Stanley Fike Oral History Interview – JFK#3, 11/30/1967 Administrative Information

Creator: Stanley Fike Interviewer: Larry J. Hackman Date of Interview: November 30, 1967 Place of Interview: Washington, D.C. Length: 24 pages

Biographical Note Fike, Executive director, Symington for President campaign (1960); administrative assistant to Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri (1952-1976), discusses the delegates from Missouri at the 1960 Democratic National Convention and Stuart Symington’s involvement with the JFK Administration after the election, among other issues.

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Transcript of Oral History Interview These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

Suggested Citation Stanley Fike, recorded interview by Larry J. Hackman, November 30, 1967, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

Stanley Fike – JFK #3

Table of Contents

Page Topic 68 Pre-Convention period of 1960 70 Rules of the Convention 73 Problems with nominators 75 The Missouri delegation at the Convention 76 Nominating Lyndon Johnson for Vice President 78 Kennedy’s presidential campaign in Missouri 80 Symington’s participation in the task force on defense reorganization 82 Replacing Thomas Carey Hennings, Jr.’s seat in the Senate 84 Symington’s interest in particular presidential appointments 88 President Kennedy’s effectiveness when dealing with the Senate and passing legislation 90 Perceptions of Symington as a “one issue politician”

Third Oral History Interview

with

STANLEY FIKE

November 30, 1967 Washington, D.C.

By Larry J. Hackman

For the John F. Kennedy Library

HACKMAN: Mr. Fike, one of the things that I hadn’t asked last time and I wanted to talk about, do you have any recollections of Paul Butler’s [Paul M. Butler] role as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee as 1960 approached and what your feelings were about it?

FIKE: Well, I think, Larry, during the pre-Convention period I’m sure that some of our people felt that Butler was pro-Kennedy [John F. Kennedy], but I understand some of the Kennedy people felt that he was not friendly to them, that he was anti-Kennedy. I’m sure he wasn’t pro-Symington [Stuart Symington, II], but for the most part I thought we got a fair break in the planning of the Convention. In the drawing for location of our headquarters at the Coliseum, I think it was absolutely fair, I just was a poor drawer, and we ended up with what we thought was not the best location. My choice, I think, was third or fourth, I’ve forgotten now. But anyway we ended up with a trailer outside the building. But as it turned out, it was the best spot. We really liked it the best of all. So that this is the way it works out sometimes. The same situation was true as far as the choice of what our headquarters was going to be. We had the Galleria in the headquarters hotel, and as it turned out I thought we had as good or better than anybody else did. It gave us a lot of space. Thanks to the Youth for Symington and the local committee in California, we were

[-68-] well pleased with it. The facilities and treatment we had from the National Committee [Democratic National Committee], as far as I was concerned, looking back on it now, and I think I felt this way at the time also, I thought we had a fair shake from the Committee.

HACKMAN: What about the selection of Los Angeles as a Convention site? Did that create any problems for you or was this…

FIKE: No. At the time Los Angeles was selected, I think we felt that we had about as much support in California as we did elsewhere. We had a good local committee out there; Jimmy Allen [James Allen], Leonard Shane, Tom Neblett [Thomas F. Neblett], a number of other people who’d worked with us all the way along, and we felt it was fair. Of course, from the standpoint of geography, we would have preferred Kansas City or St. Louis or Chicago. Chicago would have been ideal for us from the standpoint of a lot of Missourians being able to get there, but we had a good delegation from Missouri that went to Los Angeles. A Mid-west location would have been better, but this was not a controlling factor on who got the nomination.

HACKMAN: During this period before the Convention, Senator Symington was a member of the Democratic Advisory Council. Do you recall what his opinion of that group was, or the idea of that group?

FIKE: Well, his participation in that group varied from time to time, I think, as he had time to devote to it. At the time it was organized he thought it was a good thing to do, that it had a role to play as a part of the opposition.

HACKMAN: Was there anything in particular he attempted to accomplish in working with this group that you can recall?

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FIKE: No. No. I don’t think so, Larry.

HACKMAN: Is there anything you can recall, at the Convention again, as far as rules or as far as the platform goes that you people were interested in?

FIKE: Well, the one thing that we hoped for that couldn’t be accomplished, apparently, was we’d hoped that the unit rule would hold as far as Kansas was concerned, I believe, and also Iowa. I’d have to check this back to refresh my memory on it. But the man who ruled the way we didn’t want him to rule was Clarence Cannon who was an original Symington man in ’56, ’52. He was from Missouri. He was always a great friend of Senator Symington’s. And I don’t think there’s any question but what he called them exactly as he saw them. I think probably it would have been nice if he could have ruled otherwise on it, or if the chairman could have ruled otherwise, LeRoy Collins, but I think Mr. Cannon’s integrity in this situation, as far as we were concerned, was above question. He called it exactly as he thought it should be according to the rules.

