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Thunder and Lightning Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates Thunder and Lightning Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates Edward C. Mann III, Colonel, USAF Volume two of a two-volume series Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama April 1995 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mann, Edward C., 1947− Thunder and lightning: Desert Storm and the airpower debates / Edward C. Mann III. p. cm. Includes index. 1. Persian Gulf War, 1991—Aerial operations, American. 2. Airpower United States. DS79.724.U6M36 1995 95-3971 956.7044′248—dc20 CIP First Printing January 1995 Second Printing May 1995 Third Printing August 1996 Disclaimer This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or pos ition of the Department of Defense or the United States government. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release. For the Troops Those who have, those who would, and, especially, those who may yet have to. My confidence in you is total. Our cause is just! Now you must be the thunder and lightning of Desert Storm. May God be with you, your loved ones at home, and our country. Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf January 1991 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK To preach the message, to insist upon proclaiming it (whether the time is right or not, to convince, reproach, and encourage, as you teach with all patience. The time will come when people will not listen to sound doctrine, but will follow their own desires and will collect for themselves more and more teachers who will tell them what they are itching to hear. They will turn away from listening to the truth and give their attention to legends. 2 Tlm. 4:2-4 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER ······························ ii DEDICATION ······························ iii FOREWORD ······························· ix ABOUT THE AUTHOR ······················· xiii PREFACE ································ xv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ······················xvii INTRODUCTION: The Airpower Debates · · · · · · · · · 1 1 Do Concepts Matter ························· 9 2 Instant Thunder: Why an Air Staff Plan · · · · · · · · · · 27 3 How Does Airpower Work?···················· 51 4 Knockout Blow? Or Decision on Points? ········· 71 5 The Objective ····························· 85 6 Taking It to the Enemy ······················· 97 7 Seizing the High Ground: Airpower as a Maneuver Element? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 111 8 Setup for the Knockout Blow ··················127 9 The First Information War ····················145 10 Conclusions: What Is Air (and Space) Power? ·····163 EPILOGUE: A View of the Air Force Today and Tomorrow ·······················185 GLOSSARY ·······························197 INDEX · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 201 vii Illustrations Figure 1 Five-ring Model of the Modern Nation-State ·······36 2 Planning Phases: Concept to Execution ··········93 3 Effect of Circular Error of Probability (CEP) on Quantity ······························107 Photos Escort Fighters ···························· 13 Powell, Cheney, and Schwarzkopf·············· 31 Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf ················· 33 F-117··································· 38 Target Sets······························· 40 Lt Gen Carl Spaatz ························· 52 Schwarzkopf and Horner····················· 57 Glosson and Deptula ························ 66 Glosson and Planners ······················· 75 Iraqi Military Leaders · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 81 Coalition Aircraft ··························103 Brlg Gen Billy Mitchell ······················113 Iraqi Aircraft Shelter · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 120 Iraqi PWs · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 124 More Iraqi POWs ···························136 Deptula, Glosson, and Rogers·················139 Pioneer Remotely Piloted Vehicles ··············150 B-52 and KC-10 ···························169 viii Foreword At 0200 local time on the morning of 17 January 1991, airmen from all military services and 10 nations became the “thunder and lightning” of Operation Desert Storm, the multinational military offensive sanctioned by the United Nations to liberate Kuwait from the domination of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. What occurred over the next several hours, days, and weeks is a classic in the decisive application of aerospace power. Literally in minutes, the coalition delivered a knockout blow to Iraqi air defenses and paved the way for thousands of air sorties to pummel Iraqi leadership, their command and control capabilities, essential services, infrastructure, and military forces. After only 28 days, the Iraqi army in Kuwait and eastern Iraq was so demoralized, disorganized, and degraded that coalition surface operations envisioned to require weeks took only days. Yet, while the people of Iraq suffered seriously from degraded services and infrastructure, they remained nearly exempt from direct physical attack. Precise applications of force almost eliminated collateral damage. Such dramatic performance demands much attention. Desert Storm has spawned and will continue to spawn numerous histories, anthologies, and analyses. Few, however, will be as focused and useful to airmen as Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates. A small team of military analysts, working at Air University’s College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE), under the initial oversight of Lt Gen Chuck Boyd and—later—Lt Gen Jay Kelley, spent over three years piecing together the conceptual development of the Desert Storm air campaign. Their interest was not speciflcally historical; rather, their motivation stemmed from the inherent curiosity of airmen who aspire to understand their profession. This book is the second of two works produced by the CADRE team—the first being Col Rich Reynolds's Heart of the Storm. The Genesis of the Air Campaign against Iraq (Air University Press, 1995). In Heart of the Storm, Colonel Reynolds explores “a hot and often bitter debate” that developed in the early days of August 1990 between “tactical” and “strategic” schools of ix thought. In Thunder and Lightning, however, Colonel Mann explains that debate in terms of an almost “theological” division within the Air Force over the proper uses of airpower. Judiciously incorporating a historical perspective, he asserts that this debate is not new but is rooted in the earliest conceptualizations of airpower's utility. We are still engaged, he argues, in a 75-year-old debate (beginning in World War I) over issues that our doctrine answered 50 years ago (during World War II). The debate itself often hinders us from moving on to more current—and, possibly, more important—issues. Colonel Mann believes that the brilliant performance of aerospace power in Desert Shield/Storm resulted from an internal compromise which reflected, to a remarkable degree, airpower doctrine of 1943 (specifically, FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, July 1943). While much has changed, especially in our technical ability to execute this doctrine, the internal divisions and resultant debate proved inefficient as we strove to apply some of the most basic tenets of aerospace doctrine. In Thunder and Lightning, Colonel Mann challenges airmen as well as other strategic thinkers to consider how aerospace power works best so as to preclude, or at least minimize, these 75-year-old debates when we face the next challenge. Because we must prepare for the next war—not the last one—we should push concepts and ideas well out in front of technologies and capabilities. That responsibility lies primarily within our institution—specifically, with those of us who are airmen. What Mitchell, Arnold, and other airpower heroes have been to us, we must be to a new generation of airmen who face dramatic changes in technology and in the sociopolitical environment. x Not only must we know how to do aerospace power, we also must know how to think it. RONALD R. FOGLEMAN General, USAF Chief of Staff xi THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK About the Author Col Edward C. Mann III Col Edward C. Mann III was born in the same year as the United States Air Force—1947. Most of his life has been interviewed in one way or another with the service, first as the son of a 30-year civilian employee of the Department of the Air Force and for the last 25 years as a commissioned officer. Colonel Mann has served as a pilot, instructor pilot, staff officer, and researcher/educator. He has flown over 5,200 hours in T- 37, -38, -41; C-130; and KC/EC-135 aircraft, including over 1,000 combat hours in Southeast Asia. He served as an operations officer on a wing staff and as the deputy chief of the airborne division at Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC). Since leaving SAC, Colonel Mann has been the Research Associate (now National Security Fellow) to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; chief of the Doctrine Research Division, Airpower Research Institute, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) at Air University; and is currently deputy director for Information Warfare Education at CADRE. Colonel Mann has published in Air Force Times, Army Times, Navy Times, Airpower Journal and Military Review . xiii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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