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Antifragility Feb 20 49 formalizable, theoretizable, codifiable, Sovietizable, bureaucratizable, Chapter 7. A Second Lesson in Harvardifiable, provable, etc. Epistemology from Fat Tony: The Soviet- To make things simple, just look at the second type of knowledge as something so stripped of ambiguity that an autistic Harvard Illusion, or How to Out-Argue person (a high functioning autistic person, that is) can easily Socrates understand it. So could a computer. The error of rationalism is, simply, overestimating the role and necessity of the second type, the academic knowledge, in human Birds rarely write more than ornithologists – Piety for the affairs --and degrading the uncodifiable, more complex, intuitive or impious –Fat Tony does not drink milk – Why not Harvardify? experience-based type. It is a severe error because not only a large –Can Socrates out-argue FT ? -- Mystagogue philosophaster share of our knowledge is not explainable, academizable, rationalizable, formalizable, theoretizable, codifiable, Sovietizable, bureaucratizable, Harvardifiable, etc., but, further, that the role such explainable knowledge plays in life is so minor that it is not even I said earlier that, because of complexity, life and the world are funny. not command-and-control style, but that we tended somehow to think so on the occasion, the wrong occasion. Hence, of course, we We are very likely to believe that skills and ideas that we actually fragilize and stifle antifragilities. Let us call it the error of acquired by doing, or that came naturally to us (as we already knew rationalism. I will outline it in this chapter and the next one will by our innate biological instinct) came from books, ideas, and show its application to the history of medicine. reasoning. We get blinded by it; there may even be something in our brains that makes us suckers for the point. Let us see how. It is not the error of being rational, but the error of thinking that things always have a reason that is accessible to us —that we can Clearly we never think that it is thanks to ornithologists that comprehend easily. In Fat Tony’s language, that would be what birds learn to fly –and if some people do hold such belief, it would be makes us the suckers of all suckers. It is this rationalism that move hard for them to convince the birds. But, let’s anthropomorphize a us away from optionality --which makes us denigrate options and bit: when replace “birds” with “men”, then the idea that people learn trial-and-error because we think we can figure it out by ourselves. to do things thanks to what they learned during pompous lectures becomes plausible. When it comes to human agency, matters Consider two types of knowledge. The first type is not exactly suddenly become confusing to us. “knowledge”; its ambiguous character prevents us from associating it with the strict definitions of knowledge. It a way of doing thing that We tend to believe that it is largely thanks to the beautiful rules we cannot really express in clear language, but that we do of grammar that we can speak, that it is thanks to science that we nevertheless, and do well. The second type is more like what we call have all this technology, thanks to universities that societies can “knowledge”; it is what you acquire in school, can get grades for, can function, thanks to political scientists and political philosophers that codify, what can be explainable, academizable, rationalizable, we have a well-functioning political system, and thanks to 2/22/11 © Copyright 2011 by N. N. Taleb. This draft version cannot be disseminated or quoted. 50 economists that we have an economy. Of course we need to add that was incapable of weaving into a theory. But Sherlock Holmes is not the belief that it is thanks to government planning and nation states all theories-with-no-feedback: he does some grind work in collected that the world is functioning. data, smelling grounds like a dog, and noticing numerous details that In other words, the denigration of practice. This is a dangerous would escape another person, leading to feedback in searching for human disease, a severe sucker problem, to be inclined to think that other details, before building his reasoning. The greater hero is his practice has a debt to theories; that practice is inferior to theories, patently smarter brother Mycroft who was Sherlock's last resource and that theories are necessarily good and better than no-theoriesxv - when the latter hit the wall. Mycroft never left his London -even after the Soviet experiences, even after the literal bankruptcy of gentleman's club; he could solve matters in his head without needs the economic establishment, even after the severe failures of the for the trimmings of the messy reality outside his club. brand of massively destructive thinkers called the neo-conservatives, But we got so many dangerous hubris along with this ability to even after the failure of risk theories in finance that caused the discover by reasoning off other theories, very destructive hubris. So unfettered risk taking, even after fifteen centuries of fiascos in allow my skepticism about the contribution of theories, which I will medicine (I will show in Chapter x how the history of medicine as we show throughout this book by looking carefully at the record. know it today has been blatantly re-narrated in a way to overestimate Consider the bias about the way information gets to us: there are the value of reasoning at the detriment of tinkering leading to many more books on birds written by ornithologists than books by random discoveries. Academia --like governments--will always tell birds written on birds; and certainly even fewer books on you what it did for you, never what it did not do). ornithologists written by birds. Fat Tonys do not write books. It may be right on the occasion; there are numerous (valuable) University professors, particularly in the disciplines with “science” things that came to us thanks to reasoning in the relative or possibly attached to their designation, will over-represent their share of total absence of practical and empirical feedback. The most extreme contribution to knowledge –in their minds what is not explainable, case of a discovery without any feedback is Einstein's discovery of academizable, rationalizable, formalizable, theoretizable, codifiable, relativity using pure reasoning about the structure of time, Sovietizable, bureaucratizable, Harvardifiable, knowledge is not supposedly thanks to a dream. One spectacular case of a discovery knowledge. Books are typically written by those who write books, not with a small number of existing external data is that of the so much by those who do things. So, first, nonFattonys who write astronomer Le Verrier discovery of the existence of the planet books leave you with their side of the story (since they have the Neptune on the basis of solitary computation, using the behavior of books), and, second, as I showed with the metaphor of the birds, we the surrounding planets. When it was actually sited he refused to are naturally suckers for the role of ideas; we have this built-in look at it, so comfortable he was with his result. We are all infatuated tendency to overestimate the role thinking and formal learning play with stories of Sherlock Holmes in which, after collecting what facts in life. he needed, facts he shares with his sidekick and roommate Doctor Watson, he sits in his chamber torturing the violin and formulates a conclusion that surprises the reader, and highly impresses Watson, as it is entirely derived from all the facts that he already knows but 2/22/11 © Copyright 2011 by N. N. Taleb. This draft version cannot be disseminated or quoted. The Error of Rationalism 51 THE ERROR OF RATIONALISM far more than design, meaning that the ideal activity of stochastic tinkering can largely dispense with the theoreticians as they can be This chapter is about this denigration of practice and the error more of a hindrance than anything --much like regulators increase of rationalism of both the overestimation the importance of what we risks and a Wharton School class in introductory, intermediate, or call reason in human affairs, and the normative feeling that we need (especially) advanced economics will stand in your way of to be able to articulate the motives and theories behind what we do understanding the economy. and, worse, things we understand (but have not done) are more Finally, the practical: we will discuss our Fat Tony lessons on important than things we do but do not appear to understand how where the traps and suckers are and how to maneuver. they work. If I consider it the largest error ever made by man, it is For now, let us for now see how we got into this mess by going not without some backing: it is the mother problem behind such to Athens, 4th Century before our era. matters as: overconfidence, expert problems, expert errors, Soviet experiences, medical mistakes, dogmatism, and much, much more. EUTHYPHRO And we have to do things in life without being the suckers. The error has the following manifestations. The first systematic appearance of abstract knowledge, the very First, the philosophical: the difference between the two varieties notion of idea, started with Plato, particularly with his Forms of knowledge is what philosophy is about. Do we need to understand corresponding to the most ideational, abstract definitions, and with things? What do we mean by beliefs? the observable as its mere manifestation. Before Plato, even notions Second, the psychological: the mistake of reversing the arrow of that later became abstract, like God, were extremely the formation of knowledge, the illusion of thinking, is part of the anthropomorphic and embedded in some tangible character, larger mental biases that make us underestimate randomness, embodied in legends and mythical narratives.
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