HACKMAN: Now Herschel Loveless [Herschel Cellel Loveless], I believe, was chairman of the rules at the Convention. He was also one of the favorite sons. Do you recall anything in the rules…

FIKE: Well, Governor Loveless was a Kennedy man. I think he felt that this was his chance, that he did have a chance to be a vice presidential selection. I think Governor Docking [George Docking] felt the same way, from Kansas. I think both of them had been led to believe that there might be a chance for them as Vice President if Kennedy was selected, got the nomination. I’m sure there were others who felt in the same position. Nobody knew who the Vice President was going to be. I don’t think Kennedy had really made up his own mind. If he had, he didn’t tell anybody about it, that I know about. So I think probably they favored him. The Kansas delegation was split. We felt we had a majority of it. And they were held out and actually

[-70-] didn’t come in and vote until after the decision had been made. Paul Aylward [Paul L. Aylward] was the chairman of the Symington group in the Kansas delegation, and the Kennedy people had been into Kansas working, working hard, and they got a lot of support out of Kansas. I think they didn’t come into Missouri to work to try and take away any of our delegates, but they certainly came into our front yard or back yard or all around us, whatever you want to call it, Illinois, Kansas, Iowa—an area that certainly would normally have been either Symington or Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey] territory. And they were pretty doggone effective about at least neutralizing the support we normally would have had from a farm state, a neighboring farm state. They were not successful in taking away some of the solid core support Senator Symington had, particularly in down-state Illinois and the solid support we had over in Kansas. Paul Aylward stuck with us to the bitter end, and he had many of those delegates along with him. Loveless had been more effective for Kennedy in Iowa than Docking had in Kansas. We ended up with very few delegates in Iowa even though we had some grass root support up there, a number of people that were interested in it, but the Kennedy people there, as in many other places, just went out and organized and got their delegates elected over the people that we were trying to elect. We just didn’t work at the grass roots sufficiently, the Symington people didn’t.

HACKMAN: Do you recall who you people were working with in Illinois? Was this Scott Lucas [Scott Wike Lucas] or…

FIKE: Illinois? Yes. Scott Lucas, Paul Powell [Paul Taylor Powell].

HACKMAN: What was Jake Arvey’s [Jacob M. Arvey] opinion in the contacts you had with him, do you recall?

FIKE: Who?

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HACKMAN: Jake Arvey.

FIKE: Well, he’s a pro. He and Symington have been friends for many years. Some of our very close friends, Sidney Salomon of St. Louis, for example, had been a friend of Mr. Arvey for many, many years, very close together. But I think that Arvey felt that he had to go where Illinois went, and Illinois was going with Kennedy. This is where Mayor Daley [Richard J. Daley] ended up going. Mayor Daley had the power in Illinois, and I think most of Daley’s people in Chicago, where the bulk of the vote is in Illinois, felt that Kennedy was the strongest man for them, so they went that way. It ended up that Kennedy, of course, just barely carried Illinois, just as he barely carried Missouri. As I remember the figures, if he’d lost Illinois, Missouri and Minnesota, was it? That he would have lost the election. But I’m sure that Symington would have run better in all three states than Kennedy did, but they got the votes in the Convention, so that was it.

HACKMAN: On another Midwestern state, Nebraska, can you remember what people like Bernie Boyle [Bernard J. Boyle] and Brooks [Ralph G. Brooks] was governor at that time and…

FIKE: Well, Brooks was going out, so he didn’t have much control, and the man that he had selected, I think, to take his place, Conrad [Robert B. Conrad]?

HACKMAN: Right. Robert Conrad.

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FIKE: Bob Conrad. That’s right. I think he was a pro-Symington man, but it ended up that he didn’t get the nomination. And it was a primary state, Nebraska, although not a binding primary, as I remember. Kennedy was the only one that entered there. Bernie Boyle, I’m sure, was pro-Kennedy and worked to support Kennedy although he indicated to us early along that he was either staying neutral or pro-Symington. I think he was waiting to see which way the wind blew. But when the wind began to blow stronger and stronger, for Kennedy, he went that way. John Hanley was our leader in Nebraska. He was country attorney in Omaha, and he’d been elected a number of times, two or three, as I recall. He himself was a Catholic, but he was all out for Symington. And, as I remember, he ran for delegate in Omaha, but got beat for the first time he ever lost in that area, and I think it was because of the growing support that Kennedy had in the Omaha area. We did have some other delegates from Nebraska, but not many when the votes were counted because the bandwagon was on.

HACKMAN: Going back to the Convention, did you people have any problems getting the nominators and seconders that you wanted, Governor Blair [James G. Blair, Jr.] and the other people?

FIKE: Well, looking back, I think it was a mistake to pick Governor Blair. He was not good on television, always far better speaking off the cuff than in trying to follow a manuscript. He’d been over the manuscript a number of times, and I think he was nervous when he made the nominating speech, which surprised me because he’d done a lot of taking for years and years, been in public life. But I think, he just wanted to do such a good job that he tried too hard. And there was never any question in my mind, and, I think, I’m sure there wasn’t any question in the Senator’s mind but what he, Jim Blair, was completely pro-Symington. I think, like most of the rest of us who were realistic deep inside of our own minds even though we didn’t want to feel that way, we thought we probably had little or no chance at that stage in the game, but I think Jim felt that the eyes of the nation were on him, the eyes of the Missouri delegates were on him, and he

