The Sceptics: the Arguments of the Philosophers
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Mind and World: Beyond the Externalism/Internalism Debate
Research Proposal Mind and World: Beyond the Externalism/Internalism Debate Sanjit Chakraborty Research Scholar Department of Philosophy Jadavpur University Background For the last few years the concept of the natural kind terms has haunted me. My main concern has been regarding the location of the meaning of these terms. Are meanings of the natural kind terms in the head or in the world? This question has been the most pressing in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Language. I have realized that we cannot separate mind from the world. I had in the beginning only a layman‟s conception regarding mind, meaning and the world. When I entered the field of philosophy inspired by Hilary Putnam, I found that semantic externalism is a vexing issue involving a vast area. The location of content is at the core of the metaphysical debate regarding internalism and externalism in the sense that internalists believe that mental proprieties are intrinsic only if they preserve across world identity of internal replicas. Externalism is opposed to this thinking. For externalists, mental properties are in many cases dependent on physical or social environment. The linguistic strategy also maintains a difference between internalism and externalism regarding the mental content. Descriptivism focuses on general terms that consist in descriptive content and leads to mode of presentation of reference through sense. Besides, the causal theory of reference refutes descriptivism to ensure that there is a causal chain of reference between words and 1 objects that help us to identify agent‟s thought through an identification of its relation with external environment. -
Livy's View of the Roman National Character
James Luce, December 5th, 1993 Livy's View of the Roman National Character As early as 1663, Francis Pope named his plantation, in what would later become Washington, DC, "Rome" and renamed Goose Creek "Tiber", a local hill "Capitolium", an example of the way in which the colonists would draw upon ancient Rome for names, architecture and ideas. The founding fathers often called America "the New Rome", a place where, as Charles Lee said to Patrick Henry, Roman republican ideals were being realized. The Roman historian Livy (Titus Livius, 59 BC-AD 17) lived at the juncture of the breakdown of the Roman Republic and the rise of the Roman Empire. His 142 book History of Rome from 753 to 9 BC (35 books now extant, the rest epitomes) was one of the most read Latin authors by early American colonists, partly because he wrote about the Roman national character and his unique view of how that character was formed. "National character" is no longer considered a valid term, nations may not really have specific national characters, but many think they do. The ancients believed states or peoples had a national character and that it arose one of 3 ways: 1) innate/racial: Aristotle believed that all non-Greeks were barbarous and suited to be slaves; Romans believed that Carthaginians were perfidious. 2) influence of geography/climate: e.g., that Northern tribes were vigorous but dumb 3) influence of institutions and national norms based on political and family life. The Greek historian Polybios believed that Roman institutions (e.g., division of government into senate, assemblies and magistrates, each with its own powers) made the Romans great, and the architects of the American constitution read this with especial care and interest. -
Feminist Philosophy
The Blackwell Guide to Feminist Philosophy Edited by Linda Martín Alcoff and Eva Feder Kittay The Blackwell Guide to Feminist Philosophy Blackwell Philosophy Guides Series Editor: Steven M. Cahn, City University of New York Graduate School Written by an international assembly of distinguished philosophers, the Blackwell Philosophy Guides create a groundbreaking student resource – a complete critical survey of the central themes and issues of philosophy today. Focusing and advancing key arguments throughout, each essay incorporates essential background material serving to clarify the history and logic of the relevant topic. Accordingly, these volumes will be a valuable resource for a broad range of students and readers, including professional philosophers. 1 The Blackwell Guide to EPISTEMOLOGY edited by John Greco and Ernest Sosa 2 The Blackwell Guide to ETHICAL THEORY edited by Hugh LaFollette 3 The Blackwell Guide to the MODERN PHILOSOPHERS edited by Steven M. Emmanuel 4 The Blackwell Guide to PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC edited by Lou Goble 5 The Blackwell Guide to SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY edited by Robert L. Simon 6 The Blackwell Guide to BUSINESS ETHICS edited by Norman E. Bowie 7 The Blackwell Guide to the PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE edited by Peter Machamer and Michael Silberstein 8 The Blackwell Guide to METAPHYSICS edited by Richard M. Gale 9 The Blackwell Guide to the PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION edited by Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith, and Paul Standish 10 The Blackwell Guide to PHILOSOPHY OF MIND edited by Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfi eld 11 The Blackwell Guide to the PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES edited by Stephen P. -
