DOCSLIB.ORG

Conditional Pseudonymity in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Conditional Pseudonymity in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks Diplom Thesis Faculty of Engineering and Computer Science Ulm University Conditional Pseudonymity in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks Florian Marcus Schaub presented on November 13, 2008 Supervisors Prof. Dr.-Ing. Michael Weber Dr. Frank Kargl Advisor Zhendong Ma Faculty of Engineering and Computer Science, Ulm University James-Franck-Ring, 89081 Ulm, Germany This thesis has been prepared in the summer semester 2008 as a requirement for the completion of the Diplom course Medieninformatik at Ulm University. Cover photo: Night blur by Mando Gomez http://www.mandolux.com Printed on November 9, 2008. Some rights reserved. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Germany License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/de/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA. Computer Science is no more about computers than astronomy is about telescopes. Edsger W. Dijkstra Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Problem Analysis 5 2.1 Characteristics of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks . 5 2.2 Security and Privacy in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks . 9 2.3 Conditional Pseudonymity . 14 2.4 Summary . 18 3 Requirements for Privacy in VANETs 19 3.1 Assumptions . 20 3.2 General VANET Requirements . 21 3.3 Pseudonym Requirements . 23 3.4 Authentication Requirements . 28 3.5 Summary . 30 4 Privacy in other Domains 33 4.1 Health Care . 34 4.2 E-Government . 39 4.3 E-Commerce . 43 4.4 Internet . 51 4.5 Ad Hoc Networks . 59 4.6 Summary . 65 5 Research on Privacy in VANETs 67 5.1 Public Key Cryptography . 67 5.2 Symmetric Cryptography . 73 5.3 Group Signatures . 75 5.4 Identity-Based Cryptography . 77 5.5 Other Approaches . 79 5.6 Summary . 81 6 Framework for Conditional Pseudonymity 83 6.1 Pseudonyms with Embedded Identities . 84 6.2 Privacy-Preserving Pseudonym Issuance . 88 6.3 Distribution of Resolution Authority . 94 6.4 Summary . 99 7 Analysis and Discussion 101 7.1 Attack Analysis . 101 7.2 Anonymity Analysis . 106 7.3 Performance Analysis . 108 7.4 Comparison with Requirements . 114 Contents 7.5 Comparison with Other Approaches . 116 7.6 Summary . 117 8 Conclusion 119 Bibliography 123 vi List of Figures 2.1 Communication Technologies in Vehicular Communication Scenarios . 6 2.2 Communication Patterns in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks . 7 2.3 Structure of a Digitally Signed Message . 12 2.4 The Process of Pseudonym Resolution . 17 4.1 Three Ballot Voting . 43 4.2 Carbon Paper-lined Envelope Analogy for Blind Signatures . 45 4.3 Layer Structure of an Onion for Onion Routing . 54 6.1 V-token Structure . 87 6.2 WAVE OBU Certificate Structure . 88 6.3 Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme . 95 6.4 Blakley's Secret Sharing Scheme . 96 7.1 Anonymity Analysis of the Pseudonym Issuance Protocol . 107 7.2 Anonymity Analysis of the Identity Resolution Protocol . 108 7.3 Bandwidth Requirements for Messages with V-tokens . 113 List of Tables 2.1 Dimensions of an Attacker . 10 3.1 Requirements for Privacy in VANETs . 31 6.1 Notation Overview . 85 7.1 Potential Attacks and Prevention Mechanisms . 105 7.2 Comparison of Different Encryption Schemes . 109 7.3 Comparison of Certificate Storage Requirements . 111 7.4 Total Message Sizes for Different Payloads . 112 List of Tables viii List of Acronyms 3G 3rd Generation of mobile phone standards ABS Anti-lock Braking System ACL Access Control List ANODR ANonymous On-Demand Routing ASR Anonymous Secure Routing ARCPO Anonymous Receiver-Contention POsitioning routing BAN Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic C2C-CC Car 2 Car Communication Consortium CA Certificate Authority CALM Communications, Air-interface, Long and Medium range COR Core Onion Router CRL Certificate Revocation List DHT Distributed Hash Table DLP Discrete Logarithm Problem DMV Department of Motor Vehicles DRM Digital Rights Management DoS Denial of Service DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communications ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm EDR Electronic Data Recorder EFF Electronic Frontier Foundation EHR Electronic Health Record ELP Electronic License Plate EML Election Markup Language EPIC Electronic Privacy Information Center ESP Electronic Stability Programme ETP Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions EU European Union FCC Federal Communications Commission GPS Global Positioning System GSM Global System for Mobile communications HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act HMAC keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol IBC Identity-Based Cryptography IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IP Internet Protocol ISO International Standards Organization IR Identity Repository ISP Internet Service Provider ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems IVC Inter-Vehicle Communication List of Acronyms LTP Long-Term Pseudonym MAC Message Authentication Code MANET Mobile Ad hoc NETwork MPC Multi-Party Computation NoW Network on Wheels OASIS Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards OBU On-Board Unit P2P Peer-to-Peer P3P Platform for Privacy Preferences PKI Public Key Infrastructure PRECIOSA PRivacy Enabled Capability In co-Operative Systems and safety Applications PRIME Privacy and Identity Management for Europe RA Resolution Authority RFID Radio-Frequency IDentification RSU Road-Side Unit SeVeCom Secure Vehicular Communication project SK Signature of Knowledge STP Short-Term Pseudonym SPARTA Secure Pseudonym Architecture with Real Time Accounting TCP