[-73-] just tried too hard and really didn’t do as good a job as we thought he could. His selection had been the recommendation of Harry Truman [Harry S. Truman], actually. In 1948 Harry Truman asked the Governor of Missouri, Phil Donnelly [Philip M. Donnelly], who was not particularly close to him, to nominate him, and apparently Phil Donnelly did a magnificent job at the time. Television was in its very infancy, with very few television sets around the country in ’48. Looking back, I’m sure if we had it to do over again and knowing then what we know now as to the way it went over, I think we would have asked Charlie Brown [Charles H. Brown] to make the nominating speech because Charlie is excellent on television. This was his life. He’d been working at this, at that time, for a year and a half, anyway. But even with the best possible nominator, it wouldn’t have made over two or three votes difference, if that much. Gene McCarthy [Eugene J. McCarthy], who was generally conceded to have made the best nominating speech for anybody, the one he made for Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson]. I’ve heard McCarthy say since that it probably didn’t cost Stevenson more than a vote or two, and he was sure that it didn’t gain him more than a vote or two. And I think that’s true. I think the delegates had their minds made up at that time. There was no chance of a nominating speech being a “Cross of Gold” speech to sweep them off their feet.

HACKMAN: Speaking of Stevenson, what type of contacts did you people have with Stevenson throughout 1960 in discussing what his plans would be?

FIKE: Well, we had friendly contacts with his people all along. He was in it. By this time, into ’60, Kennedy was the front runner, and all the rest of us knew that we had no chance unless Kennedy didn’t make it on the first or second ballot, so naturally we hoped that all the candidates, favorite son and everybody else, would hold all their delegates. This was our only chance. We kept up a liaison, the normal thing to do. And I’m sure the Kennedy people knew we were doing it. But I’m also sure that some of the Stevenson people felt if it couldn’t go Stevenson, then they wanted Kennedy. Some of them also if it couldn’t go Stevenson wanted Symington, but you had a variety of second choices.

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HACKMAN: What do you recall after the Convention was over or during the Convention, what was Senator Symington’s opinion of the Missouri delegation’s work on his behalf?

FIKE: Well, I think he felt they were doing the best they could under the circumstances, and in view of what was happening, he felt proud of them, the fact that they did stay with the unit rule even though it was obvious to many that it would have taken a miracle in order to win. And it just didn’t look as though it was in the picture at all, but they stayed right through. No question but what a few, a very few of them, would like to have jumped off Symington onto the Kennedy bandwagon right then, but our relations with the Kennedy people after the Convention couldn’t have been better. We never had any problem. Docking, who’d worked with the Kennedy people, long before the Convention, I’m sure felt that if he wasn’t selected for Vice President, he would have a top job, Secretary of the Treasury or something like that. I’m sure he was never told this, but I’m sure he thought this. After the Convention it turned out that we had better liaison with the Kennedy people than what Governor Docking did. After the election when he was in the Administration in a relatively minor appointive spot, he was looking for something else and called up and wanted our support to get a better job. And we did what we could for him.

HACKMAN: Did this ever come up with Governor Loveless who was appointed the Renegotiation Board?

FIKE: Yes. Our relationship with Governor Loveless was fine afterwards. You know, he never came asking us for anything. I think he came out of it fairly well. I saw him a number of times later on, and he saw Senator Symington. I think, in retrospect, he accepted the way it turned out, what he got. I don’t know that he was shooting for anything much higher. I think he would have liked to have been Secretary of Agriculture or Labor or something else, but it didn’t work out that way.

[-75-]

HACKMAN: I’d heard that some of the delegates from St. Louis were among those who were particularly, I guess, uncomfortable with the unit rule during the Convention. Would you say that? Is that accurate?

FIKE: Oh, there might have been some of them who were. I think the real pros of the group, Jack Dwyer [John J. Dwyer] and people like that, Dick Nacy [Richard R. Nacy], Jim Pendergast [James M. Pendergast], I think these folks, you know, who’d been to conventions over the years, they felt that we had greater strength by staying together. Some of the relatively new people in it, Mark Halloran [Mark R. Halloran], for example, who was our National Committeeman but never had really been on the inside on Party councils, I don’t think either in Missouri or nationally, I think he felt that he’d be in a better position and maybe the state would be in a better position if we jumped to the Kennedy bandwagon.

HACKMAN: What do you recall about the reaction of the Missouri delegation to the selection of Senator Johnson [Lyndon B. Johnson] as the vice presidential nominee?

FIKE: Well, I think a great many of them were disappointed. Of course, when Senator Symington didn’t win the nomination for President, many of them thought that Symington was going to get the vice presidential nomination. The papers in Los Angeles that morning had said Kennedy-Symington, in banner headlines. And this, of course, further raised their hopes, and I’m sure that they were very disappointed that Johnson was selected. But Johnson had some support. Many of the realists in Missouri felt that he’d do well Missouri. In the pro-civil rights, they were disappointed. Among the labor leaders, labor delegates, Negro delegates, in the delegation, this was true in most parts of the United States. Certainly the Americans for Democratic Action, they were really disturbed about it.