The Book of Chuang Tzu Free
FREE THE BOOK OF CHUANG TZU PDF Chuang Tzu,Zhuangzi,Martin Palmer | 352 pages | 01 Dec 2007 | Penguin Books Ltd | 9780140455373 | English | London, United Kingdom Zhuangzi (book) - Wikipedia READ as many books as you like Personal use. One of the great founders of Taoism, Chaung Tzu lived in the fourth century BC and is among the most enjoyable and intriguing personalities in the whole of Chinese philosophy. The Way of Chuang Tzu Book Summary : Chuang Tzuu considered, along with Lao Tzu, one of the great figures of early Taoist thoughtu used parables and anecdotes, allegory and paradox, to illustrate that real happiness and freedom are found only in understanding the Tao or Way of nature, and The Book of Chuang Tzu in its unity. The respected Trappist monk Thomas Merton spent several years reading and reflecting upon four different translations of the Chinese classic that bears Chuang Tzu's name. The result is this collection of poetic renderings of the great sage's work that conveys its spirit in a way no other translation has and that was Merton's personal favorite among his more than The Book of Chuang Tzu books. Both prose and verse are included here, as well as a short section from Merton discussing the most salient themes of Chuang Tzu's teachings. The Inner Chapters are the only sustained section of this text widely believed to be the work of Chuang Tzu himself, dating to the fourth century B. Witty and engaging, spiced with the lyricism of poetry, Chuang Tzu's Taoist insights are timely and eternal, profoundly concerned with spiritual ecology. -
Plato's Euthydemus
PLATO’S EUTHYDEMUS: A STUDY ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LOGIC AND EDUCATION Plato’s Euthydemus is an unlucky dialogue. Few dealt with it in its own right, not just as part of a wider discussion of Plato, and fewer still saw in it more than a topic of sophistic fallacies. Some, of course, paid attention to the constructive sections of the dialogue, but only rarely do we come across a real attempt to unify its different aspects.1 In this paper I propose to show how, in the Euthydemus, Plato tries to distinguish between the Socratic and the Sophistic conceptions of education, by tracing them to their roots in the opposing views of the Sophists — and especially those of the second generation — and of Socrates about truth and about the role of logic. And although the eristic techniques of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are obviously fallacious, they turn out to be developments of Protagoras’ views and follow from philosophical positions worthy of serious examination. The Euthydemus is a caricature, to be sure. But, as all good caricature, it has a serious intent. It sketches the degeneration of the Sophistic approach to education, in some of its aspects. More important ly, it distinguishes Socratic education from the methods and effects of its Sophistic counterpart. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, the two sophist brothers, are reminis cent of the great Sophists of the Protagoras in more than one way. They are polymaths like Hippias, and at one time or another have taught a variety of arts, from forensic rhetoric to armed combat. Also, they have Prodicus’ penchant for linguistic analysis. -
Title on the Rejection of Reason by the Early Empiricist Author(S
Title On the Rejection of Reason by the Early Empiricist Author(s) Nishimura, Seishu Citation 京都大学文学部哲学研究室紀要 (2005), 8: 160-170 Issue Date 2005-12-10 URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/24239 Right Type Departmental Bulletin Paper Textversion publisher Kyoto University On the Rejection of Reason by the Early Empiricist Seishu Nishimura In his “On the Sects for Beginners,” Galen describes a debate between two primary sects of medicine in antiquity: the empiricist and the rationalist. According to Galen, “medicine is the science of what is healthy and what is unhealthy,” by virtue of which the doctor can prescribe the remedy (SB, 1).1 In this sense, medical knowledge is essentially practical. But the empiricist and the rationalist disagree over the origin of such knowledge. The former claims that “experience alone” is sufficient in order to obtain it (ibid). We will call this the empiricist claim. Roughly speaking, by “experience,” the empiricist means perception and memory. There are three types of experience by which we can acquire medical knowledge: (i) “autopsia,” i.e., one’s own perception, (ii) “history,” i.e., one’s knowledge of the experiences of others, and (iii) “the transition to the similar” (SB, 3).2 Here, (ii) and (iii) supplement (i) because firsthand experience is a limited capacity. The core of the empiricist claim is that, given the experience gained in these ways, we don’t need any other things for medical knowledge. For the empiricist, X is medical knowledge if X is obtained from and confirmed by experience. On the contrary, the rationalist insists that, in addition to experience, the use of “reason” is necessary for medical knowledge (SB, 1). -
Greek Cities & Islands of Asia Minor
