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Withdrawn NIST Technical Series Publication Warning Notice The attached publication has been withdrawn (archived), and is provided solely for historical purposes. It may have been superseded by another publication (indicated below). Withdrawn Publication Series/Number NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 4 Title Recommendation for Key Management, Part 1: General Publication Date(s) January 2016 Withdrawal Date May 4, 2020 Withdrawal Note SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4 is superseded in its entirety by the publication of SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5. Superseding Publication(s) (if applicable) The attached publication has been superseded by the following publication(s): Series/Number NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5 Title Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1 – General Author(s) Elaine Barker Publication Date(s) May 2020 URL/DOI https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5 Additional Information (if applicable) Contact Computer Security Division (Information Technology Laboratory) Latest revision of the attached publication Related Information https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/key-management/key-management-guidelines https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/rev-5/final Withdrawal Announcement Link Date updated: May 4, 2020 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 4 Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General Elaine Barker This publication is available free of charge from: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4 C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 4 Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General Elaine Barker Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory This publication is available free of charge from: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4 January 2016 U.S. Department of Commerce Penny Pritzker, Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology Willie May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director Authority This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3541 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130. Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on Federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other Federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-57 Part 1, Revision 4 Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-57 Part 1, Revision 4, 160 pages (January 2016) CODEN: NSPUE2 This publication is available free of charge from: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4 Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by Federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, Federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications. All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) National Institute of Standards and Technology Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory 100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 Email: [email protected] NIST SP 800-57 Pt. 1 Rev. 4 Recommendation for Key Management: General Reports on Computer Systems Technology The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. Abstract This Recommendation provides cryptographic key management guidance. It consists of three parts. Part 1 provides general guidance and best practices for the management of cryptographic keying material. Part 2 provides guidance on policy and security planning requirements for U.S. government agencies. Finally, Part 3 provides guidance when using the cryptographic features of current systems. Keywords archive; assurances; authentication; authorization; availability; backup; compromise; confidentiality; cryptanalysis; cryptographic key; cryptographic module; digital signature; hash function; key agreement; key management; key management policy; key recovery; key transport; originator-usage period; private key; public key; recipient-usage period; secret key; split knowledge; trust anchor. Acknowledgements The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) gratefully acknowledges and appreciates contributions by previous authors of this document on the many security issues associated with this Recommendation: William Barker, William Burr, and Timothy Polk from NIST; Miles Smid from Orion Security; and Lydia Zieglar from the National Security Agency. NIST also thanks the many contributions by the public and private sectors whose thoughtful and constructive comments improved the quality and usefulness of this publication. ii NIST SP 800-57 Pt. 1 Rev. 4 Recommendation for Key Management: General Executive Summary The proper management of cryptographic keys is essential to the effective use of cryptography for security. Keys are analogous to the combination of a safe. If a safe combination is known to an adversary, the strongest safe provides no security against penetration. Similarly, poor key management may easily compromise strong algorithms. Ultimately, the security of information protected by cryptography directly depends on the strength of the keys, the effectiveness of mechanisms and protocols associated with the keys, and the protection afforded to the keys. All keys need to be protected against modification, and secret and private keys need to be protected against unauthorized disclosure. Key management provides the foundation for the secure generation, storage, distribution, use and destruction of keys. Users and developers are presented with many choices in their use of cryptographic mechanisms. Inappropriate choices may result in an illusion of security, but little or no real security for the protocol or application. This Recommendation (i.e., Special Publication (SP) 800-57) provides background information and establishes frameworks to support appropriate decisions when selecting and using cryptographic mechanisms. This Recommendation does not address the implementation details for cryptographic modules that may be used to achieve the security requirements identified. These details are addressed in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140 [FIPS 140] and its associated implementation guidance and derived test requirements (available at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/). This Recommendation is written for several different audiences and is divided into three parts: • Part 1, General, contains basic key management guidance. It is intended to advise developers and system administrators on the "best practices" associated with key management. Cryptographic module developers may benefit from this general guidance by obtaining a greater understanding of the key management features that are required to support specific, intended ranges of applications. Protocol developers may identify key management characteristics
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