

convergence. Some researchers work within structuralist

traditions while others reject structuralism within the

same disciplinary sub-group. Post-modernism is an anti-

foundationalist approach which rejects doctrinairism. It

examines surfaces rather than structures. It defies

definition because there are as many post-modernist flies

examining the surface of social wall paper as there are

post-modernisms. It tends to be eclectic and pluralist.

There is something in its nature which abhors disciplinary

walls. It provides an omnibus approach, which, in attitude,

is not dissimilar to all-embracing Hinduism. Post

modernists tend to argue that they can accommodate all

Theory. Culture & Societv Vol. 7, Sage: 199 0 is devoted to the debate on Global Culture and contains a response entitled "Culture is the World System: A Reply to Boyne", pp. 63-66.

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views: So do Hindus. Despite its rigidly hierarchical

internal social structure, its exclusion of possible

pollutants from outer and inner worlds, Hindus themselves

are philosophically universalist in that they are willing

to accommodate any and all ideological systems in the Hindu

omnibus. It is still a Hindu omnibus and not, as in the

case of genuine postmodernism, an omnibus in which

postmodernism is just another passenger like all other

isms. Hinduism does not describe all views, all

philosophies, all vocabularies as being equal. In that it

falls short of being a freak classical version of

postmodernism.

Drawing as it does on ancient Indian texts,

discussed in Chapter III, as well as contemporary Western

social scientific scholarship, there are hermeneutic and

normative as well as empirical aspects to this study.

Hermeneutic aspects are discussed in Chapter III in

relation to a framework which arises simultaneously from

the empirical approaches of Galtung, Lasswell and the

Pluraliste and ancient Indian texts. The normative aspect of

the study has its roots in the liberal-irony of the

philosopher Richard Rorty. The schema for the rest of this

chapter will therefore be as follows:

The Structuralism of Galtung and Wallerstein The Dialectics of Lasswell The Evolutionism of the Pluraliste The Liberal-Irony of Rorty

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The Structuralism of Galtung and Wallerstein

Johan Galtung's contribution to peace research and

conflict studies has been prolific and seminal. His

dichotomizing of social reality is between center and

periphery, where center is the locus of power and periphery

is the relatively powerless. In a structural vocabulary

such as that of Galtung empowerment must surely mean the

proliferation of centers. The order which Galtung

describes, rather than prescribes, is a radial grid which

connects organizational centers and contains and controls

peripheries within each organizational system. It is an

order reaching from the level of small units of social

organization to larger and larger units of social

organization.

While relationships between centers and peripheries

are more or less vertical and hierarchical and represent

power differentials, relationships within centers can

be more horizontal and egalitarian. The hierarchical

form of relationship is termed 'organization' and is based

on dissimilarity of members, while the horizontal form of

relationship is termed 'association' which is based on

similarity of members, by Galtung. 'Organization'

incorporates ranked statuses based on division of labor.

These two kinds of relationship are based on functional or

social principles of integration while a third is based on

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territoriality (Galtung 1968, 378-379).

In Kenneth Boulding's critique of Galtung's work he

identifies three broad theoretical approaches to the world,

to effecting change: Structural, dialectical and

evolutionary (Boulding 1977, 76). Structuralists such

as Galtung think only in static patterns, dialectical

theorists in terms of 'struggle' (conflict) between large

structures and evolutionary theorists, such as Boulding

himself, in terms of interaction in a disequilibrium system.

But certainly Galtung provides a useful frame (center-

periphery) on which to deploy the dialectical players

(influentials) of Lasswell and the evolutionary players

(political brokers/ interest groups) of the pluraliste.

Pertinent to this discussion on South Asian

transformation, which is necessarily impacted by

exogenous influences (global modernization project of the

West) as well as endogenous ones (ethno-historical

demands), is the debate on the nature of globalization,

which is observed to result both in homogenization and

pluralization as individuals and social groups react

differently to external and internal influences. The

globalization process, which consists of individuals and

societies (through economies within which they operate)

becoming increasingly linked to a world market in the lives

of some individuals and societies and in the rejection

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of the dominance by others who espouse ethno-historical

pluralism. There are contradictory tensions, in varying

proportions, in all individuals and social groups facing

the globalization dynamic. The notion of world market as

global culture which Wallerstein espouses is consonant

with my own definition of culture which incorporates all that is socially produced including Marxian superstructure

and base (Wallerstein 1990, 63-66). Wallerstein's world

system's theoretic approach precedes his redescription of

world system as global culture. But this synthesis only

leaves an economistic motor for the world market/global

culture - the relentless pursuit of profit by capital

which as a by-product structures the world into core and

periphery in an asymmetrical power relationship. I would

argue that there are twin engines, the second being the

pursuit of empowerment through culture by ethno-

historical groups. This latter is responsible for the

pluralization ethic in many societies. It is born of a

separate world experience of a group as reflected in their

language and culture.

The Dialectics of Lasswell

In World Politics and Personal Insecuritv Harold

Lasswell describes how 'influentials' or members of a

value-manipulating elite, preserve their advantage and

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ascendancy through "manipulating symbols, controlling

supplies and applying violence" (Lasswell 1963, 3) .

This formulation is particularly important to this study

for several reasons. First, Lasswell's three groups of

influentials match closely with the Hindu varna, the three

upper castes of ancient India which are at the same time

historical structural devices which inhibit transformation

and which, due to the pace of other societal changes in

the modern period contribute toward the impetus for

change and give it a conflictual nature. Second,

Lasswell's theory allows for both descriptive and normative

modes, both of which are to be found in this study but with

the latter having their origins in the former. Third,

Lasswell's focus on elites in a structural manner which

spans domestic and international realms, allows for the

theoretical enmeshing of pluralist theory (usually non-

conflictual and in opposition to elite studies) which

informs the sub-systemic aspect of this study and Johan

Galtung's Structural Theory of Imperialism which informs

the systemic aspect of this study.

Lasswell perceives any political order as

hierarchical, in a pyramid form, with elites or

influentials extracting values from lower levels of the

pyramids through the strategies of symbol, supply and

violence manipulation. Lasswellian pyramids of extraction

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are in effect three-dimensional and non-circular

center-periphery structures. If Lasswell had employed the term cone instead of pyramid, the vertical nature of

the center-periphery relationship is immediately noticed.

While this is the extractive dimension of Lasswell's

paradigm, the creation of hierarchical order is said to

stem from a mutual need of elite and mass for personal

security. The elite's great fear is that it should lose

its historical ascendancy in society and the great fear of

the mass is that it will lose its position of relative

security or never gain security, not even vicariously

through the next generation. In that sense the hierarchical

systems are also distributive in that they distribute symbols of security.

Lasswell's prescribed methodology of analysis is

configurative analysis and consists of development and

equilibrium modes and in the adoption of contemplative and

manipulative attitudes to political change. Development

analysis involves describing the ontogenesis of elite

symbol changes from a provisional construction of an

elite symbol plateau such as the reasonably equilibrated

structure of the pre-French Revolution elite-symbol

constellation. This may be considered as an alternative

historicist process to Marxist historicism dealing as it

were with events in the superstructure but including change

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in the equilibrium mode. Change in the constitution of

elites is the subject of equilibrium analysis which

draws on the proposition that "the probability of elite

alterations will be increased if the processes of

production have been notably altered (Lasswell 1963, 5).

While Lasswell has examined Marx and his model reflects

this, he did not subscribe to dialectical materialism and

does not dichotomize between infrastructure, consisting of

forces of production (constituted by means of production,

organization of production and relations of production)

and superstructure (consisting of the juridical-political

and ideological) (Chilcote 1981, 188). Lasswell's

formulation of the process of production includes the

processes of production and distribution of symbols, wealth

and violence.

While Lasswell is concerned primarily with the role of

elites in creating social stability or effecting

transformation, Marx is concerned with the role of mass as

class generated by industrial society, through

confrontation with classes among the elite. However

"(d)espite the fact that he was a class rather than an

elite analyst, Karl Marx (1818-83) had a great influence

upon the writings of Mosca, Pareto and Michels" (Bill &

Hardgrave 1981, 146). Mosca and Pareto as well as Marx and

Dewey influenced Lasswell in the development of his

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It is the level of insecurity produced by shifts in

changes in the division of labor, changes in the

symbolic environment or changes in the distribution of

instrumentalities of violence which lead to the rapidity

with which symbols of identification, demand and expec

tation are also adopted (Lasswell 1963, 7). The

principal internal demand is for equity on the ground of

cultural unity, but after achievement of statehood

nationalism may incorporate imperialistic demands for

domination of alien cultures (Lasswell 1963, 6). Effects

of changes in division of labor (effected by new

technology) are economically determined. Effects caused

through changes in the distribution of the

instrumentalities of violence (which may be caused by troop

movements, development of new military technology such as

nuclear devices) may be considered to be politically

determined. Effects of changes in the symbolic

environment (including media campaigns) may be culturally

determined.

The manipulation of these three areas is, however,

psychologically determined as it is a consequence of the

insecurity of elites and their need to make themselves

secure and give the masses a sense of security. In trying

to make themselves and those they depend on most secure.

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through manipulation of these three areas, others are made

insecure. It is a strategy of internalizing security by

externalizing insecurity. Consequently the insecurity

level in society is always in flux, with differential

levels for different groups at any given time. Elites

must constantly juggle what Lasswell calls symbols of

identification, demand and expectation.

Table 2. Categories of Configurative Analysis

SYMBOLIC ENVIRONMENT SYMBOLS OF DISTRIBUTION IDENTIFICA OF INSTRUMENT LEVEL OF TION, EXPECT ALITIES OF ANXIETY ATION VIOLENCE AND DEMAND DIVISION OF LABOR

Lasswell's symbols of identification permit the

integration of conflictual vertically hierarchical elite

studies approach with the non-hierarchical interest

group approach of pluralism, discussed below, as they

may be linked with identity groups which may be considered

to be a specific form of interest group. The theoretical

conflict between the elite studies approach and the

pluralist approach has a parallel tension in social

reality. The stable social order created by entrenched

elite systems of a vertical nature is in opposition to

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equity demands by interest groups in a co-existing

horizontal order. The conical model helps to illustrate

this. The cone is constructed of numerous strata.

Relationships within strata may be more horizontal and

'associational' in nature than relationships between

strata, which will be more vertical and 'organizational', in

practice, despite the fact that the upper strata may have

espoused pluralism as a political value.

While earlier the state may have promoted the

vertical order, as in Ancient India, today the vertical

order is maintained through cultural devices by those in

society who are placed at an advantage by the old order.

The horizontal order is supported by the state as

distributor of values with the goal of equity, but because

of the elite in the modern South Asian state begins, at

independence by being not unlike the elite of earlier

periods in terms of caste composition, the old order tends

to reproduce itself.

Lasswell's configurative analysis, despite its

historicist development analysis and its relative

complexity, is still part and parcel of the reductionist

behavioralist period. In order to give Lasswell's analysis

more elasticity, it is appropriate to superimpose Geertz's

notion of thick description. What is of particular

interest to this study is Geertz's methodology, his

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approach to the examination of cultures which requires

that cultures be examined terms in of the examiners

perception of that cultures own terms. This requires an

awareness of the significance of cultural context, the

meaning of a statement supplemented in meaning by other

non-verbal and contextual cultural signals (Geertz 1973,

6-10). Geertz elaborates on the difference between a

twitch and a wink and Gilbert Ryle's notion of 'thick

description' (Geertz 1973, 6). He warns against

reductionism and the reification of the reduced, which can

lead in effect to twitches being permanently misread as

winks and vice versa. Our formulations of symbol systems

of other peoples must be actor-oriented, he argues;

What it means is that Berber, Jewish, or French culture must be cast in terms of the constructions we imagine Berbers, Jews, or Frenchmen to place upon what they live through, the formula they use to define what happens to them. What it does not mean is that such descriptions are themselves Berber, Jewish, or French - that is, part of the reality they are ostensibly describing; they are anthropological - that is part of a developing system of scientific analysis. They must be cast in terms of the interpretations to which persons of a particular denomination subject their experience, because that is what they profess to be descriptions of; they are anthropological because it is, in fact, anthropologists who profess them (Geertz 1973, 15).

Geertz sees enactment of culturally important games as a

hermeneutic which reveals social organization.

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Pluralism is a goal and a product of the project of

modernization. While this is a pluralism of voices and

choices it does not necessarily result in equality of

voice and choice. It is acknowledged that some have

greater voice than others in society, and it is the

matching of those with voice to those with votes in order

to expand the letter's choice which is the genius of

pluralist political order. Conflict is not erased from

society but rather it is de-'class'-ified and de-

hierarchicalized. Galtungian 'organization' is the pre

modern mode of social collectivism where as Galtungian

'association' is the modern goal. Pluralism is associ

ational. The hierarchy of elite and mass is translated

into the interdependence of voice and vote. However this

leveling of political relationships occurs after the

inauguration of the modern nation state as the

centralizer and re-distributor of values. Political

elites (called political entrepreneurs) seeking to

maximize power, contract particularist alliances with

support groups, seeking to maximize state servicing of their

own interests (known as 'interest groups'). An interest

group may be defined as an "aggregate of individuals who

interact in varying degrees in pursuance of a common

interest" (Bill & Hardgrave 1982, 121). The concept of

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'political entrepreneur' is used by Babushka and Shepsle

in their pluralist theory of democratic instability. In

using the term they follow Richard E. Wagner who wrote in

1966 (Rabushka & Shepsle 1972, 60). The successful

political entrepreneur manipulates 'politically salient'

natural social cleavages, social cleavages made

politically salient through the successful marketing of

that cleavage in order to generate demand for issues

associated with that cleavage. Young argues that "(a)

distinction is worth making between the cultural

entrepreneur, who devotes himself to enlarging the

solidarity resources of a community and a political

broker, who mobilizes the social and political realm" (Young 1978, 46).

The concept is also used by Mancur Olson in his 'by

product' theory to the theory of Collective Action, to

explain how groups may obtain collective benefits despite

latency and even despite the failure to organize at all.

Olson also uses the term interest group, deriving it

from an aggregation of individual interest prompted by

selective incentives which could be material but could

include 'individual consciousness-raising and solidarity

(Hardin 1982, 33-34). Olson describes organizations in

society, and here he includes the organization of caste,

which engage in collective action not with the intention of

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producing additional output but rather with the intention

of struggling over distribution of income and wealth, as

•distributional coalitions', as contrasted with 'production

coalitions'. These distributional coalitions are also

known as 'special interest groups (Olson 1982, 44).

The Liberal-Ironv of Rortv

Rorty's liberal ironism is the surface treatment

for the proposed redescription which will coincide with the

normative conclusion to the entire work. Liberal ironism

constitutes my philosophical stance and frames my

construction but does not 'ground' it, given its anti-

foundational character. Richard Rorty dichotomizes

between thinkers who value the telos of social

perfection, justice (Marx, Mill, Dewey, Habermas, Rawls)

and those who value the telos of individual perfection,

autonomy (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Baudelaire, Proust,

Heiddeger, Nabokov) and suggests that a reconstruction which

de-oppositionalizes the binaries should be attempted,

without altering their binary nature (Rorty 1989: xiv). He

argues that one cannot create a unified theory of human

nature through synthesizing the work of these oppositional

writers, presumably because human nature and Nature itself

is not single-voiced. He argues for the recognition of

equal validity for the oppositional positions, for a need

to be "content to treat the demands of self-creation and

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of human solidarity as equally valid, yet forever

incommensurable" (Rorty 1989, xv).

We shall only think of these two kinds of writers as opposed if we think that a more comprehensive philosophical outlook would let us hold self-creation and justice, private perfection and human solidarity in a single vision (Rorty 1989, xiv).

Rorty discusses the contingencies of language,

selfhood and community. In his Wittgensteinian-Davidsonion

discussion on the contingency of language he posits that

language is truth. Truth is not 'out there waiting to be

discovered' by post-Enlightenment science. Idealists such

as Hegel and Kant believed that truth was made by

political Utopians and artists. (Rorty 1989, 4-5). The

German idealists share a belief in the notion that truth

is made not found with the French revolutionaries and the

Romantic poets, all of whom were expansionist in their

redescription of what was out there as opposed to the

Platonic and positivist traditions which were reductionist

(Rorty 1989, 7). The political telos of truth is utopia

and the aesthetic telos of truth is beauty. Interestingly

the telos of practical science is also utopia, albeit a

technological utopia and that of abstract sciences such as

higher mathematics and cosmology is beauty. Rorty's

position is that truth cannot be out there as truth can

exist only in sentences and languages are made rather than

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found (Rorty 1989, 5). He adopts a Wittgensteinian approach

to language as a tool rather than reflection of reality.

(Rorty 1989, 19). He argues that alternative vocabularies are alternative tools (Rorty 1989, 7).

Interestingly philosophy is rarely an examination of the pros and cons of a thesis. Usually it is implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises great things (Rorty 1989, 9).

Following Donald Davidson, Rorty does away with

language as "a third thing intervening between self and

reality" (Rorty 1989, 14). Davidson believes than in any

human encounter the encountering parties engage in

developing "passing theories" (passing because they are

constantly revised) about each other in order to predict

their behavior. "To say that we come to speak the same

language is to say, as Davidson puts it, that 'we tend to

converge on passing theories'" (Rorty 1989, 14).

In his Nietzschean-Freudian discussion on the

contingency of selfhood, Rorty draws on the 'strong poet's'

fear of extinction of one's individualness, one's unique

and unrepeatable perspective on the world and of the fear

that one's perspective as conveyed through language would

not be seen as unique but rather as a routine

rearrangement (Rorty 1989, 23-24). Rorty's strong poet is

the communicator who influences with his own distinctiveness

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and includes the likes of Proust, Nabokov, Newton, Darwin,

Hegel and Heidegger, such people who "are also to be

thought of as rebelling against 'death' - that is the

failure to have created - more strongly than most of us"

(Rorty 1989, 24). Rorty suggests that this self-

expression and self-fulfillment is an adequate answer to abjection. A requirement that the strong poet also find

"something common to all men at all times, not just to one

man once" suggested by the poet Philip Larkin is described

by Rorty as a pretense (Rorty 1989, 25).

He is pretending that to be a strong poet is not enough - that he would have attained satisfaction only from eing a philosopher, from finding continuities rather than exhibiting a discontinuity (Rorty 1989, 25) .

Rorty suggests that the failure to discover the

nonidiosyncratic, atemporal and universal should not be

viewed as the realization "that at a certain point one has

to trust to the good will of those who live other lives and

write other poems (Rorty 1989, 42). Selfhood, like language

and community, bows to contingency.

Rorty draws on Nietszche in positing the need to

discard inherited language-games in any project of

self-description (which may be termed pursuit of self-

knowledge or self-creation). In other words self

description must always be redescription, a process of

inventing a new language-game, new metaphors, which can

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escape the bounds of the old. (Rorty 1989, 27). This

prescription of escaping from the old truth to a new truth,

fired by the 'will to self-overcoming', contrasts with the

Western philosophical tradition of prescribing escape from

particular truths to universal truths, fired by the 'will

to truth' (Rorty 1989, 29).

He sees Freud's role in Western culture as the

"moralist who helped de-divinize the self and conscience

by tracking conscience home to its origin in the

contingencies of our development" (Rorty 1989, 30). As

the vocabulary of the Freudian language-game has invaded

wider discourse Rorty uses the expression "commonsense

Freudianism of contemporary culture" in much the same way

as one might use the term 'economic literacy' (Rorty 1989,

31). He draws on Freudian passages which discuss "the

narcissistic origin of compassion" which "give us a way of

thinking of the sense of pity not as an identification with

the common human core which we share with all other members

of our species , but as channeled in very specific ways

towards very specific sorts of people and very particular

vicissitudes. He thus helps us to understand how we can

take endless pains to help one friend and be entirely

oblivious of the greater pain of another, one we think we

love quite as dearly. He helps explain how someone can be

both a tender mother and a merciless concentration-camp

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guard, or be a just and temperate magistrate and also a

chilly, rejecting father (Rorty 1989, 32). In Galtungian

terms one might say that Freud explains how a liberal

individual might engage in 'associational' and

•organizational', including violent 'organizational'

relationships, at the same time.

Rorty sees progress, whether political, poetic,

artistic, philosophical or scientific, as the result "from

the accidental coincidence of a private obsession with a

public need" (Rorty 1989, 37). This confluence of

interests is identical with, in the realm of politics,

the pluralist notion of confluence of interests between

the political entrepreneur and interest group. The private

obsession is the Lasswellian obsession with power, in its

cultural economic or military forms by an individual. The

public need is based on a perception of shared features

within individuals in modern society which could give

them greater voice.

In his discussion on the contingency of a liberal

community Rorty argues that "(a) liberal society is one

which is content to call "true" (or "right" or "just")

whatever the outcome of undistorted communication happens

to be, whatever wins in free and open encounter" (Rorty

1989, 67). Our discussion of Lasswell's influentials and

Galtung's center-periphery power configurations suggests

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that one cannot achieve undistorted communication in

societies. The pluraliste alone resolve this problem

through a theoretical equalization of all claims on the

basis of voice supported by vote. In practice distortions

in the power structure distort communication.

Rorty argues that "distinctions between absolutism

and relativism, between rationality and irrationality, and

between morality and expediency are clumsy tools - remnants

of a vocabulary we should try to replace" (Rorty 1989, 44). He suggests, with Freud, that one should step back

from conceiving humankind as the goal of evolution, it is

just one more of Nature's experiments. Similarly he joins

Jefferson and Dewey in describing American democracy as

an experiment (Rorty 1989, 44). Rorty draws on

Michael Oakeshott in settling the morality/prudence

distinction, by thinking of it not as the difference

between an appeal to the unconditioned and an appeal to

the conditioned but the difference between an appeal to

the interests of our community and the appeal to our own,

possibly conflicting, private interests (Rorty 1989, 59).

Rorty points out that Oakeshott differentiates between

societas (a society conceived as a band of eccentrics

collaborating for mutual protection) and universitas (a

band of fellow spirits united by a common goal): It is

impossible to ask if a societas is moral. Morality is a

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matter, according to Oakeshott and Wilfred Sellars, of 'we- intentions' (Rorty 1989, 59).

In defining the ideally liberal society Rorty

suggests that its citizens

(w) ould be people who had a sense of contingency of their language of moral deliberation, and thus of their consciences, and thus of their community. They would be liberal ironists people who met Schumpeter's criterion of civilization, people who combined commitment with a sense of the contingency of their own commitment (Rorty 1989, 61) .

Citizens of an ideally liberal state would see their

language, conscience, morality and highest hopes " as

contingent products, as liberalizations of what once

were accidentally produced metaphors" (Rorty 1989, 61).

In creating the metaphor of liberal ironism Rorty draws on

the non-ironical liberalism of Habermas and the non

liberal irony of Foucault, playing one against the

other. Foucault brings, from Nietzsche, a critical

approach to liberalism and the preference for a

genealogical narrative of contingencies over 'timeless

origins'. Habermas replaces the Nietzschean 'philosophy

of subjectivity', which he views as non-emancipatory, with

a 'philosophy of intersubjectivity' and promotes

'domination-free communication' as a replacement for Kantian

'respect for human dignity' as "the aegis under which

society is to become more cosmopolitan and democratic"

(Rorty 1989, 62-63). Rorty believes that the contrary

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claims of selfhood and community may be addressed in

contemporary liberal society through "J.S. Mill's

suggestion that governments devote themselves to

optimizing the balance between leaving people's private

lives alone and preventing suffering..." (Rorty 1989, 63) .

The problem with this approach is that universitas

and societas are not mutually exclusive, they run into each

other in the real world. In a country such as India there

are many examples of the former at the subnational level;

unless there is also universitas at the national level,

there will be no India. Societas divorced of

universitas would need a common threat to keep it

together. Universitas is really 'selfhood of community' and

I am doubtful if one can have a defense collectivity of

selves which does not develop a collective selfhood. The

notion that liberal societies must balance in various ways

intervention in suffering and personal liberty is an

important one.

In a discussion on private irony and liberal hope

Rorty further defines an 'ironist' as someone who has

radical and continuing doubts about her final vocabulary

because she has been exposed to other vocabularies which

have impressed her, she sees that her present vocabulary

cannot help her escape from her dissatisfaction and she

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does not think her vocabulary is closer to reality than

others (Rorty 1989, 73). The response of metaphysician

(who associates theory with social hope and literature with

private perfection) is that the ironist is 'relativistic'

(Rorty 1989, 75/94). The two main differences between the

liberal ironist and liberal metaphysician are related to

their sense of what redescription can do for liberalism and

their sense of the connection between public hope and

private irony. Unlike the liberal metaphysician the

liberal ironist is not interested in metaphysical

arguments to bolster the desire to be kind: " Recognition

of a common susceptibility to humiliation is the only

social bond that is needed" (Rorty 1989, 91). In his

discussion on solidarity Rorty advocates the expansion of

ones sense of 'we' to include people who were previously

'they' (Rorty 1989, 192).

The right way to take the slogan "We have obligations to human beings simply as such" is as a means of reminding ourselves to keep trying to expand our sense of "us" as far as we can. That slogan urges us to extrapolate further in the direction of set by certain events in the past - the inclusion among "us" of the family in the next cave, then of the tribe across the river, then of the tribal confederation beyond the mountains, then of the unbelievers beyond the seas (and, perhaps last of all, of the menials who, all this time have been doing our dirty work). This is a process which we should try to keep going. We should stay on the lookout for marginalized people - people whom we still instinctively think of as "they" rather than "us". We should try to notice our similarities with them. (Rorty 1989, 196).

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It is redescription by the strong poet, whether she be

novelist or film-maker, which will make the difference in

generating this human solidarity within the private space

of the self. Rorty seems to support an extremely strong

form, to use Galtungian terminology, of 'associational'

relationships generated by the self and ever-expanding

outward in ripples. His approach could be fit into

Boulding's 'evolutionary' category and it has 'dialectical'

elements but it is richer than these approaches in the

sense that it listens to the voice of the weak and the

hurting, through texts rather than through voiceless

numbers, within the evolutionary pluralist liberal

tradition. It is happiest about social transformation

within the liberal tradition but agrees to an equal

validity for all vocabularies, all descriptions of the

world. Viewing social reality as a product of the

contingencies of language, selfhood and community, it

suggests how ironism in what I take to be advantaged

groups, or elite groups, can lead to hope for dis-advantaged

groups.

Conclusion

Chapter III draws on particular ancient and modern

Indian texts, notably the edicts of Emperor Ashoka,

Arthrashastra of Kautilya, the Mahabharatha and the

Ramavana (through A. L. Basham and others) and Satyajit

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Ray's classic film Home and the World for the ancient

metaphor of the Indian subcontinent. This hermeneutic

vision is allied with the structuralism of Galtung, the

dialectism of Lasswell and the evolutionism of the plural

iste. However the configuration which is assembled in

Chapter III, Ashoka's Wheel, is based on concentric circles,

with core and periphery. Ashoka's Wheel, is the framework

of analysis which is employed in subsequent chapters.

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FRAMEWORKS FOR SOUTH ASIA

In everything is shown the wish to maintain the moral integrity of the Aryan clans in a conquered country the Aryan clans desired nothing so earnestly as the continuation and defense of their own traditions. The result of this was that the social classes of the Aryans of Iran became the castes of the Aryans of India, with theoretically watertight divisions...... The Iranian Asha - the collection of stable conditions of cosmic order - is changed to Dharma, a social structure as well as an ontological reality, the right and duty of castes as well as fidelity to the Aryan ideal (Larousse 1959, 326) .

Introduction

The study of International Relations, like all

studies, is a search for order in a realm of human

experience. The search for order is a search for

understanding and even predictability, with its roots in

personal insecurity which feeds on the vulnerability of

self, self-organization and self-nation.^ It can have a

missionary dimension which seeks either the preservation or

transformation of existing order or elements of that order.

The terms self-organization and self-nation are used here in order to stress the identification of self and self- interest with particular organizations and nations. The vulnerability, and mortality, of self is the root of themes of abjection in literature.

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security interests of self that its projection of power,

symbols and wealth and its strategic use of these values in

polities, cultures and economies respectively may be viewed

by national observers to be in the larger interest of

international order. In examining the transformation of

South Asia and the important role India plays in this

process, one of the missions of this study is to develop and

utilize frameworks for organization and analysis of this

process as seen in reflections by regional scholars. The

purpose of the present chapter is to develop and discuss

such frameworks, frameworks which have been incorporated

here in an overarching framework called "Ashoka's Wheel".

Scholars within the South Asian region have addressed

expanding levels of intra-state violence in the region,

searching for political and economic causes, employing both

Marxist and liberal approaches in their analysis. At the

level of the regional system they have examined regional

security from geopolitical perspectives and have also

highlighted the need to address ethnopolitical causes of

instability which can link up with geopolitical factors.

There appears to be a recognition of multicausality but such

an admission hardly brings order into the picture. A

comprehensive framework for analysis, based on the

frameworks of order which operate in South Asia, is

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necessary if one is to address effectively the question of

multicausality and level of causality.

Order is also the project of states and governing elites as well as, in the final analysis, of elite-

aspirants. The telos of governing elites is to maintain

the present order in which they have preeminence. The

project of the elite-aspirant is to change his position in

the current order. In a society which is based on demo

cratic institutions it is likely that elite-aspirants will

begin by attempting to take social routes to achieving elite

status - within the existing order which elite-aspirants

believe will expand to accommodate them. Indeed, this has

been the promise of 'development' as they have understood

it. Where the governing elite's order maintenance is

incompatible with the elite-aspirants' social mobility aspi

rations, perhaps as a result of economic scarcity, the

project of elite-aspirants expands in scope to transform the

existing order to create conditions where they have primacy.

When legitimate strategies such as commercial and

educational routes for achieving elite status are denied to

elite aspirants, or are perceived to be denied to them,

elite aspirants respond with strategies of violence, either

to exclude the old order from their new order or to replace

the old order with their new order. In modern democratic

societies, in the West particularly, the commercial and

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educational routes to social mobility are wide open. In

Ancient India the rigid caste system segregated the

traditional elites, the Lasswellian wielders of symbols

(brahmans), military power (kshatriyas) and economic power

(vaishyas) and others who were considered as low-caste

(sudras) and out-castes.^ There was no possibility for an

individual to move upwards in terms of caste but it was

possible for entire caste groups to move upwards or

downwards. The traditional route for claiming upper-caste

status was through violence. Indeed this was a legitimate

route and led to the princely kshatriya status.

Examples of members of governing elites who sought

radical departures from the old order, within the realm of

ideology, are Constantine of Rome who adopted Christianity

for the Roman Empire, and Ashoka of India who adopted

Buddhism for the Mauryan Empire. In modern liberal

polities where interest groups politics aims at maximizing

benefits for individual interest groups, the state is

expected to play a role in ensuring a base of equity at

least in the legal sphere. However the state may need to

promote an hierarchical external world in order to enable a

The term varna refers to the larger classification into Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Sudras while the term jati refers to actual identity groups in India. Both terms translate into caste but the word caste is used here primarily in connection with the larger order of varna.

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elites and elite aspirants is order, though they may differ

in terms of strategies for achieving order and even in their conceptions of the nature of order. To achieve this order

they take actions, which are intended to draw support for

their project, at the level of demography (social groups),

bureaucracy (state organization) and geopolitics

(international organization). Where dependence has not

pre-empted it, the state may opt for self-help if it has the

capability and sees an advantage to itself in this action.

The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation, as a

formal Grotian framework for regional relations, as symbol

and fact, is a significant step for the governing elites of

South Asia, in reducing the opportunities for self-help, muting hierarchical potential of regional relations by

seeking to allay the fears of governing elites as well as

the masses of external threat.^ This hardly means that

the Hobbesian universe of self-help has been replaced by a

kinder, gentler Grotian world in South Asia. Nor does it

mean that states will not attempt to export change, even in

The term 'Grotian' refers to the world of International Law where all states are sovereign and equal and where conflict should be resolved through negotiation, where there are established codes of behavior and where there are laws and tribunals. It is derived from the name of Grotius and contrasts with Hobbesian (from Thomas Hobbes) which refers to a state of anarchy in nature which requires a central order- generating power.

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the form of violence, rather than undergo transformation

themselves.

Grotian and Hobbesian tendencies have always co

existed and the creation of the South Asian Association of

Regional Cooperation purely emphasizes the Grotian approach

and seeks to allay the insecurities of elites and masses in

South Asia, insecurities prompted by the shifts in division

of labor, symbolic environment and distribution of violence

within the region. The South Asian Association of Regional

Cooperation as symbol is simultaneously one of

identification, demand and expectation. Identification is

based on historical, cultural and geographical factors,

demand is for cooperative modes of inter-state relations

based on equality of state actors and the expectation is

peace and progress. But as much as it is possible for

Grotian tendencies to modify a Hobbesian State of Nature in

international relations, Grotian frameworks based on the

legalist perception of equally sovereign actors may be

modified through seepage of power relationships from the

self-help universe. As Wolfgang Mommsen has pointed out:

...... Galtung asserts with some boldness that international organizations have today become more than instruments of the asymmetrical interaction between central and peripheral nations which was in the past assured by formal colonial rule (Mommsen 140, 1982).

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This chapter discusses the Hindu varna (the hierarchical

caste system of social organization) and the 'realist'-

•idealist' orientations within the domestic and foreign policies of Emperor Ashoka, drawing on the earlier

discussion of Lasswellian elites, the center-periphery

hierarchical elite studies approach of Johann Galtung and

the horizontal interest group perspective of pluralism in

political science, in order to construct the Ashoka's Wheel

framework for South Asia - which is used for analytical

purposes in this work.

The Inner Wheel; Varnasarma

The symbolism of caste continues to be a powerful

template in the reproduction of society in South Asia and in

the attitudes and behavior of the upper caste groups toward

lower ones. However, because of the countervailing

symbolism of equality and social justice, caste has become a

crucible for change. In India and its South Asian

neighbors the past impinges on the present and modern

political culture clashes with the political culture of the

past. Continuing to impact contemporary regional politics

at all levels are the separate voices of history heard by

Northern Aryans and Southern Dravidians, voices which may be

traced back to the third millennium B.C.:

The Aryan invaders from the North-West settled at first in the Punjab (upper valley of the Indus and its tributaries) between 3000 and 1500 B.C., and must even then have come into contact with the

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dark-skinned Dravidians of a rather advanced culture which may have been related to that of the Chaldeans (if we may judge from the excavations at Harappa) and with much 'wilder' tribes speaking Munda idioms, whose affinities were with the ne groids of Indo-China and Australia. A great peculiarity of India is that even today these three elements stand side by side, at once distinct and yet intermingled in an infinite number of amalgams, which moreover contain a certain number of Mongolian elements (Larousse 1959, 325).

It is the lingering social rather than political 'apartheid'

of the varnasurma which allows the present to reproduce the past.

The political economy of Ancient India, with its

metaphysical origins, was designed to minimize social

transformation. A fear of anarchy, not in itself unusual,

led to the imposition of a rigid caste structure which

concretized the political economy. The caste system of

Ancient India was state-sponsored and structural, a genuine

apartheid, whereas the modern Indian state works within the

pluralist tradition and does not promote caste hierarchy.

The caste system introduced by the Brahma-worshiping Aryans,

the varnasurma, closely matches Lasswell's three groups of

influentials:

The four varnas of India developed out of very early Aryan class divisions, for some stratifi cation existed in many Indonesian pistras or classes, comparable in some respects to those in India. In India this stratification grew more rigid when, in the Vedic period, a situation arose rather like that prevailing in South Africa today, with a dominant fair minority striving to maintain its purity and supremacy over a darker majority.

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The tribal class-divisions hardened and the dark- skinned aboriginal found a place only in the basement of the Aryan social structure, as a serf with few rights and many disabilities (Basham 1967, 138).

Caste continues to be important in areas such as

interest group politics and social reproduction but it is no

longer structural: Today it is cultural. While the

paradigm of caste holds true for India, Nepal, Bhutan and

Sri Lanka, it cannot be applied directly to the Islamic

States of South Asia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Maldives

which subscribe to the Islamic political culture of the

'brotherhood of man'. However, again, in these Islamic

countries one finds that despite the liberal instincts of

the Westernized elite and the absence of caste constraint

there are bureaucratic devices which are employed to

encourage no major changes in stratification during social

reproduction. These devices emanate from an English-

speaking elite.

The caste system is a response to cosmic entropy. The

fear of anarchy or matsayanya,^ or where the strong consume

the weak, is the motivation behind its institution. The

strong in this case must surely be those in numerical

Matsayanya is Sanskrit for 'the way of the fishes'and may be possibly be connected with the ancient image of successively larger fishes trying to swallow each other. This suggests conquest is anarchic, a notion upheld by the prescription of one type of conquest, dharmavijaya, (conquest by righteousness) discussed later in this chapter.

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superiority as against the numerically inferior

influentials. Hindu mythology describes mankind living on

an immaterial plane before descent into matter after cosmic

decay. "As men lost their primeval glory distinctions of

class arose, and they entered into agreements accepting

the institutions of private property and family" (Basham 1967, 87).

The three upper castes of the Hindu varna are the

Brahmans, Kshatriyas and Vaishyas, priests (manipulators of

symbols), warriors (manipulators of instruments of

violence) and merchants (manipulators of markets)

respectively. These coincide with the three Lasswellian

influentials (Lasswell 1963). While upward caste mobility

was impermissible for the individual, entire caste groups

could rise in the social firmament over a period of time.^

Even though Brahmans monopolized the crucial realm of

ideology and ideological control, usurpation of princely

power through violence could lead to a family and its kith

assuming noble Kshatriya status.

Ideally a royal family was of ksatriya or warrior class, but in practice this was often not the

Mancur Olson points out that in the caste system groups rather than individuals can change status" as in the case of his distributional coalitions. Another similarity with distributional coalitions, according to Olson, is that duties are applicable to the group and not universalistic. "So it is similar to professional ethics that rule out competition in a profession" (Olson 1982, 157).

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case. The Sungas and Kunvas were Brahmans, as were several other dynasties; the family of Harsa is said by Hsuan Tsang to have been of the vaisya, or mercantile class; while the Nandas, and perhaps even the Mauryas, sprang from the despised sudras. In practice the aphorism "whoever rules is a ksatriya" was applied, and after a few generations kingly families from lower orders were assimilated into the martial castes (Basham 1967, 92).

While the caste system is no longer enforced by

government, unlike in Ancient India where one of the

prince's foremost functions was to protect the purity of

caste (Basham 1967, 90), it continues to play a role in both

elite-mass and interest group politics. A rather disturbing

illustration of how the varna represents a Lasswellian

value-pyramid may be seen in the figures for food

consumption in calories per person per day (of Colin Clark

and M. Haswell) quoted by Debesh Bhattacharya in an article

entitled Growth and Distribution in India (Bhattacharya

1989, 156); Brahmans and Vaishyas - 2720; agricultural

castes - 2440; other miscellaneous castes - 1960; Harijans -

1940; fishermen - 1580. Caste plays perhaps too important a

role in the elite-mass relationship and too inadequate and

Shirley Pulle Tissera, secretary of the Colombo Chetty Association of Sri Lanka makes reference to Prof. H. Ellawala's claim in Social Historv of Early Cevlon that the Mauryan emperor Ashoka's queen (mother of Mahinda and Sanghamitta who brought Buddhism to Sri Lanka) was a Setthi (Chetty) or a vaishya. "...Prof. Ellawela goes on to say that Prince Summitta and his eight brothers who came to Lanka to guard the sacred Bo tree were sons of a Deva Setthi from Vedisa City in Avanthi". Summitta was the brother of Asoka's queen (Tissera 1990, 3).

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ineffective a role in interest group politics. Where there

is inadequate opportunity for caste mobility and class

mobility because of cultural exclusionary strategies by

upper caste (top three castes) and upper class groups, low

caste and lower class groups experience a high degree of

frustration, because of the revolution of rising

expectations. In the contemporary context upper caste

would coincide with upper class and governing elite at least

in the sense that there is a core group of individuals and

families who belong to all three classifications (i.e. upper

caste, upper class and governing elite). There might very

well be upper caste individuals who do not belong to the

other two classifications mentioned above and lower caste

individuals who belong to the governing elite. The tension

between the ethno-historical vertical elite-mass order and

the horizontal modern interest group order leads to attempts

at kshatriya route solutions to the aspirations of out

groups, led by political entrepreneurs. The route of

violence becomes a preferred one for disenchanted out

groups. In the power struggle between the old Westernized

elite and largely non-English speaking elite-aspirants, the

South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation as

presently constituted is a vehicle for the old elite which

established it. Violence becomes a preferred method for

those, who even in a pluralist, secular parliamentary

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democracy, perceive cultural obstacles to social and

political ascendancy.

The Outer Wheel

The search for a framework to be utilized in this

study, as an analytical and organizational tool, must take

us first to a symbol of an earlier regional order which

exhibited similar tensions between realism and idealism in

its formulation and outlook. This symbol is the

Dharmacakkra or 'Wheel of Right Doctrine' (or of

'Righteousness'), depicted by the cakkra or chariot wheel.

Ashoka, grandson of Chandragupta, founder of the Mauryan

dynasty established the first of less than a handful of

indigenous Indian empires and adopted the Dharmacakkra as

his symbol of empire. If his father and grandfather had

no compunction about their new role as creators of order

through manipulation of violence,

the third generation Ashoka seems to have been quick to

appreciate the advantages of a new order based on the

manipulation of the flow of symbols and services.