MASTER NEGATIVE NO. 93-81605- Y MICROFILMED 1 993 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK / as part of the "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project'' Funded by the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United photocopies or States Code - concerns the making of other reproductions of copyrighted material. and Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries or other archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy the reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that for any photocopy or other reproduction is not to be "used purpose other than private study, scholarship, or for, or later uses, a research." If a user makes a request photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of fair infringement. use," that user may be liable for copyright a This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept fulfillment of the order copy order if, in its judgement, would involve violation of the copyright law. AUTHOR: VAUX, WILLIAM SANDYS WRIGHT TITLE: GREEK CITIES ISLANDS OF ASIA MINOR PLACE: LONDON DA TE: 1877 ' Master Negative # COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT BIBLIOGRAPHIC MTCROFORM TAR^FT Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record m^m i» 884.7 !! V46 Vaux, V7aiion Sandys Wright, 1818-1885. ' Ancient history from the monuments. Greek cities I i and islands of Asia Minor, by W. S. W. Vaux... ' ,' London, Society for promoting Christian knowledce." ! 1877. 188. p. plate illus. 17 cm. ^iH2n KJ Restrictions on Use: TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA i? FILM SIZE: 3 S'^y^/"^ REDUCTION IMAGE RATIO: J^/ PLACEMENT: lA UA) iB . -
'Putnam on Bivs and Radical Scepticism'
For Putnam on Brains in Vats, (ed.) S. Goldberg, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ‘PUTNAM ON BIVS AND RADICAL SCEPTICISM’ DUNCAN PRITCHARD & CHRIS RANALLI University of Edinburgh & National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to explore Putnam’s influential ‘BIV’ argument against radical scepticism, both as he presents this argument and as it has subsequently been reconstructed. §1 explores the BIV argument as Putnam presents it and the anti-sceptical morals that he extracts from this argument. §2 examines a core critique of the argument, so conceived, from Anthony Brueckner. §3 then critically evaluates an influential reconstruction of Putnam’s argument, due to Crispin Wright. §4-5 explores the idea that Putnam’s argument is best thought of as a transcendental response to radical scepticism, and accordingly applies Stroud’s challenge to transcendental arguments to this proposal. Finally, §6 examines an influential criticism of Putnam’s argument which is due to Nagel. 1. PUTNAM’S BIV ARGUMENT A familiar way of arguing for radical scepticism is by appeal to radical sceptical hypotheses, such as the hypothesis that one might be a brain-in-vat (BIV) which is being radically, and undetectably, deceived about its environment. Roughly, the sceptical argument goes that since such sceptical hypotheses are by their nature indistinguishable from normal experience, so one cannot know that they are false. Furthermore, if one cannot know that they are false, then it follows that one can’t know much of what one believes, most of which is inconsistent with radical sceptical hypotheses. This last step will almost certainly require some sort of closure-style principle, whereby knowledge is closed under known entailments. -
1 Argumentation in the Framework of Deliberation
1 ARGUMENTATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF DELIBERATION DIALOGUE Douglas Walton, Katie Atkinson, Trevor Bench-Capon, Adam Wyner and Dan Cartwright According to argumentation theory, reasoning takes place in different types of dialogue: persuasion dialogue, negotiation, deliberation, information-seeking dialogue, inquiry, and eristic dialogue. These different dialogue types may be nested within one another. Current research in artificial intelligence is building formal models corresponding to each of these types of dialogue and showing how they can be implemented in, for example, multi-agent communications systems. In this paper, we (1) clarify the distinction between deliberation dialogue and persuasion dialogue, (2) survey some recent research in artificial intelligence studying formal properties of deliberation dialogue, (3) present a model of argumentation in deliberation dialogue that has proved to be useful in electronic democracy, and (4) argue that this model provides an attractive alternative to the dominant cost-benefit model of rational argumentation traditionally accepted in economics and other fields as the basis for evaluating argumentation of the kind used in policy decision making. One of the most important lessons of argumentation theory has been that arguments need to be analyzed and evaluated not only by identifying the logical form of an argument in abstraction from its context of use, but also by paying attention to the purpose for which an argument was supposedly used in a conversational setting. In particular, as we will show in this paper, it is vitally important to distinguish between two different types of conversational frameworks called persuasion dialogue and deliberation dialogue. As we will show, logical fallacies can easily be committed in the most common kinds of everyday reasoning by failing to take this distinction into account. -
Reading the Proemium of Plato's Theaetetus: Euclides in Action
