Lucrative Targets the U.S

THE USAF IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR Lucrative Targets The U.S. Air Force in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations Perry D. Jamieson Air Force History and Museums Program United States Air Force Washington, D.C., 2001 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force History and Museums Program, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of De- fense, or any other U.S. government agency. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jamieson, Perry D. Lucrative targets : the U.S. Air Force in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations / Perry D. Jamieson. p. cm. — (The USAF in the Persian Gulf War) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Persian Gulf War, 1991 — Aerial operations, American. 2. United States. Air Force — History — Persian Gulf War, 1991. 3. Persian Gulf War, 1991 — Campaigns — Kuwait. I. Title. II. Series. DS79.744.A47 J36 2001 956.7044´248 — dc21 2001022943 Lucrative Targets The U.S. Air Force in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations Availability of Sources The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Directorate for Freedom of Infor- mation and Security Review (OASD–PA) cleared this monograph for publication. Most of its notes cite classified documents or interviews. That OASD–PA cleared this monograph for publication does not mean its sources have been declassified or even reviewed. In many cases, they remain classified, and in some cases a doc- ument’s title or the identification of an entire source remains classified. v Foreword During the late 1970s, the United States began revitalizing its Air Force and other military services. By the close of the 1980s, America had built a force structure that stood ready for a test that, very fortunately, it never had to meet— a major war in Europe. The United States faced this dangerous possibility for more than forty years until, in 1989, the Soviet Union abruptly collapsed. Amer- icans were still sorting out the implications of this sudden change in world affairs in August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and precipitated a crisis that led to the military conflict in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Air Force found itself at war— although not the one it had prepared for, against the Warsaw Pact powers—but one against Saddam Hussein’s heavily armed regime. This monograph is one in a series of five works dealing with various aspects of the Air Force’s participation in Desert Shield and Storm. In two other volumes, William T. Y’Blood details the Air Force’s deployment to the Gulf; in a third, Diane T. Putney analyzes the planning of the air campaign; and, in a fourth, Richard G. Davis discusses the air operations against targets in Iraq. As this monograph goes to press during the spring of 2001, the Air Force is passing through a dynamic period of reorganization and change. The era when a large USAF defended the United States against a single preeminent threat, Soviet aggression, has ended. During the years ahead, a smaller Air Force will support the interests of the nation, under diverse circumstances around the globe. While the U.S. Air Force continues to ensure that the United States has a global reach and can project global power, the service will greatly benefit from the lessons it learned during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. RICHARD P. HALLION Air Force Historian vii viii Preface During the Gulf War, Col. David Tretler was serving as acting chief of the Air Force History Program. Shortly after the conflict ended, he chose the topics for a series of monographs on the Air Force in Operations Desert Shield and Storm. He asked me to write the one on the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, and I finished the manuscript in November 1992. This work is being published by the Air Force History and Museum Program. The former Center for Air Force His- tory has now become the present-day Air Force History Support Office. Many people contributed to this work and, if I fail to mention all of them here, their help is no less appreciated. Colonel Tretler initiated the Center for Air Force History’s series of works on the Gulf War, and Dr. Richard P. Hallion, who became the Air Force Histori- an in November 1992, supported these ongoing studies. At that time, three other CAFH historians—Jacob Neufeld, the Center’s director; Herman S. Wolk, its senior historian; and Dr. Alfred M. Beck, the chief of its histories division—read my manuscript and offered many useful comments. The enlisted historians of the Air Force History Program built a foundation for researching any topic related to the Gulf War air campaign. Before, during, and after Desert Storm, they collected thousands of feet of documents and conducted a number of valuable oral history