Extremity of a Persuasive Message Position Interacts with Argument Quality to Predict

Attitude Change

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Lucas Daniel Hinsenkamp, M.A.

Graduate Program in Psychology

The Ohio State University

2018

Dissertation Committee

Richard E Petty, Advisor

Duane T Wegener

Russell H Fazio

Copyrighted by

Lucas Daniel Hinsenkamp

2018

Abstract

When crafting a persuasive message, what is the effect of the extremity of the message’s

position? Past work has demonstrated that, with greater extremity comes greater

movement in recipients’ positions. However, there is also evidence that the reverse can

occur: Greater extremity can lead to greater counter-arguing and reduced persuasion.

The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion provides a framework to understand the range of demonstrated and possible effects, postulating that any variable in a persuasion context can function in multiple ways: serving as central arguments to be scrutinized, peripheral cues of positivity or negativity when not carefully scrutinized, or determining the extent or direction of message-related processing. Whether position extremity can determine the amount of message-related processing has not been rigorously investigated.

Across two sets of two studies each, we demonstrate that, indeed, the extremity of a message can determine the amount of message-related processing. Through this process, we demonstrate that, although an extreme position may not be accepted, it can create positive attitude change if supported by strong arguments, as it increases processing of the strong supporting reasons. If supported by weak, easy-to-counterargue arguments, however, an extreme position has a negative effect on persuasion. Finally, we demonstrate that this moderating effect of argument quality is weakened at absurdly extreme positions: As a message position becomes too extreme, it loses its attention- grabbing power, and message recipients begin paying less attention to the message.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Richard Petty, for his guidance and feedback throughout this project and all of my work leading up to this. I would also like to thank the members of the Attitudes and Persuasion Lab for their support and feedback, as well as the Group for Attitudes and Persuasion for their feedback on this and past work. Finally, I would like to thank my late father, who, despite not having a college degree himself, instilled in me, from a young age, a deep-seated love of knowledge.

iii

Vita

Personal Information

2005-2009 | University of Wisconsin – Bachelor of Science; Major: Psychology; Minor: Integrated Liberal Studies

2007-2009 | University of Wisconsin; Lab for Stereotyping and Prejudice, Madison, WI – Undergraduate Research Assistant

2007-2009 | Waisman Lab for Brain Imaging and Behavior; Lab for Affective Neuroscience, Madison, WI – Undergraduate Student Hourly

2009-2012 | Waisman Lab for Brain Imaging and Behavior; Lab for Affective Neuroscience, Madison, WI – Associate Research Specialist

2012-2013 | Waisman Lab for Brain Imaging and Behavior; Lab for Affective Neuroscience, Madison, WI – Research Specialist

2013-2015 | The Ohio State University – Master of Arts; Major: Social Psychology; Minor: Quantitative Psychology

Publications

Hinsenkamp, L.D., & Petty, R. E. (2017). Routes to persuasion, central and peripheral. In F. Moghaddam (Ed.), The Sage Encyclopedia of Political Behavior. (pp. 718-720). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Briñol, P., Petty, R.E., & Hinsenkamp, L.D. (2018). Embodied persuasion in a sports context. In J. Dimmock & B. Jackson (Eds.) Persuasion and Communication in Sport, Exercise, and Physical Activity (pp. 201-216). Abington, UK: Routledge.

Field of Study

Major Field: Psychology

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgments...... iii Vita ...... iv Table of Contents ...... v List of Tables ...... viii List of Figures ...... ix Chapter 1 - Introduction ...... 1 Early Models: Distance Proportional...... 5 Subsequent Work: Curvilinear Hypothesis...... 7 Information Processing & Cognitive Response Approach ...... 11 Elaboration Likelihood Model’s multiple roles postulate ...... 17 Chapter 2 - Studies 1a and 1b ...... 21 Introduction ...... 21 Method ...... 21 Participants ...... 21 Pre-manipulation attitude measure...... 22 Independent Variables...... 22 Dependent measures...... 24 Results ...... 25 Manipulation checks ...... 26 Attitude change ...... 28 Discussion ...... 31 Chapter 3 - Studies 2a and 2b ...... 33 Introduction ...... 33 Method ...... 34 Participants ...... 34 Pre-manipulation attitude measure...... 34

Independent Variables...... 34 Dependent measures...... 37 Results ...... 38 Manipulation checks ...... 38 Attitude Change ...... 41 Discussion ...... 44 Chapter 4 - Study 1b and 2b ...... 45 Introduction ...... 45 Method ...... 45 Participants ...... 45 Pre-manipulation attitude measure...... 46 Independent Variables ...... 46 Dependent Measures ...... 47 Results ...... 49 Manipulation Checks ...... 49 Attitude Change ...... 51 Discussion ...... 54 Chapter 5 - General Discussion ...... 56 References ...... 64 Appendix A - Studies 1a and 1b full list of measures...... 68 Appendix B – Study 1 means...... 72 Study 1a (Weak and Strong Argument Qualities, as analyzed above) ...... 72 Study 1a, Moderate Argument Quality (not analyzed above) ...... 75 Study 1b ...... 77 Appendix C – Persuasive messages used in Study 1 (a and b) ...... 80 Strong Arguments Message ...... 80 Weak Arguments Message ...... 80 Moderate Strength Arguments used in Study 1a only ...... 80 Appendix D – Studies 2a and 2b full list of measures ...... 82 Appendix E – Study 2 means ...... 86 Study 2a ...... 86 Study 2b ...... 89 Appendix F – Persuasive messages used in Study 2a ...... 92 vi

Strong Arguments Message ...... 92 Weak Arguments Message ...... 93 Appendix G – Persuasive messages used in Study 2b ...... 95 Strong Arguments Message ...... 95 Weak Arguments Message ...... 96

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List of Tables

Table 1 - Mean agreement with position advocated in message, Studies 1a, 1b ...... 27

Table 2 - Mean judgments of argument quality across conditions, Studies 1a, 1b ...... 28

Table 3 - Mean standardized post-manipulation attitudes, controlling for pre- manipulation attitudes, Studies 1a, 1b ...... 30

Table 4 - Mean judgments of how likely participants would be to vote for a political candidate advocating for the position in the message, Studies 2a, 2b ...... 39

Table 5 - Mean judgments of argument quality across conditions, Studies 2a, 2b ...... 41

Table 6 - Mean standardized post-manipulation attitude, controlling for standardized pre- manipulation attitude, Studies 2a, 2b ...... 43

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List of Figures

Figure 1 – Mean standardized post-manipulation attitude, controlling for standardized pre-manipulation attitude, Studies 1a, 1b ...... 29

Figure 2 - Mean standardized post-manipulation attitude, controlling for standardized pre-manipulation attitude, Studies 2a, 2b ...... 43

Figure 3 - Mean standardized post-manipulation attitude, controlling for standardized pre-manipulation attitudes in Studies 1b, 2b...... 53

Chapter 1 - Introduction

“The bold are helpless without cleverness” –Euripides

Eight decades ago, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 set the federal minimum wage

of the United States at $.25 per hour. Although it did not mandate a regular update

interval, it has generally been updated every 1-3 years since President Roosevelt signed it into law; the longest interval was 10 years, from 1997 until 2007 (mean duration of 2.54 years; median of only 1). As of June 2018, the federal minimum is $7.25 per hour, having remained unchanged since July of 2009—the third longest delay in revisiting the minimum wage in U.S. history. This is despite the national average minimum living wage (the minimum wage required to pay housing, food, healthcare, childcare, and transportation costs) being estimated at $16.07 per hour (Glasmeier, 2018). In response to this long federal legislative silence and dramatic gap between minimum wages being earned and living wage needs, the “Fight for $15” campaign was started in 2012, advocating in many metropolitan areas across the nation for local $15 per hour minimum wages. Since then, many municipalities and states have, in fact, raised their own minimum wages well above the federal minimum.

The question asked in the present research is what the impact of that movement’s chosen value, $15, has on reception of their message. Would a more modest, albeit less alliterative, Fight for $10 have been a wiser choice in winning more people over to desiring an increase in the minimum wage? What about a bolder, more extreme proposal

of a Fight for $20? This question, of course is not limited to a discussion of minimum wage advocacy, or even to the realm of public policy in general; it can be applied directly to questions as individual as a starting salary discussion or the price to set for a new product. In fact, this relates to any question involving a degree of change: What effect on the reception of a persuasive message proposal does the extremity of the position advocated in the message have? Do mild, moderate, or extreme message positions promote the most attitude change? In addition, an important goal of this research is to examine the mechanism by which the extremity of a message’s position impacts its persuasive impact. In particular, the current research considers the relationship between the extremity of the position advocated and the extent of processing or scrutiny given to the arguments in the message. Was Euripides right in suggesting that bold appeals are helpless without strong arguments, or is there some inherent advantage to taking a bold, extreme position? This question has received surprisingly little attention.

Early work predicted, and found, that messages advocating a position more discrepant from a recipient’s own position are likely to create more change in the recipients’ positions than less discrepant ones (e.g., Hill, 1963; Hovland & Pritzker, 1957).

Subsequent work reigned this in a bit, demonstrating that, unsurprisingly, this has limits; once a position gets too extreme, it becomes less persuasive, creating less change in recipients’ positions than messages with moderate positions (e.g., Bochner & Insko,

1966; Peterson & Koulack,1969).

This curvilinear pattern can be explained by a cognitive response or information processing perspective (e.g., Petty, Ostrom & Brock, 1981), such that as a message’s

position gets more extreme, recipients pay closer attention to the message until the message gets too extreme. That is, at low extremity, messages do not receive much thought, and therefore may create slight positive persuasion, if any at all. However, as the extremity of the message’s position increases, people may be motivated to think more about the message. If so, they may generate more thoughts about the message which could lead to increased persuasion if the arguments are at least moderately strong (e.g.,

Bochner & Insko, 1966) or if people are able to generate some positive thoughts even if no arguments are presented (e.g., Hill, 1963; Hovland & Pritzker, 1957). Finally, as the message position enters the realm of very high extremity or even absurdity, it may no longer warrant attention and thus be dismissed entirely.

After reviewing the prevailing perspectives on position extremity and persuasion, we discuss the cognitive response or information processing perspective just outlined in more detail, which we believe can better explain the range of effects observed in the literature. Along with this information processing perspective, we also introduce a different means of assessing message-induced change than has been traditionally used in the discrepancy and persuasion literature. That is, rather than measuring change in message recipients’ specific preferred positions on message topics as a function of position extremity (e.g., What minimum wage do you prefer?) or acceptance of specifically advocated positions (e.g., To what extent to you agree with a $20 minimum wage), we introduce a more generalized measure of change in attitude, toward the broader topic at hand (e.g., To what extent do you generally support an increase in the minimum wage?). Given the myriad possible topics and, nested within each topic, the

further expansive field of positions one could adopt, it’s nearly impossible for a person to hold an attitude about every specific position on every topic.

Rather, it seems more likely that people would generally tend to think in terms of being for change in an upward or downward direction on an issue, or for no change at all (e.g.,

MacDonald & Rabinowitz, 1998). For example, not many people have a specific budgetary allocation in mind when asked their opinion on funding the United States military. However, they likely do have an opinion on whether the United States should spend more, or less, on defense, than is currently the case. In the present research, we seek to understand how the extremity of a persuasive message’s position can affect support for the general position advocated (e.g., raising the minimum wage), and to what extent this support can be tied to the extent of processing of the message’s supporting arguments, setting aside any acceptance of the particular position advocated in the message or movement in the recipient’s own specific position. For example, it could be that people say they are less in favor of a $20 minimum wage message than a $15 minimum wage message, making it appear that the $20 advocacy was less effective than the $15 advocacy (using a measure from prior research), but those same people could still become more positive toward the idea of raising the minimum wage from its current level following a $20 advocacy message than a $15 advocacy message, making it appear that the $20 advocacy was more effective than the $15 advocacy in garnering support for raising the minimum wage.

Early Models: Distance Proportional.

The earliest work on how a message’s discrepancy from its recipient’s position affects acceptance of the message generally demonstrated that increasing extremity in a message moved participants’ own positions more. For example, a study conducted by Hovland and Pritzker (1957) demonstrated that, when receiving increasing feedback that an authority figured disagreed with participants, increasing extremity in that disagreement resulted in increasing change in participants’ own positions. In this study, participants first reported their agreement (or disagreement) on 7-point Likert scales with a wide- ranging array of 12 statements, including items such as whether they thought George

Washington was a better president than Abraham Lincoln, or whether they agreed with a policy of compulsory voting for those over age 21. After responding to each of these items, they were asked who, out of three or four options, they thought would be the greatest authority figure on that specific topic (e.g., historians, teachers, or parents). One month later, a follow-up session was conducted, in which participants were told that they would rate the same items in order to test for the stability of opinions, but that they would be provided the opinions of various authority figures “to make the study more interesting” (Hovland & Pritzker, 1957, p 258).

Participants were randomly assigned, between subjects, to whether the “authority figures” differed from their original responses by 1, 2, or 3 scale points. When authority figures differed from participants’ initial response by two points, participants changed their own response more, in the direction of the authority figure, than when the authority figure was only one point different. This difference was even greater when the authority figures

were reported to differ by three points. Thus, this work demonstrated that, when

presented with opinions different from one’s own, increasing the degree of that difference

in a persuasive message’s position leads to greater change in message recipient’s own

stated positions. Said more plainly, people appeared to move their own positions more

and more to match the position of an authority figure as they learned they differ to a greater degree. In this study, however, the authority figures differed in expressed scale points on an opinion scale from the recipient, and not in their endorsement of a specific value as in the minimum wage example. Additionally, these issues were of little importance: It is likely of little concern to somebody whether they “slightly agree” or

“strongly agree” that George Washington was a better president than Abraham Lincoln.

In a subsequent extension of this concept, Hill (1963) predicted that, based on Festinger’s dissonance theory (1957), messages more discrepant from one’s own can induce more attitude change, especially if they are conveyed by a credible speaker, as this would lead to greater cognitive dissonance. Once again, participants gave their positions on 12 topics, this time in the form of 7-point Thurstone-type scales, indicating with which of the seven statements they most agreed, and any others they found agreeable, as well as the most disagreeable and any others they found disagreeable (e.g., on the topic of running a 3:50 mile, possible responses ranged from “It is completely beyond the limits of human endurance to run a mile in 3 minutes 50 seconds” to It is certain that one day a man will run the mile in 3 minutes 50 seconds.”). They also answered an “authority figure” question similar to that in the study by Hovland & Pritzker (1957), and rated the importance of each topic.

