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Copyright by Joseph Benjamin Bullock 2015 The Dissertation Committee for Joseph Benjamin Bullock certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Skeptical Science The Pyrrhonian critique of technai in Against the Professors (M I-VI) Committee: ____________________________________ Robert J. Hankinson, Supervisor ____________________________________ Stephen A. White, Co-Supervisor ____________________________________ Richard Bett ____________________________________ Matthew L. Evans ____________________________________ Robert C. Koons ____________________________________ Paul B. Woodruff Skeptical Science The Pyrrhonian critique of technai in Against the Professors (M I-VI) by Joseph Benjamin Bullock, B.S.; M. Theological Stds.; M.A. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin May 2015 Acknowledgements Jim Hankinson is, in a sense, one of the archai of this dissertation because I began working on the concept of technē in Against the Professors (M I-VI) after he suggested that I write about Sextus' least appreciated treatise. It is difficult to express everything that I owe to Jim. He has been my mentor throughout my time at UT, and he has been the greatest influence on my thinking about ancient skepticism and science. I thank him for always being available to talk through my ideas, or to read and discuss some ancient text. I owe similar thanks to Steve White. I literally could not have finished the dissertation without Steve's help, and I am deeply grateful to him for stepping in at the eleventh hour to become co-supervisor. I also appreciate the detailed written feedback that Steve provided, and the encouragement he gave me. Richard Bett also helped to improve my work by providing substantial written feedback on an early draft. I am thankful for his generosity, which he expressed in a number of ways, including providing me some of his unpublished work, and going out of his way to visit Austin for my defense. Both Rob Koons and Paul Woodruff have contributed in important ways, beginning even before I had passed my prospectus. I thank them both for challenging me to think through important issues connected with my thesis. Paul asked an incisive question about negative dogmatism in my prospectus defense which caused me to begin the research that ultimately led to the second chapter of this dissertation. Similarly, Rob has reminded me on several occasions to think about the larger picture. iv Matt Evans was extremely gracious to join the committee late in the process so that I could meet certain bureaucratic requirements. These circumstances worked to my benefit because I received his insight as a result. I thank him for making me think about some problems in skepticism in a new light. Beyond my committee there are several other people who deserve acknowledgment. First, I'd like to thank Lesley Dean-Jones who not only taught me Greek, but also exposed me to the joys of studying ancient medicine. Second, Alex Mourelatos deserves my thanks for his guiding hand in the Joint Program in Ancient Philosophy. The Joint Program is an inviting and challenging place to study ancient philosophy, and I owe much of my development as a scholar of ancient Greek thought to it and to Alex. Additionally, the members of the Joint Program also played an important role in that development. I am thankful for the friends I have made, including Jerry Green, Ivan Heyman, Duane Long, James Patterson, Chris Raymond, David Reisbeck, and Luis Salas. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Annie, who is a source of endless support. She paved the way for me to pursue this degree, and her encouragement lifted me up when I was mired down. I would not be the scholar I am today without her. v Skeptical Science The Pyrrhonian critique of technai in Against the Professors (M I-VI) by Joseph Benjamin Bullock, Ph.D. The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 Supervisor: Robert J. Hankinson Co-Supervisor: Stephen A. White The central question of this dissertation is “What is the character of a skeptical expertise?” Sextus Empiricus, our primary source for Pyrrhonian skepticism, tells us that a skeptic has the ability to oppose thoughts and appearances in any number of ways in order to create an equally weighted dispute which results in epochē, the suspension of judgment (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [=PH] I 8). Scholars have debated the extent to which skeptics eschewed beliefs, but one thing is clear, the skeptic does not assent to the dogmatic claims of philosophy and science (PH I 13). This raises to group of related puzzles since Sextus also says that skeptics accept certain forms of expertise (technai) (PH I 24). If skeptics accept and practice certain technai, but also suspend judgment about all scientific or philosophical beliefs, what kind of science do they practice? I answer this question by interpreting Sextus' treatise Against the Professors (M I-VI), which offers his most thorough look at particular subjects of expertise. I argue for the vi following characteristics of skeptical technai: First, an adequate skeptical expertise is constituted by a collection of correlated observed phenomena (what he calls commemorative signs) established empirically through repeated observations, and always open to revision. The objects of these technai are limited to observable domains; that is, both the sign and the signified can in some sense be observed. All the same, commemorative signs allow the skeptic to predict future observable occurrences. Second, skeptical expertise is a non-axiomatic or, more generally, non-foundationalist science. Pyrrhonists did not ground the scientific domain in first principles in the way that many ancient philosophers of science do. Finally, the skeptical expertise is normative, but strictly in a relativistic sense. Scientific norms are tied to relative utility rather than truth. No expertise can be countenanced that offers theoretical rewards, just as no theoretical objects may be signified. Skeptical expertise is not some grand solution, but it achieves what is needed for practical purposes. vii Table of Contents List of Tables......................................................................................................................ix Chapter 1: Skeptical Attitudes toward Expertise...........................................................1 1.1. The Skeptical Disposition........................................................................................3 1.2. Against the Professors (M I-VI)...............................................................................9 1.3. Puzzles of Skeptical Education and Expertise.......................................................15 1.4. Unsatisfying Solutions to the Skeptical Education Puzzles...................................20 1.5. Piecing Together Puzzles.......................................................................................30 1.6. Overview of the Project.........................................................................................35 Chapter 2: Diagnosing Sextus in Against the Professors (M I-VI)...............................40 2.1. Psychosis in M I-VI? The Case for Incoherence....................................................41 2.2. A Skeptical Diagnostic: Varieties of Negative Dogmatism....................................49 2.3. Is M VI Negatively Dogmatic?..............................................................................60 2.4. A Second Opinion on the Coherence of M I-VI.....................................................77 2.5. Can Sextus have a View?.......................................................................................78 2.6. Determining Sextus' View in Against the Professors.............................................92 Chapter 3: The Rotten Foundations of Dogmatic Science.........................................102 3.1 Against the Geometers (M III)..............................................................................105 3.2 The Modes of Agrippa...........................................................................................111 3.2.1 Disagreement.................................................................................................118 3.2.2 Being Thrown to Infinity...............................................................................123 3.2.3 Relativity.......................................................................................................129 3.2.4 Hypothesis.....................................................................................................132 3.2.5 Reciprocal Mode...........................................................................................138 3.2.6 The System of the Modes..............................................................................142 3.3 The Grounds of Ancient Science...........................................................................149 3.4 The Skeptical Attack on the Hypothetical Method (M III 7-18)...........................170 3.5 The Skeptic's Methodological Anti-Foundationalism...........................................191 Chapter 4: Signs in the Sky: The Empirical Demands of a Skeptical Science.........201 4.1. Astronomy and Astrology in Ancient Education..................................................205 4.2. Does M V fit in Against the Professors?..............................................................217
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