Reading the Proemium of Plato’s Theaetetus: Euclides in Action Eleni Kaklamanou and Maria Pavlou HE FRAMES of the Platonic dialogues constitute a vexed and contentious issue and have been variously treated T by students of Plato throughout the centuries. Proclus classified Plato’s ancient commentators as those who pay little or no attention to the prefatory parts, those who acknowledge their moral aspect but deem them irrelevant to a dialogue’s subject-matter, and those who contend that they have a bear- ing on the main philosophical discussion.1 Modern scholars have adopted a similar stance: while some either completely ignore or attribute little philosophical significance to the proemia, others consider them to be an integral part of the dialogues and not merely ‘trimmings’ or decorative literary devices.2 This paper focuses on the opening of the Theaetetus, one of the most peculiar and paradoxical of the Platonic proemia.3 Two friends, the Megarians Euclides and Terpsion, acci- 1 Proclus In Prm. 658–659 (I 46 Steel); for comments see G. R. Morrow and J. M. Dillon, Proclus Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (Princeton 1987) 11 and 47 n.40. For ancient views on the importance of Plato’s prologues in general see H. Tarrant, Plato’s First Interpreters (Cornell 2000) 39–40. 2 See e.g. D. Clay, “Plato’s First Words,” in F. M. Dunn and T. Cole (eds.), Beginnings in Classical Literature (Cambridge 1992) 115: “to write com- petently about the beginning of [any] Platonic Dialogue is to understand the other extremity of the dialogue, its middle, and the unity of the dialogue as a whole.” For further bibliography see W. -
The Academy in Athenian Politics and Society – from Its Founding in the 380Ies Until Its Downfall in 87/6
Matthias Haake (Münster) The Academy in Athenian Politics and Society – from its founding in the 380ies until its downfall in 87/6 At the beginning of his description of Athens, in his work On the Cities of Greece, written at some unknown point during the third century BC, the perieget Heracleides Criticus confronts the ‘travelling reader’ with a disappointment: When approaching Athens coming from Eleusis via the Sacred Way, one would be delighted by a pleasant road and a cultivated countryside, all in all a pleasant scenery. The city itself, however, would be a bitter disappointment at first glance – in fact, such a disappointment that the stranger, coming to Athens for the first time, might even doubt that he is in the ‘famous city of Athens’: The city, the ‘lighthouse of the oikumene’, would present itself as dry and inadequately supplied with water, and, due to the age of the city, with narrow and winding roads. Yet, after a short time, the stranger would be beyond all doubt and sure to be in Athens – because: „There you will see the most beautiful things on earth: a large and impressive theatre, a magnificent temple of Athena, something out of this world and worth seeing, the so-called Parthenon, which lies above the theatre; it makes a great impression on beholders. There is the Olympieum, which though only half-completed is impressively designed, though it would have been most magnificent if completed. There are three gymnasia: the Academy, the Lyceum and the Cynosarges; they are all planted with trees and laid out with lawns.” The fact that Heracleides lists these three gymnasia alongside with the theatre of Dionysus, the Parthenon and the Olympieum as those characteristics, which remove the disbelieving stranger’s doubts to indeed be in Athens, suggests, that they are not quoted because they were loci amoeni of physical exercise and military training; they would have hardly been popular and admirable enough, to be mentioned alongside the astonishing sights mentioned above. -
The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II, with Emphasis on His Indebtedness to Max Scheler
Chapter 3 The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II, with Emphasis on His Indebtedness to Max Scheler Peter J. Colosi In a way, his [Pope John Paul II’s] undisputed contribution to Christian thought can be understood as a profound meditation on the person. He enriched and expanded the concept in his encyclicals and other writings. These texts represent a patrimony to be received, collected and assimilated with care.1 - Pope Benedict XVI INTRODUCTION Throughout the writings of Karol Wojtyła, both before and after he became Pope John Paul II, one finds expressions of gratitude and indebtedness to the philosopher Max Scheler. It is also well known that in his Habilitationsschrift,2 Wojtyła concluded that Max Scheler’s ethical system cannot cohere with Christian ethics. This state of affairs gives rise to the question: which of the ideas of Scheler did Wojtyła embrace and which did he reject? And also, what was Wojtyła’s overall attitude towards and assessment of Scheler? A look through all the works of Wojtyła reveals numerous expressions of gratitude to Scheler for philosophical insights which Wojtyła embraced and built upon, among them this explanation of his sources for The Acting Person, Granted the author’s acquaintance with traditional Aristotelian thought, it is however the work of Max Scheler that has been a major influence upon his reflection. In my overall conception of the person envisaged through the mechanisms of his operative systems and their variations, as presented here, may indeed be seen the Schelerian foundation studied in my previous work.3 I have listed many further examples in the appendix to this paper.