HACKMAN: The Michigan delegation…

[-76-]

FIKE: Oh, yeah, the Michigan delegation was terribly disturbed about it. Joe Rauh [Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.], who’d been, you know, a leader in the ADA [Americans for Democratic Action] and was one of the strongest Kennedy people there, he thought that this was just terrible, that the end had come. He was very angry about it. I remember seeing him on the floor, and I must admit that I got a little vicarious delight out of seeing his reaction because, of course, I felt that if they owed their loyalty to anybody, ADA, certainly, number one, had owed it to Hubert Humphrey. Also, at that time, Symington’s voting record, according to ADA, was just as good as Humphrey’s on civil rights, his voting record then, and still is, as good as anybody’s. So I must admit that was one small grain of satisfaction out of the whole Convention, to see Joe Rauh’s anger over the selection of Johnson.

HACKMAN: Do you recall anything about Congressman John McCormack’s [John William McCormack], now Speaker McCormack’s making an attempt to get Senator Symington to turn the Missouri delegation at the end of the balloting, to try to get the Missouri delegation to switch to Senator Kennedy? I had heard that some attempt in this direction was made.

FIKE: I don’t know of that. I think it moved so fast after it was clear that Kennedy was nominated, why, then everybody came right on in and made it unanimous. Missouri did, too. Jim Blair joined right in, and those of us from the Symington group who were on the floor—Charlie Brown was there and I was there, and the Senator was not on the floor at that time—we agreed, of course, that Jim should join right in with everybody else in making in unanimous. I think Jim was one of the seconders of the motion or made the motion. I don’t remember that detail. The records would show. But I’m sure there were a lot of people who were, you know, clamoring for the recognition to make it unanimous at that point. There was no sour grapes at all as far as Missouri was concerned. Disappointment and deep disappointment among many people who’d thought that Symington was the man, spent a lot of hours as well as a lot of their money in working to that end.

[-77-]

HACKMAN: Going on to the campaign, to what extent were you involved in the campaign, particularly in contact with the situation in Missouri?

FIKE: Well, quite a bit in Missouri. The Kennedy people who came in from the National Committee talked to us, of course. They also talked to Senator Symington. And at one time, I know, we felt there were too many volunteers coming in, volunteers for Kennedy, and were getting the thing all confused, and they weren’t touching base with the normal Democratic leaders in the state which we felt was the first thing to do because that was the base of their strength in Missouri, we felt. As well you need the independents, but you’ve also got to keep your hard core and get them working. And at one point I know Senator Symington called up Bobby Kennedy [Robert F. Kennedy] and said, “Looking, if you want to carry Missouri, the thing for you to do is to go to St. Louis and to talk to Jack Dwyer, who’s been at this business for a long time. This is where you’re going to have to get the main strength for carrying Missouri.” He said, “Work with him and have your people work with him, and if they won’t do it, why, get them out of the state.” And so this was done. John Inglish was the state chairman having been selected for that job by John Dalton [John M. Dalton], who was a nominee for governor. But the whole chance for Kennedy to carry Missouri lay in the cities, not the rural areas, because there was strong, strong religious feeling out-state. Of course, he got some votes out-state, but he lost out-state. He came into St. Louis, as I remember, about a hundred and two thousand votes behind, and he carried St. Louis by a hundred and ten thousand. He ended up with about ninety-one, ninety-two hundred votes majority, all of which he got, plus about a hundred thousand more votes, out of St. Louis. So that this, I think, was very good and sound advice.

HACKMAN: Now, I think they had a fellow named Phil Des Marais [Philip H. Des Marais] working out there at that time? And this was probably the root of the problem.

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FIKE: The old pros are always suspicious of volunteers coming in particularly if those volunteers don’t touch base with the old pros. I think this was a part of the problem. And they were going out and rounding up people, all too often dissidents, people who couldn’t get along with anybody else, getting them active. They were getting out in the front line.

HACKMAN: Were most of the candidates on the state ticket in that election very worried about having to run on the ticket with Senator Kennedy?

FIKE: Oh, I think they all were.

HACKMAN: Do you remember giving the Kennedy people any advice on what issues to emphasize in Missouri? Were there any mistakes particularly you can think of that they probably made?

FIKE: When Kennedy came into the state, I think….Let’s see, he was in St. Louis and swung over to Joplin and into Kansas City.

HACKMAN: I can remember being at a football game in Columbia, and they were supposed to stop in Columbia, and being disappointed that they couldn’t land at the airport.

FIKE: I think that was right. There’d been the report that he was going to, but I think it just worked out there was not sufficient landing runway at Columbia for him to land there, so he just didn’t come over. It didn’t work out. I think he took one swing down from St. Louis to Joplin, had tremendous crowds in St. Louis, but also in Joplin which was an anti-Kennedy area. And subsequently we decided they just came out of curiosity, not out of support, but it may well have been that everybody that came voted for him. Still there were far more in that district who didn’t vote for him than did. He lost the district by sixty thousand votes. Charlie Brown, running for Congress

[-79-] there, lost it by nineteen thousand, and Charlie got the same number of votes in 1960 that he’d gotten in ’56 when he carried it by about two or three thousand. So what happened was that just a lot more people came out to vote and to vote against Kennedy. They voted for Nixon [Richard M. Nixon], but primarily to vote against Kennedy.

