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Public Communication CHALLENGES 30YEARS OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES Club of Venice 1986-2016 30YEARS OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES Club of Venice 1986-2016 TABLE OF CONTENT YEARS OF 30PUBLIC COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES This book was published in November 2016 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Club of Venice. The contributions in this book reflect only the views of their respective authors. This publication has no commercial intent and cannot be used for any commercial purpose without prior agreement from its publishers. Published with the financial support of the Belgian State (Chancellery of the Prime Minister), the Government Offices of Sweden (Communications Division), the Government of the Italian Republic (Presidency of the Council of Ministers – Department for European Policies), the Ministry of General Affairs of the Netherlands (Public Information and Communication Office) and the European Parliament. Coordination: Philippe Caroyez, Hans Brunmayr, Vincenzo Le Voci Responsible editor: Belgian State – Chancellery of the Prime Minister Legal deposit: D/2016/9737/10 November 2016 Graphic design: Fabienne Bonnoron TABLE OF CONTENT FOREWORD Sandro Gozi 7 INTrodUCTION 8 Thirty years dedicated to a certain idea of Europe Stefano Rolando 8 The cardinal virtues of the Club of Venice... Philippe Caroyez 11 Fighting against fear and winning back confidence in Europe Aurelio Sahagún Pool 18 Sharing best practices in communicating on Europe for the sake of all its citizens Zvonimir Frka-Petešić 20 “Opening the space” and developing together Heike Thiele 21 GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION IN EUROPE 22 About Dutch dykes and dunes: the power of smart cooperation in communication Erik den Hoedt 22 Italy and the Club: a 30-year-long partnership from Venice to Venice, and beyond Diana Agosti 24 Deliver, create and inspire Alex Aiken 27 National convention on the european union: open debate on Europe in the Czech Republic Igor Blahušiak & Kateřina Merklová 30 COMPETENCE, CAPACITY BUILDING, ETHICS AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 33 Public policy and effective communication : it only works as an inseparable pair Sean Larkins 33 The next episode. The Academy for government communication Miriam van Staden & Paulijn de Bruijne 36 Professionalism in government communication matters. Much! Nada Serajnik Sraka 38 Communication horizons: some obvious shifts leading to inevitable change Zigurds Zakis 44 Communicating Europe in Italy: the role of the department for european policies Fiorenza Barazzoni and Barbara Altomonte 47 Social license to operate: positioning and the communication professional Guy Dominy & Kevin Traverse-Healy 50 Inspiring times for EU communication professionals Reijo Kemppinen 53 Public communications between projecting values and feeding populism Vuk Vujnovic 55 EU StratComs in the East and South; challenges and perspectives Giles Portman & Michael Mann 57 relaTIONS WITH CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOING local 60 Communicating Europe in partnership: involving organised civil society Peter Lindvald-Nielsen 60 Innovation in EU communication: online courses (MOOC) on regions, EU institutions and policy-making Wolfgang Petzold 62 Is democracy fit for purpose? Millicent Ragnhild Scott 66 How can open data help democracy? Michelle Brook 68 Engaging citizens in the EU processes – the MEUSAC experience Vanni Xuereb 70 PUBLIC OPINION: TRENDS AND EXPECTATIONS 74 Being relevant in changing societies Rita Timmerman 74 Evolution of the EU’s public opinion and expectations Aleyda Hernández Laviades 77 TABLE OF CONTENT 3 commUNIcaTION TOOLS: WEB commUNIcaTION, SOCIAL MEDIA AND FUTURE ORIENTATIONS 80 To be a successful communicator, learn what motivates your audience John S. Verrico 80 The importance of “being social” – The Federal Chancellery of Austria and its social media activities Susanne Weber 83 Towards a (more) social government Milko Vlessing 87 Time to think again about how you use social media? Guy Dominy 89 MEDIA FREEDOM 91 Media in turmoil – and how about trust in politics? Christian Spahr 91 Media freedom today Oliver Vujovic 94 CRISIS commUNIcaTION 96 Communicate in times of crisis Philippe Caroyez 96 Crisis communication - outline and general principles Mike Granatt 100 Crisis communication work process. Achieving an even more professional communication discipline Hugo Marynissen, Stijn Pieters, Peter Mertens, Benoît Ramacker & Bert Brugghemans 104 The migration and refugee crisis: a serious challenge for communicators Erik den Hoedt, Claus Hörr & Vincenzo Le Voci 113 Managing the migration crisis Lefteris Kretsos 117 The added value of crisis communication networks: staying active and sharing Elpida-Melpomeni Chlimintza & François Théron 