If there is tension between ethno-historical vertical

order as manifested in the caste system of elites and the

modern horizontal order as manifested in interest group

politics within South Asian societies, there is a parallel

tension between realist and idealist outlooks in South Asian

interstate relations. At the systemic level the idealist

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and functionalist values expressed in the South Asian

Association of Regional Co-operation have their early Indian

origin in the foreign policy of Ashoka. This is not to

claim that the new regional institution has its origins in

the Ashokan rather than modern European-constructed world.^

However the past does echo in the present and the Ashokan

approach to international relations is a discernible stream

in Indian political culture which is otherwise quite

realist. The rule of law in personal, family and class relations was a fundamental element of ancient Indian thought, but in the sphere of international

It is not being suggested that the political writings of Kautilya and policy statements of Ashoka have had a seminal influence on Indian politicians and political writers in a continuous historical sense. Nor is it being suggested that Kautilyan concepts had widespread currency in his own time though it is reasonable to believe that princes such as Ashoka and his forebears would have been familiar with his arguments. Certainly Kautilya gives the impression, through providing the opinions of others in his work, that there was a scholarly 'community' which commented on problems of government. What is being suggested is that contemporary Indian and Sri Lankan politicians have drawn on Ashokan concepts to explain approaches to foreign policy which might have alternative terminologies within the discipline of International Relations. President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka stated during the July 1990 offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that he would adopt a dharmavijaya approach to his dealings with the LTTE provided they to all laid down their arms: "We're committed to follow the Asokan principle of dharmavijaya, justice and fairplay, equal treat ment to all and resolution of issues by peaceful means." Sri Lanka News (Colombo), 4 July 1990. His predecessor. President Jayewardene, when assuming the newly-created Executive Presidency in 1978, adopted the Ashokan Wheel as the emblem of the presidency and used the political slogan dharmishta samajaya or 'just society'.

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affairs there was no real conception of its possibility...... Asoka was possibly the only ancient Indian king who finally broke with the tradition of aggression, though his spirit can be heard in certain passages of Buddhist texts, and many ordinary people must have echoed his sentiments (Basham 1967, 123).

Hence the so-called idealist approach to international

relations in South Asia may be referred to as the Ashokan

approach as opposed to the realpolitik of Hindu literature.

At the same time Ashoka's idealism is not without its

advantages and may be viewed as realism which has eschewed

power-based solutions in specific areas. As Ashoka did not

abandon his imperial ambitions there is a tension present in

his administration of the Mauryan Empire - between the

Ashokan approach and the realist approach of the

cakkravartin or Universal Emperor, whose symbol of universal

order is a cakkra or chariot wheel (Basham 1967, 84/85).

The cakkravartin is the "controller of universal dharma" and

"unites the fascinating legitimacy of the varna with the

vigor of Indra" (Larousse 1959, 329) who was "...the

prototype of the caste of the nobles..." (Larousse 1959,

326). By transforming the symbol of the cakkravartin from

cakra to dharmacakkra or Wheel of Righteousness (and emblem

of Law and Order), Ashoka does not resolve the tension

between realist and idealist outlooks, a tension which

continues in modern India between the project of a great and

powerful India and a great and powerful India and a great

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and morally superior India.°

Which project engages India's attention is one of

primary interest to her neighbors.* Glance at the

political, military and demographic maps of the region and

one becomes quickly aware of India's preponderance:

Intraregional balance of power based on the liberal ideal of

roughly equal powers disallowing the emergence of a

superpower which will upset the balance is hardly possible

within South Asia. India's size, military capability.

Interestingly Hindu mythology seems to understand that social order has to be based on the informal reciprocity of friendship and the formal reciprocity of contract, on gemeinschaft and gesselschaft if one were to co-opt the terminology of Ferdinand Tonnies. A dyad of deities, Mitra and Varuna, maintain rita or universal order. "for this reason the former presides over friendship and contracts, while the latter looks after oaths" [Larousse 1959, 328]. Mitra is the Sun, ruling over the day, while Varuna the Moon rules over the night. The origins of the symbol of cakkra in its association with political and moral order may be in its association with the sun. The Sun God Surya "revealed himself in twelve different forms of which Vishnu was the ninth. The horse was a constant symbol of the sun, the sun god's chariot being drawn by seven horses or mares" [Larousse 1959, 325]. The Temple of Surya in Konarak, Orissa has a good example of a Wheel of the Sun's Chariot from a Thirteenth Century A.D. frieze [Basham 1967, plate xxi].

* The leader in Sri Lanka's state-owned Sunday Observer [8 July, 1990] entitled "Wanted: Indian Policy for Sri Lanka" states that "[t]he foreign policy of a big nation should not necessarily depend on the whims and fancies of those in power. Consistency and consequently predictability are essential requirements for neighbours to fashion their foreign policies. India's moral standing and image will be enhanced by clearly defining its Sri Lanka policy. In the absence of such a consistent policy it would not make sense to chide its neighbours for not having a clearcut policy towards India.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 population, demographic ties with its neighbors and

geographic centrality suggest that a Concert of Asia will

not arise. It would seem that here is a situation where a

system of hegemonic stability might work. However the

primary systemic cause of insecurity and instability in the

region is the rivalry and mutual fear of largely Hindu but

secularly-governed India and Islamic Pakistan, which were

carved out of British India and the Indian States. This rivalry operates the sometimes convenient flashpoint of

Kashmir. Pakistan has sought to resolve the imbalance

through extra-regional alliances, development of nuclear

technology and promotion of diplomatic solidarity with other

South Asian states. China is in many ways a natural ally

for South Asia's junior partners and this dynamic leads to

considerable sensitivity on the part of China's natural

geopolitical enemy, India.

The flashpoints around India such as Bhutan, Kashmir,

Nepal, Punjab and Sri Lanka are perceived by India as

elements within her orbit which are constantly in danger,

because of her own generous liberal approach, of being

'abducted' by a foreign power in a re-enactment of Havana's

(symbolizing a foreign power) abduction of Krishna's

(symbolizing the Indian self-identity) bride Sita from the

ancient Indian epic, Ramavana. In Satyajit Ray's film The

Home and the World he describes a pre-Independence version

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 of the ancient Ramavana love triangle between the merchant

prince Nikhil, his wife and the anti-British demagogue/terrorist, Sandeep. Sandeep's approach is that of

the Kshatriya and is quite cynical while Nikhil's approach

is a Vaishya humanism: The former has no qualms of hurting

poor Indians and stirring up ethnic violence in order to

hurt the Raj and maximize his power respectively. The latter

prefers to work toward improving the lot of the poor within

the existing system, in which one must say, he has

ascendancy. The liberal Nikhil encourages his wife to listen

to the heady words of Sandeep who seduces her. Rather than

use violence to regain his wife Nikhil employs strength of

moral purpose.In the Indian mind, therefore, there is

the image of India-Krishna promoting the liberty of the

multiplicity of Sitas which surround it. While the Sitas

will never leave the Indian orbit on their own accord, they

will be seduced by Ravanas, from the West, from China, from

Pakistan. Hence the need for the Indira doctrine of

excluding external powers from acting in the region without

Indian approval. 11

In their final encounter Sandeep tells Nikhil that he is informed by the voice of the Mahabharatha and that, in terms of the Ramavana epic he sees Havana and not Krishna as the true hero.

Interestingly, when I presented a paper on SAARC in the Changing Global Order at a seminar in Colombo in 1992, using the Rama-Sita and dharmacakkra-cakravartin concepts, there were several people in the audience who were not comfortable

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India's central location in South Asia and its

preponderance lead to it being perceived as a pivotal power

by the United States. While there is a suggestion of

center-periphery relations in the word pivotal, the

relationship between the Indian hub and its South Asian rim

was not always and economic one. In colonial times economic

ties were directly between India and Britain and between

Ceylon and Britain for instance, though there has been a

history of dependence between Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim and

India and to a lesser extent between the Maldives and

Ceylon. (Sikkim became an Indian state in the 1970s).

However one may discern a center-periphery relationship

emerging in the political arena, with India insisting that

security issues should be dealt with on a bilateral basis.

Except in the case of Pakistan, India cannot be prevailed on

by its South Asian neighbors should she choose to flex her

muscles.

Johann Galtung's center-periphery model as applied to

the situation in South Asia is a case of the dynamics of the

with the introduction of these ancient terms into the discourse about South Asia (Chitty 1991). Indeed, when I presented the Ashoka's Wheel framework at a conference in Brisbane, some South Asian academics who were present were unhappy with my application of historically distant concepts on South Asia (Chitty 1990a) . My response was that I could have quite easily discussed the issues in terms of Hobbes and Grotius but that I wanted to develop an approach with roots in the region. In general I have found Western scholars to find the framework more acceptable than their South Asian colleagues.

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region moving towards such a model, as opposed to such a

relationship having already developed through centuries of

colonialism. Despite India's pivotal position in the region

and its aspirations as a great power, the historical

'dependence' on India has been cultural and demographic.

It has been cultural because of demography (through

migration) rather than purely cultural as in the case of

Buddhism spreading to China. The transformation of

demographic and cultural dependence to security dependence,

if that were to happen, could result in economic dependence.

Ashoka's Wheel (see fig. 1) , the framework which has

been developed as the primary heuristic and organizational

tool of this study, incorporates the center-periphery

potentiality in its circular design and through the device

of concentric circles incorporates the balance of power

model which is found in the mandala of Kautliya'

Arthrashastra. The Dharmacakkra is the Indian version of the

Arthurian Round Table. In both instances the monarch

consolidates power through violence and then institutes the

Rule of Law. 'Might is Right' is transformed by the mighty

into 'Might for Right'. Ashoka expanded his inheritance

into history's first Buddhist empire. Two visions of

Ashoka's Wheel, as applied to SAARC are provided below.

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Fig. 1: Ashoka's Wheel - A Cakkravartin Vision

NEPAL

PAKISTAN ^ BHUTAN

BANGLADESH MALDIVES

SRI LANKA

Fig. 2: Ashoka's Wheel - A Dharmacakkra Vision

INDIA

NEPAL

PAKJ5TAN BHUTAN

MALDIVES BANGLADESH

SR] LANKA

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 Basham states Ashoka's foreign policy perspective

succintly;

It seemed that Asoka believed that by setting an example of enlightened government, he might convince his neighbors of his new policy and thus gain the moral leadership of the whole civilized world. He by no means gave up his imperial ambitions, but modifies them in accordance with the humanitarian ethics of Buddhism (Basham 1967, 55) .

In his foreign policy Ashoka sought "the abandonment

of aggressive war" and in place of the traditional policy of

territorial expansion he substituted conquest by

Righteousness (as we here inadequately translate the very

pregnant word dharma) (Basham 1967, 55). This is in

contrast to the militarism which was characteristic of

Indian princes who,lived before and after Ashoka. While

Hindu society imposed the rule of law in determining

interpersonal, family and class relations, this order was

not extended into the realm of international relations

except in the prescription for dharmavijaya or conquest by

righteousness. This prescription may be traced to the

Mahabharatha (Basham 1967, 123-125). The Arthrashastra.

however, provides three alternatives for conquest, viz.

righteous conquest (dharmavijaya), conquest for greed

(lobhavijaya) and demonic conquest (asuravijaya). In the

first instance the conquered prince or a kinsman of that

prince becomes a tributary and vassal of the conqueror

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without having his territory annexed. Conquest for greed

includes extensive annexation of territory and extraction of

excessive amounts of tribute. Demonic conquest signifies

the complete incorporation of the conquered territory into

the body politic of the conquering state.

The original dharmavijaya was romantic in character,

following "...... the doctrine that war should be waged for

glory and homage rather than sordid aims such as wealth and

power " (Basham 1967, 125). Hindu dharmavijaya is

still a variation of Might is Right, though it prescribes a

right way of using might, a proportionate way which will

allow princes to survive after conquest and even be in a

position one day to conquer others. Dharmavijaya

recognizes the sovereignty of princes, lobhavijaya dilutes

sovereignty and asuravijaya denies the conquered prince any

sovereignty. Kautilya's mandala or configuration consists

of concentric circles around a prince who ensures his own

survival at the center by pitting each circle of advisors,

bureaucrats and princely allies against neighbouring

circles. It is a complex version of 'divide and rule'.

Kautilya recommends to princes that they form alliances with

princes who share a second frontier with their enemies.

This notion of balancing may be extended to include extra-

regional or geopolitical dimensions as well. Through a

marriage between Galtung's center-periphery framework.

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Kautilya's mandala and the dharmacakkra of Ashoka, the

overall framework of analysis and organization of this study

emerges.

Projecting the varna into the Galtung framework of

center-periphery elite relations, one can view the Indian

center as brahman, (controlling the flow of symbols),

kshatriya (military control) and vaishya (economic control)

while the periphery is sudra (servicing symbolic, military

and economic elites). It is not being suggested that this

is the existing reality though this certainly would be the

reality under a lobhavijaya or dharmavijaya scenario.

Certainly from an Indo-centric and Delhi-centric point of

view, the Indian center and its interests is paramount and

therefore may be considered to be brahman vis-a-vis Indian

regional centers (the Indian periphery) and centers of

neighbouring states. The Indira doctrine excludes states

which are external to the South Asian system from

intervening in South Asian affairs - a form of

untouchability. Pakistan and other Indian neighbours at one

time or another have rejected the Indian view of its

•brahman status' in a South Asian caste configuration.

Pakistan's response has been to adopt a kshatriya route to

parity with the brahman center which is bolstered by its own

kshatriya cohorts. The smaller countries adopt vaishya

approaches in order to increase trade links with large

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external powers.

By happy coincidence the origins of the South Asian

Association for Regional Co-operation proposal and the site

of the new institution's headquarters fit well with the

Ashokan metaphor. Ashoka's imperial capital, Pataliputra,

is relatively close to Dhaka and Katmandu in the North-East

of the subcontinent. The South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation was the brainchild of the late Ziaur

Rahman, president of Bangladesh. The organization's

secretariat is based in the capital of Nepal. It was

Rahman, a member of Bangladesh's ruling military elite, who

first made proposals for regional co-operation during visits

to India, Nepal and Pakistan between 1977 and 1980. This

was at a time there had been significant leadership changes

in the region and his initiative was meant to take advantage

of the window of opportunity presented by these changes.

Indira Gandhi had been replaced by Morarji Desai in India,

Sirima Bandaranaike by Junius Jayewardene in Sri Lanka and

Bhutto by General Zhia in Pakistan. In India the Nehru

family, of which Indira Gandhi was a member, may be said to

have subscribed to the cakkravartin approach to

international relations in the sub-continent, in contrast

with the dharmacakkra approach of Mahatma Gandhi.

It must be mentioned that Nehru, more than his

daughter, who was a firm realist, was Janus-faced. Though

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he was realist enough to reject the politics of love

prescribed by Mahatma Gandhi, he drew inspiration from

Mahatma Gandhi and tried to introduce some of the Gandhian

values into international relations. Mahatma Gandhi re

interpreted the doctrine of non-violence to incorporate a

commitment to vegetarianism and the abolition of capital

punishment and war. His was the modern expression of

Dharmavijaya, but a Victory by Righteousness which

transcends even the 'Might for Right' of Ashoka.

Gandhi's proposition is that 'Right is Might' as

demonstrated by the power of right action. He was

interested in a larger order, a decentralized low-technology

order, held together by a morally superior India. However

he wanted to do away with that ancient glue, the caste

system. Interestingly Mahatma Gandhi belonged to a

mercantile caste, the Bania, and in ancient India the values

of Buddhism (which Gandhi also draws on) were especially

favored by mercantile castes who benefited from peace rather

than war (Basham 167, 124). Having cut his activist teeth

in South Africa battling that country's state-sponsored

President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka draws directly on the Ashokan principle of dharmavijaya in his political discourse. "We're committed to follow the Asokan principle of 'dhammavijaya’, justice and fairplay, equal treatment to all and resolution of issues by peaceful means." Sri Lanka Today (Colombo) 4 July 1990. Four days earlier he is reported to have said "(w)e believe right is might, not might is right." Sri Lanka Today (Colombo) 30 June 1990.

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caste system, on his return to India Gandhi sought to rid

India of its culture of caste. He attempted to alter the

symbolism of caste and referred to outcastes or

untouchables as 'Children of God'. He paid the price for

meddling with the varnasarma with his life, at the hands of

a Hindu fundamentalist.

THE SPOKES

In Ashoka's Wheel, India is the hub of the wheel and

is connected to the rim, consisting of other members of the

South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation, by six

three-pronged spokes. The three prongs in each composite

spoke represent the ethno-historical, administrative and

international political cultural dimensions of bilateral

links between India and its six partners. Myron Weiner

identifies two political cultures in tension in India: A

mass political culture which grows upwards from local groups

and within which local and state politics operate, and an

elite political culture in New Delhi. The mass political

culture may be said to be the political culture of the

periphery as it contrasts with an elite political culture at

the center which "is personified by India's planners, many

of the national political leaders, and the senior

administrative cadre" (Weiner 1965, 199). Weiner detects

an ambivalence among the elite who have contributed to the

creation of institutional channels for the expression of

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this grass-root culture but fear that it will supersede

their own. Using the term ethno-historical rather than 'mass political' one has recognized that "(r)acial,

religious, linguistic, tribal, caste, ethnic, class, or

geographic cleavages, among the population may serve to

sustain separate political subcultures" (Bill & Hardgrave

1981, 89). These cleavages become increasingly important

within India today. The ethno-historical political culture

embodies the pre-western political experience of India which

is embedded in the deepest of values and is global within

India. These values are related to the common Indian

identity. Ethno-historical political culture also

incorporates the political culture within regional ethnic

polities and these may be related to political identities

such as Tamilian, Punjabi, Rajasthani, Kashmiri and even to

caste identities. So, while some aspects of individual

ethno-histories must vary, there are common political

cultural values of an ethno-historic nature which are

Indian. The antipathy towards leaders who project a highly

Westernized rather than home-spun image which one encounters

in India is the reflection of the abiding importance of

ethno-historic values to the masses. This important group

of people, and there are parallels in other South Asian

countries, did not experience intensive Westernization and

want to take India into a future shaped by their past, hence

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the fears of the elite class.

An ethno-historic structural framework which has

become part of mass political culture in that it shapes the

mechanics of politics is the culture of caste. It is no

longer genuinely structural in a Marxian sense but it

continues to shape social and political values and in the

reproduction of those values in society. This element is

common to much of the Indian sub-continent. In addition to

the multitude of ethno-historical experiences which

contribute to this political culture of the periphery, there

is also a caste culture and the political culture which

derives from ancient Indian mythological, religious and

scholarly texts as described in this chapter. It is for

these reasons that shifting emphasis from mass political

culture to ethno-historical political cultures is justified.

But what of the Islamic states of South Asia with

their concept of the brotherhood of Mohammedans? "The

essence of Tauhid (unity of God) as a working idea is

equality, solidarity and freedom' according to Dr Muhammed

Iqbal quoted by Mohammed Ayub Khan in an article entitled

"Pakistan Perspective" (Khan 1960, 547-556) . However,

despite the paradigm of equity, Pakistan and Bangladesh

continue to be societies where there is little real social

mobility - despite the absence of the caste system and

despite the presence of a modernizing ethic among the

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Western-educated elite. In the case of both the Islamic and

non-Islamic states the stated objective is to achieve social equity, but somehow social equity is achieved only in the

form of legislation and plans, it is a social equity only of

the symbolic universe if and only to some degree. In both

types of states the westernized elites continue to dominate

the bureaucracy and it is the bureaucracy that fails or

succeeds in the implementation of programs to achieve

equity. Debesh Bhattacharya says that "Indian Plans are

always strong on statement of goals or objectives but are

somewhat fuzzy with regard to the operating strategy and

consequently the gap between the goals of a socialist

society and achievements between what was intended and what

actually happened has continued to widen" (Bhattacharya

1989, 156). India's Eighth Plan is entitled "towards Social

Transformation" and Prime Minister Singh says that " (t)he

title is apt, because we wish not to focus so much on the

numbers of economic growth as on its content" (V. P. Singh

1990, 3). In fact one can argue that the bureaucracy has

opened doors but created bottlenecks to progress because it

belongs largely to the same group that may lose its

ascendancy in society if genuine social transformation takes

place. Ayub Khan argues that the feudalism, particularly

of West Pakistan had vested the entire political, economic

and social might of the country in a limited group of

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families. It was impossible to make any advance in any

direction without first breaking this monopoly of power.

Therefore, land reform was one of the first major steps of

the new regime (Khan 1960, 547-556). Drawing on Samuel

Huntington, Habib Zafarullah argues that in Bangladesh a military-civil bureaucracy coalition has developed and runs

the state. A social reformist military administration needs

to modify radical proposals for reform in order to maintain

the support of the bureaucracy (Zafarullah 1990). However

as military, political and bureaucratic elites are drawn

from the same larger elite, there is a community of

interests in the preservation of that groups ascendancy in

society

What Weiner refers to as elite political culture in

India is incorporated in this study in administrative

political culture. Its vehicle is the English language and

its center is the center - New Delhi. It is a political

culture which incorporates Sydney Verba and Lucian Pye's

'civic culture' (Verba & Pye, 1978). The great fear

within the administrative political culture is entropy,

centripetal ethnocentricities, the disintegration of India.

It shares with the British Raj, of which it is a ghost, the

project of holding India together. It has been deeply

wounded by the British Raj which chose to give way to a

centripetal ethnocentricity in the form of Pakistan while

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bequeathing it its larger Delhi-centered sub-continental

identity. It is also liberal, more liberal than the British Raj because for Britain India was also a matter of

international relations and hard-nosed realism. It shares

with the West the project of political and economic

modernization. It espouses pluralism and secularism.

It cannot protect and promote the perennial Indian glue, caste, but rather works against caste through programs of

political and economic modernization. It encourages social

and political diversity through regionalism and a multi

party system but attempts to seek a consensus close to the

locus of the values of the national English-speaking elite.

But the cultural distance between traditional Indian culture

and the culture of westernized Indians make such a consensus

difficult to achieve and attempt to seek such a consensus on

the part of elites results in heightened levels of

insecurity among the masses. The method of seeking

consensus includes an invitation to participate in the

political process. This leads to over-participation by the

masses because of their fear of a sociologically

Discussing caste Jawaharlal Nehru says in The Discovery of India that " [t]he spirit of the age is in favor of equality, though practice decides it almost everywhere ...... special opportunities for education, economic and cultural growth must be given to backward groups so as to enable them to catch up to those who are ahead of them" [Sigmund 1963].

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exclusionary though politically inclusionary elite culture

and their expectation of a future shaped by their own traditional values rather than those of the successors of

the British Raj.

Lack of real social mobility which would allow

significant recruitment in the elite class, compounded by an

economic world which for the masses is characterized by

scarcity and constraint, contrasts with the situation within

an ideal civic culture. In Britain, in the early days of

the Industrial Revolution, religious dissenters who were not

able to use traditional methods of social ascendancy were

allowed the vaishya route of entrepreneurship, thus helping

to launch the new economic area. Interestingly, groups

which may be described as largely ethno-historical in the

Indian periphery would try to operate as interest groups

agitating for a fairer share of the pie, while

administrative elite groups would tend to hear the ethno-

historical voice of caste in relation to important areas of

social and political behavior - though as professional

administrators they would probably listen to the

administrative voice. There is a gulf between private and

professional behavior.

The final act of the British Raj, which spawned the

administrative political culture, is that political culture

which facilitates the International System. Indian

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bureaucrats and politicians whose interaction with Britain,

other colonies and other powers such as the United States,

brought them into contact with the international political

culture. Realist and idealist perspectives are present in

different modes within this. E. H. Carr divides the world

into intellectuals and bureaucrats. Intellectuals are

Utopians and believe theory shapes praxis while bureaucrats

are realists (Carr 1946). In a sense it is ones' project

which is more important than whether one is operating within

a realist or idealist mode. If greater India is ones

project the realist would enjoy a cakkravartin strategy

while the idealist would opt for dharmavijaya.

Modern India may be seen as resembling the three

headed lion, (the two-dimensional representation emblem of

Ashoka) having to listen to ethno-historical,

administrative and international voices when dealing with

internal or external problems and therefore appearing

sometimes to follow inconsistent policies. In practise this

often means that the federal government of India has to

accommodate the interests of elites and elite aspirants

within Indian states, when dealing with problems in

international relations which impinge on transborder ethno-

historical relationships. This dynamic is represented by the

three-prongs on the composite spoke linking India to the rim

countries of South Asia (vide fig. 3 below).

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Fig. 3: Spokes of Ashoka's Wheel

r—ETHNO-HISTORICAL LINKS— i

POLITY ■ADMINISTRATIVE LINKS POLITY

INTERNATIONAL LINKS--

TRANSBORDER CULTURES

The dynamic which is set off by the tensions between

participants in the ethno-historical political cultures and

administrative political cultures, the desire for horizontal

differentiation and the culture of hierarchization,

devolution and decentralization, may be expressed in

separatist or decentralization demands of various orders.

It leads to cross-border linkages between groups which share

an important ethnic-historical commonality. Governing

elites located in the centers of each South Asian state

would normally tend to seek stability through consultation

among themselves. Elite aspirants in the peripheries of

South Asian states are likely to enter into co-operation

with or engage in co-ordination strategies with political

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entrepreneurs in neighbouring cousin cultures. As several

Indian states have neighbouring cousin cultures, the

relationship between the Indian periphery and center can be

impacted by the relationship between actors in peripheral Indian states and their cousin cultures. The transborder

cultures may have several forms viz., one or both of the

participants in a transborder culture may be a political

minority or majority with respect to their own polities.

The presence of transborder cultures provides the

opportunity for co-ordination strategies which aim at

achieving political ends at home. It is the political

entrepreneur who engages in co-ordination strategies. It

is also the political entrepreneur who, in the wake of

Crawford Young's cultural entrepreneur (Young 1978, 45) creates political capital for himself through addressing the

interest of ethno-historical interest groups. They may be

drawn from the elite at the center or elite-aspirants in the

periphery.

In Sri Lanka and India for instance A and D could be

Colombo and New Delhi respectively. X and Y could be the

Tamil North of Sri Lanka and the Tamilian South of India

respectively. The majority Sinhalese of Sri Lanka dominate

the administrative center of Colombo as do the Northerners

in New Delhi. However there are Tamil voices within the

Colombo and New Delhi administrations respectively.

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Fig. 4: Transborder Cultures

A XY D

POLITY A POLITY B

X and Y share a common ethno-historical past wheras A and X ; Y and D share a more recent political history.

It is likely that political entrepreneurs at the

center are sensitive to the emergence of ethno-historical

political entrepreneurs in the periphery and adopt

chauvinist postures in order to win the latters'

constituencies. But the appeal of political entrepreneurs

at the center to ethno-historical constituencies is not of

the pluralist order of American politics, it is hierarchical

because it is ethno-historical, even though the aspirations

of the masses and the rhetoric of the elite might be

egalitarian. The culture of caste exerts its modern

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barriers to social mobility - language, family, kind of education.

Economic constraints certainly exacerbate the

situation. It is increasing competition for scarce

resources which often leads to the formation of ethno-

historical groups by political entrepreneurs. But in South

Asia ethno-historical groups began to operate as interest

groups in the face of the withdrawal of Britain from the

reins of government. Ethnic groups which co-operated until

then began to be fearful for their security in the face of

other groups which begin to perceive of themselves as the

majority. With the withdrawal of Britain from South Asian

countries change occurred in the division of labor (with

locals replacing the British in key positions in government,

industry, defense and education), in the distribution of the

instrumentalities of violence (with the armed services

coming under the control of a majority led government rather

than Britain) and in the symbolic environment (with

nationalist symbols which might increase the security of one

sub-national group while threatening another).

Conclusion

Modern India has been governed by an elite which has

espoused the pluralist traditions of British liberalism.

With the passage of years, this approach has led to an

expansion of interest group politics. In theory this

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participatory approach should lessen levels of alienation in

the periphery of society, as the overt intent of policy is

inclusionary rather than exclusionary, attempting to increase rather than decrease the avenues for social

mobility. There is a gap between policy and performance.

In the face of increasing competition the governing elite employs cultural modes of exclusion which result in a

perception , within the periphery, that the avenues of

mobility lead to closed doors. As the governing elite, in

India as well as its Indo-centric neighbours, coincides

fairly closely with the historical governing elites and in

many cases dominant caste groups, the exclusionary mode

incorporates this dimension but expresses itself in degrees

of Westernization. The English language is an important

indicator in this respect as are other aspects of culture

such as sport, art, music and cuisine. These contradictory

impulses within the governing elite are accompanied by a

political tension within society itself as elite aspirants

attempt to change the composition of the governing elite,

through educational and commercial routes and if those fail

through politics and even political violence. The route of

political violence is the traditional method of achieving

elite status within the Hindu varna.

In the confrontation between elites and elite-

aspirants each group uses ethno-historical, administrative

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and international resources to advance its interests. In

the Indian context this means that the governing elite in

the center has to be sensitive to three voices, ethno-

historical, administrative and international in dealing with

conflicts within South Asia which have a transborder

dimension with India. In addition, governing elites and

elite aspirants may respond to changes in symbols of

expectation and demand from the people (resulting from

changes in the division of labor) by changing the

distribution of instrumentalities of violence vis-a-vis

another state, thus precipitating a high level of anxiety

which may be satisficed by symbols of identification which

flow outwards from the elites to their constituencies.

India and Pakistani governing elites and elite aspirants

engage in this anxiety building with respect to Kashmir and

Sri Lankan elite and elite aspirant groups with respect to

Eelam, the Tamil 'homeland'These ethno-historical

voices may be treated as the spokes in the wheel connecting

the Indian hub with its South Asian neighbours in the

Ashoka's Wheel framework developed in this chapter.

Ashoka's Wheel is constructed through the melding of

Debesh Bhattacharya "suspects that the Indian ruling elites have decided to attain superpower status through military spending" [Bhattacharya 1989, 151]. This is reminiscent of a group using the Kshatriya [or warrior] route to high-caste status.

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Kautilya's configuration of concentric balance of power

around the sovereign and Johan Galtung's center-periphery

model, with the Indian center coinciding with the center of

the wheel and with concentric peripheral layers consisting

of Indian states. South Asian neighbours and extra-systemic

powers around the Indian center. Governing elites and elite-aspirants operate along

the radii of the wheel which connect peripheral centers to

each other and the Indian center and our the focus of the

study. In epistemological terms it is the voice of elites

and elite aspirants, primarily in terms of text which

concerns this study. The central methodological issue, which

is raised in and dealt with in Chapter IV, is the selection

of texts which represent governing elite and elite aspirant

voices.

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METHODOLOGY

Introduction

It is the view of this study that social

transformation takes place as a result of interaction

between elites and elite aspirants, the former acting to

preserve existing order or elements of that order while the

latter works toward the establishment of new orders in which

they would be among the elite. Along with Lasswell one

believes that shifts in changes of the division of labor,

changes in the symbolic environment or changes in the

distribution of instrumentalities of violence has an impact

on the level of anxiety, among the elites and masses, which

leads to the rapidity with which symbols of identification,

demand and expectation are adopted (Lasswell 1963, 7).

Changes in the division of labor are economically

determined, changes in the distribution of instrumentalities

of violence are politically determined and changes in the

symbolic environment are culturally determined, in general

terms, though there are political economic (in the widest

sociological sense) dimensions to all of these.

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These anxieties cause elites and elite aspirants, both

of whom may be typified in the political arena as political

entrepreneurs, to make strategic use of symbols of

identification, demand and expectation within the contingent

worlds at the geopolitical, state and sub-state levels. The

three identified levels may contain the three political

cultures defined in this study: International,

Administrative and Ethno-historical. The fact that the

study operates across several levels of analysis presents a

potential level-of-analysis problem while intending to avoid

the reductionism of single level analyses.

This problem is overcome through focusing on governing

elites and elite aspirants as actors who mobilize resources

at various levels in order to impact events at various

levels, primarily as a matter of self-interest in terms of

maximizing their share of power within their own polities.

They promote vertical and/or horizontal social order at

ethno-historical, administrative and international levels,

i.e. they promote either association based on similarity of

actors of equal status or 'organization' of actors ranked on

the basis of production activity (Galtung 1968, 383). The

center of gravity is therefore on elites at the national

level, but the study looks outward from that locus toward

subnational and international levels. Also, ultimately the

political economic approach taken by this study falls back

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is defined here as control over the flows of symbols,

instruments of violence and goods and services.

There is no attempt to operationalize Lasswellian

configurative analysis. While one sees a role for

operational ism as a methodology one tends to agree with Geertz that "operationalism as a methodological dogma never

made sense as far as the social sciences are concerned, and

except for a few rather too well-swept corners...it is

largely dead now" (Geertz 1973, 5). Certainly there would be

little value in attempting to reduce the political economic

variables of Knowledge (cultural power), Power (politico-

military power), Wealth (economic power) and the Lasswellian

psychological variables of anxiety, identity, demand and

expectation, into constituent elements which might be

operationalized, within the framework of this study, which

seeks an understanding, organization and reorganization of

South Asian reality, rather than a predictive capacity. The

study itself is like the image of Ashoka's three-headed

lion. One head has hermeneutic vision, the other empirical

and the third normative.^

Kenneth Boulding argues that "[t]he understanding of how things go from bad to worse and how intervention can reverse this involves models, not just metaphors. This is the great business of what I would call 'normative science', and I share with Galtung the feeling that this is one of the most urgent tasks of the human race" (Boulding 1977, 84).

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The Lasswellian values are, after all, synechdocal

concepts and when reduced to measurable variables they will

lend themselves to uni-dimensional approaches, which would

be at variance with the synoptic and even holistic political

economic approach of this work. The approach employed in

the configuration of Ashoka's Wheel is therefore one of

'thick description' as described by Clifford Geertz in The

Interpretation of Cultures (Geertz 1973, 6-10). The

subsequent analysis of the Sri Lankan case of elite-elite

aspirant dialectics in terms of Ashoka's Wheel is one which

takes into account Lasswell's recommendation of a

configurative approach. These three theaters of action are

linked through a merging of Johann Galtung's center-

periphery model and Kautliya's mandala and the Hindu varna,

or configuration of caste, in the Ashoka's Wheel as

discussed in Chapter III.

What one observes in South Asia is not a process of

pure social reproduction but rather a dialectical and even

violent process of transformation. Despite pluralist

rhetoric and intention, changes in production lead to

changes in reproduction without genuine evolutionary social

transformation taking place within a politics of pluralism.

The prevalence of structural violence leads to the dynamics

of violent transformation. Hence the violent transformation.

The problem of achieving social transformation, non

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violently, within its borders and within South Asia, is a

genuine concern for the Indian State. The paradigm of caste

or the resistance by largely endogamous elite groups to

social transformation in South Asia results in strategies of

violent transformation, which have international effects

within the region. In the end it is values that matter, (and value is very much a question of belief), it is the

values of the governing elites which clash with those of

elite-aspirants and which are exclusionary in sum. Economic

plans have not led to a peaceful transformation but rather

to a clash of values, a clash of beliefs, a clash of

hermeneutics, which has then led to violence with the

potential of transformation.

If values are really what matter, values must be changed if such-and-such changes - for instance, change in economic productivity - are considered desirable. Realism is the key to success and influence for the social scientist. In contrast, as soon as one distinguishes carefully between mental constructs and theories proper, the predictive power of the social sciences vanishes: for example, as soon as we realize that the notion of semifeudal structure is a construct, we no longer know whether a semifeudal society will change or not and if it does, in which direction (Boudon 1983, 157).

The epistemological orientation of Chapter III, which

developed frameworks for analysis, is constructed drawing

from hermeneutic and empirical bases which are evolutionary,

structural or dialectic according to Kenneth Bouldings

taxonomy (Boulding 1977, 76). Hermeneutics are drawn from

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the Arthrashastra of Kautliya, Emperor Ashoka's Edicts, the

Hahabharatha, and the Reunayana the contemporary film The

Table. 3. Methodology of Research

STRUCTURAL DIALECTICAL

Hermeneutic - Ashokan Edicts - Arthrashastra - Hahabharatha - Ramayana

Empirical Empirical Center-Peripherv Configurative Johan Galtung - Harold Lasswell

ORGANIZATIONAL

ASSOCIATIONAL

EVOLUTIONARY

Empirical Pluralist - Rabushka & Shepsle - Mancur Olson - Kenneth Boulding - Crawford Young

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Home and the World directed by Satyajit Ray. In his article

entitled 'Culture as the Ideological Battleground', Immanuel

Wallerstein sees the need for and possible emergence of "a

more broadly defined science, one which will be able to

reconcile dramatically with the humanities, such that we can

overcome what C.P. Snow (1959) called "the division of the

two cultures..." (Wallerstein 1990, 54). Roland Robertson

argues that International Relations has hitherto been

regarded as a subdiscipline of political science and is now

being reconstituted in reference to developments in other

disciplinary areas, including the humanities (Robertson

1990, 18). The framework developed in Chapter III is within this

exploratory tradition which seeks to synthesize social

scientific approaches to politics and international politics

with cultural approaches. Ashoka's Wheel draws on

hermeneutic and empirical traditions. It synthesizes the

empirical structural approach of Galtung with the empirical

dialectical approach of Lasswell and with the hermeneutic

cum empirical structural approach of Kautilya (all of which

may be described, in Galtung's taxonomic language, as

ordering society into vertical 'organizations' rather than

horizontal 'associations'), and with the evolutionary

approach of the pluraliste, an approach which leads to

social order in the form of 'association'.

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Lasswellian 'influentials' vie for values and

ascendancy on this framework (which spans from the sub-state

through state to regional system), through pluralist

(interest group) and peripheralist (elite mass) political

technologies.

The pluralist/peripheralist dialectic is a dynamic

feature of the framework and is the locus of the assumption

that it is elite-elite aspirant interaction, in the pursuit

of Lasswellian values of the symbolic, military and

economic, resulting in changes in the symbolic environment,

distribution of instrumentalities of violence and division

of labor and, consequently, social transformation, is

located. The 'spokes' on Ashoka's Wheel, with their ethno-

historical, administrative and international political

cultural features, are where the Laswellian symbols of

identity, demand and expectation operate. However, when

transborder sub-state units have strong ethnohistorical

commonalities and are peripheral to their own larger

polities, there is the potential for the ethno-historical

political culture to have an impact at other levels. The

Ashoka's Wheel framework, developed in Chapter III, provides

the relationship between the Indian Center, its peripheral

states, the nation states on India's periphery and the

external world of superpowers. Ashoka's Wheel becomes a

theater for elite-elite aspirant strategic utilization of

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ethno-historical, administrative and international factors

at various levels.

The present political instability in Hindu and

Buddhist South Asia is a result of a lack of real social

mobility, because of the paradigm of caste which is socially

exclusionary despite the inclusionary believes of governing

elites. While caste is not paradigmatic in Islamic South

Asia, in the sense of a continuous history of belief and

practise, in pre-colonial India Islamic and Hindu cultures

existed in close proximity and the experience of caste was

not alien to Islamic culture in India. While Islamic and

Hindu cultures rely on different hermeneutics, members of

these two cultures experience each others social structures

in the course of social interaction. In theory the Islamic

notion of the Muslim Brotherhood when allied with the

British liberal notions of pluralism and equity, should

encourage social mobility in Islamic South Asia. In fact

exclusionary devices are employed in Islamic South Asia

allowing a broadening of the term paradigm of caste, also

referred to as the subcontinental paradigm.

The paradigm of caste is an ethno-historical factor

and as much as it results in covert and even unconscious

exclusionary activity by elites (through external attributes

such as language, dress sports, cuisine, education and

culture), non-elite groups when in an elite-aspirant mode

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use contrasting ethno-historical attributes as devices for generating group solidarity. It may be said to result in

Galtungian structural violence but at this stage in Indian

history caste itself is cultural and not formally linked to

state or economic structure though it continues to shape

social reproduction (through endogamy) and production

through that reproduction (Galtung 1969, 173). It will be

recalled that one has said that it was a lack of 'real'

social mobility that resulted in political instability. Economic mobility does exist because the modern state

encourages it and there even may be individual examples of

social acceptability sealed through marriage alliances with

members of the governing elite, but these cases are

sufficient only to increase the level of anxiety (in

relation to changes in the division of labor) among both

elites (who feel threatened by the changes) and elite

aspirants (who feel that change is too slow). Elites and

elite aspirants then manipulate symbols of identification,

demand and expectation in order to win the support of the

masses.

This study may be divided into four parts from a

methodological point of view as it examines a particular

wedge-shaped piece of Ashoka's Wheel. This wedge may be

described in spatial terms as including one of the

peripheral or outer rim states (Sri Lanka), one of the semi-

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peripheral or inner rim Indian states (Tamil Nadu) and the

center (Indian central government); the South Asian whole

and its parts are viewed in terms of a globalization process

which both links them to an universalizing global center

("world market") and peripheralizes them.

First, Chapter V deals with a study of Sri Lanka and

India in the post-colonial period, examining the elite-elite

aspirant relationship through an analysis of approaches to

•development'. This discussion is set within a

'globalization' perspective with its attendant effects of

universalization/homogenization and particularization/

pluralization. Second, in Chapter VI, the Indo-Sri Lankan

relationship will be examined through a study of the

commentary of regional scholars, administrators and

politicians as voiced in a series of seminars on South Asian

co-operation. Perspectives on regional security and

development will be looked using the values of the Non-

Aligned Movement, values which draw on those of Ashoka, as a

point of departure. Third, in Chapter VII, there will be an

analysis of contemporary approaches to transformation in Sri

Lanka which may be viewed as paradigmatic for South Asia.

Fourth, Chapter VIII, will provide normative proposals for

transformation of South Asia within the context of

globalization.

