Senior Airman Marcel Williams, 27th Special Operations Wing public affairs broadcaster, speaks at “Gathering for Unity” event at Cannon Air Force Base, New , June 5, 2020, and shares experiencing racism in his own community (U.S. Air Force/Lane T. Plummer)

Social Media Weaponization The Biohazard of Russian Campaigns

By Sarah Jacobs Gamberini

n a renewed era of Great Power com- competitors are regularly operating allowed for nearly ubiquitous access to petition, the is faced below the threshold that would warrant its targets and a prolific capability for I with adversaries engaging across mul- a military response, including on the controlling a narrative and manipu- tiple domains without the traditional information battlefield. The blurred red lating the hearts and minds of a pop- distinctions of war and peace. America’s lines that result from covert informa- ulation on a range of sensitive societal tion operations waged by foreign actors issues, including public health. on the Internet will force a change in has a long history of seeking how the United States operates and to project power and influence while Sarah Jacobs Gamberini is a Policy Fellow in how its society consumes information. playing with a technological and geopo- the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Institute for National Strategic Russia used tactics of influence and litical handicap. Given its history and a Studies, at the National Defense University. coercion long before geographic location with many bordering

4 Forum / Social Media Weaponization JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 nations, it sees itself as constantly be- encroachment from the United States region.9 Since the end of the Cold War, sieged from all sides, but particularly by and the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- Russia has had to be calculating and the West. Since the nadir of Soviet dis- nization (NATO). It views the United creative to balance its economic, military, solution, Russia has fought to rebalance States, NATO, and the European Union and technological disadvantages to com- power and contemporaneously reduce as committed to weakening Russia, pete with the United States, maximizing American influence. But without equiva- eliminating its sphere of influence, less conventional tools of war, including lent conventional military might, Russia and ensuring sustained U.S.-Western covert operations within the information has turned to other asymmetric advan- unipolar dominance.4 This assessment domain. tages to compensate in its competition derives from a strong Russian belief that During the Cold War, the Soviet with the United States. Social media has the United States broke its word that Union used to influence provided a unique tool kit to manipulate NATO would move “not one inch east- nations in coercive ways distinct from narratives and amplify societal divisions ward,” as stated by then–U.S. Secretary espionage and counterintelligence. Active in an effort to weaken the United States of State James Baker in the aftermath measures included disinformation, polit- in ways previously unimaginable. While of the Soviet dissolution.5 Russia touts ical influence operations, and controlling Russian weaponization of information the West’s “interference” during the media and messaging with the goal of is not new the intersection of Russian Ukrainian revolution as further evidence discrediting or influencing the West, disinformation, public health crises, and that the United States and NATO which are echoed in Russia’s modern-day vulnerability to bioevents presents new are meddling too much in its area of tactics.10 This type of warfare and other and troubling homeland and national influence.6 It views this infringement on measures below the threshold of actual security threats for the United States. what it perceives as its near abroad as an use of force have been variously referred The United States is diverse, pluralis- unacceptable affront.7 to in the West as Russia’s asymmetric, tic, and democratic. These characteristics, Russia sees Western dominance gray zone, hybrid, or next-generation its founding principles, are also its manifested socially and culturally (for warfare. However, the term cross-do- strengths as a nation. But to U.S. adver- example, Western entertainment seeking main warfare better reflects the current saries, including Russia, they are potential to replace Russian culture, values, and Russian method of shaping the security weaknesses to exploit. One strategic goal language), politically (the West foment- environment using an integrated ap- of Russia’s influence operations is to ing “color revolutions” in Russia and the proach of all military and nonmilitary weaken the United States and its allies, former ), and militarily (the devices to achieve its strategic goals.11 which Russia views as operating too close United States geographically encircling In a response to the Arab Spring to its sphere of influence, what it refers Russia with NATO expansion and tech- uprisings, which Russia believed