Social Media Weaponization the Biohazard of Russian Disinformation Campaigns

Senior Airman Marcel Williams, 27th Special Operations Wing public affairs broadcaster, speaks at “Gathering for Unity” event at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, June 5, 2020, and shares experiencing racism in his own community (U.S. Air Force/Lane T. Plummer) Social Media Weaponization The Biohazard of Russian Disinformation Campaigns By Sarah Jacobs Gamberini n a renewed era of Great Power com- competitors are regularly operating allowed for nearly ubiquitous access to petition, the United States is faced below the threshold that would warrant its targets and a prolific capability for I with adversaries engaging across mul- a military response, including on the controlling a narrative and manipu- tiple domains without the traditional information battlefield. The blurred red lating the hearts and minds of a pop- distinctions of war and peace. America’s lines that result from covert informa- ulation on a range of sensitive societal tion operations waged by foreign actors issues, including public health. on the Internet will force a change in Russia has a long history of seeking how the United States operates and to project power and influence while Sarah Jacobs Gamberini is a Policy Fellow in how its society consumes information. playing with a technological and geopo- the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Institute for National Strategic Russia used tactics of influence and litical handicap. Given its history and a Studies, at the National Defense University. coercion long before social media geographic location with many bordering 4 Forum / Social Media Weaponization JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 nations, it sees itself as constantly be- encroachment from the United States region.9 Since the end of the Cold War, sieged from all sides, but particularly by and the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- Russia has had to be calculating and the West. Since the nadir of Soviet dis- nization (NATO). It views the United creative to balance its economic, military, solution, Russia has fought to rebalance States, NATO, and the European Union and technological disadvantages to com- power and contemporaneously reduce as committed to weakening Russia, pete with the United States, maximizing American influence. But without equiva- eliminating its sphere of influence, less conventional tools of war, including lent conventional military might, Russia and ensuring sustained U.S.-Western covert operations within the information has turned to other asymmetric advan- unipolar dominance.4 This assessment domain. tages to compensate in its competition derives from a strong Russian belief that During the Cold War, the Soviet with the United States. Social media has the United States broke its word that Union used active measures to influence provided a unique tool kit to manipulate NATO would move “not one inch east- nations in coercive ways distinct from narratives and amplify societal divisions ward,” as stated by then–U.S. Secretary espionage and counterintelligence. Active in an effort to weaken the United States of State James Baker in the aftermath measures included disinformation, polit- in ways previously unimaginable. While of the Soviet dissolution.5 Russia touts ical influence operations, and controlling Russian weaponization of information the West’s “interference” during the media and messaging with the goal of is not new the intersection of Russian Ukrainian revolution as further evidence discrediting or influencing the West, disinformation, public health crises, and that the United States and NATO which are echoed in Russia’s modern-day vulnerability to bioevents presents new are meddling too much in its area of tactics.10 This type of warfare and other and troubling homeland and national influence.6 It views this infringement on measures below the threshold of actual security threats for the United States. what it perceives as its near abroad as an use of force have been variously referred The United States is diverse, pluralis- unacceptable affront.7 to in the West as Russia’s asymmetric, tic, and democratic. These characteristics, Russia sees Western dominance gray zone, hybrid, or next-generation its founding principles, are also its manifested socially and culturally (for warfare. However, the term cross-do- strengths as a nation. But to U.S. adver- example, Western entertainment seeking main warfare better reflects the current saries, including Russia, they are potential to replace Russian culture, values, and Russian method of shaping the security weaknesses to exploit. One strategic goal language), politically (the West foment- environment using an integrated ap- of Russia’s influence operations is to ing “color revolutions” in Russia and the proach of all military and nonmilitary weaken the United States and its allies, former Soviet Union), and militarily (the devices to achieve its strategic goals.11 which Russia views as operating too close United States geographically encircling In a response to the Arab Spring to its sphere of influence, what it refers Russia with NATO expansion and tech- uprisings, which Russia believed to be to as its “near abroad.”1 Time and again, nologically ringing Russia with missile incited by the West, General Valery Russia has used familiar influence tactics defenses and bases). Moreover, Russia Gerasimov (now chief of the General to spread disinformation in an attempt to has long feared it is behind the West in Staff) publicly discussed how to prevent weaken U.S. democratic society and de- science and technology. Russia has, at similar uprisings in Russia. In his speech, fame America’s reputation on the world times, achieved parity in certain defense Gerasimov cited control of information stage.2 From Russia’s interference in the platforms but generally struggles to keep as central to victory.12 This speech, which 2016 Presidential election to spreading pace, thus relying heavily on traditional has been overstated as a Russian military hoaxes during the 2020 global pandemic, weapons of mass destruction, such as its doctrine, did describe how Russia should Russia is exploiting America’s divisions substantial nuclear arsenal, to offset U.S. operate simultaneously across multiple with disinformation to amplify discord conventional might. Russia similarly lags domains—military, political, cyber, and in the United States and undermine its in technologies for civilian applications. information warfare—to achieve strategic institutions. As Russia targets issues of Underlying all this are vast and troubling goals. In March 2019, Gerasimov spoke public health in this way, there will be demographic and health challenges (a on the shift of warfare to the information tremendous implications for American declining birth rate and high death rate sphere and labeled information technolo- citizens and the U.S. health system. The from unnatural causes, including wide- gies as “one of the most promising types world is grappling with an “infodemic” spread alcoholism).8 These factors have of weapons” to be used covertly “not as well as a pandemic, and both require a led to Russia viewing itself in a constant only against critically important informa- whole-of-society approach to be success- state of besiegement and deficiency. tional infrastructures, but also against the fully addressed.3 Much of what shapes and propels population of a country, directly influ- Russia’s worldview today is based on for- encing the condition of a state’s national Russia Under Siege mer Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s security.”13 Over centuries, Russia has experienced doctrine that rejects the United States as Information is but one aspect of attacks from the Teutonic Knights, a hegemon and seeks a multipolar world cross-domain warfare. Another important Napoleon, and Nazi Germany, and the reestablishment of Russia as the facet of this Russian thinking is the belief and, since the end of the Cold War, main regional power in the former Soviet that the customary distinction between JFQ 99, 4th Quarter 2020 Gamberini 5 Control room operators with Edgewood Chemical Biological Center aboard U.S. Government–owned container ship MV Cape Ray, modified and deployed to eastern Mediterranean Sea to dispose of Syrian chemical agents, confirm and record data on current operation at Naval Station Rota, Spain, June 16, 2014 (U.S. Navy/Desmond Parks) wartime and peacetime no longer ex- undermine Russian social, cultural, Russia has responded to this threat of ists. These blurred red lines have been and political institutions as part of its the information age in a number of ways. demonstrated beyond speeches or doc- broader campaign to ensure Western It is working to create a “Russia only” trine, for instance in Russia’s employment geopolitical dominance.14 The Kremlin Internet with aspirations of creating a of this malign activity below the U.S. sees information as a new type of Russian equivalent of China’s “Great threshold of armed conflict—little green weapon and views all forms of informa- Firewall.”15 Russian news and propa- men in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, tion, across all platforms, as potential ganda (for example, the state-controlled “unaffiliated” private military groups in sources of power to be weaponized. television network RT and online “news” Syria, use of Novichok (a Cold War–era Russia believes that the West is using aggregators such as Sputnik) are beamed chemical weapon first developed by the all forms of information technology in to counter Western cable news.16 Soviet Union) in the United Kingdom, against

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