Island of Opportunity? A historical study on the recent change in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy

Master Thesis Robert Oudraad Student Number: 3603490 International Relations in Historical Perspective Thesis Supervisor: Laurien Crump Number of words: 24769 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

The image on the first page shows former President Mahinda Rajapaksa congratulating President Sirisena with his victory at the Sri Lankan Presidential Elections of January 2015. The image originated from the Sangai Express and can be found at the following link: http://e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=7..100115.jan15

2 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Table of Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 4

INTRODUCTION 6

CHAPTER 1 11 1.1 FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EARLY UNP GOVERNMENTS 11 1.2 FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE BANDARANAIKES UNTIL 1965 14 1.3 SRI LANKAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SEVENTIES AND EIGHTIES 16 1.4 SRI LANKA’S POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY UNTIL 2005 22 1.5 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SRI LANKA’S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE FIRST 60 YEARS 25

CHAPTER 2 28 2.1 RAJAPAKSA AS A WARTIME PRESIDENT 28 2.1.1 EXCLUDING THE WEST AND ENDING THE PEACE PROCESS 29 2.1.2 PLAYING INDIA AND CHINA OFF FOR HELP AGAINST THE LTTE 32 2.2 POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 35 2.2.1 INDIAN IRRITATIONS AND SINHALA NATIONALISM 36 2.2.2 CONSOLIDATING RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE 40 2.3 RAJAPAKSA’S FOREIGN POLICY 44

CHAPTER 3 47 3.1 THE MAITHRI FACTOR 47 3.2 SIRISENA’S BACKGROUND 49 3.3 RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE WEST 50 3.4 REVIVING OLD INDIAN TIES 53 3.5 TAMING THE CHINESE DRAGON 56 3.6 SIRISENA’S FOREIGN POLICY 60

CONCLUSION 62

BIBLIOGRAPHY 67 PRIMARY SOURCES 67 SECONDARY SOURCES 72

3 Island of Opportunity? 3 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

List of abbreviations ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations CEPA: Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement ETCA: Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement. FTA: Free Trade Agreement GSP+: Generalized Scheme of Preferences Plus IPKF: Indian Peace Keeping Force LLRC: Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MoU: Memorandum of Understanding SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLFP: Sri Lanka Freedom Party UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Committee UNP: United National Party

4 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

5 Island of Opportunity? 5 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Introduction

On 4 February 2016, President Sirisena conducted a speech at the 68th Independence Parade in Colombo, stating that Sri Lanka has made considerable steps in reconciliation and that the new national government would promote economic growth.1 However, during the past year there have been doubts among the international community about the commitment of the Sri Lankan government to reconciliation. For decades, Sri Lanka had been a place of much turmoil. Until 2009, the successive Sri Lankan governments fought a bloody war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). These insurgents fought for an independent nation in the north and east of Sri Lanka, where most of the biggest minority group, the Tamil, live. Many of the Tamil population felt (partially) excluded from the Sri Lankan nation. Originally, the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka came from the southern part of the Indian subcontinent, where today still a large Tamil-speaking population lives. Because of this, the interests of India in Sri Lanka have always been high since the independence of the two nations. India’s interference in Sri Lanka’s protracted civil war has greatly influenced the course of the struggle.2 While India sees Sri Lanka has an important part of its backyard, any interference by other major powers in Sri Lankan affairs is met with suspicious eyes from New Delhi. The last few decades, China has tried to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean. With its strategic location, Sri Lanka is a country which the Chinese have much interest in.3 The island nation itself, however, has always claimed to follow a foreign policy of non-alignment and has, in this way, tried to stay neutral in the geopolitical battle that is taking place in Southern Asia.4 However, Sri Lanka seemed with each succeeding presidency to have a different preference for interacting with one of the major powers. For example, former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, seemed to have developed a preference for Chinese investments after India’s government became increasingly more

1 Maithripala Sirisena, ‘Full Speech : President Sirisena's address at 68th Independence parade’, Sunday Times (4 February 2016), http://www.sundaytimes.lk/94765/full-speech-president-sirisenas-address-at- 68th-independence-parade. (2 March 2016) 2 Sandra Destradi,‘India and Civil War in Sri Lanka’ War: The Failure of Regional Conflict Management in South Asia’, Asian Survey 52 (3) (2012), 598. 3 Thilini Kahandawaarachchi, Politics of ports: China’s investments in Pakistan, Sri Lanka & Bangladesh. Master Thesis. University of Washington (2005), 32. 4 Ambika Satkunanathan, "The Executive and the Shadow State in Sri Lanka." in Reforming Sri Lankan Presidentialism: Provenance, Problems and Prospects, A. Welikala (ed.). (2015) Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternative, 12.

6 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad anti-Colombo.5 During Rajapaksa’s presidency, China became Sri Lanka’s biggest investor, with China being responsible for 24% of all investments in the country in 2013.6 China has mainly invested in the development of infrastructure, with the port of Hambantota, the first Sri Lankan highways and the proposed harbour city, Colombo Port City, being the biggest investment projects. With the victory of the other presidential candidate, Maitripala Sirisena, in the last Presidential Elections of January 2015, the foreign policy of Sri Lanka seems to have been directed into another lane. After his inauguration, President Sirisena promised great change and to tackle corruption and improve reconciliation after the civil war.7 There seems also have been a change in the interaction with the major regional and world powers. Sirisena has changed Sri Lanka’s focus on China and claims to really follow the policy of non-alignment. After January 2015, the Sri Lankan government has revised the Colombo Port City contract and started investigation into financial corruption and Chinese influence that came with the deal.8 It seems that the tone of the government has changed and that it is willing to open up to other major powers, like India and the West, more than the previous government did. However, it has to be seen to what extent Sirisena’s foreign policy is different from the previous governments. It is argued that the foreign policy of a country is a reflection of the dominant identity of that country.9 Foreign policy is merely a reflection of domestic polices, directed outwards onto the international stage. The change of government and foreign policy in January 2015, seem to reflect a change of opinion within Sri Lankan society. What that change is and how to place it in a historical context, are two questions that still need more examination. By historically comparing the factors that influenced and the motives that drove the different governments of Sri Lanka to conduct a certain foreign policy, this thesis tries to identify which factors were the most important forming the foreign policy of the current government of Sri Lanka. From this a research question can be derived: What distinguishes the foreign policy laid out by the government of Maithripala Sirisena after the presidential elections of January 2015 from previous Sri Lankan governments and why is it different? This thesis is going to try to put this change

5 Asit Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada, ‘Sri Lanka, China and India - A Tangled tale’. Business Times, 19 March 2015, 2. 6 Kahandawaarachchi, Politics of ports, 3. 7 Daily Mirror Sri Lanka, ‘Lanka anticipating new governing system : PM’ (14 March 2015) 8 Daily Mirror Sri Lanka, ‘Port City project work carried out unlawfully – ‘Public Tribunal’, (10 April 2015) 9 L. Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. (New York 2006), 23. 7 Island of Opportunity? 7 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad in a historical perspective, by tracing the foreign policy of Sri Lanka from the country’s independence and onwards. With foreign policy, I mean the relations with the major powers of the world and the preference of the Sri Lankan governments for one of these powers. Sri Lanka has changed its focus within its foreign relations frequently since its independence. While claiming to follow a policy of non-alignment for years, in different periods, different preferences for the major powers can be detected. For example, right after independence there was a preference for the West, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy during the first eight years of her independence was marked by close collaboration with the West.10. This historical examination will give a deeper explanation of the change of government and foreign policy of January 2015. This thesis tries to accomplish this by a textual examination of the available literature on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy throughout the years and by the use of primary sources in the form of journalistic articles, speeches made by Sri Lankan leaders and personal memoranda. The historical examination of the change of government and foreign policy of late January is relevant because it is a very recent development, which is still on-going and has not been examined much yet. Also, to date, this has not really been done in relation to Sri Lanka’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. There have been some recent analyses of Sri Lanka’s regime change in January 2015, but these have mainly been done in relation to internal developments. An example is the work of Prema-chandra Athukorala and Sisira Jayasuriya, professors at the Arndt-Corden Department of Economics Crawford School of Public Policy, who studies this dramatic shift in the political regime in Sri Lanka against the backdrop of longer term socio-political development in the post-independence era, placing emphasis on the determinants of the regime shift, and its implications for development prospects of the country and the resolution of the ethnic conflict.11 Others have examined recent developments in the relations between Sri Lanka and major global and regional powers, like China, India and the West. Zhu, MA, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, USA and Kahandawaarachchi, Master of Arts in International Studies: South Asia University of Washington, for example, examine the relations between Sri Lanka and the major regional powers, but mainly from a perspective of these powers. Not much attention is

10 Shelton U. Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka: A Third World Perspective. (New Delhi 1982), 82. 11 Prema-chandra Athukorala, and Sisira Jayasuriya, ‘Victory in War and Defeat in Peace: Politics and Economics of Post-Conflict Sri Lanka’, Asian Economic Papers, 14 (2015), 1- 36, 3.

8 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad given to how the Sri Lankan government formulated their policy towards these major powers. There already has been done some research on the history of the earlier foreign policy of Sri Lanka. In those works, patterns within the development of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy since the country’s independence are examined and pointed out. Shelton U. Kodikara, Professor of Political Science at the University of Peradeniya, examines these patterns in the period between independence in 1948 and the end of the Cold War. In his work he observes a distinct difference between the foreign policies of succeeding Sri Lankan governments, this despite the fact that Sri Lanka officially declared itself non- aligned. He concludes that there actually was a preference for the West or communist countries. D.M. Prasad, Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Bhagalpur, further researches the start of the non-aligned movement in Sri Lankan foreign politics and observes the same conflicting relation between non-alignment and the actual conduction of foreign relations.12 The pursuit of this non-alignment by Sri Lanka is seen by him and several other scholars as a way for Sri Lankan politicians to cope with the bipolar world and find the rightful place for Sri Lanka within the international system. Urmila Phadnis and Sivananda Patnaik, Associate Professor and research scholar at the South Asian Studies Centre, add to this that the economic dimension within the foreign policy of Sri Lanka is of great influence and conclude that trade has been one of the driving forces for the country to maintain foreign relations.13 As for the literature on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy of after the Cold War, it mainly focuses on foreign policy in relation with the civil war with the LTTE. Besides, these articles analyse the foreign policy of Sri Lanka with one other country or a few neighbouring ones. The discussion never reaches an overall view of Sri Lankan foreign policy after the Cold War, it keeps its focus on a specific period of time and/or a specific government. For example, Ashok K. Behuria and Gulbin Sultana, Research Fellows at IDSA, New Delhi, give an in-depth analysis of the foreign policy of Mahinda Rajapaksa towards India during his first term as a president.14 This thesis tries to fill this gap within the academic literature on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. On the one hand, because a

12 D.M. Prasad, ‘Ceylon’s Foreign Policy Under the Bandaranaikes 1956-65: A study in the Emergence and Role of Non-Alignment’, Indian Political Science Association, 33 (3) (1972) 271-290, 290. 13 Phadnis, Urmila and Patnaik Sivananda, ‘Non Alignment as a Foreign-Policy Strategy A Case Study of Sri Lanka, International Studies, 20 (1980) 1-2, 223- 238, 238. 14 Ashok K. Behuria, and Gulbin Sultana, ‘Mahinda Rajapaksa's India Policy: Engage and Countervail’, Strategic Analysis, 37 (2013), 84-100. 9 Island of Opportunity? 9 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad overall analysis of Sri Lankan foreign policy after the Cold War is missing, on the other hand because most of the analysis of post-Cold War foreign policy is not linked to any broad historic analysis of trends in foreign policy. By placing Maithripala Sirisena’s foreign within the right context of long-term trends in Sri Lankan foreign policy, a deeper explanation for the recent change in foreign policy will be reached. Several factors, which determine the trends within foreign policy, will be identified, of which one is the above-mentioned economic dimension. The other groups of factors that will be examined are: internal, geopolitical and personal factors. By identifying these factors in different periods since the independence of Sri Lanka, several trends in change and continuity in Sri Lankan foreign policy will be determined. The incorporation of these long-term trends into an explanation for the change in Sri Lankan foreign policy during the past year will give new insights in why this has happened. This thesis will comprise of three chapters. In each chapter, the focus will be on a different era of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. For every era, it will determined how the above-mentioned factors have influenced foreign policy. In the first chapter this thesis will put the foreign policy of Sri Lanka in a historic context and analyse the development the foreign policy on a broader historic scale. By doing this, this thesis wants to identify certain recurring factors that have influenced Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and determine certain trends in foreign policy during the first 60 years of Sri Lanka’s independence. An overview of the relations with the major powers from independence until the elections of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005 will be given. The second chapter will focus more deeply on the foreign policy that was conducted by the government of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, who headed the presidency from 2005 until January 2015. This analysis will be a combination of the examination of secondary resources and of primary sources in the form of speeches and news articles. In the last chapter the foreign policy conducted by the government of Maitripala Sirisena during the last year will explored. Through the examination of journalistic articles and statements made by government officials the foreign policy of Sirisena’s government will be compared to that of his predecessors. With the structure of this thesis laid out, this thesis will now commence with analysing the earlier foreign policy of Sri Lanka, beginning at independence in 1948 until the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa as president of Sri Lanka in 2005.

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Chapter 1 Throughout the decades, Sri Lanka has changed its foreign policy towards the major powers with each successive government. While the island nation has claimed to follow a foreign policy of non-alignment for a long time, it seems that in practice each government had its own inclination towards the support of foreign powers. An historical overview will be made in this chapter, which will give an indication of the comprehensive trends within Sri Lanka’s foreign policy up until 2005. In this chapter, the names Ceylon and Sri Lanka will be used interchangeable, as it refers to the same country. The change of the country’s name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka in 1972 is considered as not relevant for this thesis.

1.1 Foreign policy of the early UNP governments

At its independence in 1948, Sri Lanka’s fate was still closely tied with that of its former colonial overlord, Great-Britain. The newly formed government was led by the United National Party (UNP), which followed a foreign policy that was oriented mainly on the West. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy during the first eight years of her independence was marked by close collaboration with the West, a ‘policy strictly adhered to by all three UNP Prime Ministers who held office during this period’.15 Before 1977, when the executive presidency was installed, the government was led by the Prime Minister, who was the most influential person. As Shelton U. Kodikara, Professor of Political Science at the University of Peradeniya, argues: ‘For thirty years, from 1948 to 1978, the Prime Minister stood at the apex of the foreign policy decision-making process in Sri Lanka. Section 46(4) of the independence constitution required that the Prime Minister should also hold the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs’.16 So while analysing the foreign policy of Sri Lanka before 1977, it is important to look at the decision-making of the Prime Minister. However, the first two Prime Ministers of Ceylon, D.S. Senanayake and his son Dudley Senanayake did not concerned themselves much with foreign relations.17 Dudley’s career as a Prime Minister was so short that it hardly could influence Sri Lanka’s foreign policy in a significant way and his father’s foreign policy was ‘confined

15 Shelton U. Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka: A Third World Perspective. (New Delhi 1982), 82. 16 Ibidem 4. 17 D.M. Prasad, ‘Ceylon’s Foreign Policy Under the Bandaranaikes 1956-65: A study in the Emergence and Role of Non-Alignment’, Indian Political Science Association, 33 (3) (1972) 271-290, 278. 11 Island of Opportunity? 11 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad mainly to Ceylon’s relationship with the UK and the Commonwealth.’18 According to Kodikara, the most important elements within UNP foreign policy in the early years of independence were an aversion to communism and the fear of a communist threat to the newly established parliamentary institutions in Sri Lanka.19 He further argues:

‘The policy laid down by D.S. Senanayake, that friendship with Britain was Sri Lanka’s greatest security, was closely adhered to by both his UNP successors during the 1948-56 period, all of whom tended to regard the Commonwealth as a kind of third force in a world of power blocs headed by the United States and the USSR’. 20

Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, like that of most countries at that time, was formulated in the context of the emerging Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union. The aversion of the Sri Lankan government towards communism in the early days of independence was the strongest during the government of John Kotelawala, the third Prime Minister of Ceylon. He had a strong anti-communism opinion and was a fierce proponent of the Western point of view.21 He went so far as that he annoyed the other Asian countries at the Bandung Conference who wanted to follow an independent course in foreign affairs and not to be caught up within the Power blocs. The attitude of the UNP governments to the communist countries was influenced by three factors: the intimacy of the association with the British, the Soviet veto of Ceylon’s application for membership in the United Nations and the domestic political situation.22 All relations with the communist countries were seen within the context of the stance of the relations with the British. There was a strong feeling within the Sri Lankan government that Ceylon’s commercial and security interest were best served by a close association with Great-Britain. For example, after the independence of Ceylon, the Ceylon-UK Defence Agreement was established, which maintained the permission for Britain to use an airbase at Katunayake and the naval base at Trincomalee.23 This prompted the Soviet Union to veto the application of Ceylon for membership of the United Nations, as the Russians saw the military presence of the British on the island as

18 Ibidem 19 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 84. 20 Ibidem 21 Prasad, ‘Ceylon’s Foreign Policy’, 279. 22 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 55 23 Ibidem

12 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad an indication that Ceylon was still a colony of the United Kingdom. The aversion of the UNP governments towards communism originated from the fact that the first UNP government had come into power at the 1947 elections after a long contest with Marxist parties and these parties made up the main opposition in parliament until 1951.24 Another important factor in Kotelawala’s rejection of non-alignment and preference for the West were his differences and rivalry with the Indian Prime Minister Nehru.25 The foreign policy of Sri Lanka towards India has been different under each government. During the first years of independence, relations with India were also mainly conducted under influence of the British. Sri Lankan politicians were weary of Indian influence and interference in local politics. There was a perception of a threat from India that was a very real element in Sri Lankan politics, especially during the period 1948-56.26 This attitude of Sri Lankan politicians was not very strange, as many Indian politicians expressed the desire to incorporate Sri Lanka within a federal state with India. As one Indian writer stated: ‘The first and primary consideration is that both Burma and Ceylon must form with India the basic federation for mutual defence whether they will it or not. It is necessary for their own security.’27 But the origin of this mistrust and suspicion between Indian and Sri Lankan politicians must be sought more internationally. It is suggested that the anti-Indian attitude within Sri Lankan politics ‘could not have gained ground in Ceylon if its independence was not circumscribed and conditioned by British diplomacy based on the Defence Agreement, which represents British military might in the Indian Ocean area’. 28 It seems that Sri Lankan foreign policy under the first UNP governments was dictated by an orientation on the West. Most of all, the Ceylonese government tried to maintain a good relationship with their former colonizer, the United Kingdom, which was being fuelled by the perception of the Sri Lankan politicians that communism and the Indians were adversaries of the Ceylonese state. Through binding the Sri Lankans to British presence on the island by signing the Defence Agreement and by aiding an anti- communist government to come to power, the British were able to maintain their influence in the southern tip of the Indian subcontinent.

24 Ibidem 56 25 R.M. Harney,‘The foreign policy of Ceylon under two premiers’, Australian Outlook 14(1) (1960) 69-81, 69-70. 26 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 24. 27 Ibidem 23. 28 K.P. Mukerji, ‘Indo-Ceylon Relations’, Indian Political Science Association, 18 (1) (1957) 41-54, 54. 13 Island of Opportunity? 13 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

1.2 Foreign policy under the Bandaranaikes until 1965

The election of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1956 as the Prime Minister of Ceylon, meant a shift away in foreign policy from a orientation on the West and the United Kingdom. While the successive UNP governments had claimed right after independence to follow a foreign policy of non-alignment, it was during the reign of the Bandaranaikes that this neutrality was articulated in practice. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike believed that the proper position for a country like Sri Lanka was that of following a neutral policy and being non-aligned with any power blocs. According to Kodikara, Bandaranaike’s approach to foreign policy was determined by two main factors:

First, by the belief that given a period of peace the extremes of Communism and democratic capitalism would disappear and the rest of the world start moving towards the Centre and will form a type of democratic Socialism. … Secondly, he believed that Sri Lanka, like other Asian countries recently emerged from colonial status, was faced with the problem of converting a colonial society into a free society. 29

With this in mind, he tried to establish relationships with all the power blocs in the world, including China and the Soviet Union. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was against the high amount of dependence of Sri Lanka on its former colonizer, Great Britain. One of his first acts as a Prime Minister was the removal of the remaining British air and navel bases in Sri Lanka. This was done during the last half of 1957, the British military bases were removed and it gave Ceylon the appearance of an independent state.30 This outward image of the Sri Lankan state was crucial for Bandaranaike’s ambition to follow a foreign policy of non-alignment. He also tried to maintain this image of neutrality by saying that his non-alignment policy was not anti-Western or hostile to the United States. On the contrary, “we are closer to the United States than the others because we too believe in a democratic way of life”.31 It was during the Suez-crisis of 1956 that the newly adopted non-alignment foreign policy of Sri Lanka became very apparent. When France and Great Britain invaded the land surrounding the canal following the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt, Sri Lanka

29 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 98. 30 Prasad, ‘Ceylon’s Foreign Policy’, 284. 31 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 100.

14 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad denounced the actions of the Western powers.32 It became clear that Sri Lanka had broken the strong ties with its former colonial master. Another change of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy that became apparent during the Suez crisis, was that it had moved closer to India’s foreign policy. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike already had rejected the exaggerated notion of fear from India. He was convinced that India was a peace-loving country and the role that India had played to bring peace in Korea and Indo-China led him to believe that India was making a positive contribution to world peace.33 But even in the relation with India, did the Bandaranaike governments try to stay non-aligned. When Communist China invaded non-aligned India in 1962, it was difficult for the non-aligned African and Asian countries to stay neutral without abandoning India. It was Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who succeeded her father S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1960, who took the initiative to summon the Colombo conference of six non-aligned countries to explore ways and means of bringing India and China together and settle the dispute.34 This resulted in an improvement of the relations with both India and China. It further led to the signing of the Indo-Ceylon agreement in 1964, which provided a solution to the citizenship question of Indian migrants in Sri Lanka, and the increase of generous aid provided by China.35 Sri Lanka’s diplomatic relations with the communist countries during the UNP governments were mainly determined by British foreign policy, which was almost blindly followed by the Sri Lankan government. Because of this, Ceylon did recognize communist China the same time as the British did but, like the British, kept relations restricted to trade alone. In December 1952, Ceylon signed a trade agreement with China to fill up its rice shortage, which was one of the few trade relations the island nation made during the early UNP era. For the Bandaranaikes, this trade agreement became a starting point from which a more friendly relationship would be established.36 The Chinese greatly appreciated the independent policy of peaceful neutrality and anti- colonialism and the two countries implemented a policy of economic cooperation. Sri Lanka and China entered into a Maritime Agreement in July 1963, ‘which gave most favoured nation treatment to the contracting parties in respect of commercial vessels engaged in cargo and passenger services to and from the two countries or a third

32 Ibidem 33 Prasad, ‘Ceylon’s Foreign Policy’, 286. 34 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 27. 35 Prasad, ‘Ceylon’s Foreign Policy’, 289-290. 36 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 65. 15 Island of Opportunity? 15 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad country’.37 A similar treaty had been signed with the Soviet Union in 1962. Under the Bandaranaikes, the economic co-operation grew from almost non-existent to substantial, up to the extent that the impression was created in some corners of Sri Lanka and the rest of the world that the SLFP’s non-alignment policy was pro- communist. Besides closer cooperation, Sri Lanka also received more economic and technical assistance from communist countries. For example, Sri Lanka already received economic aid from several Eastern European countries in the 1950’s. The biggest contributor to foreign aid in Sri Lanka was, however, China. The country has provided tens of millions of rupees in aid to Sri Lanka during the reign of the Bandaranaikes.38 Overall, the reign of the Bandaranaikes as Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka until 1965 meant a huge change in foreign policy for the island nation. Officially a foreign policy of non-alignment was adopted and the Bandaranaike governments tried to follow a neutral course in the increasingly bipolar world of capitalism versus communism. However, a slight tilt towards favouring the communist powers can be observed up until the change of government in 1965. In that year, the UNP regained control within Sri Lankan government and relations with China entered a rough period.

1.3 Sri Lankan foreign policy in the seventies and eighties During the seventies and eighties, the different UNP and SLFP governments had the same alignment as their predecessors, with the UNP having a preference for working with the West and the SLFP government trying to uphold the non-alignment stance in a stricter manner by having more close ties with the communist countries. After the defeat of the Sirimavo Bandaranaike government, the newly elected UNP government under Dudley Senanayake enacted a different attitude towards communism and communist countries than its predecessor. It tried to maintain the non-alignment foreign policy, but the good relations with the communist world, especially China, deteriorated steadily and the government was more inclined to the West.39 Senanayake’s government even considered joining the newly formed Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was seen as a tool against China’s expansionism in Southeast Asia. But eventually Sri Lanka did not join the organisation

37 Ibidem 73 38 Ibidem 76-77. 39 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 118.

16 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad because it did not want to bring the trade agreements with China in danger.40 Also, for this reason did Dudley Senanayake’s government maintained the 1952 rice and rubber Agreement with China by not joining ASEAN. While relations with China deteriorated, Dudley Senanayake visited several Western countries and tried to normalize the relations with the United States. Moreover, in February 1966 Sri Lanka signed a treaty with the US that gave Sri Lanka a 7.5 million dollar economic assistance for the import of essential commodities for industrial and agricultural development.41 In the five years of Dudley’s UNP government, Sri Lanka received much economic assistance from the West. However, despite foreign policy veering towards the West, Sri Lanka tried to remain neutral on many international issues. On international crises like the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968, the Senanayake government tried to venture in an uncommitted manner. For example, the government refused to identify the aggressor in the Pakistan-India war of 1965 and sent messages to the Pakistani President and Indian Prime Minister to defer from the use of military means.42 The neutral stance of the Senanayake government also represented the isolated stance that Sri Lanka held within international affairs during that time. ‘Generally, a low profile was adopted by Dudley Senanayake in foreign affairs and the personality factor was played down.’43 The Vietnam War was the only international matter that Senanayake’s administration dealt with in a more intensive manner. This because it had domestic implications, as it was a mainly Buddhist country that was being attacked by a foreign country.44 In the eyes of many Sri Lankan Buddhist pressure groups and student organisations, the United States was the aggressor attacking Buddhist brothers and sisters. From the beginning, Sri Lanka tried to mediate a peaceful solution between the warring parties in Vietnam. Together with 17 other non-aligned countries, it signed a joint appeal for peace in Vietnam.45 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was the first who saw the importance in Sri Lanka’s role as a mediator on the global stage. As a small player in global affairs, Sri Lanka had to adapt to its underdog position. While recognizing the existence of ideological schisms,

40 V. Suryanarayan, ‘Sri Lanka’s Policy Towards China: Legacy of the Past and Prospects for the Future’, China Report, 30 (2) (1994) 203- 214, 206-207 41 Kodikara 124 42 Geeta Balakrishnan, Foreign policy-making in South Asia: a study of Pakistan, Nepal and Ceylon, 1962- 1971. (Proquest 1986), 118. 43 Ibidem 44 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 126-127 45 Ibidem 17 Island of Opportunity? 17 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike refused to accept ideology as the sole criterion for determining the island’s relations with other countries. Instead he believed in ‘borrowing some ideas and principles from this side and some from the other until a coherent form of society suited to the genius of Sri Lanka was evolved’.46 This philosophy fits perfectly in the ideology of non-alignment in foreign policy. The role that Sri Lanka could play was that of ‘an arbitrator and mediator to “bridge” the gulf “between the opposing factions”, to reduce world tensions, and, in the process, to safeguard its own security’.47 When Sirimavo Bandaranaike regained power after the 1970 elections, she kept the ideology of her former husband alive. Again there was a difference in her foreign policy with that of the previous UNP government, as she improved the relations with China and the rest of the communist world quickly. As Kodikara argues: ‘it was in the seventies that the Non-Aligned Movement gathered momentum, and began to play a role as a factor to reckon with in global politics.’ 48 It was Sirimavo Bandaranaike who began to play a leading role in this movement, as Colombo hosted the fifth non-aligned summit in 1976. A major Sri Lankan initiative during this period was the proposal to convert the Indian Ocean into a peace zone so ‘that the littoral states could be insulated from the adverse affects of the Cold War and super power rivalry’.49 During her second term, Sirimavo Bandaranaike redefined the concept of non-alignment, in the wake of a changing Cold War. It became apparent to the non-aligned countries that the two major world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had lost interest in getting non- aligned countries within their respective ideological spheres and showed only interest in areas of global strategic importance. It became accepted for a non-aligned country to have a mutual defence agreement with one of the major powers without losing their non-alignment. 50 For example, it was permitted that India signed a mutual defence agreement with the Soviet Union in 1971.51 While the scale of the Chinese economic assistance to the island nation increased significantly, it also kept the relations with India on good terms. Traditionally the Bandaranaikes kept good relations with the Nehrus. However the relations between Sri Lanka and India were briefly stained during

46 Phadnis, Urmila and Patnaik Sivananda, ‘Non Alignment as a Foreign-Policy Strategy: A Case Study of Sri Lanka, International Studies, 20 (1980) 1-2, 223- 238, 230-231. 47 Ibidem 48 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 135 49 Suryanarayan, ‘Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy’, 207 50 H.S.S. Nissanka, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy: A Study in Non-Alignment. (New Delhi 1984) 81-82. 51 Ibidem

18 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, when Sri Lanka permitted Pakistani aircraft to stopover in Colombo on their way to East Pakistan. 52 The non-aligned group’s new chairman became J.R. Jayewardene after the change of government in Sri Lanka in July 1977. Kodikara argues that ‘the commitment to non- alignment generally remained basically unchanged though it acquired a new orientation following upon changes in personal style and the economic philosophy of the new UNP government’. 53 Jayewardene’s support for the Indian Ocean Peace Zone during his presidency was in contrast with statements made by him when he was in the opposition under Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s Prime Minstership, when he stated that the Indian Ocean Peace Zone was impractical and idealistic. He only had a slightly different focus than the Bandaranaikes, he concentrated on disarmament and arms limitation within the Indian Ocean.54 However, it has been suggested that Jayewardene has been quite inarticulate on the Indian Ocean Peace Zone and focused mainly on overall disarmament in the world.55 Nevertheless, there was a definite pro-American tilt in Sri Lankan foreign policy. For example, Sri Lanka voted just like Britain in the United Nations on the issue of Grenada, it toned down the issue of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and it also did not condemn the naval presence of the United States in Diego Garcia.56 This is also apparent in J.R. Jayewardene economic policies. His new government came to power with a new economic policy, which comprised of a system of public and private sector competition. Consumer subsidises were scaled down and attempts to create a more free market economy were undertaken. His government tried to westernize the Sri Lankan economy by making it more capitalist and by getting rid of ‘state welfarist approaches’ of the previous governments which ‘pertained to an ideology which was basically anti- capitalist and therefore anti-western’. 57 Sri Lanka became more dependent on Western economic assistance, even more than previous UNP governments during Jayewardene’s time as a president. After J.R. Jayewardene became the first president of Sri Lanka in 1977, he kept, despite his pro-western orientation, relations with China on the same positive level as the Bandaranaikes did. This was a huge difference with previous UNP governments,

52 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 140 53 Ibidem 148 54 Nissanka, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy, 351. 55 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 151. 56 Suryanarayan, ‘Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy, 208 57 Kodikara, Foreign Policy, 158-159. 19 Island of Opportunity? 19 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad especially with the one of Dudley Senanayake, under which the relations with China sharply deteriorated. He succeeded to maintain good relations with both the West and China. Foreign Minister Shahul Hameed even stated during Vice-Premier Geng Biao’s visit to Sri Lanka in June 1978 that the Sino-Sri Lankan friendship was ‘as old as the hills’.58 Jayewardene also tried to uphold Sri Lanka’s foreign policy of non-alignment by letting his country play the role as a mediator, like his predecessors did. In 1979, Sri Lanka had a crucial role in mediating the crisis of Americans being held hostage in the US embassy in Tehran. ‘President Jayawardene sent his Foreign Minister, A.C.S. Hameed, twice to Tehran to explore the possibilities of preventing a total deadlock between Iran and the United States.’ 59 Also in issues where the country had no mediating role, Jayawardene tried to maintain the country’s non-alignment. Sri Lanka was also one of the non-aligned countries that condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, but did not sign the letter requesting the Security Council to deal with the Afghan situation. Also it did not recognize the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea as it was set up by the intervention of foreign forces, which was against non- alignment principles.60 During the eighties, the relations between India and Sri Lanka began to deteriorate. At first, Jayewardene continued the policy towards India that was laid down by the Bandaranaikes, namely the idea that Sri Lanka’s security could be maintained by developing good relations with India. This was possible because he and his Indian counterpart, Moraji Desai, where on good terms. However, after elections Indira Gandhi regained power, who had been a target of attack during the UNP elections campaigns in 1977.61 Moreover, ethnic tensions within Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups made good relations with India much more difficult to maintain. Sri Lanka repeatedly accused India of harbouring Tamil terrorists in their own country by letting them set up training camps in their country. The outbreak of civil war in 1983 and the insurgency of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) brought Indian-Sri Lankan relations to a low. India has been the most important external actor in the Sri Lankan civil war, it was caught in a dilemma of finding a solution that answered the cry of the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu and to help their brethren without affecting the

58 Surayanarayan, ‘Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy’, 208. 59 Phadnis and Patnaik, ‘Non-Alignement’, 233. 60 Nissanka, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy, 347-348. 61 Ibidem 355.