to be to as its “near abroad.”1 Time and again, nologically ringing Russia with missile incited by the West, General Valery Russia has used familiar influence tactics defenses and bases). Moreover, Russia Gerasimov (now chief of the General to spread disinformation in an attempt to has long feared it is behind the West in Staff) publicly discussed how to prevent weaken U.S. democratic society and de- science and technology. Russia has, at similar uprisings in Russia. In his speech, fame America’s reputation on the world times, achieved parity in certain defense Gerasimov cited control of information stage.2 From Russia’s interference in the platforms but generally struggles to keep as central to victory.12 This speech, which 2016 Presidential to spreading pace, thus relying heavily on traditional has been overstated as a Russian military during the 2020 global pandemic, weapons of mass destruction, such as its doctrine, did describe how Russia should Russia is exploiting America’s divisions substantial nuclear arsenal, to offset U.S. operate simultaneously across multiple with disinformation to amplify discord conventional might. Russia similarly lags domains—military, political, cyber, and in the United States and undermine its in technologies for civilian applications. information warfare—to achieve strategic institutions. As Russia targets issues of Underlying all this are vast and troubling goals. In March 2019, Gerasimov spoke public health in this way, there will be demographic and health challenges (a on the shift of warfare to the information tremendous implications for American declining birth rate and high death rate sphere and labeled information technolo- citizens and the U.S. health system. The from unnatural causes, including wide- gies as “one of the most promising types world is grappling with an “infodemic” spread alcoholism).8 These factors have of weapons” to be used covertly “not as well as a pandemic, and both require a led to Russia viewing itself in a constant only against critically important informa- whole-of-society approach to be success- state of besiegement and deficiency. tional infrastructures, but also against the fully addressed.3 Much of what shapes and propels population of a country, directly influ- Russia’s worldview today is based on for- encing the condition of a state’s national Russia Under Siege mer Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s security.”13 Over centuries, Russia has experienced doctrine that rejects the United States as Information is but one aspect of attacks from the Teutonic Knights, a hegemon and seeks a multipolar world cross-domain warfare. Another important Napoleon, and Nazi , and the reestablishment of Russia as the facet of this Russian thinking is the belief and, since the end of the Cold War, main regional power in the former Soviet that the customary distinction between

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gamberini 5 Control room operators with Edgewood Chemical Biological Center aboard U.S. Government–owned container ship MV Cape Ray, modified and deployed to eastern Mediterranean Sea to dispose of Syrian chemical agents, confirm and record data on current operation at Naval Station Rota, Spain, June 16, 2014 (U.S. Navy/Desmond Parks) wartime and peacetime no longer ex- undermine Russian social, cultural, Russia has responded to this threat of ists. These blurred red lines have been and political institutions as part of its the information age in a number of ways. demonstrated beyond speeches or doc- broader campaign to ensure Western It is working to create a “Russia only” trine, for instance in Russia’s employment geopolitical dominance.14 The Kremlin Internet with aspirations of creating a of this malign activity below the U.S. sees information as a new type of Russian equivalent of ’s “Great threshold of armed conflict—little green weapon and views all forms of informa- Firewall.”15 Russian news and propa- men in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, tion, across all platforms, as potential ganda (for example, the state-controlled “unaffiliated” private military groups in sources of power to be weaponized. television network RT and online “news” Syria, use of Novichok (a Cold War–era Russia believes that the West is using aggregators such as Sputnik) are beamed chemical weapon first developed by the all forms of information technology in to counter Western cable news.16 Soviet Union) in the , against them—from persistent satellite Additionally, until Russia has its own and numerous cyber attacks—and by the television and the Internet bombarding information operations military systems, nature of cloaked activities, likely many Russian citizens with what it views as it holds Western systems at risk both more. Yet Russia has protected itself from overtly anti-Russian messages to social physically (for example, antispace capa- military response because attribution and media as tools for coordinating activists bilities) and with cyber attacks.17 Finally, proportionality are thrown into question