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Looking at the schema of the entire work we see that

the literature reviewed provides the hermeneutics and

structure for the framework which is used in the analysis of

the Sri Lankan case, Indo-Sri Lankan Relations and the South

Asian Association of Regional Co-operation. In the study of

South Asian views, which are treated essentially as beliefs, from texts, one takes a phenomenological approach to

knowledge, considered essential because of the role of

belief (with its ethno-historical, administrative and

international origins), in people's responses to symbols of

identification, demand and expectation and indeed in the

selection of symbols by political entrepreneurs. These be

liefs are set against Ashoka's Wheel which is a limiting

framework, resonating with Cartesian dualism and the

tensions inherent in that dualism. Despite its mix of

structural, dialectic and evolutionary theory, despite even

its Cakravartin-Dharmacakkra binary, it is limited in

nature. It is an ideal limitation on social transformation.

The actors can only change insofar as their actions change.

State actors at the regional level are a permanent feature.

However elite composition can change at the subregional

level through elite-elite aspirant dialectics. It is not a

normative framework in Kim's sense.

The dominant bias in social science research against

employing a normative framework in defining and evaluating

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social reality (especially strong in the United States), is

predicated on the assumption that in fact/value - and

science/ideology - distinction is logically possible,

theoretically necessary and axiologically essential (Kim 1984, 3).

The final chapter seeks to free itself of these bonds

while being normative and so, in Richard Rorty's 'post-

culturalese' I will seek to construct a new vocabulary, in

which one redescribes the various binaries. The Cakravartin- Dharmacakkra binary is a potential window into Rorty's

normative world. As suggested by Rorty:

The method is to redescribe lots of things in new ways until you have created a pattern of linguistic behavior which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing them to look for appropriate new forms of non-linguistic behavior... (Rorty 1989, 9).

This is the method of what Rorty calls the 'liberal-

ironist', liberals being those who see cruelty as the worst

case of human behaviour and ironists being those who face up

to the contingency of their most central beliefs and desires

-"sufficiently historicist and nominalist to have abandoned

the idea that those central beliefs and desires refer back

to something beyond the reach of time and chance" (Wolin

1988, 36).

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Indian & Sri Lankan Cases

A modified Lasswellian configurative analysis is

drawn on in the examination of the Sri Lankan and Indian

cases. In examining a particular period beyond a distinct

Lasswellian elite symbol plateau. Independence in 1948, when

a new Ceylonese governing elite took over the reins of

government, the development mode of analysis which looks at

the ontogenesis of elite symbols is reflected on. The Sri

Lankan case is looked at within the context of parallel

processes in India. Indian Independence is taken as the

elite symbol plateau. There is the need to look at this

period with a wide angle lens as ethno-historical processes

which affect political processes today had an earlier

existence. Our concern is with these societies as modern

nation states which mediate between the rival claims of

different interest groups of how centrally-distributed

values should be distributed and so the focus is on the

post-Independence period. Drawing on Lasswell' equilibrium

mode of analysis, which looks at the changes in constitution

of elites and draws on the proposition that "the probability

of elite alterations will be increased if the processes of

production have been notably altered" (Lasswell 1963, 5),

one focuses on the process of knowledge production and

distribution rather than pure material production.

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Lasswell's formulation of the process of production

incorporates production as well as distribution of symbols,

wealth and violence. There will be no separation of

equilibrium and development modes of analysis into discrete

modes of analysis. That will be at cross-purposes with the

integrative approach of this study. Rather there will be a

consciousness of the intent of Lasswell's configurative

approach during the description of the approaches taken by

ruling elites in Sri Lanka and India to "development".

Texts, including the published speeches and autobiographical

or policy writings of representatives of identified members

of pre-Independence elite-aspirant groups and post-British

governing elites and elite-aspirant groups, as well as

historical, political scientific, and sociological accounts

of identified members of the elites will be examined.

Five categories of elites/elite-aspirants may be

identified. First, the 'cultural entrepreneurs' during the

British period who drew on hermeneutics within their own

cultures in order to develop a cultural constituency which

provided an acceptable critical space within the colonial

system, not overtly challenging imperial authority. In Sri

Lanka, among the Sinhalese Buddhists the cultural

entrepreneur was Anagarika Dharmapala and among the Tamil

Hindus it was Navalar. In neighboring South India where

cultural entrepreneurship had its origins in an earlier

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period the Scottish missionary Rev. Robert Caldwell played a

role in developing Tamil cultural nationalism as did Prof.

P. Sundaram Pillai at the turn of the century as did C. N.

Annadurai more recently (Young 1978, 117-118).

Second, the political entrepreneurs of the transition

period from colonial to national rule, (who drew the

critical space from within the cultural sphere to the

political sphere) whom we will examine are Mahatma Gandhi

and Jawaharlal Nehru for India and Don Stephen Senanayake

and Solomon West Ridgeway Bandaranaike for Sri Lanka. These

were among the elite aspirants of the British period vis-a-

vis the British governing elite. These individuals attempt

to draw on ethnohistorical hermeneutics as well as

hermeneutics from European culture, in varying proportions

and with varying emphases as do the third group of elites.

However, the critical space, whether based on ethno

historical or marxist logic, continued to be the province of

the elite. Violence as criticism is a product of this

condition and the new elite aspirants have produced a

violent critical space, where what is seen as pro-social

violence is text, which may result in swifter social

transformation.

The third group of elites are representatives of more

contemporary leadership in India and Sri Lanka and they also

have to draw on a hermeneutic of organized political

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violence, the voice of the elite-aspirants of their day :

Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, V. P. Singh, Dudley Senanayake,

Solomon Bandaranaike, Sirima Bandaranaike, Junius

Jayewardene and Ranasinghe Premadasa, the governing elite of

the 1950's, 1960's, 1970's and 1980's.

Fourth, we have the new elite aspirants in Sri Lanka,

personified politically in the 1980's as the leaders of the

Sinhalese and Tamil militant organizations, and who live in

a world of fragmented hermeneutics.

Fifth, we have those who seek to move upwards in

society through economic and/or educational routes. The

clash of European and ethno-historical hermeneutics is resolved in the governing elite through their role as

mediators between the two hermeneutics with respect to their

own people and the Euro-American international system,

stabilized by their ability to, through use of wealth, power

and knowledge, to create a linguistic and material world

which is a comfortable 'harmony' of cultures and a

convergence of teleologies. For the contemporary political

elite aspirant there is a true clash of hermeneutics and the

absence of wealth, power or knowledge with which to create a

harmony. Indeed the power and wealth achieved through

violence and a knowledge of the strategic use of violence,

does not immediately resolve this problem.

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The present study is qualitative rather than

quantitative. It takes a psycho-phenomenological view that

perception of changes in the composition and distribution of

elite symbols within a polity is as consequential as actual changes and further that such changes may be reflected in

the literature about that polity. Similarly in assessing

the probability of elite alterations one looks for

discussions in the literature of changes in the division of

labor, changes in the symbolic environment or changes in the

instrumentalities of violence, identification and demand.

It is believed that propagandist literature produced by

Sinhalese and Tamil groups regarding the 'Eelam' dispute

provides a true indication of what the main parties to the

dispute believe and are prepared to believe. Whether the

claims are true or false is less important to this study

than whether elites and elite-aspirants on either side

believe in them and are therefore likely to be prepared to

act in terms of their beliefs. There will be reliance on

propaganda texts as well as published interviews with

leaders of elite aspirant groups for the beliefs of these

groups.

Have the most recent leaders of India and Sri Lanka

read the hermeneutic of the dharmacakkra in addition to

reading the hermeneutic of violence as pro-social voice and

responded in order to lower the level of anxiety with new

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symbols of demand, expectation and identification, in

relation to elite-aspirant groups within their societies and

relations between their states? Official organs of the

Indian and Sri Lankan governments will be subjected to

qualitative content analysis for this purpose, over the

period February to August 1990. The organs which will be

examined are Sri Lanka News ^ and India News. The former

is a weekly compendium of Sri Lankan news publish by the

government-owned Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd, which

projects in its editorials the views of the government. Sri

Lanka News is published for international consumption. The

latter is the periodical compendium of news published by the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India for distribution by

Indian missions abroad. There is currently no Sri Lankan

Foreign Ministry publication of this kind, hence the

selection of Sri Lanka News as an equivalent. The Indian

newsletter consists almost entirely editorial or speeches

while the Sri Lankan newspaper contains non-editorial matter

as well. The study will therefore focus on editorial

matter, speeches of national leaders and specific articles

of relevance to the question of social transformation within

India and Sri Lanka. The same newspapers will be examined in

relation to transformation of Indo-Sri Lankan relations and

regional transformation or transformation of regional

2. Sri Lanka News became Shri Lanka News in November 1991.

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relations in chapters dealing with Indo-Sri Lankan

Relations, SAARC and South Asian views respectively.

Indo-Sri Lankan Relations and Regional Views.

Building on Chapter V which is a modified config

urative analysis of Sri Lankan and Indian development

perspectives. Chapter VI will examine regional views on

South Asian security and development through an analysis of

how Sri Lankan and Indian scholars interpret the values of

Non-alignment (a particular approach to security and

development) in their commentary on regional co-operation.

This is executed in the manner of a literature review of

major South Asian publications of 1985/1986 on regional co

operation. In particular, the commentary of scholars is

examined for its location in ethno-historical,

administrative or international space. The chapter also

identifies key words and phrases from the chapter titles of .

literature under review under the rubrics administrative,

ethno-historical, and international.

This is followed, in Chapter VII with an analysis of

scholarly commentary, in terms of spatial origin or

interest, from selected seminars on South Asian co-operation

and official commentary from selected Sri Lankan and Indian

government and semi-government organs. The period to be

covered is 1948 to February 1990 but the focus is on the

decade of the 1980's. The study takes the view that the

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commentary of regional scholars, that is scholars dealing

with issues of South Asian co-operation from bases within

Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Pakistan, Nepal, India and Sri

Lanka, may be accepted as being representative of the

multiplicity of views within their nation states. However it

is posited that, belonging to administrative space, scholars

are likely to represent regional problems from an

administrative or international rather than ethno-historical

perspective. Scholars, after all, are ideal typical of one

of the three Lasswellian elites, the manipulators of symbols

(Brahmans) and their scholarly discourse which deals with the other two elites, the manipulators of violence

(Kshatriyas) and of markets (Vaishyas). There has been an

interest in the future of South Asian co-operation by

regional scholars after the establishment of the South Asian

Association for Regional Co-operation, leading to the

production of a fair amount of literature on the security

and political issues which impact regional co-operation.

The debate takes place through the media, through books as

well as through formal settings for such a debate -

seminars. The study conducts an analysis of the

contributions to four seminars on South Asian regional co

operation conducted by the Bandaranaike Center for

International Studies in Sri Lanka in 1990, by regional

scholars and other comnmentators; also of editorial

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commentary in selected official and quasi-official organs

constitute the data for analysis in this chapter. The

thought of selected regional commentators is examined within

the metaphor of the Ashoka's Wheel framework. These

regional commentaries are classified as either "seminar

contributions" or "official news/views". It is argued that

seminar participants (drawn from academia, politics and the

bureaucracy) will in their commentary reflect the gamut of

South Asian views as seen from within the administrative

space. The extent to and manner in which they capture the

ethno-historical dimensions will reflect the degree to which

the administrative space is sensitive to the aspirations of

elite-aspirants from within the administrative space, a

commentary on attitudes to social mobility.

Views of scholars within the region, the data for this

chapter, are drawn from a series of seminars arranged by the

Bandaranaike Center for International Studies (BCIS) in Sri

Lanka. The first three seminars were a series funded by the

Ford Foundation. The fourth was sponsored by the Sri Lankan

Foreign Ministry as a preparatory activity for the November

1991 SAARC summit which did not in fact take place.

The Accord of 1987 and the IPKF withdrawal from Sri

Lanka in 1990 are milestones in regional relations. They

are also multi-layered events, being linked to important

ethnic, national, regional and international considerations

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Table 4. BCIS Seminars

Seminar on Indo-Sri Lankan Relations. Sri Lanka;BCIS, January 1990.

Seminar on India's Relations With her South Asian Neqhbors. Sri Lanka: BCIS,1990.

Seminar on India's Role in South Asia. Sri Lanka: BCIS, June 1991.

Seminar on SAARC; Problems & Prospects. Sri Lanka; BCIS, October 1991.

in India and Sri Lanka: They are events which are the focal

points of conflicting energies, beliefs, expectations. The

seminars are all post-Accord and the the first two were held

while the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was still in Sri

Lanka.

First, the contributions of scholars to these seminars

will be organized in terms of the Ashokan Wheel framework

and discussed in tejrms of the concepts dealt with in Chapter

III. Second the contributions of scholars will be subjected

to content analysis in order to determine scholars' beliefs

regarding causality (political, economic, political

economic, cultural) and level of causality (individual, sub

state, national, regional systemic, geopolitical). Third,

the contributions of scholars will be studied in order to

determine their approach to social and systemic

transformation.The chapter will also rely on data from Sri

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Lanka News and India News. The data looked at in Chapter

VII is supplemented with an interview, recounted in Appendix

I, with former President J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka con

ducted in February 1990 by the present writer.

Conclusion

Kenneth Boulding categorizes theorists into

structural theorists who think in terms of static patterns

and forms, dialectical theorists who see the world in terms

of struggle between large structures and evolutionary

theorists who disagree with the premise that the dominant

mode of relationship is struggle. (Boulding 1977, 77). Table

3 laid out the methodological organization of this work and

included in structural, empirical and evolutionary modes in

the configuration of Ashoka's Wheel. However it is felt

that a further categorization, normative/ transformative, is

necessary. In its methodology this work seeks to integrate

the structural, empirical and evolutionary modes as well as

the hermeneutic and empirical approaches. Finally in its

normative phase this study attempts to go beyond structural

proposals to a neutralization of antinomies at the level of

language and symbols which could lead to a transformation of

the paradigm of caste and thereby change the elite-elite

aspirant game. Chapter V examines this game as it has been

played out in Sri Lanka.

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THE INDIAN & SRI LANKAN CASES

Introduction

The methodological problem faced in this study is

based on an epistemological orientation which gives validity

and importance to both hermeneutic and empirical sources of

knowledge and sees loci of causality in culture as well as

political economy. This is addressed through the marrying

of the Ashoka's Wheel, described in Chapter III, with a

description of globalization which shares a center-periphery

framework with Ashoka's Wheel. The Ashoka's Wheel framework

incorporates structural (Galtung/Wallerstein), dialectic

(Lasswell) and evolutionary (pluralism) approaches; provides

for cultural and political economic motives of empowerment

for elites and elite aspirants at the individual level;

allows for the universalizing influence of the dharmacakkra

at the center.

The globalization process consists of contrary trends:

Universalizing pull from the unipolar center

(universalization/homogenization) and multipolar pushing in

the periphery (particularization/pluralization). Ashoka's

Wheel constitutes the overarching analytical tool of this

work.

112

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The present chapter examines the specific cases of

India and Sri Lanka through an expanded and holistic

Lasswellian configurative analysis. Lasswell*s prescribed

methodology of analysis consists of development and

equilibrium modes and in the adoption of contemplative and

manipulative attitudes to political change. In development

analysis a description of the ontogenesis of 'elite symbol

changes' is required. Selection of a provisional elite

symbol plateau is required in order to launch the

description. Equilibrium analysis draws on the proposition

that "the probability of elite alterations will be increased

if the processes of production have been notably altered" (Lasswell 1963, 5).

It is believed that both these modes could be dealt

with in an integrated manner through examining the changing

meaning of self reliance, looking at both the political

economic focus of development and the cultural focus of

language, in India and Sri Lanka, in relation to

alterations among elites and elite aspirants. Development

and linguistic programs carry within them the contradictions

of pluralist and conflict approaches as well as the

homogenization - pluralization dynamic.

The aspects of development which are selected for

comparative study are emphases on self-reliance in models of

development communication and in development approaches of

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Sri Lanka and India in the post-Independence period. These

are placed in context in terms of theoretical models of

development and development communication. The period in

which the comparison takes place is between Independence

(India - 1947, Sri Lanka - 1948) and 1990/1991, a period of

almost 25 years. The elite symbol plateau is the long moment

of becoming independent in the late 1940's. The source of information about development plans are scholarly

commentaries, particularly by Baldev Singh (1989) and

Mahendra Prasad Singh (1990). The sources of information

about Sri Lanka's development approaches include the present

writer's earlier research on "Approaches to Communication

Planning in Sri Lanka" (Chitty 1979); Speeches and writings

of Indian and Sri Lankan political leaders are also examined

for comments on the concept of self-reliance.

In the equilibrium analysis component the focus here

is the process of empowerment of elite-aspirant groups,

through politicization of ethno-historical vocabulary, an

important manifestation of ethno-historical political

culture. The political relationships in the late colonial

and post colonial periods are described in terms of elites

and elite aspirants and the relationship of these various

groups to ethno-historical, administrative and international

vocabularies is described. After a discussion of

" 'development'and development analysis" and "'vocabulary'

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and equilibrium analysis" this chapter goes on to discuss

theoretical questions, examine the Indian and Sri Lankan

cases in a particular period and finally to look at the

transborder ethno-historical cultures that straddle India

and Sri Lanka.

'Development' and Development Analysis

There have been several alternative terms for develop

ment. Europeanization, Modernization, Development,

Underdevelopment, Another Development - the reconstruction

of societies undergoes a continuous redescription as the

Euro-American project of universal modernization washes

against shorelines of ethnohistorical experience. There

are various redescriptions, the use of many lexicons, many

vocabularies which together constitute the field of

Development. There are as many definitions as there are

redescriptions. The classificatory systems drawn for the

general discussion on development communication are those

of Wimal Dissanayake (Dissanayake 1981, 62-75.) and Hamid

Mowlana (Mowlana, 1990: 26). Dissanayake distinguishes

between four approaches: The dominant paradigm which

stresses industrialization, an expanded dominant paradigm

which recognizes the import of social growth, 'dependencia'

and self-reliance. Mowlana's liberal/capitalist approach

encompasses Dissanayake's first two approaches and his

monistic/emancipatory approach incorporates Dissanayake's

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third and fourth approaches. In addition Mowlana includes,

as his second approach, the marxist/socialist approach. These approaches have been regrouped, for the present

analysis, under Boulding's classification of approaches to

social change: Evolutionary, dialectical and structural

refered to in Chapter II. (Boulding 1977, 76).

Table 5. Classification of Development Approaches

BOULDING MOWLANA DISSANAYAKE

Dominant Paradigm

Liberal/ - Industrialization Evolutionary Capitalist - Social Growth

Dialectical Marxist/ Leninist

Dependencia Monistic/ Structural Emancipatory

Self-reliance

The self-reliance sub-period in the above

periodization leads to post-structuralist evolutionary and

post-structuralist Neo-Gandhian periods in India and Sri

Lanka. The periodization provided below places this in

context. It is elaborated on further later on in this

chapter when the Indian and Sri Lankan cases are examined.

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Table 6. Periodization of Development Approaches

PERIOD YEARS Evolutionary (Economic emphasis) 1950-1960

Evolutionary Social emphasis 1960-1970

Structuralist 1970-1980

Post-structuralist (Evolutionary) 1980-1990

Post-structuralist

(Neo-Gandhian) 1990

Development communication at the national level cannot be

treated in isolation. Today a globalization perspective is

necessary if the analyst is to deal with both the

homogenizing force of 'development', sponsored by the global

center via national governments, non-governmental

organizations and international organizations, and the

pluralizing reaction of ethno-historical cultures. There

are those such as Daniel Lerner, Everett Rogers, Gabriel

Almond who saw the individual as the recipient of

modernizing knowledge from external sources, knowledge that

to them hopefully replaced traditional knowledge which

impeded modernization. Implicit in their commentary is the

fact that the larger culture around the individual is an

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important factor and the cultural changes which took place

in the West during the Industrial Revolution should be

exported to developing societies.

These approaches together constitute the dominant

paradigm which is referred to here as evolutionary after

Boulding and which informed academics and international and

national bureaucracies in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s

Latin American scholars began to critique the dominant

approach which seemed to blame the individual for the

failure to succeed within the development paradigm. The

approaches of the 1970s are called monistic/emancipatory by

Mowlana because of their reverse Euro-American ethno-

centrism within the context of particularist holistic

systems of thought (Mowlana 1990, 34).

Two paths may be discerned among these approaches. The

first was one which suggested that in a post-colonial world

of dependendent relationships, 'development' as proposed by

the dominant paradigm and funded and organized by the

international aid community, resulted in further dependence

and 'underdevelopment'. As discussed in Chapter II, Johann

Galtung describes human groups as being arranged in one of

three ways: Association, organization and territorial

(Galtung 1968, 378-379). Interdependence, non-hierarchical

communication is possible within an 'association' such as

the North. Dependence, hierarchical communication obtains

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between the North and the South and this includes value

extraction from the periphery (South) to the center (North).

There are external structural barriers which inhibit the

individual and individual societies. This is a structuralist

approach. Extreme solutions to the problem of dependence

have been suggested by Dietar Senghas and Cees Hamelink

(Jayaweera 1986, 2) and reiterated by Colleen Roach (Roach

1990, 301). But as Jayaweera points out these are not

entirely workable propositions because of the pre-existing

situation of dependence (Jayaweera & Amunugama 1987, 87).

The second approach of the 1970s, which Mowlana calls

monistic/emancipatory rejects the Eurocentrism of the

dominant paradigm and suggests the development of ethno-

methodologies. The latin-American pedagoguist Paolo Freire

and the Asian pedagoguist A. T. Ariyaratne re-focus on the

concept of self-reliance and view the individual as the

well-spring of endogeneous development. Freire's

methodology is conscientizacao or conscientization (Freire

1970). Ariyaratne's methodology is 'self-awakening'

(Ariyaratne 1987, 240-241). In both cases the onus is on

the individual rather than an external agency, though

Ariyaratne's movement does have an organization which has

begun to play an intermediary role between international

development agencies and rural communities.

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reliance has been the goal of developing countries, as spelt

out in their development programs, since the 1950's. A

brief survey of history of development since the Fifties

clarifies this re-focussing of self-reliance in relation to

elites and elite aspirants of the post colonial period.

Pertinent aspects of the vocabulary of Indian Five Year

Plans are examined below and changing emphases in those

plans are related to systemic changes which took place in

the global environment. The purpose is to track the

semantics of self-reliance, as it moves between the

dimensions of self, state and international system, with a

view to describing elite symbol changes as well as elite

alterrations in the wake of development.

'Vocabulary' and Equilibrium Analysis

In American social science causality has been

attributed generally either to political or economic

independent variables. Recently there has been a

convergence of new concepts from a number of disciplines:

International Regimes from the neo-realist in International

Relations; Global Culture from Cultural Studies; World

Market from World Systems Theory; Interdependence from

economists and neo-functionalists. In general advocates of

cultural studies, rooted as they are in hermeneutics and

textual analysis are expansionist in their descriptions and

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redescriptions, in contrast with social scientists.

Dissanayake discusses just this problem, noting Drage's

categorization of knowledge (into factual, value and

normative types) and Habermas'categorization of

epistemological approaches (into empirical-analytical

sciences, historical-hermeneutic-sciences and critically-

oriented sciences). His recommendation is an open-mindedness

in looking at non-traditional approaches ^ (Dissanayake

1984, 127-128). C. P. Snow saw three types of knowledge

workers, the literary intellectual, the physical scientist

and the social scientist: The two breeds of scientists share

a common scientific culture (vocabulary), and literary

intellectuals have a well-developed and shared text culture

(Snow 1959). Scientists are forever deaf to 'voice' (the cry

of one who suffers) and literary intellectuals always blind

to 'vote' (showing of hands, aggregate data). The optics of

vote were with scientists and the sonics of voice with

literary intellectuals.

Onuf speaks of "voices" in terms of Lasswellian

categories in a chapter entitled "Voices of Modernity" in

his book World of Our Making. He argues that Realism is

really about the primacy of premodern voices whick "speak of

war, the need for guns, the protection of goods, the

^ Dissanayake is concerned here with the expansion and modification of communication theory.

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absurdity of abstractedly good deeds in a world of

adversity" but should really find places for "voices that

speak of believing or persuading, making or trucking, much

less growing and healing" (Onuf 1989, 248). He contrasts

Realism with Functionalism which "adopts the language of

tasks .... but is also really about voices - voices that

speak about the issues and the routines to be invoked to

deal with those issues" (Onuf 1989, 248). In the language of

the present work. Realism and Functionalism both see 'vote'

but are deaf to 'voice' in that they do not seek to document

the perspective of the individual, particularly the hurting

individual. They document issues, processes, procedures,

behaviors, attitudes - insofar as they belong to or affect a

population.

The problem is an epistemological one: Can one hear

voice and see vote at the same time? Along with Richard

Rorty this work takes the position that language is truth,

truth is not 'out there waiting to be discovered' by post

enlightenment science (Rorty 1989, 4-5). Language is a tool

rather than a reflection of reality and alternative

languages are alternative tools (Rorty 1989, 7). Language is

not "a third thing intervening between self and reality"

(Rorty 1989, 14). But if textual analysis is the

methodology for hearing individual voices, there is also

need to understand group voice which is closely associated

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with vote. The quantitative approach attributes causality

to measurable variables, usually either political or

economic. It finds it difficult to capture culture

particularly when cultures are defined as being ethno-

historical rather than universalist in character. The

development message has historically been dominated by the

vocabulary of economics and has ignored the multitudinous

voices of ethno-historical culture, preferring the concept

of the World Market. The framework described in Chapter II

and elaborated on below allows one to listen to ethno-

historical cultures (listen to voice) while continuing to

examine aggregate data? (study vote).

T h e o r y

Globalization

Globalization is a process which takes place via the

interaction between Metropolitan elites and elites in the

metropolises in the Periphery. From this point of view

institutionalized South Asian regional co-operation, in the

form of SAARC, is an elite construct in the periphery and a

framework (from the point of view of the West) through which

universalization can expand into the potentially vast

markets of the subcontinent. At the same time South Asian

ruling elites see SAARC as a potential filter which will

give them further flexibility in mediating between forces of

homogenization and pluralization. Regionalization, like

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homogenization and pluralization is a feature of

globalization. This notion will be further discussed in

Chapter Seven which deals with SAARC.

The debate on the nature of globalization with that

processes' contradictory forces of homogenization

(universalization) and pluralization (particularization)

provides an integrating problématique for development

communication and therefore the current study: It

encompasses all levels of analysis and all foci of

causality. The evolutionary (liberal/capitalist) and

dialectical (marxist/leninist) approaches were at

loggerheads in world politics in the post-war period and the

question of which would be the dominant paradigm had yet to

be resolved. For much of the world this meant an

universalizing process centered around the United States and

the West or the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. While the

strategy of non-alignment was mean to minimize bloc hegemony

over smaller states, there was universal agreement on the

material goals of development. The goal of material

development brings together the evolutionary (Western) and

dialectical (Soviet) worlds despite disagreement over

economic and political means. Acceptance of material goals

by developing country post colonial elites allowed American

culture and industry to create a world market for

American/Western goods and cultural products via the agency

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of marketing and mass communication. Governing elites in

developing countries represent the center in the Periphery

(to draw on Galtung's structuralist metaphor). This is the

dominant paradigm in operation on a global scale. Cultural

diffusion proceeds through its two-step flow from the metropolitan center in the industrialized North via national

elites in the centers of periphery nations to the masses in

the South - resulting in 'development'. Perhaps as a

reaction to the process of universalization

(homogenization), which to all intents and purposes is a

process of Americanization, the peripheries (traditional

masses) in developing countries demonstrated a contrary

particularization (pluralization). An illustration of an

extreme case of this is of course the Shah-Ayatollah

confrontation, the Shah representing the local elite and the

universalizing process initiated in the Center (West), and

the Ayatollah representing the pluralization process of

ethno-historical tradition, in this case Islamic tradition.

This case became extreme because the Shah was unable to

balance in himself (symbols) and his administrative

vocabulary (policies) the contradictory flow of ethno-

historical and international vocabulary.

Wallerstein believes that there is one World System

and that it is market driven, driven in fact by a World

Market (Wallerstein 1990b, 63-66). Wallerstein's political

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economy approach, despite its economism and structuralism,

is more expansionary than political or economic approaches

but it still does not adequately answer the cultural studies

critiques which argue that the World System approach does

not address the pluralization aspect of globalization; It

only addresses the universalizing aspect of the world

market. Wallerstein responds that the world market is

global culture (Wallerstein 1990b, 63-66). While this is

not purely semantics, Wallerstein's motor for the World Mar

ket/Global Culture is the endless accumulation of capital

through maximum appropriation of surplus value (Wallerstein

1990a, 36). He argues that the capitalist world system is

globally integrative in establishing a single 'division of

labor', and that it is economically polarizing (Wallerstein

1990a: 35-37).

In Galtung's terms the global division of labor is

'organizational' and so is the result of economic

polarization. Wallerstein's approach is structuralist, he

does not introduce class conflict over ownership of the

means of production in his model. His dialectism derives

from the integrative and polarizing dynamics of culture as

social glue (culture - usage 1) and the role of culture as a

means of creating or maintaining social stratification

(culture - usage 2) within social groups (Wallerstein

1990a, 33). The culture or idea-system of the capitalist

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world economy arises out of coping with the dynamics of the

system, a coping achieved through the employment of culture

(usage 1) to resist change and culture (usage 2) to justify

inequalities. He argues that the "two principal ideological

doctrines that have emerged in the history of the capitalist

world economy - "that is, universalism on the one hand and

racism and sexism on the other are not opposites but a

symbiotic pair (Wallerstein 1990a; 39).

He argues that racism-sexism legitimate the real

inequalities within the world system and within the state.

This does not quite explain the language of abhorrence of

caste by the Indian state and bureaucracy as demonstrated in

statute and policy and the contradiction of its survival as

a cultural force to be reckoned with. Roy Boyne's criticism

that Wallerstein's explanation treats racism and sexism as

epiphenomenal is sustainable (Boyne 1990, 62). This leaves

the pluralization process, which is part and parcel of the

globalization process, inadequately explained. Wallerstein

does not discuss any cultural motors or motives.

Interestingly Sunkel and Fuenzalida proposed in 1980 that

the capitalist system has changed in character from

international to transnational. The major actors are now

transnational corporations and polarized development takes

place with contradictory processes of transnationalization

and national disintegration in response to the assertion of

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nationalist or subnational values (Servaes 1986, 131).

Wallersteinian world systems theory may nevertheless complement a culturally sensitive orientation. In his

analysis New World International and Communication (NWICO)

process, Anura Goonasekera views cultural invasion from the

West as resulting in an emphasis on the dominant internal

culture in plural societies thereby generating minority

dissonance (Goonasekera 1987, 71). In his sociological

account of the growth of the individual self in Third World

societies, he argues that increased commmunication

technology-mediated social contact with externalities "and

the consequent increase in social density in Third World

plural societies can unleash the dual forces of unity and

separation, harmony and discord in these societies"

(Goonesekera 1990, 46). Goonasekera's approach is

essentially exogenous in that pluralization takes place as a

result of central homogenization. Certainly cultural

invasion of the developing world in terms of material

products, technologies and cultural products is a projection

of Western culture but the pluralization dynamic described

by Goonasekera as resultant can occur within the modern

states independent of contemporary exogeneous forces.

There is a need for a general unified theory which

explains individual and social motives in the world market

and in global culture. The Ashoka's Wheel framework moves in

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this direction through its focus on the interaction between

ruling elites and elite aspirants who vie for control over

the administrative space (of the nation state) which lies between,the multitude of ethno-historical spaces in the

periphery and the international space at the global center.

Elite aspirants employ strategies of empowerment, with

their interests converging with those of the ethno-

historical mass from which they are drawn, in relatively

marginalized cultures. This brings us into a manageable

realm of self-interest, based however on two types of

rationality. Western rationality and various ethno-

historical forms of rationality. There is merit in

selecting a concept which works at the level of the

individual, group and nation state, as well as addresses

the need for cultural as well as political-economic motives.

The term 'empowerment' is sometimes used interchangeably

with development in the teaching of development theory and

it is a term which has great possibilities as the discussion

provided below might suggest. I draw on all three

approaches to development communication, evolutionary

(pluralism), dialectic (Lasswellian elite theory) and struc

tural (Galtung) as well as the liberal-ironic approach of

Richard Rorty in describing a framework for development

and development communication which is sensitive to both

voice and vote.

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Structuralism

Galtung's dichotomization of social reality is between

center and periphery, where center is the locus of power and

periphery is the relatively powerless. Relations between

centers and peripheries are 'organizational', unequal,

extractive. Centers employ the strategy of keeping

peripheral units apart, linking them through the central

hub. In a vocabulary such as this empowerment must surely

mean the proliferation of centers. Superimposing the

discussion of vocabularies on the Galtungian framework, one

can describe three types of vocabularies found at various

levels of the center-periphery configuration viz.

International, administrative and ethno-historical.

The international vocabulary of the World Market/Global

Culture which is the vocabulary of the Metropolitan center.

This is shared with the periphery via diffusion through

interraction of post-colonial national elites (occupying the

space at the centers of peripheral states) with

international organizations, transnational corporations and

media and also directly through product marketing via new

technologies. These elites view science and technology as

necessary tools in a struggle for national empowerment and

national self-reliance. New technologies offer the North the

opportunity of going over the heads of national elites

directly to the masses in the periphery, hence the increased

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apprehension about balanced flow of information in the

1970's by national elites. National elites do not wish do

not wish to lose their national constituencies to the

•global prince' (center) who, heeding Machiavelli's advice,

is prepared to use modern technologies to go above the heads

of 'nobles' (national elites) to the 'plebs' of the

periphery (Machiavelli 1980, 64). The vocabularies of

international law, human rights, liberal democracy,

positivist economics, social science, science and

technology and Northern goods and services are included in

this international vocabulary which is co-terminous with

global culture and the world market. Secondly, there is an

administrative vocabulary which is the vocabulary used by

the national elite, in its space at the center of the

periphery, in governance of the state. It could be very

different to, or draw heavily on, the international

vocabulary.

In countries such as India and Sri Lanka it draws on

the administrative language of the British Raj, the

universalizing vocabulary of a bygone era. But it is very

much a mediating vocabulary because it must also draw on the

ethno-historical vocabularies of the periphery. The

international vocabulary (which in this case is the British

imperial ethno-historical vocabulary which expanded into an

administrative and international vocabulary) is a particular

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ethno-historical vocabulary the influence of which has

waxed. This vocabulary has cannibalized others on the way

and later been cannibalized by its offspring vocabulary in

North America. The Anglo-American vocabulary is is now

perhaps the most important universalizing force, global

ecumene. Ethno-historical vocabularies represent separate

worlds of experience and separate ways of experiencing the

world, different forms of rationality. Transnational

corporations, international organizations and media through

their operations and their relations with national elites,

move in the direction of converting these separate worlds

into one manageable world market based on shared values,

common expectations, universal rationality, global culture.

However national elites are not immune to ethno-historical

vocabularies and are certainly reactive/proactive to them as

in the case of interest group politics within political

pluralism.

Pluralism

The other approach drawn on is the evolutionary ap

proach of pluralism, which is 'associâtional' and non-

hierarchical in character. Essentially under this approach

the assumption of the task of distributor of values by the

modern state leads to individuals organizing themselves

through routes of self-interest into interest groups which

behind political entrepreneurs or brokers who serve their

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constituencies out of self-interest. While this is an

universalization of the concept of biological self-interest

as a motive force, it is not an universalization of social

definitions of self-interest. There is the universalized

definition of the metropolitan West as well as particularist

definitions within ethno-historical spaces. Political

entrepreneurs give voice to the interests of interest

groups, which may be organized on ethno-historical lines,

in the bidding for centrally distributed values.

In democratic societies in political entrepreneurs

purchase votes through giving voice to interest groups. The

aim of interest groups is empowerment in terms of politico-

military, economic or cultural values through the

manipulation of the allocative system of the state. The

language of administration of a state, for instance, becomes

a key issue around which ethnohistorical interest groups

form. Pluralist models are usually conceived of as being

antithetical with conflict or dialectical models. But if

pluralism results in modern 'associational' relations in

society, how does one explain pre-modern 'organizational'

relations, exclusionary behavior, which one observes to a

lesser or greater degree in all societies. There are modern

and pre-modern features in all societies: Reliance on either

conflict or pluralist approaches would be reductionist. A

holistic approach should recognize the tension between

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Conflict Theory

Mowlana mentions under his conflict category the

marxist-leninist models. Interestingly there is not much

evidence in the literature of conflict models within the

liberal tradition being employed in the field of development

communication, though they are used in the field of

development studies and certainly developing countries have

attempted to produce a mix of evolutionary and dialectical

policies on occasion. Rohan Samarajiva and Peter Shields

argue that while the "so-called paradigm shift of the 1970's

changed the unit of analysis from the individual to

interpersonal relationships ... there is no discussion of

how the village community could be empowered in relation to

external agencies, or how power relations within the

community could be made symmetrical" (Samarajiva & Shields

1990, 100). While I propose to deal with empowerment vis-a-

vis external agencies later in this paper, I would like to

address the question of power asymmetries here.

Harold Lasswell begins with a biologically based

Freudian premise that all individuals are insecure because

of a fundamental sense of abjection. Biological despair over

mortality translated into personal insecurity (recognition

of vulnerability) leads to projections of power in the

politico-military, economic and cultural realms.

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Influentials, who may be characterized in Indian terms as

brahmans (priests), kshatriyas (warriors) and vaishyas

(merchants) manipulate either symbols (brahmans), the flow

of violence (kshatriyas) and/or markets (vaishyas) in order

to maintain ascendancy over others (the low caste sudras),

in a value-extractive pyramid.^ This approach has the

value of being broadly political-economic (including culture

via symbols) at the micro-level. It translates the

Lasswellian approach (of overcoming personal insecurity

through manipulation of meanings, might and markets) broadly

to mean the individuals need for and search for empowerment

through knowledge, wealth or military means.

At every level - international, regional system,

national, institutional, local group and even, through

alternative vocabularies, individual - 'organizational' and

'associâtional' forces are in tension. Drawing on Daniel

Lerner's argument in the literature on modernization, one

The metaphor of chess was considered and found to be inappropriate as it clashed with Ashoka's Wheel and also requires more of a concern for strategic moves and counter moves. If the castle is viewed as a symbol of mediaeval wealth, Lasswellian political economy may be transposed onto modern chess. Note that pawns can become queens.

LASSWELLIAN INFLUENTIAL CASTE CHESS PIECE Symbol manipulator Brahmin Bishop Violence manipulator Kshatriya Knight/Queen/King Market manipulator Vaishya Castle NON-INFLUENTIAL CASTE CHESS PIECE Mass Sudra Pawn

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may say that it is the 'transitional' with his capacity to

empathize, that bridges the traditional and modern in

society and the individual (Lerner 1958). And this is

probably true of most individuals. This is very much a case

of retention of old ethno-historical or traditional

vocabularies or acquisition of new vocabularies from the

industrialized West. Individuals from the center

(metropolitan elites), center of peripheries (national

elites) and the periphery of peripheral societies (locals)

would have varying mixes of ethno-historical and new

vocabularies with very few if any being totally void of

ethno-historical vocabulary. This explains the contradictory

sometimes premodern hierarchical behavior of national elites

who espouse liberal values.

India & Sri Lanka

India is one of the most important and populous

developing countries. Thanks to Mahatma Gandhi it had begun

discussion on development even prior to achieving

Independence. Elements of its development history together

with that of neighbouring Sri Lanka will be examined below.

In India as well as Sri Lanka there have been opposing

visions of self-reliance. Nehru's state-centered view of

national self-reliance, very much the approach taken by most

post-colonial national elites, contrasted with Mahatma

Gandhi's vision of local self-reliance.

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The Gandhian and sarvodaya political visions are also basically voluntaristic and autonomist, and firmly opposed to aggrandizement of state power. Gandhi and Jayaprakash Narayan, it appears, also saw through the 'original sins' of political theory and praxis - ie German Idealism and fascist and communist totalitarianism. The most completely modern and liberal incarnation of the statist tradition, on the other hand, is to be found in the Nehruvian strategy of development that seeks economic growth, equality and national integration as the goals and democracy and planning as the means of an interventionist state (Mahendra Singh 1990, 811).

The Nehruvian perspective on development involves all

the major elements of the dominant paradigm, namely economic

growth, equality and national integration. The Gandhian

perspective on development is an early version of

Dissanayake's fourth approach and 'Another Development' and

in fact informs movements such as A. T. Ariyaratne's

Sarvodaya Sanvidanaya of Sri Lanka. Ariyaratne's movement is

also influenced by the Buddhist revivalist movement in Sri

Lanka, spearheaded by the American Lt. Col. Olcott and

Anagarika Dharmapala. Olcott started the Buddhist public

school, modelled on Christian public schools, which later

became the cradle of Ariyaratne's Sarvodaya movement.

Mahendra Prasad Singh argues that the Nehruvian

perspective has been dominant in India despite different

syles which he periodizes thus: " (1) The mass populism and

'imperial' premiership of Indira Gandhi (1969-77); (2) the

farmer-trader populism of the Janata phase (1977-80) ; (3)

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the economic liberalization under Indira Gandhi (1980-84) and Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89)" and (4) the National Front

Minority government dominated by farmers and regional

bourgeoisie and propped up by parliamentary support of the

Hindu communal Bharatiya Janata Party and regional communist

parties (1989-91). He sees the potential for a genuine

paradigm shift under the National Front but balks at its

unwieldy ideological alliances (Mahendra Singh 1990, 811).

Baldev Singh believes that India has pursued the Gandhian

approach of balancing self-dependence and interdependence

over the past half-century but it was Nehru "who laid the

practical guidelines of India's course of economic and

industrial development on a self-reliant basis" (Baldev

Singh 1989, 27). In Sri Lanka the Gandhian perspective was

less evident in development politics of the state till more

recently. A matching of Baldev's Singh's account of Indian

Five Year Plans, Mahendra Singh's periodization of shifts in

ideological perspectives in India and a characterization of

Sri Lanka's development perspectives with a periodization

of development approaches produces interesting results.