Transmission Control Protocol TESLA Time Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication TLS Transport Layer Security Tor The Onion Router TPD Tamper-Proof Device TPM Trusted Platform Module TTP Trusted Third Party V2I Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communication V2V Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication VANET Vehicular Ad hoc NETwork VLR Verifier-Local Revocation VSC Vehicle Safety Communications project W3C World Wide Web Consortium WAVE Wireless Access in the Vehicular Environment WSN Wireless Sensor Network ZKPK Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge x 1 Introduction The traffic volume on roads worldwide has been steadily increasing in recent years. According to the annual road statistics report of the European Union Road Federation [60], road transport has been growing with an annual rate of 2.4% in the European Union (EU 27) since 1995|corresponding to about 15.53 million new car registrations every year. Despite the increasing traffic volume, the number of car accidents has been slightly decreasing from 1.43 million accidents involving injury, in 2000, down to 1.28 million, in 2006. The number of fatal accidents even dropped by 23.0% in the same period. This positive development can be partly attributed to the improvement of passive safety systems, like airbags and seat-belt tighteners, which lessen the impact of an accident, but also to the advancement of active safety systems. Active safety systems aim to prevent accidents by warning, supporting, and actively assisting drivers in critical situations. If a collision is inevitable, active safety technology can proactively prepare the vehicle for the impact to reduce injury. Typical active safety systems are traction control, ESP, ABS, and four-wheel drive. In the course of improving active safety, more advanced technologies find their way into vehicles. Sensors of all kinds are employed to measure and assess a vehicle's condition and environment, enabling the issuance of early warnings to drivers. Radar technology, laser systems, and camera sensors detect obstacles on the road and warn drivers, but can also provide parking assistance. Camera sensors can actively scan road sides and alert the driver when the vehicle is unintentionally crossing lines or moving into another lane|seat or steering wheel vibrations can provide corresponding haptic feedback to the driver. All these assistive technologies aim to alert the driver as early as possible to potentially dangerous situations before they occur. The next steps in that direction are cooperative safety systems that leverage wireless communication between vehicles to extend the telematic horizon. Laser sensors can only detect visible obstacles ahead, but vehicles that communicate wirelessly can alert and warn each other, and therefore the drivers, about situations out of sight, e.g. the upcoming end of a traffic jam or a stranded vehicle around the next bend. Inter-vehicle communication (IVC) enables vehicles to continuously exchange messages with other vehicles in their proximity, and establish detailed information about their surrounding environment. Based on this context information, potential dangers can be detected in early stages and appropriate counter-measures can be initiated. With ever increasing traffic density, vehicle-to-vehicle communication can improve road safety in the future. The potential of the technology has been recognized by car manufacturers, governments, and research institutions alike. Many projects of national and international scale are under way worldwide which represent the joint efforts of these stakeholders to develop reliable vehicular communication solutions for commercial use. Simultaneously, the definition of corresponding standards is pursued to ensure interoperability. Although safety is one of the strongest selling points of vehicular communications, the technology has further advantages. Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) [82], consisting of interconnected smart vehicles, can achieve better traffic efficiency and enhance driver convenience, for example by enabling
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Cryptography
    56 Protecting Information With Cryptography Chapter by Peter Reiher (UCLA) 56.1 Introduction In previous chapters, we’ve discussed clarifying your security goals, determining your security policies, using authentication mechanisms to identify principals, and using access control mechanisms to enforce poli- cies concerning which principals can access which computer resources in which ways. While we identified a number of shortcomings and prob- lems inherent in all of these elements of securing your system, if we re- gard those topics as covered, what’s left for the operating system to worry about, from a security perspective? Why isn’t that everything? There are a number of reasons why we need more. Of particular im- portance: not everything is controlled by the operating system. But per- haps you respond, you told me the operating system is all-powerful! Not really. It has substantial control over a limited domain – the hardware on which it runs, using the interfaces of which it is given control. It has no real control over what happens on other machines, nor what happens if one of its pieces of hardware is accessed via some mechanism outside the operating system’s control. But how can we expect the operating system to protect something when the system does not itself control access to that resource? The an- swer is to prepare the resource for trouble in advance. In essence, we assume that we are going to lose the data, or that an opponent will try to alter it improperly. And we take steps to ensure that such actions don’t cause us problems.
