Strategic Negative Emotions in Negotiations

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Strategic Negative Emotion in Negotiation

(Extended Abstract)

Shu Li and Michael E. Roloff

Department of Communication Studies

Northwestern University

2240 Campus Dr., #1-146, Evanston, IL 60208

Tel: (847) 491-7532; Fax: (847) 467-1036

Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

Abstract

This experiment focused on the effects of strategic negative emotion in negotiation. Dyads engaged in more argumentation, threats, and rejections when one member adopted a negative rather than positive emotional strategy. In terms of outcomes, strategic negative negotiators achieved higher outcomes than their partners, whereas strategic positive negotiators achieved lower outcomes than their partners. Negative strategists also had better outcomes than positive strategists. Results have implications for the enactment of emotions as communication tactics and the blend of different emotional strategies in negotiations.

Keywords: Negative Emotion, Negotiation Strategy, & Interpersonal Communication

Strategic Negative Emotions in Negotiations

After a decade of negotiation research centered on the cognitive processes of strategic,

rational bargaining, the past few years has witnessed an increasing number of studies that take

into account the relationship between emotion and negotiation (for review, Bazerman, Curhan, &

Moore, 2000). Research shows that positive emotions lead to cooperative behaviors, greater joint

gains, and a more preferable future relationship (e.g., Baron, 1990; Carnevale & Isen, 1986).

They also facilitate information sharing and help build trust in negotiations, which are necessary

components of cooperative, integrative bargaining. Negative emotions, on the other hand, have

been shown to decrease joint gains, lead to more competitive behavior, and negatively affect

future relationship (e.g., Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton,

1999; Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, & Kopelman, 2001). We are interested in expanding

research on the influence of negative emotions in negotiations by focusing on how they can be

used strategically.

Negative Emotional Strategies in Negotiation

In recent years, researchers have increasingly focused on negative emotions (e.g., Allred

et al., 1997; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Thompson et al., 2001). Despite the possible relational

damage they may cause, negative emotions have a number of social functions: they can be

informative (signaling risk, recklessness, and aggressiveness), evocative (eliciting compliance

from others), and incentive (signaling punishment or negative consequences for opponent)

(Keltner & Kring, 1998). In a non-negotiation but relevant study, Tiedens (2001) found that the expression of anger implies confidence and capability, whereas expressing sadness, another

negative emotion, signals weakness and subjugation. This points to the informative function of

emotions. Further, it suggests that when negotiators feel the need to express their dissatisfaction,

frustration, or hurt feelings, it is important to distinguish anger and sadness expressions.

However, current research usually examines experienced negative emotions as concurrent

processes that occur during negotiations. For example, a negotiator may feel angry because of

perceived injustice, and that in turn affects negotiator behavior and outcome. It is unclear

whether these emotions will influence outcomes differently when they are planned. When used

as a strategy, negative emotions are other-directed – externalized and communicated to one’s opponent, whereas experienced emotion may be underlying moods and work intrapersonally on the negotiator’s cognitive processes without the opponent knowing it (Barry, 1999; Morris &

Keltner, 2000). Thus strategic negative emotions may take on different forms and have different

consequences than experienced negative emotions.

How negative emotions are enacted as negotiation strategies is largely unknown to us.

This study attempts to test a few hypotheses about the communicative tactics that embody

strategic negative emotions, as well as the impact of strategic negative emotions on outcome and

future relationship. We contrast strategic negative emotions with positive emotions, and a focal

negotiator instructed to adopt a positive or negative emotional strategy with one who is not

instructed to use strategic emotions.

Processes

Although research on affective communication is abundant, it is often on nonverbal

emotional expression (e.g., Ekman, 1993) and not carried out in the negotiation context. We

drew on research on emotion in marital interaction (Gottman, 1994) and communication tactics

in negotiation (Donohue, 1981; Jordan & Roloff, 1997; Putnam & Jones, 1982) and selected

some communicative behaviors that we would like to test.

The display of negative emotion in negotiation signals hostility and contention toward the

partner. We believe strategic negative emotion is reflected in communicative actions like

arguments, threats and rejections.1 Argumentation is a contentious behavior and can highlight areas of firmness for one’s opponent (Pruitt, 1981). Negotiators with a negative emotional strategy may employ argumentation to signal insistence and competitiveness. If they do not get compliance from an opponent, they may argue until the other party gives in. Threats are

consistent with the undertone of negative emotion in negotiation. Threatening negative

consequences (e.g., impasse) if a demand is not met is an unpleasant, aggressive and coercive

behavior. However, making convincing threats is a realistic tactic to get concessions from a

partner who cannot afford a deadlock. Negotiators who use a negative emotional style are likely

to utilize the tactic of threats. Negative negotiators are strategically poised to be difficult, tough,

and uncooperative. They will use rejection more frequently than their partners if they do not like the offer, request, or suggestion.

