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134 Part One: Between the Wars elevators of this country. In this day of aircraft carriers it is quite conceivable that enemy nations might raid this nation, supplying food as a neutral amongst belligerents. Our elevators and our food supplies might be raided, and apart from our essential coast defence our food supplies might be protected in the case of any hostilitie~.~~ When the prime minister concluded the discussion on I 9 February, he referred to the growing influence of airpower and to his previous and longstanding support of aviation, but kept the threat to Canada well in perspective - 'Relatively our danger is small. '59 The government could not, however, ignore its responsibilities. These demanded a policy which would appeal to moderate opinion, convince outsiders of seriousness of purpose, and prepare for some future, and largely undefined, participation in collective action to secure peace. The prime minister's words gave hope to all shades of opinion. Isolationists could take heart from his apparent rejection of an expeditionary force,60 while those who considered an overseas commitment to be inevitable could point to the address as a mandate for action and preparation. 'This speech I read and re-read, ' one defence planner recalled; 'it seemed to me the first positive statement on defence policy made by a leader of a government since Confederation. As such I enthusiastically commended it to my friends? It was hesitant, it was partial, it was a mere beginning, but the rearmament programme sanctioned at the close of the parliamentary debate was probably the most which could be expected in the circumstances. The RCAF,in the process, had been given primary responsibility for Canada's direct defence. As its responsibilities for the country's defence increased, it was natural that the RCAF began to question its status as a subordinate of the militia. It will be recalled that, whether by oversight or design, the air force's status was imprecisely defined at the time it was absorbed by the Department of National Defence in 1922. The RCAF did, however, exercise a certain autonomy in conducting its affairs, and it seemed to be generally assumed that the air force would become a separate military service 'when its expansion so warrants . .'62 In the meantime, a ramshackle administrative system had evolved to accommodate the RCAF.Except for special aeronautical stores supplied by its own technical, research, and supply branch, the RCAF obtained its services - pay, transport, medical, rations, and so on - through regular militia staff channels. Units were under the jurisdiction of regionally based militia districts. In I 932 the RCAF began appointing air staff officers to districts to advise the officer commanding on air matters, especially those pertaining to non-permanent units. On some topics the air staff officer dealt directly with district staffs; others he referred to AFHQ,which would take the question to the adjutant-general or quartermaster-general. Still other issues, such as discipline, lay in administra- tive limbo. Under the provisions of King's Regulations and Orders, district officers commanding had jurisdiction over RCAF officers and airmen in their districts, but RCAF crews based in one district might well operate in several others while on summer civil operations. It was cumbersome at best to determine where final responsibility lay. In I 935 a new quartermaster-general , Brigadier T. V . Anderson, was astonished to find that he was 'unable to find laid down anywhere Towards a Military Air Force I35 what duties the Q. M. G. should carry out in connection with the RCAF.'63 When the chief of the general staff looked more closely he found that his own authority and that of the adjutant-general was equally cloudy, as 'the situation has never been defined . '64 It became evident, moreover, that the RCAF'S military operational require- ments differed functionally from the militia's. As the RCAF member on the interservice Mobilization Committee pointed out, the RCAF'S responsibilities to defend the coasts against surprise attack meant that, unlike the army, it must have fighting units in place well before any formal declaration of war.6s In addition, the operational command of air force squadrons could hardly be left to militia districts organized solely for the peacetime administration of static units. On the east coast, for example, seaward air patrols overflew several militia jurisdictions. Clearly an operational headquarters would be needed which took account of the long-proclaimed air force premise that the air was indivisible. Noting the accumulation of differing army and air force needs, the senior air officer, Air Commodore G .M. Croil ,proposed in I 935 a full-scale reordering of the existing command and administrative structure.66 After reviewing the inadequacies of the current organization, Croil could see two alternatives. The first was to build up all 'the branches of the Air Force Staff, i.e., the Air Staff, Personnel Staff, and Equipment Staff, with armament, photography and signal advisers and the requisite clerical staff in 10 Military Districts. ' This, he thought, would be an inefficient use of scarce resources. Instead, he recommended the formation of four air defence areas, each with its own RCAF Headquarters. Decentralization, Croil concluded, would simplify the command and control of air force operations, facilitate local recruiting and mobilization, and take full account of the flexibility of air units. The militia would retain control over common services - medical, pay, engineering, and rations - and provide them on demand to RCAF units from the nearest The result would be to give the RCAF co-equal service status with the militia and navy. For his own unrecorded reasons, the chief of the general staff ignored Croil's recommendation, deciding instead to increase the air staffs of some military district^.^^ When Croil met Ian Mackenzie in I 935, however, the new defence minister told him that he intended 'to make all three services of equal status. '69 The deputy minister, L.R. LaFkhe, was also sympathetic to the air force's claims, counselling Croil to bide his time and 'continue until change occurred progressively. '70 Croil's next opportunity came over the issue of RCAF representation on the Defence Council, which had been formed in 1922 to offer military advice to the government. The chief of the general staff and chief of the naval staff were members, and together with the adjutant-general and quartermaster-general, the director of the RCAF (from 1932 the senior air officer) was an associate member. In 1936the militia staff proposed that the master-general of the ordnance also be made an associate member. 71 LaFWhe, however, returned the proposal with the suggestion that the senior air officer be elevated to the status of member. When the chief of the general staff demurred, the deputy minister sought the opinions 136 Part One: Between the Wars of the navy and air force. The chief of the naval staff was unequivocal: 'as a member of the Defence Council I am of the opinion that the SAO should be the member of that Council. '72 Croil agreed. Because national defence was the direct concern of all three services, he replied, all must be equally represented in its planning, and 'This co-operation can only be achieved if the requirements and views of the three services receive just consideration. It is felt that each service should be free to express its views and none should be dominated by another. It is clear that unless the Air Force is given a seat on Defence Council, its requirements and views are not brought to the attention of the Minister, and therefore the Government, as clearly and convincingly as those of the other services. As a consequence, the possiblity of a true appreciation of defence requirements is jeopardized. '73 The Defence Council considered the matter at one of its rare meetings on 8 July 1936. The RCAF'S claim touched a raw militia nerve. Major-General Ashton believed that the air force had no reason 'to develop an inferiority complex' and warned that separating the services would be expensive because 'The tendency of officers of the Air Service, as far as I am aware, is to give little consideration to the question of expenditures . .. ' We also objected that the change would disturb the seniority list, leaving 'the Adjutant General, Quartermaster General and Master General of the Ordnance, who are his seniors, in the junior position of Associate Members. ' Ashton was overruled. The minister elevated the senior air officer from associate member to member within a week.74The change was an important symbolic step towards full service independence. Croil was not content to leave the matter there. He continued to point out to the chief of the general staff that the RCAF needed to control more of its own internal affairs in order to implement its increasing responsibilities. 'The original intention,' he pointed out in 1937, 'in bringing the three Services together into one Department was to effect an economy in the provision of the common requirements. The authority ordering this concentration did not include or suggest any merging of the three .Services into one homogeneous whole. That it was intended that each of the three services should retain its individuality and control its policy and administration is apparent. It is presumed that the intention was also that, inasfar as the common provision of the common requirements is concerned, these should when practicable be handled by the Service best equipped to handle the particular work for the other services. This procedure,' the senior air officer cautioned, 'was not intended to embrace all aspects of the ''common requirements." For instance, there is no argument in favour of concentrating in the hands of one Service, matters which can be equally well carried out by the existing personnel of the other services.

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