HACKMAN: I’ve heard that Senator Kennedy had at least one meeting with the people of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Do you know anything about trying to get the support of the Post-Dispatch? FIKE: I wasn’t in on that at all. I’m sure he did because he did with newspaper people all over the country, and I understood that he was meeting with them there. I don’t even remember when that was, Larry. I wasn’t

contacted on that.

HACKMAN: During the campaign, Senator Symington was asked to head, I believe, this task force on defense reorganization.

FIKE: That’s right.

HACKMAN: Do you remember what his feelings were about how satisfactorily this thing proceeded?

FIKE: He had no reservations about it at all. He told Senator Kennedy—Kennedy invited him to come up to Hyannis Port [Hyannis Port, Massachusetts] and visit with him in August after the Convention—first of all that he didn’t want any job in the Administration. He had been interested in only one other job (the presidency) besides the one he had, and the decision had been made on that, therefore, he just wanted to help in any way he could to see him get elected, and he’d do anything he could to help, but to not worry about him. He did not want any job. I’m sure this conversation took place because I’ve heard the Senator tell about it too many times. And I know this was his feeling. I don’t think he really wanted to be Vice President. He would have taken it if

[-80-]

Kennedy had asked him, I think, for two reasons: First, because he liked Kennedy and thought he could work with him; and second, because he felt that this would be a recognition for the people who’d worked so hard for Symington in the pre-Convention time. But I don’t think he was ever really sorry from the standpoint of self-satisfaction in the job in not being Vice President because I think he’s always felt that this is a job in which a man can only be what the President wants him to be. And you either rise or fall depending on what the President wants. So when he went up and talked to Kennedy, he talked to Kennedy of his concern about our defenses, and Kennedy asked him to put together this committee. And he came up with people for the committee. Paul Nitze [Paul Henry Nitze], as I remember, was one of them, Ros Gilpatric [Roswell L. Gilpatric], Clark Clifford [Clark M. Clifford], one or two others. It’s been published, anyway, so it’s all a matter of record. And Ed Welsh [Edward C. Welsh] who was our legislative assistant at that time, now with the Space Council [National Aeronautics and Space Council], acted as secretary for the committee. And they did a lot of work on it in the fall in recommendation of reorganization. In their report, they said they thought that most things suggested could be accomplished without legislation. And I think the Senator has felt that McNamara [Robert S. McNamara] did accomplish most of these things. Gilpatric, of course, became Under Secretary of Defense, did a tremendous job in support of McNamara and moved ahead on most of the things that the committee had recommended. HACKMAN: In this same period before…

FIKE: If he felt it was worthwhile.

HACKMAN: In this period before the election, this is…Tom Hennings [Thomas Carey Hennings, Jr.] died in this period, I believe.

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FIKE: Yes, as I remember, he died about the middle of September.

HACKMAN: And do you recall what took place or who the people were who pushing to get this nomination that Senator Long [Edward Vaughn Long] eventually got, now Senator Long.

FIKE: I didn’t go to Jefferson City while the committee was meeting, but I’m aware that quite a bit of the pulling and the hauling about it I think there’s no question but what the man who made the decision, had the most weight, was John Dalton, because he was the nominee for governor; he was going to head the state ticket, he personally had the most at stake to get a man on the ticket with him who would be strong as possible or lose as few votes as possible for any reason. I think they wanted somebody from the western side of the state, and I’m satisfied that if Floyd Gibson [Floyd R. Gibson], who was then president pro-tem of the Missouri state senate, if he had not been a Catholic, I think he would have been offered the nomination. But they felt that with Kennedy at the top of the ticket and Tom Eagleton [Thomas F. Eagleton] running for Attorney General, they felt that this was just taking too much of a chance. I’m sure that the Cooks at Central Missouri Trust Company, Dick Nacy, and a number of other people who would have liked very much for Jim Blair to have the job, to get the nomination. And I know Jim Blair wanted it because he had previously talked to Senator Symington and asked him if he would support him if he ran for the nomination in 1962 when Tom Hennings’ term was up. Symington told him that he’d never taken a position in a primary, but he certainly wouldn’t do anything to hurt him. And Symington felt that way about the nomination for the vacancy on the ticket. But John Dalton did not want Jim Blair. There was also, I think, a lot of feeling in Missouri about a governor coming to the end of his term and unable to run for reelection, the people, the politicos in the state always remember the things that they didn’t get that they wanted and they’re unhappy with the outgoing governor. I’ve seen it happen every time. After he’s been out for two or

[-82-] three years, why, they forget that and compare it with the guy who’s in and that they’re not getting all that they want from him either, and, well his predecessor maybe wasn’t so bad after all. And John Dalton went through the same thing later in 1964. But, anyway, there just wasn’t any chance of getting Jim Blair in there. So when I think they looked around, and John Dalton was in on the talking. Charlie Brown was an all out candidate for it. I think he felt he had no chance to get reelected from the seventh district with Kennedy at the top of the ticket, and he felt that he was entitled to it for what he’d done for Symington. Symington told him that he couldn’t get into it because he never had gotten into the primary, and also he told Jim Blair that he wouldn’t do anything to stop him, and this was moving pretty fast there. And I’m not sure that Symington could have, you know, made the difference even if he had gotten in. My name came up at one time, and John Dalton talked to me about it. I told him that I didn’t feel that I could even entertain that thought because I felt that Charlie Brown had gone all out, and if there was anything that could be done, why, I certainly didn’t want to be in a position of blocking Charlie in any way. And I don’t know whether Dalton was serious about it when he talked to me or not, but I knew then that he was not pro-Brown because Brown had talked about running against him for governor in ’59 and also that they had some other differences. Some of the people who had been trying to get Brown into the race, and they were close friends of Brown’s, were very much anti-Dalton and always had been, so I think this was a part of it. And, then, Charlie had some other problems in St. Louis. Some of the people there just didn’t think that he was the man for the job, so that I think