    [Show full text]
  • PCI Assessment Evidence of PCI Policy Compliance
    PCI Assessment Evidence of PCI Policy Compliance CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: The information contained in this report document is for the Prepared for: exclusive use of the client specified above and may contain confidential, privileged and non-disclosable information. If the recipient of this report is not the client or Prospect or Customer addressee, such recipient is strictly prohibited from reading, photocopying, distributing or otherwise using this report or its contents in any way. Prepared by: Your Company Name Evidence of PCI Policy Compliance PCI ASSESSMENT Table of Contents 1 - Overview 1.1 - Security Officer 1.2 - Overall Risk 2 - PCI DSS Evidence of Compliance 2.1 - Install and maintain firewall to protect cardholder data 2.1.1.1 - Requirements for firewall at each Internet connections and between DMZ and internal network zone 2.1.1.2 - Business justification for use of all services, protocols and ports allowed 2.1.2 - Build firewall and router configurations that restrict connections between untrusted networks and the cardholder data environment 2.1.2.1 - Restrict inbound and outbound to that which is necessary for the cardholder data environment 2.1.2.3 - Do not allow unauthorized outbound traffic from the cardholder data environment to the Internet 2.1.2.4 - Implement stateful inspection (also known as dynamic packet filtering) 2.1.2.5 - Do not allow unauthorized outbound traffic from the cardholder data environment to the Internet 2.2 - Prohibition of vendor-supplied default password for systems and security parameters 2.2.1
    [Show full text]
  • Self-Encrypting Deception: Weaknesses in the Encryption of Solid State Drives
    Self-encrypting deception: weaknesses in the encryption of solid state drives Carlo Meijer Bernard van Gastel Institute for Computing and Information Sciences School of Computer Science Radboud University Nijmegen Open University of the Netherlands [email protected] and Institute for Computing and Information Sciences Radboud University Nijmegen Bernard.vanGastel@{ou.nl,ru.nl} Abstract—We have analyzed the hardware full-disk encryption full-disk encryption. Full-disk encryption software, especially of several solid state drives (SSDs) by reverse engineering their those integrated in modern operating systems, may decide to firmware. These drives were produced by three manufacturers rely solely on hardware encryption in case it detects support between 2014 and 2018, and are both internal models using the SATA and NVMe interfaces (in a M.2 or 2.5" traditional form by the storage device. In case the decision is made to rely on factor) and external models using the USB interface. hardware encryption, typically software encryption is disabled. In theory, the security guarantees offered by hardware encryp- As a primary example, BitLocker, the full-disk encryption tion are similar to or better than software implementations. In software built into Microsoft Windows, switches off software reality, we found that many models using hardware encryption encryption and completely relies on hardware encryption by have critical security weaknesses due to specification, design, and implementation issues. For many models, these security default if the drive advertises support. weaknesses allow for complete recovery of the data without Contribution. This paper evaluates both internal and external knowledge of any secret (such as the password).
