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credo of “move fast, break things?” break fast, “move of credo without written consent. SR-2097 consent. written without reserved. Reproduction is prohibited prohibited is Reproduction reserved. compete with a business that espouses a a espouses that business a with compete © 2019 Institute for the future. All rights rights All future. the for Institute 2019 © greater distrust? greater grapple with in our effort to combat disinformation. combat to effort our in with grapple words, how does an ethical business business ethical an does how words, media tools without engendering engendering without tools media trends driving compromised cognitive immunity, as well as the difficult choices we must must we choices difficult the as well as immunity, cognitive compromised driving trends mitigate adverse consequences? In other other In consequences? adverse mitigate and technology of workings the to improve our defenses. Then, flip the map over to gain a deeper understanding of the the of understanding deeper a gain to over map the flip Then, defenses. our improve to resources to develop mechanisms that that mechanisms develop to resources in people educate we do How bad actors use to exploit our cognitive biases. The map also reveals seven strategies strategies seven reveals also map The biases. cognitive our exploit to use actors bad competitive, while also taking time and and time taking also while competitive, Media Manipulation Media nd the attack methods methods attack the nd a system immune cognitive the of overview visual a for side map How can a media business stay stay business media a can How www.iftf.org 650.854.6322 vs. Literacy Media in the battle between disinformation tactics and healthy immune responses. Start with the the with Start responses. immune healthy and tactics disinformation between battle the in Innovation vs. Deliberation vs. Innovation 94301 CA Alto, Palo This map presents the dilemmas, drivers, and future forces that will play important roles roles important play will that forces future and drivers, dilemmas, the presents map This essential to a healthy society? healthy a to essential Avenue Hamilton 201 HOW TO USE THIS MAP MAP THIS USE TO HOW while maintaining shared worldviews worldviews shared maintaining while magazine? a or newspaper a How do we maintain healthy diversity diversity healthy maintain we do How like publisher, a it is extent what to and phone company or an email service, service, email an or company phone Cognitive Diversity Cognitive a platform a common carrier, like a a like carrier, common a platform a vs. Cohesion Cognitive individual and community levels. community and individual its users publish? To what extent is is extent what To publish? users its system, suited to today’s realities. We need to uprade our “cognitive immune systems” at at systems” immune “cognitive our uprade to need We realities. today’s to suited system, media platform bear for the content content the for bear platform media To preserve democracy, we need to develop new immune mechanisms, a new immune immune new a mechanisms, immune new develop to need we democracy, preserve To advertisers? How much responsibility does a social social a does responsibility much How put their users above sponsors and and sponsors above users their put Platforms vs. Publishers vs. Platforms respond to the rapid changes in our information environment. environment. information our in changes rapid the to respond in the disinformation age disinformation the in investment in media platforms that that platforms media in investment transformation, with old structures, regulatory systems, and cultural norms straining to to straining norms cultural and systems, regulatory structures, old with transformation, How do we encourage capital capital encourage we do How and behaviors of billions of their users. And yet, we still are at the early stages of this this of stages early the at are still we yet, And users. their of billions of behaviors and maximization in our media ecosystem? ecosystem? media our in maximization lines? the draw democracy defending of dollars. Social media platforms have unprecedented insight into the desires, fears, fears, desires, the into insight unprecedented have platforms media Social dollars. of expression? Who decides where to to where decides Who expression? How do we move beyond profit profit beyond move we do How cameras, a staff, transmitting equipment, and an FCC license, all all license, FCC an and equipment, transmitting staff, a cameras, of which totaled millions millions totaled which of What are the boundaries of free free of boundaries the are What Social Returns Social account has a greater potential audience than a 1990s television station with a newsroom, newsroom, a with station television 1990s a than audience potential greater a has account IMMUNE SYSTEM IMMUNE Free Speech vs. Censorship vs. Speech Free vs. Returns Economic An individual with a $500 laptop, a $30 a month Internet service plan, and a YouTube YouTube a and plan, service Internet month a $30 a laptop, $500 a with individual An power to shape our dominant narratives, and the power to influence influence to power the and narratives, dominant our shape to power our cognition. cognition. our and learn to manage, in the process balancing difficult choices. difficult balancing process the in manage, to learn and COGNITIVE have altered existing power dynamics by re-defining who has the power of voice, the the voice, of power the has who re-defining by dynamics power existing altered have these dilemmas. Like parasites in an ecosystem, dilemmas are things we have to live with with live to have we things are dilemmas ecosystem, an in parasites Like dilemmas. these ever before. For better and worse, networked communications tools and technologies technologies and tools communications networked worse, and better For before. ever organization based in Palo Alto, California. Alto, Palo in based organization to protect. We must accept that there are challenges we cannot find solutions to. We call call We to. solutions find cannot we challenges are there that accept must We protect. to world, however, attacks against democracy have the potential to be more devastating than than devastating more be to potential the have democracy against attacks however, world, is a registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit nonprofit 501(c)(3) registered a is Future over-react, a cognitive immune system can sometimes damage the system it’s designed designed it’s system the damage sometimes can system immune cognitive a over-react, a democratic society we tolerate and even invite many voices. In voices. many invite even and tolerate we society democratic a today’s highly networked networked highly today’s HEALTHY A BUILDING Institute for the the for Institute future. sustainable more out disinformation. In the same way that a biological immune syst immune biological a that way same the In disinformation. out em can backfire or or backfire can em manipulation. Many are attempting to persuade others in many different directions, and in in and directions, different many in others persuade to attempting are Many manipulation. across all sectors that together support a a support together that sectors all across It is important to note that a healthy cognitive immune system isn’ system immune cognitive healthy a that note to important is It t a cure-all for wiping wiping for cure-all a t The cognition of individuals and of the larger body politic has always been a target for for target a been always has politic body larger the of and individuals of cognition The coherent views of transformative possibilities possibilities transformative of views coherent IFTF methodologies and toolsets yield yield toolsets and methodologies IFTF dilemmas is ill suited to ward off these new attackers, which include bots, trolls, and much more. much and trolls, bots, include which attackers, new these off ward to suited ill is change and develop world-ready strategies. strategies. world-ready develop and change we’ve built over decades decades over built we’ve defenses the And manipulation. of forms new many and attacks navigate complex complex navigate to training foresight and Cognitive immune system system immune Cognitive our individual and collective cognitive immune systems, opening opening systems, immune cognitive collective and individual our us up to disinformation disinformation to up us forecasts, custom research, research, custom forecasts, global IFTF upon Dramatic changes in our media and information technology landscapes landscapes technology information and media our in changes Dramatic are weakening weakening are depended depended have organizations impact social The metaphor is particularly apt in describing the state of our body body our of state the describing in apt particularly is metaphor The politic today. today. politic over 50 years, businesses, governments, and and governments, businesses, years, 50 over organization. For For organization. thinking futures leading erode, or help sustain, democracy. democracy. sustain, help or erode, mechanisms are no longer effective, allowing parasites to thrive and weaken the host. host. the weaken and thrive to parasites allowing effective, longer no are mechanisms the world’s world’s the is Future the for Institute must understand the forces—technological, cultural, economic—on the horizon that could could that horizon the economic—on cultural, forces—technological, the understand must mechanisms for warding off such attackers.
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