20 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. This led India to host talks between the Sri Lankan government and the leading militant groups in August 1985, while providing military training to some important Tamil militant groups during the 1980’s to ‘shore up their bargaining power against the Sri Lankan government’. 62 The ‘pangs of proximity’ led India to become more involved in Sri Lanka’s domestic conflict and eventually led to the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 that should bring peace back to the island.63 The main reason for the Indians to sign the agreement was to prevent any power outside the region that was a threat for Indian interests in Sri Lanka gaining a foothold in the country.64 This is illustrated by the fact that an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sent to the northern part of Sri Lanka. Eventually the election of a new president in 1988, Ranasinghe Premadasa, who was critical of the IPKF and a regime change in India let to the withdrawal of the IPKF in 1990. While Sri Lanka was caught up in a domestic ethnic war, relations with the other major powers other than India, moved to the background during the latter half of the 1980’s. This happened despite an attempt made by Sri Lanka to internationalise the ethnic conflict and encourage the involvement of external powers. During the conflict, China’s support to Sri Lanka was on a low key.65 China preferred to minimize its involvement in the Sri Lankan affairs not to affect the normalization of Sino-Indian affairs that was happening at that time.66 When Chinese President Li visited Sri Lanka in March 1986 he advised the Sri Lankans to search a political solution to the ethnic problem. The same was said when Sri Lanka asked the Chinese for support when the confrontation between India and Sri Lanka escalated in the summer of 1987. However, China continued to be the largest arms supplier for Sri Lanka during the ethnic conflict and a 3.000 ton Guided Missle Destroyer and supply ship paid a ‘friendly visit’ to Colombo in 1985 to show ‘China’s support for Sri Lanka in its efforts to safeguard its sovereignty’.67 It seems that China, despite not wanting to provoke its neighbour India, kept on protecting and expanding its influence in the island nation.

62 N. Manoharan,‘Brothers, Not Friends: India-Sri Lanka Relations’, South Asian Survey, 18 (2011) (2) 225- 238, 227-228. 63 Suryanarayan , ‘Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy’, 211. 64 Monaharan, ‘Brothers, Not Friends’, 228. 65 Suryanarayan, ‘Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy’, 212. 66 Ibidem 67 Ibidem 21 Island of Opportunity? 21 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Sri Lanka’s foreign policy of non-alignment evolved into a mature state during the seventies and was consolidated in the first half of the eighties. Both the UNP and SLFP governments tried to maintain Sri Lanka’s non-alignment, which was first introduced by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in the 1950’s. However, despite the official foreign policy of non- alignment, the UNP and SLFP governments had different preferences while interacting with the major powers. The UNP governments tended to align itself with the West, while the SLFP governments were more drawn to the communist countries, which is a trend that can be observed since the nation’s independence. Relations with Sri Lanka’s nearest neighbour, India, were until the end of the seventies quite cordial. Yet with the inauguration of J.R. Jayewardene as Sri Lanka’s president in 1977, these trends began to change. He deviated from the earlier UNP governments’ anti-communism, and managed to maintain good relationships with both the capitalist and communist world. He also expanded the mediating role of Sri Lanka within global affairs. The choice of the role of a mediator is one that is taken often by Sri Lanka during the heydays of the Cold War. This was an important part in the strategy for the non-alignment foreign policy that the country tried to follow. He continued Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s newly transformed non- alignment policy in his first years as a president. But when ethnic conflict broke out in the country, J.R. Jayewardene’s focus was mainly on domestic issues and any foreign policy was heavily influenced by this new struggle. The policy of non-alignment became less important within the formulation of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, a tendency that was maintained during the whole 25-year long civil war. The start of the civil war also marked the beginning of a period of stained relations with India.

1.4 Sri Lanka’s post-Cold War foreign policy until 2005 When the Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, the structure of South Asian politics changed dramatically. The strategic environment in the Indian Ocean changed with the United States and Russia having fewer interests in the region. At the same time, China and India stepped in as the new major regional powers in South Asia. While the United States closed many of its military bases in the region, China stepped up its military presence. China emerged as a major arms supplier in India’s neighbourhood and increased its naval presence near Sri Lanka.68 Meanwhile, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy became increasingly focussed on domestic

68 Surayanarayan, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy’, 213-214.

22 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad economic preoccupations, as well to the security threat confronting the state due to armed insurgency. 69 Under President Ranasinghe Premadasa, relations with neighbour India became the most important factor in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. Indo-Sri Lankan relations experienced a sharp improvement under the Narasimha Rao-Premadasa governments, as was evident in the closer cooperation between the two countries in countering the LTTE insurgency, as well as in matters relating to trade and economics, cultural exchange, and the foreign policy world-view in general. 70 After the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in may 1991 by the LTTE, India followed a ‘hands off’ approach towards Sri Lanka’s internal ethnic struggle, while cooperating with the Sri Lankan government to counter their newfound common enemy.71 So it seems that Premadasa improved relations with India. Yet a Sri Lankan politician who worked closely with him at that time noted that “he gave priority to domestic affairs and took refuge in an inward and reactive foreign policy strategy rather than following more outreaching and innovative one.” 72 With the election of Chandrika Kumaratunga Bandaranaike, daughter of S.W.R.D. and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the SLFP returned to power in 1994. Chandrika enacted a more active foreign policy during her presidency than her predecessor Premadasa. Her government attached the greatest importance to strengthening relations with Sri Lanka’s neighbours and to playing a leading role in fostering greater regional cooperation through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).73 During her first term, she tried to re-establish neglected relationships with the West and China. The SLFP government tried to convince the Western governments, with some success, to stop the flow of funds and arms to the LTTE insurgents and was able to establish a more productive relationship with the new Deve Goda government in India.74 The government of Chandrika initiated a peace process with the LTTE during the turn of the millennium. This had also influence on the foreign policy of Sri Lanka. Before the initiation of the peace process and the signing of the Cease-Fire Agreement of 2002,

69 Shelton U. Kodikara, ‘International Change and Regional Compulsions: Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy’, South Asian Survey, 2 (1995) 1, 77- 100, 92. 70 Ibidem 93. 71 Manoharan, ‘Brothers not Friends’, 229. 72 A. Sivarajah,‘Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy since 1994’, 9th International Conference on Sri Lanka Studies 57 (2003), 1-22, 7. 73 Sivarajah, ‘Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy’, 10 74 Howard B. Schaffer, ‘Sri Lanka in 1996: Promise and Disappointment.’ Asian Survey 37 (1997) 2, 143- 148, 147. 23 Island of Opportunity? 23 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad the country had made every effort to battle terrorism domestically and abroad. Within their relations with the major powers, the government made international help with the struggle against the LTTE, who was considered a terrorist group by many countries, a first priority. With the initiation of the peace process with the LTTE, Sri Lanka now changed from fighting terrorism, to a partnership with the LTTE in exploring ways in ‘which they could normalise life in the country, and move towards a political negotiation which could led to durable peace and the restoration of the economy.’75 This prompted the foreign missions of Sri Lanka based in the capitals of the major powers to divert from promoting the fight against terrorism to a policy that preferred a more peaceful solution. Al the Western powers were supportive of Sri Lanka’s new direction.76 Also, the Chandrika government maintained close relationships with India, especially after UNP member Ranil Wickremesinghe was chosen to serve as Prime Minister. From the memoirs of Bradman Weerakoon, who served as a personal secretary to Ranil, his struggles with being the Prime Minister can be observed first-hand. Wickremesinghe knew a great deal of the important Indian politicians personally and started numerous initiatives to improve the relations between India and Sri Lanka even further. Two of those were the possibility of a defence agreement and the signing of a Comprehensive Economic Partnerhsip Agreement (CEPA), which would move forward on the Free Trade Agreement (FTA).77 The cooperation between Chandrika as a president and Ranil as the Prime Minister was a unique one in Sri Lankan politics. The government was effectively a bond between the SLFP and the UNP, with a SLFP president and a cabinet that consisted almost entirely of UNP ministers. This caused from time to time some tensions within government, especially about the peace process with the LTTE. It was Ranil who was the main force within Sri Lankan government of the facilitation of the peace process, as he created the strategic plan to settle peace with the LTTE.78 Despite having the same goal, peace trough negotiation, Chandrika was a big opponent from within his own government for Ranil to deal with. She would question ‘Ranil’s strategy and methodology, in the name of national security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and so on.’79 She also showed a hostile attitude towards the Norwegian negotiators and handed out policy and orders that were counter to the policy

75 Bradman Weerakoon, Rendering Unto Caesar, (Berkshire 2004), 344. 76 Ibidem 345. 77 Ibidem 347. 78 Ibidem 338. 79 Ibidem 335.

24 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad of her own ministers. It is also suggested that Chandrika believed that the peace process, which she had seen as her own project for years, was being hijacked by an outsider.80 It is evident that the Chandrika-Wickremasinghe government was one of internal differences, which led to difficulties in the peace process. Nevertheless, it seems that the policies of the SLFP and the UNP at the time were more aligned than ever, mainly because of the civil war. After the election of a new president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, in 2005, the new SLFP government diverted from the policies of the Chandrika government. It was when the peace process proved to be unsuccessful that the new SLFP government under Rajapaksa renounced a peaceful solution to the war and the good relations with the West and India began to crumble.

1.5 An overview of the Sri Lanka’s foreign policy during the first 60 years When making a historical analysis of the foreign policy of Sri Lanka since independence, several trends and factors of influence can be seen. First, the same trend can be observed when analysing the foreign policy conducted by the different Sri Lankan governments between 1947 and 2005. Since independence, the two main parties, the UNP and the SLPF, have been the only two who have been able to form a government and administer the country. With each change of the ruling political party, there was a change of foreign policy. Throughout the Cold War, the UNP governments seem to have aligned themselves more with the Western powers, while the SLPF governments had a preference for the communist countries. This was despite the fact that the official alignment of Sri Lanka since the 1950’s within the Cold War was neutral. The ideology of Non-Alignment was introduced in Sri Lankan politics during the administration of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, after which it played a central role in Sri Lanka’s foreign relations until the end of the Cold War. However, with the end of the Cold War and the start of the ethnic insurgency of the LTTE, non-alignment policy became less of a priority for Sri Lanka. Also, between 1989 and 2005, the UNP government of Premadasa and the SLFP government led by Chandrika Bandaranaike, seemed to be more similar in their foreign policy. These were mainly influenced by domestic factors, especially by the on-going civil war. It seems that during the civil war, the UNP and SLFP got more aligned in their foreign policy up until 2005. Besides these trends during the changing UNP and SLFP governments, there were

80 Ibidem 337-338 25 Island of Opportunity? 25 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad certain factors influencing the foreign policy of the respective governments. Four different groups of factors have been identified. Internal factors like civil war are the first set of factors that can influence foreign policy. In the case of Sri Lanka, besides civil war being the obvious biggest internal influence, we have seen that struggles with political or ideological rivals can influence the foreign policy of the UNP or SLFP government. For example, the UNP developed an aversion against the communist powers because they had to struggle with communists internally while they rose to power. Also, internal religious pressure led the Sri Lankan government to be more politically involved with the Vietnam War. The second type of influential factor on foreign policy that has been identified is geopolitical of nature. Obviously the biggest geopolitical factor that has influenced Sri Lankan foreign policy has been the Cold War. The ideological struggle prompted Sri Lanka, together with numerous Asian and African countries to choose a path of non- alignment and try to stay neutral in matters that involved the major powers. Successive Sri Lankan governments even managed to play the neutral role as a mediator during critical events within international politics. However, when the civil war broke out the importance of non-alignment declined and Sri Lanka did not do much effort to mediate in international crises. The end of the Cold War also changed the geopolitical context where within Sri Lanka conducted its foreign relations. The disappearance of the bipolar world led to the upswing of a Sino-Indian rivalry and later on in the nineties to the re- emergence of the interest of the West in Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean. When Mahinda Rajapaksa came to power in 2005, a new geopolitical struggle between China, India and the Western countries had already gained momentum. Another element that influenced foreign policy were economic factors. Trade has been one of the most important reasons to maintain relationships with foreign countries throughout the history of independent Sri Lanka. In quite some instances, the economic value of a foreign relationship is given priority over the political significance. Throughout the history of the foreign policy of Sri Lanka, this seems to be a returning factor in determining policy. Both the UNP and SLFP governments proffered to maintain profitable economic relations with a country than to stain those relations for political reasons. For example, while the UNP government of Dudley Senanayake had an antipathy against the communist countries, it did not dare to bring the Trade Agreement of 1952 with China into any real danger. This was distinctive for the foreign

26 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad relationships of Sri Lanka in general. While having political difficulties with a major power, the country still tried to maintain trade with the respective country. A forth and final aspect that has been of influence on foreign policy, are the personal characters and relationships of its leaders. This was also evident in Sri Lankan foreign policy. A good personal relationship of a Sri Lankan Prime Minister or president with the leader of another major power has a significant positive effect on the relations with that country in overall. When Bandaranaikes and the Nehru’s were befriended during the fifties and sixties, relations between the Sri Lankan and Indian governments were good. Sir John Kotelawela and Jawaharlal Nehru, on the other hand, were rivals and this had a negative influence on the relations between the two countries. After 2005, when a new SLFP president was chosen, the above-mentioned factors remained of influence, as will be explained in the successive chapters.

27 Island of Opportunity? 27 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Chapter 2 This second chapter will zoom in on the foreign policy of Mahinda Rajapaksa, who held office as president of Sri Lanka from 2005 until January 2015. Rajapaksa’s foreign policy was mainly China-oriented, especially after the end of the war with the LTTE in 2009. Because of the significant influence of the civil war on the conducted foreign policy of the Sri Lankan government, this chapter is subdivided into two parts. The first part will analyse the foreign policy during the civil war, and the second part will elaborate on the post-war foreign policy of Rajapaksa.

2.1 Rajapaksa as a wartime president Mahinda Rajapaksa was sworn in as the 6th president of Sri Lanka on the 19th of November 2005. This was done after he defeated his opponent of the UNP, Ranil Wickremesinghe with a 2 per cent margin. He succeeded in achieving this victory because of the broad support for him among the Sinhala rural poor. The Sinhala are Sri Lanka’s biggest ethnic group, consisting of 74,88% of the total population of the country. They mainly live in the West and South of Sri Lanka and are politically the most powerful group. Already during his election campaign did Mahinda Rajapaksa express his opposition to the 2002 cease-fire agreement with the LTTE and promised to get rid of it. He argued that ‘Ranil’s ceasefire agreement with the LTTE was a hasty and short-sighted step and did not have the backing of a national consensus’.81 He thought that what he called ‘the short-sighted policy of the UNP since 1977’ had led to the situation where foreign powers could intervene in Sri Lankan affairs whenever they wanted.82 At his first speech before the Parliament of Sri Lanka in 2005, he stated that he would continue the policy of the previous SLFP government and ensure that Sri Lanka would build relationships with all the countries of the world. He declared that ‘to this end we will be guided by the principles espoused by the Non-Aligned Movement and the developing countries where these principles and our national interests converge.’ 83 He declared

81 Ashok K. Behuria, and Gulbin Sultana, ‘Mahinda Rajapaksa's India Policy: Engage and Countervail’, Strategic Analysis, 37 (2013), 84-100, 76. 82 Ibidem 83 Mahinda Rajapaksa, ‘The Policy Statement made by President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the opening of the New Session of Parliament’, 25 november 2005 (Version 25 november 2005) http://www.priu.gov.lk/execpres/speeches/2005/20051125policy_statement_opening_new_session_parl iament.html (7 January 2016)

28 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad that he wanted to improve relations with India, China, Pakistan and Russia. However, in practice he only maintained good relations with countries who could contribute to the war against the LTTE and the development of Sri Lanka.