In this study, the extremity of authority figures’ most-agreeable responses varied on nine

of the statements, this time within subject, once again varying between one and three

points different from the participant’s most-agreeable position. Participants in the high credibility condition received responses ostensibly from their highest ranked authority figure on the topic; those in the moderate credibility condition were told they received responses from their fourth-ranked authority figure; those in the low credibility condition received responses labeled as being from an obviously biased or irrelevant source.

Attitude change in this study was measured as being the number of statements a participant moved when identifying their “most acceptable” position at time 2. Once again, the researchers found that increasing discrepancy of a message’s position from a recipient’s position leads to greater change in what participants considered their most agreeable statement. Unsurprisingly, highly credible sources also created more change than moderately credible sources, who in turn created less change than the least credible sources. The interaction of extremity and source credibility was not significant, however; they found only two main effects. While overall low, importance of topics did not have an effect either.

Subsequent Work: Curvilinear Hypothesis.

Of course, the success of increasing extremity leading to increased persuasion must have limits. Subsequent work sought to probe these limits. For example, Bochner and Insko

(1966) examined this in a study that moved away from the mere opinion-endorsement of

Thurstone or Likert scales to advocacy of positions that differed numerically from a participant’s initial stand (i.e., advocating specific hours per night that a person should

sleep). This work demonstrated that, as the extremity of a persuasive message nears its numeric limits (i.e., zero hours of sleep per night), its persuasiveness wanes. In this study, participants read a three-page essay allegedly written by either a highly credible author (a Nobel laureate in physiology) or a moderately credible author (the director of a large city’s YMCA), advocating for a new healthy standard of nightly sleep anywhere from 8 to zero hours of sleep (at one-hour intervals). As the number of hours’ sleep advocated fell, so too did participants’ own opinion on the optimal amount of sleep, but only to a point. In the moderate-credibility condition, this was curvilinear, such that participants’ opinions moved most at moderate message positions, reaching as low as 6.5 hours per night when the moderate-credibility author advocated for just 3 hours per night.

When the moderately credible author got even more extreme, advocating for 2, 1, or even zero hours, however, there was a “boomerang effect,” with participants’ resulting opinions of a healthy night’s sleep actually increasing (6.9, 6.9, and 7.3 hours, respectively). On the other hand, the high credibility author technically produced a linear pattern, with decreasing recommendations yielding lower personal opinions of the required number of hours’ sleep per night. However, at the lower limit of zero, even the expert lost his directional effect on recipients’ opinions, with participants’ estimates of the optimal number of hours climbing back up from 5.7 hours, when the high credibility speaker advocated 1 hour, to about 6.8 hours when they advocated for 0 hours. High credibility speakers were able to push to the very limits of extremity in the position of their message before it appeared to hurt their persuasiveness. However, moderately

credible sources showed a significant downturn in persuasiveness as they increased their position’s extremity.

This curvilinear pattern closely aligns with the predictions of the social judgment theory of persuasion (Sherif & Hovland, 1961).1 Said briefly, social judgment theory predicts that people judge novel positions in terms of how they fit into their own attitude structure: If they are within one’s “latitude of acceptance” (the range of positions people find acceptable), they generally assimilate that position toward their own, essentially considering it “close enough” to their own position and accepting it. This, in turn, moves their own position closer to that statement. In contrast, when they judge a position to be in their “latitude of rejection” (the range of positions they consider unacceptable), they contrast away from that, considering it too extreme and rejecting it. However, when positions are near the boundary of the two latitudes, or in the “latitude of noncommitment,” they choose not to take a strong stance toward them. Social judgment theory predicts that messages advocating for positions in the latitude of noncommitment provide the greatest opportunity for persuasion (Sherif & Sherif, 1967).

This prediction of accepting increasingly extreme positions, so long as they are within (or near) the latitude of acceptance, until they eventually get too far into one’s latitude of rejection, yields a curvilinear prediction of message position extremity on attitude change. As people assimilate positions further from their own, this also exerts some force

1 This is also consistent with more contemporary mathematical modeling efforts to predict the relationship between message extremity and persuasion, which generally show a positive, but non-monotonic relationship (e.g., Fink & Cai, 2012; Fink, Kaplowitz, & Bauer, 1983). However, because this work has focused strictly on testing the predictions under this model rather than any mechanisms underlying it, we do not focus on it here. 9

on their own position, “pulling” people increasingly further from their original position,

until the message gets extreme enough that the recipient begins contrasting away from it.

In one demonstration of this prediction, Peterson & Koulack (1969) asked participants to

rate their attitude toward the Vietnam war on a Thurstone-type scale, indicating which of

10 statements, ranging from one suggesting that the only solution is complete destruction of North Vietnam to one stating that the U.S. should withdraw immediately, they considered most acceptable. They also indicated other statements they considered acceptable (i.e., their latitude of acceptance), as well as the statement they found most unacceptable and others they found unacceptable (i.e., their latitude of rejection). Three weeks later, they were asked to write a 500-word essay supporting a different statement from that which they chose as their most acceptable statement. They were then asked to re-rate the full range of statements with their most acceptable, other acceptable ones, the most unacceptable, and other unacceptable ones. Position change was measured as the distance between their initial most-accepted position and the position they chose as most acceptable after writing the essay in support of a different position. As predicted by social judgment theory, a (descriptively) curvilinear pattern was observed, as writing an essay in support of statements closer to the bounds of the latitude of acceptance, even a little bit into their latitude of rejection, moved participants’ own positions more than writing for more moderate positions that were well within their latitude of acceptance or positions that were well into their latitude of rejection.

This curvilinear finding is consistent with the prediction that a latitude of noncommitment, between acceptance and rejection, is especially important in the context

of persuasion. Even if people initially reject a position that is at the bounds of their latitude of rejection, they can be persuaded toward that. The social judgment approach’s predictions, however, do not enjoy unconstrained support. Eagly & Telaak, (1972) demonstrated, for example, that persuasion may not depend on where in a person’s attitude structure a statement falls that determines how persuasive it is, but rather how wide a person’s latitude of acceptance is that determines how persuasive any given statement will be to that person.

Information Processing & Cognitive Response Approach

Thus far, we have summarized research that demonstrates that increasing the discrepancy of a message’s position from that of its recipient’s position can have a positive linear relationship with subsequent movement in the recipient’s own position if the topics are of low importance, or the messages do not approach some physical or practical limit (e.g., zero hours of sleep, Bochner & Insko, 1966; a life sentence in prison, Kaplowitz, Fink,

Mulcrone, Atkin, & Dabil, 1991), and/or are not supported by any reasons (e.g., Hill,

1963; Hovland & Pritzker, 1957). Furthermore, research has shown that increasing discrepancy can produce a non-monotonic relationship with attitude change—at some point, the persuasiveness of a message begins to decrease as its extremity nears its limit

(e.g., zero hours of sleep per night; Bochner & Insko, 1966), or perhaps if the topic is of relatively greater relevance or importance (e.g., the Vietnam war; Peterson & Koulack,

1969).

Still other research suggests that increasing extremity can, under certain conditions, negatively impact a message’s persuasiveness. The cognitive response (Greenwald,

1968) approach to persuasion argues that the recipient of a message is an active receiver who elaborates on, and reacts to, a persuasive message (Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981).

Thus, whether a factor in a persuasive message will have a positive or negative effect on the message’s persuasiveness depends critically on how message recipients react to it. In this vein, Brock (1967) demonstrated that, as participants anticipated increasingly extreme proposals to increase tuition at their university, they prepared more counter- arguments against the forthcoming proposal. This increased counter-argumentation was also significantly associated with decreased acceptance of the specific proposed tuition as it became more extreme. The linear pattern of (dis)agreement in this work may be explained by the lack of supporting arguments: Participants were simply warned of a forthcoming, hypothetical message. Being provided with increasingly extreme

(presumably counter-attitudinal) tuition led to greater and greater counter-argument production. However, the counter-arguments did not need to counter any specific arguments. Thus, any counter-argument against raising tuition may have felt compelling to these participants. A more rigorous test of the cognitive response approach would provide either strong or weak arguments, so that those presented with strong arguments would have a harder time counter-arguing, and therefore may be more persuaded as discrepancy increases compared to those presented with weak arguments.

We argue that this cognitive response or information processing perspective may help to explain the variety of effects revealed by researchers. That is, the hypothesis tested in the current research is that when a message advocates for an increasingly extreme position, message recipients process the message more carefully. If true, only messages that are

strong and difficult to counter-argue should show increasingly positive attitude change as

discrepancy increases (to a point) consistent with the distance proportional perspective

(Hill, 1963; Hovland & Pritzker, 1957; Kaplowitz, Fink, Mulcrone, Atkin, & Dabil,

1991). In contrast, messages containing weak, easy-to-counterargue arguments should instead be hurt by their extremity if it is increasing message-relevant processing, similar to Brock’s (1967) work containing no arguments but advocating for increasingly undesirable outcomes (i.e., outcomes people were motivated and able to counterargue).

The current research also examines the proposition that as the position advocated gets increasingly extreme, crossing into the realm of absurdity, recipients should decrease in their motivation to process, creating the curvilinear pattern most often observed when at least moderately strong arguments presented and/or participants are motivated to process due to a relevant topic being chosen or a heavy demand is made of them (e.g., Bochner &

Insko, 1966; Peterson & Koulack, 1969). An absurdly extreme position becomes too extreme to be worth one’s attention. To the extent that this is true it would produce the curvilinear effect observed across several studies, at least when strong arguments are used. That is, when the arguments are strong, an inverted-U pattern should be observed but when the arguments are weak, a U-pattern should be seen. Indeed, this has been proposed before (Kaplowitz & Fink, 1997), but was only examined in one prior study that will be described later (i.e., Siero & Doosje, 1993).

The proposition that increasing message extremity produces increased information processing is consistent with work showing that messages seen as counter-attitudinal can motivate more message processing than messages seen as pro-attitudinal, if the message

threatens the recipient’s own attitudes/beliefs or expectations (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty,

1979; Smith & Petty, 1996). That is, counter-attitudinal messages and increasingly

discrepant messages might similarly be seen as threatening. 2 However, this prior work

has only looked at whether a message is directionally pro or counter attitudinal; it has not

investigated the effect on information processing of increasing extremities of a message.

It seems intuitive to suggest that the extremity of a message may have different effects at

different extremities. That is, a mild, non-extreme pro-attitudinal message is probably

not the same as a moderately extreme pro-attitudinal message. Some work does suggest that extreme pro-attitudinal arguments can backfire, tempering the attitudes/beliefs of those who had extreme positions to begin (Hameiri, Porat, Bar-Tal, Bieler, & Halperin,

2014; Swann, Pelham, & Chidester, 1988). Nonetheless, although the current research does not specifically address the effect of position extremity on proattitudinal versus counterattitudinal messages, in some studies in this dissertation the overall position advocated is generally proattitudinal (i.e., raising the minimum wage) whereas in other studies the overall position advocated is generally counterattitudinal (i.e., raising tuition).

Yet, as will be seen, the impact of discrepancy on attitudes is similar across these topics.

There is also a wealth of research demonstrating that messages violating the expectations

of recipients lead to greater message scrutiny (e.g., Baker & Petty, 1994; Garcia-

Marques, Mackie, Maitner, & Claypool, 2016; Petty, Fleming, Priester, & Feinstein,

2 Some research has shown that pro-attitudinal messages can sometimes motivate more message processing than counterattitudinal messages especially if processing provides an opportunity to bolster one’s initially weak attitude (Clark & Wegener, 2013). That is, when one’s attitude is weak, processing a counter message may be too threatening. The differing effects of pro versus counter-attitudinal messages that vary in extremity of the position taken is not addressed in the current research where position is held constant and only extremity is varied. 14

2001; Smith & Petty, 1996), processing is increased presumably to allow people to make sense of their violated expectations. Similarly, if not dismissed outright, an extreme advocacy might activate a biased set of possible explanations in seeking to explain the extreme position being taken in the message (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999) or even create inferences of greater need for stronger underlying arguments if processing is particularly high as they attempt to evaluate the message’s merit (see Wegener, Petty, Blankenship, &

Detweiler-Bedell, 2010).

In sum, early work suggested that the relative extremity of a message had an impact on its efficacy in persuading message recipients: Increasingly extreme messages created more attitude change in recipients, up to a point. Positions too extreme, however, began

to get less effective, perhaps even backfiring. The current research will investigate the

impact of position extremity on attitudes toward the general direction of the advocacy.

Each study will manipulate extremity of the position taken (from low to high levels) and

then present participants with a message that varies in the quality of the arguments

presented (i.e., strong versus weak arguments). It is expected that when the message is

strong, increasing extremity (up to a point) will lead to increasingly positive persuasion,

or persuasion in the direction advocated. This is because if people process strong

messages more as discrepancy increases, they will come to better appreciate the strength

of the arguments leading to more persuasion. However, when the message is weak,

increasing extremity (up to a point) will lead to increasingly negative persuasion, or

persuasion in the opposite direction of that advocated. This is because if people process

weak messages more as discrepancy increases, they will come to better appreciate the

flaws in the arguments leading to reduced persuasion. This interaction pattern of

discrepancy and argument quality is the pattern expected if increasing extremity increases

message processing, at least up to some point. Many prior studies have shown that

variables that increase message processing such as increased message repetition

(Cacioppo & Petty, 1979) or increased personal relevance (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979)

interact with argument quality to affect attitudes (see Petty & Wegener, 1998, for a

review; see Carpenter, 2015, for a meta-analysis of variables that interact with argument quality). With respect to past work on how the extremity of a message’s position impacts persuasion, there is a dearth of published work manipulating both the extremity of a

persuasive message’s position and the cogency of the arguments supporting that position,

so we cannot be sure whether discrepancy will interact with argument quality or not.

In only one instance (Siero & Doosje, 1993) were we able to find discrepancy or

extremity of message position orthogonally manipulated with argument quality. In this

work, messages were sent to participants who had previously reported their position on a

19-statement Thurstone-style proximity scale (i.e., reporting their agreement with 19

statements such as “Instead of taking environment protecting measures against

automobile driving, the road system should be expanded”). Although they did not find

an argument quality by discrepancy interaction on attitude change overall, an interaction

pattern emerged for participants who reported that they were motivated to think about the

message. This pattern indicated that argument quality affected attitudes more when the

message appeared in the latitude of non-commitment (moderate discrepancy) than when

it appeared in the latitudes of acceptance or rejection. Although this interaction pattern is

in accord with the hypothesis that moderate discrepancy increased information processing over low and high discrepancy, this study also showed a reverse interaction pattern among participants who reported that they were not motivated to think about the issue.