    [Show full text]
  • Cryptographic Control Standard, Version
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Chief Information Officer Computer Security Standard Office Instruction: OCIO-CS-STD-2009 Office Instruction Title: Cryptographic Control Standard Revision Number: 2.0 Issuance: Date of last signature below Effective Date: October 1, 2017 Primary Contacts: Kathy Lyons-Burke, Senior Level Advisor for Information Security Responsible Organization: OCIO Summary of Changes: OCIO-CS-STD-2009, “Cryptographic Control Standard,” provides the minimum security requirements that must be applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) systems which utilize cryptographic algorithms, protocols, and cryptographic modules to provide secure communication services. This update is based on the latest versions of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Guidance and Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publications, Committee on National Security System (CNSS) issuances, and National Security Agency (NSA) requirements. Training: Upon request ADAMS Accession No.: ML17024A095 Approvals Primary Office Owner Office of the Chief Information Officer Signature Date Enterprise Security Kathy Lyons-Burke 09/26/17 Architecture Working Group Chair CIO David Nelson /RA/ 09/26/17 CISO Jonathan Feibus 09/26/17 OCIO-CS-STD-2009 Page i TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................. 1 2 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices
    Fordham Law Review Volume 87 Issue 1 Article 9 2018 Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices Laurent Sacharoff University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons Recommended Citation Laurent Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 203 (2018). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss1/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. UNLOCKING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: PASSWORDS AND ENCRYPTED DEVICES Laurent Sacharoff* Each year, law enforcement seizes thousands of electronic devices— smartphones, laptops, and notebooks—that it cannot open without the suspect’s password. Without this password, the information on the device sits completely scrambled behind a wall of encryption. Sometimes agents will be able to obtain the information by hacking, discovering copies of data on the cloud, or obtaining the password voluntarily from the suspects themselves. But when they cannot, may the government compel suspects to disclose or enter their password? This Article considers the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled disclosures of passwords—a question that has split and confused courts. It measures this right against the legal right of law enforcement, armed with a warrant, to search the device that it has validly seized.
    [Show full text]
  • Pgpfone Pretty Good Privacy Phone Owner’S Manual Version 1.0 Beta 7 -- 8 July 1996
    Phil’s Pretty Good Software Presents... PGPfone Pretty Good Privacy Phone Owner’s Manual Version 1.0 beta 7 -- 8 July 1996 Philip R. Zimmermann PGPfone Owner’s Manual PGPfone Owner’s Manual is written by Philip R. Zimmermann, and is (c) Copyright 1995-1996 Pretty Good Privacy Inc. All rights reserved. Pretty Good Privacy™, PGP®, Pretty Good Privacy Phone™, and PGPfone™ are all trademarks of Pretty Good Privacy Inc. Export of this software may be restricted by the U.S. government. PGPfone software is (c) Copyright 1995-1996 Pretty Good Privacy Inc. All rights reserved. Phil’s Pretty Good engineering team: PGPfone for the Apple Macintosh and Windows written mainly by Will Price. Phil Zimmermann: Overall application design, cryptographic and key management protocols, call setup negotiation, and, of course, the manual. Will Price: Overall application design. He persuaded the rest of the team to abandon the original DOS command-line approach and designed a multithreaded event-driven GUI architecture. Also greatly improved call setup protocols. Chris Hall: Did early work on call setup protocols and cryptographic and key management protocols, and did the first port to Windows. Colin Plumb: Cryptographic and key management protocols, call setup negotiation, and the fast multiprecision integer math package. Jeff Sorensen: Speech compression. Will Kinney: Optimization of GSM speech compression code. Kelly MacInnis: Early debugging of the Win95 version. Patrick Juola: Computational linguistic research for biometric word list. -2- PGPfone Owner’s
    [Show full text]
  • Case Study on the Official Scripts Electronic Applications in Bantul)
    I.J. Information Engineering and Electronic Business, 2017, 4, 1-6 Published Online July 2017 in MECS (http://www.mecs-press.org/) DOI: 10.5815/ijieeb.2017.04.01 The Implementation of Pretty Good Privacy in eGovernment Applications (Case Study on the Official Scripts Electronic Applications in Bantul) Didit Suprihanto Department of Electrical Engineering Universitas Mulawarman, Kalimantan Timur, Indonesia, 75123 Email: [email protected] Tri Kuntoro Priyambodo Department of Computer Sciences & Electronics, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 55281 Corresponding Author Email: [email protected] Abstract—eGovernment application has evolved from the world [1]. The United Nations‘ global survey reports simply appearing as a website providing news and some ICT indicators that point to the measure of how far information, to the application that provides various a nation has gone in the implementation of e-governance services through online transactions. Provision of online such as: 1.E-readiness, 2.Web measure index, 3. transactions require the effectively and safely service, so Telecommunications infrastructure index, 4. Human the users can make sure that the entry data is secure and capital index, 5. E-participation index[2] will not be used by other parties which are not authorized. Information security is a major factor in the service of Security is also necessary for the service provider side of eGovernment. The using of the host to host in previous online transactions, it is necessary to keep the system, and services of eGovernment is considered as lacking in the data transactions sent through the communications security. Therefore, it needs more security to serve clients media and the data stored in the database are secured.