2.1.1 Excluding the West and ending the peace process It was in a short time that his behaviour contradicted his promise to follow a non- aligned foreign policy. Rajapaksa seemed committed to the traditional SLFP policy of non-alignment at the start of his presidency. At the 14th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Cuba in September 2006, nine months after his election, he stated that he was devoted to the ideals of the movement and that he had great respect for its founders, which the Bandaranaikes were part of. 84 However, in the end his foreign policy proved to be less non-aligned than he pretended towards the rest of the world. This became clear for the first time when the relations with the West deteriorated because of controversy about the solution for the war with the LTTE. As a new president, he seemed to have the intention to continue the Western-coordinated peace process with the LTTE. The peace talks in Geneva that were held at the beginning of 2006, were welcomed by the US and the other Western countries.85 However, these peace talks were unsuccessful after the LTTE pulled out of the talks. The ceasefire agreement of 2002 was already very fragile after the LTTE announced their unilateral withdrawal from peace negotiations and by July 2006, the ceasefire had in practice already collapsed.86 Moreover, already during Rajapaksa’s electoral campaign and the first months of his presidency, he demonstrated different ideas for the future of the conflict with the LTTE. As Destradi, research fellow at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies in Hamburg, argues: ‘at the same time, the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa as Sri Lanka’s executive president in November 2005 in a coalition with hard-line Sinhalese parties constituted the precondition for a much tougher stance against the LTTE’. 87 So even if Rajapaksa had the intention to follow through with the Western-sponsored peace talks with the LTTE, and it hardly seemed the case, by the time he became president, a military solution already seemed a very possible scenario. Rajapaksa’s background also already prescribed a less Western-oriented foreign policy. Mahinda

84 Mahinda Rajapaksa, ‘Speech of His Excellency Mahinda Rajapaksa, President of Sri Lanka, at the XIVth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to be held in Havana, Cuba’, 16 november 2006 (Version 16 november 2006) http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20060916_05 (7 January 2016) 85 S.V. Narayan, ‘India welcomes Govt-LTTE dialogue’, The Island, 28 January 2006. 86 Destradi, ‘India and Civil War in Sri Lanka’, 11 87 Ibidem 29 Island of Opportunity? 29 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Rajapaksa’s family has a different ancestry than the traditional political elite of Sri Lanka. The rise of Rajapaksa as the president of Sri Lanka, meant a new era in Sri Lankan politics, he was the second president, after Ranasinghe Premadasa, who did ‘not emerge from the pro-Western Colombo-centric social elite.’ 88 Ashok K. Behuria and Gulbin Sultana explain: ‘while the Sri Lanka of yesterday was governed by a Westernized elite who were known for their ‘clienting to the West’, Rajapaksa’s Sri Lanka has witnessed the rise of the underclass, represented by a neo-elite from deep rural southern Sri Lanka, known for their proud, rural anti-Western and anti-colonial mindset.’89 So because of Rajapaksa’s different origin from the Senanayake’s, Bandaranaikes and Wickremasinghes, he had a different perspective on foreign relations than his predecessors. In this way he was more inclined to be even more skeptical of the West than other SLFP presidents. This would be in contrast which Chandrika Kumaratunga Bandaranaike’s foreign policy, which was more Western oriented like the UNP governments. After the failure of the peace talks with the LTTE and the then seemingly inevitable military solution for the insurgency, the relations between the Rajapaksa government and the West deteriorated steadily. While the West still urged for a peaceful solution for the war with the LTTE, the Rajapaksa government was already heading for a revival of the full-blown military confrontation with the LTTE. In his address to the nation on the 6th of December 2006, Rajapaksa showed his intentions to deal with the LTTE militarily. He depicted the LTTE as an untrustworthy band of murderers, who could not be dealt with peacefully. He stated that ‘we cannot anymore be satisfied with a partial response’ to the terrorism of the LTTE and that ‘there is no room anymore to assist terrorism directly or indirectly, and talk about democracy.’90 From there onwards, Rajapaksa talked mainly about ‘eradicating terrorism’ when referring to the LTTE-threat. He represented the war with the LTTE as part of the global war on terrorism. By doing so, he tried to gain more legitimacy, domestic and abroad, for defeating the LTTE militarily. By naming the struggle with the LTTE a ‘war on terrorism’, he seemed to use the international narrative of the war on terror for his own gain. By

88 Sergei, DeSilva-Ranasinghe, ‘Another Bead in the “String of Pearls”?: Interpreting Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy Realignment’, China Security, 19 (2011), 57-67, 58. 89 Behuria and Sultana, ‘Mahinda Rajapaksa’, 96. 90 Mahinda Rajapaksa, ‘Address to the Nation’, 6 december 2006 (version 6 december 2006) http://www.mea.gov.lk/index.php/component/content/article/386-address-to-the-nation-by-president- mahindarajapaksa-on-december-06-2006 (14 December 2015)

30 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad depicting the LTTE as terrorists, he tried to gain support against them internationally. At the same time, he was strengthening the military capabilities of the Sri Lankan army. As Behuria and Sultana mention: ‘it has been reported that in early 2006, responding to the Sri Lankan team’s request to help them militarily, India gifted five Mi-17 helicopters to the Sri Lankan air force to be flown under Sri Lankan air force insignia.’91 India was not the only regional power that provided military aid during that time, as China was al to happy to send support. When the West was unwilling to provide military support to Sri Lanka in its struggle with the LTTE, Rajapaksa sought eastward for that support. Rajapaksa’s schism with the West was not only driven by different military interests, it also had its economic reasons. Rajapaksa’s background also gave him a different perspective on Sri Lanka’s future economic development. Unlike his predecessors, he foresaw ‘the emphasis on the economic development of regions outside Colombo and the Western Province.’ 92 This was emphasized in his political manifesto, Mahinda Chintana (Mahinda’s Vision), in which he stated that ‘it is clear that in the past the economic growth has largely bypassed the rural areas and concentrated in the Western Province’ and that he ‘envisages channeling a larger share of investment to developing the basic infrastructure and other services in the rural areas electricity supply, telecommunication services, supply of drinking and irrigation water, access roads, agricultural storage, health and education facilities’.93 This also meant that he needed to free the distant rural areas of the North and East of the LTTE, in order to develop them. Because it had to face a war with the LTTE, Sri Lanka needed quite some foreign help to achieve this vision of economic development. After the peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE broke down, the United States and several Western countries threatened to cut off their aid, on which Sri Lanka heavily depended. 94 Because of the threat of being cut off of most of its foreign aid, Rajapaksa changed its foreign policy. It was his goal to reduce Sri Lanka’s dependence on the West and seek help from the two powers that had an aversion to the LTTE and Tamil diaspora, China and India.95 It was the sympathy of some Western politicians towards Tamil diaspora that

91 Behuria and Sultana, ‘Mahinda Rajapaksa’ 90 92 DeSilva-Ranasinghe, ‘Another Bead’, 58 93 Mahinda Rajapaksa, Mahinda Chintana 2005 94 P.K. Balachandran, ‘Rajapaksa's nationalistic foreign policy pays dividends’ The Island, 19 December 2007. 95 DeSilva-Ranasinghe, ‘Another Bead’, 59. 31 Island of Opportunity? 31 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad also fuelled Rajapaksa’s swing to the East. As DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Research Manager of the South and West Asia Programme at think-tank Future Directions International, puts it: ‘throughout the Norwegian-mediated peace process, the perceived partiality and appeasement of some Western government officials towards the Tamil diaspora, and in some instances even towards the LTTE and its separatist movement, alienated many Sri Lankans.’96 The sentiment that the West was willing to support the LTTE grew among the Sri Lankan politicians and led them to distrust the Western countries even more. This is illustrated by Sri Lanka’s Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who stated to a local newspaper: ‘a lot of the time, you think America, UK and a few western nations are the only important ones. But there are a lot of other friendly nations that were completely forgotten.’97 It was almost natural for Rajapaksa and his closest politicians to turn to China and India for help.

2.1.2 Playing India and China off for help against the LTTE When entering office in December 2005, Rajapaksa immediately increased the cooperation with the Indians. He saw the importance of India’s role in tackling the LTTE successfully with military means. Not only was India a supplier of military hardware, Rajapaksa also saw the political influence that India had within the LTTE and their Tamil diaspora abroad as an important fact. He was of the opinion ‘that one of the key factors underpinning the failure of previous military operations against the LTTE was the mismanagement of Sri Lanka’s relationship with India by previous governments.’ 98 After recognizing India’s importance in the conflict, the Rajapaksa government set up a special committee that consisted of representatives from both countries to keep in constant contact with India. The committee came together eight times in total between 2007 and 2009, both in Sri Lanka and India. 99 However, despite this more intensive cooperation between the Sri Lankan and Indian government, the Indian government opposed the intentions of Sri Lanka to defeat the LTTE with military means. This was mainly because India had adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach since the assassination of premier Rajiv Gandhi in 1987, but also because of ‘political pressure from Tamil Nadu’, the influential state in southern India with a major Tamil population.100 During the time

96 Ibidem 97 Ibidem 98 Behuria and Sultana, ‘Mahinda Rajapaksa’, 89 99 Ibidem 90 100 Destradi, ‘India and Civil War in Sri Lanka’, 13.

32 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad that the special Indian-Sri Lankan committee met, the Indian delegation pressed for a political solution. This also has always been India’s official stance on a solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka. As Shri Prahab Mukherjee, the Indian Minister of External Affairs stated:

Let me reiterate our conviction that there is no military solution to the ethnic conflict. What is required in Sri Lanka is a peacefully negotiated political settlement within the framework of a united Sri Lanka respecting the legitimate rights of the minorities including the Tamil community. The rights and the welfare of the Tamil community of Sri Lanka should not get enmeshed in the on-going hostilities against the LTTE. We encourage the government of Sri Lanka to continue to nurture the democratic process in the Eastern Province as well.101

India’s hands-off policy on the conflict in Sri Lanka began to change in 2007. First this happened because of pressure from Tamil Nadu on the Indian government to be more actively engaged in protecting the Tamil population in Sri Lanka from violence. It was this domestic pressure that eventually overruled the hands-off policy of India. This internal pressure mainly resulted to a hardening of the Indian stance on the Sri Lankan conflict and the increase of the pressure on the Sri Lankans to take more caution when dealing with civilians in the war.102 However, this new engagement with the Sri Lankan war was still indirect, and the Sri Lankans sought military support elsewhere. It encouraged them to contact the Chinese and the Pakistani, who were more than happy to make deals for providing Rajapaksa with military equipment. As DaSilva-Ranasinghe argues: ‘this was something India was not able to match in scale due to political sensitivities in the influential southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Similarly, Western military aid and security cooperation with Sri Lanka were minimal and restricted by human rights caveats.’103 Rajapaksa signed a deal, worth 37.6 million dollar, with China’s Poly Technologies that would deliver ammunition and ordnance to Sri Lanka’s army and navy. This ammunition and ordnance comprised of Chinese artillery pieces,

101 Pranab Mukherjee, Suo-Motu Statement by Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Minister for External Affairs on "Sri Lanka" In Parliament. (Version 22 October 2008) http://mea.gov.in/Speeches- Statements.htm?dtl/1698/SuoMotu_Statement_by_Shri_Pranab_Mukherjee_Minister_for_External_Affairs_ on_quotSri_Lankaquot_In_Parliament (15 December 2015) 102 Destradi,, ‘India and Civil War in Sri Lanka’, 12. 103 DaSilva-Ranasinghe, ‘Another Bead’, 59. 33 Island of Opportunity? 33 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad basic infantry weapons, armored personnel carriers, JY 11 3D radar and some other ammunition. 104 Of course, this new Sino-Sri Lankan deal was of great concern to India, which did not want her regional rival to get more influence in India’s own backyard. Because of these international factors, India changed its attitude towards the military campaigns of the Sri Lankan government against the LTTE. While not openly supporting the armed struggle against the LTTE, it silently stepped up its economic support to the Sri Lankan government and did not openly condemn Sri Lanka’s campaign anymore. This change in Indian policy is best illustrated by the statement made by Mukjerhee on January 28, 2009, in which he ‘stressed that military victories offer a political opportunity to restore life to normalcy in the Northern Province and throughout Sri Lanka, after twenty three years of conflict’. 105 This is in sharp contrast with his previous statement of October 2008, only 3 months before. It seems that in this short period, the Indian government came to believe that losing influence in the southern island to a regional competitor was a bigger problem than ensuring a peaceful solution for the Tamil population in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. The Indian government expressed its new policy by cracking down LTTE networks in Tamil Nadu, and by providing military hardware, in the form of ‘defensive’ equipment. This military hardware contained ‘life-saving equipment such as flak jackets, but also, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), … an offshore patrol vessel in 2007.’ 106 As for the Sri Lankans, playing out India and China against each other was a profitable tactic. By approaching both the two regional powers it fuelled India’s fear for Chinese influence and, at the same time attracted the Chinese interest in the island nation. It forced India to change its opinion about the option to defeat the LTTE militarily, which led Sri Lanka to receive aid from the big neighbor to counter Chinese influences. China’s influence in the region had already been expanding since the beginning of the new millennium. Trade between China and Sri Lanka has grown between 2000 and 2010, with China becoming the second-largest source of importing goods for Sri Lanka in 2008.107 Overall, trade with China had quadrupled in since 1990.

104 Behuria and Sultana, ‘Mahinda Rajapaksa’, 90. 105 Shri Panab Mukjerhee, Statement by EAM in Sri Lanka 28 January 2009. (Version 18 January 2009) http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/880/Statement_by_EAM_in_Sri_Lanka (7 January 2016) 106 Destradi, ‘India and civil war in Sri Lanka’, 14. 107 Nilanthi Samaranayake, ‘Are Sri Lanka's Relations with China Deepening? An Analysis of Economic, Military, and Diplomatic Data’, Asian Security, 7 (2011) 2, 119-146, 124.

34 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

However, at the same time trade between Sri Lanka and India has grown even in a faster rate 108 Nevertheless, Rajapaksa had a growing preference for enhancing ties with China. Not only because China provided aid without any humanitarian or economic conditions, but also because, according to some, Rajapaksa had a longtime aversion against the big neighbor of Sri Lanka. Mentioned by Behuria and Sultana, a number of people who are close to Rajapaksa think that in his eyes, ‘India like the world at large, has chosen to work with the feudal pro-Western elements who have so far dominated the affairs of the state.’ 109 This made him prone to suspicion towards any interest from India in the affairs of the southern island. 110 However, during the war against the LTTE, this supposed aversion of Rajapaksa against India did not manifest itself yet properly. It was after the defeat of the LTTE that Rajapaksa did not need the help of India that much anymore and his preference for good relations with China showed itself.

2.2 Post-war international relations Without the military and economic aid from both China and India, Sri Lanka probably could not have made the eventual final push against the LTTE in mid 2009. During that last stage, many civilians and LTTE-combatants were killed, when the Sri Lankan army shelled the ‘safe zones’ that they had designated. India and China kept on supporting Sri Lanka during the last stages of the war and even after, when the international community wanted to initiate an investigation in alleged atrocities during the final stage of the war. In May 2009, India and China, along with Russia and other non-aligned countries voted for the motion that incorporated a proposal by the Sri Lankan government to ‘support Sri Lanka’s reconstruction efforts’ in the United Nations, which was eventually passed. This motion ‘did not mention the shelling of civilians and the need to provide international organizations with access to IDP camps’.111 By courting with both the regional powers, Rajapaksa’s government knew to steer away from what they regarded Western interference in their post-war justice.

