Cold War at Sea

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Winkler submitted to the Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History Chai Robert L. BeiSiij David A. Rosenberg to o Dean ophe College 1998 The American University m i Washington, D.C. 20016 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 9826685 Copyright 1998 by Winkler, David Frank All rights reserved. UMI Microform 9826685 Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. O COPYRIGHT by David F. Winkler 1998 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. COLD WAR AT SEA THE MARITIME CONFRONTATION ON AND OVER THE HIGH SEAS BETWEEN THE STATED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1945 - 1989 BY David F. Winkler ABSTRACT Because of the freedom for all nations to travel on and over the high seas, U.S. and Soviet naval and air forces came into to daily direct contact during the Cold War. This contact was not always peaceful. During the late 1940s and 1950s, a U.S. surveillance effort at times penetrated Soviet airspace, provoking Soviet attacks. The narrative details the air incidents and follows the diplomatic efforts to contain the violence. Both sides exchanged notes and used the U.N. as a forum to air grievances. Traditional diplomatic efforts produced mixed results. During the 1960s, the Soviet Union became a major sea power with merchant, fishing fleets and a blue water navy. U.S. Navy ships and aircraft came into contact with these vessels worldwide. Each side charged harassment and collisions occurred. In April 1968, the U.S. proposed safety at sea talks. The Soviets accepted the proposal in November 1970 and an Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) was signed in Moscow in May 1972. The agreement passed its first major test during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. ii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. During the 1970s and 1980s, naval officers met annually to discuss the effectiveness of the accord. After several benign years, changes in U.S. policy and strategy placed U.S. and Soviet ships into greater contact. As Afghanistan, KAL 007, and other events soured U.S.-Soviet relations, INCSEA became the only direct military-to-military contact and served as a venue to discuss other issues of concern. With small exceptions, the behavior of naval and air forces remained correct and professional. During the 1980s, the United States implemented an aggressive Freedom of Navigation (FON) program, testing Soviet territorial claims. During a FON demonstration in the Black Sea during February 1988, two Soviet warships rammed two American warships. The resolution o f this incident concluded the Cold War at Sea. In contrast to conventional diplomatic channels, the navy-to-navy channels established under INCSEA had greater success in modifying the behavior of the two navies. This dissertation examines this observation and concludes by looking at the implications o f the Cold War at Sea in the post-Cold War world. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The impetus for this dissertation came in November 1984 in the Sea of Japan. I was the Officer in Charge of a Military Detachment assigned to provide communications support to the Military Sealift Command oiler USNS N avasota. In those waters off Siberia, the N avasota participated in a fleet exercise involving three carrier battle groups. Naturally, our presence provoked a Soviet response, yet I was impressed how the two sides interacted. With the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) communications mechanism in place, I noted that the two sides acted with great professionalism and avoided the potential for danger. I remember wondering to myself how the INCSEA regime came into place. As I embarked to answer that question, many have assisted in my research or have provided inspiration. As a student at Washington University in St. Louis from January 1988 to May 1991, I conducted my initial research on the subject. Dr. James W. Davis served as my advisor and helped refine a “Directed Research Project” that explored the negotiation of the INCSEA accord. Sean-Lynn Jones of Harvard University’s Center for Science and International Affairs provided background materials he had used for an INCSEA article published in 1985 in International Security. Lynn-Jones’ assistance was important, as I received no support from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP 616). My research was not welcomed because the Navy had no interest in publicizing the accord. iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Fortunately, I received assistance from retired Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, a veteran INCSEA delegation member and from Bernard Cavalcante o f the Naval Historical Center, who provided some declassified documents from the 1970s. Upon graduating from Washington University in May 1991 with an M.A. in International Affairs, I received my first shipment of documents I had requested from the State Department through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). As the shipments kept arriving, I realized I had the core materials for a dissertation covering more than the negotiation of an accord. Should I pursue a doctorate? Having left eleven years of active duty in the Navy, I credit President George Bush for presiding over a lousy economy that kept me unemployed and Professor Emeritus J. H. Hexter of Washington University who urged me to further my education. Dr. Hexter was one of the most inspirational men I have had the privilege to meet and I still mourn his passing in December 1986. As to where to further my education, Captain Jim Bryant made me an offer I couldn’t refuse. As the new OP 616 on the Navy Staff, Captain Bryant came across my directed research project, called, and invited me to come to Washington to explore how INCSEA could apply to the Middle-East peace process. Together, we drafted a presentation that was given by Vice Admiral Leighton Smith to visiting Arab and Israeli delegations on May 12,1992. After the success of the presentation, Bryant asked if I could work for him as a naval reservist. Assured of part-time income, I accepted an offer to study at American University. Relocated to Washington, I began to refine a rough dissertation draft I had written in St. Louis. Norman Polmar persuaded me to focus on incidents on and over the high v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. seas as documents discussing submarine operations would not be available for decades. Dr. Charles McLoughlin and Dr. Michael Kazin helped me polish seminar papers that formed the basis for two chapters. At the Pentagon, Captain Bryant introduced me to numerous individuals having an interest in the topic. Helpful contacts included Dr. Stan Weeks, Science Applications International Corporation; Dr. Charles Meconis, Institute for Global Security Studies; Dr. James Tritten, Naval Doctrine Command; Michael Krepon, Henry Stimson Center, Rear Admiral Robert P. Hilton Senior, Institute for Defense Analysis; Commander Howard Sidman, Department of State; George Fedoroff, National Maritime Intelligence Center; Commander Sam Tangredi, Office of the Secretary of the Navy; Lauren Van Metre, Office o f the Secretary of Defense; Rear Admiral William H. Wright IV, currently serving in the Office o f the Secretary of Defense; and Lieutenant Commander David N. Griffins of the Canadian Maritime Command. With the 1992 Navy reorganization, OP 616 became N312Q. Other officers within N312Q who reviewed various INCSEA articles and point papers I wrote included Jim Bryant’s successors: James Voter and Louis Hughes, as well as Captain Jon Barker, Captain Louis Boink, Captain Larry Brennan, Commander Richard Massey, Lieutenant Commander Tim Meier, Lieutenant Commander Eric Anderson, Lieutenant Commander Wayne Noble, Lieutenant Commander Brian Eidson, and Nancy Shimp.

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