That is, for these individuals, a reverse argument quality effect emerged in the latitude of non-commitment with weak arguments being more persuasive than strong ones. Because of these unexpected results, our aim was to provide another test of the hypothesis that message discrepancy can motivate increased information processing at least up to a point of high extremity. The current research also moves away from the social judgment theory perspective of discrepancy and latitudes, in favor of a simpler “extremity” framing, and in favor of a more domain-general, directional attitude change approach (e.g., becoming more positive toward a “pro-environment” worldview, without necessarily taking a new position or stance in the environment-versus-automobile continuum).

Elaboration Likelihood Model’s multiple roles postulate

Past work focused on the effect of message extremity as a direct effect on attitude change without delving much into the mechanisms by which the attitude change may have occurred. However, in the years since work on message discrepancy receded from popularity, the persuasion field has made large strides. One critical update to the field comes from the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo,

1986), which, like the cognitive response approach (Greenwald, 1986), posits that targets of persuasion are active recipients of information, and that how they are impacted by a message will rely critically on how carefully they elaborate on the message. Especially important to the current research is postulate three of the ELM, which states that any

variable in a persuasive context can operate in multiple ways: as central arguments,

peripheral cues, and/or affecting the extent or biasing the direction of elaboration. We

argue that most work in extremity and discrepancy affecting attitude change has focused

on extremity either as an argument, a peripheral cue, or a directionally biasing variable.

In each instance, extremity would be expected to have one effect on persuasion –

generally increasing it at least up to a point. With the exception of the Siero and Doosje

(1993) study over 25 years ago, prior research has not examined the possibility that position extremity may function as a determinant of the extent of elaboration, affecting attitude change indirectly through the thoughts that are produced in response to the message.3 Specifically, when a message is rather low in extremity, it may not elicit much

processing, thus creating little attitude change to either strong or weak arguments. As its

extremity climbs, however, the message demands more of our attention, thus producing

positive change when thoughts are favorable (i.e., when the arguments are strong) and

negative change when thoughts are unfavorable (i.e., when the arguments are weak). At

a certain point, however, the extremity of the message becomes so great that it is no

longer worth consideration, thus reducing message-related elaboration, and reducing the effect of the message quality on people’s attitudes.

Notably, past work can be fit to this model. Prior research showing a positive, linear

“distance proportional” relationship generally featured relatively low motivation to counterargue: learning that an authority figure differed from you on a scale of “strongly

3Kaplowitz and Fink (1997) suggested that increased information processing was a possible effect of message discrepancy but this was only a suggestion arrived upon from a review of the literature, rather than an empirical test. 18

disagree” to “strongly agree” in response to nine to twelve random statements (i.e., Hill,

1963; Hovland & Pritzker, 1957) does not seem especially likely to motivate strong reactions. Similarly, reading a three-page essay, written by a physiologist who has received a Nobel prize for his work, arguing for a specific number of hours’ sleep per night may be difficult to swallow as that number shrinks toward zero, but the credibility of the source, and the length and strength of the piece (3 pages), presumably made it quite difficult to counterargue (Bochner & Insko, 1966). In such instances, increasing discrepancy would likely be associated with more positive thoughts.

On the other hand, when a contentious topic was presented to participants with zero supporting arguments, participants readily produced counterarguments, and subsequently agreed less with the proposal (Brock, 1967). Work demonstrating a curvilinear pattern falls somewhere in between these: Writing a 500-page essay supporting a novel position toward the Vietnam war, for example, likely became more and more difficult (i.e., more and more counter-arguments spontaneously came to mind) as the extremity of the position increased (Peterson & Koulack, 1969), thus creating a curvilinear pattern of persuasion.

In the present research, we aim to test this information processing prediction. Across two sets of two studies, both the extremity of a message’s position and the quality of arguments supporting that position are manipulated independently. We predict that the established curvilinear effect of discrepancy will be moderated by argument quality:

When supported by strong messages, moderately extreme positions will create the more positive (i.e., in the direction advocated) attitude change than mild or very extreme

positions. However, when supported by weak, easy-to-counterargue arguments, we

predict the opposite pattern: Messages with moderately extreme positions will create

more negative (i.e., away from the direction advocated) attitude change than mild or very

extreme positions. Because of the importance of directional, over proximal (or

positional) thinking on sociopolitical issues (MacDonald & Rabinowitz, 1998), we also

move away from the measures of message acceptance used in much prior research which

focused on support for the specific position advocated (e.g., do you favor a $20 minimum

wage?). Instead we measure attitude change as directional attitude change or change in attitudes toward the issue at hand (e.g., do you favor increasing the minimum wage?), setting aside any consideration of specific values or positions. In this way, participants at

each level of message extremity can be given the exact same attitude measure. In S

In Chapters 2 and 3, we examine the notion that increasing extremity of the position

taken will increase information processing. In each chapter, the results from two similar

studies are combined. The studies reported in the different chapters use different

message topics. Then, in Chapter 4, data from studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3 are

revisited to examine the notion that information processing ceases if the message position

taken becomes too extreme.

Chapter 2 - Studies 1a and 1b

Introduction

In this work, we seek to orthogonally manipulate message position extremity and

argument quality. As noted earlier, we predict that, as extremity increases, participants

will elaborate more on the message contents (until a very high level of extremity is reached). Thus, even if a message’s position is not accepted, if the message contains compelling arguments, recipients will be directionally persuaded: They will become more positive toward the general direction advocated in the message. If it contains weak arguments, however, they will react against the direction advocated more as extremity increases. We collapse across two independent studies because materials were shared, and this analysis would maximize power to detect the predicted interaction.

Method

Participants

Participants consisted of adults recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Study 1a consisted of 300 participants (170 female; Mage = 36.6; SDage = 11.5 years), and study 1b

consisted of 301 participants (174 female; Mage = 36.1 years; SDage = 11.8 years). Data from all participants who completed the critical pre- and post-manipulation attitude measures are included, with no other exclusion criteria enforced except as noted below.

All participants were paid $.50 for their participation.

Pre-manipulation attitude measure.

Participants first reported their attitudes toward a series of sociopolitical topics, including

the critical item of “Do you think the federal minimum wage should be increased?”

(anchored at “1: Should not be raised at all” and “7: Should be raised a lot”). See

Appendix A for the full list of measures and Appendix B for means. After completing

these measures, participants were told a topic had been randomly selected from the items they had just completed, and that they would read an abbreviated letter to the editor in the

St. Louis Post-Dispatch regarding the topic, from which we had extracted the position and main arguments of the author.

Independent Variables.

All participants were assigned to read about increasing the federal minimum wage, with the extremity of the proposal put forth in the message and the quality of the supporting arguments being manipulated orthogonally. Specifically, both Studies 1a and 1b

consisted of a 3 (extremity: $10/hr, $20/hr, $40/hr) × 2 (argument quality: strong, weak)

between-subjects design.4

Position extremity. To vary extremity, all messages began with a statement of the

author’s proposed federal minimum wage in dollars per hour and the full-time annual

salary equivalent. In both Study 1a and 1b, the levels of this manipulation were $10/hr

4These are the conditions that are common across Studies 1a and 1b and can therefore be analyzed together to achieve greater statistical power. In addition to these conditions, Study 1a (but not 1b) included a “moderate quality arguments” condition, and Study 1b (but not 1a) included an even more extreme proposal of $80 per hour as the minimum wage. Means of the full design of Study 1a including the moderate quality arguments condition (150 participants) are presented in Appendix C. Inclusion of this condition does not change any interpretation of the results. Analysis of the full design of Study 1b including the $80 proposal condition (103 participants) is presented later in this dissertation in Chapter 4, as the more extreme value is not hypothesized to behave similarly to the other conditions. 22

(38% increase; $20,880 annual full time equivalent), $20/hr (176% increase; $41,760 annual full time equivalent), and $40/hr (452% increase; $83,520 annual full time equivalent). Participants were also informed about the current minimum wage. For example, in the $20 per hour condition, the introduction to the message read: “The federal minimum wage should be $20/hr (up from the current level of $7.25), equaling

$41,760/yr for a full-time position.”

Argument quality. Immediately following the stated position, the advocacy was supported with either strong or weak arguments. Specifically, directly beneath the statement of the author’s position were four bullet-pointed arguments supporting the proposed increase. These arguments were pretested on 35 students at a large Midwestern university, in exchange for partial course credit or extra credit, to be either all relatively strong arguments (i.e., all statements rated as greater than 5.25 on a scale of argument quality ranging from “1: very weak” to “9: very strong”) or all weak arguments (all statements were under 3.75), consistent with Petty and Cacioppo (1986).5 An example strong argument stated that “minimum wage is not just for teens and part-time workers:

80% of minimum wage earners are over age 25, and 73% are full time employees.”

Other strong arguments focused on the public burden of assisting those who earn the current minimum wage, the exaggerated nature of claims of costs impacting businesses

5 Petty & Cacioppo (1986) suggest subsequently verifying the strength of arguments by asking different participants to provide their thoughts to the messages, which are then rated by independent coders as positive toward the message, negative, or neutral. In the current research, we operate under the assumption that a simple rating of persuasiveness is sufficient, with mean ratings falling below the scale midpoint representing weak arguments and those falling above the scale midpoint representing strong arguments (and those roughly at the midpoint representing moderate-strength arguments). This is because prior research suggests that such ratings are associated with messages that elicit the appropriate pattern of thoughts (e.g., ratings below the scale midpoint on argument quality being associated with messages that produce primarily negative thoughts when people are instructed to think about them). 23

and consumers, and that it would positively impact the wage of more than just those

currently earning minimum wage.

An example weak argument stated that “increasing the minimum wage will help workers

to afford the modern luxuries of 4k resolution TVs, cutting edge smartphones and tablets,

and the luxury vehicles that everyone deserves to have.” Other weak arguments focused

on the need for generous wealth for basic happiness, that every job exists out of necessity

translating into every job deserving the same amount of pay, and that higher minimum

wage will make the U.S. look better and draw more unskilled laborers to fill positions.

The full texts of all persuasive messages are presented in Appendix C.

Dependent measures.

Manipulation checks. After reading the persuasive message, participants were asked (1) to what extent they agreed with the specific position on a 7-point scale ranging from

“extremely disagree” to “extremely agree,” (2) how strong (or weak) they considered the author’s arguments to be on a 7-point scale ranging from “extremely weak” to “extremely

strong”, and (3) some filler items unrelated to our hypotheses. The message-specific

questions were intended as manipulation checks. That is, more extreme [discrepant]

positions should be associated with less agreement with that specific position, and strong

arguments should be rated as stronger than weak ones.

General attitude measure. Following response to the manipulation check items,

participants read,

“Of course, we also need to know a bit more about how you feel about increasing

the minimum wage, from its current level of $7.25/hr in general. Please respond

to the rest of these questions about the general idea of increasing the minimum

wage above its current level, rather than the more specific proposal put forth in

the letter to the editor” (emphases original).

Following this emphatic dismissal of the specific position advocated in the message, they

then completed the key measure of attitudes toward increasing the federal minimum

wage. This was a single bipolar item stating, “Increasing the minimum wage above its

current level is…” with response options anchored at 1 (“Extremely bad”) and 7

(“Extremely good”). Because the pre- and post-manipulation measures of attitude toward

the general idea of increasing the minimum wage used different questions that were

responded to on different scales, each measure was standardized prior to the subtraction.

After completing a series of ancillary measures and demographics, participants were debriefed and released.6

Results

An initial test of whether study (1a or 1b) moderates our effect of interest was conducted

solely to test the three-way interaction of extremity, argument quality, and study.

Specifically, a regression testing for the effects of extremity, argument quality, study, and

their interactions on the effect of post-manipulation attitudes, controlling for pre- manipulation attitudes was run. The three-way interaction was not significant, β = -.03

(95% CI = [-.12, .07]), t(592) = -0.55, p = .584. Thus, we present subsequent analyses

with both studies collapsed.

6 Measures assessing objective and subjective ambivalence, as well as attitude certainty, were included for exploratory purposes. Condition means for all measures can be found in Appendix B. 25

Manipulation checks

Using the conditional analysis macro (“PROCESS”) for SPSS developed by Hayes

(2013), we first regressed agreement with the author’s position on to the proposed

minimum wage proposed (entered as continuous), the argument quality manipulation

(weak arguments coded as -1, strong coded as 1), and their interaction. We intended this

measure of agreement with the position taken as a proxy for perceived extremity, as more extreme statements should engender lower agreement with the specific position advocated. The regression revealed a significant conditional effect of position extremity,

β = -1.19 (95% CI = [-1.35, -1.03]), t(595) = -14.62, p < .001, suggesting that our

extremity manipulation succeeded. The regression also reveals a significant conditional

effect of argument quality, β = .24 (95% CI = [.08, .40]), t(595) = 2.99, p = .003,

indicating less agreement with weak than strong arguments; and a non-significant

interaction, β = .02 (95% CI = [-.14, .18]), t(595) = .20, p = .839. See Table 1 for

condition means.

Low Moderate Extremity Extremity Extreme Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Study 1a Strong 5.18 0.28 3.65 0.27 2.32 0.28 Weak 5.06 0.28 3.06 0.27 1.76 0.29 Study 1b Strong 5.21 0.29 3.80 0.28 2.19 0.27 Weak 4.46 0.27 3.40 0.28 1.72 0.28 Collapsed Strong 5.20 0.20 3.73 0.20 2.26 0.20 Weak 4.76 0.20 3.23 0.20 1.74 0.20 Note: Bolded numbers indicate that strong and weak condition are significantly different from one another at p < .05; italicized numbers indicate that strong and weak condition trend toward being different from one another at p ≤ .15

Table 1 - Mean agreement with position advocated in message, Studies 1a, 1b

A second regression, testing the effects of the same predictors on subjective perception of argument quality, revealed a significant conditional effect of manipulated argument quality, β = 1.02 (95% CI = [.89, 1.16]), t(597) = 14.68, p < .001, indicating that our argument quality manipulation succeeded. The regression also revealed a significant conditional effect of position extremity, β = -.48 (95% CI = [-.62, -.35]), t(597) = -6.94, p

< .001; and a significant interaction, β = -.18 (95% CI = [-.31, -.04]), t(597) = -2.52, p =

.012. The interaction indicated that as extremity increased, the argument quality manipulation had a larger effect on perceived argument quality. See Table 2 for condition means. This provides some initial evidence that extremity may have enhanced attention to the quality of the arguments presented. Prior research has shown similar effects in which a variable increasing motivation to think was associated with message persuasiveness ratings that were more responsive to argument quality (e.g., Cacioppo,

Petty, & Morris, 1983; Luttrell, Petty, & Xu, 2017).

