The RAF and the Far East War 1941-1945 Bracknell Paper No 6 A Symposium on the Far East War 24 March 1995 Sponsored jointly by the Royal Air Force Historical Society and the Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell ii THE RAF AND THE FAR EAST WAR 1941-1945 Copyright ©1995 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society First Published in the UK in 1995 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without the permission from the Publisher in writing. ISBN 0 9519824 4 3 Typeset and printed in Great Britain by Fotodirect Ltd, Brighton. Royal Air Force Historical Society THE RAF AND THE FAR EAST WAR 1941-1945 iii Contents Frontispiece Preface 1. Welcome by the Commandant Air Vice-Marshal M P Donaldson 2. Introductory Remarks by the Chairman, Air Chief Marshal Sir Lewis Hodges 3. Setting the Scene Air Commodore Henry Probert 4. Burma: The Land Campaign Major General Ian Lyall Grant 5. Burma: The Air Fighting Group Captain Dennis David 6. Offensive Air Support for the Army Air Vice-Marshal David Dick 7. Air Supply Group Captain Deryck Groocock 8. A Personal Memoir Wing Commander Terrence O’Brian 9. Seminar Discussion Groups 10. Chairman’s Closing Address 11. Biographical Notes on Main Speakers The Royal Air Force Historical Society iv THE RAF AND THE FAR EAST WAR 1941-1945 THE RAF AND THE FAR EAST WAR 1941-1945 v Preface The sixth and last of the World War two series of Bracknell Symposia, the RAF and the Far East War 1941-45, was held at the RAF Staff College on March 25th. There can hardly have been a hotter, more inhospitable or unhealthy part of the world in which to have to wage war than Burma/Malaya. It is this area on which the symposium largely concentrated – from bitter defeat in 1942 to final victory in 1945. The proceedings were chaired by Air Chief Marshal Sir Lewis Hodges. Lively and extensive discussion groups in the afternoon were clear signs of the interest shown. It is fitting that coverage should at last be given to what Air Commodore Probert aptly entitled his recent book ‘The Forgotten Air Force’. Derek Wood Editor vi THE RAF AND THE FAR EAST WAR 1941-1945 Air Vice-Marshal Mike Donaldson, Commandant of the Staff College, with, Chairman for the day’s proceedings, Air Chief Marshal Sir Lewis Hodges THE RAF AND THE FAR EAST WAR 1941-1945 1 1. Welcome by the Commandant Air Vice-Marshal Donaldson MBE Good morning ladies and gentlemen. The Staff College offers a very real welcome to the RAF Historical Society. Great importance is attached to the link between the Historical Society and the Advanced Staff Course of the Staff College because the student body are at about that stage where they are able to look back a little as well as looking forward. They are now willing to consider the implications of the RAF’s historical activities and to look at the lessons that can be drawn from them. We are enjoined these days to look at joint operations more and more in our consideration of military and air power, and to look at the joint perspective. We could not have a tougher joint operation than the Far East Burma Campaign of 1942-45. Therefore today’s topic is extremely relevant to the studies here at the Staff College. 2 THE RAF AND THE FAR EAST WAR 1941-1945 2. Introductory Remarks by the Chairman Air Chief Marshal Sir Lewis Hodges As your Chairman today at this Historical Society seminar on the Far East war, my main job is to introduce the speakers and to try and keep the programme running on time – as we have a lot to get through. This year we commemorate the 50th anniversary, not only of the ending of the war in Europe, but also the war against Japan, and it is therefore timely that we should be discussing at this meeting the operations that took place in SE Asia 50 years ago – particularly from the point of view of the Air Forces involved. We have, as you see from your programmes, six speakers who will be making the formal presentations in preparation for our syndicate discussions this afternoon. THE RAF AND THE FAR EAST WAR 1941-1945 3 3. Setting the scene Air Commodore Henry Probert The air war we are considering today is in many ways unique in the history of the RAF. It occurred much further away from home than any other major campaign we have ever been involved in. Much of it took place over mountain and jungle terrain, in weather conditions that knew no parallel elsewhere and often beggared description, with few of the aids to navigation that were taken for granted in Europe, and at times over distances that were enormous by the standards of those days. It was made possible by a great team of men working on the ground in conditions of heat, rain, disease and natural hazards that few had ever experienced before, and where all the key qualities were at a premium – leadership, team spirit, morale, technical proficiency, the ability to improvise. It was marked by what had by 1944/45 grown into the closest degree of co-operation that has ever been achieved between the airmen and the soldiers – they became quite simply ‘one force’ as that great commander of the 14th Army, General Slim, made abundantly clear. At the same time it was waged against the most ruthless of foes – one who could be relied on to fight to the death and whose conduct towards those who fell into his hands bore no resemblance to that of our other enemies, and it all started with an unprecedented series of disasters in which the RAF did no better than anybody else, so to put our later discussions into perspective I want first to say a little about the events associated with one of the greatest military defeats in our history – the fall of Singapore. Britain’s decision to build a naval base in the Far East was made in the early ‘20s in the hope of ensuring that an increasingly powerful Japan would not be able to threaten our important political and economic interests in SE Asia, Australasia and India, and the choice of Singapore was based on the assumption that naval power would be the key, in other words that a battle fleet based there would suffice to deter and if necessary repel attack. 4 THE RAF AND THE FAR EAST WAR 1941-1945 Yet when the assault came in December 1941, while the base was ready, only two battleships were there, and they not only failed to deter, or even interfere with, the attack but paid the price themselves. Gradually, over the previous 20 years, several strategic factors had been appreciated. First it was unlikely that a sufficiently large naval force could in practice be spared from elsewhere or would be able to get there in time. Secondly an attack was more likely to come overland from the north than via seaborne assault, which meant that the key to Singapore’s defence lay in the defence of the Malayan approaches. Thirdly any successful defence of Malaya and Singapore would be impossible without the presence of a substantial air force. All three factors were in fact appreciated as early as 1937 by the military authorities on the spot, who were convinced that the best way for the Japanese to attack would be to use Indo-China as the base for landings in South Thailand and NE Malaya and then advance south. Yet four years later we were very far from prepared. On the RAF side, sufficient airfields had been constructed – 27 in all, although many had very limited facilities – but there had been no consultation between the Army and RAF about their actual siting; only in 1941, when most had been built, was it realised that there would be serious difficulties in defending them against land attack. Given enough aircraft this might not have mattered, but in the event many of the airfields were not even used and proved merely to be liabilities. The situation as regards aircraft was, of course, dreadful. The commanders on the spot had in 1940 estimated their requirement as 582 (not only for Malaya but also for Burma, Borneo and Hong Kong); the Chiefs of Staff said 336 would be enough; in December 1941 there were in fact only 265 front-line aircraft, with a mere 181 serviceable. 79 of these were Buffaloes, American-built aircraft whose performance had caused them to be rejected for use in Europe; all four squadrons had been formed within the last eight months and a lot of the pilots (many Australian and New Zealand) were inexperienced. Day air defence was entirely in their hands. Of the others, 50 were Blenheims and 18 Hudsons, covering the bomber, night fighter and maritime roles, 31 the truly ancient Vildebeest torpedo bombers, and there were three Catalinas. Opposing them on the opening day based in Indo-China would be 88 bombers with the range to reach Singapore and 150 other aircraft, two-thirds of them long-range fighters, able to THE RAF AND THE FAR EAST WAR 1941-1945 5 operate over South Thailand and northern Malaya – and, of course, to re-deploy very quickly to forward bases as soon as they were seized.