108 Ibidem 109 Behuria and Sultana, ‘Mahinda Rajapaksa’, 96. 110 Ibidem. 111 Destradi, ‘India and the Civil War in Sri Lanka’ 16 35 Island of Opportunity? 35 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

2.2.1 Indian irritations and Sinhala nationalism Rajapaksa still kept on reiterating that the position of Sri Lanka in international affairs was non-aligned. As he stated in his speech for the 62nd anniversary of Sri Lanka’s independence:

‘You all are aware that our foreign policy is independent and non-aligned. It is no secret that we have maintained close friendly relationships with our neighbors such as India, China, Japan and others. We also maintain close affinity with Africa, the West, the Middle East and the European countries.’112

Still, in practice he seemed to have an inclination for good relations with China. This only accelerated after the end of the war with the LTTE. It is argued that his mistrust of the West led him to be critical of India because he saw the Indians as accomplices in spreading the Western neo-colonialism. But it is also argued that ‘Mahinda Rajapaksa’s defiant approach towards India is further buttressed by the anti-India sentiments generated by India’s vote against Sri Lanka at the UN, the nationalists position on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and the issue of fishermen.’ 113 It was at the 19th session of the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) of 22 March 2012 that India voted for the resolution started by the US on Sri Lanka, which had the purpose to promote reconciliation and accountability after the war. 114 In this report, the US ‘calls upon the Government of Sri Lanka to implement the constructive recommendations made in the report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and to take all necessary additional steps to fulfil its relevant legal obligations and commitment to initiate credible and independent actions to ensure justice, equity, accountability and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans.’115 This Indian vote in favour for a resolution that was initiated by the West, was disliked by Rajapaksa and

112 Mahinda Rajapaksa, ‘Nation building through corruption free, commitment and discipline – President’, 2 February 2010 (Version 2 February 2010) http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20100204_03 (12 December 2015) 113 Behuria and Sultana, ‘Mahinda Rajapaksa’, 94 114 UNHRC ‘Voting Process Regular Session 19’ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/resolutions/voting process/L2.pdf (19 January 2016) 115 United Nations Human Rights Council ‘Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General’ http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/LTD/G12/115/97/PDF/G1211597.pdf?OpenElement (16 January 2016)

36 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad the nationalist Sinhala parties, with which the SLFP had an alliance. These politicians had the strong feeling that ‘the Indian statement made in Lok Sabha, the lower House of the Indian Parliament, was calculated to undermine Sri Lanka.’ 116 This statement was made four days before voting for the resolution, and in this statement Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh threw ‘his weight behind Western powers’, which led some other countries to rethink their position on voting against the resolution, according to Sri Lankan nationalistic politicians.117 It has been suggested that from the Indian side, this vote was made because Indian politicians were frustrated that it could not get the Sri Lankan government to begin reconcile with the Tamils in the North. 118 The Indian vote in favour for a Western resolution contrasts strongly with the Indian vote for the motion at the special session of UNHRC in May 2009 that was proposed by the Sri Lankan government, which was mentioned earlier. It seems that in three years time, the relations between Sri Lanka and India had deteriorated. Apparently the Indians were fed up with the Sri Lankan tactic of courting both the Indians and Chinese for their personal gain, and they wanted to send a strong message to Rajapaksa that he should take Indian interests in the region more serious. The decline in Indo-Sri Lankan relations was further strengthened by the inaction of the Sri Lankan government on signing the CEPA Agreement with India, on which there is no political consensus. 119 Also, the issue of Indian fishermen, who were violating the maritime borders between Sri Lanka and India in the north by fishing in Sri Lankan waters, had a negative impact on Indo-Sri Lankan relations in the post-war period. 120 The fishing of Indian fishermen in Sri Lankan waters, is seen by Sri Lankan fishermen as an attack on their capability to provide daily income and has strengthened nationalist sentiments in Sri Lanka. However, the Indian government has denied the allegations of the Tamil Nadu State that the Sri Lankan Navy has fired on Indian fishermen.121 With this statement, the

116 S. Ferdinando, ‘SL rejects claim of Indian ‘helping hand’ in Geneva’ The Island. 24 March 2012. (Version 24 March 2012) http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article- details&code_title=48260 (4 January 2016) 117 Ibidem. 118 Amali Wedagedara, ‘The ‘Ethnic Question’ in India–Sri Lanka Relations in the Post-LTTE Phase’ Strategic Analysis, 37 (2013) 1, 65-83, 74. 119 Behuria and Sultana, ‘Mahinda Rajapaksa’, 95 120 Ibidem. 121 ‘Attacks on Indian fishermen: Centre refutes TN charges against SLN’ The Island, 19 August 2012. (Version 19 August 2012) http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article- details&code_title=59610 (4 January 2016) 37 Island of Opportunity? 37 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Indian government seemed to want to keep the negative vibe within Indo-Sri Lankan relations from escalating. Another hurdle in Indo-Sri Lankan relations after the LTTE war, was the ‘ethnic question’. The ethnic question refers to the 13th Amendment, which initiated a devolution of power in Sri Lanka in the North and East, by creating provincial councils, and making Sinhala and Tamil both official languages with English as a link language.122 The 13th Amendment was created in the aftermath of the 1987 Indo-Lanka Agreement, but it has never been fully implemented up to date. This would mean a beginning of a political solution for the problem of Tamil separatism in the North, by giving the Tamils more freedom in conducting their local politics. Rajapaksa’s opinion on the 13th Amendment has changed in the post-LTTE period. In speeches to Parliament and interviews given to newspapers in 2009, he expressed his hope for a political solution in the form of the 13th Amendment and invited India to play an active role and to get involved in reconstructing the North. He even named himself a proponent of the 13th Amendment in his 2010 vision for the future, the 2010 Chintana, and stated that he would ‘re-establish the Northern Provincial Council under the 13th amendment with immediate effect.123 However, after his re-election in 2010 this changed, and he expressed his opposition to devolving powers to provincial councils in the Tamil areas.124 This is in line with his preference for China and being less dependent on India without the war against the LTTE. During the war Rajapaska mainly expressed his support of a solution that included the adoption of the 13th Amendment because this would please the Indians, whose support was needed in the struggle against the LTTE. After the defeat of the LTTE, this support was not longer needed and Rajapaska could follow his personal opinion on the 13th Amendment. The change of Rajapaksa’s engagement with India after his re-election can also be linked with domestic factors. After the re-election for his second term of presidency, Rajapaksa tried to consolidate and expand his power. With the 18th Amendment to the constitution, he gave himself more executive powers and influence in the legal apparatus, and extended the term of presidency so he could run for the third time as president of Sri Lanka. While consolidating his power, he tried to remain popular within

122 Government of Sri Lanka, ‘The Thirteenth Amendment’ (14 November 1987) http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/actsandordinance/13th_Amendment.pdf (4 January 2015) 123 Mahinda Rajapaksa, ‘Mahinda Chintana: Vision for the Future 2010’, 1-103, 54. 124 Amali Wedagedara, ‘The Ethnic Question’, 67-68.

38 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad his traditional constituency, the rural Sinhalese population, who saw Western and Indian influence on the island as a threat to Sri Lankan sovereignty. As Behuria and Sultana argue: ‘Rajapaksa owes his overwhelming popularity at home, in a way, to his image of being strong enough to resist unwelcome pressure from India on issues such as CEPA and devolution. Therefore, Rajapaksa cannot afford to be seen to be too friendly towards India and it is unlikely that he will succumb to Indian pressures easily.’ 125 Already being suspicious of any Indian interest in Sri Lanka, Rajapaksa had even more incentive to engage with India in a less positive way to keep his popularity among the Sinhalese nationalists high. The need for him to keep himself well perceived among the Sinhala population also explains his personal aversion against the 13th Amendment. The 13th Amendment is very unpopular among the Sinhala nationalists, who perceive it as a threat to the unity of the Sri Lankan state. Rajesh Venugopal, Assistant Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, takes this even further, and states that maintaining popularity among the Sinhala nationalists was at the core of his personal agenda. He argues that the presidency originally was designed to ‘shield the executive from the heat of day-to-day electoral vulnerability, and from ethnic nationalist and welfares economic pressures’, and that the Sri Lankan politicians saw their politics as ‘a game in which elites used bread and circuses to distract the masses in order to get on with the business of government undisturbed’.126 Instead of the cultivation of Sinhala nationalism just being a mean to an end for gaining legitimacy for certain unpopular polices, for Rajapaksa it became ‘the end-game and the agenda in itself’.127 Rajapaksa could exploit his rural Sinhala lineage, something that his predecessors could not, because they were mostly Sinhala elite from Colombo. His bond with Sinhala nationalism gives away his personal motives behind his conducted foreign policy. It shows that he prioritized his own traditional Sinhala constituency and with that his own power. The adoption of any policy by him was being motivated by securing and enlarging his own power and that of his family’s. His main objective was keeping his Sinhala nationalist voters happy, by adopting a foreign policy that would give those voters a feeling of a secure nation and minimum foreign influence, while they were under the impression that Rajapaksa was

125 Behuria and Sultana, ‘Mahinda Rajapaksa’, 96. 126 Rajesh Venugopal, ‘Democracy, development and the executive presidency in Sri Lanka’, Third World Quarterly, 36 (2015) 4, 670-690, 687-686. 127 Ibidem 686 39 Island of Opportunity? 39 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad bringing prosperity to the island. It was the Chinese that could provide him with the tools to keep his electorate happy, which will be explained later on. Despite the growing negative attitude of Rajapaksa against the Indians, the Indian government tried to keep relations with Sri Lanka warm, fearing that deterioration of these relations would increase Chinese influence. For example, India has been involved in in reconstruction efforts after the war and has provided materials for this, has extended a line of credit of $200 million during a state visit of Rajapaksa in 2010 to build a power plant, and has established an annual defence dialogue.128 Besides, between 2009 and 2011 it has had a ‘continuous Indian engagement in terms of economic assistance, economic integration and discussions on humanitarian issues as well as the ethnic question.’ 129 Despite Rajapaksa’s aversion against more cooperation with the Indians, the Indians tried to continue cooperating with and aiding Sri Lanka. The country was reluctant to put any real pressure on Sri Lanka on the ethnic issue because ‘it did not want to be seen as ganging up with the Western powers whose action might led to the escalation of the Sinhalese nationalists’.130 It seems that Sinhalese nationalism not only has been an important factor for Rajapaksa in shaping his foreign policy, but also for the Indians it has been a force to be reckoned with. Because the Indians bestowed much weight on their relations with Sri Lanka to counter Chinese influence, Sinhalese nationalists seemed to have, to an extent, influence on Indian foreign policy. This influence was strengthened after Rajapaksa made Sinhalese nationalism one of the main points on his personal agenda.

2.2.2 Consolidating relations with the Chinese During the last years of war with the LTTE, the number of Chinese investments in Sri Lanka grew at a fast rate. One of the biggest was the construction of the Hambantota port in Southern Sri Lanka, which is entirely funded by Chinese investors. The construction has raised a lot of concern in the West and India, where politicians ‘allege that the Chinese intend to use the facility as a listening station and base for its warships as part of a so-called “string of pearls” strategy to stretch China’s power projection into the Indian Ocean.’131 The Sri Lankan and Chinese government have stated that the development of the port is strictly for economic purposes. In 2009 China even became

128 Destradi, ‘India and the Civil War in Sri Lanka’, 20 129 Amali Wedagedara, ‘The Ethnic Question’, 71. 130 Ibidem. 131 DeSilva-Ranasinghe 60-61.

40 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Sri Lanka’s largest single lender, giving Sri Lanka even more credit than the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.132 Also, a Chinese bank signed a contract with the Sri Lankan government in 2009 giving $248.2 million for the development of the Colombo-Katunayake Expressway, the first highway in Sri Lanka.133 After this, China has done numerous investments in infrastructure and buildings in Sri Lanka. For example, Chinese investors have funded the Southern Expressway from Colombo to Matara, the BMICH conference hall, the Sri Lankan Supreme Court Complex, the Central Mail and Telegram Complex in Colombo.134 During the last years of his presidency, Rajapaksa enhanced ties with the Chinese and neglected relations with other major powers. Through this, he gave Sri Lanka an increasingly isolated position within international politics. Just after the end of the war and his reelection in 2010, his tone towards the international community was still open and friendly. He stated that Sri Lankans ‘have the closest relations with India, China, Japan as well as other neighboring countries’ and ‘maintain the closest relations with the countries of Asia, Africa, the West, the Middle East and Europe.’135 If his statements of his last years of presidency are examined, a far different tone can be seen. At the 18th SAARC summit, for example, he declared that ‘we are witnessing motivated political agendas being thrust by extra regional entities, on some countries in our region, in the guise of human rights. Intervention in such form is being attempted with scant regard to the structures, and cultural traditions of societies, and ground realities.’ 136 With these extra regional entities, he is obviously pointing at the Western countries. His aversion of their interference in Sri Lankan matters had only grown. His personal opinion on the conditional trade and aid from the West is put into words by himself during his speech before the 69th Session of the General Assembly in New York:

132 Malathi De Alwis, ‘The ‘China Factor’ in post-war Sri Lanka’, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 11 (2010) 3, 434-446, 437. 133 Samaranayake, ‘Are Sri Lanka’s relations’, 126. 134 ‘Making the most of Chinese economic expansion’ The Island, 21 September 2014 (Version 21 September 2014) http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article- details&code_title=110697 (4 January 2016) 135 Mahinda Rajapaksa, ‘Address to the Diplomatic Corps by HE Mahinda Rajapaksa, Presidential Secretariat, Colombo’, 10 May 2010 (Version 10 May 2010) http://www.president.gov.lk/speech_New.php?Id=86 (27 January 2016) 136 ‘Mahinda urges South Asian leaders to join forces against external threats on Member States’ Asian Tribune, 27 November 2014. (Version 27 November 2014) http://asiantribune.com/node/85940 (5 January 2016) 41 Island of Opportunity? 41 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Human rights are used as a tool to implement motivated agendas with no understanding or appreciation of the complexity of issues in the countries concerned. Human rights should be recognized by all as a moral and ethical concept rather than as a political tool. External intervention without adequate consideration of the structures in a society and cultural traditions of the countries where such intervention takes place, inevitably results in destabilization, which is very much in evidence today, in most parts of the world. 137

At the General Assembly, he attacked the Human Rights Council by saying that ‘Post- conflict Sri Lanka has also become an unfortunate victim of ill-conceived agendas of some in the Human Rights Council’ and that there is an ‘obvious lack of balance and proportion in the manner in which my country is being targeted today.’138 It is clear that he radicalized his view on Western conditional aid and had brought relations with the West to a very low. He had steered his government into isolation within the international community. At the same time, relations with China were cordial and the Chinese were expanding their influence on the island. The government’s tone when speaking about China was very different: ‘China has been one of Sri Lanka's foremost development partners for many years, and it has contributed richly to many of Sri Lanka's key economic development projects.’139 By this time, Rajapaksa thought that he had the tools to keep his voter base happy and did not care much about foreign powers other than the Chinese. The choice of the Rajapaksa government for Chinese investments can be explained by the way China keeps relations with other countries. Besides not making any conditions in the form of human rights assurances for economic assistance, China ‘believes that low-key communication and mutually beneficial dialogue, carried out on an equal footing, is more efficient than the US approach of distributing money and exerting pressure.’ 140 Also China follows a policy of non-interference in regard to other

137 ‘External Intervention without consideration results in destabilization – warned President Rajapaksa’ Asian Tribune, 25 September 2014. (Version 25 September 2014) http://asiantribune.com/node/85489 (5 January 2016) 138 Ibidem 139 Gotabaya Rajapaksa, ‘Full Text of the Speech delivered by Secretary Defence at the 'Defence Seminar 2013' on 03rd September 2013 at the Galadari Hotel in Colombo 3 September 2013.’ 3 September 2013 (Version 3 September 2013) http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=full_text_Post_Conflict_Sri_Lanka_Challenges_20130903 (5 January 2016) 140 Kahandawaarachchi, ‘China’s Investments’, 29-30

42 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad countries internal affairs.141 This policy appealed very much to Rajapaksa, because he could engage and receive aid from a foreign power without the fear of intervention, which in turn would enrage his traditional nationalist constituency. A comparison of the Chinese aid during the Rajapaksa era with that of the previous administrations, results in a staggering statistic. This comparison is done by Thilini Kahandawaarachchi, who has written a thesis on China’s investments in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh at the University of Washington: ‘Between 1971-2004, China provided Sri Lanka a total of US$362 million during the 30-year period. In contrast, from 2005 to 2013 over only eight years, its development assistance to Sri Lanka amounted to US$5,664 million. This amounts to 94% of the total aid provided from China to Sri Lanka’.142 More recently the China Harbour Company Ltd. signed a contract with the Sri Lankan government to build a Port City just in front of Colombo’s beach, Galle Face Green, with a total investment of $ 14.4 Billion.143 This seems like a generous investment on the part of the Chinese, but after the defeat of Rajapaksa in the January 2015 Presidential elections, it was revealed that the Rajapaksa government had made a deal that gave the Chinese much influence within the new Port City, which will be elaborated more on in the next chapter. China’s policy on foreign investments not only gives China itself more power in the developing regions, but also incorporates benefits for the local political elite. As Kahandawaarachchi, points out: ‘China’s foreign policy of non-interference results in the empowerment of political elites at national levels that will eventually undermine supranational regulatory approaches and encourage state- based regional architectures’.144 The empowerment and non-interference that the Chinese way of making investments abroad provided were the ideal source of finance for Rajapaksa’s vision of the development of Sri Lanka. It kept the Sinhala nationalists at bay, and provided him enough funds to start carrying out his vision, his second Chintana that he created during his reelection in 2010. In this Chintana, he envisaged developing the rural area’s by improving infrastructure and building naval and aerial hubs.145 He thought that with Chinese help, he could make his Chintana a reality. Another incitement for the increasing preference of Rajapaksa for conducting relations with non-Western powers, was the suspension of the trade concessions under

141 Ibidem 142 Kahandawaarachchi, ‘China’s Investments’, 35 143 Ifham Nizam, ‘More Chinese projects in pipeline’ The Island, September 17 2014. 144 Kahandawaarachchi, ‘China’s Investments’, 30 145 Mahinda Rajapaksa Mahinda Chintana: Path to Success, A Secure Nation, A Bright Future. 2014, 13. 43 Island of Opportunity? 43 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad the Generalized System of Preferences Plus (GSP+) by the European Union. The GSP+ trade system helps developing countries by making it easier for them to export products to the EU. Countries with the GSP+ status gain zero duties for part of their exports to the EU. However, there are certain conditions for gaining the GSP+ status. As it is stated in the EU trade policy: ‘The GSP+ promotes sustainable development and good governance. It provides additional trade preferences to vulnerable countries that ratify and effectively implement core international conventions on environment, labor and human right’.146 Sri Lanka had enjoyed membership of the GSP+ for years, when the EU decided on February 16 2010 to suspend the GSP+ trade concessions because Sri Lanka failed to implement three human rights conventions.147 This meant a blow for Rajapaksa’s plans for Sri Lanka’s development, as this had big influence on the export the country. The decision made Rajapaksa even more anti-Western and radical in his Sinhala nationalism, and it gave him even more reason to seek economic assistance elsewhere. At the same time, the lack of implementing these human rights conventions displays that Rajapaksa had the opinion that this scheme was merely an extension of Western neo-colonialism.