[-83-] he looked around and thought Ed Long was a natural for it. Long was acceptable to Dick Nacy and the group from the Bank, the old Central Missouri Trust group, and the nomination was offered to him. I think he didn’t want it. He had his mind made up he was going to run for governor in 1964, and I’m sure he didn’t have any idea of coming to Senate. And he said no, I think, when he was first approached on it. I remember it was a Monday night. He said no, and then early the next morning he said yes, he would take it. I’d spent the night with Bill Hull [William R. Hull, Jr.], I remember, on the way back from St. Joseph. We’d had a meeting up in St. Joseph, a Democratic meeting, and I was going to the airport early in the morning to fly over to St. Louis when I heard the early morning announcement. I was going to catch a plane, I think, at 6 o’clock in the morning, and I heard the announcement at 5:30 r so going to the airport, heard that Ed Long—that they’d been up until 2 or 3 o’clock in the morning, the members of the committee, and decided on Ed Long. They were trying to reach him and ask him if he would take it, but I think at that time they had it pretty well set that he was going to take it. And so, of course, he did, and the rest is history.

HACKMAN: Moving after the election, then, can you remember any appointments that Senator Symington was particularly interested in? I know Fred Heinkel [Fred V. Heinkel] for Secretary of Agriculture was one of them he was, at least, sponsoring.

FIKE: Yes, yes. He was very much interested in Fred Heinkel for Secretary of Agriculture. He was interested in Harold Stuart for Secretary of the Air Force. Harold Stuart had been Symington’s assistant when he was Secretary, from Tulsa, he was treasurer of the National Symington Committee. Not treasurer, he was finance chairman. And Symington was supporting Stuart and so was the Secretary of the Air Force, who actually got the job. Funny, I talked to him yesterday. Gene Zuckert [Eugene M. Zuckert].

[-84-] HACKMAN: Zuckert. Yes.

FIKE: Gene Zuckert and Harold Stuart had been law partners here in Washington. Stuart was from Tulsa, but Gene was his resident partner here in Washington. And Gene was working for Stuart. That’s the story I got. And I’m sure it’s right. Gene told me this, and Harold did, too. Gene went to talk to McNamara, whom he’d known and known well for many years. I think they were on the faculty together at Harvard Business School, was it? And Gene told him that he thought Harold Stuart was the best man for the job of Secretary of the Air Force. McNamara said, “Gene, I’m sorry I’ve already made a selection for that job.” And said, “Well, that’s too bad because I think Stuart would have made an excellent choice.” And McNamara said, “Well, the choice is you.” Gene didn’t want it at all, so he said. And I’m sure that’s right. He’s a very loyal guy. He was Harold’s assistant and did a lot of the work right along with Harold in working for Symington. It turned out that he was appointed, of course. McNamara wouldn’t hear of anybody else. He recommended him to Kennedy, and Kennedy, of course, made the appointment. And Zuckert served longer as Secretary of the Air Force than anybody else, surpassed Symington’s record, who had held it up to them, and did a very fine job, I think. I don’t remember any others particularly that Symington was interested in. One amusing side light. He was down in Florida before he went up to see Kennedy at Hyannis after the Convention and visited there with Orville Freeman [Orville Lothrop Freeman], whom he’d known. Of course, Freeman was first a Humphrey man, and then when Humphrey faded, why, he then became a Kennedy man. Humphrey was for himself, and McCarthy, of course, went for Stevenson. And Freeman’s term as governor was expiring. I think he’d been defeated, hadn’t he? Maybe not. Anyway Symington said, “What shall I tell Jack that you’re interested in?” And Freeman said, “Well, I’d like to be ambassador,” and told him where. The Senator doesn’t remember the country.

[-85-]

I don’t know whether Freeman does or not. And Freeman also said, “The one job I don’t want is Secretary of Agriculture.” So Symington reported this right in to Kennedy and told him, and Kennedy said, “Well, I’ve been thinking about him for Secretary of Agriculture, but I think we can work it out for ambassador,” wherever it was. And here he ended up being the Secretary of Agriculture, the one job that Symington wanted to Heinkel. Heinkel’s situation….I think Kennedy was all ready to move, but I think when he met Heinkel and talked to him, he felt that Fred Heinkel was too old for the job. We didn’t feel that was right because he had a lot of drive, was a good organizer. He’d done a fine job with the MFA [Missouri Farmers Association]. The Senator was completely sold on Fred Heinkel. He thought he would have been an excellent choice. It was a decision that Kennedy made in his own mind, based on his contact with Fred Heinkel. I just don’t know what it was. You know, something that he said, or some feeling of approach to the problems. Heinkel was as strong a supporter, I think, as anybody could have been for Orville Freeman and still is a strong supporter. And I think his counsel, probably, is respected as much as anybody’s counsel in the Department of Agriculture. Frankly, I think Fred was very lucky that he didn’t get the job because it’s an impossible one. But I think that Fred Heinkel thinks that Freeman has done a good job. He thinks he made some mistakes a couple of times in what he’s had to say, taken out of context and so forth, and made a lot of farmers unhappy thinking that Freeman was not fighting for the farmers. But I think, on the whole, Heinkel’s been very well satisfied with Freeman, and we have, too. He’s done about as good as anybody could have done. He’s made a couple of slips that have been picked up out of context.