Low Moderate Extremity Extremity Extreme Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Study 1a Strong 5.33 0.24 4.35 0.24 3.33 0.24 Weak 2.71 0.24 2.25 0.24 1.77 0.25 Study 1b Strong 5.19 0.25 4.42 0.24 3.85 0.24 Weak 2.48 0.24 2.94 0.24 2.02 0.24 Collapsed Strong 5.26 0.17 4.38 0.17 3.59 0.17 Weak 2.60 0.17 2.60 0.17 1.89 0.17 Note: Bolded numbers indicate that strong and weak condition are significantly different from one another at p < .05; italicized numbers indicate that strong and weak condition trend toward being different from one another at p ≤ .15

Table 2 - Mean judgments of argument quality across conditions, Studies 1a, 1b

Attitude change

A measure of attitude change, representing standardized post-manipulation attitudes

toward the general proposal of increasing the minimum wage, controlling for

standardized pre-manipulation attitudes toward the issue is graphed in Figure 1.

0.15

0.1 manipulation manipulation - 0.05 Weak Argument Quality

0 Strong Argument manipulation attitudes,

- Quality attitdues -0.05

-0.1 Standardized post Standardized controlling for standardized pre standardized for controlling -0.15 Low Wage Proposal Extremity High Wage Proposal (-1 SD) Extremity (+1 SD)

Figure 1 – Mean standardized post-manipulation attitude, controlling for standardized pre-manipulation attitude, Studies 1a, 1b

Regressing attitude change on to the proposed minimum wage (10, 20, or 40, entered as a continuous variable), the argument quality manipulation (weak arguments coded as -1, strong coded as 1), and their interaction, reveals the predicted interaction, β = .05 (95%

CI = [.00, .10]), t(596) = 2.15, p = .032, such that as extremity of the persuasive message position increased, argument quality had a greater effect on post-manipulation attitudes, with strong arguments creating more positive attitudes than weak arguments.

Testing the effect of argument quality on post-manipulation attitudes, controlling for pre- manipulation attitudes, using a separate ANCOVA at each level of extremity yields a nonsignificant effect at the lowest level of extremity, F(1, 194) = 0.43, p = .511. At the moderate extremity, the argument quality effect is marginal, F(1, 201) = 3.22, p = .074.

At the most extreme level, however, the effect of argument quality is significant, F(1,

197) = 5.05, p = .026. See Table 3 for condition means.

Low Moderate Extremity Extremity Extreme Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Study 2a Strong -0.02 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.08 Weak 0.08 0.08 -0.19 0.08 -0.13 0.09 Study 2b Strong 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.08 Weak 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.08 -0.08 0.08 Collapsed Strong 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.06 Weak 0.06 0.06 -0.10 0.06 -0.11 0.06 Note: Bolded numbers indicate that strong and weak condition are significantly different from one another at p < .05; italicized numbers indicate that strong and weak condition trend toward being different from one another at p ≤ .15 Table 3 - Mean standardized post-manipulation attitudes, controlling for pre- manipulation attitudes, Studies 1a, 1b

The main regression also revealed a predicted significant conditional effect of argument

quality, β = .05 (95% CI = [.00, .09]), t(596) = 2.05, p = .041, such that attitudes were

more favorable in the strong argument condition than weak. Critically, as predicted, but

contrary to past work on extremity or discrepancy, the conditional main effect of position

extremity was not significant, β = -.01 (95% CI = [-.05, .04]), t(596) = -0.33, p = .740.

Re-running this regression with study as a factor reveals neither a conditional effect of,

nor any interactions with, study (all p’s > .3).7

7 There are alternative way to examine the hypothesis other than looking attitudes toward the issue post- message while controlling for pre-message attitudes. For example, a regression analysis testing the effects on post-manipulation attitudes minus pre-manipulation attitudes does not change the interpretation, neither does conducting an analysis of variance rather than a regression. In a regression of post message attitudes minus pre, the extremity × argument quality interaction is significant, β = .06 (95% CI = [.01, .11]), t(597) = 2.47, p = .014. In addition, the argument quality effect is significant, β = .06 (95% CI = [.01, .11]), t(597) = 2.44, p = .015.; but the effect of extremity again is not, , β = -.01 (95% CI = [-.06, .04]), t(597) = -0.51, p = .613. In conducting a 2 (AQ) X 3 (Extremity) ANOVA on the attitude change measure, the interaction is again significant, F(2, 595) = 3.55, p = .029; Arg Quality F(1, 595) = 6.37, p = .012; Extremity F(2, 595) = 30

Discussion

Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that, at least in the range of message position values used

across these two studies, increasing message discrepancy appears to increase the impact of argument quality on attitudes, consistent with the view that the increased discrepancy

increased message processing. Another notable finding from these studies is that a

measure of acceptance of a specific advocated position was not affected in the same way

as acceptance of the general idea of a minimum wage increase. That is, acceptance of the

specific position advocated decreased in a linear fashion with the extremity of that

position regardless of the quality of the arguments used to support it. In contrast,

directional attitudes toward the topic more broadly were impacted differently depending

on the quality of the arguments presented. That is, when thinking about the general idea

behind the message, rather than the specific value advocated, increasing discrepancy did

not always reduce persuasion, but only when the arguments were weak.

Considering the wide range of values used here (a modest $10/hour federal minimum

wage to a rather extreme $40/hour), we believe this is a novel contribution. Instead of the

more classic view of extremity directly contributing to persuasive success or failure, the

current research demonstrated that the impact of extremity depends on the quality of the

arguments presented. Specifically, argument quality mattered more for resultant attitudes

the more discrepant the position taken. This is consistent with the view that extremity

may be determining the degree to which people elaborate on the message. That is, as a

0.61, p = .545. Finally, in an ANCOVA, controlling for pre: Interaction F(2, 593) = 2.21, p = .110; Arg Quality F(1, 593) = 3.44, p = .064; Extremity F(2, 594) = 0.39, p = .676.

message position increases in extremity, people pay closer attention to the message

arguments and their cogency. Thus, if an extreme message contains very strong

arguments in favor of its proposition, its extreme position does not necessarily serve as a

negative cue to outright rejection. An extreme position may even facilitate attitude change if the message arguments are compelling enough, as people will process the good arguments more carefully than if the message’s position were modest. Although the enhanced processing does not lead to greater agreement with the specific extreme position taken, it could enhance support for the general proposal (i.e., increasing the minimum wage). If, however, the message’s supporting arguments are not very good, increased extremity of the message’s position will lead message recipients to scrutinize these bad reasons more carefully, in turn leading them to become even more negative toward the idea behind the message than if the source had advocated for a more modest position.

Chapter 3 - Studies 2a and 2b

Introduction

Studies 1a and 1b provided initial evidence that the extremity of a position can impact processing of a message, and, subsequently, that the quality of supporting arguments moderates the effect of message position extremity on persuasion. Specifically, at low extremity, recipients did not process the message carefully. However, as extremity of the

message’s position increased, message recipients paid closer attention to the content of

the message. Thus, when a message contains strong, difficult-to-counterargue arguments,

even though more extreme positions may not be accepted, the arguments contained

therein have the potential to create directional attitude change toward the topic being

discussed.

In Study 2, we sought to replicate this effect in a new sample (college students) and with

a new, counter-attitudinal topic (increasing tuition at their university). Moving away

from brief Mechanical Turk studies also provided the opportunity to use more rich

materials and measures. In Study 2, we shift from a manipulation containing bullet

points to a full 475-word (in the strong argument condition) or 481-word (in the weak

argument condition) essay. We also move away from using a single post-manipulation

attitude item to a more reliable 4-item aggregate measure. Due to subject pool

constraints across terms, we again combine two studies sharing nearly identical

conditions.

Method

Participants

Participants consisted of undergraduates from a large Midwestern university. Study 2a

consisted of 144 participants (80 female; Mage = 19.3 years; SDage = 1.6 years), and study

2b consisted of 159 participants (118 female; Mage = 19.2 years; SDage = 2.3 years). Data from all participants who completed the critical pre- and post-manipulation attitude measures are included, with no other exclusion criteria enforced except as noted below.

All participants were compensated with partial course credit for their participation.

Pre-manipulation attitude measure.

As in studies 1a and 1b, participants first reported their attitudes toward a series of sociopolitical topics, including the critical item of “How do you feel about the idea of increasing the cost of tuition at your university in order to maintain and increase the quality of education and student experience on campus?” (anchored at “-3: Strongly oppose” and “+3: Strongly support”). See Appendix D for the full list of topics. After completing these measures, participants were told a topic had been randomly selected from the items they had just completed, and that they would read a letter to the editor about it.

Independent Variables.

All participants were assigned to read about increasing tuition at their university, with the extremity of the proposal put forth in the message and the quality of the supporting arguments being manipulated orthogonally. Study 2a consisted of a 4 (extremity: $5,419,

$6,825, $8,993, and $10,036) × 2 (argument quality: strong, weak) between-subjects

design. In study 2b, the lowest and highest values from Study 2a were increased to reflect

an increase in actual tuition at the university, and the two middle values were collapsed to

create a moderate extremity condition, resulting in a 3 (extremity: $5,556, $7,943,

$10,590) × 2 (argument quality: strong, weak) between-subjects design. In the following

regression analyses, the specific tuition advocated was used in regression analyses as a

continuous predictor variable.8

Position extremity. As in Study 1, all messages began with a headline advocating for a

specific position. In Study 2, these messages advocated for increasing tuition at the

students’ university. In Study 2a, the levels of this were $5,419 (8% increase), $6,825

(36% increase), $8,993 (79% increase), and $10,036 (100% increase) per semester. In

Study 2b, these consisted of $5,556 (5% increase), $7,943 (50% increase), and $10,590

(100% increase). Participants were also informed of the current tuition ($5,018 per semester in Study 2a, $5,296 per semester in Study 2b). For example, in the $5,556 per semester condition, the headline read, “Why Ohio State Should Increase its Tuition From

$5,296 [$5,018 for Study 2a] to $5,556 Per Semester.” See Appendices F and G for full text of messages in Study 2a and 2b, respectively.

Argument quality. The body of the persuasive message contained either strong or weak arguments in favor of the author’s proposed tuition increase. These arguments were heavily inspired by those used in Petty, Wells, and Brock (1976), but updated to be more

8The conditions reported here were common/analogous across Studies 2a and 2b and can therefore be analyzed together to achieve greater statistical power. In addition to these conditions, Study 2b (but not 2a) included an even more extreme tuition increase proposal of $26,475 per semester, and a condition with no specific position given. Analysis of the full design of Study 1b including the $26,475 per semester proposal condition (52 participants) is presented later in this dissertation in Chapter 4, as the more extreme value is not hypothesized to behave similarly to the other conditions. For means in the exploratory value- free condition, see Appendix E. 35

relevant to current students. In Study 2a, those who received the message containing strong arguments were also led to believe that the article had been printed in their city’s largest newspaper. Those reading the message containing weak arguments were led to believe they were reading an article from their university’s student newspaper. In Study

2b, all messages were ostensibly printed in the student newspaper, to better control for possible source credibility cues across conditions. Message content remained largely unchanged, except to better match source credibility cues (e.g., changing a cited source to match across conditions, whereas it had been a doctor—Dr. Fitzgerald Klaus—in the previous strong argument condition and a casual-sounding nickname—Fitzy Klaus—in the weak argument condition). An example strong argument stated that “increasing tuition actually improves accessibility to college for those who cannot afford it. A higher base tuition creates more opportunity for grants, partial tuition waivers, and scholarships for traditionally underrepresented populations and those who would have trouble affording an education.” The weak counterpart to that instead argued that increasing tuition would “create more of a feeling of prestige and esteem around the university for those who are fortunate enough to afford it.”

Other arguments focused on retaining renowned professors through either better funding their salaries and research (strong) or by buying better office furniture (weak), making up for lost funding from the state budget that was predicted to be either drastic (strong) or trivial (weak), and making campus improvements that would either dramatically improve student experiences and learning (strong) or would not impact them at all (weak). The

full texts of all persuasive messages used in Studies 2a and 2b are presented in

Appendices F and G, respectively.

Dependent measures.

Manipulation checks. After reading the persuasive message, participants were asked on

7-point scales how strong (or weak) they found the arguments presented by the author,

ranging from extremely weak (-3) to extremely strong (+3). Due to a coding error, the specific position agreement item used in Study 1 was not collected. However, a filler item of “How likely would you be to vote for a political candidate who advocated for Ohio

State tuition to increase to [specific value]” were used as a proxy for the missing agreement with the specific proposal measure.

General attitude change. As in Studies 1a and 1b, participants responded to a series of filler items after the manipulation checks, and then moved on to the measure of interest.

As an introduction to this measure, they read

“Of course, we also need to know a bit more about how you feel about increasing

tuition from its current level of $5,018 [or $5,295, in Study 2a] per semester, in

general, disregarding any actual tuition value that the author may have been

arguing for. Again, please respond to the rest of these questions about

the general idea of increasing tuition at Ohio State, rather than any more

specific amount (if any) of tuition increase put forth in the article you read”

(emphases in original).

As in Studies 1a and 1b, participants then reported their attitudes, this time by responding to four statements, on 7-point scales: “Increasing tuition at Ohio State is…”, anchored at -

3 (extremely bad) and +3 (extremely good); “I think increasing tuition at Ohio State

would be…”, anchored at -3 (extremely harmful) and +3 (extremely beneficial); “My

overall position toward the abstract idea of increasing tuition at Ohio State is…”,

anchored at -3 (extremely opposed) and +3 (extremely in favor); and “I think increasing

tuition at Ohio State would be…”, anchored at -3 (extremely foolish) and +3 (extremely wise). These items were strongly correlated (α = .937) and were averaged to form an aggregate post-manipulation attitude measure. Because the pre- and post-measures constituted different items, each measure was then standardized prior to the subtraction.

Results

An initial test of whether study moderates our effect of interest was conducted solely to test the three-way interaction of extremity, argument quality, and study. Specifically, a regression was conducted, testing the effects of extremity (tuition entered as a continuous predictor), argument quality, tuition, and their interactions, on the effect of post- manipulation attitudes, controlling for pre-manipulation attitudes. The three-way interaction was not significant, β = -.04 (95% CI = [-.25, .17]), t(294) = -0.39, p = .699.

Thus, we present subsequent analyses with both studies collapsed.

Manipulation checks

Using the conditional analysis macro (“PROCESS”) for SPSS developed by Hayes

(2013), we first regressed the proxy agreement item (likelihood of voting for political candidate advocating the position) on to the proposed tuition (entered as continuous), argument quality manipulation (weak arguments coded as -1, strong coded as 1), and their interaction. As in Studies 1a and 1b, we expected this to reveal a strong effect of

position extremity, as specific values would be less accepted as they increased in

extremity. The regression revealed a significant conditional effect of position extremity,

β = -.34 (95% CI = [-.51, -.18]), t(278) = -4.03, p < .001, suggesting that our extremity

manipulation succeeded. Specifically, as extremity increased, participants reported being

less likely to vote for a hypothetical candidate who advocated that position. In addition,

the regression revealed a marginal conditional effect of argument quality, β = .16 (95%

CI = [-.00, .32]), t(278) = 1.93, p =.055. This effect was also expected, as hypothetical

candidates supplying strong arguments should receive more support than those who

provide weak arguments. Finally, the regression did not reveal a significant interaction, β

= -.02 (95% CI = [-.18, .15]), t(278) = -0.17, p > .865. See Table 4 for condition means.