and provocateurs in uprisings in former the Russian government’s active Internet by their deniability and obfuscation. Soviet republics. Finally, Russia sees presence pervades the social media land- U.S. space, intelligence, surveillance, scape using large numbers of Russian Old Influence Operations and reconnaissance, as well as other Web brigades, troll farms, and automated Playbook, New Media Tools information technology systems, as net- bots to disseminate and flood Russia’s present leaders fear that U.S. worked military capabilities designed to hashtags.18 advantages in information technology summarily dismantle any opponent slow Coinciding with its view that all infor- allow Washington and its allies to to adapt. mation can be leveraged, Russia’s social

6 Forum / Social Media Weaponization JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 media machine is employed to great that makes online influence operations communication during protests.25 It is effect to influence its adversaries and so successful is that once information is important to note that Russia’s goal is their populations. Russian trolls utilize disseminated and consumed, it is hard rarely to promote one side of any issue, the power of narratives online, focusing to retract it from people’s minds. The but to stir the pot and enflame ten- on simple messages targeting a cohesive tools that make social media so useful for sions—U.S. self-destruction would be group so that its message will then be connecting, sharing, and organizing are Russia’s ideal victory. shared and further amplified by foreign the same tools that allow malign actors Russia’s information warfare tactics targets.19 They have a keen understanding to take advantage and manipulate. This are a moving target, making them diffi- that strong emotions spread quickly on- fact—paired with a need for fast news cult to understand and counter. In June line and that, given the right prompting, without waiting for validating research or 2020, a large-scale, persistent 6-year-long people love nothing more than arguing fact-checking, the ease of sharing on so- disinformation campaign out of Russia and solidifying entrenched viewpoints.20 cial media platforms, and the fact that the was exposed. The campaign used new As with Soviet active measures, Russia’s most divisive topics are deeply emotional methods for targeting the West and goals in weaponizing social media are (for example, public health and race Ukraine on issues ranging from denying to foment chaos, create distrust in U.S. relations)—makes the United States the Russian doping in international sporting institutions, and target the preexisting perfect target of this type of social media events to the broader praising of Russia divisions in the country. All this makes weapon. and its government and highlighting U.S. it harder for the United States to form Russia’s modus operandi for social and NATO aggression and interference a unified response to counter Russia in media exploitation is predictable: Identify in other countries.26 The campaign was more traditional domains. a contentious issue, employ bots and labeled “Secondary Infektion”27 as an trolls on various social media platforms to homage to Operation Infektion, a Cold and spread divisive rhetoric, amplify debates, War callback to the 1980s disinforma- Disinformation Campaigns and promote discord.22 One of the most tion campaign when the Soviet Union Americans are regularly confronted with publicized influence operations by Russia employed malicious messaging to sell the in many forms from both was its interference in the U.S. that the U.S. military domestic and foreign sources. There in 2016. But Moscow’s efforts are created the AIDS virus as a tool of war.28 is a spectrum of false content online, broader than elections and exist as part of Of particular interest in Russia’s methods from well-meaning friends on an ongoing deliberate campaign against during Secondary Infektion was the large thoughtlessly sharing misinformation the U.S. public. As a diverse, pluralist so- number of “burner” accounts used for a they assume to be true to more malev- ciety, the existence of societal fissures for single misleading tweet and then aban- olent and targeted propaganda-like target are numerous. doned. As opposed to previous efforts content designed to intentionally In 2019, leaked documents revealed to build social media accounts with a fol- confuse and deceive. Therefore, it is that Russia considered targeting one of lowing, credibility, and trust, this shows important to understand the difference America’s deepest and oldest fault lines as Russia’s recognition of Americans’ media between the terms disinformation and a nation: race. Documents showed Russia illiteracy, inability to recognize fake news, misinformation. Disinformation is the considered training African-Americans in and unwillingness to research deeper than malicious and intentional development combat and sabotage before returning a single tweet. Few people take the time and propagation of false information, these individuals to the United States to to seek the source of information, and so while misinformation is the inadvertent create a Pan-African state in the southern far Russia has been proved correct in its spreading of erroneous content. Russia United States, physically breaking apart hypothesis.29 As much as can be under- relies on both. A misinformation cam- the country. The proposal, which was stood about Russia’s goals and methods, paign, for example, could be employed never enacted, intended to “destabilize the inexpensive and ubiquitous nature of maliciously by relying on unwitting the internal situation of the [United social media empowers disinformation users to spread false information. States].” 