120 Dealing with a common problem Paul Azzopardi 122 Central Europe and the refugee question: cooperation, not confrontation Gabi Gőbl, Christian Kvorning Lassen, Marko Lovec, Milan Nič & Paul Schmidt 124 Counter-terrorism and strategic communications: How to shape the debate? Christiane Höhn 128 Research-based messaging on countering violent extremism Leonie Sheer 130 Clarity vs shadows Peter Wilson 133 CLImaTE CHANGE 134 Communicating climate change and EU climate action Anna Johansson 134 PUBLIC DIplomacy AND braNDING 138 Public diplomacy and branding: re-telling Europe Stefan Vukotić 138 Soft power will continue to matter Verena Nowotny 141 Public diplomacy: relevance and reasonable perspectives in times of crisis Vincenzo Le Voci 143 Public diplomacy and branding Hanna Brogren 147 4 TABLE OF CONTENT commUNIcaTING EUrope TOGETHER 150 Communicating Europe to citizens: more than a lip service? Hans Brunmayr 150 The role of institutional communication and the resurgence of propaganda Juana Lahousse Juárez 152 Communicating Europe after Brexit: an important task for each and every one of us Niels Jørgen Thøgersen 154 From a chequered dissent a new active and intelligent consensus Pier Virgilio Dastoli 157 Une fenêtre sur l’Europe : communication de la crise ou communication en crise ? Michaël Malherbe 160 Co-creating our european future Verena Ringler 165 Les défis des communicants publics en territoire Dominique Mégard & Bernard Deljarrie 168 commUNIcaTING EUrope: THE EDUcaTION DIMENSION 170 Sapere aude (“Dare to know”)! European citizenship School – the “Europe is us” case Barbara Altomonte 170 “EU back to school” - a Romanian story Irina Pachitanu 173 THE VISION/THE way forward 176 Communication guys 4.0 – the “empowerers” Claus Hörr 176 European information challenges in a fast-changing world Jaume Duch Guillot 178 The state, the future and the vision of public communications in Europe Eleonora Gavrielides 181 Enhance relevance, innovate democracy Anthony Zacharzewski 183 Learning something new every day John S. Verrico 186 Time to embrace communication interdependence Kevin Traverse-Healy 189 192 THE CLUB OF VENICE role, compeTENCIES AND acTIVITIES 192 What is the Club of Venice? 192 Constitutional principles 193 Convergences 194 Loutraki Declaration approved by the members of the Club of Venice on the 1st of March 2003 195 Chronology of the Club of Venice meetings 196 Upcoming Club of Venice meetings 2016-2018 199 TABLE OF CONTENT 5 FOREWORD Sandro Gozi FOREWORD Sandro Gozi Today with this book we wish to celebrate a smart idea of the then General Directorate for Information in 1986 and the political will of the then Secretary of the State of the Presidency of Ministers Giuliano Amato who allowed its official launch. Thirty years on, that idea remains still very necessary. The Club of Venice, in fact, aims to connect the dots between communication experts from EU member states and EU institutions, as well as between representatives of science, communities and civil society. The Club of Venice is an informal network, although fully recognized providing an highly valuable service to the European system as a whole. From ethics to civil society, from the web tools to press freedom, from crisis communication to the crisis of communication or to climate change. These were just some of the issues dealt with in recent years. We are convinced that the European Union means first and foremost sharing: sharing information, strategies, analyses and proposals. In a nutshell, we are firmly convinced of the deep value of communication exchange and coordination in Europe. That not only reflects one of the basic values of our Continent, but it is a necessary golden thread among its countries. Only by carrying on along this road we will be able to deal at best with the crises Europe is facing today from migrants to the economic crisis, from the fight against populism and nationalism to the relaunch of the European project. Only with a shared approach to communication we will be able to convey to the public opinion the importance of belonging to the Union. In times like these where it seems easier for some to build walls of barbed wire and turn their back aeay from solidarity, it is if the utmost importance to better communicate Europe, within and outside its borders. Thirty years of Club of Venice have meant more than eighty meetings all over Europe and every year, in the autumn session, a meeting in Venice. For thirty years with the same spirit, informal and oriented to the best communication possible on Europe, its values, its history and, above all, its future and its common challenges. This year, with a very special attention to the upcoming anniversary of the sixty years of the Treaties of Rome. Actually, this not “only” an anniversary, but an unique opportunity to relaunch the European process, to strengthen the link between
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