2.3 Rajapaksa’s foreign policy

The rise of Mahinda Rajapaksa as the president of Sri Lanka has meant a break in the pro-Western course that both the UNP governments of Premadasa and Jayawardene and the SLFP government of Chandrika Bandaranaike had adopted in their foreign policy. While these previous governments were mainly reliant on aid from the Western countries in their struggle against the LTTE, Rajapaksa engaged India and foremost China for help. With China, he seemed to return to one of the SLFP old favourites, but within a very different context than the Bandaranaikes in the fifties and sixties did. With the Cold War as the background for the international stage, the Bandaranaikes turned, with their official non-alignment policy, to the communist countries to counterbalance the pro-Western foreign policy of the UNP governments. Rajapaksa also did look East to counter Western influence, but did this because of internal factors: he was heavily influenced by the war with the LTTE. While this internal factor led the previous post- Cold War governments to become more engaged with the West, developments within

146 European Commission ‘Using EU Trade Policy to promote fundamental human rights : Current policies and practices’ (2012) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/february/tradoc_149064.pdf (10 January 2016) 147 ‘Sri Lanka losses GSP Plus’ The Tamil Guardian 24 February 2010. (Version 24 February 2010) http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=2673 (12 January 2016).

44 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad the war with the LTTE drove the Rajapaksa government away. Because of the foreign policy of the Western countries on providing aid to developing countries, Rajapaksa began to contact the regional powers, whose conditions for supplying help suited his interest more. He was faced with the dilemma of both wanting to develop Sri Lanka and to defeat the LTTE at the same time, which was not possible with the help of the West. The West foresaw a political and peaceful solution to the Tamil separatists problem, and withdrew their support when Rajapaksa continued military campaign against the LTTE. Another internal factor made Rajapaksa even more inclined to back away from the West. His nationalistic and rural background made him to believe that any Western influence was a form of neo-colonialism and made him want to bring this to a minimum. This background also made him very popular under the rural Sinhala poor, which generally had the same view on Western interference in Sri Lanka. Moreover, the distrust of this nationalistic constituency of Rajapaksa towards India made him retain from improving Indo-Sri Lankan relations too much, in order to maintain his traditional votes. And thus steered his foreign policy to China even more. However, aided by the Sino-Indian rivalry, Rajapaksa succeeded in receiving both Indian and Chinese aid during the final phase of the war. Because of Sri Lanka’s strategic position, both wanted to exert their influence on the island. Rajapaksa was cunning enough to use this rivalry for his own gain, by approaching both countries and appease them. He even managed to use the geopolitical situation to coerce India to abandon their call for a peaceful solution with the LTTE and openly aid in the battles against the Tamil separatists, which was against the will of the Indian state Tamil Nadu. Fear of losing grasp on their backyard island, led the Indians to prioritize the Indo-Sri Lankan relations before the interests of Tamil Nadu. In the post-LTTE period, this geopolitical factor kept on providing the Sri Lankans an advantage over the Indians, even when their relations were somewhat tense. For the Chinese this worked vice versa, as they wanted to expand their influence in the Indian Ocean and protect it from the Indians. During Rajapaksa’s regime, economic factors kept on being an important factor in determining Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. As he explained in his Mahinda Chintana, developing Sri Lanka was one of his biggest priorities. After the war with the LTTE ended, this factor became even more important in his foreign policy. With the Western aid already being cut off, and revival not being possible because of differences in the post-war reconstruction and reconciliation process, continuing the eastern oriented

45 Island of Opportunity? 45 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad course was the logical policy. With anti-Indian sentiment among the Sinhala nationalists being widespread, China became the most important investor for Sri Lanka. This led to a series of development projects, which were beneficial to both Rajapaksa personally and the Chinese. It helped Rajapaksa to begin his project of consolidating and extending his power as a president, by increasing his popularity among the Sinhalese population through developing the areas where they lived. Concluding, its seems that the same set of factors can be found to be of influence in Rajapaksa’s foreign policy and the foreign policy of previous governments. However, because of a different context within which foreign policy is conducted, the interaction of these factors with foreign policy is different during the Rajapaksa era. For example, the post-Cold War rise of the Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean is an important part of that context, but also more domestic factors, like the influence of Sinhala nationalism is of significance in determining foreign policy. Both where present during pre- Rajapaksa times, but were not that strong in their influence. Different geopolitical and domestic factors were of importance during previous regimes and led to different foreign policy. The next chapter will explain how geopolitical, internal, economic and personal factors have influenced Sri Lankan foreign policy in the post-Rajapaksa era.

46 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Chapter 3 Because of the recent change of regime in Sri Lanka, the foreign policy that has been conducted by the government the past year should be examined and placed within the historic context. This will be done in this chapter, in which the foreign policy of the newly elected president Maithripala Sirisena will be set out through the examination of newspapers and other journalistic articles. Through this, three important subjects within Sirisena’s foreign policy will be identified: Rapprochement with the West and their conditional aid, reviving ties with India while determining their role in Sri Lankan post-war reconciliation and engaging in the Sino-Indian regional rivalry.

3.1 The Maithri factor The regime change in January 2015 was quite unexpected, certainly for Rajapaksa. With much confidence he called early elections in mid-2014, while having faith in the popularity among his traditional constituency. This faith in his popularity was misplaced, and eventually it was what led to his defeat by his opponent Maithripala Sirisena. According to some, the reason that former president Rajapaksa called for early elections was because he was worried about ‘further erosion for his electoral support as economic conditions worsened.’148 These economic factors where crucial in the loss of Rajapaksa’s support. Mahinda’s Chintana seemed an unrealistic vision for a growing number of people. Despite the fact that the Sri Lankan economy grew with 7 per cent each year between 2010 and 2014, the account deficit and foreign debt accumulation were enormous, which led to a debt-fuelled growth that was not sustainable.149 People began to worry about the sustainability of the economic situation and the growing authoritarianism, corruption and nepotism within the government. Signs of this decline in support and worries among a part of the population were already visible during the provincial council elections in the Uva province in September 2014, where the votes for the government decreased from 72 % to 51 %.150 With the unexpected rise of the secretary of the SLFP party and one of his former ministers, Maithripala Sirisena, the dissatisfied members of the SLFP constituency had a good alternative to vote on.

148 Athurokala, ‘Victory in War’, 19. 149 Idibem, 17-19 150 Ibidem, 19 47 Island of Opportunity? 47 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

There was a definite difference in the campaigns of the candidates for the Presidential Elections of January 2015. Rajapaksa’s campaign was mainly focussed on the nationalists’ sentiments among the Sinhala population. In his manifesto he elaborated mainly on protecting and developing the Sri Lankan nation. He set forth a anti-Western policy and pressed on the national security issue by trying to create and promote the view that there was still a security threat from foreign, mainly LTTE-backed powers. For example, he stated that ‘we all know that the LTTE movement is supported by persons in certain European and western countries’ and that these ‘are still continuing their ruthless and relentless campaign to divide our country’.151 During election rallies he focused on the national security question even more. Sirisena, on the other hand, elaborated on good governance and improving relations with all the countries in the world.152 At his election rallies he vowed to end ‘mass scale corruption, nepotism and family rule’.153 Eventually Sirisena won by taking part of Rajapaksa’s traditional Sinhala constituency, the more moderate Sinhala, and because all the other minorities overwhelmingly voted for Sirisena. Rajapaksa’s focus on Sinhala nationalism, which he expanded throughout his last years as a president, eventually proved to be a bad tactic. At his inauguration on 9 January 2015, Sirisena started his 100 days-program, which had the purpose to reform the Sri Lankan society into a more transparent and democratic one. For example it promised to establish various independent commissions, freedom of information legislation and the abolishment of the executive presidency.154 On foreign relations, the 100 days program promised the full reorganization and replacement of all the foreign services employees, equal relations with India, China, Pakistan and Japan and to ‘take action to promote humanitarian and environment- friendly attitudes both locally and internationally.’ 155 Sirisena promised to normalize relations with all the countries and with this he tried to counter Rajapaksa’s conduct of international relations. Clearly he wanted to diminish the focus on China and re- establish good relations with the West, and being more open to promoting human rights

151 Mahinda Rajapaksa Mahinda Chintana: Path to Success, A Secure Nation, A Bright Future. 2014, 13. 152 Maithripala Sirisena Manifesto: A Compassionate Maithri Governance, A Stable Country. (Version 25 December 2014) (http://www.asianmirror.lk/news/item/5782-full-text-of-maithripala-sirisena-s- election-manifesto (14 January 2016), 13-20. 153 ‘Ill Bring about good governance – Maithripala, Daily Mirror 1 December 2014. 154 ‘A vote for change for the 100-day challenge’ Daily Mirror 15 January 2015. 155 Maithripala Sirisena ‘Manifesto’, 44.

48 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad and reconciliation with the Tamil population. Partly he wanted this because of economic reasons, because he wanted an alternative for the dependence on Chinese investments. But also because wanted to tackle a problem that the previous government had neglected.

3.2 Sirisena’s background

Before analyzing the foreign policy that has been laid out by Sirisena the past year, his own background must be examined. This can explain his view on the right foreign policy for Sri Lanka and give more insight in his openness to the West. Sirisena, although born in a suburb of Colombo, grew up in the ancient medieval northern capital of Polonnaruwa and was the son of a minor landowner.156 Just like the former president Rajapaksa, he did not come from the traditional Colombo elite and being a rural Sinhala, he joined the SLFP in the seventies. But this is where the similarity with Rajapaksa stops. While Rajapaksa’s father was a successful politician, Sirisena’s family was not part of the local rural elite. Sirisena was born into less wealth and had a more simple early life, and his family has never been very prone to nepotism. As a raised politician, Rajapaska used his Sinhala decent for political purposes, he used it to stir the nationalist feelings among his fellow rural Sinhala. For example, he adopted parts of the traditional Sinhala peasant dress, like the traditional scarf, to use in his daily outfit, which Sirisena never has done.157 Already part of a powerful family, Rajapaksa could use his family’s power to win popularity among the Sinhala nationalists. Charisma and nepotism became important parts of his political strategy. Sirisena, however, as a son of a simple Sri Lankan commoner is more timid and deliberate and is said to be a disciplined practitioner of Buddhism and a honest and hard worker.158 This can explain his aversion to the corrupt practices and increased family-rule of the previous Rajapaksa government, one of the most important incentives for ousting his fellow party member from the presidency. This led him not to try to gain popularity among the Sinhala nationalists and thus steal some of the thunder of Rajapaksa. Instead, he tried to appeal to the ethnic minorities and other Sinhala by providing an alternative to the corrupt and dynastic rule of the former president. Without the Sinhala nationalists being his

156 J. Burke,‘Sri Lanka election result: ‘Who is the new President Maithripala Sirisena’ The Guardian, 9 January 2015 (Version 9 January 2015) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/sri-lanka- election-result-who-is-new-president-maithripala-sirisena (14 January 2016) 157 Ibidem 158 Ibidem 49 Island of Opportunity? 49 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad traditional constituency, he had no reason to see Western aid as a form of neocolonialism. His more deliberate approach of conducting politics and his aversion to nepotism led him to understand that the threat of more Western influence on the island was a necessary evil to develop Sri Lanka into a nation with more wealth and equality.

3.3 Rapprochement with the West

That the new Sri Lankan government sought to engage the Western countries in a more open manner quickly became apparent after the presidential elections. Just over a month after the inauguration of president Sirisena, External Affairs Minister Mangala Samaraweera paid a visit to the United States, where he met with US Secretary of State, John Kerry. This was something that would be unthinkable during the regime of Rajapaksa. There they made a joint statement that they wanted to improve American-Sri Lankan relations, while Samaraweera asserted that the new government viewed the United States ‘not as a threat but as a great opportunity’.159 During his visit on the 11th and 12th of February 2015, Samaraweera had meetings with several high-ranked American politicians where discussed the steps being taken by the Sri Lankan government for reconciliation, strengthening democracy and good governance. Samaweera stated during these meetings that Sri Lanka and the United States share a range of values and a commitment to democratic ideals, which ‘gave much scope for the two countries to work together.’160 These statements are in sharp contrast with the attitude of the Rajapaksa government when interacting with the Western countries. Rajapaksa regarded any cooperation with the West on improving the democratic situation in Sri Lanka as imperialistic interference in the country’s internal affairs. Moreover, Rajapaksa would never discuss the issue of reconciliation in the North and East and the status of corruption in the country that openly with a Western country. Sirisena did not approve of Rajapaksa’s xenophobia regarding solving these issues and saw a constructive dialog with the whole international community as a vital part of a viable solution for the country’s internal reconciliation. A big hurdle in the relations with the Western countries during the post-war Rajapaksa era has been the investigation into war crimes during the last phase of the war. This was a topic on which Rajapaksa did not want to engage and did not put much

159 ‘US not a threat but a great opportunity: Mangala’ Daily Mirror 14 February 2015. 160 ‘Mangala concludes successful visit to US capital’ Daily FT 16 February 2015

50 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad effort in to resolve. Sirisena however, wanted to resolve this problem as quickly as possible. As an alternative that would be more acceptable for the international community, he proposed a domestic inquiry into war crimes by the Sri Lankan government that would involve assessment by international actors. As he stated while addressing the Sri Lankan parliament on 20 February 2015: ‘We have clearly communicated to the international community to have faith in the domestic inquiry carried out by Sri Lanka. But, we can take the international opinion into consideration when conducting our domestic inquiry’.161 Most Western leaders saw the willingness of Sirisena to restablish good relations with the West and to cooperate with international inquiries in war crimes as welcome and genuine. For example, during U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Sri Lanka in early May 2015, he expressed his admiration for the steps taken by the government in reconciliation and his confidence in adressing these issues in the future.162 Among the Sri Lankan population, the general opinion on Sirisena’s efforts establish a reconciliation mechanism with help from the international community was quite positive. The first few months especially, they were full of hope that Sirisena would bring the longneeded justice and reconicliation in the north and east.163 Still, when taking in consideration the timing of the rapproachment with the US and the desire of Sirisena to set up an domestic inquiry into alleged war crimes, the two seem hardly accidental and apart. That is to say, Sirisena needed the support of the Americans to fend off an upcoming international inquiry. First scheduled to commence in March 2015, one of the first actions of the Sri Lankan government on the international stage was lobbying for the postponement of the international inquiry by the United Nation Human Rights Counil (UNHRC) until september of the same year. After the visit of External Affairs Minister Samaraweera on 12 February, the US government stated on 16 February that they supported the desicision of the UNHRC, that was made that same day, to postpone their inquiry.164 Surely, any American pressure on the UNHRC would have had some influence on their decision making. In this instance, Sirisena seemed to have some level of the clever tactics of his predecessor to extend Sri Lanka’s influence on the international stage.