23 Russia recognizes that slav- efforts to shift and flex to changes in Bill Gates, when asked in 1995 about ery and the resulting centuries-long the social media as needed. false information spreading on the then- inequality is the original American sin It could also release prolific amounts of new “Net,” stated that fake news would and the ultimate fissure to be exploited. false and harmful information, which, if be easy to debunk because there would Russian influence operations were used only marginally successful, could have an be more people checking the facts and in- against African-Americans in advance of outsized impact. formation would be spread from friend to the 2016 election,24 and more recently friend, a more trustworthy transaction.21 Russia has exploited the Black Lives Amplifying Public But as we now know, it is this very aspect Matter movement by flooding Health Debates of social media that allows for misinfor- hashtags—a technique used to dilute Russia clearly recognizes how to iden- mation campaigns to succeed and for fake legitimate related content, thus inhibiting tify, exploit, and amplify U.S. political news to flourish. Another core challenge the social media platform as a means of tensions and the Nation’s racial wounds

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gamberini 7 Transportation systems technicians from 452nd Logistic Readiness Squadron prepare 50 pallets of ventilators provided by U.S. Agency for International Development for delivery to Moscow, Russia, at March Air Reserve Base, California, May 19, 2020 (U.S. Air Force/Keith James) as well as other seams and fissures. vaccinations are at best unnecessary and example, children, pregnant women, Public health is another area of acute at worst cause physical harm, including and other vulnerable populations). debate in the United States, and one autism and seizures. The movement is For a disease as contagious as measles, that is ideal for Russian targeting. fueled by a deep mistrust of authority herd immunity occurs only if approx- Public health issues are both personal and the existence of echo chambers imately 94 percent of a population is and societal, and therefore any discus- online that encourage the spread of vaccinated; even a small change in vac- sion of related topics is often full of misinformation quickly and among cination numbers could bring back this emotion and an eagerness to quickly friends. All the fake news about vaccines disease, declared eliminated in the United obtain information. Often, people are is actually harder to counter due to States in 2000.32 The result of erroneous more trusting of health advice from their amazing success. Diseases such as fear-mongering about vaccines is a society friends, family, or influencers they trust measles are seen as relics of the past that that is physically degraded by previously than impersonal institutions. A National have long been eradicated and do not eliminated diseases.33 And now that the Institutes of Health study found that touch modern U.S. society. However, world grapples with the novel corona- “in the [United States], eight in ten the United States is experiencing the virus causing COVID-19, large pockets Internet users search for health infor- greatest number of measles cases since of society are loathe to be told how to mation online, and 74 percent of these 1992 in parts of the country where a protect themselves and their communi- people use social media.”30 This makes significant percentage of the population ties. If Americans are rebelling against public health issues such as COVID-19 has opted out of vaccines.31 Vaccines the science that underlies why masks and or measles an ideal target for Russian are successful with herd immunity physical distancing are good preventative social media weaponization. It is divisive when, depending on how contagious measures, it is foreseeable that there will and emotional, and could realistically the disease, a certain percentage of the be skepticism over a vaccine once it is physically weaken the United States. society is vaccinated in order to protect a available. The United States has been The anti-vaccination (anti-vaxx- small number of the society who cannot lulled into a false sense of security due to ers) movement espouses a belief that get vaccines for various reasons (for the very success of vaccines.