Introducing study as a factor reveals no significant effect of or interactions with study, all

ps > .14.

Low Moderate Extremity Extremity Extreme Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Study 2a Strong 2.50 0.34 2.09 0.24 2.06 0.34 Weak 2.74 0.33 1.83 0.24 2.00 0.34 Study 2b Strong 3.00 0.29 2.75 0.29 2.04 0.29 Weak 2.45 0.32 1.83 0.29 1.85 0.32 Collapsed Strong 2.75 0.22 2.42 0.19 2.05 0.22 Weak 2.59 0.23 1.83 0.19 1.93 0.23 Note: Moderate Extremity condition is comprised of $6,825 and $8,993 (Study 2a) and $7,943 (Study 2b) levels of extremity. Bolded numbers indicate that strong and weak condition are significantly different from one another at p < .05 Table 4 - Mean judgments of how likely participants would be to vote for a political candidate advocating for the position in the message, Studies 2a, 2b

A second regression, testing the effects of the same predictors on subjective perception of

argument quality, revealed a significant effect of manipulated argument quality, β = .74

(95% CI = [.56, .93]), t(299) = 7.84, p < .001, suggesting our manipulation of argument

quality was successful. As in Study 1, the regression also revealed a significant effect of

position extremity, β = -.22 (95% CI = [-.41, -.03]), t(299) = -2.30, p = .022. The

interaction of argument quality and position extremity on subjective judgments of

argument quality was not significant, β = -.04 (95% CI = [-.22, .15]), t(299) = -0.37, p =

.709. Entering study as a factor does not reveal any significant factors except that Study

2b was seen as having stronger arguments overall, β = .64 (95% CI = [.28, 1.01]), t(295)

= 3.46, p < .001; and the interaction of study and manipulated argument quality was

marginal, β = .33 (95% CI = [-.04, .69]), t(295) = 1.74, p = .083. These differences are not surprising, as we did make slight changes to the manipulations between studies while matching the two on source credibility (all other interactions with Study p > .3). See

Table 5 for condition means.

Low Moderate Extremity Extremity Extreme Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Study 2a Strong 3.89 0.38 3.97 0.27 3.50 0.38 Weak 2.84 0.37 2.50 0.27 2.89 0.38 Study 2b Strong 5.00 0.31 5.08 0.32 4.25 0.31 Weak 3.54 0.32 2.74 0.31 2.69 0.32 Collapsed Strong 4.44 0.25 4.53 0.21 3.88 0.25 Weak 3.19 0.24 2.62 0.21 2.79 0.25 Note: Moderate Extremity condition is comprised of $6,825 and $8,993 (Study 2a) and $7,943 (Study 2b) levels of extremity. Bolded numbers indicate that strong and weak condition are significantly different from one another at p < .05; italicized numbers indicate that strong and weak condition trend toward being different from one another at p ≤ .15

Table 5 - Mean judgments of argument quality across conditions, Studies 2a, 2b

Attitude Change

As in Study 1, post-manipulation attitudes toward the general proposal of increasing the tuition controlling for pre-manipulation attitudes toward the issue is graphed in Figure 2.

Regressing post-messages attitudes on to the proposed tuition values (ranging from

$5,419 to $10,590, standardized in order to make beta values more meaningful, and entered as continuous), argument quality manipulation (weak arguments coded as -1, strong coded as +1), and their interaction reveals a significant conditional effect of argument quality, β = .11 (95% CI = [.01, .21]), t(298) = 2.09, p = .038. As in Study 1, we once again reveal a novel, but predicted, null effect of tuition extremity, β = -.04 (95%

CI = [-.14, .06]), t(298) = -.85, p = .395. Instead, we again reveal moderation of that effect, with the interaction of the two factors being significant, β = .14 (95% CI = [.04,

.24]), t(298) = 2.66, p = .008.

Specifically, as in Study 1, the interaction between message position and argument quality reveals that as the proposed tuition increase climbs, participants differentiate strong from weak arguments more. When provided with weak supporting arguments, increasingly extreme proposals produced less favorable attitudes toward the general idea of increasing tuition (simple slope of weak arguments conditions, β = -.18, p = .014).

However, when supported by strong arguments, the extremity of a proposal did not have the same negative effect on attitudes toward the broader idea of increasing tuition at Ohio

State (simple slope of strong arguments conditions, β = .09, p = .197). Re-running this regression with study as a factor reveals neither a conditional effect of, nor any interactions with, study (all p’s > .5).9 See Table 6 for condition means.

9 As in Study 1, there are alternative ways to examine the hypothesis other than looking at the post-message message attitudes, controlling for pre-message attitudes. The regression analysis testing the effects on change in attitudes toward the issue over time, or post-manipulation attitudes minus pre-manipulation attitudes, does not change the interpretation, neither does conducting an analysis of variance rather than a regression. In a regression of post message attitudes minus pre-manipulation attitudes, the extremity × argument quality interaction is significant, β = .15 (95% CI = [.03, .27]), t(299) = 2.53, p = .012. In addition, the argument quality effect is significant, β = .15 (95% CI = [.03, .27]), t(299) = 2.45, p = .015; but the effect of extremity is not, β = -.03 (95% CI = [-.14, .09]), t(299) = -.43, p = .666. In conducting a 2 (AQ) X 3 (Extremity, collapsing both moderate conditions in Study 2a along with study 2b’s moderate condition) ANOVA on the post-message minus pre-message attitude measures, the interaction is marginal, F(2, 297) = 2.80, p = .062; Arg Quality F(1, 297) = 5.00, p = .026; Extremity F(2, 297) = 0.61, p = .544. Finally, in an ANCOVA, controlling for pre-message attitudes: Interaction F(2, 296) = 3.86, p = .022; Arg Quality F(1, 296) = 3.31, p = .070; Extremity F(2, 296) = 0.81, p = .448. 42

0.3

0.2 manipulation manipulation

- 0.1 Weak Argument Quality 0 Strong Argument Manipulation Attitudes,

- Quality

attitudes -0.1

-0.2

-0.3 Standardized post Standardized controlling for standardized pre standardized for controlling -0.4 Low Tuition Proposal High Tuition Proposal Extremity (-1 SD) Extremity (+1 SD)

Figure 2 - Mean standardized post-manipulation attitude, controlling for standardized pre-manipulation attitude, Studies 2a, 2b

Low Moderate Extremity Extremity Extreme Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Study 2a Strong -0.04 0.21 -0.13 0.15 0.24 0.21 Weak 0.20 0.20 -0.28 0.15 -0.13 0.21 Study 2b Strong -0.01 0.17 0.51 0.18 0.17 0.17 Weak 0.21 0.17 -0.25 0.17 -0.24 0.17 Collapsed Strong -0.02 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.20 0.13 Weak 0.21 0.13 -0.26 0.11 -0.19 0.14 Note: Moderate Extremity condition is comprised of $6,825 and $8,993 (Study 2a) and $7,943 (Study 2b) levels of extremity. Bolded numbers indicate that strong and weak condition are significantly different from one another at p < .05; italicized numbers indicate that strong and weak condition trend toward being different from one another at p ≤ .15 Table 6 - Mean standardized post-manipulation attitude, controlling for standardized pre- manipulation attitude, Studies 2a, 2b

Discussion

Studies 2a and 2b demonstrate once again that as extremity of the message increased, the

quality of the arguments presented had a larger impact on attitudes consistent with the

view that message discrepancy enhances message processing. That is, Study 2 showed

that when supported by weak arguments, increasing extremity of a message’s advocated

position reduced its persuasiveness on more general attitudes toward the topic. However,

when supported by strong, difficult-to-counter arguments, increasing extremity of a

message’s position cues message recipients in to the message’s good argumentation, thus,

in theory, potentially leading to even more positive general attitudes toward the direction

of the advocated message, despite those specific extreme positions still being seen as

increasingly unacceptable. Although the positive slopes of the strong arguments

conditions were not significant in the studies presented here, they are consistent and in

the same direction. This may suggest that with even stronger arguments, the positive

slope of the strong arguments conditions would likely become significant. Indeed, when

collapsing across Studies 1 and 2, the slope of the strong argument condition comes close

to a traditional level of significance, β = .11 (95% CI = [-.01, .23]), t(900) = 1.76, p =

.079.

Chapter 4 - Study 1b and 2b

Introduction

Some prior literature has shown that persuasion declines as discrepancy between a message’s position and its recipient’s position becomes too extreme. In the data presented so far, however, we did not see any curvilinear effect on the directional attitude change in which we are interested. Thus, in addition to the levels of extremity already

reported, Study 1b and 2b introduced even more extreme positions taken. Specifically,

Study 1b consisted of extremity levels of $10/hr, $20/hr, $40/hr, and a very extreme

$80/hr condition. Study 2b consisted of $5,556 (5% increase), $7,943 (50% increase),

$10,590 (100% increase), and a very extreme $26,475 (500% increase) condition. To

examine the impact of these extreme levels of message discrepancy with the maximum

statistical power, we collapse these into a categorical variable with 4 levels of extremity

(low, moderate, extreme, and absurd). We report below this new analysis.

Method

Participants

Participants consisted of adults recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, in exchange for

$.50 (Study 1b), and at a large Midwestern university, in exchange for partial course credit or extra credit (Study 2b). The expanded design of Study 1b consisted of 404 participants (232 female; Mage = 36.2; SDage = 11.7 years). The expanded design of Study

2b consisted of 211 participants (154 female; Mage = 19.3; SDage = 2.6 years). 45

Pre-manipulation attitude measure.

As reported in Chapters 2 and 3, participants first reported their attitudes toward a series

of sociopolitical topics, including the critical items of “Do you think the federal minimum

wage should be increased?” (Study 1b; anchored at “1: Should not be raised at all” and

“7: Should be raised a lot”) and “How do you feel about the idea of increasing the cost of

tuition at your university in order to maintain and increase the quality of education and

student experience on campus?” (Study 2b; anchored at “-3: Strongly oppose” and “+3:

Strongly support”). As they measure different attitudes, these pre-manipulation measures were standardized within study. See Appendices A and D, respectively, for all pre- manipulation attitude measures collected in Study 1b and 2b. After completing these measures, participants were told a topic had been randomly selected from the questions they had just answered, and that they would read a letter to the editor about it.

Independent Variables

All participants in Study 1b were assigned to read a message containing an initial statement advocating for an increase in the federal minimum wage to one of four specific values, supported by 4 arguments which were pre-tested to be either strong or weak. A similar design was implemented in Study 2b, except that the topic was changed to increasing tuition at the university attended by the participants, and they were given a full essay containing a headline advocating for a specific topic, supported by either strong or weak arguments, rather than the simplified bullet points of Study 1b. Thus, each study had a 4 (extremity: low, moderate, extreme, absurd) × 2 (argument quality: strong, weak) between-subjects design.

Position extremity. All messages began with a headline advocating for a particular

position. In Study 1b, the headline advocated for the federal minimum wage to be

increased to either $10, $20, $40, or $80 per hour, as well as providing the current

minimum wage of $7.25 for reference and the annual full-time salary equivalent of the proposed minimum wage (i.e., $20,880, $41,760, $83,520, and $167,040 respectively).

In Study 2b, the headline advocated for the tuition at the participants’ university to be increased to either of $5,556, $7,943, $10,590, or $26,475 per semester. Thus, each study had a low level of extremity ($10/hr or $5,556/semester), a moderate level of extremity ($20/hr or $7,943/semester), a high level of extremity ($40/hr or

$10,590/semester; henceforth the “extreme” condition), and an absurd condition ($80/hr or $26,475/semester).

Argument Quality. The body of the persuasive message contained either strong or weak arguments, as described in Chapters 2 and 3. Study 1b consisted of four strong or four weak arguments supporting an increase in minimum wage presented as bullet points, while Study 2b consisted of a 475 (strong arguments condition) or 481 (weak arguments) word essay.

Dependent Measures

Manipulation checks. After reading the persuasive message, participants were asked how strong (or weak) they considered the author’s argument on a 7-point scale, ranging from

“extremely weak” to “extremely strong”, as well as how likely they would be to vote for a political candidate who advocated for the position in the message they had read, again on a 7-point scale, anchored at “not at all likely” and “extremely likely”. As described in

Chapter 3, this item is used as a proxy measure of extremity, as a more extreme candidate is presumed to be less desirable.

General attitude change. As described in Chapters 2 and 3, after completing the manipulation checks and several filler questions designed to lead participants to believe this was a study on their reactions to the writing, rather than a study on persuasion, they were urged to set aside the specific value advocated in the message, and to respond to the subsequent questions regarding just the general topic at hand, be it increasing the federal minimum wage (Study 1b) or tuition (Study 2b). The Study 1b post-manipulation general attitude measure consisted of a single item (“Increasing the minimum wage above its current level is…”; anchored at 1“Extremely bad” and 7 “Extremely good”). The

Study 2b post-manipulation general attitudes were measured using four items

(“Increasing tuition at Ohio State is…”, anchored at -3: extremely bad and +3: extremely good; “I think increasing tuition at Ohio State would be…”, anchored at -3: extremely harmful and +3: extremely beneficial; “My overall position toward the abstract idea of increasing tuition at Ohio State is…”, anchored at -3: extremely opposed and +3: extremely in favor; and “I think increasing tuition at Ohio State would be…”, anchored at

-3: extremely foolish and +3: extremely wise). These four items still correlate strongly in this full sample (α = .933), so they were aggregated to form a single post-manipulation attitude. Finally, both post-manipulation attitude measures were standardized within study.

Results

Manipulation Checks

We first test subjective ratings of argument quality in a 4 (extremity: low, moderate,

extreme, absurd) × 2 (argument quality: strong, weak) × 2 (study: 1b, 2b) ANOVA. As

in Studies 1 and 2, this analysis reveals a main effect of both manipulated argument

quality, F(1, 599) = 145.25, p < .001, and of extremity, F(3, 599) = 9.28, p < .001. The

interaction of these two is not significant, F(3, 599) = 1.29, p = .278. The 3-way interaction of argument quality, extremity, and study is significant, F(3, 599) = 3.50, p =

.015. However, the patterns are roughly similar, and with different materials used across study, the somewhat different results are not surprising. The three-way interaction was obtained because the two-way interaction of Argument Quality and Extremity is stronger in Study 2b than Study 1b. See Table 7 for condition means.