interviews. My sincere thanks to CMSgt. John Burton and the NCOs who served with him in the Gulf. Military historians will benefit from their work for long years to come. Dr. Wayne Thompson, a CAFH historian detailed to the Checkmate Office, did an excellent job of collecting and organizing the scores of important documents that were created or received by that organization during Desert Shield and Storm. Dr. Thompson could not have done this work without the cooperation of Col. John A. Warden III, the chief of the Checkmate Office, who assigned a high priority to preserving the historical record of the Desert Storm air campaign. Colonel Warden strongly supported the work of Dr. Thompson, myself, and other Air Force historians. In addition to Colonel Warden, Lt. Col. Ben Har- vey, Lt. Col. Al Howey, and several other Checkmate officers also helped me when I worked there during the spring and summer of 1991. I visited a number of history offices around the Air Force, and elsewhere, and I always found people who were proud of what their organizations had contributed to the Gulf War and happy to share useful information with me. Since I finished my research, some of these offices have reorganized, and a number of these people have made career moves. These contributors, and their assignments ix Preface when I visited them in 1991 and 1992, included Drs. Jay H. Smith and John W. Leland, Headquarters Military Airlift Command History Office, Scott AFB, Illi- nois; Dr. James K. Matthews and Ms. Cora Holt, Headquarters U.S. Transporta- tion Command History Office, Scott AFB, Illinois; Dr. Robert J. Parks, Dr. J. Todd White, Dr. Kent Beck, and Mr. Edward (Wendy) Gayle, Headquarters Strategic Air Command History Office, Offutt AFB, Nebraska; Mr. Steven L. Head, Special Assistant to the Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engi- neering, Tactical Warfare Programs, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the Pentagon; Mr. Grant M. Hales, Mr. George W. (Skip) Bradley III, and Dr. James M. George, Headquarters Tactical Air Command History Office, Langley AFB, Virginia; Dr. Hans Pawlisch and Col. Kenneth McGraw, Headquarters U.S. Central Command History Office, MacDill AFB, Florida; Mr. David L. Rosmer and Dr. Barry R. Barlow, Headquarters Ninth Air Force History Office, Shaw AFB, South Carolina; Drs. Frank N. (Mickey) Schubert, Theresa L. Kraus, and David W. Hogan, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Benis M. Frank and Capt. David A. (Scotty) Dawson, U.S. Marine Corps Histor- ical Center, Washington, D.C.; and Dr. Edward J. Marolda, U.S. Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. General Charles A. Horner deserves the thanks of all military historians for his willingness to participate in interviews after the Gulf War and, moreover, for his concern for preserving the historical record during the conflict. He permitted Chief Burton to record on audiotape, each morning and afternoon throughout the conflict, his remarks to his staff in the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). Gen- eral Horner also encouraged the work of the enlisted historians who worked around the clock in the TACC: Chief Burton, MSgt. Theodore J. (Jackie) Turner, TSgt. Frederick Hosterman, TSgt. Marcus R. Walker, and TSgt. Scott A. Saluda. The CENTAF commander was personally responsible for creating one of the most important primary sources about the conduct of the air campaign: the CC/DO Logbook that the senior officers in the TACC maintained throughout the war. One colonel who served in this command center during Desert Storm re- membered that when “anything…had any smack of importance,” General Horn- er would say, “Write it in the book.” This officer also recalled that the CENTAF commander “was pretty adamant” about enforcing this rule and, “You could get in trouble for not writing it in the book.” General Horner and many other officers took time from their busy schedules to give oral history interviews. I am indebted to them and to the historians who conducted these sessions. Most of the oral histories I used are listed in the List of Short Citations, and all of them appear in the endnotes. Particularly helpful to me were interviews given by General Horner, Maj. Gen. Thomas R. Olsen, Maj. Gen. Buster C. Glosson, Col. John A. Warden III, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula, and Lt. Col. Sam Baptiste. I owe a considerable debt to two editors, Karen Fleming-Michael and Bar- bara Wittig. Karen Fleming-Michael improved my manuscript and, at the same x Preface time, maintained her sense of humor. I especially appreciate the time she spent on this project during 1993, when I had to set it aside while working in the Pen- tagon for a year. When Karen Fleming-Michael moved to another assignment, Barbara Wittig finished the project.

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