8 Forum / Social Media Weaponization JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 These public health crises would be was brought to Wuhan by the U.S. Army also relied on the military to help with atrocious enough without attempts by during Olympics-style military games expanded hospital bed capacity at home, foreign adversaries to exacerbate them. in 2019.36 This adds to concerns that all of which stretches resources and in The Journal of Public Health uncovered Russia’s influence operations are attrac- theory means fewer forces deployed.38 that the same Russian Internet Research tive to other U.S. adversaries and will If anti-vaxxers grow in number and/ Agency—led by Yevgeny Prigozhin (a continue to be a prime method of attack or influence, this could weaken the U.S. close friend of Russian President Vladimir from multiple actors. ability to respond to any type of biolog- Putin) and indicted in Robert Mueller’s These attacks on public health pres- ical threat—natural or human-made. investigation report on Russian election ent a threat to homeland and national Bioweapons of the future are less likely to interference—was also behind deploying security. The anti-vaxxer movement risks be those agents historically weaponized bots and trolls to spread disinformation increasing U.S. vulnerability to infec- and will likely target civilian populations. on vaccinations.34 In its analysis, the tious diseases. Looking forward to how Biological agents have always been diffi- journal article notes that Russian bots these same tactics may be used against a cult to weaponize because of the quantity and trolls tweeted an equal number of COVID-19 vaccine once it is available, and dissemination needed to have wide- pro- and anti-vaccine tweets. The goal, we must consider the implications of spread, mass impact. As the large-scale it seems, was to stir the debate and bring malignant messaging about vaccines programs of the Cold War gave way to people into their corners, further en- from both domestic and foreign sources. the terrorist threat, the biothreat scenario trenching their own viewpoints. Russia’s Beyond propagating doubt in U.S. insti- of a biological agent–filled test tube goal is to amplify and normalize the tutions (for example, hospitals/testing dropped in a subway has been overtaken debate and firmly cement divisions. The and government organizations such as by disturbing real-world pandemic health repercussions that result from the Centers for Disease Control and scenarios. a normalized vaccination debate were Prevention), these campaigns result in Russia and other U.S. adversaries are unlikely Russia’s primary goal—merely doubt of basic science (for example, peo- certainly noting U.S. vulnerabilities in a byproduct—but the fact that Russia ple not wearing masks and possibly not its response to the coronavirus. All this could so callously degrade the health trusting a future vaccine). By amplifying presents renewed concerns of a future of U.S. citizens as a secondary effect public health debates and not advocating biological weapon, the effects of which of its influence operations is egregious. for one side, Russia has helped normalize could be further enabled by information Given the ties to the Russian president, it a previously fringe discussion rejecting warfare. These indiscriminate information presents further concerns about how this basic science underlying vaccines and dis- attacks on public health reveal how Russia campaign may be endorsed by the state ease prevention. U.S. health institutions will exploit any divisions within the and what that means for how the United are faced with a crisis of trust as scientific United States, even to the point of wreak- States responds. Deniability, however, is facts about these contagious diseases are ing public health havoc. These attacks the crux of Putin’s success in this area. degraded by both intentional and inad- on public health highlight the type of Russia has similarly used its predict- vertent lies. ruthless adversary the United States faces. able tactics against the United States to There are longer term effects of At a certain point, the United States must stoke fear and chaos and to undercut amplifying the anti-vaxxer movement. contemplate whether this interference in the U.S. response during the COVID- Beyond the health and institutional its public health is a biothreat caused by a 19 pandemic. False narratives spread concerns, there are also costs to the U.S. foreign adversary. by Russian state media, trolls, and bots health system, as well as costs associated range from conspiracy theories that the with quarantining. The movement is a Countering the Influence virus was variously created by migrants, distraction for healthcare professionals of Influence Operations as a U.S. bioweapon, or to benefit the who are overburdened in this crisis as Asymmetric warfare is being waged U.S. pharmaceutical companies, or that it is, and for local, state, and Federal against the United