Low Moderate Extremity Extremity Extreme Absurd

Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Study 1b Strong 5.19 0.25 4.42 0.24 3.85 0.24 4.02 0.23 Weak 2.48 0.24 2.94 0.24 2.02 0.24 1.92 0.24 Study 2b Strong 5.00 0.33 5.08 0.34 4.25 0.32 3.62 0.34 Weak 3.54 0.34 2.74 0.33 2.69 0.34 3.08 0.34 Collapsed Strong 5.10 0.21 4.75 0.21 4.05 0.20 3.82 0.20 Weak 3.01 0.21 2.84 0.20 2.36 0.21 2.50 0.21

We next test ratings of how likely participants were to vote for a candidate advocating the position in the message, as a proxy for perceived extremity, in a 4 (extremity: low, moderate, extreme, absurd) × 2 (argument quality: strong, weak) × 2 (study: 1b, 2b)

ANOVA. Again, we find a significant main effect of both manipulated argument quality,

F(1, 568) = 13.67, p < .001, and extremity, F(3, 568) = 20.64, p < .001 but a non- significant interaction of the two factors, F(3, 568) = 0.42, p = .742. The 3-way interaction is not significant, F(3, 568) = 1.00, p = .392. See Table 8 for condition means.

Low Moderate Extremity Extremity Extreme Absurd Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Study 1b Strong 5.26 0.28 4.06 0.27 2.98 0.26 2.89 0.26 Weak 4.15 0.26 3.44 0.27 1.96 0.27 1.90 0.27 Study 2b Strong 3.00 0.38 2.75 0.39 2.04 0.38 1.48 0.42 Weak 2.45 0.43 1.83 0.39 1.85 0.43 1.81 0.42 Collapsed Strong 4.13 0.24 3.41 0.24 2.51 0.23 2.18 0.24 Weak 3.30 0.25 2.64 0.24 1.91 0.25 1.85 0.25

Attitude Change

Because of the nonlinear prediction for these data, we first present an analysis in the form

of a 4 (extremity: low, moderate, extreme, absurd) × 2 (argument quality: strong, weak) ×

2 (study:1b, 2b) ANCOVA on post-manipulation attitudes, controlling for pre-

manipulation attitudes, probing the argument quality by extremity interaction with tests

of the effect of argument quality at each level of extremity. We predict that the

difference between attitudes in the weak argument condition will be significantly

different from the strong argument quality condition at the moderate and extreme

conditions, as in Chapters 2 and 3; however, we expect the difference between strong and

weak argument quality conditions to return to non-significance at the “absurd” level of

extremity. Given the expected pattern of results, we subsequently collapse the most

extreme condition with the least extreme condition, and the two middle conditions, to test

a simpler 2 (extremity: low/absurd, moderate/extreme) × 2 (argument quality: strong,

weak) × 2 (study: 1b, 2b) ANCOVA on post-manipulation attitudes, controlling for pre- manipulation attitudes.

Testing the first ANCOVA (i.e., a 4 [Extremity] X 2 [Argument Quality] X 2 [Study])

reveals the significant expected interaction of extremity × argument quality, F(3, 598) =

4.41, p = .004. There is no main effect of argument quality, F(1, 598) = 2.77, p = .096,

nor extremity, F(3, 598) = 1.74, p = .158. The three-way interaction with study is

significant, F(3, 598) = 4.75, p = .003, again suggesting that the two-way Extremity X

Argument Quality interaction is stronger in Study 2b than Study 1b. An alternative way

to decompose this three-way interaction is by testing the argument quality by study

interaction at each level of extremity (see Table 9 for condition means). In this analysis, the only significant interaction is at the 2nd level of extremity, F(1, 147) = 12.45, p =

.001. This may indicate that the moderately extreme condition was not as extreme in

Study 1b as the moderately extreme condition in Study 2b. Intuitively, this makes sense;

“Fight for $15” was very a salient social movement when this study was being

conducted, and the moderately extreme condition in Study 1b was only $5 more than that.

The moderately extreme condition in Study 2b, however, was a 50% percent increase in

tuition.

Low Moderate Extremity Extremity Extreme Absurd

Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Study 1b Strong 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.10 -0.05 0.10 Weak 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.11 -0.04 0.11 -0.14 0.11 Study 2b Strong -0.05 0.15 0.51 0.15 0.19 0.14 -0.33 0.15 Weak 0.17 0.15 -0.29 0.15 -0.23 0.15 0.04 0.15 Collapsed Strong -0.01 0.09 0.27 0.09 0.15 0.09 -0.19 0.09 Weak 0.10 0.09 -0.12 0.09 -0.13 0.09 -0.05 0.09

Note: Bolded numbers indicate that strong and weak condition are significantly different from one another at p < .05; italicized numbers indicate that strong and weak condition trend toward being different from one another at p ≤ .15

As can be seen in Figure 3, when further probing the extremity × argument quality interaction by testing the effect of argument quality on post-manipulation attitudes, controlling for pre-manipulation attitudes, at each level of extremity, we find the

expected relationship, such that strong and weak argument conditions are significantly

different from one another at the moderately extreme level, F(1, 149) = 5.69, p = .019,

and the extreme level, F(1, 153) = 4.17, p = .043, but non-significant at the low extremity

level, F(1, 149) = 0.31, p = .582, and the absurd extremity level, F(1, 152) = 0.29, p =

.588.

0.30

- 0.20

0.10 manipulation - 0.00 * * Strong Weak -0.10 manipulation attitudes manipulation

attitude, controlling pre attitude, controlling for -0.20 Standardized post Standardized -0.30 Low Moderate Extreme Absurd Extremity Extremity

Note: * indicates a significant argument quality effect within the level of extremity indicated at p < .05 Figure 3 - Mean standardized post-manipulation attitude, controlling for standardized pre-manipulation attitudes in Studies 1b, 2b

Given our prediction that attitude change would not differ between strong and weak arguments in the outer extremity conditions (low and absurd extremity), but only under the middle conditions (moderate and extreme), we proceeded to collapse the conditions in this way, testing a 2 (extremity: low/absurd, moderate/extreme) × 2 (argument quality: strong, weak) × 2 (study: 1b, 2b) ANCOVA, again testing for an effect on post- manipulation attitudes, controlling for pre-manipulation attitudes. Here, again, we see a

significant 3-way interaction, F(1, 606) = 11.44, p = .001, such that we see the expected

argument quality by extremity interaction in Study 2, F(1, 206) = 10.49, p = .001, with

the effect of argument quality not mattering at the low/absurd ends of extremity, F(1,

102) = 1.79, p = .184, but a significant effect at the moderate/extreme midpoints, F(1,

103) = 11.28, p = .001. However, the interaction of argument quality and extremity was

not significant in Study 1, F(1, 399) = 0.51, p = .475. Neither study showed a main effect

of argument quality, Study 1b F(1, 399) = 1.01, p = .316, Study 2b F(1, 206) = 0.15, p =

.241, nor did they reveal a main effect of the contrast coded extremity variable, Study 1b

F(1, 399) = 0.69, p = .407, Study 2b F(1, 206) = 0.15, p = .702.

Again, running this model in an ANOVA testing for effects on attitude change, rather

than an ANCOVA for effects on post attitudes while controlling for pre-message

attitudes, a similar pattern emerges. First, there is a significant interaction between

Argument Quality and Extremity, F(1, 607) = 16.66, p < .001. In addition, the three-way interaction of argument quality, contrast-coded extremity, and study is again significant,

F(1, 607) = 8.31, p = .004, simply demonstrating that the two-way interaction is weaker in Study 1b, F(1, 400) = 1.79, p = .182, than in Study 2b F(1, 207) = 10.27, p = .002.

Discussion

We present evidence that, at levels of extremity one might call outrageous, absurd, or unthinkable, we were finally able to turn back the pattern of increasing argument quality effects as extremity of a proposal increased. Although study did moderate these analyses, we do not consider that surprising: We ran Studies 2a and 2b exactly for the reasons driving those interactions: Study 1a and 1b had relatively weak effects, perhaps

because of their brief, superficial presentation (to accommodate the demands of a

Mechanical Turk study), or their already generally pro-attitudinal topic. That is, because most people had a generally positive reaction to the general idea of increasing the minimum wage, there was potentially little room for positive persuasion, in the direction of the persuasive message.

Chapter 5 - General Discussion

Past work on the extremity of a message’s position affecting persuasion has not been rigorously tested from an information-processing perspective (cf. Siero & Doosje, 1993).

Across four studies, we have demonstrated that the extremity of a message’s position can indeed serve to determine the extent to which the quality of the arguments in a message impacts attitudes, an indicator of the amount of message-related elaboration. Thus, when supporting arguments are strong and difficult to counterargue, an extreme position can create more positive attitude change toward the topic (e.g., raising minimum wage), even if not endorsement of the position advocated (e.g., $40 per hour) than the same message advocating for a more moderate position (e.g., $20 per hour).

If the supporting arguments are weak, however, message recipients can successfully counterargue them, thus becoming more negative toward the topic. We also demonstrate that, like the literature on persuasion in extremity’s effect on specific position change, its effect on domain-general attitudes also has a limit: When the message’s position enters the realms of absurdity, recipients appear to reduce their processing. In today’s fractured political space, with talk of “shifting the Overton Window” and extreme views taking center stage, it is important to take stock of the psychological responses to these messages. We believe the effect we demonstrate here is unique from something akin to the variable perspective approach (Ostrom, 1966) in the wild; under that perspective, those who received absurdly extreme messages may have been answering questions with

a different perspective on what “increasing the minimum wage [or tuition], in general” means. Although we stressed to participants that we wanted them to neglect the values presented, they may have at least been thinking in terms of modest versus extreme changes from the status quo. We feel comfortable dismissing this alternative explanation because the variable perspective approach would not predict differential persuasion when receiving strong, versus weak, arguments—it may well be occurring in tandem, but it is insufficient to explain the argument-quality differentiation effect observed.

It is also the case that we can dismiss a simple anchoring explanation for the results (e.g.,

Mussweiler & Strack, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). That is, if participants

anchored on an advocated number (e.g., the specific tuition or minimum wage

advocated), as that number got larger, participants would be expected to endorse a larger

value themselves or become more persuaded. Yet, this was not invariably the case. If

anything, the strong arguments condition is similar to past anchoring research in which

people take on more extreme positions themselves as larger anchors are presented up to some limit (see Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell, & Jarvis, 2001). However, the current results in the weak arguments condition were opposite to this, indicating that a traditional anchoring approach is also insufficient to account for the data that we observed. Yet, an approach that considers anchors as just one more variable within an Elaboration

Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) context (i.e., anchors can assume the same roles as any other variable; see Wegener et al., 2010), can allow for the fact that if message position serves as an anchor, message position can affect the extent of information processing.

It is worth noting that exploratory measures of surprise and threat that were included in this research failed to show reliable effects. That is, it was not the case that more discrepant messages produced more threat or surprise, suggesting that these mechanisms were not involved. Future work should probe this further, as the precise reason that increased discrepancy led to enhanced impact of argument quality on attitudes (up to some limit) remains uncertain. Future research should address possibilities other than surprise and theat. For example, perhaps increasing discrepancy increased curiosity which focused attention on the reasons for the advocacy.

One interesting possibility that should be explored further in future research is that different mechanisms operate at different levels of extremity. One particularly compelling example is that the likelihood that a proposition may actually become reality and how threatening that proposition would be if it did become reality may drive effects separately at different levels of extremity. That is, a modest proposal may be intriguing because it seems very possible, while an extreme (but not absurd to the point of seeming impossible) proposal may be intriguing because, on the off chance it did become reality, it would be awful (or fantastic, in a pro-attitudinal situation). We did collect data in

Study 2b on how likely a proposal seemed as well as how threatening it was, in hopes of testing this model; however, data collection was far slower than anticipated, and we had to terminate data collection before we had collected a reasonable number of subjects to explore that more complicated statistical model.

Without a reliable mechanism documented, we cannot rule out what may be the most likely of alternative explanations: That message processing may still be occurring at the

absurd levels of extremity, but that the supporting arguments are not strong enough to

justify the absurd position being advocated. However, there are data suggestive that

reduced processing, as opposed to insufficient argument quality, is the driving factor. In

Study 1, when the persuasive message was a brief bulleted list of roughly 130 words, the

primary effect of interest, attitude change, showed a very weak effect (p = .04). Study 2,

however, which consisted of a more complex persuasive message consisting of a roughly

500-word essay, revealed a much stronger effect (p = .008). Because such little

processing was required in Study 1 to process the message, even a minimal amount of

processing would have been enough to digest the message, so the manipulation was

severely hamstrung. However, with the more complex message used in Study 2,

processing would have been more important—if message recipients were not able or

motivated to read the message, they likely would not have gotten much information at all;

there was less of a chance to glean information at a glance. This may help to explain the

stronger effect. In addition, cognitive responses were elicited from participants in Study

2, and were coded by two independent raters, on a scale of -3 to +3. Although the evidence from them was not compelling enough to include in Chapter 3, a reduced correlation between cognitive responses and post-manipulation attitudes in the most extreme condition of Study 2b would suggest that message-related elaboration was happening to a lesser degree than if they were correlated. Indeed, that is what the data reveal: In the unanalyzed, no-position condition, the correlation between thought valence and post-manipulation attitudes was r = .49, p = .001. Correlations at $5,556, $7,943, and $10,590 were r = .56, r = .51, and r = .46, respectively (all p’s ≤ .002). At the most

extreme condition of $26,475, however, the correlation drops to r = .29, p = .092. This

seems to indicate that, even if other variables did not reveal effects indicative of

differential processing (i.e., time spent reading, time spent reporting the thoughts they

had experienced during the message, word count of thoughts, or even how seriously they

took the experiment), the thoughts they had while the message was on the screen had less

impact on their evaluations of the topic when the position advocated was absurdly

extreme. This pattern of reduced attitude-thought correlations is indicative of reduced message processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

Of course, this suggestive evidence needs further investigation in future work. It is still

possible that equal processing across the range of extremities advocated could resemble

our effect in the strong argument condition, as no argument may be strong enough to

justify a position that is downright absurd. Although it was not significant in the current

work, an upturn in attitudes in the absurd position/weak argument condition would help to differentiate these two competing hypotheses; an information processing mechanism predicts nonmonotonic patterns in both the strong and weak argument conditions (with strong arguments eventually becoming less persuasive, because they aren’t actually processed and positive reactions do not occur, while weak argument eventually become more persuasive, because they aren’t processed and negative reactions do not occur).

Although an insufficient argument quality mechanism might predict the same in result in the strong argument condition, it does not in the weak argument condition, as the weak arguments should continue to be worse and worse for the increasingly extreme positions if they are processed more carefully. We do observe the nonmonotonic pattern

directionally (see Figure 3), but the upturn from the second-most extreme to the most extreme condition is not significant, p = .837, while the strong argument condition is, p =

.023.