Positive affect, on the contrary, has led negotiators to be more altruistic, optimistic, and flexible, and are also more inclined to be helpful (Forgas, 1998). Thus adopting a positive emotional strategy should decrease negotiators’ level of anger and hostility as well as their preference for competition in face-to-face negotiations (Baron, 1990). Positive negotiators are also more likely to solve disagreements with their partners in a cooperative style in hope to find a mutually beneficial solution (Carnevale & Isen, 1986). When enacted as a negotiation strategy,

1 We also selected criticism, complaint and sarcasm as communicative indicators of negative strategic emotion. However, because coding of these tactics is still ongoing, we do not report them in this paper

4 we expect positive emotion to have the opposite effect – reduce the probability of negative actions like arguments, threats and rejections.

Hypotheses 1a-3a: Strategic negative negotiators will use more

argumentation/threats/rejections than their partners, whereas strategic positive negotiators

will use fewer argumentation/threats/rejections than their partners.

Negotiation is an interactive process in which dyad members exert mutual influence on each other. Therefore we expect to observe behavioral reciprocity in using these three communicative tactics. For example, if the focal negotiator engages in more argumentation, threats, or rejections, the partner will also increase use of these tactics. As a result, dyads with a negative focal negotiator will use a greater number of persuasive arguments, threats, and rejections than dyads with a positive focal negotiator.

Hypotheses 1b-3b: Participants in negative dyads will use more

argumentation/threats/rejections than participants in positive dyads.

Outcomes

Negative emotional display (e.g., anger, frustration, irritation) signals one’s commitment to own outcome and warns the opponent that one may be prone to rash action, such as abandoning the negotiation and taking alternative measures. The stance sometimes implies power and dominance. Anger, for instance, also evokes fear and guilt, leading one’s opponent to yield (e.g., by making concessions) or to avoid behaviors that could offend or upset the other

(Dimberg & Ohman, 1996), resulting in a better outcome for anger-expressing negotiators. We propose that negotiators using a negative emotional strategy will achieve better outcomes than their partners. In contrast, because positive emotion is linked to increased concession making

(Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), it may be reflected in cooperative behaviors that improve joint but

not own outcomes. Further, we predict that negative negotiators will also achieve higher

outcomes than their positive counterparts because of the different orientations of their emotional

strategies.

Hypothesis 4a: Strategic negative negotiators will achieve higher outcomes than their

partners, and strategic positive negotiators will achieve lower outcomes than their

partners.

Hypothesis 4b: Strategic negative negotiators will achieve higher outcomes than

strategic positive negotiators.

If negative negotiators will have better outcomes than their partners, they are also likely

to feel more satisfied with it. Positive negotiators will have a lower level of satisfaction than

their opponents because of their relatively low outcomes compared to their opponents.

Hypothesis 5a: Negative negotiators will report a higher level of satisfaction than their

partners, while positive negotiators will report a lower level of satisfaction than their

partners.

However, partners may feel differently about outcomes. Compared to positive style, the

use of a negative emotional style can leave partners feeling dissatisfied with the outcome because

they may feel threatened during the negotiation and perceive their opponent or the process as

unfair.

Hypothesis 5b: Partners of negative negotiators will report a lower level of satisfaction

with their outcomes than partners of positive negotiators.

Following the reasoning above, negotiators who use negative strategic emotion may not win the heart of their opponents. Rather, they may be remembered as tough, negative, and

aggressive, and may be avoided in the future. A positive emotional strategy, in contrast, creates

positive feelings between negotiators and facilitates social interaction and future relationship.

Hypothesis 6: Partners will be more willing to negotiate with positive negotiators again

in the future than with negative negotiators.

Methods

Participants, Design, and Procedure

A total of 88 undergraduate students participated in a negotiation simulation for course

credit in the School of Communication (44 males and 44 females; ages range from 18 to 25, M =

20). Individual participants were randomly assigned to the role of a job recruiter or the role of a candidate. One participant in each dyad (comprised of a recruiter and a candidate) was randomly selected to receive instructions of a positive or negative strategic emotional style, while the other participant received none (individual condition). Dyads with a strategic positive negotiator were positive dyads, and those with a strategic negative negotiator were negative dyads (dyad condition).