    [Show full text]
  • I2P, the Invisible Internet Projekt
    I2P, The Invisible Internet Projekt jem September 20, 2016 at Chaostreff Bern Content 1 Introduction About Me About I2P Technical Overview I2P Terminology Tunnels NetDB Addressbook Encryption Garlic Routing Network Stack Using I2P Services Using I2P with any Application Tips and Tricks (and Links) Conclusion jem | I2P, The Invisible Internet Projekt | September 20, 2016 at Chaostreff Bern Introduction About Me 2 I Just finished BSc Informatik at BFH I Bachelor Thesis: "Analysis of the I2P Network" I Focused on information gathering inside and evaluation of possible attacks against I2P I Presumes basic knowledge about I2P I Contact: [email protected] (XMPP) or [email protected] (GPG 0x28562678) jem | I2P, The Invisible Internet Projekt | September 20, 2016 at Chaostreff Bern Introduction About I2P: I2P = TOR? 3 Similar to TOR... I Goal: provide anonymous communication over the Internet I Traffic routed across multiple peers I Layered Encryption I Provides Proxies and APIs ...but also different I Designed as overlay network (strictly separated network on top of the Internet) I No central authority I Every peer participates in routing traffic I Provides integrated services: Webserver, E-Mail, IRC, BitTorrent I Much smaller and less researched jem | I2P, The Invisible Internet Projekt | September 20, 2016 at Chaostreff Bern Introduction About I2P: Basic Facts 4 I I2P build in Java (C++ implementation I2Pd available) I Available for all major OS (Linux, Windows, MacOS, Android) I Small project –> slow progress, chaotic documentation,
    [Show full text]
  • Modern End-To-End Encrypted Messaging for the Desktop
    Die approbierte Originalversion dieser Diplom-/ Masterarbeit ist in der Hauptbibliothek der Tech- nischen Universität Wien aufgestellt und zugänglich. http://www.ub.tuwien.ac.at The approved original version of this diploma or master thesis is available at the main library of the Vienna University of Technology. http://www.ub.tuwien.ac.at/eng Modern End-to-End Encrypted Messaging for the Desktop DIPLOMARBEIT zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Diplom-Ingenieur im Rahmen des Studiums Software Engineering and Internet Computing eingereicht von Richard Bayerle Matrikelnummer 1025259 an der Fakultät für Informatik der Technischen Universität Wien Betreuung: Privatdozent Dipl.Ing. Mag. Dr. Edgar Weippl Mitwirkung: Dr. Martin Schmiedecker Wien, 2. Oktober 2017 Richard Bayerle Edgar Weippl Technische Universität Wien A-1040 Wien Karlsplatz 13 Tel. +43-1-58801-0 www.tuwien.ac.at Modern End-to-End Encrypted Messaging for the Desktop DIPLOMA THESIS submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Diplom-Ingenieur in Software Engineering and Internet Computing by Richard Bayerle Registration Number 1025259 to the Faculty of Informatics at the TU Wien Advisor: Privatdozent Dipl.Ing. Mag. Dr. Edgar Weippl Assistance: Dr. Martin Schmiedecker Vienna, 2nd October, 2017 Richard Bayerle Edgar Weippl Technische Universität Wien A-1040 Wien Karlsplatz 13 Tel. +43-1-58801-0 www.tuwien.ac.at Erklärung zur Verfassung der Arbeit Richard Bayerle Seestraße 67 78315 Radolfzell am Bodensee Deutschland Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich diese Arbeit selbständig verfasst habe, dass ich die verwen- deten Quellen und Hilfsmittel vollständig angegeben habe und dass ich die Stellen der Arbeit – einschließlich Tabellen, Karten und Abbildungen –, die anderen Werken oder dem Internet im Wortlaut oder dem Sinn nach entnommen sind, auf jeden Fall unter Angabe der Quelle als Entlehnung kenntlich gemacht habe.