161 ‘Govt. asks for time for domestic mechanism’ Daily Mirror 21 February 2015. 162 ‘Sri Lanka’s problems for Sri Lankans to solve, we will only help: Kerry’ Sunday Times 3 May 2015. 163 ‘UNHRC engagement: state-led shift?’ The Media Analysis Verite Research 5(9), 3. 164 ‘US supports UNHRC decision to delay report on Sri Lanka’ Daily News, 19 February 2015. 51 Island of Opportunity? 51 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Another point that rested high on the agenda of the new Sirisena government, was reestablishing the Generalized Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) status of Sri Lanka with the European Union and the lifting of the fisheries ban that was imposed on Sri Lanka by the EU in 2014. External Affairs Minister Samaraweera, as part of the rapprochement with the West, visited the European Commission in Brussels on 28 January 2015. As he stated during his briefing of Sri Lanka’s parliament on his visit to the EU: ‘The objective of my visit was largely to revive positive relations and begin a new chapter in Sri Lanka-European Union relations, based on mutual respect and understanding.’ 165 During his speech he expressed his confidence in the lifting of the ban and regaining GSP+ status. This, however, proved to be a long-term process. For the EU, the desire of the Sri Lankan government to regain profitable access tot the European market could be used as leverage in gaining more influence on the island. In the months after the inauguration of the new government, the Sri Lankans lobbied heavily at the EU to regain the GSP+ status. Numerous statements and promises were made by the government that they were on the verge of regaining the trade concessions.166 It was clear for Sirisena that Sri Lanka could not rely on Chinese investments alone anymore and the country should get rid of its accumulated foreign debt. He was keen on regaining the profitable access to what still is the largest export zone for the island nation, with one-third of all the Sri Lankan exports going to European countries. In April 2015, European delegates and the Sri Lankan government organized the EU- Sri Lanka Joint Commission, in which they discussed the GSP+ status of Sri Lanka and further deepening of the cooperation between the EU and Sri Lanka. This Joint Commission was created after the EU and Sri Lanka established relations in 1975.167 After the Joint Commission had ended, the European delegates expressed their confidence in the Sri Lankan government ratifying the 27 conventions of the UN relating to human rights, labour rights, environment and good governance and announced that the Joint Commission had decided to form a working group to allow a dialog on governance, rule of law and human rights.168 The decision to allow the EU to form a working group on governance, rule of law and human rights, runs counter to the beliefs

165 ‘Mangala briefs Parliament on EU visit, fishing and GSP’, Daily, FT 21 February 2015. 166 Throughout March, April and May 2015, there were several dozen statements made by the Sri Lankan government on regaining the GSP+ trade concessions, which were most of the time confusing and conflicting which each other. 167 ‘EEC- Sri Lanka Commercial Cooperation Agreement’ EEC 1975. 168 ‘SL ON COURSE TO GET GSP+ STATUS: EU’, Daily Mirror, 3 April 2015.

52 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad of the previous government, and indicates the very different foreign policy laid out by Sirisena. It is clear that Sirisena has a very different view on the conditional economic aid that the Western countries could provide for Sri Lanka. Where Rajapaksa saw the human rights factor in Western economic aid as a form of Western imperialism and a threat to the unity and development of Sri Lanka, Sirisena sees trade with the Western countries and receiving aid from them as a crucial part of developing Sri Lanka to a more prosperous and secure country. The human rights, rule of law and good governance criterion of the Western countries also fit perfectly with his promises to attack the deeply entrenched corruption in the Sri Lankan government and to come up with an effective reconciliation program.

3.4 Reviving old Indian ties Sirisena’s climb to presidency was a welcome change for most of the international community. The replacement of Rajapaksa by a more open president with less focus on China was seen especially by the Western countries and the Indians as a very positive development. Numerous leaders expressed a positive attitude against the regime change and their confidence in the new regime.169 For the Indians too it meant a reopening of the traditional friendly ties between their country and the island nation. Sirisena already envisaged re-establishing the previous good relations with India, to establish ‘closer relations with an attitude that would be neither anti-Indian nor dependent.’170 With this attitude he wanted to break with the anti-Indian sentiment that existed among the Rajapaksa government, but also promised not to allow India to get too much influence in Sri Lankan matters. The first evidence of efforts to reestablish excellent Indo-Sri Lankan relations came in mid February 2015, when Sirisena paid a four-day visit to the Indian capital New Delhi, where he had meetings with Indian President Pranab Mukherjee and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Sirisena clearly had the intention to address the issues on which India and Sri Lanka had their differences and which had a negative influence on their relations during the Rajapaksa era. He was prepared to discuss what drove Rajapaksa further away from the Indians: the fisherman issue, the creation of a CEPA Agreement between the two countries and the ethnic question. At the end of Sirisena’s visit, a joint statement was released that announced that the two countries would move

169 A. Keenan, ‘A new Sri Lanka?’, Crisis Group 18 May 2015 (Version 18 May 2015) http://blog.crisisgroup.org/asia/2015/05/18/a-new-sri-lanka/. (26 January 2016) 170 Maithripala Sirisena ‘Manifesto’, 44. 53 Island of Opportunity? 53 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad forward on creating a CEPA Agreement, that the fisherman issue would be jointly addressed and that India fully supported the way in which the Sri Lankan government was trying to reconcile with the Tamil population.171 Sirisena’s visit marked the beginning of finding solutions for the problems, caused by the civil war in the north and east, which have created a wedge between India and Sri Lanka. Finding these solutions were long overdue, as it had been postponed for years since the end of the war with the LTTE. Besides these reaching these understandings, Sirisena and Mukherjee signed four Memorandums of Understanding (MoU), including an Agreement between Sri Lanka and India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.172 Sirisena’s new foreign policy seems to be shifting away from China in favor of India. Sri Lanka seems to have abandoned what is called China’s ‘string of pearls’, which are countries and place throughout Asia where they have a high level of influence. It has even been suggested that Sirisena’s government is pro-New Delhi and that ‘Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government was able to snatch back this pearl from Beijing's string’.173 However, the swing towards India seemed to have been subtler, as some bilateral issues are still not resolved. For once, the issue of Indian fishermen crossing over into Sri Lankan territorial waters remained an issue despite the promises made during Sirisena’s state visit to India. Relations between the two countries came again under tension after Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, made a statement on 7 March justifying the shooting of Indian fishermen by the Sri Lankan Navy, which was heavily criticized by the Indian government.174 This controversial statement came at a painful moment, as it was just days before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was scheduled to pay Sri Lanka a state visit, the first by an Indian leader in 28 years. During his visit, four bilateral agreements were signed between the neighbouring countries, which were meant to further enhance their relations.175 Despite this second high-level Indo-Sri Lankan state visit, politicians from both countries were not able to find a lasting solution for the fisherman issue. This is illustrated by the reiteration of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe’s previous statement on the justification of shooting

171 ‘Indo – Lanka relations: Going forward’, The Island, 18 February 2015. 172 ‘Lanka, India ink four agreements’, Daily News, 20 February 2015. 173 K. Pethiyagoda , ‘India v. China in Sri Lanka—Lessons for rising powers’, 1 may 2015 (Version 1 may 2015) , http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/05/01-china-india-sri-lanka- pethiyagoda (26 January 2016) 174 ‘India flays Ranil for threats to shoot fishermen’, Daily Mirror, 11 March 2015. 175 ‘Sri Lanka and India sign four bilateral deals’, Daily FT, 14 March 2015.

54 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Indian poachers by himself, just days after the visit of Modi.176 Moreover, almost one year after the inauguration of Sirisena, the Sri Lankan government is still seeking new dialogue with the Indians on the issue while repeated talks with the Indian Tamil Nadu state and between Sri Lankan and Indian fishermen in the past year have never worked out.177 Since the presidential elections in January 2015, the Sri Lankan Navy has arrested and detained hundreds of Indian fishermen, which remains a heated topic during talks between Sri Lanka and India. Another issue that remained a problem in Indo-Sri Lankan relations was the ethnic question. When Modi visited Sri Lanka in March, he also pressed for the implementation of the 13th Amendment and even to go beyond it, to find a solution that integrates the Tamil community even more into the Sri Lankan nation.178 The Sri Lankan government stated that they shared Modi’s vision, but there was also much resistance among the opposition. Mainly the Sinhala nationalists were still against implementation of the Amendment and argued that it was a treaty that was forced upon Sri Lanka by India and that it was a threat to the unity of the Sri Lankan nation.179 In general, the steps taken by the Sirisena government for a successful reconciliation and accountability mechanism are seen as important and already making a difference.180 However, these efforts must not be exaggerated, as some delays in developing these mechanisms can be observed. While the government expressed its favour for implementing the 13th Amendment, it has not made much effort during the past year to make this promise a reality. It seems that the government kept on reiterating their promise to implement the 13th Amendment and even going further than it to keep the investigators of the upcoming UNHRC satisfied. By giving the impression that they were actively occupied with a viable solution for the ethnic question, the government hoped that the Human Rights Council had more incentive to give a more positive review on the progress made in post-war reconciliation. The report officially concluded that the commitments made by the government are welcome and that ‘President Sirisena and other government figures have struck a very different tone on reconciliation in public

176 ‘Shoot trespassers – Ranil’, Ceylon Today, 17 March 2015. 177 ‘Poaching in Lankan waters: Fisheries Ministry seeks fresh dialogue’, Daily Mirror, 1 January 2016. 178 ‘Modi: ‘Go beyond 13A’’, The Island, 14 March 2015. 179 ‘Modi’s 13th Amendment call gets mixed reactions in Lanka’ Daily FT, 17 March 2015. 180 ‘Truth and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka’ The Boston Globe, 15 September 2015, (Version 15 September 2015) https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/09/15/truth-and-reconciliation-sri- lanka/6AG2GxRCRwJ2G3gRcidtRO/story.html (22 January 2016) 55 Island of Opportunity? 55 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad statements.’181 The resolution initiated by the United States that followed on the publication of the report by the UNHRC, was drafted in a manner that was quite appealing for the Sri Lankan government. While the resolution calls for extensive reforms and a domestic accountability mechanism with international involvement, it stays quite vague about what this international involvement entails. It also does not address the militarization in Sri Lanka in a clear and comprehensive way. 182 Later on, Sirisena’s attitude towards an international investigation became more clear, as he stated last January: ‘the investigation has to be “internal” and “indigenous” …. the international community need not concern itself with matters of the state’.183 This tone stands in stark contrast with the government’s statements during the UNHRC sessions in September. Sirisena’s openness towards the West and the UNHRC proved to be a useful tactic to make the UNHRC report not too harsh on the government and to let the UNHRC adopt a less strict resolution. By achieving this, Sirisena had more space for finding a domestic solution with as little as possible international involvement. From these observation can be concluded that Sirisena’s intentions to create a successful truth and reconciliation mechanism may be genuine, but at the same time he is not scared to stall the development of this mechanism to influence international involvement.

3.5 Taming the Chinese dragon

Sirisena’s goal to re-establish a foreign policy of non-alignment, was an important part of his strategy to use the Sino-Indian rivalry for the benefit of Sri Lanka. In general, this past year Sirisena has tried to re-establish or keep good relations with all the relevant countries. With this, he had a different approach to the regional India-China rivalry, which Rajapaksa knew to exploit in a strategic manner during the civil war. Instead of concentrating on China, which Rajapaksa did in his last years as president, and thereby creating leverage on India and excluding the West, Sirisena tried to spread his chances more evenly. It has been argued that the ‘Sri Lankans will certainly still need Chinese money and support, but will want to have it along with support from India and the

181 Comprehensive report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Sri Lanka, UN Human Rights Council, 13th session 28 september 2015. 182 Dibbert, T. ‘The UN Human Rights Council Resolution on Sri Lanka is Tabled’ The Diplomat, 28 September 2015. (Version 28 September 2015) http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-un-human-rights- council-resolution-on-sri-lanka-is-tabled/ (10 January 2016) 183 ‘President Sirisena wants “indigenous” inquiry into alleged war crimes’ Daily FT , 21 January 2016.

56 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

West.’184 Observations seem to confirm this view of Sirisena’s China policy. By trying to court all the major powers Sirisena is trying to get Sri Lanka back within the regional geopolitical game and exploit Sri Lanka’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean for the country’s own good. It seems that he also understands the importance of keeping good relations with both China and India to get full benefit of their regional rivalry. Besides the rapprochement with India, good relations with China were maintained. However, the level of cooperation with the Chinese that Rajapaksa preferred was not continued by Sirisena’s government and several Chinese-sponsored projects were placed under review. It seemed that political issues weighted heavier than economic ones, the prospect of being too dependent on Chinese aid was seen as a more severe problem than suspending multimillion-dollar projects. The biggest one, the Port City project, which would give the Chinese considerably more influence in the region, was temporarily suspended by the Sri Lankan government. At first, the government stated that the previous government under Rajapaksa had closed the deal in an unlawful and non-transparent manner and that any decision on the future of the project would not influence relations between Sri Lanka and China.185 This was reiterated by Sirisena during his visit to New Delhi in February 2015. He stated that the Port City project was only temporarily under review and that it would definitely continue, while Sri Lanka wanted to stay friends with both China and India and at the same time stay non- aligned.186 In the first week of March 2015 however, the Sri Lankan government decided to suspend the Port City project, which caused some raised eyebrows in Beijing. Officially the Chinese reaction was mild, and merely stated that they hoped that Sri Lanka would resolve the situation quickly because it could damage the confidence of foreign investors in the country. 187 However, there are reports of stressed-out Chinese officials having emergency meetings with Sirisena and other high-level Sri Lankan officials after the announcement of suspension of the project.188 Apparently the Chinese were scared that their long-time investments in an important part of their ‘string of pearls’ would vanish. Sirisena assured Beijing in the following weeks that the suspension of the Port City

184 Keenan, A. ‘A new Sri Lanka?’ 185 ‘Ranil vows to strengthen Lanka-China relations’ The Island, 19 February 2015. 186 ‘We won’t side with either giant’ The Island, 19 February 2015 187 ‘Suspension of USD 1.4 bn Colombo Port City project: Chinese government reacts’ The Island, March 6 2015. 188 ‘Port City: China asks SL to protect investor interests’ Daily Mirror, 9 March 2015. 57 Island of Opportunity? 57 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad project had nothing to do with the Chinese, but with domestic matters, mainly with the investigation of the corruption of the previous government.189 The suspension of the Port City project was evenly timed with the arrival of Indian Prime Minister Modi to Sri Lanka, both were just days apart, which cannot be held as a coincidence. A Chinese think-tank even dubbed the visit of Modi interference in Sri Lankan matters and a way to undermine Sino-Sri Lankan relations.190 It seems that Sirisena wanted to strengthen the image of Sri Lanka’s rapprochement with India, by sending a message to Beijing. The Chinese reaction was like the Sri Lankans would have hoped: it signalled a fear for losing their strong influence and for more Indian involvement on the island. It was not strange that the Chinese were eager to meet President Sirisena on his state visit to China between 25 and 27 March. During this visit, five MoU’s were signed and talks about creating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries were instigated.191 In the mean time, the investigation into corruption and the environmental friendliness of the project that was initiated by the government took months. It can be concluded from the sources that during this time, Sri Lanka used the suspension as leverage on China and, in doing so, they attracted more interest of the Chinese government to invest in the country and stay the largest investor.192 Sirisena had China on a leash concerning Chinese investments during most of the past year. This was also evident when the government finally decided to continue the Chinese projects. Besides suspending the Port City project, the Sri Lankan government decided to suspend and cancel a handful Chinese funded infrastructure projects like the Northern Expressway, the enormous Lotus Tower and a communications tower. 193 On the 9th of October 2015 a Chinese delegation was sent to Colombo, headed by Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, to maintain good relations and address the problem of suspension of Chinese funded projects in Sri Lanka. During the visit, Sirisena invited the Chinese to fund new infrastructure projects and even underlined the importance of the