The design is a 2 (dyad emotional style: positive vs. negative) x 2 (individual instructions

vs. no insturctions) factorial. Manipulation of emotional styles was based on the method used by

Kopelman, Rosette, and Thompson (2004). Experimental participants were given explicit

written instructions regarding the emotional approach they were to follow. Positive style is

induced by telling participants “bargaining experts and savvy negotiators agree that being

positive and building rapport are key elements to successful negotiations” and directing them to adopt a positive style. In the negative-demanding condition, experimental participants were told

“bargaining experiments and savvy negotiators agree that firm commitment and tenacity are key

elements to successful negotiations” and that they should employ a resolute style. In addition, experimental participants received specific examples of behaviors typical of each strategic emotional style.

The task was a mixed-motive, multi-issue negotiation of an employment package

comprising eight issues, including bonus, job assignment, vacation time, starting date, moving

expenses coverage, insurance coverage, salary, and location. Participants were given five

options to choose from on each issue. Recruiter and candidate instructions differed in the point

value of each option. The highest number of points a negotiator could get was 13,200 and the

lowest was -8,400.

Participants were then given 30 minutes to negotiate. The process was videotaped. After

the negotiation, they filled out a questionnaire about their decisions on each of the eight issues,

their perceptions of their own and their opponents’ emotional display during the negotiation, and

their satisfaction with the outcome and willingness to negotiate with their opponents again in the

future. These measures are described below.

Measures

Manipulation Checks

Emotional style. Based on each negotiator’s rating of their own emotional display, two

constructs were created: self-positive and self-negative. Perceived positive display for the

negotiator was measured with three items: friendly, empathic, and fair, α = .68. Each item was rated on a 9-point Likert scale, from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Scores were averaged to create a self-positive score. Perceived negative display was measured with four items: aggressive, insistent, tough, and competitive, α = .81. The self-negative score was the average of ratings on these four items.

Negotiation Discourse

Coding procedures. All negotiation tapes were transcribed for analysis. Three coders were trained to identify the three discourse tactics within each negotiation. The coding unit was the speaking turn. Coders reviewed each negotiation transcript and made a judgment regarding the absence (coded as “0”) or presence (coded as “1”) of each tactic within each turn. An agreement was reached when they all identified a speaking turn as containing or not containing an instance of the tactic. There was a disagreement when one coder identified the occurrence of a tactic in a specific turn while the others did not. In the first phase, coders were trained to identify argumentation and rejection. All three worked on the same transcripts until intercoder reliability was established. Then they split the transcripts with overlap so that each transcript was coded by two coders. Then in phase two, they repeated the same procedure coding for threats, using clean transcripts so that they were not affected by their decisions from the first pass.

Discourse codes. Three discourse codes were derived from the hypotheses.

Argumentation occurred in the discourse whenever the negotiator made an explicit effort to persuade the partner through some evidential claim (M = 7.22, SD = 6.67). Negotiators usually made persuasive arguments for a specific position or offer, such as a certain number of vacation days, on the basis of need and qualifications. Intercoder reliability for this code was good, κ

= .72. Rejection occurred when a negotiator explicitly turned down an offer, rejected a request or refuted a position by his/her partner (M = 2.88, SD = 3.00). Intercoder reliability for this code was acceptable, κ = .67. Threats occurred when a negotiator made an explicit warning of negative or unfavorable consequences if a demand was not met (M = .17, SD = 0.57).

Candidates might threaten to work for another company if they did not get a satisfactory salary;

9 or recruiters might threaten to shorten the candidates’ days of vacation if the latter refused to yield on bonus. Reliability for this code was good, κ = .71.

Outcome Measures

Outcome scores. Outcome scores were calculated by adding up point values associated with each agreed-on issue for recruiters and candidates, respectively. Three dyads (1 positive, 2 negative) were unable to reach an agreement before time ran out. They were excluded from the outcome analysis, leaving 21 positive and 20 negative dyads, but were still included in other analyses (manipulation check and discourse analysis).

Satisfaction. This measure assessed the negotiator’s satisfaction with the outcome. After the negotiation, participants rated how pleased or satisfied they were with the result, α = .97.