The Evolutionary Approach (1948-70)

In relation to 'development' in India, this period includes

the first four Five Year Plans (FYP): One (1951-56); Two

(1956-61); Three (1961-66); Four (1969-74). FYP 4 spills

over into the 1970's. These two decades after Independence

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were dominated by Nehru with an interregnum before Indira

Gandhi took over the reigns of government in 1969. "Nehru

believed that India's growth and development on a self-

reliant basis would have to depend on its scientific and

technological capability" and invested in research and

training "to provide the infrastructure for the development

of science and technology (Baldev Singh 1989, 28). As late

as 1956 Nehru expressed conviction in the industrial

approach of the West, which the Soviets had also followed;

If we really wish to industrialize, we must start from the heavy, basic and mother industries. There is no other way. We must start with the production of the machine which makes the machine. So long as you have not got the basic things, you are dependent on others and can never grow rapidly enough. Once you have got these basic things, you grow as rapidly as you like. It depends upon your own energy; you are not bound down by any external factor; you start a process of self-growth (Baldev Singh 1989, 27-28).

This was in contrast with Mahatma Gandhi's approach which

rejected science and modern technology and sought to

establish decentralized Home Rule for thousands of village

republics, non-princely states in a development framework

that valued moral refinement while rejecting the notion of

progress competition and acquisition: "Civilization is that

mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty"

(Sigmund 1963, 76). He in effect rejected economic self-

interest in favor of a moral self-interest. However he

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certainly was for empowerment, except that he was for the

empowerment of the ethno-historical polity and the

individual through a rejection of 'organizational' ties with

either a Delhi-based British Raj, a western technology Raj

or an Indian version of the British Raj. Speaking of ethno-

historical spaces in the firmament of the Raj, Gandhi says:

The common people lived independently and followed their agricultural occupation. They enjoyed true home rule. And where this cursed civilization has not rreached, India remains as it was before. The inhabitants of that part of India will very properly laugh at your new-fangled notions. The English do not rule over them. Those whose name we speak we do not know, nor do wthey know us.. I would certainly advise you and those like you who love the motherland to go into the interior that has not yet been polluted by railways, and to live there for six months; you might then be patriotic and speak of home rule (Sigmund 1963, 77).

Whereas Gandhi attempted to de-center the state through

empowerment of ethno-historical polities and used a

universalist ethno-historical vocabulary to achieve that

end, Nehru proposed and achieved the empowerment of the

state inherited by the elite he represented.

FYP 1 stressed agriculture and correcting disruption

to the economy brought by war and partition. It also

invested in the scientific infrastructure for FYP 2 "in

which emphasis was shifted to the setting up of basic and

heavy industries with a view to a self-reliant development"

(Baldev Singh 1989, 28). The social growth variation of the

evolutionary approach began with FYP 3 which stressed the

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achievement of self-sufficiency in food and which coincided

with the international development community's promotion of

the 'green revolution'. FYP 4, which bleeds into Indira

Gandhi's first term, emphasizes the building of safeguards

against fluctuations in agricultural products and

uncertainties of aid (Baldev Singh 1989, 28). In this

twenty-year period the major premises of the dominant

paradigm go largely unchallenged and there is a belief in

national self-reliance without a call to restructure the

global economy. However the vocabularies of 'dependencia'

and 'conscientizacao' (which reflected Mahatma Gandhi's

earlier approach) were in the making in Latin America, which

had achieved its independence earlier.

In neighboring Sri Lanka the period 1948 to 1956 was

one in which the paternalist United National Party (UNP) ran

a plantation economy organized around the export of three

cash crops; a welfare state which provided for the 'basic

needs' of society was financed by cash crop exports. Though

Sri Lanka did engage in some industrialization this was

nowhere on the scale of Indian industrialization. There was

not the same interest in self-reliance in industry within

the 1948-56 period in Sri Lanka. During the period 1956-

1965, under the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Sri Lanka

focussed on nationalization of assets. In 1958 the question

of land reform was taken up by the Cabinet but the Cabinet

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was divided on the issue and the minister who proposed the

reform had to resign from the Cabinet under political fire

(Arasaratnam 1967, 269). In Sri Lanka there has been an

alternation of governments working within the evolutionary

approach (UNP) and dialectical approach (SLFP). The early

UNP governments in Sri Lanka tended to be less aware or

interested in self-reliance in defence and industry though

they did have an enormous interest in self-reliance in

agriculture. Indeed the national dependence on export

markets for plantation crops was rewarded with handsome

foreign exchange reserves which translated into subsidies in

education, health, food and other areas which carried dependence to the level of the local community and

individual. At the same time this reliance on the economics

of dependence was used to achieve significant and measurable

social growth as evidenced by Sri Lanka's high literacy and

life expectancy figures. In Sri Lanka, one might argue, the

social growth approach within dominant evolutionary paradigm

started earlier than in India. The externally promoted

'green revolution’ was emphasized in Sri Lanka particularly

between 1965 and 1970.

In relation to the management of vocabularies in India

in this period, it must be mentioned that the balancing of

the three groups of vocabularies is a particularly difficult

task. The administrative vocabulary prior to the arrival of

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the British had been a Moghul-Hindu mixture reflected in

Urdu, a confluence of the Hindi and Arabic languages.

English replaced Urdu in the same way as the British

administrative political culture and vocabulary replaced the

Moghul-Hindu administrative political culture and

vocabulary. The international vocabulary of the British

period coincided with the administrative vocabulary to a

large extent, though the vocabulary of the Raj picked up

vocabulary from the Indian environment. The administrative

vocabulary of the Raj may be termed the Raj vocabulary. The

linguistic expressions of ethno-historical vocabularies were

termed vernacular in a somewhat perjorative way because of

British political dominance in India.

Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the two major

influences on Indian political culture in the modern period,

grew up within the administrative vocabulary, but Nehru

moreso than Gandhi. Gandhi, a Gujerathi, though drawn from a

mercantile caste, was descended from hereditary prime-

ministers of Indian princely states — princely states which

were repositories of ethno-historical political metaphor.

He had a legal training in London and was exposed to the

South African caste system where he evolved a political

metaphor which could subvert the military strength of the

Raj within the framework of liberal values. His dress and

lifestyle symbolized his identification with the ethno-

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historical space in Indian society. His problem was that it

is not easy to universalize ethno-history in the sense of

developing a vocabulary which appeals to a multitude of

ethno-historical cultures. Such a vocabulary may even take

on the form of an administrative vocabulary albeit one of

with a pastoralist paternalism. Ethno-historical

vocabularies work in the manner of Wallersteinian culture -

usage 1.

Nehru on the other hand was a Kashmiri Brahman from a

'modern' family, operating within the space of the Raj

vocabulary. His father Motilal was a westernized barrister.

While Gandhi was concerned with the adoption of a

universalist vocabulary which would prioritize and empower

ethno-historical space, he drew from the vocabulary of

ethno-history and from universal moral values drawn from the

great religions including those of India. Nehru drew

extensively from an exogeneous universalist vocabulary, the

vocabulary of the evolutionist approach.

Nehru's response to ethno-historical dissonance (in

the wake of uneven economic development; Hindu-ized Indian

nationalism; British ethno-political intervention; ethno-

historical interest group activity) was the promotion of

state secularism through a resolution on fundamental rights

at the Karachi Congress of 1931 (Gopal 1989, 2). He saw

Hindu political resurgence as the primary threat to modern.

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democratic India (Gopal 1989, 2). Along with Mahatma Gandhi

he opposed state legitimization of specific ethno-historical

practises such as in the instance of Rajendra Prasad's

willingness to consider a banning of cow slaughter in August

1947 "as symbolic of the attainment of freedom" (Gopal

1989, 7). Gandhi's argument against the ban was that "it

would be a concession to Hindu feeling and therefore to be

avoided in a composite country with a composite culture"

(Gopal 1989, 7). However Nehru, very much a product of the

Raj administrative vocabulary, also saw 'common-sense'

reasons (such as the problem of breeding quality cattle and

the value of similar animals such as the horse) for arguing

against the ban. Here 'common sense' may be interchanged

with 'administrative vocabulary' without a deficit in

meaning. While Nehru opposed the symbolic action of banning

cattle slaughter he did not object to the

institutionalization of such a ban in the Indian Constitu

tion, but ensured that the ban was not operationalized

(Gopal 1989, 7). Nehru was the great centralizer of India

through the values of an Indianized Raj, fearful of the

possible pluralizing effect of Hindu universalism.

Even his enemies could never accuse him of thinking in any but national terms; caste, creed, town, tongue - none of these loyalties meant anything to him; it was India first and India last (Tinker 1967, 287).

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As early as 1965 reactions to centralization became evident and

the food crisis during late 1965 and early 1966 ... demonstrated that governments will respond to a national crisis in regional terms when the crisis is internal and not external to India (Tinker 1967, 292).

It is possible that Nehru would not have operationalized the

Hindi as national language clause in the Indian Consti

tution. Nehru is reported to have written to Rajendra Prasad

'that he did not understand a word of it' when he was sent a

Hindi translation of the Constitution.^ However it was

Nehru's successor, Lai Bahadur Shastri, who had to deal with

a final decision on the national language after the interim

period allowed by the Constitution had elapsed: He

miscalculated the regional opposition to Hindi and provoked

popular protest movements particularly in the South (Tinker

1967, 294).

In 1967, the Congress was swept away in Tamil Nadu (then known as Madras). It lost the state elections and has never regained power .... The result marked the arrival of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) (Jeffrey 1990, 2).

The ethno-historical approach of the DMK political

entrepreneur, C. N. Annadurai, is in sharp contrast with

^ Hugh Tinker provides this information in a footnote [Tinker 1967, 293].

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that of Nehru. Annadurai inherited an ethno-historical

vocabulary which had been politicized by the 'Non-

Brahmanical Movement' which had taken shape around 1885 as a

form of Dravidian political resurgence. The Scottish

missionary Rev. Robert Caldwell had been a cultural

entrepreneur for the Tamils by identifying Tamil as the

oldest and purest of Dravidian languages. Missionaries were

also responsible for the historical interpretation which

suggests that Brahmans were Aryan invaders "who made use of

the Hindu metaphor of hierarchy through varna to give sacred

sanction to the subjugation of the Dravidians" (Young 1979,

116-118). By 1916 the 'Non-Brahmanical Movement' had become

the Justice Party, which sought equity for Tamil non-

Brahman castes vis-a-vis Tamil Brahmans, who had been the

first to take advantage of the British educational systems.

The ethno-historical ideology was elaborated by nineteenth

century Tamil scholars. This elaboration reached its fullest

political expression in DMK leader C. N. Annadurai's book

The Arvan Illusion. Among other things, Annadurai claimed

that

(B)y irony of fate, the people who came here with their cattle, badly in search of a place for living, have today become rulers and masters: the Aryans by intoxicating us with their stories of imagination, have perverted us and plunged us into desolation and the gloom of Brahmanism (Young 1979, 20).

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The Gandhian approach reconciles these two visions.

It is one of unity within diversity, in an ever-widening

circle from the individual through numerous intervening

circles of identity to India as a whole (Tinker 1967, 294).

Gandhi inverts the globalization process by inviting the

periphery to be the universalizing force. The difference

between Nehru and Gandhi is that the former had an

abhorrence for de-centralized polities because they would

fragment the modern state, destroy it. Gandhi wanted a

network of decentralized polities in the space of the Raj,

"a network of government by consultation and co-operation at

all levels from the village to the nation's capital" (Tinker

1967, 295). Gandhi's vision is essentially a premature post

modernist 'associational' one of equal cultures, perhaps one

that can only be truly operational in contemporary times

through the spread, ironically, of new technology — albeit

interactive communication technologies. In relation to the

management of vocabularies in Sri Lanka in this period, the

first three prime ministers of independent Sri Lanka were

similar in some ways to Nehru but differed from him in other

ways. Like Nehru and his fellow freedom fighters, Don

Stephen Senanayake, his son Dudley Senanayake and his nephew

Sir John Kotelawala, were power-aspirants during the British

period. They were already drawn from an elite group and

could not accurately be described as elite-aspirants. As the

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historian S. Arasaratnam has described:

These English-educated groups formed the upper layer of the elite groups of Ceylon. They were Western-oriented and monopolized the upper rungs of political and social privilege. Separate from them, and below them in the social scale, was another larger elite that stemmed from traditional sources of power and traditional institutions. Unlike the English-educated elite, they found a link between independent Ceylon and the pre colonial Sinhalese kingdoms. They were the Sinhalese literati specialists in Sinhalese medicine, the Sinhalese schoolmasters, the Buddhist priest-teachers. In the years after independence they were content to play second fiddle to their social and intellectual betters, to act as a liason between these holders of power and the voting masses (Arasaratnam 1957, 264).

These elite aspirants wanted to empower themselves

through capturing the administrative space of the state, and

that meant replacing the administrative vocabulary of the

ruling elite with their ethno-historical vocabulary. The

national elite's administrative vocabulary was a nationalist

version of the British colonial administrative vocabulary.

Unlike in Nehru's India, however, this was combined with a

local ethno-vocabulary - a Buddhist ethno-historical

vocabulary enjoying state protection. Influence of the

local vocabulary was contained by the use of English as the

national language and language of administration. The

political entrepreneur S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike was elected

as prime minister in 1956, wresting power from his leader

Sir John Kotelawala at a general election, through appealing

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to the elite aspirants desire for empowerment. "The major

changes that took place in 1956 mark it as the year when the

transfer of power was effected from the English-educated to

the traditionalist elite " (Arasaratnam 1967, 265).

While the westernized national elite, like Nehru,

equated nation with state, the ethno-historical elite

aspirants identified nation with 'race' (Arasaratnam 1967, 265). Arasaratnam argues that the forces of Sinhalese and

Buddhist revival worked for equity but against the liberal-

national order; Bandaranaike did attempt to rein in the

extremist Sinhalese nationalism of his supporters through

emphasizing the older liberal nationalism. The vocabulary of

the old nationalism was part of his make-up. Arasaratnam

argues that Bandaranaike continued to partially believe in

that old liberal nationalism (Arasaratnam 1967, 267).

He attempted a legislative programme that would destroy the privileges of the middle and upper classes and the English-educated elite and do away with the gross forms of discrimination against the Sinhalese-educated intelligentsia. The most vaunted piece of legislation and one most satisfying to this section, was the passing of the Official Language Act of July 1956, popularly known as the 'Sinhala Only Act'. It established Sinhalese as the one official language of Ceylon and imposed a period of up to five years when the transition was to be effected. Other changes swiftly follow, promoting the interests of the Sinhalese-educated by means od administrative regulations (Arasaratnam 19 67, 2 67).

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The Structural Approach (1970-1980)

This period approximates with FYP 5 (1974-79) and 6 (1980-

85) and Indira Gandhi's first period in office (1969-77).

Prasad Singh characterizes Indira Gandhi's rule in this period as the authoritarian 'imperial premiership' which

employed mass populism (Prasad Singh 1990, 811). Mass

populism had come earlier in Sri Lanka, in 1956 and in the

Indian state of Tamilnadu in 1967. In Sri Lanka too this

period coincided with considerable authoritarianism. As

governments began to use media increasingly for development

communication, the sacrosanct nature of the larger

development project became the justification for increased

press control. In India FYP 5, while stressing the need to

step up non-traditional exports, also stressed import

substitution (Baldev Singh 1989, 28) . The SLFP government

in Sri Lanka in the 1970-76 period followed the same

strategy advocated by the international development

community.

The dependence on oil-based energy and agricultural

inputs generated by the 'green revolution' had created

problems for developing countries after the oil crisis of

the 1970's. The oil crisis with its discovery of a resource

weapon for a consortium of developing countries gave new

credence to emerging theories which called for structural

change. Some international agencies such as the Food and

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within a nation state, in terms of land reform, seeing the

concentration of land ownership among the national elite as

an impediment to empowerment of the masses. While national

elites in Sri Lanka implemented land reform, they were also

interested in the structural reform of the world market

(through UNCTAD) and global culture (through UNESCO)^. Gees

Hamelink's 'disassociation' was one proposed strategy for

doing away with external impediments to development.

The 1980s Approach

This coincides with FYP 7 in India which departs from

the import substitution emphasis to an export drive, as Sri

Lanka had done under its new market-oriented government of

1977. In India, FYP 7, though implemented under Rajiv

Gandhi's government of 1984-89, has its roots in the

economic liberalization of Indira Gandhi's second term

(1980-84). At the international level these policies in Sri

Lanka and India are synchronized with World Bank promoted

strategies of export-led growth. These strategies became

Mrs Bandaranaike's United Left Front government imposed a ceiling on incomes, houses and agricultural land owned by individuals. While the ceilings resulted in the loss of property by individuals who had execessively large holdings, families were able to retain fairly large holdings through passing property on to their children. It also nationalized the plantation sector and imposed a once-only wealth tax. At the same time tax holidays attracted capital controlled by the privileged classes to areas such as tourism and export industries.

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states such as Singapore and South Korea transited that

magic mile from less-developed country (LDC) to newly-

industrialized country (NIC) status. Second, socialist

strategies had failed to solve problems of unemployment

within several countries and economic suffering in general.

They also failed to achieve a restructuring of global

economic and cultural relations through international agencies. As a response to the restructuring bid, the West

promoted investment in developing countries, investment

which would train and employ personnel in the use of new

technologies and in employment of developing country labor

for offshore production. Export led growth replaced import substitution as the dominant philosophy of trade and

development in the developing world. This would be viewed by

some advocates of NIEO (New International Economic Order) as

the antithesis of the structural reform proposed in the

1970's as creates increased dependence of developing

economies to industrialized market economies.

So the individual level self-reliance approach of

such as the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation's 'Another

Development', Paolo Freire and A. T. Ariyaratne, the Gandhi-

type approaches, survive into the 1980's and 1990's while

the macro-level structural approaches of the likes of

Hamelink are replaced by a return to a market approach. The

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new governments of Sri Lanka (1988) and India (1990) seem

to reflect this dynamic. At the national level there is a

recognition of the reality of the World Market but there is

also the recognition of the pluralization process and the

need to hear the voice of the hurting individual. President

Ranasinghe Premadasa, a liberal Sri Lankan politician and

leader of the UNP, who promotes export-led growth, has

stated that the UNP's new vision is to serve the poorest of

the poor. He has asked his party to "go into the highways

and by-ways of Colombo, the dark and dreary slumland and

forgotten villages of the country, and seek out the poorest,

to put them on their feet" This sounds like rhetoric but

even if it is there is the simple fact of President

Premadasa's personal socio-political journey which has

shaped his mission of uplifting the poorest. That there is

political opportunity in such a mission does not alter the

fact that he is drawn from a different space to Bandaranaike

and Jayawardene and therefore has not inherited the

paternalist style of the Sri Lankan aristocracy. This is a

new approach for any party in Sri Lanka, not a statistical

approach but one which listens to the voice of the hurting.

There may be some similarity in George Bush's 'kinder and

gentler America' rhetoric and the post-conservative trends

in sections of the Bush Administration which call for

^ Sri Lanka News. (Colombo), 2 January 1991.

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"Approach to the Eighth Plan" of India announced in 1990 by

Prime Minister V. P. Singh, is entitled "Towards Social Transformation" and states "we wish not to focus so much on

numbers of economic growth as on its content" (V. P. Singh

1990, 3). He claims that:

(t)he poor have not benefitted as much as the large new middle class of the country. At the lower end, there has been a noticeable increase in the marginalization of some groups, such as our tribals. The income gap between the urban and rural areas has widened (V. P. Singh 1990, 3) .

•Another Development', popularized by the Dag

Hammarskjold Foundation, has the following characteristics:

Need orientation; endogeneous; self-reliant; eco-sound;

structural transformation; participatory democracy (Servaes

1986, 133). Jan Servaes points out that while "(s)elf-

reliance clearly needs to be exercised at national and

international levels, .... it acquires its full meaning

only if rooted at the local level, in the praxis of each

community (Servaes 1986, 133). It is no longer possible in

the minds of national elites, to discuss the potential of

delinking, because of the degree of cultural synchronization

which has taken place in the World Market. Jayaweera has

described the concepts of delinkage and self-reliance as

"conceptual fantasies that have little relevance to the

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realities on the ground" (Jayaweera 1987, 87).

It is no longer fashionable to talk of global

structural transformation. The term New World Order is now

one which emanates from the Bush White House and has a

totally different meaning to NIEO (New International

Economic Order) and NWICO (New World Information &

Communication Order). The only space which remains where

group autonomy is possible and even desirable, (within the

global universalization which is taking place), is the distinct space of separate ethno-histories, with their sepa

rate vocabularies, distinct minds and of course beyond the

community within selves. While these could be separate

worlds, retreats, they need not be closed to each other.

Ethnic Polarization & Transborder Culture

The preceding discussion provided a view of elite

management of two concepts which are important to elite

power and empowerment of the multitude - empowering

political economic strategies (self-reliant development) and

empowering vocabularies (national languages). Ashoka's

Wheel, as expounded on in this chapter, explains the

dynamics of power/empowerment, the struggle of elite-

aspirants - within the hub state and within individual rim

states, India and Sri Lanka.

Five categories of elites were identified in Chapter

IV. First, the 'cultural entrepreneurs' of the British

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period, those who worked within ethno-historical space,

reviving culture and religion to develop an acceptable

critical space within the colonial system, not overtly

challenging imperial authority. They rendered unto Caesar

what was Caesar's ..... If colonialism was a form of

multi-globalization, i.e. the formation of distinct imperial universalization processes, cultural entrepreneurs were the

ethno-historical particularizers. Their ethno-historical

narrative provided their peoples with an alternatives to the

powerful narratives issuing forth from colonial powers. In

Sri Lanka, among the Sinhalese Buddhists the cultural

entrepreneur was Anagarika Dharmapala and among the Tamil

Hindus it was Navalar. In neighbouring South India where

cultural entrepreneurship had its origins in an earlier

period the Scottish missionary Rev. Robert Caldwell played

a role in developing Tamil cultural nationalism as did Prof.

P. Sundaram Pillai at the turn of the century and C. N.

Annadurai more recently (Young 1976, 117-118).

The second category of elite are the political

entrepreneurs of the transition period from colonial to

national rule, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru

in India and Don Stephen Senanayake and Solomon Westridgeway

Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka. Working within administrative

space, these individuals drew the critical space from within

the cultural into the political sphere. They were among the

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elite aspirants of the British period vis-a-vis the British

governing elite. Political entrepreneurs attempt to draw on

ethno-historical hermeneutics as well as hermeneutics from

European culture, in varying proportions and with varying

emphases. So do the third group of elites described below.

However, the critical space, whether based on ethno-

historical or marxist logic, continued to be the province of elites.

The third group of elites include Indira Gandhi, Rajiv

Gandhi, V. P. Singh, Dudley Senanayake, Sirima Bandaranaike,

Junius Jayewardene and Ranasinghe Premadasa. They are the

governing elite of the 1950's, 1960's, 1970's and 1980's.

They are representatives of more contemporary leadership in

India and Sri Lanka and must respond to a hermeneutic of

organized political violence. They cannot help but hear the

violent noise of elite-aspirants clashing with the state.

The clash of European and ethno-historical hermeneutics is

resolved in the governing elite through their role as

mediators between the two hermeneutics with respect to their

own people and the Euro-American international system. The

ability of contemporary governing elites, through use of

wealth, power and knowledge, to create a linguistic and

material world which is a comfortable 'harmony' of cultures

and a convergence of teleologies gives them stability.

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For the contemporary elite aspirant who adopts the

kshatriya route, there is a true clash of hermeneutics. The

absence of wealth, power or knowledge with which to create a

harmony, to lend stability, leads to militancy. These new

elite aspirants are the fourth category. In Sri Lanka they

are personified politically in the 1980's as the leaders of

the Sinhalese and Tamil militant organizations, and who live

in a world of fragmented hermeneutics. Violence as

criticism may be viewed as a product of the continued

dominance of administrative space by the westernized elite.

The historical critical space which came into being with the

cultural entrepreneurs has become a theater of violence.

What is viewed as as pro-social violence may be read as a

form of text. Swifter but more painful social trans

formation could result in the production of such texts.

Finally we have those who choose vaishya (mercantile)

and/or brahman (educational) routes to higher social status.

Cultural interaction between entities within hub and

individual rim states, the spokes of the wheel, needs also

to be described. Similar cultures, 'cousin cultures' which

are also neighbours, are able to impact each others domestic

politics. This clearly happened in Sri Lanka and India in

the 1980's when Tamil groups in Sri Lanka began co-operating

extensively with Tamil groups in South India. At the same

time the administrative centers of Sri Lanka and India

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experienced strains in their relationship because of this

co-operation and center-periphery (federal-state) political

alliances within India. The Indo-Sri Lankan relationship

itself is addressed in Chapter VI. The transborder cultures

relationships between Sri Lankan and Indian groups, distinct

from relationships between such groups and the states

concerned or between the states themselves, is described

here as a link between the interplay of ethno-historical,

administrative and international vocabularies within India

and Sri Lanka and the Indo-Sri Lankan relationship which is

dealt with in Chapter VI. The relationships between Tamil

groups in North Sri Lanka and Tamilian groups in South India

are based on transborder ethno-historical vocabularies which

arise from political entrepreneur/interest group interaction

within Tamil groups in Sri Lanka and India respectively,

drawing on dissonances in elite management of empowering

political economic strategies and empowering vocabularies.

The motive of political entrepreneurs, in transborder co

operation, continues to be maximization of power; that of

the group continues to be empowerment.

The matter is compounded by elite aspirants from out

groups who may feel it necessary to adopt kshatriya

(military) routes to power. While one of the strong links

between North Sri Lanka and South India should theoretically

be vellalar communities, these are historically high status

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caste groups in both areas and therefore not likely to be

militant. Because Sri Lankan vellalars had recreated the

pre-Aryan reality of a Brahman-less social hierarchy in

which they were pre-emminent and because of the greater

purity of Sri Lankan Tamil (less Sanskritized, less

Aryanized), Sri Lankan vellalars have considered themselves

superior to their South Indian cousins. Consequently even

though in the modern period Tamilnadu emerged as a Tamil

universalizing center through its film and publishing industry, co-operative strategies between Jaffna and Madras

were not evident till the beginings of the Tamil militancy

in the 1970's.

In both Jaffna and Tamilnadu ethnic polarization began

in a cultural sense, with cultural entrepreneurs who

rediscovered the ethno-historic past of their communities.

In South India latterday Aryan Brahmans (European Christian

missionaries) attempted to subvert the authority of the

Hindu Brahmans with anti-Brahmanical ideology. In Sri

Lanka, European missionaries did not have to overcome the

problem of Brahmanic dominance. In both cases the modern

state seemed to provide routes to elite status via the

education system and government employment. When these

routes seemed, to minorities, to be roadblocked by

affirmative action by majorities (Sinhala-speaking in Sri

Lanka and Hindi-speaking in India) axes formed between

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ethno-historical groups (Tamil-speaking in both Sri Lanka

and India) and political entrepreneurs. Affirmative action

by majorities included a capturing of administrative space

through language policies which gave primacy of place to

their ethno-historical vocabularies.

The political elites of Sri Lanka and India shared in

the creation of a common international vocabulary (non-

alignment) and inherited a common administrative vocabulary

(from the colonial administration). The vellalar leadership

in Sri Lanka and South India shared in these vocabularies

with national elites from majority groups. The interraction

between elite vellalars in the two polities, in the post

colonial period, was therefore within international and

administrative spaces, rather than ethno-historical space.*

In Sri Lanka an ethno-nationalist party (Bandaranaike's

SLFP), captured power in 1956, replacing a more secular

government (that of Kotelawala's UNP). The SLFP claimed to

listen more closely to ethno-historical voice and

Bandaranaike saw his power base as being drawn from what he

called pancha balavegaya (five forces) - five ethno-

historical elite aspirant occupational groups. These

Sinhala-speaking elite aspirant groups had been overlooked

during the colonial period when an English-speaking national

A factor in the attitude of the high caste Jaffna Tamil was his belief that Tamil culture was at its purest in Jaffna where it was not sanskritized.

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elite had been formed; Village ayurvedic physician

(traditional medicial practioner); village headman; village

mudalali (merchant); village Buddhist priest; village

teacher.

Conclusion

Rohan Samarajiva and Peter Shields complain, about

what has been called the dominant evolutionary paradigm here, that while change of gear took place within diffusion

theory in the 1970s, this only changed the unit of analysis

from the individual to interpersonal relationships. It did

not address how village communities could be empowered in

relations to external agencies and how more equal power

relations could be achieved within villages themselves

(Samarajiva & Shields 1990, 100). This is really a plea for

modern 'associational' communication between national elites

and village communities and within village communities

themselves. Certainly such relations may be aspired to

within a developing society despite the fact of pre-modern

'organizational' relations between that developing country

and the North. In relation to the wider question of

nationally self-reliant development through delinkage

Colleen Roach sees Third World national elites as the self-

interested links which thwart any real delinking:

...Hamelink's analysis, like that of Samir Amin, connects delinkage to the problem of national elites. Amin has consistently stressed in his writings that delinkage from world capitalism is

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only part of the self-reliance process; the other is necessarily that of developing a national development project that is a truly 'popular force'. In short, self-reliance is necessarily that of the people (Roach 1990, 301).

Roach's proposal is that "a strategy of promoting people's

power as a response to capitalism and the national elites

must also advance a project for democratic socialism",

following Samir Amin's three-phase dialectical process towards socialism (Roach 1990, 303). The contradiction here

is that Amin believes that 'socialism will only be reached

via a universal path that incorporates change in all

countries" (Roach 1990, 304). In the contemporary world

Eurocentrism and the Euro-American-Japanese capitalism is waxing rather than waning and even Eastern bloc states are

vying for admission into the 'parade' of nations.

What Amin recommends is the replacement of Eurocentric

universalism with socialist universalism but with a popular

national development being reaffirmed under the outgoing

universalism of capitalist Eurocentrism and flourishing

under socialist universalism (Roach 1990, 303).

In the present work there is an interest on empowerment

strategies adopted by by individuals and local communities

regardless of the ideological composition of ruling elites

at national and international levels. It is advantageous to

leave behind the vocabularies of socialism and capitalism

and employ new vocabularies in this search for empowerment

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of individuals and local communities whose minds,

vocabularies and cultures are the battlegrounds of ethno-

historical, administrative and interinternational

vocabularies. The post-modernist view that all truths, all

vocabularies, all cultures have equal validity is, as stated

earlier, accepted in this paper. There is no orthodoxy. The

ethno-historical vocabulary of the totally traditional local

ideal-type is equally valid to that of the totally modern

metropolitan ideal-type and all real world intermediate

variations.

The key to the problem is in ethno-historical

vocabularies which keep alive 'organizational' or

hierarchical relations between local communities and

national and sub-national elites despite the familiarity

with 'modern' concepts of pluralism and equality with which

national elites are familiar. To transform power attitudes

(if not actual relations) between local individuals and

local communities and national elites it is necessary to

transform ethno-historical vocabularies, to transform their

'organizational' content into 'associational' content. For

instance the paradigm of caste in India is a classic

'pyramid' arrangement and transmits related values and

attitudes through ethno-historical vocabularies (which local

communities and national elites share and bind them in

hierarchical relationships) which then impede the

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development programs proposed by national elites who espouse

liberal values with part of their minds. In India and Sri

Lanka one of the ways of preserving social ascendancy is

through the preservation of the higher administrative and

international vocabularies, by largely upper caste elites.

Amunugama argues that sovereignty has become a plaything of

Asian elites despite its devalued status and that "(m)ost

Western scholars talk of cultures of Asian countries as

though they were immutable, sacred substances" and that "

most traditional cultures are backward looking and

inegalitarian" and that cultural screens within cultures are

effective and foreign values will not necessarily prevail.

He further points out that Asian elites do not for instance

promote the liberal concept of personal freedom while they

stress national sovereignty (Amunugama 1990, 212) .

In order to promote personal freedom within

peripheral societies one should focus on the provision of a

space in which the ethno-historical vocabularies of local

communities could flourish - so that the individual has the

option of moving between vocabularies into distinct worlds.

The danger in attempting to transform ethno-historical

vocabularies (which is essentially playing with languages

and minds) even under a convergence approach to diffusion,

is that the vocabulary of one group may dominate the

vocabulary of the other. "Convergence is the tendency for

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two or more individuals to move toward one point, or for one

individual to move toward another, and to unite in a common

interest" (Rogers & Kincaid 1981, 63). However the concept

of convergence is a useful one and what I propose in this

empowerment approach is that there should be a balancing of

local and metropolitan interests under an 'associational*

relationship, of mutual learning of each others needs with

respect to each other and the external world. This is best

achieved in terms of discussion of specfic concepts such

egalitarianism or pluralism by the national elite (or its agencies) with local groups in order to ascertain what both

parties may agree to be the preserve of their ethno-

historical, administrative and international worlds.

National elites have traditionally looked at local

communities in terms of vote rather than listened to their

voices.Local communities in democracies purchase voice with

votes but even in non-democratic states governments focus on

statistics (vote) rather than voice (text). Text, whether

literary, verbal, visual, is the epistemological tool of

expansionist methodologies whereas statistics is that of

reductionist methodologies.

In his discussion on the contingency of liberal

community Richard Rorty argues that : "(a) liberal society

is one which is content to call "true" (or "right" or

"just") whatever the outcome of undistorted communication

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happens to be, whatever wins in free and open encounter "

(Rorty 1989, 67). Our discussion of Lasswell's influentials

and Galtung's center-periphery power configuration suggests

that undistorted communication cannot be achieved in

'organizational' societies'. The pluraliste alone resolve

this problem through a theoretical equalization of all

claims on the basis of voice supported by vote and through

social mobility. Rorty believes that the contrary claims of

selfhood and community may be adequately addressed in

liberal society through "J. S. Mills' suggestion that

governments devote themselves to optimizing the balance

between leaving people's private lives alone and preventing

suffering " (Rorty 1989, 63). How does this translate

into a developing country situation where suffering is so

widespread: Intervention to prevent suffering is what

development is all about even though historically suffering

has been perceived through vote rather than voice. And that

intervention to prevent suffering can also create new suf-

ferring for the individual through attempts to open up

spaces of ethno-historical development to universalizing

forces. President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka takes

the following view:

We want technology. But should we not be careful of the messages that technology brings? Can our culture be influenced, even distorted by such impacts? Are the cultural norms of other countries, particularly the affluent ones and

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post-modern norms suitable for us? How can we obtain fruitful and productive messages while rejecting destructive messages?.....We have traditionalists who resist change. We have modernists who advocate change. But neither tradition nor modernity is a water-tight compartment. There is a great need for our scientists and our philosophic-humanists to get together. It is there task to set the guidelines by which science and society can interact.

Western critiques such as Marcuse have argued that

the modern state increasingly invades individual private

space (Marcuse 1964). Individuals are converted into

markets for material and cultural products - products which

are broadly consonant with the ethno-historical,

administrative and international vocabularies in industrial

societies. There are countervailing vocabularies here too

and in a way the United States itself is a microcosm of the

globalization process. But there are routes of empowerment

through accumulation of knowledge and skills, non-violent

political participation or accumulation of material wealth

within a culture which promotes social mobility, encourages

the legal accumulation of values by the individual.

It is the countervailing ethno-historical or academic

vocabulary which preserves for the individual and community

a space apart from the vocabulary of the market and the

state. While there may be opportunities for locals and

local communities to benefit from market forces and state

^ Sri Lanka News. (Colombo), 26 December, 1990.

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and dangers. The market relies on diffusionist advertising

and salesmanship and this tends to overemphasize benefits

and underemphasize dangers. Development Communication

should therefore seek to empower the individual and the local community vis-a-vis the range of opportunities

presented by the market and state. A development support

communication project dealing with locals should seek to

engage in an 'associational' pedagogic process with respect

the projects specific area of interest, such as family

planning. It should not begin with the purpose of changing

the 'target groups' fertility behaviour. It should begin

with two groups of people, project personnel with their

universalized knowledge and the locals with their ethno-

historical experience. Both kinds of knowledge should be

treated as equally valid. In the discussion that must

follow the meeting of these two worlds the locals express

their fears and needs and the project personnel relate the

potential consequences of particular behavioral routes

(fertility behavior) in relation to the market and the

state. Strategies and technologies for dealing with

fertility behaviour are shared among locals and project

personnel and locals are free to adopt a modern technology

of contraception if they so desire. However there should be

no attempt to invade the ethno-historical space of

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individual. The general approach should be one of

differentiating between ethno-historical, administrative and

international vocabularies and while providing the

individual an opportunity to become familiar with useful

portions of the administrative and international

vocabularies, it should not seek to replace the ethno-

historical space with some other content. Convergence will

only be between that portion of an individual's vocabulary

which interfaces with the state and the external market,

subscribing to universal values of rationality for that such

purposes, as in the Japanese model. This is a pedagogy of

empowerment through self-development. In today's context,

where there is such a density in the development

opportunities provided by state and market, learning what

these opportunities are, what might be possible dangers and

how one can maximize ones advantage through them is

development.

Within international space the traditional vocabulary

and methodology of empowerment has been non-alignment, which

makes the best of super power nuclear rivalry in order to

maximize security and economic benefits for non-aligned

states. Chapter VI examines relations between India and Sri

Lanka in terms of non-alignment, the international

vocabulary of all SAARC states. The chapter examines

approaches to security and development.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VI

INDO-SRI LANKAN RELATIONS

Introduction

The previous chapter examined the semantic trajectory

in India and Sri Lanka of a key concept in development, self

reliance, under a modified Lasswellian configurative

analysis. The 'development mode' focussed on political

economic empowerment while the 'equilibrium' mode placed

emphasis on cultural empowerment as motive forces.

Political economic and cultural foci within a Lasswellian

framework, allowed for the utilization of a synoptic

approach to empowerment. The Ashoka's Wheel framework,

encompasses political economic as well as cultural foci of

analysis and cuts across levels of analysis. It exposes the

dynamics of power/empowerment within the hub state (India)

and within individual rim states (focussing on Sri Lanka).

The view of this study is that the engine of change is

the struggle for ascendancy by elite-aspirant groups and

that these groups and governing elites draw on propellants

of an ethno-historical, administrative and international

nature in achieving their ends, thereby manipulating events

at domestic, regional and international levels. The

concepts of ethno-historical, administrative and

172

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international vocabularies were used in order to distinguish

between the spaces occupied by central elites and peripheral

locals in India and Sri Lanka respectively. The

transborder culture relationships between Sri Lankan and

Indian groups were also described as links between the

internal cases of India and Sri Lanka respectively and the

description of relations between the two countries - the

subject of the present chapter.

Chapter VI examines relations between India and Sri

Lanka in terms of an international vocabulary both states

espouse, that of non-alignment, through a literature review.

The chapter describes, more generally, the established

vocabulary of international relations of South Asian states,

under the rubric of 'security and development', two major

foci of non-aligned philosophy and concepts which capture

the three processes identified above.

Non-alignment: Regional Securitv & Development

Non-Alignment is a major part of the international

vocabulary of all South Asian nations. Development is

another. Non-alignment is a refusal to form ranks behind

the nuclear forces massing at Armageddon and is strategic in

that sense. It is not a refusal to take sides on issues

outside of the nuclear stand-off or to allow political

cultural or economic preferences to be reflected in a

state's international policies. It is not necessarily a

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structuralist ideology though non-aligned countries

propogated its values through international organs such as

UNESCO and UNCTAD, within the structuralist period

identified in Chapter Five, filling international linguistic

space with a new vocabulary. This vocabulary added to

international vocabulary which consists essentially of the

vocabularies of realism, geo-politics, economics and the

various regimes composing the international system. Drawing

on the development approaches identified in Chapter V one

might say that some international organs offered spaces in

which frustrated evolutionism could blossom into

structuralist rhetoric.

Chapter III draws on Kautilya's Arthrashastra and the

reign of Emperor Ashoka for pre-liberal sources for this

work's framework of analysis. The same concepts have,

through Nehru of India and Soekarno of Indonesia, informed

the values of Non-Alignment. Co-operation within a non-

hierarchical 'movement' is an important value which may be

termed solidarity. The preference for 'association' as

opposed to 'organization' is natural for states which have

for centuries been subordinate parts of orders constructed

in Europe. The non-aligned movement's ideology is against

several processes and very much in favor of others. It is

possible to marry the pros and antis thus in a list which,

however, does not represent a hierarchy of values:

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Their's is very much an Euro-American constructed

world. The Euro-American construction of values invades non-

aligned philosophy even if we may search for alternative

sources in Kautilya and the Ashokan age. Pro-independence,

Pro-equality and pro-solidarity reflect the values of the

French Revolution; Liberty, equality and fraternity. But

these values are deployed by the NAM in the international

realm where realism has long reigned and where such values

have usually been regarded as idealist. None-the-less the

idealist and realist streams of Western-dominated world

politics did give rise to a global infrastructure for

development which serves the former's altruism and the

letter's self-interest. This infrastructure is the battle

ground for the NAM.

Table 7. Non-Aligned Values

Anti-militarism (pro-diplomacy) (pro-disarmament)

Anti-colonialism (pro-independence) (pro-self reliance)

Anti-racism (pro-equality)

Anti-hierarchical organization (pro-solidarity)

Anti-suffering (pro-development) (pro-science/tech nology) (pro-education)

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Within the Indian sub-continent there have been

moments of high idealism, for instance in relation to

Emperor Ashoka's Dharmacakkra approach referred to in

Chapter III. The anti-colonial (pro-independence/self

reliance) and anti-suffering (pro-development) values of

non-alignment interact to offer the kinds of contradictions

discussed in Chapter V, contradictions which fall within the

push-pull of particularization /universalization within the

globalization framework. Chapter V looked at the Indian and

Sri Lankan cases, particularly from the perspective of

development and self-reliance.