189 ‘Port City Project will go ahead – China’ Daily Mirror, 27 March 2015. 190 ‘PM Narendra Modi’s Jaffna visit interference in Sri Lankan affairs: China think-tank’ Daily FT, 21 March 2015. 191 ‘President Sirisena Undertakes first Visit to China as President’ news.lk, 27 March 2015. http://www.news.lk/fetures/item/6818-president-sirisena-undertakes-first-visit-to-china-as-presdient 192 ‘China pledges to speed up Sri Lanka’s development’, The Island, 4 June 2015. 193 P. Gunaratne and J. Berkshire Miller, ‘Sri Lanka: Balancing Ties Between China and the West’ The Diplomat 26 May 2015, (Version 26 May 2015) http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/sri-lanka-balancing- ties-between-china-and-the-west/ (26 January 2016)

58 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad resuming work on the second phase of the Hambantota port.194 Eventually one year after the inauguration of President Sirisena the government has decided to go forth with the Port City project and other Chinese investments, with some amendments to them.195 Just before this decision, the Sri Lankans decided to back out of a multi-million dollar deal buying 8 to 12, JF-17 Thunder’s, low-cost multi-role fighters that are being built collaboratively by China and Pakistan.196 Of course, this was a disappointment for the Chinese, but this setback was overshadowed by the decision to continue the projects. It is even suggested that the Indian government orchestrated the cancellation of the fighter deal.197 The Indian government would have sent a ‘diplomatic missive’ that suggested that the Sri Lankan government should refrain from accepting the deal, which also included a negative technical assessment of the Pakistani-Chinese fighter.198 Fending off any big Chinese investments until January 2016, seemed to be part of a strategy to improve ties with India. In September 2015 already, did Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe pay a state visit to India to discuss the fishermen issue and the CEPA trade Agreement.199 In the months after the visit, several meetings and discussions were held between high-ranking Sri Lankan and Indian officials about further economic cooperation, which eventually led to the creation of the Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement (ETCA), which is due to be signed in February 2016.200 Sirisena seems to have developed a balanced foreign policy that fits well within the regional power play in the Indian Ocean, one that is maybe even better than Rajapaksa’s strategy. The game of carrot and stick that he played with the Chinese and the Indians is further apparent when Sri Lanka started the first rounds of negotiation on a FTA with China in December 2015.201 In this instance, he put the pressure on the Indians, as the talks with China about a FTA coincided with the last meetings on the

194 Sweet, R. ‘China sends envoy to Sri Lanka amid stalled infrastructure schemes’ Global Construction Review 9 October 2015, (Version 9 October 2015) http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/c8hi8n8a-sends-envoy-sri-lanka-amid-stalled/ (24 January 2016) 195 ‘Govt. will go on with Chinese projects – Ranil’ Daily Mirror, 21 January 2016. 196 Panda, A. ‘Revealed: Why Sri Lanka Backed Off the Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder’ The Diplomat 11 January 2016 (Version 11 January 2016) http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/revealed-why-sri-lanka- backed-off-the-sino-pakistani-jf-17-thunder/ (24 January 2016) 197 ‘SL drops plan to buy Chinese fighter aircraft assembled in Pakistan due to Indian pressure’ The Island, 11 January 2015. 198 Panda, ‘Revealed’ 199 ‘Ranil Wickremesinghe visit: Can India and Sri Lanka build bridges over troubled waters’ Daily Mirror, 16 September 2015. 200 ‘Sri Lanka to sign ETCA framework agreement with India by February’ Daily Mirror 30 December 2015. 201 ‘Sl-china FTA concerns’ Daily Mirror, 22 December 2015. 59 Island of Opportunity? 59 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad drafting of the ETCA with India. Sirisena and his government know how to play the two regional powers against each other by careful timing of rapprochement and divergence. This is even more evidence for Sri Lanka’s renewed important position within the Indian-Chinese rivalry. Moreover, on the 22nd of January 2016, India’s biggest military ship, the aircraft-carrier INS Vikramaditya arrived in the port of Colombo, underlining the maritime ties between the two countries and delivering a strong message to the Chinese.202 Allowing the Indian warship into Colombo port will give the Chinese more to worry about and will give Sirisena more leverage in negotiating the terms of continuing the Chinese funded projects and gaining future Chinese investments. It proves that Sirisena did understand the importance of breaking out of the isolation that Rajapaksa created by focusing on China. His more balanced foreign policy up until the writing of this thesis has proven to be more beneficial for Sri Lanka, as it has profited more from the regional power struggle between China and India and the West as a third party.

3.6 Sirisena’s foreign policy With the unexpected defeat of former President Rajapaksa by his own party secretary, an era of isolation in foreign relations for Sri Lanka seemed to have come to an end. The newly elected president, Maithripala Sirisena was quick to re-establish relations with India and the West and open up Sri Lanka to the trade and aid it needed to develop further into a more prosperous and modern country. This break from a China-oriented foreign policy meant a revival of the struggle for influence on the island nation between the major powers of the world, especially for India and China. From the beginning, the rapprochement with India and the West and the suspension of Chinese funded projects in Sri Lanka caused much concern in Beijing. The fact that every major power was eager to race in to get a piece of the newly available Sri Lankan pie, provided much opportunity for Sirisena’s government. Another discontinuity with the foreign policy of Rajapaksa was the willingness of Sirisena and his government to work to towards more reconciliation after the civil war with the LTTE. Not only was this a promise he made during the elections of January 2015 to his constituency, he saw reconciliation crucial in reviving relations with the West and ensuring a prosperous future for Sri Lanka. However, the honesty of Sirisena’s promises to improve the process can be disputed. His seems to time his promises for

202 ‘India’s biggest warship arrives in Colombo’ Daily Mirror 22 January 2016.

60 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad better reconciliation with gaining or re-gaining economic benefits from Western countries. It seems that reconciliation as an internal factor has been used as tool to revive relations with the West and thereby is also of important influence on foreign policy. Personal factors, the character and background of Sirisena himself, and changing economic factors, the unsustainable dependence of the development of Sri Lanka on Chinese foreign investment, leads Sirisena to follow a different policy in the same international context. Besides, he is less influenced by an important internal factor, Sinhala nationalism. Sirisena’s character also worked beneficial in establishing good foreign relations, as many foreign leaders saw the rational and thoughtful reasoning of Sirisena as a welcome change after the emotional and sometimes irrational behavior of Rajapaksa.

61 Island of Opportunity? 61 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

Conclusion The world witnessed a profound change of regime in Sri Lanka when Maithripala Sirisena was elected president in January 2015, although that was most of the world wanted to believe. However, when historical tendencies within Sri Lankan politics are being taken into account, this change was not that unexpected. In historical context, the foreign policy of the Sirisena government is both a break and a continuation of foreign policies of previous governments. With Sirisena diverting from a preference for engaging with China and following a more pro-West direction, he seems to have broken with the old tradition of the SLFP’s pro-communist foreign policy. However, he was not the first to break with the traditional SLFP foreign policy that was developed under the first Bandaranaikes. Already during the presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, a more pro-Western foreign policy was being followed, allowing Western countries to be involved in the peace negotiations with the LTTE. Sirisena’s foreign policy can be seen as a revival of Chandrika’s foreign policy and the engagement with the West and India, although he seems to be less influenced by the conditional aid that the West provides and besides this, also partly continues Rajapaksa’s partnership with China. The similarity in the foreign policy of the Chandrika and Sirisena government can also be explained by their compositions. That is, the combination of an SLFP president with an UNP-led cabinet. Both during Chandrika’s second term as a president and now during Sirisena’s first term, the UNP had the majority in parliament and Ranil Wickremasinghe, an UNP’er, headed the cabinet. Certainly, in both cases this led the UNP influence the SLFP president to follow a more pro-Western policy. Nevertheless, Sirisena’s intention was already to open up to the West, so this can be seen more as his own policy. Sirisena’s foreign policy can also be seen as a continuation of the convergence of the SLFP and UNP traditional foreign policy and ultimately as the merger of the two. The merger of the SLFP and UNP foreign policies is something that already was set in motion by two major events: the end of the Cold War and the uprising of the LTTE. These two geopolitical factors caused a both a power vacuum within the South Asian region and a domestic problem that required full attention of the Sri Lankan government. Within in this context, Sri Lanka’s governments turned inwards and defeating the LTTE and developing Sri Lanka became the highest priority of both the SLFP and the UNP. However, the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa as Sri Lanka’s 6th

62 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad president, meant a break in the merger of the SLFP and UNP foreign policies. It was temporarily beaten by another strong domestic force that had arisen because of the end of the Cold War and the rise of the LTTE, Sinhala nationalism. The election of Rajapaksa, a Sinhala nationalist himself, caused Sinhala nationalism to be the dominant narrative within Sri Lankan politics and created a different foreign policy within the same geopolitical context. The power vacuum that was created by the end of the Cold War generated a new geopolitical situation, namely a surge of the rivalry between the regional powers India and China, which went on to play a big role during the regime of Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa turned out to be a shrewd politician who possessed some clever tactics to make use of the Sino-Indian rivalry for his own gain. Where Chandrika Kumaratunga Bandaranaike mainly was focussed on gaining a peaceful peace with the LTTE, Rajapaksa knew how to gain leverage on both regional powers and by this coercing them into giving military support that was needed to win the war against the LTTE. Rajapaksa’s eventual victory over the LTTE in 2009 created a short upsurge of Sinhala nationalism, giving him immense popularity and led him to a landslide victory in the 2010 elections. This peak of Sinhala nationalism was short-lived however, and his diminishing popularity eventually led to his defeat during the 2015 presidential elections. Internationally, he managed to push Sri Lanka into political isolation after the end of the civil war, by focussing on the relations with China while ignoring the West and neglecting the ties with India. With the enormous amounts of Chinese investments, he hoped to carry out his promise to develop Sri Lanka into a prosperous nation while consolidating his own power and turning his regime into a form of family dynasty. His gamble to bet all his money on Sinhala nationalism and Chinese aid proved to be a bad bet, as he did not take into account the voting power of the minority groups and many Sinhala being fed up with the corruption and family-rule of his regime. Sirisena’s victory was mainly established by addressing these concerns among the Sri Lankan population. The foreign policy which he set out from January 2015, proved to be break with that of Rajapaksa, but he seemed to possess the same set of tactic skills as his predecessor. Different personal beliefs led him not be a proponent of Sinhala nationalism and thus he was unaffected by it. Sirisena continued and improved Rajapaksa’s impressive ability to play the major powers off against each other for his own and Sri Lanka’s gain, something he mainly excelled in during the civil war. After the

63 Island of Opportunity? 63 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad war however, Rajapaksa allowed himself to be led by his emotional aversion against the West and India. Sirisena on the other hand, is a more pragmatic and rational man and he was able to see the benefit of maintaining good relations with all the major powers. This ability arose from his personality and background: he grew up as a simple man without any affiliation with Sinhala nationalistic sentiments. From his non-nationalistic perspective, he could develop a foreign policy that would give Sri Lanka the opportunity to develop itself further without being heavily depended on Chinese investments. Sirisena had the same economic vision as Rajapaksa for Sri Lanka, to develop it into a prosperous and modern nation, but a different view on how to achieve it. Without being influenced by Sinhala nationalism, Sirisena could exploit the geopolitical factor of the Sino-Indian regional rivalry more fully and even add the United States and the European Union into the mix. With a carefully timed game of carrot and stick, he could persuade the major powers in developing more beneficial trade agreements, giving more aid and doing more investments. He even achieved to get the United States to propose a more beneficial resolution in the UNHRC session on reconciliation in Sri Lanka, which was approved by all the major powers. This thesis has identified four different groups of factors that influenced Sri Lanka’s foreign policy: internal, geopolitical, economic and personal factors. These factors contributed to a break or continuity in the foreign policy of Sri Lanka by succeeding governments. A combination of these factors led to the election of Sirisena and the different foreign policy his government set out. First, internal factors led to the diminishing popularity of Rajapaksa and the call for a president with a new vision. Scholars already described the influence of these internal economic and socio-political factors on the regime change in January 2015. This thesis adds and emphasizes Sinhala nationalism as an internal factor that influenced the change of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy during the past year. Another important internal factor that has been identified is reconciliation after the civil war. While this factor propelled Rajapaksa more towards the Chinese, Sirisena has used it to revive relations with the West and to improve economic development. While the civil war has been ended more than five years ago, as a long-term factor, it still influences Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. Secondly, this thesis emphasized economic factors, as trade and economic development has been very important for Sri Lanka in conducting its foreign relations. Several authors already had stressed the centrality of trade within Sri Lanka’s non-alignment foreign policy, where

64 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad political issues were subservient to maintaining economic ties. However, it has been observed that Sirisena also sees economic development as a priority, but acts differently than previous Sri Lankan leaders. In some cases he prefers to be politically more independent, even when it is at the expense of economic profit. This is a U-turn in comparison with previous Sri Lankan governments, who always ensured that political issues did not influence profitable trade with a country. Further, this thesis has identified the Sino-Indian rivalry as the main geopolitical factor of influence on the change of foreign policy. This rivalry has already been pointed out previously as a defining factor in Sri Lankan foreign relations since the end of the Cold War, but by adding relations with the West into the mix, a better understanding of the influence of geopolitical factors on the change of Sri Lankan foreign policy can be reached. In doing so, it has been observed that in particularly the past ten years Sri Lanka has been good at playing off the major powers. Thereby it has been crucial not to focus on one major power too much, something that Sirsena seems to understand better than his predecessors. Another difference with earlier Sri Lankan governments is that the temporary rivalry between the major powers in the Indian Ocean is different than during the Cold War. Without the clear bipolar world of the Cold War, Sirisena is able to influence the major powers more because there is more uncertainty in the current multipolar situation in the Indian Ocean. At last, personal factors have been described by only a few authors as being of influence on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. By adding Sirisena’s background and personality as a factor of influence, this thesis highlights an important aspect of the formulation of the different foreign policy of Sri Lanka since January 2015. By placing the change of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy in a historical perspective, long-term and short-term factors that influence Sri Lankan policy have been identified, which give a broader and more comprehensive explanation for recent developments in Sri Lankan foreign policy. Without it, explanations for the change of foreign policy fail to identify crucial aspects of the formation of foreign policy. These explanations focus too much on one aspect of foreign policy and hereby giving partial explanations for Sirisena’s new political course. The defeat of Rajapaksa and Sinhala nationalism by Sirisena meant the revival of the merger of UNP and SLPF foreign policies. This is illustrated by the fact that Sirisena’s cabinet of ministers is a mix between SLFP and UNP politicians. Without having to fight a civil war, Sirisena’s government can now focus on

65 Island of Opportunity? 65 Master Thesis Robert Oudraad the development of the country and the reconciliation between the different ethnic groups. Without a clearly defined bipolar world of communism and capitalism, the socialist SLFP and traditionally more liberal UNP seem to have found a common ground in developing Sri Lanka into a more secure and prosperous nation. Sirisena seems to have developed the first truly non-aligned foreign policy in order to achieve this. However, this is much up to debate, as he does not hesitate to manipulate the major powers for his government’s own gain and there are signs that his government is inclining more towards India in favor of China. Concluding, it seems that with the creation of the combined SLFP-UNP government led by Sirisena, the traditional interchanging of a pro-West UNP foreign policy with a pro-East SLFP foreign policy is now something of the past. Sirisena’s foreign policy is a new form of the traditional Sri Lankan motive to maintain relationships with other countries: trade and economic development. As a veteran within the SLFP ranks, Sirisena may succeed in carrying out the vision of the old Bandaranaikes: a non-aligned foreign policy that revolves around the development of Sri Lanka. However, it is premature to state that this will successful within the foreseeable future, as Sinhala nationalist forces again rally around Mahinda Rajapaksa. There are even rumors that Rajapaksa is planning to form a new political party outside the SLFP, which will give him all the freedom to revive his support among the Sinhala rural communities. This will be a hard challenge for the newly created bond between the UNP and the SLFP. A revival of the Sinhala nationalist forces may even develop into a threat to Sri Lanka current openness and a relapse into an isolated position on the international stage.

66 j Island of Opportunity ? Master Thesis Robert Oudraad

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