Each item was measured on a 9-point scale, from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). Scores on the two items were collapsed to create a satisfaction score for analysis, ranging from 2 to 18 (M =

11.59, SD = 4.27).

Future relationship. This item indicated each negotiator’s willingness to negotiate with the same opponent again in the future. It is also rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9

(extremely). Scores ranged from 1 to 9 (M = 6.66, SD = 1.98).

Results

In negotiation, dyad members influence each other’s perceptions and behaviors through their interactions. Significant correlations may exist between measures of dyad members, resulting in nonindependent observations. To adjust for such mutual influence, we used a 2-way

ANOVA in which there was a between group (emotion: positive/negative) and within group

(instruction/no instruction) factor (Kenny, 1995). We also used t-tests for simple effects. Next we will briefly report results from preliminary statistical analyses.

Manipulation Checks

Negative Emotion

We first examined the degree to which participants perceived themselves to have acted negatively during the negotiation. A mixed ANOVA revealed that negotiators in negative dyads perceived themselves to be significantly more negative (M = 5.51, SD = 1.44) than did negotiators in positive dyads (M=4.68, SD = 1.22), F(1,42) = 8.22, p < .01. As expected, participants who received negative instructions rated their display as significantly more negative

(M = 6.06, SD = 1.23) than did participants who received positive instructions (M = 4.67, SD =

1.35), t(42) = 3.55, p < .001. Also, negatively instructed participants reported that they were more negative than their partners (M = 4.97, SD = 1.45), paired t(21) = 3.00, p < .01.

Therefore, the negative emotion manipulation was effective. Negative participants were significantly more negative than their partners and their positive counterparts; and the negative dyads were also perceived as more emotionally negative than positive dyads.

Positive Emotion

Our positive emotion manipulation was unsuccessful. None of the main effects or the interaction in the mixed model was statistically significant. Positive dyads did not perceive themselves as more positive than negative dyads, F(1,42) < 1, ns. Positive experimental participants did not perceive themselves as more positive than their partners, t(21) < 1, ns, or more positive than negative experimental participants, t(42) < 1, ns.

In summary, the manipulations were effective to the extent that they produced different

negative display between groups but they were ineffective at producing positive display. This

may be explained by participants’ mindset. Many of them mentioned before negotiation that

they just wanted to be nice, work with their partners, and get the job done. In this light, the

highly significant effect of negative instructions is understandable. When participants were told

to adopt a negative emotional style, they obviously distinguished themselves from other groups.

Strategic Emotions and Negotiation Process

We predicted (H1-H3) that strategic emotions would be associated with discourse tactics used in negotiations.

Argumentation

We hypothesized (H1a) that negotiators receiving negative emotional instructions would use persuasive arguments more than their naive partners, while positive participants would use arguments less than their partners. It was not supported, F(1,42) < 1 (.16), ns.

Hypothesis 1b predicted a main effect for dyad condition (positive or negative) and it was confirmed (F(1,42) = 7.83, p < 0.01). Participants in negative dyads used significantly more argumentation (M = 9.50, SD = 7.98) than participants in positive dyads (M = 4.93, SD = 3.96).

Threats

We predicted (H2a) an interaction between dyad condition and individual condition in the

use of threats, but this hypothesis was only marginally supported, F(1,42) = 2.76, p < 0.10. In

positive dyads, experimental participants used threats slightly less than their partners (M = -0.05,

SD = 0.21), whereas in negative dyads, the difference was observed in the opposite direction (M

= 0.36, SD = 1.14). We also hypothesized (H2b) that there would be a main effect of dyad

condition on use of threats, which was confirmed, F(1, 42) = 7.32, p < .01. Participants in negative dyads used more threats (M = 0.32, SD = 0.77) than participants in positive dyads (M =

0.02, SD = 0.15).

Rejections

Hypothesis 3a predicted that negative experimental participants would use rejections more than their naive partners and positive experimental participants would use rejections less compared to their partners. This hypothesis was not supported, F(1,42) < 1, ns. The main effect of dyad condition predicted in H3b was significant, F(1,42) = 4.43, p < 0.05. Participants in negative dyads used rejections (M = 1.71, SD = 2.09) more than those in positive dyads (M =

0.80, SD = 1.13).

To summarize, hypothesized interactions were unconfirmed, but the predicted main effect of dyad emotion was supported with each communicative tactic – participants in negative dyads used more arguments, threats, and rejections than participants in positive dyads.