HACKMAN: Can you think of any other appointments the Senator was particularly interested in?

[-86-]

FIKE: Well, when Fred Heinkel didn’t get the appointment for Secretary of Agriculture, Abby Story [Albert L. Story] of southeast Missouri, Charleston, Missouri, a close friend of ours, the Senator’s, he had been interested in Secretary of Agriculture, but the boss told him that he just could not support two men for it. So then he talked to Freeman and talked to Kennedy about Story for Under Secretary of Agriculture. They evidently offered him an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, but Abby talked to the Senator about it, and together they decided to turn it down. Some of the, particularly the American Bar Association, politicians within the Bar Association, don’t say that critically, but they felt that Jim Meredith [James H. Meredith] had been more interested in politics than he had been in law. There was some question about him raised, but Symington and Long stood fast, and people who knew him and knew him well in the practice of law recommended him without any reservation at all. So the Administration did go ahead and appoint him as a Federal Judge in St. Louis. President Kennedy appointed him, and I think today that he probably is one of the most popular judges in St. Louis. He’s really done a job. The same thing was true with Floyd Gibson in Kansas City when he was appointed. He’d been in the state legislature for twenty years, and the feeling was that he hadn’t tried… [BEGIN SIDE II, TAPE III]…law suits, actually participated in enough court cases. But he’d had excellent background in working actually as a member of the legislature, was a very highly regarded state legislator. And he has done as fine a job as any judge had. When he moved on up, when he was promoted from district court to appellate court, there wasn’t a single criticism of it that I remember. The other four district judges in Kansas City are all Order of the Coif men, all very highly thought of at the time. He never appointed any problems there. No problems about the others in St. Louis.

HACKMAN: Was there any pressure from the Justice Department [United States Department of Justice] or the Administration for Republican appointments in Missouri in these positions?

[-87-]

FIKE: Well, a question was raised about it, but the senators did not see fit to recommend any Republicans. And the people they’ve recommended have been appointed. The same thing is true with the district attorneys, the marshals, and so forth. There hasn’t been anybody for any position in Missouri that Missouri senators have recommended that hasn’t been appointed to that position that I can recall. We haven’t gotten all the people we’ve recommended nationally, but that’s to be expected.

HACKMAN: One thing I wanted to ask you to comment on, and that was just a general comment on the President, his effectiveness with the Senate in getting legislation passed during the Administration and Larry O’Brien’s [Lawrence F. O’Brien] operation.

FIKE: I think Larry O’Brien’s operation was tops, and his representative over here in the Senate, Mike Manatos [Mike N. Manatos], was very good. I think that because Kennedy was elected by such a narrow margin in 1960, that in most instances the senator or the congressman got many more votes that the President did in his state or in his district, they felt pretty independent, felt that they knew more what their people wanted than what the President did. And this made it difficult for the President, for legislation.

HACKMAN: Can you recall any particular areas that Senator Symington disagreed with the Administration or attempted to try to change the President’s mind on, that he was particularly upset about?

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FIKE: No. No. He was a strong supporter of the Peace Corps, Symington was. He was impressed by the idea and Kennedy’s interest in it. He was impressed by Sarge Shriver [R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.] as trying to do the job in that area and worked with him, helped him, I think. He was a new member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But I think he advised a great deal with the President’s people as well as Sarge Shriver about how to go about that. I think actually he encouraged him to come in for more on the Peace Corps than what they had originally thought they might do. If not originally, then on the second go-round, on the second authorization, the appropriation for it. The Senator felt very strongly about the merits of this program. He still does, I think; he still feels this is one of the truly fine programs that were introduced under the Kennedy program. He also supported the Trade Agreement Act of 1962, I think it was, which to me in memory, I think, stand out as the two principal accomplishments in that first Congress.

HACKMAN: Now, one thing you had mentioned last time, you had said you’d like to talk about again. I don’t know if you recall this. And that was the….We had talked about Senator Symington’s problem, or supposed problem, some people saw it as a problem, of being labeled a one issue politician, a defense man. You had said you wanted to talk about that. You had said that the press particularly played this up as a kind of an organized effort to put down Senator Symington. I wonder if you would want to comment further on that.