It is important to bear in mind that while Non-

alignment is a key element in the international vocabulary

of India, Sri Lanka and all the member states of SAARC and

shapes members' roles and relationships within international

organizations, the vocabulary of realism often invades

bilateral relations between non-aligned states. The Iraqi

invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980's,

Indo-Pakistani wars, Indonesian invasion of Timor are cases

in point.

The views of regional commentators on Indian and Sri

Lankan security and development emphases are reviewed below.

The review is conducted within the terms of Ashoka's Wheel

framework and its metaphor. As the literature which this

section looks is often authored by scholars who contributed

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to the seminars examined later in this paper, it is a source

for the creation of categories for the analysis of seminar

contributions and official news/views. Four leading South

Asian scholars from within the region who were contributors

to the seminars discussed later in this chapter were

selected, viz. Pervaiz Cheema (Pakistan), Pran Chopra

(India), Shelton Kodikara (Sri Lanka) and S. D. Muni (India)

for this review, two from the hub and two from the rim for

this review.

Non-Alignment informs the state philosophies of all

SAARC countries' in relation to security and development

relations with the outer extra-regional circle of Ashoka's

Wheel. However its vocabulary cannot help appearing in the

spokes of the wheel, along with the vocabulary of raison

d'etat in the international political culture which together

with administrative and ethno-historical political cultures

form the links between rim (in this case Sri Lanka) and hub

(India).

In The Future of South Asia Pran Chopra, addressing the

subcontinent's future at a strategic level, harks back to

Alfred Mahan and his contention that the Indian Ocean will

be the key to the 21st century (Chopra 1986, 2). This

notion adds to India's importance to the world and to

India's need for vigilance against hostile intervention

(Chopra 1986, 2-3). In Regional Cooperation and Development

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in South Asia Chopra reminds us that K. M. Panikkar has

shown that it was through control of India that Britain

gained power over South Asia and the Indian Ocean and "this

was the key to the vast empire and controlling influence

that Britain built up in Africa and in western, southern and

eastern Asia" (Gupta 1986a, 57).

He proposes that India should opt for one of five

potential destinies: Association with the Soviet Union,

South Asian nations. Non-aligned Movement (and similar

groupings), middle power countries or Indian Ocean

countries/* He reasons that India's future will best be

served "as a member, and so obviously the leading member

that it does not have to stress the point, of an association

between South Asian countries" (Chopra 1986: 5). In

discussing a case for a South Asian destiny Chopra first

identifies a common history (colonial exploitation) which

should propel cooperation and a major economic resources

(water) which can only be exploited through cooperation

(Chopra 1986, 12-13).

But far from facilitating regional cooperation, the overhang of history has cast a shadow upon South Asia, creating a fog of mistrust in which the problems of the centrality of India and its

Writing in 1986 Chopra could not have foreseen the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1990. As late as November 18, 1991, an Indo-Soviet communique was announcing that "India and the Soviet Union are to sign a protocol to extend Indo-Soviet Peace, Friendship and Co-operation Treaty of 1971 for another twenty years" (India News Nov. 20, 1991).

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neighbors loom even larger than facts justify (Chopra 1986, 14).

Chopra continues with the argument that India's

diplomatic influence via its standing in the NAM and its

relatively strong and independent food economy limit the

maneouverability of external powers vis-a-vis India.

External powers who are interested in throwing a spanner in

Ashoka's Wheel can only seek to "isolate India from its

neighbors", set them against India and actively use them

against India in order to gain control over the Indian Ocean

(Chopra 1986, 18).

The obvious gateways for the game of isolating India are the cleavages which already divide India from its neighbors. They are also the gateways through which the traditional defence perimeter of the Indian sub-continent may be pierced (Chopra 1986, 19)

India's weakness is external: Her neighbors can be seduced.

The imagery of the Ramayana is immediately evoked. Rama is

strong and undefeatable. The only way Ravana can get to him

is through abducting his consort Sita. But the fickle are

warned that "(a) relationship of dependency seldom works to

the advantage of a small state" (Chopra 1986, 21). Chopra

quotes Shelton Kodikara as describing India in relation to

Sri Lanka as "a mountain which at any moment might send down

destructive avalanches" (Chopra 1986, xii). Contrast this

with Chopra's well-intentioned attempt, in discussing Indo-

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Pakistani relations, to make a molehill out of the Indian

mountain.

...... the roots of mistrust are in the perception of a threat from India, that the perception itself feeds on a misperception of the problems of the disparity in the size between India and its neighbors and the centrality of India in this region, and that this misperception (which India does not do enough to rectify) is used to their own advantage in this region by the global actors (Chopra 1986, 23).

Referring to India's strong role in the Grotian world of

non-aligned politics Chopra points out that;

...... India is sometimes regarded as a country preaching peace to the world but often at war itself; preaching principles of relations between countries which it does not practise itself in relation to its own neighbors; engaged in the same type of armed race, or races, which it urges others to avoid; diverting to military purposes resources badly needed for human welfare, and diverting them in the same manner and for the same reasons which it rightly deplores when other countries use them (Gupta 1986a, 57).

In discussing the specific case of Indo-Sri Lankan

relations over the Tamil ethnic issue, Chopra argues that in

one sense India's concerns over the fate of Tamils in Sri

Lanka are "legitimate by all norms of inter-country

relations" because of the Indian nationality of a number of

Tamils in Sri Lanka (Chopra 1986, 27). This is a drawing on

existing international vocabulary. But at the same time he

finds that vocabulary inadequate and would need to enter the

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realm of the ethno-historical lexicon to provide legitimacy

for India's concerns for non-Indian Sri Lankan Tamils.

But in another sense Indian concern exceeds these norms because it is also expressed on behalf of those Tamils who clearly and even according to India are Sri Lankan citizens and who constitute roughly two-thirds of the Tamil population of Sri Lanka (Chopra 1986, 27).

Chopra recognizes the issues and contradictions and:

(t)he feeling among some people in India that a country as

"large and important" as India should not get tied down to

relations with its puny neighbors", and the feeling among

the neighbors that "regional cooperation" with India, from

whom they feel a greater threat than from any other source, would only be another name for Indian hegemony over the

region (Chopra 1986, xii).

He is apologetic that his own paper is the longest in

the book and attributes this to the fact that as "the

initiating paper it had to take up several ground clearing

issues" and that the paper also grew in size "from the fact

that when seen from India inter country relations in South

Asia have more problems to look at than when seen from any

other country" (Chopra 1986, xii). Chopra recognizes that

"(e)ach contributor to the book has discussed the journey

and the destination as seen by him from where he is, from

his own location in his own country" (Chopra 1986, xi).

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In sum we could say Chopra recognizes that national

perspectives are brought to their work by individual

regional scholars; that India and its neighbors have

reciprocal national security concerns; that India does have

legitimate concerns about neighbors' ethnic problems where

her own nationals are adversely affected but that on

occasion India's concerns spill over to include non

nationals. Chopra reports that some Indians feel India is

too big and important to bother with its neighbors; that

some of India's neighbors feel that regional cooperation

with India will lead to Indian hegemony. The composition of

the book, the problems recounted by him are a testament to

the natural effect (and I stress the word natural) of

India's size and centricity in South Asia on any relationship it might have with one or all of its South

Asian neighbors. Chopra is not glossing over the problems,

rather he sees India as benevolent and therefore that others

fears about its size are unfounded. He feels that the

persistence of what may be wrong perceptions of disparate

security interests in India and its neighbors is wrong in

itself and that these perceptions are grist in the mill of

hostile regimes in neighboring countries intent on

mobilizing public opinion against India for domestic reasons

(Gupta 1986a, 58). He lays some of the blame for the failure

to allay the fears of neighbors on New Delhi, arguing that

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"India's regional diplomacy, even where India's case is a

good one, has been so hamhanded, generally couched in such

abrasive tactics and language...... " (Gupta 1986a, 58).

Chopra believes that particularly after the Simla

agreement, in which India and Pakistan elected to ban the

use of force in dealing with the Kashmir problem, any

dispute between India and its neighbors could be settled by

compromises which would cost a fraction of that which will

be entailed by a continuation of the dispute (Gupta 198 6a, 59-60).

In describing opportunities for economic cooperation

among India and its neighbors Chopra reminds us that even

here "India is suspected to harbor hegemonistic ambitions"

and at the same time there are fears from an Indian

perspective of "attempts to bring India into frameworks in

which its neighbors can gang up against it" (Gupta 19886a,

64). This is one of the major dynamics which goes into the

Ashoka's Wheel framework: To the Indian mind India is at the

center of the wheel and has six spokes which connect it to

six rim states.

But India sees itself as benevolent, as employing a

dharmacakkra rather than a cakkravartin approach, conquest

of minds by righteousness not rather than bodies and land by

force of arms. Chopra sees India as being less powerful or

less willing to use power in the region to than its natural

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endowments might suggest:

The reality is that in spite of India's advantages of size and strength, there are very few examples of India being able to coerce or cajole its neighbors into policies or actions or economic or political arrangements which they did not approve of...... On the other hand, there are many examples of India being pegged down to some uncomfortable positions by one or another of its neighbors. Nevertheless, the suspicion of hegemony persists on the one hand, and along with it, apprehensions arising from the disparity which some of India's neighbors feel when placed in juxtaposition with India; and, on the other hand, the suspicion of ganging up (Chopra 1986a, 65).

A dharmacakkra approach is practised by India in

international relations at the extra-regional level where

India has a relatively low capacity for projection of power.

Within the region India has not been unwilling to project

power in support of its security or of others' human rights

(though as pointed out by Chopra and quoted above, there

may be very few examples of such cases) . Hence the fears of

rim countries. In rim countries India is viewed as employing

a dharmacakkra approach vis-a-vis the global community and a

cakkravartin approach within.

Chopra's complaint is that India is not employing a

dharmacakkra approach in a way in which it would win the

hearts and minds of those who people neighboring states.

At the least, India is unable to benefit from the fact that large segments of people among some of India's neighbors desire closer relations with India, and if India presented the right image of itself this desire would grow sufficiently for the

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ruling regimes in these countries to discover that it is no longer possible for them to rest their fortunes only upon fear of India. At the worst, this fear and the actions and reactions between India and the regimes which are hostile to it, is converting the imaginary wedges which divide India into its neighbors into real ones (Gupta 1986a, 59) .

It is easy for a paranoid mind from one of the rim states to

read 'state' for 'wedge' and fear an absorption of the

individual rim states into a greater India. The dharmacakkra

approach itself is suspect if it is in any way

'organizational' rather than 'associational'. The inherent

problem is that geopolitics has presented India with an

'organizational' outlook towards its neighbors and and the

Western powers with an 'organizational' outlook towards

India and other developing countries. India seeks

'associational' treatment from the West and South Asian rim

states seek 'associational' treatment from India.

What does this mean when we look at it in terms of

elites and elite aspirants? It is after all governing

elites who look for 'associational' treatment. Would elite

aspirants trade 'associational' treatment at the bilateral

level to achieve ascendancy within their own polities? Would

they be willing to dissolve the 'wedges' and become leaders

within new states in a greater India? Unfortunately Chopra

does not address this important point though he has hinted

at ethno-historical commonalities and 'cousin cultures' in

the phrase 'large segments of people among some of India's

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neighbors desire closer relations with India quoted above.

The Sri Lankan case suggests that those 'large segments' are

often divided about their potential relationship with India

and that this division is based on intergroup rivalry and

jockeying for power among Tamil groups in Sri Lanka and

among their various allies in Tamilnadu and their allies in

New Delhi.

In his contribution to The Future of South Asia.

Kodikara identifies Collective Self Reliance (CSR) as the

economic philosophy of the NAM, a philosophy which is now

applicable at the regional level (Chopra 1986, 117). He also

agrees with Chopra's proposal for a regional security

agreement: Chopra sees a "SAARC route to security" (Chopra

1986, 120). Kodikara in his contribution to Regional

Cooperation and Development in South Asia describes the

international system in the language of American

international relations, the discipline, stressing its

universality (Gupta 1985, 29). He agrees with Brecher that

there were five identifiable 'subordinate systems' (Middle

Eastern, American, Southern Asian, Western European and West

African) under a dominant system which was co-terminous with

Morton Kaplan's bipolar bloc system; he does not accept

Brecher's arguments for the inclusion of Burma, Cambodia,

Laos, Malaya, N. Vietnam, Philippines, S. Vietnam, Thailand,

Indonesia and even China in the South Asian Subordinate

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System (Gupta 1985, 30-33).

He sees the seven South Asian states which have now

formed SAARC deserving of treatment as a region. He

provides reasons from within the 'administrative' domain for

this, but these are not developmental reasons: The seven

states are geographically proximate; they share a common

heritage of having been dominated by the British Raj ; they

are tied up in an Indo-centric knot based on India's

demographic, military and technological ascendancy allied

India's dyadic relationships with the other six (Gupta 1985,

34). Kodikara points out that these very reasons for

supporting the notion of the natural existence of a South

Asian Subordinate System in the cluster of states now known

as SAARC, contain seeds of regional insecurity. The British

Raj's 'defense of India' imperative, which encompassed the

whole sub-continent, has been inherited by the independent

New Delhi Raj.

Indeed, it could be said that one of the biggest dilemmas of South Asian politics is that India conceives of her neighboring countries as lying within the Indian defence perimeter and being integral to the security interests (Gupta 1986, 34).

Kodikara describes how "the Indian ocean became the extended

arena of regional conflicts in South Asia and superpower

rivalry became enmeshed in the larger global confrontation

between the US and the Soviets (Gupta 1985, 23)

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What interests me particularly is that both Chopra

and Kodikara see the Indo-Sri Lankan relationship from their own national perspectives, Chopra's being a center and

Kodikara's being a rim perspective. But whether from center

or rim, they both see SAARC as providing an opportunity for

achieving regional security and development which will

benefit all. Writing in the mid-1980's both Chopra and

Kodikara view Rajiv Gandhi's prime-ministership of India as

offering opportunities for greater regional security

cooperation. Chopra writes about the "much greater

credibility the office of the Prime Minister now enjoys"

(Chopra 1986, 63). Kodikara argues that " (t)he Rajiv factor

must be recognized as one of the important variables in the

'SARC route to security'" (Gupta 1985a, 44). Muni is

concerned with domestic causes of domestic conlict in its

violent and non-violent forms in his contribution to

Domestic Conflicts in South Asia (Phadnis et al. 1986, 54).

On the other hand in his contribution to Regional Co

operation & Development in South Asia he examines the

relationship between defence and development (Gupta 1986,

170). He recognizes that in South Asia cultural identity

may be more salient than class and complains that there have

not been many non-Marxist studies of intra-societal

conflicts in the Third World. He is concerned with security

without mentioning it, noting that:

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a new urgency seems to have arisen to undertake a systemic study of domestic conflict in South Asia because currently the region is passing through a very critical stage of its historical evolution in this respect (Phadnis et al. 1986a, 55).

Muni sees conflicts in South Asia to be either systemic

(with either short-term power-sharing goals or long-term

political restructuring goals) or ethnic/sectarian. where

the conflict is a reaction to deprivation and

discrimination (Phadnis et al. 1986a, 57).

Table 8. Muni's Types of Domestic Conflict:

1.SYSTEMIC CONFLICTS:

POWER-SHARING GOALS RESTRUCTURING GOALS

-Punjab Akali agitation -Naxalite unrest Army coups in Paki- -MRD unrest in istan & Bangladesh Pakistan -Thapa's anti-Panchayat -Outlaw political politics in Nepal groups against Nepal -SLFP-UNP opposition in -1971 JVP uprising in Sri Lanka Sri Lanka

2.ETHNIC/SECTARIAN:

-Naga/Mizo uprising in India -Baluchi/Frontier uprisings in Pakistan -Pro-Eelam fighting in Sri Lanka

Interestingly Muni does not mention the conflict in

Punjab as ethnic and does not mention Kashmir at all. This

may very well be a case of treating Punjab as a manageable

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administrative rather than less manageable ethno-historical

conflict; as one with a short-term power-sharing rather than

long-term restructuring goal. Punjabi separatists may not

agree with this classification. As ethnic/sectarian

conflicts are the result of discrimination or deprivation,

they must surely be the consequence of uneven development,

an administrative matter. Muni's categorization is weakened through its inability to sense the administrative within the

ethno-historical and vice versa. And of course it has

created a regional domesticity which ignores the

international in the administrative. Muni's three categories

fall either within my administrative or ethno-historical

spaces. It is interesting to see what the comparative

classification does to Sri Lanka's internal conflicts.

Table 9. Administrative & Ethno-historical Conflicts

ADMINISTRATIVE ETHNO-HISTORICAL

POWER-SHARING RE-STRUCTURING ETHNIC/SECTARIAN

SLFP-UNP 1971 JVP EELAM POLITICS REVOLT WAR

Muni's classificatory system reveals the difficulty

regional scholars face in viewing their own nation's

domestic problems vis-a-vis those of others. Why should the

Eelam war and the Punjab conflict occupy different spaces in

the categorization? Is there not a linkage between

administrative and ethno-historical politics. Muni points

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out that the frequency and variety of South Asian domestic

conflict has resulted in the strengthening of the coercive

state, weakening of political process and participation,

failed to achieve genuine reform and spilt over into

neighboring countries, with India being involved in disputes

in several instances on account of her pivotal position

(Phadnis et al. 1986, 62-63).

In his contribution to Regional Co-operation and

Development in South Asia Muni argues that India's security

perceptions have been extrovert or geopolitically-derived

and those of her neighbors have been introvert, centered

"within the region particularly vis-a-vis India" (Gupta

1986a, 172-173). He describes Non-Alignment as the Third

World's way of dealing with superpower ideological and

nuclear competition, with pacification of the Indian Ocean

as being a particular strategy of South Asian states

(Phadnis et al. 1986a, 174). His article shows how from the

beginning Indo-Pakistan relations, which were shaped by pre-

Independence ethnic politics within British India, drew on

the super-power relationship and relationships with super

powers. He mentions that while Jinnah identified in May 1947

Pakistan's two major threats to be "Soviet aggression" and

"Hindu imperialism", it was "the latter threat, which got

concretized in the form of distribution of assets and the

conflict on Kashmir after the participation" and contributed

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to the diminishing of the Soviet Union as a perceived

threat. In fact Liaquat Ali Khan used overtures to the

Soviet Union in 1949 in order to interest the US in a

security alliance which would provide the US with bases in

exchange for US support on the Kashmiri and Pakhtoonistan

questions. The US was wary of the Kashminir issue. After

Khan's assassination in 1951 a new "enemy image" of the

Soviet Union was developed in Pakistan in order to justify a

US-Pakistan alliance, which came about in 1954 (Phadnis

1986a, 176-177).

I believe Muni's argument that Pakistan, like other

South Asian nations apart from India, has an introverted

approach to security is somewhat misleading as it seems to

suggest that Pakistan only perceives a genuine threat from

Hindu India. It ignores the reality of potential ideological

threats from a communist Afghanistan or a fundamentalist

Iran, threats which Pakistan's ruling elite would no doubt

emphasize in its diplomatic dialog with the United States as

well as in its discourse with the masses.^ In the language

of this paper, with the exception of Pakistan, India's SAARC

partners' security interests are within the administrative

Gamini Dissanayake, who was a senior cabinet minister in the Jayewardene Administration said in the course of conversation with members of the Sri Lanka delegation during the Vancouver CHOGM (1987) that, when he had called on President Zia shortly after assuming office, the Pakistani president had said that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had saved Pakistan.

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rather than international space - which is why only

administrative (developmental) aspects of non-aligned

philosophy are drawn on for application within the region.

Political aspects of non-aligned philosophy are left for the

extra-regional world.

India on the other hand perceived ideological threats

from China and the Soviet Union and neo-colonial threat from

the US. Muni sees a conflict in India's perception of the

West in that it saw Western policies towards Pakistan as a

threat to Indian security interests, it "found it expedient

during the later half of the fifties, to let the US join its

efforts in countries like Nepal in economic development"

(Phadnis et al. 1986a, 181). India's perception of itself as

an agent of modernization and democratization (the head of

Ashoka's three-headed lion which faces the international

sphere) and its perception of itself as being threatened by

a dependency-creating sovereignty-eroding American-led

process of market universalization (the head which faces the

ethno-historical sphere), tug at each other but are kept

together through the third head, the administrative sphere.

The administrative sphere resolves the potential policy

conflict through interpreting co-operation in the

modernization process as an extension of non-aligned

philosophy, which has appropriated modernization, and as

contributing to stability on India's borders.

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Muni views the obsession with parity and status by

Indian and Pakistani regimes as the spanner in the regional

works. Pakistan refuses to accept the role of junior partner

and India insists on being recognized as regional power.

Muni advocates more contact at the level of people to

"moderate this obsession" (Gupta 1986, 228). As we have said

earlier Indian ruling elites have shown an interested in

constructing the region in an 'organizational' or

hierarchical form which places New Delhi at the center of

the wheel. Rim country elites are much happier with the idea

of India joining them on the rim with SAARC as a weak

center.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in his contribution to Regional Co-operation and Development in South Asia examines the

impact of threat perceptions in South Asia on regional co

operation. Cheema sees regional co-operation as having to

overcome obstacles presented by threat perceptions which are

based either on threats perceived to originate intra or

extra-regionally. "Dissimilar political units or ruling

groups are likely to generate different perceptions of the

same threat" (Gupta 1986, 104). Cheema brings in the

vocabulary of international relations, particularly that of

David Singer, into his analysis. He draws on Singer's

formula in which "Perceived Threat = Estimated Capability x

Estimated intentions" (Gupta 1986, 105).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 195 He identifies three major sources of regional tension -

the intra-regional asymmetrical power balance, regional

conflicts and linkages between insiders and outsiders. He

argues that

In view of this significant asymmetry, India quite naturally, not only envisaged a place of pre- emminence in the subcontinent but also expected it to be acknowledged and respected by its regional neighbors (Gupta 1986, 106).

In an inversion of the Indian Chopra's measured and moderate

but Indo-centric approach, the Pakistani Cheema sees India

as having failed to opt for an elder brother approach, but

rather having decided to assert itself or in the terminology

we have chosen to use, to play the role of a cakkravartin.

Scared and subdued neighbors were left with not many options but to evolve policies that would not only refrain from causing frictions with India but would also prevent them getting too close to India. Indian policies generated fears rather than invoking genuine respect. This fear, in turn, led them to seek extra regional linkages (Gupta 1986, 106) .

If the hub perspective is that the Indian Rama is surrounded

by a harem of regional Sitas, who are forever susceptible to

abduction by extra-regional demon kings or Ravanas, the rim

perspective is that Ravana is in the hub, that Rama the

protective spouse must be sought outside the region. Sita

has already been abducted.

Recall that we identified Chopra as seeing India as

less powerful or less willing to use power in the region

than its natural endowments might suggest. He believes that

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regardless of asymmetrical size and strength India has

limited opportunities to bully neighbors, but that India is

more likely to be "pegged down" (like Gulliver?) to some

uncomfortable positions by one or another of its

(Lilliputian?) neighbors (Chopra 1986a, 65).

The most consequential regional conflict is the Indo-

Pakistan one, in which, in "Pakistan's efforts towards

normalcy were much more impressive than those of India's"

(Gupta 1986, 106-107). He sees the establishment of Pakistan

and the development of a strong China as having modified the

Indian defence policy which had been inherited from the

British. The British defence policy for India the time of

independence was to ensure control over the Indian Ocean,

secure the North Western Frontier and deny control of

India's periphery to interested foreign powers (Gupta 1986,

109). British administrative vocabulary which described the

defence of India provides a powerful modern vehicle for the

Rama and Sita metaphor. But the essential difference in the

vocabularies is that for the British defence of India,

regional states were "buffer states", defence against

attack. It is inconceivable to view at "buffer states" of

that period as female "living shields", as hostage Sita's.

In the Indian conception, the so-called "buffer states" are

a source of vulnerability.

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We do not include Suryanarayan's seminar paper because

of he works outside the region. However, the South Indian

Tamilian's contribution to Domestic Conflicts in South Asia

focuses on the Sinhala-Tamil dispute in Sri Lanka. He

attempts to capture the broad ethno-historical voices of

Sinhalese and Tamils. 'Sinhalese fears' are attributed to a

historical role of the Buddhist and Aryan linguistic group

called the Sinhalese in preserving their identity vis-a-vis

"anti-Buddhist barbarians" (Phadnis et al.. 1986, 123-124).

In describing the Sinhalese self-image as defenders of a

Sinhala-Buddhist entity which coalesced faith, nation and

island, Suryanarayan draws on Sri Lankan academics such as

Gananath Obeysekera and Kumari Jayawardena as well as

Sinhalese publications. His is a genuine effort to discover

Sinhalese ethno-historical vocabulary. On the other hand in

describing 'Tamil misgivings' Suryanarayan relies on what I

have called 'vote', statistics (Chapter V), though he does

state that Tamils "argue that they also have an authentic

memory of shared historical experience which is as old as

the Sinhalese component (Phadnis et al.. 1986, 126-127).

Suryanarayan quantifies 'economic neglect' in the North of

Sri Lanka, a neglect through which "the poorer classes of

Tamil society are exposed to the ethnic conflict, which

until very recently, had affected only the middle classes"

(Phadnis et al.. 1986, 142). He goes on to argue that "(t)he

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demand for separation and its extreme manifestation among

Tamil militant groups has to be seen in the light of these

developments" (Phadnis et al. 1986, 142). He differentiates

between the various major sub-groups among Tamil-speaking

Sri Lankans and points to the high vulnerability of the

Indian Tamils of the Central Province (Phadnis et al. 1986,

129). He sees a coming together of Indian and Sri Lankan

Tamils of Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the 1983 ethnic

riots.

In the language of this study Suryanarayan views the

Sinhala-Tamil conflict as being based on Sinhalese drawing

on ethno-historical culture to monopolize administrative

space and thereby affecting middle classes as well as poorer

masses among Tamils, stirring up a separatist movement which

includes violence. While some Sinhalese will present the

picture in reverse, i.e. they would provide statistics to

disprove the charge of discrimination against Tamils, and

attribute ethno-historical reasons for Tamil demands for

separatism, the essential features of both approaches fit

into the 'spokes' segment of Ashoka's Wheel.

Conclusion

Titles of contributions in the five important volumes

on South Asian regional co-operation were examined for key

words/phrases. Identified words and phrases were classified

under international, administrative and ethno-historical

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vocabulary as shown in Table 10.

While political demography and minorities have

been placed under ethno-historical, the terms could very

well fit in under administrative. In the literature review

itself, except in the case of Suryanarayan's contribution,

there was no significant evidence of ethno-historical

vocabulary. Much of the commentary was from within

administrative space. It is interesting that a South Asian

scholar located outside the region focuses on an ethno-

historical area and in general terms addresses the question

of empowerment of ethno-historical groups. However

Suryanarayan's approach is uni-dimensional: It does not take

into account the larger international context.

In Chapter VII which follows we examine regional views,

through seminar contributions of regional scholars and

through official views. The expectation is that seminar

contributions will also deal with the interests of

administrative space as would official news. Seminar

contributions are largely by academics and bureaucrats

(manipulators of symbols and power), who after all people

'administrative space' along with the other Lasswellian

influentials (manipulators of markets). Official news is

produced by the same influentials. The main objective of

Chapter VII is to examine regional views in terms of the

Ashoka's Wheel framework.

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Table 10. Key Words & Phrases in Chapter Titles

ADMINISTRATIVE

- Development; Democratic revolution; development; economic development; poverty; social justice; social change; democratic revolution

- Regionalism; Collective self-reliance; regional co operation; regionalism; regional roles; regional communication policy; regional security; SAARC; threat perception; water resources

- Conflict:

Conflict; crisis; border dispute; ethnic conflicts; ethnic tensions; turmoil

ETHNO-HISTORICAL

Political Demography Minorities

INTERNATIONAL:

- Defence: Defence build-up; disarmament; extra- regional; lOPZ; power; neighborhood defence; nuclear arms race; symmetry

- Development;

Aid; collective self-reliance; development; dependence

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VII

REGIONAL VIEWS

Introduction

Freedom for us meant the ending of colonial subjugation and working for equality amongst all nations. It was also the beginning of a grand endeavour to reform and rebuild our society on a more humane and just basis, free from religious prejudice, social inequality and economic exploitation. This was the vision of our founding fathers (Rajiv Gandhi 1985)-.

While we can hope for world peace, there is much we can do for peace among our own group of non- aligned nations. Too many of us are in conflict. Unless we can resolve our own conflicts, we stand indicted in the court of global opinion (Ranasinghe Premadasa 1987, 46).

In Chapter VI we examined the views of key regional

(particularly Sri Lankan and Indian) commentators, in the

period framed by the 1983 ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and

the IPKF withdrawal in early 1990 through a qualitative

study of how their commentary reflects three major ethno-

historical, administrative and international processes

respectively: The violent struggle for ascendancy by elite-

aspirants; the administrations' development policies; the

practise of Non-Alignment. Chapter VI described the estab

lished vocabulary of international relations of South Asian

states, under the rubric of 'security and development', two

Ministry of External Affairs. Prime Minister Gandhi: Statements on Foreign Policy - Mav-Auaust 1985. New Delhi; External Publicity Division, Oct. 1985, p.78.

201

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major foci of non-aligned philosophy and concepts which

capture the three processes identified above. It examined

the titles of regional literature reviewed on South Asian

regional co-operation, it also developed the contents of

international, administrative and ethno-historical

vocabulary. Chapter VII examines regional views, abstracted

from 'seminar contributions' and 'official views',

quantitatively in terms of those rubrics, and qualitatively

in terms of Ashoka's Wheel within which framework these

contributions are placed.

Methodology

Contributions to selected regional seminars on regional

co-operation (1990/1991) by selected regionally-domiciled

commentators and editorial commentary in selected official

and quasi-official organs constitute the data for analysis

in this chapter. The thought of selected regional

commentators is examined within the metaphor of the Ashoka's

Wheel framework. These regional commentaries are classified

as either "'seminar contributions'" or "official

news/views". It is posited that seminar participants (drawn

from academia, politics and the bureaucracy) will in their

commentary reflect the gamut of South Asian views as seen

from within the administrative space. However the extent to

and manner in which they capture the ethno-historical

dimensions will reflect the degree to which the

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administrative space is sensitive to the aspirations of

elite-aspirants, a commentary on attitudes to social

mobility.

The international vocabulary of all SAARC members is

heavily enmeshed with the lexicon of non-alignment. The

discussion is centered on the cakkravartin-dharmacakkra.

realism-idealism tension at the heart of non-aligned country

relations with the outer world. The examination of regional

academic voices reveals how the essentially geo-politically

generated non-aligned philosophy is drawn on by scholars for

prescriptive application within the region.

This introduction is followed in the present chapter by

a discussion on non-alignment and its security and

development imperatives as transposed on a regional map,

essentially a review of some important regional literature.

A description of the methodology of the chapter follows the

literature review. An analysis of 'seminar contributions'

and official news/views follows the section on methodology.

Views of scholars within the region, the data for this

chapter, are drawn from a series of seminars arranged by the

Bandaranaike Center for International Studies (BCIS) in Sri

Lanka. The first three seminars were a series funded by the

Ford Foundation. The fourth was sponsored by the Sri Lankan

Foreign Ministry as a preparatory activity for the November

1991 SAARC summit which was postponed.

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Table 11. BCIS Seminars

Seminar on Indo-Sri Lankan Relations. Sri Lanka: BCIS, January 1990.

Seminar on India's Relations With her South Asian Neighbors. Sri Lanka: BCIS, 1990.

Seminar on India's Role in South Asia. Sri Lanka: BCIS, June 1991.

Seminar on SAARC: Problems & Prospects. Sri Lanka: BCIS, October 1991.

The Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of 1987 and the IPKF

withdrawal from Sri Lanka in 1990 are milestones in

regional relations. They are also multi-layered events,

being linked to important ethnic, national, regional and

international considerations in India and Sri Lanka: They

are events which are the focal points of conflicting

energies, beliefs, expectations. They were events which

sharpened the perception of the dharmacakkra-cakkravartin

dialectic within the two polities in relation to security

and development. The seminars are all post-Accord and the

the first two were held while the Indian Peace Keeping Force

(IPKF) was still in Sri Lanka. It is in order to reveal

these perceptions that the commentary of regional scholars

is examined here. The methodology adopted in this chapter

to capture regional views was to select important 'seminar

contributions' which contain the views of South Asian

commentators (those working within South Asia rather than in

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Western universities) on South Asian issues. Neither a

historic reconstruction of events through study of South

Asian commentaries nor a construction of a microcosm of the

totality of views within South Asia is intended. Indeed it

is posited that voices of elite aspirants will not be

evident in the seminar papers.

It should be noted that not all papers presented at the

seminars were available for this study. For instance

Professor Bhabani Sen Gupta's paper entitled "India and her

Neighbours in South Asia with special reference to Sri

Lanka" was not available. Another shortcoming has been the

fact that the present writer did not have access to the

discussion which followed the presentation of papers having

not himself attended the first threee seminars. Although

the BCIS seminars were held in Sri Lanka a sufficient number

of non-Sri Lankan regional scholars presented papers to

create a balance of views. In some instances scholars who

presented papers at seminars were excluded from the study

either because they were not South Asian or because even

though they were of South Asian origin they were based

overseas.

Political leaders such as present and past heads of

state and government of Sri Lanka and India are listed

separately in a periodization provided below. The

periodization used in Chapter V is superimposed over Indo-

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Sri Lankan relations as discussed in Chapter VI in order to

reveal the interplay of self-reliance foci in the attempt to

create a regional administrative vocabulary drawing on the

non-aligned lexicon. The reality which the non-aligned lexi

con describes is not the same reality as that which obtains

in South Asia. The tension between cakkravartin and

dharmacakkra approaches may be universal, but it changes in

meaning, in the perception of actors, when one moves from

one theater to another.

Periodization

Kodikara's periodization is from the Sri Lankan

decision-makers' perspective (Kodikara 1990, 11-12). His

three periods are as follows:

1. 1948-1956 UNP Rule 2. 1956-1977 Predominantly SLFP rule 3. 1977-1988 UNP Rule under Jayewardene

He argues that under the SLFP relations with India have

generally

been characterized by a low level of mutual suspicion and threat perception in the dyadic relationship, and periods of UNP rule by relatively higher levels of mutual threat perception in this relationship (Kodikara 199 0a, 10) .

Dudley Senanayake's administration of 1960-65 and the early

years of UNP rule are viewed by him to have been exceptions.

It should be noted that in my periodization

Bandaranaike (1956-59) and Jayewardene are considered to be

transitionals (asterisked) in my periodization presented

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below), the former cranking the engine of structuralism and

the latter bringing the process to a halt with political

structural change. (Bandaranaike is used throughout to refer

to Solomon Bandaranaike, prime minister between 1954 and

1956 and Mrs Bandaranaike is used to refer to his widow who

was elected subsequently as prime minister and currently

serves as leader of the opposition). Bandaranaike leads the

way to a more socially focussed approach to development in

the 1960's, based on linguistic reform (opening the portal

of political power a crack wider to accommodate the voices

of ethno-history), which has parallels in foreign policy and

security. His non-aligned foreign policy, argued for

balanced relations with all ideological blocs despite the

weighty history of colonial alignment. His national security

perspective called for the banishment of colonial military

outposts under the belief that post-colonial neighbours will

respect each others sovereignty. His widow Sirima

Bandaranaike actually instituted structural reform in the

form of constitutional change as well as land reform.

Jayewardene instituted constitutional change and market

reform but also bolted the door of constitutional change

behind him through electoral reform which would make the

two-thirds parliamentary majority required for

constitutional amendment difficult to muster.

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Table 12. Development Approaches in India & Sri Lanka

PERIOD STATE LEADER YEARS

EVOLUTIONARY - ECONOMIC EMPHASIS: 1950-1960

India: J. Nehru 47-61 Sri Lanka: Senanayake Sr. 48-52 Senanayake Jr. 52-53 J. Kotelawala 54-56 Bandaranaike 56-59*

EVOLUTIONARY - SOCIAL EMPHASIS: 1960-1970

India: L. Shastri 61-68 Sri Lanka: Mrs. Bandaranaike 60-65 Senanayake Jr. 65-70

STRUCTURALIST 1970-1980

India: I. Gandhi 68-77 M. Desai 77-80 Sri Lanka: Mrs. Bandaranaike 70-77 J. Jayewardene 77-78*

POST-STRUCTURALIST EVOLUTIONARY 1980-1990 India: I. Gandhi 80-84 R. Gandhi 84-89 Sri Lanka:J. Jayewardene 78-88

POST-STRUCTURALIST NEO-GANDHIAN 1990-

India: V. Singh 89-90 Chandra Sekhar 90-91 N. Rao 91- Sri Lanka: R.Premadasa 89-

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Seminar Papers

The first of the four BCIS seminars on the South Asian

Association of Regional Co-operation was on "India's Role in

South Asia" (Colombo, January 1990) . The papers listed in

the program, other than Gupta's which was not available, are

to be found in Table 13.

The second BCIS seminar was on "India's Relations with her South Asian Neighbours other than Sri Lanka" (Colombo,

July 1990) . The papers listed in the program are to be found

in Table 14. All papers listed in the program are available

for study except that the seminar documentation seems to

indicate that while Air Commodore Jasjit Singh's paper was

circulated at the seminar, deputy director Sreedhar Rao of

the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses attended the

conference. Abdus Sabur's paper is from a symposium held in

connection with the seminar:

The third BCIS seminar was on India's role in South

Asia (Colombo, June 1991). The papers listed in the program

are to be found in Table 15. The American, Soviet, Chinese,

Japanese, Australian and ASEAN perspectives do not fall

within the ambit of this study. Sen's contribution was not

available among the conference papers. The South Asian

perspectives available as documents are those of Mrs

Bandaranaike, Foreign Minister Herat and Venkateswaran,

dealt with below.

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The fourth BCIS seminar was on problems and prospects for SAARC (Colombo, October 1991). The papers listed in the

program are to be found in Table 16. The contribution of

the present writer, Naren Chitty, is not considered a

regional view as he is based in Australia. However, aspects

of his paper have been incorporated in Chapter VIII.

Table 13. BCIS Seminar 1; Indo-Sri Lankan Relations

Bandaranaike, Sirima. Chairman's Inaugural Address. Kodikara, Shelton. Geo-Strategic Perspectives of Indo-Sri Lankan Relations (Gupta, Bhabani Sen. India and Her Neighbours in South Asia with Special Reference to Sri Lanka) Jayaweera, Stanley. The Ethnic Crisis and the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Process (1983-1987) Muni, S. D. The Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) Issue in India-Sri Lanka Relations Bandaranayake, Senaka. An Approach to the Study of Sri Lanka's Relations with the South Asian Mainland in Pre- Modern Times. Wanigaratne, Maurice. Indo-Sri Lankan Economic Co-operation. Hussein, Izzeth. The Role of Tamil Nadu in Indo-Sri Lankan Relations Bastianpillai, Bertram. The Integration of the Stateless in Sri Lankan Society Ratnatunga, Sinha. The Role of Media in Indo-Sri Lankan Relations Verghese, George. Indo-Sri Lankan Relations: Prospects for the Future

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Table 14. BCIS Seminar 2; India's Relations With Her Neighbors Other Than Sri Lanka

Bandaranaike, Sirima. Chairman's Inaugural Address Herat, Harold. Foreign Minister's Address Singh, Jasjit. India and South Asia: The Strategic Security Issues Cheema, Pervaiz. Indo-Pakistan Relations Kodikara, Shelton. Indo-Bhutanese Relations and Bhutan's Strategy for Survival Aryasinha, Ravinath. Indo-Maldives Relations and the Relevance of the Sri Lanka Factor Mishra, Chaitanya. Indo-Nepal Relations: A View From Kathmandu Ghosh, Partha. India's perceptions of Indo - Pakistan, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Nepal Relations Abdus Sabur, A. Bangladesh-India Relations: An Overview.

Table 15. BCIS Seminar 3: India's Role in South Asia

Bandaranaike, Sirima. Chairman's Inaugural Address

Herat, Harold. Foreign Minister's Address (Sen, Gautam. India's Role in South Asia: Geo strategic Perspectives) Venkateswaran, A. P. India's Role in South Asia: An Indian Perspective Rudolph, Lloyd. India's Role in South Asia: A United States Perspective (Lunyov, Sergei. India's Role in South Asia: A Soviet View) (Lin Liang Guang. India's Role in South Asia: A Chinese Perspective) (Takako Hirose. India's Role in South Asia: A Perspective From Japan). (McPherson, Kenneth. India's Role in South Asia: An Australian Perspective). (Magenda, Burhand. India's Role in South Asia: An ASEAN Perspective).

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Table 16. BCIS Seminar 4: SAARC - Problems and Prospects

Ariyaratne, R. A. SAARC: A Survey from Dhaka to Colombo. Kodikara, Shelton. The Political Dimensions of SAARC. Gunatilleke, Godfrey. Prospects for South Asian Regional Co-operation and Trade. (Chitty, Naren. SAARC in the Changing Global Order). Aryasinha, Ravinatha. Regionalism as a Dimension of Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy.

Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike

Sirima Bandaranaike, leader of the opposition in Sri

Lanka and one of the important forces which shaped Sri

Lanka's structuralist period, devotes approximately 25% of

her inaugural address in the January 1990 seminar to non-

alignment, a movement which she led in the mid-70's. She

recounts that her husband's administration (1956-58)

introduced 'non-alignment' into the lexicon of official Sri

Lankan foreign policy. These developments may be restated

in the language of this work as the introduction of non-

alignment, and the lexicon which accompanies it, into the

international vocabulary in the mid-1950's and the adoption

of this evolving lexicon (to the development of which both

India and Sri Lanka would contribute) by both India and Sri

Lanka. The foreign policy goals of Bandaranaike's

administration as stated in his party's election manifesto

were the maximization of national self-interest and

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preservation of peace. The methodology proposed for

achieving these ends was non-alignment and universal

friendly relations (Bandaranaike 1990a, 2). Bandaranaike

was not a Hamelinkian structuralist: "He rejected the idea

that a small nation could cut itself from the world and live

in splendid isolation" (Bandaranaike 1990a, 2). However nor

was he a traditional balance-of-power theorist, a realist in

the classical sense. Asking for the withdrawal of British

bases from Ceylon, and filling the power void thus created

with good will toward India, must presuppose a willingness

to engage in some foreign policy synchronization with India.

In her inaugural address for the July 1990 seminar Mrs

Bandaranaike said:

(a)11 the countries of South Asia belong to SAARC, and we are all members of the Non-Aligned Movement. We have a common civilizational matrix binding us together, and we also have a common bond in attempting to raise living standards of our peoples and to keep abreast of developments in science and technology which will determine the future of the world in this decade (Bandaranaike 1990b, 1).

The development aspect of non-aligned philosophy is invoked

here and annexed to the greater SAARC ethno-historical

matrix.

The third inaugural address given by Mrs Bandaranaike,

for the June 1991 seminar, reflects the confusion of the

times. Symbols of non-alignment had been "shot down" by

events within and without the region. The end of the Cold

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War and President Bush's proposed New World Order seemed to

have rendered the non-aligned movement anachronistic. The

assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, a potent symbol of the non-

aligned movement, added to the sense of disorientation

reflected in the address.

In her inaugural address for the fourth BCIS seminar

Mrs Bandaranaike commented on the global trend towards

democracy, the global trend toward regional linkages based

on economic co-operation, regional development based on a

Basic Needs perspective and the non-aligned movement. She

noted a qualitative change in the character of politics

throughout the world, a "wave of humanism sweeping across

the continents" were "giving new meaning and significance"

to "(t)he time tested values of democracy" (Gunewardene

1991, 2). Political modernization is seen by her as

happening all over the world within states. At the same time

she notes a "trend towards global domination by a single

power or distinct power bloc" and therefore makes "a strong

plea for the continuance of the non-aligned movement as the

broad platform available to the Third World for voicing its

protests at the injustices of the global economic system"

(Gunewardene 1991, 2).

An application of the globalization perspective of

Chapter V sets Mrs Bandaranaike's perceptions in context.

The global center promotes political and economic

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modernization in the periphery through international

organizations, transnational corporations and media. But

Mrs Bandaranaike's view is that the global center has become

too powerful and impatient with global economic reform. It

is the non-aligned movement which must take its vision of an

equity-conscious economic modernization to the global level.

She is keen on applying the economic values of non-alignment

within the region (development) and globally (fair trade). Harold Herat

Foreign minister Herat of Sri Lanka, in his inaugural

address at the second BCIS seminar, states his belief that

the non-aligned view that a military build-up is not in the

security interests of the superpowers seems to have been

accepted by the superpowers (Herat 1990,2).^ Herat suggests

that

During the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau, The Bahamas, I had occasion to discuss the lOPZ proposal with W. T. Jayasinghe, who at the time held the post of Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Indeed he had held that post continuously from the 1970's when he was appointed by Mrs Bandaranaike. I inquired of him whether Sri Lankan diplomats who had been involved with the proposal had considered the effects of excluding all powers from the Indian Ocean on the lesser powers of South Asia. He responded that the lOPZ proposal was based on a larger premise, that there should be total disarmament. Foreign Minister Herat's perception of a conversion of superpowers to a 'non-aligned' approach in relations between themselves and slow progress in the lOPZ proposal may be related to the fact that the superpower relationship is ' associational ' and potentially workable on civic society basis, while the superpower-region relationship is 'organizational' and would require, from the superpowers' view, more organizational approaches to regional security.

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(i)n a curious way, the super-powers are moving towards the realization of an assertion long held by the Non-Aligned that the security of the super-powers, let alone international security, cannot be guaranteed through a build-up of armaments (Herat 1990, 2)

Herat then makes the nexus between superpower arms build-up,

global insecurity and the diversion of resources from

development. He does not fail to apply externally oriented

non-aligned values intra-regionally. He argues that

... a global ban on nuclear armaments is a goal to which all South Asian countries are committed. Yet this must not be a pre-condition for, nor preclude any initiatives and regional measures to prevent a nuclear race beginning in our our own environment (Herat 199 0, 4).

Herat salutes Solomon Bandaranaike as "a major advocate

of Non-alignment in international affairs" and refers to the

lack of progress in Sri Lanka's Indian Ocean Peace Zone

(lOPZ) proposal, a proposal which was supported by all Non-

aligned countries (Herat 1990, 1-2). He also mentions that

non-aligned nations "have been active in the United Nations"

and at NAM (non-aligned movement) meetings emphasizing "the

vital principles of non-interference in internal affairs of

states, the non-use of military force and the peaceful

settlement of disputes..." (Herat 1990, 4). He reports that

they are moving towards the non-aligned vision of a

dismantling of the nuclear stand-off; while the fundamental

interests of superpowers has not altered they are now acting

in concert; there are now important non-military

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determinants of power; internal security through military

coercion has failed and popular governments have replaced

military regimes; the concert of superpowers has led to the

resolution of some important regional issues (Herat 199 0, 2-

3) . A BCIS press release reports that in the discussions

views were expressed that spread of non-alignment and the

de-alignment of Europe "shows the strength of the

international movement for true independence and equal

relations between state" (BCIS 1990, 2). The suggestion

here is that the vocabulary of non-alignment has invaded the

discourse of the superpowers and transformed its content,

altering the overall dominance of balance-of-power

vocabulary. This is consonant with Foreign Minister Herat's

views expressed in the same seminar and referred to above

(Herat 1990, 2).

Herat's inaugural address for the third BCIS seminar

(June 1991) seminar makes no allusions to non-alignment.

The ordering logic of non-alignment is not invoked in this

address which reflects something of the sense of

disorientation to be found in Mrs Bandaranaike's address to

the same seminar: "We are meeting at a time of major global

changes, the future direction of which is still not clear"

(Herat 1991, 1). Later in the address Herat refers to Rajiv

Gandhi's assassination and the the fact that "India is now

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in the final stages of an important election" (Herat 1991,

3). The fact that Herat does not resort to waving the

familiar comforting non-aligned road map when he finds

himself at this cross-roads sans road signs is in itself

interesting. Rather he reminds his audience that without co

operation South Asian nations cannot hope to maximize their

position in the merging world or achieve prosperity within

their own societies. However, though non-aligned philosophy

is not referred to, it is accessed: " (N)o state in South

Asia can expect security or development if its relations are

conducted on a confrontational basis with others" (Herat

1991, 2).

Herat's inaugural address at the fourth BCIS summit

(October 1991) held on the eve of the Colombo SAARC summit

which had been scheduled for early November but had been

postponed on account of non-attendance by two members,

India and Nepal, stresses the role Sri Lanka has played in

establishing a "[f]orum which could work to create a new

regional order that promotes co-operative bilateral

relations between South Asian countries" . He cites Sri

Lanka's initiative in pressing that SAARC should discuss the

political question of terrorism, an initiative which led to

a regional convention on the suppression of terrorism signed

in Kathmandu in 1987, at the third summit and subsequently

ratified by all SAARC members. He also highlights Sri

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Lanka's role, "(a)s one of the more liberalized economies in

South A s i a ..... in advocating the need for SAARC to

grapple with the important area of economic co-operation".

And he stresses the importance of "mechanisms that would

strengthen people-to-people contact in the region" (Herat

1991, 1-2). In effect Herat is arguing for a regional regime

which promotes bilateral co-operation on political, economic

questions. Multilateralism has the aim in his vision as

suggested in his paper of promoting co-operative bilateral

relations. This is clearly a vision of Ashoka's Wheel as a

dharmacakkra, with India on the rim along with the other six

SAARC states, with a network of co-operative bilateral

spokes sans a hub. Also interesting is the Sri Lankan view

that it is ahead of India in some ways and that it is a

liberalizing, modernizing influence in the region - a notion

which is interesting to compare with India's self-perception

of itself as the great modernizer.

Both Sirima Bandaranaike and Harold Herat draw on

international and administrative vocabulary, in dealing with

the concepts of security and development. Mrs Bandaranaike

does reflect in her June 1991 address something of the

invasion of international space by reports of the capture of

repressive administrative apparatuses in the communist world

by ethno-historical groups. She wonders whether the pursuit

of liberty throughout the world will result in greater

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individual freedom, freedom from state and terrorist

violation of human rights (Bandaranaike 1991, 2). Shelton Kodikara

Shelton Kodikara, professor of international relations

at the University of Colombo, recalls in his contribution to

the first seminar that both Sri Lanka and India had been

anti-communist in the early years of independence but that

from 1953, when Pakistan began to receive American military

aid, India began to develop a policy of non-alignment in the

East-West confrontation. Pakistan's joining of SEATO (the

South East Asian Treaty Organization) further propelled India into non-alignment (Kodikara 1990a, 2).

Kodikara argues that in general the relations

Bandaranaike's SLFP had with India have "been characterized

by a low level of mutual suspicion and threat perception in

the dyadic relationship, and periods of UNP rule by

relatively higher levels of mutual threat" (Kodikara 1990a,

10). This aspect of threat perception is dealt with in terms

of international vocabulary; Kodikara is not here drawing on

ethno-historical causes for threat perception. The language

here is pure balance of power and related to systemic

analysis, Kodikara's interest. Kodikara suggests that of

all UNP administrations only Senanayake's government of

1965-70 and the early years of UNP rule were exceptions

(Kodikara 1990a, 10). Neither Bandaranaike nor Kodikara

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consider it sufficiently important to mention the fact that

the UNP administration of Sir John Kotelawala participated

in the Bandung Conference which was hosted by President

Soekarno and is considered to be a fetal non-aligned summit.

Kodikara argues that claims by pre-1956 Sri Lankan

administrations of subscribing to principles of non-

alignment, cannot be sustained given that British bases

continued to exist in the country until they were closed by

Solomon Bandaranaike. Kodikara does point out that "sheer

economic compulsions impelled Sri Lanka, in 1952, to sign

the rubber-rice barter agreement with the People's Republic

of China...." despite a revulsion for domestic or foreign

communism (Kodikara 1990a, 1). He believes that Sri Lanka's

non-alignment was confirmed after the inauguration of the

non-aligned movement (NAM) in Belgrade in 1961 (Kodikara

1990a, 2). The fluctuations in emphasis on relations with

East and West by various Sri Lankan administrations in the

1970's and beyond, he observes, happened within a larger

framework of non-alignment (Kodikara 1990a, 3).

I would argue that the test of strategic non-alignment

is not the degree of a state's avoidance of political or

economic affiliation at every level. Rather it is the

degree of a state's avoidance of political affiliation vis-

a-vis the highest level of global confrontation - the

nuclear stand off. A test of developmental 'non-alignment'

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is more difficult to construct as non-aligned nations range

from the free market oriented guided democracy of Singapore

to members of the old communist fraternity such as

Yugoslavia. However regardless of their approaches to

development states from across the non-aligned spectrum see

benefit in collective bargaining for a more equitable global

trade environment.

As said earlier non-alignment is not necessarily a 'structural' (as opposed to 'evolutionary' or 'dialectical'

as defined in Chapter II) though it did achieve for

subscriber nations working within the international system

and international organizations a political space in which

frustrated evolutionism could transform into structuralism

in the 1970's. But frustrated structuralism led to a return

to evolutionism. Other elements in non-aligned ideology are

identified by Kodikara as anti-colonialism, anti-militarism

and anti-racism (Kodikara 1990a, 1). He does identify the

'anti-suffering' and 'anti-hierarchy' purposes within the

ideology and strategy of non-alignment, the belief in

science and technology as a means of achieving self-reliant

development. In a sense part of this is implicit in anti

colonialism, but belief in science and technology and the

goal of self-reliant development are important enough to

warrant special mention. These arise out of a liberal

notion that the state should intervene to overcome suffering

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- a notion which is linked to a belief that suffering can be

overcome through progress via the instrumentality of science

and technology.

Kodikara, in a paper on Indo-Bhutanese relations (his

contribution to the second BCIS seminar), mentions that

Bhutan took a position which was not in accord with that of

India, on the Kampuchean question, at the Havana non-aligned

summit. Non-aligned and United Nations meetings have been

used by Sri Lanka and several other South Asian states to

express independence of Indian foreign policy. The framework

of the non-aligned movement is a relatively non-threatening

platform from which to flex their foreign policy

independence from India: India is an acknowledged leader of

the movement. South Asian diplomats also tend to consult

among themselves in formulating language for conference

communiques. Consequently the Indian view is not ignored.

Kodikara's paper on Bhutan is a historical description of

the difficult lot of a small landlocked state which is viewed as a buffer by two giants, India and China. However

Kodikara, a Sri Lankan, cannot speak with a Bhutanese voice

and from that point of view the paper is of less interest to

this study than it might otherwise have been (Kodikara

1990b).

In his contribution to the fourth BCIS seminar,

Kodikara deals with the political dimensions of SAARC. He

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argues that consideration of the political dimensions of

SAARC must take into account "parametric givens" which are

"commonality of interests" and "asymmetries arising from

.... size, population, economic potential" (Kodikara 1991,

2). He notes that while "current Indian opinion inclines to

view regional conflict in South Asia as being engendered by

extra-regional forces", all of SAARC including Pakistan was

now non-aligned and "in any event the theory of external

origins of conflicts in South Asia overlooks important

elements in the Indo-Pak situation". The three aspects he

identifies may be placed in terms of two of this works major categories (Kodikara 1991, 6) ;

"(T)he primordial Hindu-Muslim antagonism" (ethno- historical relationships);

"the nature of opposing regimes" (administrative relationships) ;

"the nature of India's own inherent tendency to regard relations with the other states of South Asia as a species of patron-client relationships" (administrative relationships).

He quotes Bhabani Sen Gupta in order to describe what this

work presents in terms of globalization, the economic

dependency of South Asian states and ruling elites on the

capitalist World Market, a dependency which leads to

intervention in internal affairs (Kodikara 1991, 6). He

argues that the post cold war era devalues the Indo-Soviet

Treaty which India used to discourage Pakistan from

launching an attack on India, even though in Gupta's words.

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"American commitment to Pakistan is limited at the best and

uncertain at the worst, and China will not get dragged into

a war with USSR" (Kodikara 1991, 7). Describing the relative

military standing of India and Pakistan, Kodikara argues

that as a consequence of this strategic imbalance in India's

favor, "the nuclear option becomes a tempting proposition

for Pakistan, and there are all indications that the India-

Pakistan rivalry may have been escalated into a nuclear arms race (Kodikara 1991, 8).

In discussing Indo-Sri Lankan relations Kodikara

identifies the following as elements in India's approach:

Tamil Nadu's influence on Indian politics; the problem of

Sri Lankan Tamil refugees; the fear that Sri Lanka was

tilting toward the West in its foreign policy. All these,

including the last, are from India's point of view,

administrative rather than international issues. It is

interesting that Kodikara does not mention a primordial

Sinhala-Tamil antagonism here. He points out that

the fundamental geopolitical reality of the South Asian region, in the Indian view, was that regional security was essentially an Indian concern and that states neighboring India must adjust their security concerns in the context of the larger security of the Indian subcontinent, of which India was the sole custodian (Kodikara 1991, 13) .

This language marries well with the Ramavana metaphor

employed in the present work. Kodikara draws on

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international vocabulary to admonish India for "arming and

training Sri Lanka's militants in camps in India" and for

the "blatant act of aggression" when India para-dropped

supplies of food and drugs over the Jaffna peninsula on June

4, 1987 (Kodikara 1991, 13)^.

It flouted accepted norms of international law. It infringed the specific UN resolution which declared that no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist, or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State or interfere in civil strife in another State (Kodikara 1991, 12).

In the view of this writer, it is not a coincidence that in

drawing on international vocabulary to comment on an intra-

regional quarrel, that the vocabulary of United Nations

resolutions rather than non-alignment's parallel language is

selected. It is particularly interesting that Kodikara does

In the post-1980 period India's official statements began to suggest to the careful observer that it was reserving judgement about the nature of Sri Lanka's sovereignty. As a Washington-based Sri Lankan diplomat between March 1982 and December 1987, I noticed that official comments from New Delhi or the Indian High Commission in Colombo referred to India's support for Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity. The word sovereignty did not appear. I pointed this out to W. T. Jayasinghe (then Sri Lanka's foreign secretary) and Gamini Seneviratne (a senior Sri Lankan diplomat) at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) held in Vancouver in 1987. It was noted by us that prime minister Rajiv Gandhi had not used the term sovereignty in his inaugural address. It was later revealed to me by Seneviratne that the Indian delegation to CHOGM had suggested that the last paragraph of a statement on the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, which Sri Lanka wanted included in the final text of the conference, was not necessary. That last paragraph included the word sovereignty. Sri Lanka insisted on the inclusion of the paragraph and it went into the final document.

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not draw on the non-aligned lexicon here because a few

paragraphs later he quotes prime minister Rajiv Gandhi as

explaining at the signing of the Indo-Lankan Accord of 1987

that "(t)he greatest threat to the security of our region is

if the the countries of our region drift towards the power

blocs. Our security lies in non-alignment" (Kodikara 1991,

11). Kodikara might very well have contrasted India's

actions in Sri Lanka with Gandhi's defense of those actions;

have argued that non-alignment itself calls for non

intervention; that non-intervention should apply

within the region as well as in the larger international

context.

Kodikara points out that "(i)t is now generally agreed

that the Indian view after about 1980 that Sri Lanka's

foreign policy was prejudicial to Indian security interests"

informed India's policy toward her southern neighbor. He

refers to three contributing factors: Sri Lanka having

permitted Voice of America (VGA) to expand its transmission

capacity under a new agreement* ; the rejection of the

Indian Oil Corporation's tender for the lease of the old oil

My recollection of the case of the VGA agreement, from my period as Consultant to the Ministry of State in Sri Lanka, was that the decision to allow the expansion of VGA facilities was as much a product of permanent secretary Sarath Amunugama's liberal instincts as that of the Jayewardene cabinet's liberal instincts. The VGA file actually passed through me on one occasion and I noted Mrs Bandaranaike's extension (but not expansion) of the agreement on an earlier occasion.

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tank fana in the "strategic natural harbor in Trincomalee"

in favor of what India viewed as a consortium which could be

an "instrument of American influence"; the involvement of

Israeli and British military trainers (Kodikara 1991, 13)

Kodikara does not find the bilateral security-related

agreements/ treaties between India and her neighbors to be

satisfactory. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the accompanying

Letters of Exchange "brought Sri Lanka within the strategic

perimeter defined by India" in exchange for Indian co

operation on the Tamil ethnic problem. Sikkim was brought

into the Indian Union itself in 1975. The Indo-Bhutan treaty

of 1949 excludes India from its internal administration but

gives India an advisory role in Bhutan's external relations

and control over Bhutan's materiel supplies. The Indo-Nepali

Treaty of 1950 called for security co-operation with any

neighbor who threatened Indo-Nepali relations. Here again

there were letters of exchange, made public only in 1959,

Interestingly, during my tour of duty as Counsellor of the Sri Lankan Embassy in Washington (March 1982- December 1987) I could not find any American defense analyst who believed that the United States wanted Trincomalee harbor badly enough to be willing to upset the Indians. I recall being told that noone in the State Department and perhaps one analyst in the Pentagon thought Trincomalee to be of any great strategic value to the United States in the present period. Indian diplomats in Washington must surely have unearthed the same kind of views. The pronouncements of fear of American bases in Trincomalee, often originating from the Lok Sabha, was more likely to have been political drum-beating on the part of Indian leaders, a drum-beating which excited a more generalized fear of external intervention in the region as captured in the Ramayana analogy used in this work.

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which stated that neither party would tolerate threats to

the security of the other. The Indo-Bangladeshi Friendship

Treaty of 1972 stipulates that the parties concerned should

consult each other in the event of either party being

attacked by a third in order to take action toward

eliminating the threat (Kodikara 1991, 14-18).

Kodikara advocates "[p]eaceful settlement of disputes

and the renunciation of the use of force" within the region

and calls, cautiously, for "a multilateral SAARC security

treaty, if such a treaty can be worked out", pointing out

that "[a]11 that is necessary is that SAARC should renounce

its presently exclusive concern with economic forms of co

operation ...." (Kodikara 1991, 22). While he sees that the

"common threat perception in SAARC is that of grinding

poverty" he notes that "political co-operation are a sine

qua non of successful economic development", establishing

his neo-functionalist credentials (Kodikara 1991, 23-24).

S. D. Muni

Muni of the School of International Studies of

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, in his contribution

to the first BCIS seminar deals with the IPKF, attributing

causality for the Sri Lankan ethnic crisis to the "dynamics

of socio-political development in Sri Lanka beginning with

independence" (Muni 1990, 2), an approach which is consonant

with the present work's political pluralism. The paper's

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argument may be described thus: Political out-bidding by the

two mainstream parties resulted in a move by Sinhalese

ethno-historical forces to capture administrative linguistic

space. Differentials in economic development among Sinhalese

and Tamil populations, particularly under President

Jayewardene's "open economy", exacerbated the situation

(Muni 1990, 3) . The intensification of ethnic violence in

the early 1980's which was accompanied by Tamil refugees

streaming into Tamil Nadu led to political outbidding

between the main Tamil Nadu parties, DMK and AIDMK, and

therefore political pressure on New Delhi to "to adopt an

active and assertive policy towards Sri Lanka to ensure

safety and security of Sri Lankan Tamils" (Muni 1990, 5).

So far Muni's account faithfully illustrates the

workings of the Indo-Lankan spoke of Ashoka's Wheel. The

description leads to the outer wheel, or the Rama-Sita

analogy. India was "dragged" into Sri Lanka's domestic

conflict not only because of what the present paper has

described as the phenomenon of 'cousin cultures' operating

within Ashoka's Wheel, but also because Sri Lanka "was

increasingly using extra-regional military support to

suppress the Tamil militancy " and extra-regional powers

such as U.S., British, China and Israel, and also Pakistan,

were exploiting Sri Lanka's military requirements "to

consolidate their strategic presence in the island" (Muni

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1990, 5). The outcome of all this. Muni states, was the

Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of July 29, 1987. Muni goes on to

describe the main points in the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement.

Neither Muni nor the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement describes the conflict as one between elites and elite aspirants, though

the latter recognized group aspirations.

The Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement is an administrative

'solution' to an ethnic problem with cross-border

implications. Through it Sri Lanka "undertook to accomodate

the Tamil aspirations" while India agreed to ensure

"surrender of arms by the Tamil militant groups ....

bringing them into the mainstream of Sri Lankan national

life". The outer circle of Ashoka's Wheel with its

international vocabulary only enters the letters of

attachment to the Agreement in which Sri Lanka "offered to

meet India's security concerns regarding the role of

external strategic interests" (Muni 1990, 6-7). The

Agreement, from the Indian point of view, was a

reconciliation between the Indian Rama and the Sri Lankan

Sita which had been saved from Havana's clutches. By

signing the Agreement Sri Lanka officially concurred with

this perspective, but subsequent events in South Asia have

shown that the Sri Lankan perception of India as the

abductor dies hard.

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Muni's paper, describes the "unusual and dramatic

style of diplomacy" of President Premadasa and India's "strong and firm" reactions to Premadasa's public diplomacy vis-a-vis his decision that India should withdraw the IPKF

before the end of July 1990. Muni is describing the likely

reaction of any power to public diplomacy which may be seen

to be connected with a concession or demonstration of

weakness.

The withdrawal of the IPKF per se had never been a major issue in India's policy. For the past track record of India on the question of keeping its military presence in the neighbouring countries clearly suggests that Indian forces are not looking for any piece of real estate in its neighbourhood. Even in the present Sri Lankan case, India had started IPKF withdrawal even before President Premadasa asked for it. This was admitted by Premadasa himself (Muni 1990, 28) .

Senake Bandaranavake

Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University

of Keleniya, Senake Bandaranayake, looks at internal and

external factors in Sri Lanka's historical factors in a

paper on Sri Lanka's relations with South Asia in pre-modern

times. His is a self-consciously theoretical (rather than

descriptive) and philosophical paper which seeks to stress

"that it is only a society's or country's internal dvnamism

that produces significant historical momentum" and that

relations with the external world "can create vital

conditions or determinants which may enhance that momentum.

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or retard it, but they cannot replace it". He advocates the

freest development of that internal dynamism as such unfettered development would be of "mutual benefit to all

societies and countries that share in the broader matrix of

unit" (Bandaranayake 1990, 14). Bandaranayake is referring

to 'development', the focus of Chapter V, in an

anthropological sense. While he does not discuss development

in those terms, his arguments if extended would probably

place him closer to the approach which I have called neo-

Gandhian and focuses on individual development. In the neo-

Gandhian approach development begins within the individual

in his ethno-historical space and then spreads outwards.

Ethno-historical space is the motor of change for

Bandaranayake. This view is at variance with the view taken

in this work, that under a globalization framework, both the

world market/international system/global culture (global

universalizing forces) and ethno-history (particularizing

ethno-historical forces) are motors of change.

Bandaranayake does not draw on non-aligned philosophy

in his discussion. But he asks "that the same principles

are applicable to relationships between countries as they

are to relationships between the constituent elements of a

country" which in this context must surely mean that both

India and Sri Lanka should allow free development of ethno-

historical groups and that South Asian neighbours should

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allow each other to develop freely (Bandaranayake 1990, 15).

Stanley Javaweera

Stanley Jayaweera, a former Sri Lankan diplomat,

provides a critical Sinhalese view of India and the Sri

Lankan ethnic crisis, which contrasts with Muni's Indian

view, in the former's contribution to the first BCIS

seminar. While Jayaweera's description of events is critical

of the Sri Lankan government. Muni's description is not far

removed from an official Indian version. While Muni

attributes causality to political out-bidding by mainstream

"Sinhalese" parties in Sri Lanka, Jayaweera lays the blame

on the violent disobedience of the TULF as well as the

authoritarianism of the Sri Lankan government . As much as

Muni is interested in rationalizing the IPKF presence in Sri

Lanka, Jayaweera is interested in explaining the

"conflagration" which was ignited by the killing of thirteen

Sinhala soldiers by the Tigers in July 1983 (Jayaweera 1990,

2). While Muni sees Sri Lanka, through Indian eyes, as a

Sita ripe for abduction by an external Ravana, one might

say that the Sinhalese see the Tamil North as a Sita. In

Jayaweera's words "(t)he Tamil Nadu connection in the

separatist politics of Jaffna was just beginning to surface,

much to the annoyance of the Sinhalese". He further states

that "President Jayewardene was probably articulating those

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feelings of many Sinhalese when he remarked that the riots

of 1983 were a 'natural response' of theirs to separatist

demand" (Jayaweera 1990, 3) .

Jayaweera traces back India's "Asian Monroe Doctrine"

to Nehru's speech at the Asian Relations Conference held in

New Delhi in 1947 (Jayaweera 1990, 5). He seems to believe

that Nehru's statements show that he would have liked India

to have dominated all of Asia, but a modicum of realism in

his outlook made him recognize the power of China and limit

his aspirations to the sub-continent or Indo-centric region

of South Asia:

Thus was born India's sub-continental obsession - cruel necessity and India's own security considerations combining to lay the foundation of India's policy in the South Asian region. Briefly, the term implies that South Asia is an Indo- centric region and that India is central to it geographically and in terms of the socio-cultural and economic infrastructure of the region. The result of this Indo-centric nature of South Asia is that no step towards Co-operation and collaboration can be taken in the region without India acquiring the central place in the scheme of things (Jayaweera 1990, 5) .

Jayaweera views the Indian intervention in the Sri

Lankan ethnic conflict as opportunistic, having the primary

purpose of achieving security related foreign policy

objectives which go back to Nehru and Sardar K. M. Panikkar.

The human rights and refugee issues raised by the July 1983

ethnic disturbances and what Jayaweera views as the Sri

Lankan government's ineptitude in both domestic and foreign

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affairs "presented the giant neighbour with a suitable

opportunity" (Jayaweera 1990, 9). Jayaweera's paper goes on

to describe the chain of events which led to the arrival of

the IPKF in Sri Lanka. Interestingly, though he describes

India's violation of Sri Lankan air space on June 4, 1987 as "a blatant act of international brigandage", the former

diplomat does not draw on the values of non-alignment in

addressing either India's treatment of Sri Lanka or Sri

Lanka's treatment of its Tamils (Jayaweera 1990, 28).^

On the morning of Thursday, 2nd, June 1987, I received a phone call from A. C. S. Hameed, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, from Colombo, to my desk at the Sri Lanka Embassy in Washington D.C. I was then serving as Counsellor of the Sri Lanka Embassy. Hameed asked me to ask Ambassador Susantha de Alwis to pass on to the White House a request from President Jayewardene to President Reagan for a consultation by phone, I checked with Ambassador de Alwis, who was at the time making the same request at the State Department: The State Department was awaiting a message from the U.S. Ambassador in Colombo. When I called Hameed in Colombo and explained the position he asked me: "Mr Chitty, is there only one way to reach the White House?" I could hear the voice of President Jayewardene in the background. I asked Hameed if he was asking me to use alternative channels. He replied in the affirmative and requested that the White House call Jayewardene either "at midnight or on Friday at 9.3 0 to 10 p.m." I was not aware of the situation developing between India and Sri Lanka but understood that there must have been matters of urgent national interest involved if Jayewardene wanted Reagan to contact him. I decided to approach the White House through Charles Wicks, director of USIA and a friend of both Reagan and Jayewardene. Wicks was away and so was his deputy and I ended up conveying the request to Stan Burnett, the general counsellor who said he would be attending a White House function, at which President Reagan would be present, within the hour, and would ensure the request reached the president. Later Burnett informed me that he had conveyed the message to White House aides Baker and Carlucei who had undertaken to pass it on to Reagan. My information is that Reagan did not call Jayewardene. With hindsight I believe that Jayewardene was looking to Reagan (an external Rama) at the eleventh hour for pressure on India (Ravana) so that Sri Lanka's abduction (loss of sovereignty)

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This is in keeping with my contention that South Asian

commentators tend to invoke non-aligned values and employ

non-aligned vocabulary in relation to development within the

region but not in relation to intra-regional political

relations. Foreign Minister Herat's language as described

above is the exception rather than the rule but also represents the beginning of a trend which I believe has some

relation with the radically changing altered world order.

Maurice Waniqaratne

Marga Institute's Maurice Wanigaratne, in his

contribution to the first BCIS seminar, looks at the

question of economic co-operation between India and Sri

Lanka. Wanigaratne views the period India and Sri Lanka were

part of the British Empire as one which brought about closer

economic integration, particularly through labor

(indentured) food (rice, dry fish, currystuffs) , fuel

(coal) and textile (cotton) imports from India valuing Rs

235.5 million or as much as 42.5% of Sri Lanka's total

import bill in 1938 (Wanigaratne 1990, 1-2). Wanigaratne is

less than enthusiastic at the Indian approach to trade with

Sri Lanka in the post-colonial era. He is concerned about

could be averted. When a researcher from the Congressional Research Service drove upto the Sri Lanka Embassy and handed an analysis of the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement to Ambassador Susantha de Alwis moments after he had read out the foreign ministry telex to a stunned staff, there was a feeling that Ravana and Rama had been in agreement.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238 "the regular deficit in merchandise trade" and "the

reduction in Indian imports from Sri Lanka ..... through

banning or otherwise administratively reducing imports from

Sri Lanka" (Wanigaratne 1990, 4 ) . He argues that the

establishment of an Indo-Sri Lanka Joint Committee has done

little to improve trade between the neighbors largely

because "India showed no genuine indication that she was

prepared to take a more liberal attitude on trade matters

between the two countries" (Wanigaratne 1990, 5).At the same

time the global level negotiations on trade "are one area

where co-operation between the two countries is very real"

because of common interest vis-a-vis the North in regimes

governed by UNCTAD and GATT (Wanigaratne 1990, 10).

Looking at SAARC itself Wanigaratne reports

unenthusiastically that twelve technical committees have

been set up to consider means of closer co-operation but

that "there has been only one attempt so far to come to

grips with areas such as trade, investment and industrial

collaboration" (Wanigaratne 1990, 12)J Wanigaratne

believes that

while India is prepared and willing to join in, or to support, in principle. South Asian Co-

The twelve technical committees of SAARC are; (1) Rural Development; (2) Health & Education; (3) Telecommunications; (4) Sports, Arts & Culture; (5) Science & Technology; (6) Women & Development; (7) Agriculture; (8) Education; (9) Meteorology; (10) Transport; (11) Postal Services; (12) Prevention of Drug Trafficking and Abuse.

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operation or even co-operation within developing countries at the global level ...... India has been intransigent where she has to give away anything material.... (Wanigaratne 1990, 13).

India acts in its national interest within the region and

globally. In my terminolgy, in the global caste

stratification, India and Sri Lanka are both at the low end:

Solidarity is strength. Within the region India is at the

upper end and solidarity is not always considered a

necessity. Interestingly Wanigaratne manages to complete

his paper without once drawing directly on the developmental

values of non-alignment. The paper operates within

administrative and international space and provides no

window for ethno-historical voice.

Izzeth Hussein

Hussein, a former Sri Lankan diplomat, focuses on the

Tamil Nadu factor in Indo-Sri Lankan relations in his

contribution to the first BCIS seminar. His paper traces the

development of similar but distinct ethno-historical

political identities in Tamil Nadu, India and Northern

Province, Sri Lanka. The material in his paper is consonant

with and fleshes out the 'cousin culture' dimensions of the

spokes of Ashoka's Wheel. Despite its focus on ethno-

historical groups, Hussein's paper does not deal with

'empowerment' of ethno-historical groups. He does however

briefly comment on the non-brahmanical movement in India

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(Hussein 1990, 5). The paper is concerned primarily with a

problem within the administrative realm, the impact Jaffna-

Tamil Nadu relations has on the management of Colombo-New Delhi relations.

Bertram Bastiampillai

Bastiampillai, professor of history at the University

of Colombo, addresses the question of Sri Lanka's plantation

Tamils in his contribution to the first BCIS seminar. He

recounts the history of the problem of 'statelessness'

experienced by plantation or "Indian Tamils" in the post

colonial period and Sri Lankan dialog with India about their

repatriation to India or being accepted as citizens of Sri

Lanka. The problem has always been considered an

administrative one requiring an administrative solution.

Bastiampillai, having the administrative goals of nation

integration, social cohesion and harmony, proposes pluralism

rather than assimilation. He argues that "assimilation with

the idea of creating a homogenous society will only lead to

the disintegration of Sri Lankan society" (Bastiampillai

1990, 17).

Sinha Ratnatunaa

Sinha Ratnatunga, former editor of the now defunct

Davasa newspaper, in his contribution to the first BCIS

seminar, deals with the role of media in Indo-Sri Lankan

relations. Ratnatunga notes that:

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....while individual good neighbourly relations exist between journalists of the two countries, the printed, broadcast and electronic media of both India and Sri Lanka unfortunately also played a damning role to bring about a nose-dive in bilateral relations of the two countries in recent years (Ratnatunga 1990, 3) .

The press has the potential to pick up an amplify ethno-

historical voice for administrators to hear. However as

Ratnatunga points out "in a free press, critical commentary

is always seen as independence and constructive commentary as sucking up to the government" (Ratnatunga 1990, 2). As I

argued in Chapter V, the war against suffering (development

activity) becomes reason enough for frowning on an

adversarial role for the press in developing countries. This

is also true about developed countries in time of war

against other states. Ratnatunga's paper reveals his Sri

Lankan nationality, a demonstration of how journalists, like

academics tend to line up behind their respective national

flags during confrontations: Objectivity is from within the

larger national subjectivity. There are, of course,

exceptions to journalistic nationalism.

B. G. Verohese

Verghese, former editor of the Indian Express, in his

contribution to the first BCIS seminar, recognizes that

"Indo-Lanka relations got entangled in India's domestic

politics" and that "Indian diplomacy in Lanka could have

done with greater finesse" (Verghese 1990, 5-7). Looking to

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the future, as "permanent estrangement between these two

countries is unthinkable" he makes several recommendations

(Verghese 1990, 9). These are the finalization of the new

Treaty of Peace and Friendship which is meant to replace the

Peace Agreement, the provision of Indian economic assistance

for rehabilitation of Sri Lanka's North and East through

trans-channel energy generation and distribution, expansion

of opportunities in Indian tertiary institutions for Sri

Lankans, co-operation in developing both countries' extended

economic zones and in trade and joint ventures.

Interestingly Verghese' proposals are bilateral, rather than

multilateral and within the framework of SAARC. Commenting

on the natural fears of dwarf states neighboring on giants

he argues that the size of giants "need not necessarily

imply domination". Verghese points out that

" (i)nterdependence and common security are the directions in

which Sri Lanka and India can and must move, bilaterally and

within SAARC ...." (Verghese 1990, 14). Neither Ratnatunga

nor Verghese draw on the international vocabulary of non-

alignment, nor on ethno-historical vocabulary. Their focus

is within administrative space.

Pervaiz Cheema

Cheema, professor of international relations at Quaid-

I-Azam University in Pakistan, has made a contribution on

Indo-Pakistan relations at the second BCIS seminar. Cheema

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notes that the "roots of antagonism" between India and

Pakistan "lie deep in history" growing in the context of

"the basic irreconcilability of the two religions", Hinduism

and Islam (Cheema 1990, 1) . Identifying the question of

Kashmir as the main focus of Indo-Pakistani reciprocal

antagonism, Cheema accuses of India as continuing to "dwell

heavily upon military means" to resolve the dispute, an

approach which reveals India's "hegemonistic intentions

coupled with its inability to hide the intensity of reaction

generated by the guilt of broken pledges and promises

(Cheema 1990, 6-7) .

Other major issues identified by Cheema are the Siachin

Glacier dispute (where "Pakistan's claim seems relatively

stronger"), the Wuller Lake Project (which shows how "India

is even reluctant to abide by its conventional

obligations"), nuclear development, domestic factors,

superpower linkages, the Afghan crisis and mutual security

perceptions (Cheema 1990, 5-17). In his commentary on

domestic factors Cheema states that "both India and Pakistan

almost consistently exploited each others internal turmoils

and tensions through propaganda and other available means",

a commentary which could be positioned on the spokes between

Pakistan and India on Ashoka's Wheel (Cheema 1990, 11). In

his description of Indian and Pakistani security

perceptions, Cheema sees Pakistan seeking to contain the

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Indian threat through aligning with the West and India

seeing potential threats in Pakistan and China (Cheema 1990,

16). But India also sees potential threats from the south,

from Sri Lanka. It is therefore more useful to generalize

India's threat perceptions drawing on the Ramavana as I have

done. Like many in the South Asian rim, Cheema sees India as

adopting a cakkravartin rather than dharmacakkra approach:

Although South Asia is an Indo-centric region, India never really took a major initiative to compose differences with its apprehensive neighbors on neighborly terms. Instead, its tough attitude towards its smaller neighbors and its attempts to impose its dominance in the South Asian subsystem generated fears, distrust and tensions (Cheema 1990, 20).

Cheema mentions non-alignment in passing but states that for

Pakistan normalization of relations with India means that

Pakistan must be given "its due status within the South

Asian state system" and that India should "also recognize

its territorial integrity and sovereignty in congruence with

good neighborliness and the spirit of the U.N. Charter"

(Cheema 1990, 20).

Ravinath Arvasinha

Ravinath Aryasinha, a Sri Lankan diplomat, in his

contribution to the second BCIS seminar, deals with the Sri

Lankan factor in Indo-Maldives relations. The paper

describes the impact of the 1988 coup attempt in the

Maldives and its crushing by New Delhi on traditional close

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ties between Male and Colombo. "If the coup attempt brought

India and Maldives closer to each other it also inversely

affected relations between the Maldives and Sri Lanka .....

at least at the public level (Aryasinha 1990, 12). Aryasinha

brings to our attention various acts of Indian involvement

in the Maldives in the post-coup period, including a pledge

to build a hospital, help with efforts to manage the rise of

sea level, a visit by Minister Gujral in 1990, waiver of

Indian visas for Maldivians, signing a cultural exchange

pact and a visit by Prime Minister Singh (Aryasinha 1990,

12-15). He remarks that Maldivian President Gayoom's ruling

out a defence treaty with India on the grounds that he had

"excellent rapport" with New Delhi "can be inferred to mean

... that Male counts on New Delhi coming to her rescue if

requested ...." (Aryasinha 1990, 13). Aryasinha recommends

that Maldives should not become over-dependent on India, but

rather should return to its pre-coup relationship with Sri

Lanka and expand relations with other SAARC rim countries

(Aryasinha 1990, 21). The perspective is clearly one from a

rim country. It is very much a cautionary message from one

Sita to her sister who seems to have mistaken Ravana for

Rama and entertained the former's amorous advances. In his

contribution to the fourth BCIS seminar, Aryasinha looks at

regionalism as a dimension of Sri Lanka's foreign policy. He

provides a historical account of the various notions of

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regional development entertained by Sri Lankan leaders and

governments and then focusses on Sri Lankan perceptions on

the nature of co-operation within SAARC. The paper attempts

to explain instances of what has been described as Sri

Lankan allowing "bi-lateral issues to stand in the way of

her participation in SAARC activities" and seeking "to

destabilize SAARC ephasizing issues such as terrorism"

(Aryasinha 1991, 18). He argues that some of the situations

in which Sri Lanka has been portrayed in the role of the

spoiler could have best been addressed through "a clearer

adherence on the part of member states to the principles of

panchasheela" (Aryasinha 1991, 17) . Panchasheel, a variation

of panchaseela, refers to peaceful co-existence, which

include rejection of force and belief in non-intervention,

values which have guided the NAM.