Notably, we chose not to measure pre-existing latitudes of acceptance or rejection in the present research for fear of anchoring participants on a value or creating a position in them that they did previously hold if they had not thought in depth about the topic.

Instead, we sought to compare values that were normatively moderate, extreme, and absurd. That is, the Fight for $15 movement made a $10 federal minimum wage proposal relatively reasonable in Study 1a, and increasing tuition by 5% in Study 2b (8% in Study

2a) is roughly on par with the 2007-2008 to 2017-2018 national average of 3.2% among public four-year universities (Ma, Baum, Pender, & Welch, 2017). From there, we chose what seemed like more extreme positions. That is, $20/hour was equidistant from the

$15/hr movement as the $10 condition, so it seemed reasonable. When we found in Study

1 that neither $20/hour nor $40/hour were extreme enough to eliminate the argument quality effect, we chose more extreme “moderate,” “extreme,” and “absurd” conditions for Study 2a, of 36%, 79%, and 100% tuition increases. Even then, we found processing effects at what we expected would be the “absurd” condition, so we finally pushed the

“absurd” condition to 500%. This difficulty in finding appropriate values for very high extremity is not unique to the current work. In fact, past work (Fink, Kaplowitz, & Bauer

1983) has demonstrated that eliciting “extremely discrepant” values from participants that are extreme enough to produce reduced persuasion when presented to subsequent participants simply does not work: When Person A is asked to produce a value that seems

absurd, it still tends to be in the range of “reasonable-enough” that Person B processes it as a legitimate position, not dismissing it out-of-hand. When we attempted to test values for this work, of four participants assigned to the “absurdly high” condition who were asked, “The current federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. What is a wage, in dollars per hour, that you would consider absurdly high for a federal minimum wage proposal?”, the responses ranged from $15 to $20 (M = 18.0, SD = 2.45). When those four students were asked “In-state tuition at [their university] is currently $5,295 per semester. What is a cost, in dollars, that you would consider absurdly high for in-state tuition (per semester) at [their university]?”, the range of responses was $2,000 to $10,000 (M = 7250, SD =

3774.9). This mean increase of 37% is even less than that reported by Fink, Kaplowitz, and Bauer, who reported that, when asked for a tuition increase that would be “extremely discrepant” from their own position, the mean value was a 50% increase, but when this value was randomly assigned to other participants, they did not process it as if it were absurd. Unfortunately, data collection in our testing was both slower than expected and had to be terminated due to the end of the academic term before a sufficient number of students had completed this pilot study, but the responses of this very small sample are illustrative nonetheless. The best mechanism to elicit what values will be viewed as absurd remains to be determined.

Despite these unresolved issues, we believe that the current work provides a valuable contribution to the literature. One clear finding is that argument quality becomes a more important determinant of persuasion as message discrepancy increases, at least up to an extremely high discrepancy level. A second clear finding is that consideration of

message arguments continues at levels of discrepancy that are surprisingly high – levels that surely would have fallen within participants’ latitudes of rejection or positions that participants would have labeled as entirely implausible a priori.

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Appendix A - Studies 1a and 1b full list of measures Items presented only in Study 1b are underlined.

Prison: The American Prison System requires significant overhauling. 1: Strongly disagree to 7: Strongly agree

PrisonCert: How certain are you of your position toward prison reform? 1: Not at all certain to 7: Extremely certain

CapPunish: The drugs required for a death sentence by lethal injection should be easier for states to acquire. 1: Strongly disagree to 7: Strongly agree

PreAtt: Do you think the federal minimum wage should be increased? 1: Should not be raised at all to 7: Should be raised a lot

PreCert: How certain are you of your position toward increasing the federal minimum wage? 1: Not at all certain to 7: Extremely certain

GunCtrl: President Obama overstepped his bounds in pursuit of stricter gun control laws. 1: Strongly disagree to 7: Strongly agree

IncomeIneq: Income inequality is a very serious problem in the United States today. 1: Strongly disagree to 7: Strongly agree

Bootstraps: An adult working a minimum wage job must have made some serious mistakes in her/his life. 1: Strongly disagree to 7: Strongly agree

EthicShop: When shopping for clothing, price is more important to me than business practices that are good for the environment. -3: Strongly disagree to +3: Strongly agree

GMOs: I try to avoid eating genetically modified foods (GM foods). -3: Strongly disagree to +3: Strongly agree

USxtian: The United States was founded as a Christian nation. -3: Strongly disagree to +3: Strongly agree

SpecAgree: How much do you agree with the author's position of increasing the minimum wage to $XX/hr? 1: Extremely disagree to 7: Extremely agree

SpecCert:How certain are you of your attitude toward the author’s proposed minimum wage value? 1: Not at all certain to 7: Extremely certain

Reason: How reasonable do you think the author's proposed minimum wage value was? - 1: Extremely unreasonable to 7: Extremely reasonable

Surprise: To what degree were you surprised by the author's proposed minimum wage value? 1: Not at all surprised to 7: extremely surprised

WriteEval: How would you rate the overall writing ability of the original letter's author? -3: Extremely bad to +3: Extremely good

WriteGram: How would you rate the grammar of the writing selection? -3: Extremely bad to +3: Extremely good

Upset: To what degree were you upset by the summarized article regarding increasing the minimum wage?

Offended: To what degree were you offended by the summarized article regarding increasing the minimum wage? 1: Not at all offended to 7: Extremely offended

Vote: How likely would you be to vote for a political candidate who advocated for increasing the minimum wage to $XX/hr? 1: Not at all likely to 7: Extremely likely

PercAQ: Overall, how strong (or weak) were the arguments presented by the author in favor of increasing the minimum wage? -3: Extremely weak to +3: Extremely strong

Bias: To what extent did you view the author as biased on this topic? 0: Not at all to 6: Extremely so

Trustw: To what extent did you view the author as trustworthy on this topic? 0: Not at all to 6: Extremely so

Expert: To what extent did you view the author as an expert on this topic? 0: Not at all to 6: Extremely so

PostAtt: Increasing the minimum wage above its current level is… 1: Extremely bad to 7: Extremely good

ObjAmbPos: Please indicate how positive you feel toward increasing the minimum wage 1: Not at all positive to 7: Extremely positive

ObjAmbNeg: Please indicate how negative you feel toward increasing the minimum wage 1: Not at all negative to 7: Extremely negative

Conflicted: To what extent would you describe your thoughts toward increasing the minimum wage as "conflicted"? 0: I feel no conflict at all to 6: I feel completely conflicted 69

Undecided: To what extent would you describe your thoughts toward increasing the minimum wage as "undecided"? 0: I feel no indecision to 6: I feel maximum indecision

Mixed: To what extent would you describe your thoughts toward increasing the minimum wage as "mixed"? 0: I have completely 1-sided reactions to 6: I have completely mixed reactions

Certain: How certain are you of your position toward the general concept of increasing the minimum wage? 1: Not at all certain to 7: Extremely certain

Corr: Of all possible attitudes toward increasing the minimum wage, how certain are you that your attitude reflects the correct way to think about this issue? 1: Not at all certain to 7: Extremely certain

Clar: How certain are you that you know what your true attitude toward increasing the minimum wage actually is? 1: Not at all certain to 7: Extremely certain

SelfPers: How likely do you think it is that you could be persuaded away from your current position on this topic by reasons other than those in the piece of writing you just read? (e.g., do you think there might be other arguments out there that could convince you of the author's point?) 1: Extremely unlikely to 7: Extremely likely

Sincere: How sincere did you think the author was being in arguing for increasing tuition? 0: Not at all sincere to 6: Extremely sincere

Irony: How ironic or satirical did you think the author was being in arguing for increasing tuition? 0: Not at all ironic or satirical to 6: Extremely ironic or satirical

Believer: To what degree do you think the author truly believed in what she or he was writing? 0: Not at all to 6: Extremely so

Funny: As you read the excerpt, how funny did you find it? 0: Not at all to 6: Extremely so

SatSerBip: Looking back, did you think the article was more satirical or serious while you were reading it? 1: Definitely satire to 7: Definitely serious DesiredWg: What do you think the federal minimum wage SHOULD be (in $/hr)? If you do not think there should be a federally enforced minimum wage, please put 0 (zero).

MinWageCur: What do you think the federal minimum wage CURRENTLY is (in $/hr). 2-item Need for Cognition Scale10 (Bizer, Krosnick, Petty, Rucker, & Wheeler, 2000)

10 As this measure requires standardization, and the mean is therefore predetermined at zero, it is not included in the table in Appendix B 70

open minded cognition scale (general version; Price, Ottati, Wilson, & Kim, 2015) PolSoc: Please indicate your political views regarding social issues. 1: Very liberal to 7: Very conservative

PolEcon: Please indicate your political views regarding economic issues. 1: Very liberal to 7: Very conservative

PolOrient1: With which political party do you most closely identify? Republican / Democrat / Neither

PolOrient2: [If neither to PolOrient1] If you had to pick, would you say you lean more toward the left or right, overall? Lean strongly left / Lean slightly left / Lean slightly right / Lean strongly right

Serious: How seriously did you take this experiment? 1: Not at all seriously to 7: Very seriously

ReadTime: How much time (in seconds) spent reading message Age Gender Race English as a first language US Citizenship

Appendix B – Study 1 means

Study 1a (Weak and Strong Argument Qualities, as analyzed above)

Mild ($10) Moderate ($20) Extreme ($40) Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Prison 5.76 1.09 6.00 1.31 5.87 1.07 5.87 1.30 5.94 1.03 5.39 1.31 PrisonCert 5.20 1.80 5.80 1.32 5.37 1.31 5.83 1.06 5.51 1.25 5.04 1.51 CapPunish 3.42 1.99 3.82 2.24 4.18 2.00 4.15 2.31 4.09 1.65 4.67 1.98 PreAtt 5.41 1.47 4.90 2.20 4.81 1.99 5.12 1.83 5.38 1.74 4.47 2.00 PreCert 5.65 1.52 6.27 1.05 6.02 1.21 5.88 1.42 5.87 1.19 5.90 1.20 GunCtrl 3.08 2.20 3.51 2.46 3.73 2.49 3.50 2.17 3.34 2.27 4.20 2.33 IncomIneq 5.57 1.58 5.47 2.00 5.31 1.89 5.73 1.54 5.83 1.22 4.92 1.75 EthicShop 4.02 1.71 4.06 1.77 4.52 1.82 3.88 1.64 4.19 1.57 4.78 1.62 Bootstraps 2.37 1.54 2.71 1.78 2.31 1.50 2.46 1.63 2.49 1.57 2.98 1.78 GMOs 3.75 2.07 4.37 2.08 4.33 2.15 3.96 2.04 4.26 2.09 3.84 2.22 Usxtian 3.38 2.30 4.10 2.39 3.81 2.29 3.44 2.15 3.32 2.38 4.29 2.41 SpecAgree 5.06 1.85 5.18 2.26 3.06 2.31 3.65 2.07 1.76 1.35 2.32 1.87 SpecCert 5.53 1.44 6.16 1.31 5.98 1.79 5.73 1.34 5.61 2.02 5.36 2.02 Reason 4.50 2.05 5.59 1.69 2.77 2.25 3.25 1.98 1.54 1.21 1.88 1.55 72

Mild ($10) Moderate ($20) Extreme ($40) Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD WritEval 3.65 1.58 5.69 1.18 3.35 1.71 5.25 1.47 3.46 1.49 4.52 1.30 WritGram 4.92 1.06 5.90 1.05 4.86 1.37 5.58 1.11 4.74 1.22 5.37 1.11 Upset 3.65 1.87 2.39 1.96 4.27 2.22 2.56 1.70 3.60 1.94 3.39 1.88 Vote 4.90 1.95 5.08 2.38 3.38 2.50 3.90 2.19 1.89 1.67 2.43 2.05 PercAQ 2.71 1.65 5.33 1.71 2.25 1.72 4.35 1.75 1.77 1.22 3.33 1.79 bias 5.21 1.64 4.33 1.88 5.50 1.80 5.00 1.78 5.32 1.96 5.51 1.68 trust 3.02 1.76 5.02 1.51 2.52 1.80 4.21 1.47 2.15 1.30 3.02 1.78 expert 2.35 1.58 4.16 1.49 2.00 1.47 3.42 1.58 1.60 0.92 2.78 1.76 PostAtt 6.02 1.42 5.47 1.97 5.10 1.94 5.71 1.67 5.64 1.66 5.39 1.80 ObjAmbPos 5.84 1.71 5.41 2.17 5.13 1.99 5.67 1.76 5.57 1.66 5.33 1.94 ObjAmbNeg 2.06 1.60 2.88 2.36 3.00 2.13 2.33 1.91 2.30 1.63 2.59 2.03 Conflicted 2.39 1.77 2.20 1.62 2.65 1.77 2.29 1.54 2.23 1.76 2.61 1.83 Undecided 1.98 1.27 2.00 1.44 2.48 1.65 2.04 1.33 2.19 1.50 2.18 1.55 Mixed 2.49 1.62 2.31 1.57 2.73 1.74 2.67 1.63 2.77 1.84 2.90 1.81 Certain 5.94 1.30 6.27 0.97 6.12 0.97 6.12 1.00 6.02 1.42 6.12 1.14 Corr 5.78 1.14 5.90 1.28 5.79 1.16 5.63 1.46 5.62 1.45 5.59 1.40 Clar 6.04 1.15 6.24 1.05 6.19 0.91 5.98 1.16 5.89 1.39 6.18 1.07 SelfPers 2.90 1.73 2.67 1.51 2.44 1.65 3.02 1.64 2.77 1.58 2.98 1.86 DesiredWg 10.57 4.08 9.83 4.10 11.36 6.10 10.97 5.76 11.45 7.01 10.79 6.04 MinWageCur 7.65 0.79 7.60 1.16 7.62 0.60 7.61 1.02 7.46 1.88 7.84 1.61 PolSoc 2.94 1.66 3.35 1.96 3.54 2.01 2.88 1.49 3.17 1.65 3.55 1.94 PolEcon 3.42 1.65 3.90 2.05 3.94 1.91 3.46 1.80 3.72 1.84 4.29 1.98 73

Mild ($10) Moderate ($20) Extreme ($40) Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD serious 6.75 0.53 6.78 0.51 6.81 0.53 6.73 0.53 6.57 0.80 6.75 0.59 ReadTime 38.13 39.80 54.47 34.26 35.53 22.20 40.72 22.35 38.98 32.37 50.59 25.06

Study 1a, Moderate Argument Quality (not analyzed above)

