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Signalling Systems Guidelines of the Finnish Transport Agency 7/2014 - RATO 6 SIGNALLING SYSTEMS RATO 6 Draft version 27.2.2014 This document is the English translation of the RATO Part 6 “Signalling Systems”, accepted in March 2014. It deals with the design, construction and maintenance of signalling systems used on the rail network governed by the Finnish Transport Agency. RATO is an abbreviation from the Finnish words “Ratatekniset ohjeet”. RATO is a set of technical guidelines by the Finnish Transport Agency. It is applied to work performed on the state rail network. In case of conflicts between the Finnish and English versions, the original Finnish version is valid. Guidelines of the Finnish Transport Agency 7/2014 - RATO 6 2 RATO 6 Contents CONTENTS 6 SIGNALLING SYSTEMS ........................................................................................... 9 6.1 DEFINITIONS, SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS .......................................... 9 6.1.1 Symbols ............................................................................................................... 20 6.1.2 Abbreviations ...................................................................................................... 20 6.2 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SIGNALLING SYSTEMS ......................................... 21 6.2.1 General ................................................................................................................ 21 6.2.1.1 Engineering configuration requirements for signalling systems planning ................................................................................................................ 21 6.2.1.2 Effect of maximum track speed in signalling systems planning .... 22 6.2.1.3 Signalling apparatus code ................................................................... 22 6.2.2 Interlocking system ............................................................................................ 22 6.2.2.1 Computerised interlocking system ..................................................... 22 6.2.2.2 Relay interlocking system .................................................................... 22 6.2.2.3 Mechanical interlocking system .......................................................... 23 6.2.2.4 Area key lock system with signals ...................................................... 23 6.2.2.5 Area key lock system ............................................................................ 24 6.2.3 Signals and signal aspects ............................................................................... 24 6.2.3.1 Main signal aspects .............................................................................. 27 6.2.3.2 Block signal aspects ............................................................................. 27 6.2.3.3 Distant signal aspects .......................................................................... 27 6.2.3.4 Shunting signal aspects ....................................................................... 28 6.2.3.5 Combined signal .................................................................................... 28 6.2.3.6 Signal aspects of other signals ........................................................... 29 6.2.3.7 Radio signal operation .......................................................................... 29 6.2.3.8 Aspect abbreviations ............................................................................ 29 6.2.3.9 Control lines in a new interlocking system ........................................ 30 6.2.3.10 Control lines in interlocking system to be modified ....................... 35 6.2.3.11 Fictive aspects in a centralized ATP control ................................... 40 6.2.4 Track vacancy proving ...................................................................................... 44 6.2.5 Line block ............................................................................................................ 44 6.2.6 Connecting a point to signalling apparatuses ............................................... 44 6.2.7 Route track .......................................................................................................... 46 6.2.8 Main route ........................................................................................................... 47 6.2.8.1 Main route overlap ................................................................................ 48 6.2.9 Shunting route .................................................................................................... 48 6.2.10 Level crossing system ..................................................................................... 49 6.2.11 Signalling system commands and indications ............................................ 49 6.2.11.1 Commands ........................................................................................... 49 6.2.11.2 Indications ............................................................................................ 49 6.2.12 User manual ..................................................................................................... 50 Guidelines of the Finnish Transport Agency 7/2014 - RATO 6 3 RATO 6 Contents 6.3 INTERLOCKING SYSTEM .................................................................................. 52 6.3.1 General ................................................................................................................ 52 6.3.2 Track section ...................................................................................................... 52 6.3.3 Signal ................................................................................................................... 52 6.3.4 Point, derailer and stopping device ................................................................. 53 6.3.4.1 Powered point ........................................................................................ 54 6.3.4.1.1 Controlling and monitoring of a powered point .................... 54 6.3.4.1.2 Automatic point operation ....................................................... 55 6.3.4.1.3 Individual point operation ........................................................ 55 6.3.4.1.4 Point operation by a local operation button .......................... 56 6.3.4.1.5 Trailed point ............................................................................... 56 6.3.4.2 Point equipped with a hand lever ....................................................... 56 6.3.4.3 Free of fouling restrictions ................................................................... 57 6.3.4.4 Powered derailer and stopping device .............................................. 58 6.3.4.5 Derailer and stopping device equipped with a hand lever .............. 58 6.3.4.6 Standard diamond crossing ................................................................. 59 6.3.4.7 Key box ................................................................................................... 59 6.3.5 Main route ........................................................................................................... 60 6.3.5.1 Setting a main route .............................................................................. 61 6.3.5.1.1 Disabling block conditions ....................................................... 63 6.3.5.1.2 Main route to an occupied track. ............................................ 63 6.3.5.1.3 Main route flank protection ..................................................... 64 6.3.5.1.4 Main route overlap ................................................................... 65 6.3.5.2 Releasing a main route ........................................................................ 73 6.3.5.3 Cancelling a main route ....................................................................... 73 6.3.5.3.1 Signal approach zone .............................................................. 74 6.3.5.4 Emergency releasing of a main route ................................................ 75 6.3.5.5 Functions of a main signal connected to shunting signals on a main route ............................................................................................................ 75 6.3.6 Shunting route .................................................................................................... 75 6.3.6.1 Setting a shunting route ....................................................................... 75 6.3.6.2 Releasing a shunting route .................................................................. 76 6.3.6.2.1 Automatic release of an unused shunting route .................. 77 6.3.6.3 Cancelling a shunting route ................................................................. 77 6.3.7 Automatic functions of the route ...................................................................... 77 6.3.8 Line ....................................................................................................................... 78 6.3.8.1 Block conditions .................................................................................... 78 6.3.8.2 Line point monitoring ............................................................................ 80 6.3.9 Local point operation permission ..................................................................... 81 6.3.9.1 Local point operation permission monitoring .................................... 81 6.3.9.2 Forming and protecting a local point operation group ..................... 82 6.3.9.3 Returning local point operation permission ....................................... 86 6.3.9.4 Local point operation
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