States and its citizens the virus itself is a .35 Furthermore, governments that must devote time daily across multiple platforms and with China’s disinformation use—which has and resources to countering this false expanded notions of what constitutes historically been focused on domestic information. Furthermore, natural or acceptable warfare. Though the effects propaganda and creating the narrative intentional biothreats (including nat- of Russia’s information operations on that China and its authoritarian govern- ural biothreats exacerbated by foreign health matters are grave, we have not ment are benevolent and powerful—has adversary messaging) could potentially yet codified these societal attacks as borrowed from Russia’s influence oper- inhibit the military’s ability to project warfare, and therefore they do not rise ations playbook during the pandemic, power abroad. The pandemic has shown to the level of military response. The moving from its initial propaganda-type how vulnerable forces are to contracting United States requires a comprehen- response downplaying and denying the diseases such as COVID-19, and there sive, whole-of-government solution disease to all-out conspiracy theories and is renewed awareness of this threat by to counter these actions as well as a disinformation, including that the virus our adversaries.37 The United States has whole-of-society awareness to be part

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gamberini 9 Berkut (Ukrainian riot police) man checkpoint at entrance to Crimean Peninsula, March 10, 2014 (Courtesy Sasha Maksymenko) of the solution. Governments and as authorized.39 In the past, there has citizens and the Nation’s adversaries, it companies could raise barriers to make been work to counter Russian messaging cannot be fully successful.41 the efforts harder, and people could be in pockets of the U.S. Government, but One of the most effective things better informed on how to identify mis- it has often been limited to addressing that the U.S. Government could do information and disinformation, thereby overt propaganda rather than the low- to counter disinformation is practice making it less effective. The combined level guerrilla exploitation of social media consistent messaging and, in the case of effects could lead to reducing Russia’s we face today. During the Cold War, the disinformation and public health, deliver influence, if not deterring it altogether. U.S. Active Measures Working Group a consistent, science-based message. The solution will be complex, at all was established not only to counter During the aftermath of the attempted levels of society, and it begins and ends Soviet disinformation but also to sensitize assassination of Sergei Skripal in the with an informed public with high societies to be able to recognize Russian United Kingdom using Novichok, Russia media literacy. interference for themselves.40 It would put out hundreds of conflicting narratives Government can help but cannot seem this type of whole-of-government to confuse, deflect, and deny its involve- alone solve the problem of disinformation commitment to countering disinforma- ment. The United Kingdom, rather than any more than it can solely solve public tion would be timely to revive, perhaps in play whack-a-mole by attempting to health challenges. The 2020 National the form of the Malign Foreign Influence disprove each falsehood, put out a consis- Defense Authorization Act called for the Response Center. Even so, it would not tent, science-based message that helped Director of National Intelligence to cre- be enough on its own and certainly not reveal the lies and inconsistencies within ate a Malign Foreign Influence Response with intelligence-only participation. the Russian messaging.42 Center to coordinate and integrate across The Department of State’s Global Furthermore, the United States the Intelligence Community on issues Engagement Center is doing its part to must call out Russia for its cross-domain of foreign influence; as of this writing, identify, expose, and counter disinforma- misdeeds, including in the area of infor- this center has not yet been established tion, but without higher visibility by U.S. mation operations. The United States

10 Forum / Social Media Weaponization JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 must respond directly to these threats As social media continues to evolve Russia’s theory of the United States through targeted sanctions, international into more visual platforms including is that its diversity is its weakness. To condemnation in multilateral forums, TikTok, it will be important to flag counter this narrative, the United States and other asymmetric responses. Despite manipulated media such as artificial must show strength in its pluralism and Russia’s attempts at deniability of its role intelligence–enabled . Though work as a country to heal the divisions in these campaigns, the United States it presents a great challenge, as the tech- that make it the