$10 per hour $20 per hour $40 per hour Moderate Moderate Moderate Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 5.45 1.34 5.6 1.4 5.47 1.53 PrisonCert 4.98 1.83 5.52 1.24 5.39 1.41 CapPunish 3.47 1.78 3.71 2.01 3.53 1.65 PreAtt 4.98 2.06 5 1.86 4.92 1.95 PreCert 6.06 1.3 6.08 1.01 6.06 1.14 GunCtrl 2.84 1.97 3.38 2.07 3.65 2.31 IncomIneq 5.2 1.88 5.44 1.91 5.33 1.71 EthicShop 2.61 1.71 2.46 1.58 2.55 1.65 Bootstraps 4.33 1.86 3.84 1.71 4.1 1.7 GMOs 4.39 2.22 4.12 1.83 4.55 2.07 Usxtian 3.52 2.33 3.52 2.2 3.86 2.25 SpecAgree 4.84 2.16 3.21 2.04 2.02 1.45 SpecCert 5.81 1.54 5.46 1.61 5.82 1.73 Reason 4.78 1.88 2.83 1.87 2 1.61 WritEval 4.29 1.5 4.23 1.41 4.35 1.23 WritGram 4.94 1.23 4.98 1.23 4.9 1.12 Upset 3 1.93 3.39 1.94 3.33 2.13 Vote 4.9 2.04 3.54 2.26 2.45 2 PercAQ 3.49 1.67 3.35 1.77 2.8 1.66 bias 5.18 1.64 5.29 1.4 5.78 1.28

trust 3.55 1.8 3.35 1.58 2.92 1.55 expert 2.88 1.78 2.75 1.57 2.35 1.51 PostAtt 5.51 1.83 5.42 1.82 5.43 1.93 ObjAmbPos 5.39 2.03 5.35 1.99 5.41 2.01 ObjAmbNeg 2.78 2.16 2.56 1.91 2.78 2.22 Conflicted 2.37 1.73 2.77 1.58 2.22 1.53 Undecided 2.16 1.59 2.04 1.3 2 1.5 Mixed 2.45 1.78 2.6 1.55 2.63 1.69 Certain 6.02 1.36 6.12 1.02 6.1 1.39 Corr 5.94 1.27 5.52 1.29 5.55 1.44 Clar 6.02 1.27 5.92 0.99 6.08 1.26 SelfPers 2.98 1.91 3.21 1.79 3.2 1.77 DesiredWg 10.81 4.71 11.33 5.53 10.4 5.5 WageCur 7.67 0.85 8.13 1.92 7.66 0.9 PolSoc 3.04 1.9 2.88 1.49 3.49 1.82 PolEcon 3.42 1.94 3.46 1.8 4.14 1.78 serious 6.75 0.56 6.73 0.53 6.73 0.7 ReadTime 36.92 37.09 40.72 22.35 41.02 39.9

Study 1b

$10 per hour $20 per hour $40 per hour $80 per hour Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Prison 5.70 1.43 5.40 1.13 5.84 1.43 5.76 1.45 5.81 1.31 5.52 1.47 5.67 1.39 5.22 1.53 PrisonCert 5.26 1.87 5.15 1.50 5.50 1.56 5.54 1.43 5.42 1.30 5.14 1.50 5.44 1.53 5.10 1.56 CapPunish 3.68 2.06 4.39 1.99 4.06 2.10 3.80 2.06 3.58 2.16 3.84 2.04 4.15 2.13 4.12 1.86 PreAtt 4.92 2.02 4.52 1.77 4.66 2.20 5.30 1.63 5.08 1.81 5.26 1.72 5.09 1.93 4.78 1.97 PreCert 6.04 1.35 5.35 1.67 5.90 1.45 5.72 1.23 5.75 1.38 5.86 1.16 5.93 1.23 5.78 1.40 GunCtrl 3.19 2.22 3.75 2.24 3.84 2.39 3.66 2.35 3.02 2.26 3.56 2.31 3.33 2.13 3.39 2.19 IncomIneq 5.55 1.78 5.14 1.77 5.30 2.10 5.80 1.50 5.37 1.85 5.08 1.93 5.56 1.87 5.22 1.72 Bootstraps 2.34 1.59 2.87 1.92 2.56 1.74 2.76 1.51 2.50 1.70 2.90 1.96 2.69 1.61 2.80 1.78 EthicShop 4.64 1.65 4.39 1.75 4.34 1.85 4.46 1.73 4.37 1.60 4.76 1.74 4.74 1.73 4.18 1.63 GMOs 3.89 2.11 4.19 2.13 3.92 1.94 4.26 2.16 3.77 2.09 3.62 1.99 3.98 2.17 4.25 2.00 USxtian 3.81 2.46 4.08 2.29 3.76 2.22 3.76 2.12 3.89 2.28 4.50 2.25 3.82 2.22 3.98 2.21 SpecAgree 5.21 2.06 4.46 2.01 3.80 2.27 3.40 2.29 2.19 1.69 1.72 1.34 2.32 1.89 1.71 1.54 SpecCert 5.92 1.23 5.31 1.73 5.62 1.32 5.78 1.54 6.04 1.50 6.44 1.23 6.06 1.37 6.35 1.33 Reason 5.40 1.93 4.19 2.05 3.78 2.19 3.10 2.20 1.96 1.44 1.54 1.22 2.17 1.74 1.31 0.71 surprise 2.60 1.94 3.65 2.07 4.84 2.22 5.92 1.56 6.39 0.91 6.40 1.21 6.39 1.05 6.53 1.12 WriteEval 5.53 1.20 3.75 1.51 5.10 1.46 4.18 1.89 4.65 1.43 3.86 1.51 4.67 1.39 3.88 1.38 Writ3Gram 5.94 1.01 4.75 1.36 5.66 1.02 5.04 1.40 5.25 1.20 4.78 1.45 5.17 1.06 4.78 1.09 Upset 2.30 1.72 3.75 2.01 2.80 1.95 3.42 1.97 3.10 2.08 3.60 2.06 3.24 1.99 3.82 2.03 Offended 1.75 1.45 3.69 2.06 2.36 1.93 3.32 1.98 2.90 2.13 3.46 2.36 3.13 2.28 3.78 2.09 Vote 5.26 2.06 4.15 2.01 4.06 2.39 3.44 2.23 2.98 2.25 1.96 1.75 2.89 2.20 1.90 1.57

PercAQ 5.19 1.65 2.48 1.62 4.42 2.00 2.94 2.01 3.85 1.78 2.02 1.36 4.02 1.74 1.92 1.43 bias 4.04 1.90 5.14 1.65 4.70 1.93 4.82 1.98 4.83 1.84 5.80 1.68 5.22 1.83 5.47 1.62 trust 4.66 1.70 3.12 1.72 4.20 1.91 3.28 1.92 3.39 1.67 2.24 1.39 3.32 1.83 2.06 1.41 expert 4.04 1.57 2.33 1.64 3.70 1.85 2.80 1.93 3.12 1.65 1.78 1.20 3.26 1.85 1.82 1.38 PostAtt 5.55 2.04 5.29 1.84 5.40 1.98 5.80 1.46 5.79 1.46 5.64 1.48 5.52 1.87 5.16 2.08 ObjAmbPos 5.51 2.06 5.14 2.04 5.52 1.91 5.86 1.37 5.79 1.50 5.56 1.66 5.57 1.89 5.53 1.83 ObjAmbNeg 2.47 2.06 2.87 1.97 2.72 2.11 2.12 1.52 2.14 1.53 2.20 1.62 2.43 2.10 2.69 2.13 Conflicted 2.23 1.55 3.06 2.01 2.40 1.76 2.74 1.88 2.64 1.56 2.50 1.61 2.11 1.60 2.63 1.94 Undecided 1.77 1.05 2.52 1.87 2.28 1.80 2.24 1.35 2.08 1.27 2.28 1.50 1.91 1.42 2.49 1.77 Mixed 2.53 1.65 3.08 2.23 2.60 2.01 3.18 1.83 2.64 1.48 2.78 1.74 2.30 1.71 2.74 1.90 Certain 6.11 0.94 5.64 1.57 5.96 1.41 6.12 1.08 6.10 0.98 5.88 1.37 6.06 1.31 5.76 1.59 Corr 5.62 1.39 5.04 1.77 5.70 1.56 5.64 1.44 5.65 1.36 5.74 1.21 5.78 1.37 5.53 1.54 Clar 5.94 1.29 5.44 1.79 5.82 1.64 6.12 1.00 5.96 1.19 6.04 1.16 6.00 1.35 5.94 1.36 SelfPers 2.79 1.65 3.00 1.85 3.04 1.75 3.08 1.86 2.90 1.79 2.56 1.66 2.91 1.84 2.82 1.81 Sincere 6.04 1.08 4.21 1.85 5.90 1.27 4.32 1.94 4.50 1.94 3.02 1.92 4.13 2.04 2.74 1.90 Irony 1.66 1.09 4.14 1.99 2.30 1.80 4.26 1.88 3.58 2.04 5.08 1.96 4.26 1.92 5.18 1.89 Believer 6.26 0.79 4.56 1.86 5.86 1.29 4.34 1.87 4.44 1.79 3.06 1.81 3.96 2.05 3.20 2.03 Funny 1.19 0.58 2.67 1.79 1.56 1.22 3.20 1.98 2.21 1.70 3.50 2.05 2.98 1.94 3.41 1.94 SatSerBip 1.26 0.85 2.75 1.84 1.62 1.29 2.94 1.79 2.19 1.48 3.92 2.10 3.37 2.02 4.22 1.79 DesiredWg 11.36 3.04 10.97 2.30 13.47 4.29 13.03 4.81 13.21 4.62 11.48 3.22 14.09 10.16 12.29 3.87 MinWageCur 7.56 0.89 7.61 1.49 7.83 2.13 7.85 1.62 7.90 1.28 7.50 0.50 8.74 9.21 7.57 0.66 OpenMindedCog 3.27 0.30 3.28 0.57 3.32 0.34 3.34 0.40 3.25 0.35 3.22 0.42 3.27 0.36 3.27 0.34 PolSoc 3.19 1.86 3.64 1.82 3.50 2.08 2.86 1.70 3.04 1.67 3.78 1.99 3.48 1.88 3.16 1.59 PolEcon 3.57 1.84 4.19 1.75 4.12 2.00 3.50 1.97 3.67 1.90 4.06 1.90 4.04 1.85 3.94 1.75 Orient1 2.13 0.71 1.96 0.84 2.10 0.77 2.00 0.70 2.10 0.63 2.04 0.81 1.94 0.79 1.92 0.67 Orient2 2.21 0.89 2.31 0.70 2.60 0.83 2.00 0.60 2.67 0.49 2.13 0.64 2.54 0.78 2.00 0.87

serious 6.57 0.88 6.71 0.70 6.62 0.83 6.68 0.68 6.56 0.83 6.42 0.99 6.76 0.51 6.63 0.76 ReadTime 49.05 31.33 40.89 27.38 57.47 59.06 49.75 55.78 68.84 138.22 36.55 24.03 62.38 108.54 33.47 21.08

Appendix C – Persuasive messages used in Study 1 (a and b)

Strong Arguments Message The federal minimum wage should be $XX/hr (up from the current level of $7.25), equaling $YY,YYY/yr for a full time position. Minimum wage is not just for teens and part-time workers: 80% of minimum wage earners are over age 25, and 73% are full time employees. Fast food workers, alone, require over $200 billion per year in public assistance to subsidize their currently too-low wages. Making their employers pay that, instead of the public, just makes sense. Many economists and researchers have found that predictions of businesses having to close and consumer prices increasing dramatically to cover the cost of increased wages are unfounded or greatly exaggerated. Simulations and real-world instances have shown that increasing minimum wage actually increases wages for many more than just those earning minimum wage: It is not just an unfair boost to only the lowest rung of a company’s earners.

Weak Arguments Message The federal minimum wage should be $XX/hr (up from the current level of $7.25), equaling $YY,YYY/yr for a full time position. Increasing the minimum wage will help workers to afford the modern luxuries of 4k resolution TVs, cutting edge smartphone and tablets, and the luxury vehicles that everyone deserves to have. Everybody deserves happiness, and with wealth comes increased ability to achieve happiness. Thus, some reasonably generous amount wealth should be a basic human right. Because every job exists out of necessity, every worker should be paid the same. Increasing the minimum wage approaches that ideal. Having a higher minimum wage will make our nation look better to outsiders, and will draw more unskilled laborers to fill open positions.

Moderate Strength Arguments used in Study 1a only The federal minimum wage should be $XX/hr (up from the current level of $7.25), equaling $YY,YYY/yr for a full time position. If work is needed badly enough, then employers and customers will pay whatever they need to get the work done.

Minimum wage workers tend not to save their money, instead spending it as soon as they get it. This increased funding of paycheck-to-paycheck lifestyles will help the economy in general. Making double figures per hour will result in a gain in morale for workers, increasing productivity over single-figure hourly wages. Raising the minimum wage will allow people too stressed out by their life-long careers to fall back on basic, minimum wage jobs.

Appendix D – Studies 2a and 2b full list of measures

Items presented only in Study 2a are italicized. Items presented only in Study 2b are underlined

DeathPen: The drugs required for a death sentence by lethal injection should be easier for states to acquire. -3: Strongly disagree to +3: Strongly agree

GMOs: I try to avoid eating genetically modified foods (GM foods). -3: Strongly disagree to +3: Strongly agree

PreAttitude: How do you feel about the idea of increasing the cost of tuition at Ohio State in order to maintain and increase the quality of education and student experience on campus? -3: Strongly oppose to +3: Strongly support

PreCertainty: How certain are you of your position toward increasing the cost of tuition at Ohio State? 0: Not at all certain to 6: Extremely certain

OpenBorders: What is your attitude toward the United States adopting an "open borders" immigration policy, enabling free movement of people into the country with only minimal restrictions? -3: Strongly oppose to +3: Strongly support

MinWage: What is your position toward increasing the federal minimum wage? -3: Strongly oppose to +3: Strongly support

MinWageCert: How certain are you of your position toward increasing the federal minimum wage? 0: Not at all certain to 6: Extremely certain

EthicShop: When shopping for clothing, price is more important to me than business practices that are good for the environment. -3: Strongly disagree to +3: Strongly agree

USxtian: The United States was founded as a Christian nation. -3: Strongly disagree to +3: Strongly agree

PercAQ: Overall, how strong (or weak) were the arguments presented by the author in favor of increasing tuition? -3: Extremely weak to +3: Extremely strong

Surprise: To what degree were you surprised by the author's proposed tuition? 0: Not at all surprised to 6: extremely surprised

Reason: How reasonable do you think the author's proposed tuition value was? -3: Extremely unreasonable to +3: Extremely reasonable