    [Show full text]
  • Analysis of the I2P Network
    Analysis of the I2P Network Degree programme: BSc in Computer Science | Specialisation: IT-Security Thesis advisor: Prof. Dr. Emmanuel Benoist Expert: Daniel Voisard (BAKOM) Providing anonymous online communication is challenging and an 1 important task. Similar to the well-known and -researched TOR project, I2P (Invisible Internet Project) aims to provide this inside its own network. But how secure and protected can a user feel when using I2P? The main objectives of this thesis were to create I2P Observer, a Java program which gathers and publishes information about the I2P network, and to evaluate possible attacks on the software. The I2P Network view pages with accurate data and monthly ones I2P aims to provide anonymous communication bet- where the average for each day is computed. I2P ween participating systems inside an overlay network, Observer is also easily configurable to collect more separated from other Internet traffic. It is written in and more accurate data. Java with versions for Windows, Linux and Mac, pro- viding HTTP- and HTTPS-Proxies for browsing and Theoretical Attacks on I2P APIs to adapt applications to communicate over I2P. The main motivation for this thesis was an evaluation Multiple layers of strong cryptography are used to pro- of I2P’s security, which was researched with 4 dif- tect the content of packets and a mechanism called ferent approaches: Garlic Routing, where multiple messages for the same − Impersonation of a service: Can a user be redirec- destination can be encapsulated, to hide meta data. ted to a malicious server without noticing it? Jens Henning Müller Its NetDB, a database distributed across participating A Clickjacking attack which allows this under cer- [email protected] peers – so called floodfil routers – contains all infor- tain circumstances was found.
    [Show full text]
  • Walking Onions: Scaling Distribution of Information Safely in Anonymity Networks
    Walking Onions: Scaling Distribution of Information Safely in Anonymity Networks by Chelsea Holland Komlo A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Masters of Mathematics in Computer Science Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2020 c Chelsea Holland Komlo 2020 Author’s Declaration This thesis consists of material all of which I authored or co-authored: see Statement of Con- tributions included in the thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. ii Statement of Contributions Walking Onions first originated as a Tor proposal authored by Nick Mathewson [Mat20c], who is a co-author of this work. In this original proposal, Nick proposed the concept of ENDIVEs and SNIPs, as well as the concept of one protocol variant presented in this work which we call Telescoping Walking Onions. Additionally this proposal introduced the concept of bootstrapping using a circuit through a directory cache. Our collaboration on the published version of Walking Onions has since been accepted to the USENIX Security Symposium [KMG20]. In his capacity as co-author of our joint work, Nick created the framework for our bandwidth and CPU performance analysis, and used this framework to assess the performance of Telescop- ing Walking Onions relative to Idealized Tor. Nick also wrote the python script for our real numbers analysis, which we use to compare the performance of Walking Onions in actualized estimates against a simplified Tor-like network.
    [Show full text]
  • Integrating Privacy Enhancing Techniques Into Blockchains Using
    Integrating Privacy Enhancing Techniques into Blockchains Using Sidechains Reza M. Parizi, Sajad Homayoun, Abbas Yazdinejad, Ali Dehghantanha, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo Department of Software Engineering and Game Development, Kennesaw State University, GA, USA [email protected] Department of Computer Engineering and Information Technology, Shiraz University of Technology,Shiraz, Iran [email protected] Faculty of Computer Engineering, University of Isfahan, Iran [email protected] School of Computer Science, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada [email protected] Department of Information Systems and Cyber Security, The University of Texas at San Antonio, TX, USA [email protected] Abstract—Blockchains are turning into decentralized stored on a ledger, never to be erased, but that by nature it exists computing platforms and are getting worldwide recognition for on a blockchain which is irreversibly shared with the entire their unique advantages. There is an emerging trend beyond network. Although the pseudonym nature of blockchains is payments that blockchains could enable a new breed of deemed to protect the users’ identity [4], reputation and privacy decentralized applications, and serve as the foundation for is a very challenging issue because it is still possible to trace Internet’s security infrastructure. The immutable nature of the blockchain makes it a winner on security and transparency; it is back transactions to a specific identity through blockchain nearly inconceivable for ledgers to be altered in a way not instantly analytics techniques. As blockchain technology generally clear to every single user involved. However, most blockchains fall requires the storage and exchange of data on a large scale, it short in privacy aspects, particularly in data protection.
    [Show full text]