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FIKE: Well, I think the problem was that he was recognized as such an authority in this field because of his service in the Pentagon and his work on it that whenever he spoke on this, and usually, at that time, during the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] Administration, he was speaking in disagreement with the Administration so that you had a combination both of criticism of the Administration plus the fact that here was a man who was talking about something that he really knew about and was recognized as being an authority. So he got a lot of publicity on this. And also it was a matter of an issue of great concern to a lot of people. And he got much more attention on this than he got on anything else. He went on the Agriculture Committee, for example, to become really familiar with it and did quite a job on there, became thoroughly familiar with the problems of agriculture, really worked at it, studied it. And he served on the Public Works Committee; he was chairman of the Public Buildings Subcommittee. These are not things that really get headlines, like defense do. Of course, when space came along, this was allied to defense, and he’d been a voice crying in the wilderness for quite awhile that we ought to do something about missiles, and tying in with that exploration in space. And when Sputnik went up, why, I think he was perhaps the only appointment to the new Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee who was not at that time a ranking member of any other committee. And, of course, he’d been a leader on the Government Operations Committee back in ’53 and ’54 on the subcommittee at the time of the Army-McCarthy hearings. He’d done battle with Joe McCarthy [Joseph R. McCarthy] when a lot of other people weren’t willing to. And then in ’59 when the issue of birth control came up, I know he spoke out much clearer on it than anybody else did, and it’s now the national policy. What he said at that time was that we should furnish birth control information to any government when the President thought it was in the interest of this government to do so on request from another government. And this, of course, is what we’re doing and have been doing for quite awhile. Eisenhower was namby-pamby about it at that time, Kennedy skirted around the issue, and Stevenson skirted around the issue. There wasn’t anybody that really came out, frankly,

[-90-] on it. It’s now becoming accepted policy of some people in the Catholic Church, really. But at that time, you know, he was one of the first to really speak out frankly on it. Made the best statement of anybody on it, I thought. And I didn’t have anything to do with drafting it. It was done before I saw it, so I can’t claim any credit for it. But whether it gained or lost votes, I’m not sure. Some Catholics, I think, used it to point out the danger of having Symington for President to support their other ideas about it, but, you know, I think he had the guts for it. When he was hammering on defense, Lyndon Johnson, back as far as ’53 and ’54, told him he was just wasting his time, that there was no political appeal in defense, he was wasting his time on it. But he did it because he felt that this was most important. In 1956 I think if he’d gone to work and went out after the nomination, he could have gotten the nomination at that time, in ’56. But he felt that what he was doing on defense then in conducting the air power hearings was more important to the security of the country than what his running for the presidency would be. And also, frankly, he obviously didn’t think the Democrats were going to have much chance against Eisenhower in’56. A lot of other people felt the same way. I don’t think anyone could have won then. If he had gone out and made a good race in 1956 for President, headed the party from ’56 to ’60, I think he could have had the nomination in ’60 without any trouble.

HACKMAN: Well, that’s all I have unless you want to…

FIKE: Fine, Larry, I think you’ve been very patient.

[END OF INTERVIEW]

[-91-] Stanley Fike Oral History Transcript – JFK #3 Name List

A J Allen, James, 69 Johnson, Lyndon B., 76, 77, 90, 91 Arvey, Jacob M., 71, 72 Aylward, Paul L.,, 71 K Kennedy, John F., 68, 72-75, 77-83, 85-90 B Kennedy, Robert F., 78 Blair, James T., Jr., 73, 77, 82, 83 Boyle, Bernard J., 72, 73 L Brooks, Ralph G., 72 Long, Edward Vaughn, 81, 84, 87 Brown, Charles H., 74, 77, 79, 80, 83 Loveless, Herschel Cellel, 70, 75 Butler, Paul M., 68 Lucas, Scott Wike, 71

C M Cannon, Clarence, 70 Manatos, Mike N., 88 Clifford, Clark M.,, 81 McCarthy, Eugene J., 74, 85 Collins, LeRoy, 70 McCarthy, Joseph R., 90 Conrad, Robert B., 72, 73 McCormack, John William, 77 McNamara, Robert S., 81, 85 D Meredith, James H., 87 Daley, Richard J., 72 Dalton, John M., 78, 82, 83 N Des Marais, Philip H., 78 Nacy, Richard R.,, 76, 82, 84 Docking, George, 70, 75 Neblett, Thomas F., 69 Donnelly, Philip M., 74 Nitze, Paul Henry, 81 Dwyer, John J., 76, 78 Nixon, Richard M., 80

E O Eagleton, Thomas F., 82 O’Brien, Lawrence F., 88 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 90, 91 P F Pendergast, James M., 76 Freeman, Orville Lothrop, 85, 86, 87 Powell, Paul Taylor, 71

G R Gibson, Floyd R., 82, 87 Rauh, Joseph L., Jr., 77 Gilpatric, Roswell L., 81 S H Salomon, Sidney, 72 Halloran, Mark R., 76 Shane, Leonard, 69 Hanley, John, 73 Shriver, R. Sargent, Jr., 89 Heinkel, Fred V., 84, 86, 87 Stevenson, Adlai E., 74, 85, 90 Hennings, Thomas Carey, Jr., 81, 82 Story, Albert L., 87 Humphrey, Hubert H., 71, 77, 85 Stuart, Harold,, 85 Hull, William R., Jr., 84 Symington, Stuart, II, 68-78, 80-91

I Inglish, John, 78 T Truman, Harry S., 74

W Welsh, Edward C., 81

Z Zuckert, Eugene M., 84, 85