Aryasinha proposes that there be an intensification of

efforts to achieve even a limited program of regional

economic co-operation; SAARC should develop common positions

on international issues; SAARC organs should be streamlined;

people-to-people contact should be improved. Chaitanva

Mishra

Chaitanya Mishra, reader at the Center for Nepal and

Asian Studies of Tribhuvan University in Nepal, has

contributed a paper on Indo-Nepal relations to the second

BCIS seminar. He argues that India puts "inordinate pressure

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for a near monopolistic trade advantage from Nepal" and this

will not create a stable Nepal which India wants as part of

its "geostrategy along the Himalayas". Also, even a treaty-

bound Nepal cannot "keep vigil" and "remain at a treaty-

specified level of hostility to PRC with whom it shares the

border and has considerable geographical, cultural, economic

and other affinities" (Mishra 199 0, 11). Further he argues

that India cannot want an ethnic explosion in Nepal and its

ethno-political objective can rationally go no further than being a "pressurizing or bargaining tactic", so "it makes

little sense to pitch the issue of 'Indian origin' peoples

in Nepal" (Mishra 1990, 12) . In other words it is

purposeless and counter-productive for India to play the

role of cakkravartin vis-a-vis Nepal in the areas of trade,

foreign policy and ethno-politics.

There is a sense in Mishra's paper that the Nepalese

Sita has already been abducted and is now trying to

demonstrate her independence. The paper was written after

the normalization of relations between India and Nepal

following the Indian trade embargo and the change of regime

in Nepal. The 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Friendship made "it

improbable for durable military, political and economic

relationships to be sustained between Nepal and PRC" and

distance Nepal "from its only other neighbor" (Mishra 1990,

4). Though Nepal attempted to become equidistant from New

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Delhi and Beijing and signed a peace and friendship treaty

with China in the early 1960's, a secret 1965 agreement

empowered India to determine Nepal's defence requirements

(Mishra 1990, 4). In 1975 Nepal proposed that it should be

designated by the U.N. as a peace zone, neutral in Indo-

Chinese disputes but India refused to endorse the proposal

(Mishra 1990, 5). In 1990, following the "highly organized

rebellion against the state" and the break-down of the

party-less system in Nepal, India proposed a new more

restrictive treaty which Nepal rejected (Mishra 1990, 6). Jasiit Singh

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, of the Institute for

Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, in a contribution

entitled India and South Asia; The Strategic and Security

Issues made to the second BCIS seminar, lists six inter

state and seven intra-state conflicts of significance

between 1947 and the present. He comments that it "is

significant that 5 out of 6 inter-state conflicts involved

two larger countries of the region (Jasjit Singh 1990, 7).

It should also be noted that 4 of the 6 intra-state

conflicts occured in the two largest countries. Jasjit

Singh, one of India's leading strategic analysts, is

primarily concerned with India's largest South Asian

neighbor. It is interesting to note than India has had

occasion to intervene, in consultation with the government

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of the country concerned in the internal conflicts in East

Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

17. Singh's Conflict Categories

Inter-state conflicts The Kashmir War (1947-48) Sino-Indian War (1962) Indo-Pak War (1965) Bangladesh Liberation War (1971) Ran of Kutch (1965) Siachen Glacier (1984-87)

Intra-state conflicts Insurgency in NE region of India Punjab (1982-90) Kashmir (1989-90) East Pakistan (1970-71) Sri Lankan ethnic conflict; Mercenary coup attempt in Maldives Baluchistan (1974-75) Sindh (1989)

Sunil Bastian

Sunil Bastian, a researcher at the International Center

for Ethnic Studies, Sri Lanka, quotes Aftab Ahmed of

Bangladesh as having identified seven outstanding regional

issues among South Asian states (Bastian 1985, 4-9):

Table 18. Ahmed's Conflict Categories

1. River water disputes : Indo-Bangladesh : Indo-Nepal 2. Border disputes Tin Bigha and Talpatty: Indo-Bangladesh Fenced border : Indo-Bangladesh 3. Tamil insurgencies : Indo-Sri Lanka 4. Territorial disputes Kashmir : Indo-Pakistan 5. Post-Raj asset disputes : Indo-Pakistan 6. Transit disputes : Indo-Nepal : Indo-Bhutan

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Table 19. Bastian*s Conflict Categories

INDO-BANGLADESH PROBLEMS

1. Maritime belt 2. Indian support for pro-Mujib guerillas 3. Sharing of Ganges water 4. Ownership of Muhurir Char (Island on R, Muhuri) 5. Ownership of Purbasha Island (Bay of Bengal) 6. Indian barbed wire fence on No-Man's Land boundary 7. Rumors of Bangladeshi offer to provide bases to USA

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

1. Pakistan's fear of Indian hegemony 2. Failure of nuclear accord 3. Superpower interference 4. Pakistan's readiness to provide bases to US 5. Unresolved Kashmir dispute 6. Indian accusation that Pakistan harbors Sikh terrorists

Bastian distinguishes between the seven "regional" disputes

and thirteen bilateral problems provided above.

These lists of Singh and Bastian are of particular interest

because the former Jasjit Singh, is from the center (India);

the latter, Bastian, is from the rim (Sri Lanka). Bastian

sees the Sri Lankan Tamil conflict as a regional issue while

Jasjit Singh views it as an intra-state conflict. Jasjit

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Singh's list represents conflicts which directly effect

Indian security or have an indirect effect on it. He argues,

about his list "none of these six conflicts were initiated

by India" (Jasjit Singh 1990, 7). The danger is from

outside, from multiple Havanas intent on abducting virtuous

Sitas.

It would appear that categorization into regional and

bilateral issues is somewhat subjective in this list. For

instance why should Kashmir and superpower interference be

considered bilateral issues while the Sri Lankan Tamil

insurgency be considered a regional problem? Abdus Sabur

Sabur, a research fellow at the Bangladesh Institute of

International and Strategic Studies, provided an overview of

Bangladesh-India relations in his contribution to the second

BCIS seminar. He points out that even in its midwifing at

the birth of Bangladesh, India was taking advantage of a

historic opportunity "to cut to size its arch-rival,

Pakistan, and at the same time emerge as the unchallenged

regional power in South Asia". He adds that Bangladesh has

found unacceptable the Indian view that Bangladesh should be

in "eternal debtedness" to India (Sabur 1990, 2-3). Sabur

argues that what the giant land power's neighbors "resist is

India's attempts to transform this natural pre-eminence into

an imposed pre-dominance, often through the use of force or

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the treat to use it" (Sabur 1990, 5). The fear of a

cakkravartin India is widespread in the South Asian rim.

However Sabur notes that "the withdrawal of IPKF from Sri

Lanka, a conciliatory approach towards Nepal and to a lesser

extent towards Bangladesh" are indicative of a trend in

Indian thinking (Sabur 1990, 5). Without mentioning non-

alignment Sabur does emphasize non-aligned values, making

the nexus between development and security spending. He

notes that a paradigm of co-operation appears to be

overtaking East-West relations while "South Asia is bogged

down in in low-intensity but protracted conflicts and

numerous political discords giving regional cooperation

within the framework of SAARC a low profile". He calls for

mechanisms within SAARC for conflict resolution (Sabur 1990,

16). Sabur's paper is within administrative and

international space.

Partha Ghosh

Ghosh of the Indian Council of Social Science Research,

in his contribution to the second BCIS seminar, addresses

India's perceptions of its relations with Pakistan,

Bangladesh and Nepal. He points out that in India there is a

continuity with the past and "epics like Ramavana and

Mahabharat still hold enormous appeal at mass level" but

that the distinct Indian identity "must not be confused with

Hindu identity although that is understandably the most

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dominant streak (Ghosh 1990, 3) . Pakistan, on the other

hand, derives its identity from being other than Indian and

from association with West Asian Islamic states (Ghosh 1990,

4). He sees Bangladesh as having an identity crisis in that

it wants to be distinct from Pakistan (an Islamic nation)

and West Bengal (a Bengali state) by emphasizing Islamic

faith and Bengali ethnicity. He does not see Nepal as having

an identity problem (Ghosh 1990, 5). Ghosh argues that India

has and probably enjoys an image of superiority based on

heritage or what would fall under what this work would term

ethno-history.

The second self-image Ghosh discusses is that of India

as a modern democracy, "the only democracy on the

subcontinent" (Ghosh 1990, 5). Nepal, Pakistan and

Bangladesh read this democratic image as a threat to their

non-democratic regimes: India was seen as encouraging

democratic forces in Nepal, of supporting the Movement to

Restore Democracy (MRD) in Pakistan between 1983 and 1985

and supporting the Awami League in Bangladesh (Ghosh 1990,

5). In the language of this work, India sees itself as

having a positive administrative role to play in the region

- a role in modernizing the region politically.

Ghosh states that India's image of Pakistan is "that

of an enemy which is bent upon destroying the Indian state

both by aggression as well as by internal subversion".

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Centrist forces which have ruled India since independence

view Pakistan as being a threat to "..... all four tenets of

India's nation building, namely, secularism, federalism and

socialism ..." (Ghosh 1990, 7). India's ethnic problems in

Punjab and Kashmir and Pakistan's security relationship with

the U.S. add to India's concern about Pakistan (Ghosh 1990,

7). However India has no enemy image of either Bangladesh

or Nepal, Ghosh argues, and "Nepal's and Bangladesh's

hobnobbing with China does not cause that much alarm"

(Ghosh 1990, 8). Ghosh's under-emphasizing the extra-

regional interference factor may be because he is describing

broad political perceptions such as those of centrist

forces. He does mention that the extra-regional hobnobbing

is "carefully monitored by South Block" (Ghosh 1990, 8).®

Perhaps it is the foreign policy and defense establishment

which is sensitive to extra-regional meddling. If there is

no such sensitivity or fear of external interference,

Ghosh's claim that "India's military image is that of a

nation which should receive habitual obedience from its

neighbors" - what this paper would call a cakkravartin

image - is based on hegemonic impulses rather than threat

perceptions (Ghosh 1990, 9). However I believe that the

analogy of Ravana, Rama and the six regional Sitas, from the

South Block is the location in New Delhi of India's foreign ministry. The term is used in much the same way as Foggy Bottom is used to refer to the State Department.

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Ramavana. has far more explanatory power.

Ghosh advocates that "the leadership of South Asia

coordinate their developmental and nation-building

strategies with a sense of pragmatism and co-operation"

without interfering in each others affairs (Ghosh 1990, 11).

Again, the modernization values of non-alignment are drawn on, but so is one of the principles of panchaseela, non

interference .

A. P. Venkateswaran

In his contribution to the third BCIS seminar, A. P.

Venkateswaran of the Center for Policy Research, New Delhi,

provides a South Indian perspective of India's role in South

Asia. He recognizes that " (t)he sheer size and population of

India is overwhelming to her neighbors, but at the same time

cannot be wished away" (Venkateswaran 1991, 2). Alluding to

the problem of 'cousin cultures' he notes the irony in the

fact that in the case of Sri Lanka, despite the Sinhalese

immigrants from Bihar and Tamil migrants from South India,

"the large ethnic Tamil population of that island did not

make matters easier for building up a relationship of mutual

confidence and trust" (Venkateswaran 1991, 2).

However three of Venkateswaran's themes are

particularly interesting. First, he identifies

fundamentalism, whether Islamic or Hindu, "as a defensive

response from countries which would understandably be

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concerned about safe-guarding their distinctive cultures and

traditions (Venkateswaran 1991, 4). Second, he views

the evolving world order as one in which South Asia provides

an "opening to speak with one voice on the issues affecting

them" for mutual benefit. He warns that:

This will need courage, vision and determination and also a willingness to subordinate internecine rivalries for the larger common good, whether in the political arena by reinforcing their independent decision making in their national interest, or in the economic field by helping in building a New International Economic Order through resolutely resisting undue and unwarranted pressure (Venkateswaran 1991, 5) .

He mentions in particular the Uruguay round of talks as an

appropriate forum for action in a common cause

(Venkateswaran 1991, 5). Third, he exhorts South Asian

powers to adopt common foreign policy stances "on issues

like the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the abolition of

all weapons of mass destruction and the creation of a system

of collective security..." Fourth, he asks for the exercise

of political will by South Asian leaders and governments in

"building a better life" for the peoples of the region

(Venkateswaran 1991, 6). His perception marries well with

the globalization framework of this work even if he has not

articulated his thoughts in terms of globalization.

He argues that "the absence of a comprehensive and

clear-cut foreign policy has hampered India in developing

its relations with its neighbors within the region and with

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other major powers and lays the blame for this on

Nehru's dominant style of managing Indian foreign policy:

The Kashmir and Sino-Indian border disputes are viewed by

him as Nehru's foreign policy legacies (Venkateswaran 1991,

6). In the case of China Nehru preferred to listen to

Mountbatten rather than Patel and, "being hypnotised by his

own vision of unshakeable friendship and co-operation

between India and China", he failed to listen to advice

given in 1954 "that India should seek confirmation from the

Chinese on the Macmahon Line" (Venkateswaran 1991, 7).

He argues that, in addition to Nehru's style, "the

evolution of the 5 principles of Peaceful Co-existence and

the growth of the non-aligned movement" contributed to the

"absence of a full-fledged Indian foreign policy framework"

(Venkateswaran 1991, 7). In the language of this work he

sees India's international vocabulary being dominated by the

language of non-alignment, but that such a vocabulary can

only address relations at the global strategic level.

While NAM contributed to the strengthening of independent decision-making of countries which had newly emerged from colonial rule, it also led to the false belief that it constituted, by itself, the totality of foreign policy. However, that could not be the case because non-alignment was mainly dependent for its validity on the existence of opposing power blocs. In any case, the fallacy of considering non-alignment as a full-fledged foreign policy stands out when one asks oneself as to how one non-aligned country could use non- alignment as a policy towards another non-aligned country (Venkateswaran 1991, 7)

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Venkateswaran is articulating the problem raised in the

discussion on non-alignment in Chapter VI - because India

cannot project power globally as effectively as the

cakkravartins (super powers), the non-power dharmacakkra

approach of non-alignment to global security and development

is employed in the international theater. India is in a

position to project power within the region and there is therefore the temptation to adopt a cakkravartin route. Non-

aligned values are not applied to intra-regional security

problems, which is why this work treats the foreign policy

language employed within the region as part of

administrative vocabulary. Venkateswaran does not call in his paper for the values of non-alignment to inform intra-

regional political relations, nor does he note (unlike

Foreign Minister Herat in his inaugural address at the

second BCIS seminar) that non-aligned values seem to have

taken over the politics of realism which had previously

informed super-power relations. However he sees the much-

vaunted New World Order as something which "calls for a

greater degree of démocratisation of international relations

than has been the case so far". He views the United Nations

as the body politic of such an order which "must be born out

of a process of consensus, with its foundations firmly laid

on the bed-rock of international law, equity and justice"

(Venkateswaran 1991, 9).

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R. A. Arivaratne

R. A. Ariyaratne, senior lecturer in history and political science at the University of Colombo, dealt with

SAARC's problems and prospects in his contribution to the

fourth BCIS seminar. His historical account is summarized in

Table 17 below which itemizes SAARC summits and their

achievements. One gets the impression through reading

Ariyaratne's quite accurate account that the prelude to

SAARC meetings have often been exercises in brinkmanship between 'hub' and 'rim'. However every act of hub-rim

brinkmanship is followed by progress in co-operation and

consequent political euphoria. He describes pre-SAARC South

Asian international relations in Kautilyan terms, that it

was based on the 'Kautilyan dictum that your 'neighbor is

your natural enemy' and the twisted corollary that 'your

neighbor's neighbor need not necessarily be your natural

ally" (Ariyaratne 1991, 2). However Kautilya's mandala or

configuration consists of concentric circles around a

prince, who ensures his survival at the center by pitting

each circle of advisors, bureaucrats and princely allies

against neighboring circles in a complex game of divide and

rule, as described in Chapter III. Ariyaratne's statement

that India feared that the SAARC arrangement "would trap her

into a pro-Western strategic consensus" and Pakistan "was

concerned that such a grouping would adversely affect her

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relationship with the United States" may be translated into

the language of the R a m a y a n a model which is part of this

work'a Ashoka's Wheel framework. The Indian Rama saw SAARC

initially as a device through which the six regional Sitas

would peg him down and make him vulnerable to Ravana.

Pakistan was the one South Asian country which had already

forged a defense relationship with an external power, the

US. Joining in an association with India may have resulted

in the alienation of the extra-regional power. However one

must add here that the reason for building a relationship

with the US was fear of domination by India in the first

place.

All these achievements are within administrative space.

Even the call for people-to-people co-operation is,

predictably, almost solely within administrative space, for

"professional organizations, educational authorities, the

media, legal organizations and artists" (Herat 1991, 2).

Artists are the exception. Ariyaratne's paper, proposing a

cautious functionalist approach to regional co-operation, is

very much within administrative space.

Godfrey Gunatilleke

Executive vice-chairman Gunatilleke of the Marga

Institute in Sri Lanka, contributed a paper on prospects for

South Asian Regional Co-operation and Trade to the fourth

BCIS seminar. He notes that central feature in multilateral

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Table 20. SAARC Summits

Dhaka Summit (1985)

- adopted charter for regional co operation - identified terrorism, drug trafficking and women in development as new areas for co-operation - decided to establish secretariat - noted the need for people-to-people co operation

Bangalore Summit (1986)

- included audio-visual exchange as an area for co-operation - decided on a SAARC documentation center - decided to expand inter-regional tourism - decided on SAARC sholarships/fellow- ships - decided to set up a youth exchange program

Kathmandu Summit (1987)

- completed signing of convention on suppression of terrorism - agreed on establishing food security reserve

Islamabad Summit (1988)

- agreed to prepare national and regional perspective plans with basic needs targets - included education as an area of co-operation - abolished visa restrictions for parliamentarians and judges

Male Summit (1990)

- extended SAARC activities to economic co operation, biotechnology, environment and tourism - decided on establishment of a regional project fund - Signed convention on narcotic drug abuse (Ariyaratne 1991, 4-12)

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discussions since 1970 has been about the need for a "regime

of co-operation which ensures that the smaller partners can

co-operate without fear of economic domination by the major

partner" (Gunatilleke 1991, 1). The rim countries desire a

center-less Ashoka's Wheel, with India itself on the rim. He

points out that present levels of economic exchange and

trade are low in South Asia at 19.3 % compared with 28.5%

for Latin America and 78.5% for East Asia and the Pacific.

The external trade sectors as a proportion of GDP for

several South Asian countries are cited by him:

Sri Lanka - 56% Pakistan - 3 0% Nepal - 29% Bangladesh - 22% Maldives - 18% India - 15% (Gunatilleke 1991, 2).

He provides what is essentially a dependencia description of

post-colonial trade relations between South Asian ex

colonies and the metropolitan power at the expense of

horizontal trade within the region. He reminds us that trade

between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh was 'internal trade'

during the Raj and the "events after independence and the

partition of the sub-continent reversed these processes,

severing the growing horizontal links and strenghtening the

dominant vertical ones" (Gunatilleke 1991, 3). In this

'wheel', the West is the hub and post-colonial societies are

on the rim.

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In addition, Gunatilleke argues, that the self reliant

development policies, with strategies of import substitution

and a dominant role for the state sector, discouraged the

expansion of market-driven trade and further closed their

economies to each other (Gunatilleke 1991, 4). Gunatilleke

does not comment here on the dependencla-generated

externally-oriented collective self-reliance and South-South

co-operation rhetoric of non-aligned countries during what

this work calls the structuralist period (in development and

development communication), when structural change was

sought within and without. The rhetoric of the 1970's

finally becomes potential action in the 1990's - within an

altered environment.

Gunatilleke sees much more interaction between the

Indian economy and those of other SAARC countries in the

1980's. Presenting from the World Bank Development Report

1980 and 1991, Gunatilleke takes the view that "(a)n

economically dynamic India can make all the difference to

the South Asian region" (Gunatilleke 1991, 6). Summarized

in the vocabulary of this work one might say that while he

recognizes the colonial 'wheel' as one in which India was on

the rim along with other developing countries, a location

where the post-colonial rim countries would like India to

remain in a South Asian wheel, he sees India as a potential

economic hub, though he is not suggesting a role of

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dominance. The Galtungian terminology of Chapter II

language which differentiates between 'associational'

(horizontal) and 'organizational' (vertical) relationships -

has the power to clarify this seeming contradiction. What is

required is increased horizontal economic interaction

between India and its neighbors. Given the centrality of

India to the region, this must necessarily be one of

attitude to relationships rather than structural change

within the region.

Gunatilleke notes that the changes in the world

economy, particularly as a consequence of change in the old

Soviet bloc will have far-reaching impacts on flows of aid,

trade and investment capital. Further, Asia replaced North

America as the principal market for Asian exports in the

mid-1980's. He draws attention to the fact that "the trade

share of South Asia in this intra-Asian trade is as yet

extremely small..." and advises "...South Asia to place

itself in this dynamic context of a fast expanding Asia"

(Gunatilleke 1991, 10) ,

He reveals that South Asian scholars and policy makers

have expressed concern recently regarding South Asia's

isolation in "a global order of economic and geopolitical

partnerships...": Latin America, Africa, South East Asia

and the Pacific Islands have developed special relationships

with North America, EEC/Europe, Japan and Australia/New

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Zealand respectively. "...South Asia remains almost an

outsider.

This might be partly due to India, her size and her

geo-political role" (Gunatilleke 1991, 11). While he

recognizes the negative effects of this exclusion, he sees

it as also presenting opportunities and challenges:

It underscores the need for South Asian regional co-operation. There is greater need than ever for South Asian countries to examine together the global context in which they as a region exist. They need to respond collectively to the dynamic changes and new configurations that are emerging in the rest of the world (Gunatilleke 1991, 11).

Gunatilleke's approach could easily fit into the

Ashoka's Wheel framework, but being fundamentally

economistic, there are aspects of Ashoka's Wheel with which

the paper does not deal. Analysis of the struggle between

elites and elite aspirants at the level of the periphery, in

relation to controlling markets as well as states, would be

as necessary as looking at the macro relationships between

economies in the North and South. While he draws on the

international vocabulary of economics and argues for global

thinking on the part of SAARC, he does not actually use a

globalization framework.

Table 21 tabulates the values of all participants of

the seminars whose contributions have been drawn on and is

to be found below.

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Table 21; Values in Seminar Contributions

CONTRIBUTOR R/H CC/PL Cl/Dl C 2/D2 IE/IS RM/RV G/GZ

Mrs. Bandaranaike R IE G Herat R D2 IE/IS Kodikara R Cl D2 GZ Muni H PL Dl RM Bandaranayake R IE/IS Jayaweera R Cl IS Wanigaratne R Cl IS Hussein R CC Cl Ratnatunga R Verghese H Dl D2 Cheema R Cl IS RV Aryasinha R Cl D2 IS RV Mishra R Cl RV Sunil R Jasjit Singh H RM Sabur R Cl D2 IS/IE Ghosh H IS/IE Venkateswaran H CC IS/IE GZ Ariyaratne R RV Gunatilleke R D2 IE GZ

R/H From either Hub (H) or Rim (R) CC/PL : Includes 'cousin culture" or pluralist approaches. Cl/Dl : View of India's approach to neighbors similar to Cakkra- vartin (Cl) or Dharma- cakkra (Dl). C2/D2 : Vision for SAARC is Cakkra- vartin (C2) or Dharmacakkra (D2) lE/IS : Draws on international vocab ulary of economics (IE) or security (IS) issues. RM/RV : View of India described as one of Rama or Ravana. G/GL : Global/globalization views.

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Official Views

Offical views are drawn for the post-IPKF period,

specifically for the period March 1990 to July 1991, from

two 'official' organs. Government opinion in Sri Lanka and

India in the period March 1990 to March 1991 was gleaned

from two organs, Sri Lanka News and India News. particularly

editorials and statements by political leaders. Sri Lanka

News is a "weekly digest of news" published by the government-owned Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd. Sri

Lanka News, especially in its editorial comments, tries to

reflect the views of the Sri Lankan government. Leader page articles may be viewed as being signals of government

thinking. The weekly is purely for overseas consumption and

is read by Sri Lanka's expatriate community and Sri Lanka

watchers in, according to the paper's subscription informa

tion, over 40 countries. The weekly often draws directly on

its domestic sister dailies. The Cevlon Dailv News and the

The Dailv Observer for editorial material.

India News is the official organ of the Indian High

Commission in Canberra. The official organ of the mission in

Canberra was selected because the substantive research for

this work was undertaken in Australia. However the

selection, prioritization and descriptive treatment of

events would be very much the same in any Indian mission at

any particular time, particularly as their is a reliance by

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overseas missions on government communiques and official

reports from New Delhi.

A quantitative content analysis of the leader articles published in Sri Lanka News in the period 1990 - 1991 was

undertaken. Sixty-seven leader articles were looked at in

54 issues. There were less than half a dozen issues of the

weekly government-owned newspaper which were not available

in the study. Leader articles were read through and

categorized under three master rubrics and eight subordinate

rubrics, vide Table 22. However in all these cases it is

the administrative sphere which is reflecting on aspects of

other spheres and not the other spheres representing

themselves. Indo-Sri Lankan relations were placed in the

administrative space as a regional rather than international

affair. Symbols looked at are those used purposively by the

Sri Lankan government. Editorials were classified as

belonging to one of these rubrics.

Table 22. Categorization of Leader Articles

International sphere; Extra-regional relations

Administrative sphere; SAARC; Indo-Sri Lankan relations; domestic administration; symbols for society; national thought;

Ethno-historical sphere; Tamil groups; Sinhala groups.

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Of the 54 issues of Sri Lanka News examined in the

period 7 March 1990 to 1 May 1991, none had any editorial

comment on non-alignment. The only significant item of news

reported which dealt with non-alignment was entitled "Lanka

and China affirm continuing support to panchaseela" (Sri

Lanka News Dec. 26, 1990, 7) .

The absence of editorial material, or for that matter the paucity of articles on SAARC is significant in a

government-owned newspaper targetting an overseas audience.

There is more of an interest in explaining Indo-Sri Lankan

relations and the activities of Tamil groups under an

administrative lexicon than anything else. Sri Lanka News

being an administrative voice, the treatment is very much a

case of administrative representation of international,

administrative and ethno-historical space. Sinhala and Tamil

groups and their activities, particularly, are viewed from

the administrative center.

In thirty-three issues of an Indian diplomatic organ,

India News. there are only three brief references to non-

alignment, one to panchseel (a variation of panchaseela) and

one to the North-South dialog, a surprising record for a

twelvemonth period by one of the principal players in the

movement. The period covered is January 4, 1990 to January

11, 1991. There is a reference to the Non-aligned Bureau's

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consultations regarding the Gulf Crisis.* There is a

'structuralist period' statement by Prime Minister V. P.

Singh which calls "for a more cohesive approach by

developing countries in their fight against (the) developed

North to secure justice in international economic relations"

which was made at a G-15 Summit in Kuala Lumpur. Singh

described the meeting as a "timely initiative as it will

help reviving and strengthening the North-South dialogue"

and offered to underwrite an information system and

secretariat for G-15.^°

What is significant here is the emphasis on the

administrative in both organs. India as a middle power has

much more of a stake in international issues than does Sri

Lanka and this is reflected in the Indian percentages. Also

the Indian organ is a diplomatic publication which services

Indian expatriates and India-watchers in Australia while the

Sri Lankan organ is a quasi-governmental news publication

which services expatriate Sri Lankans all over the world.

Remember also that as we have defined it administrative

space includes regional international relations. What is

also significant is the sparse reporting on ethno-historical

matters, let alone ethno-historical voice, in the Indian

* India News (Canberra). September 5, 199 0.

India News (Canberra). 15 June 1990. G-15 or Group of 15 is a group of United Nations member states beloying to the South.

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organ. This is not to say that there are no India journals

or magazines which are sensitive to ethno-historical voice.

What we are trying to establish is the sensitivity of

governments to ethno-historical voice, having posited that

if governments want particular issues to be viewed as

important they will be given prominence in official media.

Table 23. Content of Sri Lanka News Leaders

INTERNATIONAL SPACE NO .PERCENT Extra-regional affairs 01 (1.5%) ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE South Asian regional co-operation 00 (00) Indo-Sri Lankan relations 18 (26.7%) Domestic administration 10 (14.9%) Symbols for society 07 (10%) National thought (Jathika Chintanya) 00 (0)

ETHNO-HISTORICAL SPACE Tamil groups 8 (41.8%) Sinhala groups 03 (4.5%)

Table 24. Content of India News Front Pages Stories

INTERNATIONAL SPACE NO.PERCENT Extra-regional affairs 12 (32.00%)

ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE South Asian regional co-operation 00 (00%) Indo-Sri Lankan relations 00 (00%) Indo-Pakistani relations 05 (13.5%) Indo-Nepali relations 03 (0 0 .8%) Indo-Bangladeshi relations 00 (00% Indo-Bhutanese relations 00 (00%) Domestic administration 13 (35%) ETHNO-HISTORICAL SPACE Caste 1 (.02%) Ethnic groups (Kashmir) 3 (.8%)

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Table 25. Comparative Content of India News & Sri Lanka News

SPACE SRI LANKA NEWS INDIA NEWS

International space : 01.5 32.0 Administrative space ; 51.6 49.3 Ethno-historical space ; 46.3 00.4

India continues with its Mahatma Gandhian /

dharmacakkra self-image as an international reformer, intent

on modernizing global relations, or the international

varnasharmadharma or inherited functional hierarchy. Under

that system India is perceived by developed states, in GNP

per capita terms, as a lesser nation, along with other

developing states.”

A desire for global structural change was voiced in the

structuralist period by the Mrs Gandhi and Mrs

Bandaranaike, along with leaders of other G-77 countries,

through the debates on the New International Economic Order

(NIEO) and New World Information and Communication Order

(NWICO). These were moments of high co-operation between

India and Sri Lanka, because of the superordinate goal of

global structural change, as well as the foreign policy

Consider the word 'branding' in the following response by Rajiv Gandhi when asked by Eastern Eve how he would like history to record his legacy: "(A)s 'having brought India into the 21st century, parallel with more advanced countries .... out of the branding of (India) as a developing country ....'" (Ministry of External Affairs. Prime Minister Gandhi: Statements on Foreign Policy - Mav-August 1985. New Delhi: External Publicity Division, Oct. 1985. 184.

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outlooks of the parties which governed the two countries at

the time and the personal relations between the two leaders.

In the post-structuralist Neo-Gandhian period that was

entered around 1990 leaders such as V. P. Singh and

Ranasinghe Premadasa began to address the need to transform

caste within their own countries. This is not an easy task.

There continues to be resistance. Mohandas Gandhi's attempt

at linguistic reform of caste, calling the sudras by the

name Harijan or 'children of God', did not erase old

attitudes. But the new elites who will be released through

the current bloody process of transformation will in turn

transform South Asian societies and perhaps South Asia itself.

The extracts of a statement on Pakistan/Kashmir

issues made by the Minister of External Affairs on 9 April

1990 mention the non-aligned movement in connection with the

Minister's reiteration of India's support for the

Palestinian right to self determination at the NAM Committee

of Nine meeting in Tunisia.’^ An official spokesman's

statement on Afghanistan makes reference to "India's active

role in the NAM and for its support to a UN framework for a

political settlement.^ The Indian External Affairs

Minister is quoted as basing Sino-Indian relations on the

India News Canberra). April 18, 1990.

India News (Canberra). 2 February 1990.

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principles of panchseel in a speech made at a banquet in

honor of the Chinese Foreign Minister (India News April 10, 1990, 1).

Conclusion

Seven seminar contributors have drawn on international

vocabulary (economic values) and seven have drawn on

international vocabulary (security values). Many of these

values have been drawn from the United Nations system of

values and not from non-alignmed movement, though in some

instances the values may be similar. There is no little

evidence in early 'seminar contributions' and 'official

views' that the vocabulary of non-alignment has influenced

or is used purposively with the intent of influencing

international relations within the region, except in

relation to development. Non-alignment itself is related to

the global nuclear standoff of the superpowers. But there

are the non-strategic aspects of the philosophy of non-

alignment which could linger even after a change in the

strategic relationship between superpowers, even after total

disarmament. However there are instances where scholars or

politicians have drawn on the philosophy of non-alignment in

the context of intra-regional security and bilateral

relations. These instances are to be found in the third and

fourth seminars and are likely to be related to the gradual

awakening of the political, at the insistance of Sri Lanka

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and others who have taken a neo-functionalist view of

regional co-operation, and the search for new theaters for the non-aligned drama in the post-cold war era. Table 21

shows that application of non-aligned values in addressing

regional security is proposed by two Sri Lankan foreign

ministry officials, foreign minister Herat and Aryasinha.

There are more references to non-alignment in 'seminar

contributions' than in 'official views'. Indeed the number

of references to non-alignment in 'official views'' is

surprisingly low. This could be because non-alignment, a

post-colonial ideology, is of less interest to the emerging

elites of the 1980s, those following a Vaishya route, who

are more interested today in capturing markets than in

shaking off the colonial yoke. Over 50% of the editorials

deal directly with issues within administrative space under

which has been included Indo-Sri Lanka relations (26.7%), a

matter of concern in the light of the IPKF interlude in Sri

Lanka. Only 1.5% of the editorials deal with extra-regional

issues among which there is no reference to South Asian

regional co-operation (vide Tables 23, 25).

Eight of fifteen rim state seminar contributors

articulated, in their own terms, a view that India was

playing a cakkravartin role in its relations with its

neighbors. The other seven made no reference. No rim state

contributor saw India as playing a dharmacakkra role, but

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five of them expressed what I would call a dharmacakkra

vision of SAARC, though clearly most contributors would

have held such a vision. On the other hand two out of five

of the hub contributors articulated, in their own terms, a

view that India was currently playing a dharmacakkra role in

South Asia. The other three made no reference. Two of the five hub state contributors articulated a relationship

between India and its neighbors which could be described in

my terms as seein India as Rama and her six SAARC neighbors

as Sitas. One hub state contributor and three rim state

contributors described the Indian relationship with its

neighbors in terms which could be translated into India

playing Ravana to six neighboring Sitas. Four contributors

brought in a global perspective of which three actually

addressed factors in a manner which made their contributions

very compatible with the globalization framework of this

work.

There is also a paucity of reporting of ethno-

historical voice. Where it is reported it is done so from

the elevated administrative perspective which views ethnic

conflict as an administrative problem and overlooks the

micropolitics of power struggle between elites and elite

aspirants. However it must be added that the descriptions of

South Asian regional co-operation by regional scholars is

predictably from within administrative space. It was stated

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at the outset of this chapter that 'seminar contributions' (of academics, politicians and bureaucrats) are likely to

reflect the gamut of South Asian views as seen from within

administrative space; the extent to and manner in which they capture the ethno-historical dimensions will reflect the

degree to which the administrative space is sensitive to the

aspirations of elite-aspirants from within ethno-historical

space, a commentary on attitudes to social mobility. The

lack of sensitivity to ethno-historical voice is a

reflection of the culturally exclusivesness of the

administrative class in South Asia. There are very few

instances in the 'seminar contributions' reviewed of

regional scholars expressing sensitivity to ethno-historical

voice or viewing the transformation taking place in South

Asia as closely related to the dialectic between elites and

elite aspirants.

On the other hand, lookinmg at 'official views', Sri

Lanka News devotes over 42% of its editorials to ethno-

historical space - but these editorials are largely devoted

to 'Tamil terrorism', hence it is an administrative

treatment of ethno-historical space. Political violence is a

reality in the North and must necessarily be commented on.

It is also an important rallying issue for an administration

which is challenging the old order. Only 4.5% of the

editorials deal with Sinhalese opposition groups, including

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extra-parliamentary 'terrorist' opposition (vide Table 23,

25). This figure would change significantly if the period

studied was October-December 1991, when a breakaway group

from the ruling United National Party challenged Premadasa

and the executive presidency. Subsequent issues of Sri

Lanka News demonstrate a sensitivity to ethno-historical

voice, including the voice of the defeated 'terrorist'

Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna, the Sinhalese revolutionary

group. But the function of this sensitivity may be to spread

the appeal of the Premadasa Administration over as wide an

ethno-historical spectrum of Sri Lankan politics as

possible, given that the presidency is voted into office by

a national electorate. This in no way detracts from that

sensitivity, except that as the purpose is administrative,

ethno-historical voice is drawn into administrative space in

order to capture for the Premadasa Administration title to

various parcels of ethno-historical space as well as various

political inheritances, among these the 'anti-westernized

elite' sentiments of the under-class JVP, the pro-working

class sentiments of the old left, the identification of the

upper-class Solomon Bandaranaike with the 'common man' and

the open economy approach of Jayewardene. Premadasa is a

capitalist revolutionary and his revolution is "that of a

struggle against an ancien regime, prosecuted in the name of

natural laws of progress by a nation which has emancipated

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122) . The above may be summarized in the claim that elites

who people administrative space have an inordinate interest

in the philosophy of non-alignment because of their post

colonial need of self-reliance vis-a-vis the West. However

till recently there has been little attempt in academia or

politics to draw on the international vocabulary of non-

alignment in relation to security values for South Asia: The

vocabulary has drawn on extensively with respect to

development values. On the other hand administrative elites

do not in their seminar papers demonstrate much sensitivity

to the demand for removal of roadblocks to social mobility.

Conversely, examination of 'official views'' reveals

surprisingly low levels of reporting on non-aligned matters

or values, both in the Indian and Sri Lankan organs studied.

This may be related to the potential collapse of the non-

aligned movement with the disintegration of its raison

d'etre, superpower confrontation. The consequence of this

disintegration is for the security and development

philosophy of non-alignment to be inducted into firmer

regional political space by regional scholars and wished on

the G-77 (the committee of the group of developing nations

in the United Nations system) nations by leaders of the

movement as a philosophical basis for collective bargaining

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demonstrates sensitivity to ethno-historical voice or

viewing the transformation taking place in South Asia as

closely related to the dialectic between elites and elite

aspirants, but this sensitivity is seen in articles, rather

than editorial comments, during the period examined. Sri

Lanka News sees a dialectic between elites and elite-

aspirants; it bappears to have an overall vision of

contemporary Sri Lankan politics as a dialectic between the

old regime (consisting of the aristocracy which exercised

great influence under former leaders) and the new regime

(consisting of a meritocracy which functions under President

Premadasa). It is after all an organ which promotes the

Premadasa program of modernization, which includes the

replacing of an ascriptive society with a meritocracy, as

indeed are the local English-language state-owned newspapers

from which it draws its news, articles and leaders. There is

a strong element of praxis in the selection of content of

leaders and political commentaries in these papers. The

results would be viewed by anti-Premadasa forces as

propaganda and by Premadasa supporters as a form of

development communication the objective of which is to build

G-77 or Group of 77 refers to the committee of developing countries which seek to co-operate on trade and development issues in the United Nations system. G-7 référés to the Group of 7 industrial powers viz. Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and USA.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 281 a modern meritocracy.

President Ranasinghe Premadasa unveiled the first ever

statue of the pre-Vijayan era near the footbridge in the

precints of the Kataragama sacred city in June 1991, not too

long after the IPKF departed Sri Lanka's shores.The

symbolization was multi-layered. First, Premadasa may be

seen as dealing with India. King Ravana was King of Lanka,

the villain of Ramayana who abducted the Indian god-hero

Rama's consort Sita. Recall that in Chapter III the final

encounter between the elite aspirant Sandeep and the

merchant prince Nikhil, in Satyajit Ray's film Home and the

World. is described: Sandeep tells Nikhil that he is

informed by the voice of the Mahabharatha and that, in terms

of the Ramavana epic he sees Ravana and not Rama as the true

hero. Second, he may be seen as dealing with separatist

claims for a Tamil homeland by making claim to the mythic

Ravanic pre-Vijayan civilization. But he is making a claim

on behalf of both the Sinhala Buddhists and Hindu Tamils by

erecting the stue in Kataragama which is sacred to both

groups. Third, he addresses the caste dimension of the elite

- elite aspirant struggle by drawing on a myth that so-

called low-caste Sinhalese are descendants of a group who

lived on the island prior to the arrival of Vijaya and who

were subjugated by the Vijayans. Chapter VIII, entitled

Sri Lanka News (Colombo). 26 June 1991,

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Symbols of Transformation. is normative and makes some

broad policy suggestions for the community living within the

borders of SAARC nations.

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SYMBOLS FOR TRANSFORMATION

Introduction

Today it is not possible just to be revolutionary, or liberal, or even nationalist. We must learn to reduce the distance between these apparently contradictory but actually complementary elements of development (Touraine 1990, 141).

The SAARC charter evokes historical ties and

differences of ethnicity and culture, common goals of peace,

freedom, social justice and economic prosperity, and common

problems, as reasons for regional co-operation. Recall from

Chapter I that five of SAARC's six objectives are related to

economic, social, cultural and individual development and

one to mutual perceptions:

To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life;

To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realise their full potentials;

To promote and strengthen collective self reliance among the countries of South Asia;

To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems;

To promote collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural and scientific fields;

283

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To strengthen co-operation with other developing countries (SAARC 1988).