Strategic Emotions and Consequences

Negotiation Outcome

Three dyads reached an impasse and were excluded from the analysis. A mixed ANOVA

revealed a significant interaction, F(1,39)=8.58, p < 0.01. It shows that negative experimental

participants achieved higher outcomes (M = 5970.00, SD = 971.22) than their naive partners (M

= 4570.00, SD = 1534.89), whereas positive participants achieved lower outcomes (M = 5047.62,

SD = 1467.86) than their partners (M = 5609.52, SD = 1109.46). Thus Hypothesis 4a was

confirmed. Hypothesis 4b predicted that participants given instructions to use a negative

emotional strategy would achieve better outcomes than those given instructions to use a positive

emotional strategy. This hypothesis was also confirmed, t(39) = 2.36, p < 0.03.

Satisfaction

Our prediction (H5a) that negative experimental participants would report a higher level

of satisfaction with their outcomes when positive negotiators would report a lower level of

satisfaction than their opponents was confirmed, F(1,39) = 3.99, p < 0.053. Naive participants in

the positive condition reported a higher satisfaction score (M = 13.48, SD = 3.03) than naive

participants in the negative condition (M = 11.30, SD = 3.71), t(39) = 2.06, p < 0.05. Thus

Hypothesis 5b was also supported.

Future Relationship

Hypothesis 6 predicted that partners of positive experimental participants would be more willing to engage in future negotiations with their opponents than partners of negative experimental participants. This hypothesis was not confirmed, t(39) = 1.56, ns.

Discussion

As predicted, negotiators in negative dyads used significantly more persuasive arguments, threats and rejections than negotiators in positive dyads. Negative experimental negotiators achieved significantly better outcomes than their partners and positive experimental negotiators, and reported a higher level of satisfaction than their partners. In addition, partners of negative negotiators were less satisfied with their outcomes than partners of positive negotiators.

However, within dyads, negative participants did not use more argumentation, threats, or rejections than their partners; positive participants did not use these tactics less than their partners. All these results suggest that strategic negative emotion influenced not only negotiators

14 receiving instructions, but also their partners. In other words, partners reciprocated communicative tactics of negative negotiators.

This study contributes to research on emotion and negotiation in a few ways. First, it focused on negative emotion and confirmed its effectiveness. Second, it focused on strategic emotion of the focal negotiator and on how negotiators enact their emotion. It complements previous research on experienced emotion and how negotiators react to others’ reputation or emotion (e.g., Tinsley, O’Connor, & Sullivan, 2002; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004).

Last, it is a study of face-to-face negotiation and discourse tactics, incorporating interpersonal effects and communication perspectives.

The unsuccessful positive emotion manipulation might be responsible for the unconfirmed predictions of interactions. As we reported earlier, self-positive ratings were quite similar for positive and negative experimental participants. Positive emotional instructions did not make negotiators more positive, and negative emotional instructions did not reduce negotiators’ positive display. An alternative explanation is that this reflected the effort of negative experimental negotiators to balance the two types of emotional display. On the one hand, they increased their negative display considerably as instructed. On the other hand, they sensed that to reach an agreement they needed the flexibility of positive emotion as well. After all, negotiation is between two people. Firm execution of a negative emotional style may earn points for the negative negotiator, but when overused it could deadlock the negotiation and lead to mutual damage. To maximize the effect of strategic negative emotion, participants also maintained a seemingly contradictory positive display. Past research on negotiation has touched on this “dual display” phenomenon. In a study of strategic emotion, Kopelman et al. (2004) reported that when the demander used a strategic positive style, the terms of their ultimatums

were better received. Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle (1998) also hypothesized that the combination of

contentious and noncontentious communication would be more effective than either one alone.

Lindskold and Bennet (1973) found in a study on prisoner’s dilemma that “participants evaluated

their partners more favorably when the former received promises of cooperation in conjunction

with threats than when they received the promises alone (in Brett et al., 1998, p. 413)”. These

findings all suggest that it could be a complex emotional strategy that was more rational than we

expected. If it is the integration of both positive and negative strategic emotions that lead to better individual outcomes, rather than the use of either one alone, and if it is the lack of negative

strategic emotion rather than the overdose of positive emotion that cost positive negotiators their

game, we can train negotiators more effectively. If this explanation could be tested in future

research, it will shed light on the dynamics of strategic emotion in negotiations and social

interaction in general.

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