ideal target for this meth- and its allies should present evidence nology to create believable deepfakes odology. Russia is drilling deeper into in a forum such as the United Nations improves, so does the technology to the preexisting fault lines of American Security Council to show the links be- counter it. Tech companies are investing society—distracting, dividing, and tween these bad actors and the Russian in methods that reveal clues for when weakening. Particularly in the face of the government. Because of Russia’s veto an image has been altered, such as water Presidential election and a modern pan- on the Security Council, no resolutions droplets on an image, a tell-tale sign of demic, all Americans must be vigilant in would be passed, but this high-visibility .44 There are also questioning where information originates action would highlight to the world algorithms to assess when the title of and hyperaware of the seams and fissures Russia’s malign activities and perhaps rally an article does not match the content, in American society that are primed for support of other nations around stop- which could then alert users and dis- this type of attack. Healing the wounds ping this bad actor. The United States courage them from sharing misleading and divisions of an increasingly polarized needs to assess Russia’s actions not only information based on the title alone.45 nation will go a long way toward protect- by its methods but also by its effects. If Incorporating these technologies into ing the United States from Russia’s social Russia’s social media meddling results in social media platforms to flag manipu- media weaponization. JFQ a physically weakened society, even inad- lated media before it is shared further vertently, the United States must consider would both slow the spread of false treating these actions as more akin to a information and help create a society Notes bioattack than to a cyber attack. with a healthy level of skepticism and 1 Industry partners would play an improved media literacy. To maintain Roy Godson, Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Cam- important role in the solution. Silicon freedom to access all information, we paigns, Hearing Before the Select Committee Valley, the home of the platforms on must ensure users have the tools they on Intelligence of the U.S. Senate, 115th Cong., which this misinformation and disinfor- need to help recognize and counter 1st sess., 2017, available at . 2 Adam Taylor, “Did Russia Interfere of speech and shareholder pressure and must happen to effectively counter in Brexit? An Unpublished Report Roils therefore has not done nearly enough to Russian disinformation is an educated UK Politics Before Election,” Washington combat the information warfare waged and empowered U.S. population ca- Post, November 5, 2019, available at ; Filippa this threat but rather must accept that will not work to stop or slow Russia’s Lentzos, “The Russian Disinformation Attack this false content exists and focus on em- disinformation efforts; the United States That Poses a Biological Danger,” Bulletin of the powering companies and users to identify should therefore focus on inoculating Atomic Scientists, November 19, 2018, available and expose this content. In the midst of the population against Russia’s attempts at ; Robert S. Mueller III, Report system to identify and draw attention to A challenge of countering disinfor- on the Investigation into Russian Interference articles and posts that may be consid- mation during a public health crisis is in the 2016 Presidential Election, vols. I and ered dangerous or spreading disproven balancing the need for a media-literate II (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, information. In June 2020, Twitter society that is highly attuned to detect March 2019), available at . 3 Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, speech of Foreign Affairs official Lijian Zhou’s trusting institutions in equal measure. delivered to the Munich Security Conference, tweet advertising a bioweapon conspiracy The United States must invest in media Munich, Germany, February 15, 2020, avail- theory. While this social media policing is literacy and instill an awareness of the able at . 4 concerns and a “whack-a-troll” approach campaigns. In addition to making the Godson, Disinformation. 5 Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blan- is inefficient, it is a good first step to public aware of Russia’s role in these ton, NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev draw users’ attention to the reality that targeted information attacks, Americans Heard (Washington, DC: all tweets, even from verified accounts, must assess other fissures in U.S. society Archive, 2017), available at

JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gamberini 11 Marines fire 81mm mortar during training in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Hajin, Syria, August 4, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Corey Hook) bachev-heard-western-leaders-early>. library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP- 14 Carolina Vendil Pallin, “Internet Control 6 Ukraine: Background, Conflict with 84B00049R001303150031-0.pdf>. Through Ownership: The Case of Russia,” Post Russia, and U.S. Policy, R45008 (Washington, 11 Dmitry Adamsky, “Strategic Stability Soviet Affairs 33, no. 1 (2017). DC: Congressional Research Service, April 29, and Cross-Domain Coercion: The Russian 15 Jane Wakefield, “Russia ‘Successfully 2020), available at . The End of Strategic Stability? Nuclear Weapons ber 24, 2019, available at . West, and the Contest Over Ukraine and the Lawrence Rubin and Adam N. Stulberg (Wash- 16 Steven Erlanger, “Russia’s RT Network: Caucasus (New York: Oxford University Press, ington, DC: Georgetown University Press, Is It More BBC or KGB,” New York Times, 2017). 2018). March 8, 2017, available at

12 Forum / Social Media Weaponization JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Narratives for National Security: Proceedings Best Practices,” Pharmaceutical and Thera- com/2020/04/08/magazine/hospi- of a Workshop (Washington, DC: The National peutics Journal 39, no. 7 (July 2014), available tal-ship-comfort-new-york-coronavirus.html>; Academies Press, 2018), available at . PMC4103576/>. formation.” 20 Matthew Shaer, “What Emotion Goes 31 Centers for Disease Control and Preven- 39 National Defense Authorization Act for Viral the Fastest?” Smithsonian Magazine, April tion (CDC), “Measles Cases and Outbreaks,” Fiscal Year 2020, 116th Cong., § 1790, January 2014, available at . gov/legislation/damon-paul-nelson-and-mat- est-180950182/>. 32 Sebastian Funk, Critical Immunity thew-young-pollard-intelligence-authori- 21 Tom Huddleston, Jr., “In 1995, Bill Thresholds for Measles Elimination (London: zation-act-fiscal-1>; Amy Klobuchar et al., Gates Made These Predictions About Stream- Centre for the Mathematical Modelling of In- “Letter to Secretary Esper, Director Ratcliffe, ing Movies and Fake News on the Internet,” fectious Diseases, October 19, 2017), available Director Wray, General Nakasone, and Acting CNBC, May 31, 2019, available at . files/1/d/1d99087e-0a26-4242-a0cf- html>; Bill Gates and Terry Pratchett, “GQ&A: 33 CDC, “Measles History: Measles Elim- a5867d208a18/D1FD0C7DAF35260CBB- Bill Gates Talks to Terry Pratchett About the ination,” 2018, available at . ter.pdf>. Become a Billionaire,” GQ, July 1995. 34 David A. Broniatowski et al., “Weapon- 40 Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. 22 The War on Pineapple: Understanding ized Health Communication: Twitter Bots and Lamb, , Disinformation, and Strategic Foreign Interference in 5 Steps (Washington, Russian Trolls Amplify the Vaccine Debate,” Communications: How One Interagency Group DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), American Journal of Public Health (October Made a Major Difference, Strategic Perspectives available at . available at . How Putin’s Disinformation Efforts Could Strategic-Perspectives-11.pdf>. 23 Richard Engel, Kate Benyon-Tinker, and Backfire at Home,”Bulletin of the Atom- 41 Department of State, “Global Engage- Kennett Werner, “Russian Documents Reveal ic Scientists, March 31, 2020, available at ment Center,” 2020, available at . ment-center/>. uments-reveal-desire-sow-racial-discord-vio- 36 Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, 42 Tom McTague, “Britain’s Secret War lence-u-s-n1008051>. “As New Coronavirus Spread, China’s Old with Russia,” The Atlantic, December 3, 2019, 24 Scott Shane and Sheera Frenkel, “Russian Habits Delayed Fight,” New York Times, available at . Times, December 17, 2018, available at ; Steven Lee Myers, “China 43 Nina Jankowicz, “Russian Trolls Are nytimes.com/2018/12/17/us/politics/rus- Spins Tale that the U.S. Army Started the Only Part of the Problem,” New York Times, sia-2016-influence-campaign.html>. Coronavirus Epidemic,” New York Times, January 25, 2018, available at . 1, 2020, available at ; Depart- 44 Fijoy Vadakkumpadan and Ye Liu, Detect- russia-china-us-protests-social-media-twitter/>. ment of Defense, “7th International Military ing Deepfakes and Disinformation (Cary, NC: 26 Secondary Infektion at a Glance, 2020, Sports Council: Military World Games,” 2019, SAS, 2020). available at . Spotlight/CISM-Military-World-Games/>; 27 Ben Nimmo et al., Graphika: Secondary Sarah Jacobs Gamberini and Amanda Moodie, Infektion, 2020, available at . Conspiracy Theories,” War on the Rocks, 28 Thomas Boghardt, “Operation INFEK- April 6, 2020, available at . . Theodore Roosevelt, April 2020,” Morbidity and 29 Lance E. Mason, Dan Krutka, and Jere- Mortality Weekly Report (Washington, DC: my Stoddard, “Media Literacy, , and CDC, June 12, 2020), available at . at . Comfort Is Now Taking Covid-19 Patients. 30 C. Lee Ventola, “Social Media and Here’s What to Expect,” New York Times, Health Care Professionals: Benefits, Risks and April 8, 2020, available at

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