The Dhaka Declaration of heads of state or government

articulates the relationship between political stability and

modernization, the essence of the non-aligned perspective.

This chapter looks back at fundamental questions about the

nature of South Asian regional co-operation in terms of the

SAARC objectives stated below and makes some policy suggestions.

In Chapter II, I looked at Forty's discussion on

private irony and liberal hope in his construction of the

liberal-ironist. He defines an 'ironist' as someone who

has radical and continuing doubts about her final vocabulary because she has been exposed to other

vocabularies which have impressed her, she sees that her

present vocabulary cannot help her escape from her

dissatisfaction and she does not think her vocabulary is

closer to reality than others (Forty 1989, 73) . South

Asian elites should fit into the liberal ironist mold with

relative ease, shuttling between three vocabularies,

international, administrative and ethno-historical, as they

do. However the administrative is often a final vocabulary

about which Westernized elites have no radical and

continuing doubts. In relation to South Asian regional co

operation, the results of this study suggest that, among

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South Asian academics working in this area, the ethno-

historical tends to be isolated, shut out from intercourse

with the administrative.

Forty believes that the contrary claims of selfhood

and community may be addressed in contemporary liberal

society through governments engaging themselves in

reducing suffering while keeping invasion of privacy at a

minimum. (Forty 1989, 63). Fecall from Chapter III that Satyajit Fay's film The Home and the World describes a

version of the ancient Famavana love triangle as one between

a merchant prince Nikhil, his wife and the anti-British

demagogue/ terrorist, Sandeep. Sandeep's approach is that

of the kshatriya and is quite cynical while Nikhil's

approach is one of vaishya humanism; The former has no

qualms of hurting poor Indians and stirring up ethnic

violence in order to hurt the Faj and maximize his power

respectively. The latter prefers to work toward improving

the lot of the poor within the existing system, in which one

must say, he has ascendancy. His is a vaishya solution, to

empower the people through the market, on which Mahatma

Gandhi, also a vaishya, understood and espoused. Under a

globalization framework, where markets are dominant forces,

where the vaishya ethic has triumphed, India, Shri Lanka and

its partners in SAARC would do well to adopt vaishya

strategies for empowerment of their peoples.

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This should take the form of using the aggregate

markets of SAARC countries as engines of internal

development as well as to project bargaining power in extra-

regional relations. Such economic co-operation, has been

propsed by chairman of SAARC in November 1991, as something

which should flow incrementally from regional trade

agreements to a South Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA)

to a firmly established South Asian Economic Community

(SEAC). There is enormous potential for regional trade.

"(O)nly 2.8 percent of the trade of SAARC countries is

intra-regional". ^

The chairmanship of SAARC has passed in turn from

Bangladesh to India to Nepal to Pakistan to Maldives and to

Shri Lanka. Premadasa of Shri Lanka, who began a term as

chairman of SAARC in November 1991, may be viewed as being

in some ways different to the other chairmen. He may be

viewed as a symbol of transformation. Certainly he and his

followers take this view. He presents in his person and

purpose a paradigm of how an individual from outside the

westernized elite can capture the party and state apparatus

of that elite through democratic means. Premadasa's doubts

about administrative vocabulary are based as much on

changing political reality, the so-called globalization

effects, as on his socio-political journey. As the

^ Shri Lanka News (Colombo). 25 December 1991.

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individual who presides over administrative space in Shri

Lanka, Premadasa is a symbol of stability, a symbol of the

state. As an individual who has no kinship connections with

the leading upper class Sinhalese and Tamil political

families of Shri Lanka who inherited the state from the

British, Premadasa is able to empathize with the views of

post-colonial elite aspirants and certainly views them as

part of his power base. He projects himself as the protector

of ethno-historical space, constantly admonishing the

westernized elite. He recognizes the potent nature of the

World Market and the value of giving elite-aspirants access

to it as it could afford them enormous social mobility

within a single life time.

Mahatma Gandhi, as moral reformer and leader, is in a

class of his own and perhaps cannot be compared with other

South Asian politicians. His championship of the cause of

the common people has never been surpassed in the sub

continent. I have no doubt that he was a genuine friend of

the common man and a 'strong poet' in the truest Rortyian

sense. But he was also the descendant of hereditary vaishya

prime-ministers of princely states and could never be a

genuine man of the people. In a way Premadasa is a creation

of Gandhian rhetoric, particularly Gandhi's re

interpretation of the varnashrama-dharma. In Gandhi's final

vocabulary of caste, he accepted the hereditary nature of

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Varna, but recognized all varnas as being equal (Mason 1967,

174). He wished to transform caste from an 'organizational'

or hierarchical vertical to an 'associational' or non- hierarchical horizontal order.

Premadasa's strength as a symbol of transformation is

that he is the image of the transformation he wishes to

effect. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the Harijan who spearheaded the

Neo-Buddhist movement, attempted to win self-respect for

Harijans through an escape from the varnashramadharma

through conversion to Buddhism, which rejects caste (Mason

1967, 103). Former prime minister V. P. Singh of India did

not have the right credentials even though he was keen on

implementing the Mandel Commission report on caste and

instituting structural changes in government recruitment

which might alter caste power relations: He was the adopted

son of a maharajah. The Nehru dynasty was symbol of a

cakkravartin India and of the traditional varna

shramadharma, with brahmans uppermost. ^ Bandaranaike of

The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a women who is believed by both the Indian and Shri Lankan governments to be an agent of Prabhakaran, the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), may be seen as a symbol. The LTTE leadership has strong "low caste" overtones and Prabhakaran himself is said to be from the Tamil fisher caste. Earlier, at the signing of the Indo-Shri Lanka Peace Agreement in Colombo, Gandhi was hit on the head with the butt of a rifle by a member of the Shri Lankan honor guard who is said to have belonged to the 'low caste' JVP. Rajiv Gandhi was perceived as a brahman, because of his mother, even though his father was a Parsi, a non-Hindu Indian of Persian origin. He is the first national leader in India to be assassinated by a "low caste" group. The perversion of untouchability of uppercaste rulers by the

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Shri Lanka may have fought for the common man and sought to

empower the majority linguisticaly, but he was a member of

Shri Lanka's westernized elite whose existence debilitated

the non-English speaking 'masses'. Premadasa, on the other hand, is the common man of South Asia enthroned as chairman

of SAARC, sitting in councils of state with princes of

Himalayan kingdoms, sheiks and begums from Muslim South Asia

and the old upper caste aristocracy of India. As Chairman

of SAARC for 1992, he is potentially a symbol for the

region, a symbol of the association created by political

elites no doubt, but also a symbol for the underprivileged

who want a place in the sun. Whether Premadasa is seen as a

symbol for elite-aspirants, those who have been disavantaged

through ancient interpretations of the varnasarma, will

depend on the manner in which that symbolism is conveyed

throughout South Asia by individual governments and national

media, both of which have an interest in the old order.^

'untouchables' is perversely overcome by these actions.

Mahatma Gandhi (Vaishya) - (caste Hindu) Indira Gandhi (Brahman) - (Sikh) Rajiv Gandhi ("Brahman") - "Tiger agent" ("Low caste")

^ Even political opponents of Premadasa will find it hard to deny his role as a symbol of 'social modernization' in Shri Lanka. However, if indeed this is or continues to be his aim, his aiming at replacing ascriptive values with a merit orientation has potential for hurting the westernized elite and political leaders drawn from this group. Some members of the westernized elite read in these changes a lack of liberal intelligence and refusal to consult the (western) educated. Other members of the westernized elite have thrown their lot with the Premadasa reforms. It is

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He is not unaware of this and seeks to export his Shri

Lankan poverty alleviation program to the region:

Among the central common questions which afflict our region is poverty. Deprivation anywhere in South Asia means insecurity anywhere in South Asia. For our part, we will be glad to share our experience with Janasaviya - Shri Lanka's Poverty Alleviation Programme, with everyone in the region. I recommend therefore for the consideration of Your Majesty and Your Excellencies, the appointment of an independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation. It should consist of eminent persons from each member state. This Commission could study the question in all aspects and report to us.

Inventing A New Framework for South Asia

In Chapter II, I drew on Forty's discussion of the 'strong poet' who seeks to convey his unrepeatable

perspective on the world (Rorty 1989, 23-24). Forty's

strong poet is the communicator who influences with his own

distinctiveness. Reformative politicians are also, in my

mind, strong poets of a kind. I have made this claim for

Mahatma Gandhi, a claim which will hardly be challenged in

his case. It is redescription by the strong poet, whether

she be politician, novelist or film-maker, which will make

the difference in the private space of the individual,

introducing ordinary people to new ways of looking at old

unlikely that elites in other SAARC countries will be interested in projecting Premadasa as a symbol of South Asian transformation. However as chairman of SAARC he can symbolize the potential for elite aspirants in the whole subcontinent.

^ Shri Lanka News (Colombo). 25 December 1991

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things. It is political redescription which will make the

difference in managing transformation within the public

space of a community, sub-national, national or regional.

Rorty posits the need to discard inherited language-

games in any project of self-description (which may be

termed pursuit of self-knowledge or self-creation). In

other words self-description must always be redescription,

a process of inventing a new language-game, new metaphors,

which can escape the bounds of the old. (Rorty 1989, 27).

I have followed Forty's prescription in preceding chapters,

inventing a new language game, new metaphors, for South

Asian politics, through a synthesis of Western academic

streams of thought with South Asian mythic thought. In this

final chapter I mean to continue with a redescription which

is not so much aimed at providing a model for the future,

but to shake up the model of the present.

In his discussion on solidarity Rorty advocates the

expansion of ones sense of 'we' to include people who were

previously 'they' (Rorty 1989, 192). SAARC is something

which is done by a 'we' who people administrative space for

a "they" who are seen to need a certain kind of development

and a certain kind of security. The SAARC Charter begins

"We, the Heads of State or Government o f ...... " in contrast

with the opening statement of the United States Constitution

which begins "We the people" and the Preamble of the United

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Nations Charter: "We the People of the United Nations....".

Encouraging greater people-to-people contact in SAARC as

proposed by the Premadasa administration, with its special

interest in elite-aspirants, is a beginning. Premadasa's

well-intentioned South Asian Commission on Poverty

Alleviation will "consist of eminent persons from each

member state" and will "study the question in all aspects

and report to us"

The institutional framework of the proposed commission

will be within administrative space, even if it has been

conceived of as independent. Apart from Premadasa the other

heads of government of South Asia are not drawn from among

elite-aspirants with a personal mission to alter power

relations in society. Moreover the eminent persons will be

drawn from administrative space and report to a collectivity

of heads of government. They are unlikely to be

representatives of the people. Nor are they likely to be

representative of the people. They will however be likely to

espouse the values within liberal thought known as development.'

^ Shri Lanka News (Colombo). 25 December 1991.

^ An anecdote related to me in Sydney by a Shri Lankan expatriate in February 1992, illustrates the contradictory voices heard by the Shri Lankan elite, though the story could be apocryphal. After prime minister Bandaranaike drew up plans for the Official Language Act of July 1956, which would replace English with Sinhala as the language of administration, some members of Shri Lanka's westernized elite had gathered for drinks at the Orient Club. One asked a powerful civil servant why he had helped cloud the future of their (English-speaking) children. The civil

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However it is important to involve the people of South

Asia in determining the shape of their regional society, not

just as subjects of policy, but as shapers of policy. The

myriads of ethno-historical voices should be given a forum

of expression which will allow the shaping of policy within

the administrative space of SAARC. It is difficult to speak

of giving ear to ethno-historical voice without raising

specters of separate states. Premadasa himself has "(t)he

very concept of the nation State is being challenged. The

stale solution that is being offered to ethnic and other

divisions is to dismember States".^

The long term solution may be in a democratization of

SAARC through a SAARC parliament. In the shorter term it may

be desirable to institute an advisory council which contains

representatives of ethno-historical clusters of states and

provinces of regional countries. In order to bring the

ethno-historical into a functionalist domain, such a council

could consist of technocrat representatives of ethno-

servant responded that in fact the measure had secured the future of their children; English would no longer be taught to all. Only the children of the elite would speak, read and write the all- important international language at home and be at an advantage.

^ Shri Lanka News (Colombo). 25 December 1991. The tight-rope which politicians have to walk is clearly seen when one compares this statement with Premadasa's message to Boris Yeltsin on recognizing the Russian Federation: "I have followed with keen interest the recent events in the Soviet Union. I warmly welcome the peaceful evolution that has taken place there leading to fulfilment of the national aspirations of the constituent states of the Union".Shri Lanka News (Colombo). 1 January 1992.

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historical groups, dealing with technical issues. In this

way the voices of the periphery will reach expression in the

center through technocrats who represent the periphery

rather than the SAARC center. Perhaps the road to such an

institutional framework is through contact and co-operation

in development projects between local governments in SAARC

countries.

Looking at the schema of the entire work we see that

the literature reviewed provides the hermeneutics and

structure for the framework which is used in the analysis of

the Sri Lankan case, Indo-Sri Lankan Relations and the South

Asian Association of Regional Co-operation. In the study of

South Asian views, which are treated essentially as beliefs,

from texts, one takes a phenomenological approach to

knowledge, considered essential because of the role of

belief (with its ethno-historical, administrative and

international origins), in people's responses to symbols of

identification, demand and expectation and indeed in the

selection of symbols by political entrepreneurs. These be

liefs are set against Ashoka's Wheel which is a limiting

framework, resonating with Cartesian dualism and the

tensions inherent in that dualism. Despite its mix of

structural, dialectic and evolutionary theory, despite even

its Cakkravartin-Dharmacakkra binary, is limited in nature.

It is an ideal limitation on social transformation. The

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actors can only change insofar as their actions change.

State actors at the regional level are in one form or

another a permanent feature. However elite composition can

change at the subregional level through elite-elite aspirant

dialectics. It is not a normative framework in Kim's sense.

The dominant bias in social science research against employing a normative framework in defining and evaluating social reality (especially strong in the United States), is predicated on the assumption that in fact/value - and science/ideology - distinction is logically possible, theoretically necessary and axiologically essential (Kim 1984, 3). This final chapter seeks to free itself of these bonds

while being normative and so, in Richard Rorty's 'post-

modernese' I seek to construct a new vocabulary, in which

one redscribes the various binaries. The Cakkravartin-

Dharmacakkra binary is a potential window into Rorty's

normative world. As suggested in the liberal-ironical

method of Rorty:

I can now begin to redescribe South Asia, not just

using a different vocabulary to describe the same reality,

but to describe a reality which if it 'happened' might

address the problems created by Indo-centrism and captured

in the Ashoka's Wheel framework. In the invented reality

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local governments will engage in free association within and

across borders in order to co-operate on development

projects in areas such as employment generation, health,

narcotics control, power generation and supply, transport,

tourism, water supply. Groups of local governments, which

may belong to more than one state, would elect technocratic

representatives to sub-regional councils. While I do not

wish to suggest how free association should proceed, it may

be useful to provide an illustration, which is meant only to

be an illustration rather than a recommendation. For

instance a South Central Council (SCC) might contain

representatives of comparable local government areas in

Maldives, Sri Lanka and the middle and southern Indian

states. Another, the North Western Council (NWC), might

contain the North Western states of India and all the units

of Pakistan and Nepal. A third, the North Eastern Council

(NEC), might contain representatives of units in Bhutan,

Sikkim, Bangladesh and the North Eastern states of India.

The representatives of SCC, NWC and NEC could meet annually

in one of their states, in the way the UN has annual

sessions, to co-ordinate development and formulate

development project proposals for the SAARC center as well

as for the various local government units their members are

drawn from. Most importantly they could co-ordinate sub

regional co-operative projects. SCC, NWC and NEC, for

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instance, will nominate technocrats who are their voices at

the SAARC center, maintained by the respective regional

council's budget. The councils will be symbols of ethno-

historical voice.

Such an invention will set up an alternative line of

interaction between the grassroots of South Asia and the

SAARC center without destroying the nation state.

Table 26: Illustration of Popular Participation in SAARC

NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS ^ - -- - V — A V P E 0 P LE 0 F S GU T H ASIA — V - V S V A SUB-STATEUNITS » > SCC » > TECHNOCRAT » > A SUB-STATE UNITS » > NEC » > TECHNOCRAT » > R SUB-STATEUNITS » > NWC » > TECHNOCRAT » > C

SCC, NEC and NWC would also alter perceptions of the

centrality of India without geographically altering that

centrality. They will alter the 'them' and 'us'

relationships in the region. New 'thems' and 'us' will

emerge to qualitatively change old 'them' and 'us'

relationships. The Ramavana analogy could not be applied to

the new relationships. Nor could India be seen as following

a cakkravartin approach. Indeed the Ashoka's Wheel framework

will lose its potency.

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SAARC and the New Global Framework

In security terms the new global order offers SAARC the

option to exorcise some of the ghosts that have haunted it.

SAARC has been bedevilled by hub-rim security perceptions.

In a new world order in which external intervention requires

multilateral intervention in the security council, India may

not need fear imperialist invasion. India, along with other

states in the region, does have to fear the possible

reaction to military action outside its own borders. A major

spat over Kashmir, particularly if their is suspicion of

potential use of nuclear devices, can lead to pressure from

the United Nations.

A regional security council and regional peace-keeping

force may help keep the process of South Asian conflict

resolution within South Asia. Kodikara and others have

called for a regional security agreement.

Looking outwards, the question of global security is

also something SAARC nations cannot ignore. In the present

situation where world politics is changing rapidly, a new

world order is in the making, SAARC must take the

opportunity to shape that new world order. The principal

instrument of the order in transition is the five-power

dominated security council of the United Nations and largely

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American security forces financed by the G-7 nations.®

SAARC should join forces with the Commonwealth of

Independent States, Japan and Germany, ASEAN and other

regional economic groupings to argue for security council

membership to represent regional economic groupings rather

than the victors of the Second World War. The World

Market is organized to some degree by regional economic

groupings such as the European Economic Community (EEC),

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is

markets which can bring security through prosperity. Under

the Cold War world order, kshatriyas projected insecurity,

demanding ever increasing supplies of weaponry. Vaishyas

obliged and a kshatriya-vaishya complex (military-industrial

complex) managed this security-related economy. The market

was security driven. Under the post-cold war order security

will be market driven. If so it would make sense to give

vaishyas a stake in collective control of the instruments of

the kshatriyas; The Security Council should be expanded to

include representatives of regional economic groupings and

major economic powers rather than be limited to the victors

of World War II.

® Group of 7 or G-7 consists of Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, USA.

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SAARC is an intermediary plane of organization between

national markets and polities and the World Market and

International System respectively. It should not repeat

'organizational' elements of national social frameworks;

should also work to replace the 'organizational' elements in

the International System with 'associational' elements. The forces of change in South Asia may no longer be

contained by the social frameworks of antiquity or the Raj.

Indeed changes in the International System, the dominance of

all-pervasive World Market, compel change. The voices of

elite-aspirants, calls for genuine social mobility, need to be recognized for what they are, harbingers of

transformation. The power of the World Market

encourages social mobility through the Vaishya route. Today

everyone can be a Vaishya, a Brahman or a Kshatriya and

caste should be treated as occupational rather than

inherited if South Asia is to reach its true potential.

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INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE

On Thursday 13 February 1990 I conducted an interview with

President J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka in his study at his

private residence, "Braemar", Ward Place, Cinnamon Gardens, Colombo. Notes were made by me on this occasion.

Jayewardene's answers are provided below.

Referring to the introduction to my dissertation he said;

You have taken a philosophical approach. Politicians only look at religion and race and perhaps caste, though this is not so important in Sri Lanka.

Regarding criticism of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord today he

said:

My only concern was to end a war I could not win. After the air drop, Gandhi offered his support. I took it. The country could not afford to spend Rs 10,000,000 a day on the war. The Accord was for peace. The UNP fought elections and won on this. IPKF came in only after Indians failed to disarm the LTTE. I wanted to prevent a coup. The JVP had tried to kill me, Gandhi and Premadasa.

Regarding the Indian air drop he said:

If there was a message [in the air drop] it was don't attack Jaffna. Food wasn't required in Jaffna. It was only symbolic. After being sent back by the Sri Lankan Navy, Gandhi called me and told me that he would be sending MIGs - and asked

301

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me not to shoot at them. I had earlier suggested that India should send food to Colombo for distribution in Jaffna but India did not agree. India was giving Sri Lanka a message. After the Accord I got close to Rajiv but made my feelings clear. I said India had invaded Sri Lanka several times. Gandhi need not have done what he did.

Regarding SAARC he said:

Other countries don't speak when India is around [in SAARC]. Even Pakistan does not. Everyone is aware of India's size. For example in the case of a SAARC airline. I proposed SAARC before Rahman did, in Parliament.

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SCHEDULE 6: TOPICS OF "COMMENT'* IN SRI LANKA NEWS

SAARC

"Maldives hosting '90 SAARC summit" [58:27, 07-04-90, p. 1] "Sinhala computer team eyes the SAARC market" [58:28, 07- 11-90, p. 12] "Govt urges UN and SAARC" [58:37, 09-12-90, p. 1] "Collective regional approach welcome, Hameed tells SAARC jurists" [58:38, 09-19-90, p. 7] "Tourism oriented policy decisions at 5th SAARC Summit [58:50, 12-12-90, p. 3] "Edge to SAARC in Airlanka's ground fees for cargo" [59:04, 01-23-91, p. 6]

INDO-SRI LANKAN RELATIONS

COMMENT

"Clowning in Trincomalee" [58:10, 03-07-90, p. 9] "Welcome assurance" [58:11, 03-14-90, p. 9] "A special duty" [58:12, 03-21-90, p. 9] "Fence mending" [58:13, 03-28-90, p. 9] "Keeping India's Goodwill"[58: 27, 07-04-90, p. 9] "Wanted: India policy for Sri Lanka / Gandhi's goondas" [58:29, 07-18-90, p. 3] "Indian sneeze" [58:30, 07-25-90, p. 9] "Good News, Bad News" [58:30, 07-25-90, p. 9] "The Indian Farce" [58:31, 08-01-90, p. 9] "India, LTTE & the Refugees" [58:31, 08-01-90, p. 9] "Noises from Madras [58:34, 08-22-90, p. 9] "Warm winds from Tamil Nadu" [58:37, 09-12-90, P. 9] "Running to Delhi" [58:50, 12-12-90, p. 9] "Sharing problems with India" [59:01, 01-02-91, p. 9] "Reflections on Independence" [59:06, 02-06-91, p. 9] "Implications of the Tamil Nadu takeover" [59:06, 02-06-91, p. 9] "Tamilnadu picture can change" [59:08, 02-20-91, p. 9] "Taking sides in the war" [59:08, 02-20-91, p. 9]

303

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"President thanks India for pullout" [58:14, 04-04-90, p.11] "Defeat of India's SL policy complete" [58:14, 04-04-90, p.11] "Close ties with Lanka now: Gujral" [58:14, 04-04-90, p.11] "Time for new start says new friend" [58:14, 04-04-90, p.10] "IPKF returns to India to sober welcome" [58:14, 04-04-90, p.10] "IPKF leaves" [58:14, 04-4-90, p.4] "End of IPKF chapter" [58:14, 04-4-90, p.4] "Notion that newspaper can make or break a govt, is incorrect - President [58:14, 04-04-90, p. 3] "Democratic process will go on, says Ranjan" [58:14, 04-04- 90, p.3] "Gandhi's assailant freed in general amnesty" [58:15, 04- 11-90, p.5] "Indo-Lanka disputes must not be allowed to recur: JRJ" [58:18, 05-02-90, p. 5] "Karunanidhi confirms Tamil groups trained in India" [58:20, 05-16-90, P. 7] "Talks on bilateral issues bring closer ties" [58:20, 05- 16-90, p.3] "Karunanidhi warns Tamil militants" [58:21, 05-23-90, p.l] "SL swap with India at UN" [58:21, 05-23-90, P.3] "Non violent rebel? Follow me - JRJ" [58:24, 06-13-90, p. 12] "SL envoy briefs Karunanidhi" [58:25, 06-20-90, p. 1] "Indian navy to patrol Palk Straits [58:24, 06-13-90, p. ,3] "India to blame for massacre: Natwar" [58:26, 06-27-90, p. 2 ] "India calls for an end to hostilities in SL" [58:26, 06- 27-90, p. 3] "V.P. Singh warns he'll 'take steps to save Lankan Tamils'" [58:27, 07-27-90, p. 1] "Ranjan hails Indian PM's Lanka policy" [58:27, 07-27-90, p . 2 ] "War between justice and injustice in N.E.- President" [58:27, 07-27-90, p. 7] "LTTE was making rifle-fired grenades in Coimbatore" [58:27, 07-04-90, p. 11] "India wont' meddle in Lankan conflict -Gujral" [58:28, 07- 11-90, p. 1] "Tigers prepare second hit list in India -Indian Express" [58:29, 07-18-90, p. 6] "Indian Express exposes DMK-LTTE link" [58:30, 07-25-90, p. 1]

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"India won't send troops to Sri Lanka - Singh" [58:30, 07- 25-90, p. 1] "Indo-Lankan parliamentarians agree on periodical talks" [58:30, 07-25-90, p. 3] "Strike paralyses life in T'Nadu" [58:30, 07-25-90, p. 2] "Send refugees back, Ranjan requests Karunanidhi" [58:30, 07-25-90, p. 1] "SL Allays Indian fears on N-E" [58:30, 07-25-90, p. 7] "LTTE has alienated sympathy of most Indians- Rajiv" [58:31, 08-01-90, p. 1] "Clear nexus between LTTE and DMK - Gandhi : Tamilnadu backing Eelam" [58:31, 08-01-90, p. 1] "India neutral says Speaker" [58:31, 08-01-90, p.10] "Karunanidhi denies backing LTTE" [58:31, 08-01-90, p. 11] "Rajiv's party attacks India's Lankan policy" 58:31, 08-01-90, p. 11] "Passage to India" - reports by members of multi party parliamentary delegation to India "Intervene diplomatically in SL, Balasingham tells India" [58:33, 08-15-90, p. 1] "India tells SL to settle conflict thru' talks" [58:33, 08-15-90, p. 5] "LTTE-Tamilnadu ties straining" [58:34, 08-22-90, p. 1] "Karunanidhi urges India to bring peace to SL" [58:34, 08-22-90, p. 5] "India will not interfere in Sri Lanka's affairs - Mohamed" [58:34, 08-22-90, p. 11] "Tigers cannot take India for a ride again" [58:37, 09-12-90, pg. 1] "Karunanidhi changes stance on Lankan refugees" [58:37, 09-12-90,p. 3] "Ranjan confident that India will stay clear" [58:37, 09-12-90, pg. 6] "Tigers beat hasty retreat" [58:38, 09-19-90, p. 1] "Tigers divided, sending peace feelers"[58:38, 09-19- 90, p.l] "Delhi to summon Karunanidhi" [58:38, 09-19-90, p. 4] "Tamil Nadu plans to tackle Tamil militants" [58:50, 12-12-90, p.3] "IPKF presence helped crush JVP insurrection - Rajiv" [58:50, 12-12-90, p.2] "India has always extended hand of friendship to SL" [59:04, 01-23-91, p. 3] "Lanka gratified by India's response: Ranjan" [59:06, 02-06-91, p. 1]

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"India will not send troops to Sri Lanka" [59:06, 02- 06-91, p. 1] "Tamil Nadu Govt, sacked" [59:06, 02-06-91, p. 3] "Delhi promises to clear LTTE from Tamil Nadu" [59:08, 02-20-91, p. 1] "New Governor attacks LTTE" [59:08, 02-20-91, p. 1] "Indo-Sri Lanka relations take a great leap forward" [59:08, 02 20, 1991, p. 9]

EXTRA-REGIONAL

Comment

"What after 'liberating Kuwait'?" [59:50

Other "Shukla briefs President on NAM Heads' views" [59:05, 01- 30-91, p. 1] "President urges peace move by NAM, to resolve Gulf conflict" [59:05, 01-30-91, p. 3] "Lanka on NAM committee on Gulf crisis [59:06, 02-06-91, p. 6 ] "Kaleel calls for quick NAM initiative through President" [59:07, 02-13-91, p. 3]

ADMINISTRATIVE

Comment

"The Cabinet changes" [58:14, 04-04-90, p. 9] "Value for money" [58:15, 04-11-90, p. 9] "The challenge ahead" [58:19, 05-09-90, p. 9] "A pearl of great price" [58:22, 05-30-90, p. 9] "Racket busting" [58:23, 06-06-90, p. 9] "What is truth?" [58:36, 09-05-90, p. 9] "A billion cheers" [58:44, 10-31-90, p. 9] "Concern for human rights" [58:50, 12-12-90, p. 9] "Two years and beyond" [59:02, 01-09-91, p. 9] "Sorting out the land fiddle" [59:05, 01-30-91, p. 9]

Other

"Guidelines for ministers" [58:14, 04-04-90, p.12] "Six new ministers in expanded cabinet" [58:14, 04-04-90,

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p.l] "Let's work together to bring relief to poor masses" [58:15, 4-11-90, p.3] "New cabinet will take on poverty" [58:15, 04-11-90, p.5] "Development for all..... govt's aim in dawning era" [58:15, 4-11-90, p.10 "New scheme for varsity set-up?" [58:15, 04-11-90, p.12] "Parties to pick youth for polls" [58:17, 04-25-90, p. 1] "President's pragmatic approach has revived economic activity: NYT [58:17, 04-25-90, p.4] "Colleges for undergrad 'surplus'" [58:18, 05-02-90, p.10] "Sack for MP's who flout code of conduct" [58:20, 05-16-90, p.3] "Niche for youth at local polls" [58:22, 05-30-90, p. l] "UN 'human index' boosts Lankan feat" [58:22,05-30-90,p. 1] "'Peoplisation' of SLTB begins on June 1" [58:22, 05-30-90, Pg 9] "12th Gam Udawa opens jobs for over 50,000 in Kandy" [58:22, 05-30-90, p. 10] "Gam Udawa dedicated to shelter homeless, poor - Sirisena Cooray" [58:20, 05-30-90, p. 5] "UN briefed on Lanka's bid to end poverty, homelessness" [58:20, 05-30-90, p. 4] "Lanka heading for steady growth" [58:23, 06-06-90, pg 1] "All children must have equal opportunities to learn English" [58:23, 06-06-90, p. 6] "Plaudits for President's direct approach in taking govt. to people" [58:23, 06-06-90, p. 4] "Govt, gives impetus to national language policy" [58:23, 06-06-90, p. 6] "Unsecured loans for rural poor" [58:23, 06-06-90, p. 7] "President to wipe out corruption, waste" [58:23, 06-06- 90, p.7] "Growth rate in Sri Lanka better after 1978" [58:23, 06- 06-90, p. 12] "People-isation gains ground" [58:24, 06-13-90, p. 1] "None above the laws of the land. President reminds VIPs" [58:24, 06-13-90, p. 10] "Sri Lanka ranks high on human development index" [58:26, 06-27-90, p. 1] "'Quality of life in Sri Lanka superior' reveals study" [58:29, 07-18-90, p. 3] "Democracy meaningless if injustice prevails - President" [58:31, 08-01-90, p. 4] "Sinhala language part and parcel of common heritage of mankind - Lalith" [58:34, 08-22-90, p. 11] "Youth must be taken into confidence and assisted" [58:34, 08-22-90, P. 11] "Govt, determined to protect, promote Buddha Sasana - president" [58:34, 08-22-90, p. 5]

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"Shun divisive forces, unite for peace - president" [58:35, 08-29-90, p. 11] "Conference on social change in Sri Lanka" [58:36, 09-05- 90, p.7] "Janasaviya families should be made self-reliant before getting assistance - president" [58:36, 09-05-90, p. 11] "Buddha sasana fund will play key role" [58:38, 09-19-90, p. 7] "Blood and Guts" [58:38, 09-19-90, p. 9] "Lawyers vs society" [58:38, 09-19-90, p. 9 "Playing pandu with grants for sports" [58:43, 10-24-90, p. 9] "The Jaffna visit" [58:49, 12-05-90, p. 9] "Budget and the opposition" [58:49, 12-05-90, p. 9] "Govt bound to protect the Buddha Sasana: President" [58:50 12-12-90, p. 14] "Business or politics" [59:01, 01-02-91, p. 9] "Two years of solid achievement and a vision of unity" [59:02, 01-09-91, p. 3] "Sorting out the land fiddle" [59:05, 01-30-91, p. 9] "President outlines govt's changing role" [50:05, 01-30-91, p.5] "Who killed Richard de Zoysa?" [59:07, 02-13-91, p. 8] "Govt will help Janasaviya families to become self-reliant" [59:08, 02-20-91, p. 5]

TAMIL GROUPS

COMMENT

"LTTE talks" [58:17, 04-25-90, p. 9] "The Vavuniya shooting" [58:24, 06-13-90, p. 9] "Another try...for peace" [58:25, 06-20-90, p. 9] "Nation unites against LTTE's U-turn" [58:26, 06-27-90, j 9] "The amazing "peace trap" [58:28, 07-11-90, p. 9] "It's your move Mr Prabhakaran" [58:30, 07-25-90, p. 9] "Massacre of the innocents" [58:31, 08-08-90, p. 9] "Narco-terrorism and the West" [58:33, 08-15-90, p. 9] "The Tiger strategy" [58:33, 08-15-90, p. 9] "The Tamil shame" [58:34, 08-22-90, p. 9] "Building bridges to Jaffna" [58:36, p. 9] "Tamil racism running amok" [58:37, 09-12-90, p. 9] "Is there a way to stop the killing?" [58:39, 09-26-90, p. 9] "Amesty International and Human Rights" [58:39, 09-26-90, p. 9]

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"A welcome investigation" [58:40, 10-03-90, p. 9] "Ball in Tiger court" [58:40, 10-03-90, p. 9] "The Australian initiative" [58:42, 10-17-90, p. 9] "Tiger tears" [58:42, 10-17-90, P. 9] "A festival of lights" [58:43, 10-24-90, p. 9] "The cause of Tamil misery" [58:44, 10-31-90, p. 9] "Tamil racism running amok" [58:45, 11-07-90, p. 9] "Save the Muslims" [58:45, 11-07-90, p. 9] "Kittu's Tamil National Army" [59:02, 01-09-91, p. 9] "The writing on the wall" [59:04, 01-23-91, p. 9] "Hold fast to peace prospects" [59:03, 01-16-91, p.9] "Ending Tiger bluff"[59: 03, 01-16-91, p. 9] "The cause is just" [59:04, 01-23-91, p. 9] "Talk or not to talk" [59:07, 02-13-91, p. 9]

OTHER "Tiger arms only problem left" [58:15, 04-11-90, p.l] "LTTE will join security forces to establish peace" [58:16, 04-18-90, p. 11] "LTTE frees 'poaching' Indian fisherman" [58:16, 04-18-90, p.11] "Govt, rejects EPRLF call" [58:16, 04-18-90, p.16] "Hameed, Prabhakran talk peace" [58:17, 04-25-90, p.3] "Prabakaran and Balakumar meet again" [58:18, 05-02-90, p. 1 ] "Tigers release 19 policemen" [58:21, 05-23-90, p.l] "EPRLF tgo participate in APC?" [58:21, 05-23-90, p.5] "Anti-repatriation hartal by LTTE" [58:22, 05-30-90, p. 12] "Decision soon on repeal ,of 6th amendment" [58:22, 05-30- 90, p.5] "Front leader arrested" [58:22, 05-30-90, p. 1] "Hameed, LTTE leaders reach agreement on several issues" [58:23, 06-06-90, p. 1] "Lanka to take back Male PLOT-rers?" [58:23, 06-06-90, pg. 1 ] "Hameed, LTTE leaders reach agreement on several issues" [58:23, 06-06-90, p.l] "Tigers here to press four demands" [58:23, 06-06-90, p. 6 ] "Thondaman confident of humane solution to Indian problem" 58:23, 06-06-90, p. 10] "LTTE master plan to destabilize Lanka" [58:25, 06-20-90, p . 1 ] Ranjan calls for national unity in fighting speech" [58:24, 06-13-90, p. 3] "TELO condemns LTTE's action" [58:24, 06-13-90, p. 3] "Forces harnessing land-sea-air resources to hit back hard" [58:25, 06-20-90, p. 3]

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"Terror campaign in North and East will be wiped out soon: President" [58:26, 06-27-90, p. 1] "Kittu admits their war was badly timed" [58:26, 06-27-90, p. 1] "Prabhakaran dead?, asks Ranjan" [58:26, 06-27-90, p. 1] "Tiger plot to whip up backlash says President" [58:26, 06-27-90, p. 1] "Ranjan lambasts LTTE" [58:26, 06-27-90, p. 6] "Newsweek attacks Tigers" [58:27, 07-27-90, p. 1] "Tigers poisoning wells as they retreat" [58:27, 07-27- 90, p.l] "No napalm bombing says Reuter reporter in Jaffna" [58:27, 07-27-90, p. 1] "Soldiers, policemen hold on without food and medicine" [58:27, 07-27-90, p. 1] "Govt, rules out ceasefire in the North-East" [58:28, 07- 11-90, p. 1] "Elections soon in North and East" [58:28, 07-11-90, p. 1] "What went wrong with the LTTE?"- articles by Prof. Shelton Kodikara, Vasudeva Nanayakkara and L. A. M. Hisbullah [58:28, 07-11-90, p. 11] "Role of international community in Sri Lanka" - articles by Stanley Jayaweera, Stanley Tillekeratne and G. L. Peiris [58:29, 07-18-90, p. 14] "War against Tigers not against Tamils" [58:30, 07-25-90, p. 5] "My people's rights are won through a democratic process - Thondaman" [58:30, 07-25-90, p. 11] "Marching ahead" [58:35, 08-29-90, p. 8] "The curious role of the churches" [58:35, 08-29-90, p. 9] "Govt, ready to reopen talks - Hameed" [58:36, 09-05-90, p. 1] "Human rights and NGOs" [58:37, 09-12-90, P. 9] "Help end war with LTTE chief minister tells Thondaman" [58:38, 09-19-90, p. 4] "Mossad trained Tigers in Israel" [58:39, 09-26-90, p.l] "The reign of repression" [58:41, 10-10-90, p. 9]

SINHALA GROUPS

"Police get JVP hit squad men" [58:21, 05-23-90, P.4] "A dangerous monster" [58:21, 05-23-90, p. 4] "Ten of JVP terror gang arrested" [58:23, 06-06-90, P. 1] "The aftermath of anarchy" [58:26, 06-20-90, p. 4]

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SYMBOLS

COMMENT "An imaginative gesture" [58:18, 05-02-90, p. 9] "The Sigiriya robbers" [58:20, 05-09-90, P. 9] "The new regime" [58:41, 10-10-90, p. 9] "The LSSPs anniversary" [58:52, 12-26-90, p. 9] "A salute to courage" [58:52, 12-26-90, p. 9] "The lesson of the gold plate" [59:07, 02-13-91, p. 9]

OTHER

"Dudley was 'symbol of life'" [58:15, 04-11-90, p.8] "The heart of the matter" [58:16, 04-18-90, p. 9] Photo and caption depicting a religious ceremony, held opposite a statue of King Dutugemunu, attended by the President [58:16, 04-18-90, p.l] "Diplomats take part in Avurudu festival" [58:17, 04-25-90, p.5] Photo of the Sri Lankan First Lady unveiling a statue of Queen Vihara Maha Devi, the mother of King Dutugemunu [58:17, 04-25-90, p. 6] "It's International Vesak Day from now on" [58:20, 05-16- 90, p.4] "Buddha taught us way to peace, says President" [58:20, 05- 16-90, p. 5] "President: Lanka stands by right, not might" [58:22, 05- 30-90, p. 10] "Uncultivated VIP lands first on takeover list" [58:23, 06- 06-90, p. 1] "Hindu-style revival?" [58:23, 06-06-90, p. 7] "Virtuous example greatest tribute to Ven. Ariyadhamma" [58:23, 06-06-90, p. 11] "English for everyone' ends terror of the 'kaduwa' [58:23, 06-06-90, p. 12] Picture of President and First Lady with statue of King Dutugemunu [58:24, 06-13-90, p. 1] "Gam Udawa benefits can be seen if one cares to look" [58:26, 06-27-90, p. 5] "A symbol of national aspirations" [58:26, 06-27-90, p. 8] "Buddhism and Democracy - the inexpungible nexus" [58:30, 07-25-90, p. 8] "Buultjens reviews Sir John's role as leader - I" [58:36, 09-05-90, p. 8] "Buultjens reviews Sir John's role as leader - li" [58:37, 09-12-90, p. 8] "Sajith and Old Royalists visit Rajasisugama" [58:38, 09- 19-90, p. 11]

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Photograph of President of Sri Lanka placing a wreath at the base of the statue of Anagarika Dharmapala [58:39, 09-26-90, p.4] "Forging Buddhist-Hindu ties aim of new association" [58:41, 10-17-90, p. 11] "Menikdiwela's daughter in customs net" [58:43, 10-24-90, P • 1 ] Photograph of President and Mrs Premadasa at unveiling of statues of Prince Dantha and Princess Hemamala [59:02, 01-09-91, p. 8] "Vallipuram gold-plate testifies to ancient unity of Sri Lanka" [59-07, 02-13-91, p. 3] "DS's aspirations are now being fulfilled, says President" [59:07, 02-13-91, p. 14]

JATHIKA CHINTANAYA

"A Sinhalese in Trincomalee" [58:19, 05-09-90, p. 11] "The dowry system must go" [58:24, 06-13-90, p. 8-9] "Tradition and modernity in Lankan thought" [58:35-90, p. 9]

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