Air University Quarterly Review: Fall 1949, Vol. III, No. 2

Home , Air Commodore, George Lenczowski, Military administration, Oliver La Farge, Tactical air force, Tactical bombing

EDITORIAL STAFF

Major Kenneth F. Gantz, Ph.D., Editor Captain Edmond N. Gates, Assistant Editor Grace G. Lane, Editorial Secretary

EDITORIAL BOARD

Colonel James W. Chapman, Jr., C S Education, President Colonel George E. H enry, Deputy Commandant, AWC Colonel John C. H orton, Deputy Commandant, AC&SS Colonel Joseph Ladd, Deputy Chief, Evaluation Division L ieutenant Colonel Jack L. Bentley, AU Secretary Dr. Charles M. T homas, Dept. of the Air Force Library Mr. A lder M. Jenkins, Publications Section, Academic Div.

ATTENTION Views expressed in this journal are those of the authors, and are not to beconstrued as the official opinions or policies of the Department of the Air Force or the Air University. The purpose of this journal is to stimulate healthy discussion of Air Force problems which may ultimately result in improvement of our national security. Appropriate contributions of pertinent articles and correspondence which present new views, or refute or support old ones, are solicited.

THE U nited States Air Force AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

V olume III FALL 1949 N umber 2

IDEAS ARE WEAPONS 3 C ol. D avid Burchinal, USAF INDUSTRIAL VULNERABILITY IN THE ATOMIC AGE 13 L t . C ol. G eorge R. C harlton, USAF A MATTER OF NOMENCLATURE 24 J. M. S paight HUMAN RELATIONS IN UNIFICATION 30 C ol. J oseph C. R eddoch, USAF SENTINELS OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY 3:5 M aj. J ohn D. R eid, USAF IN >IY OPINION . . . Limitations of an Air Defense System 4(j L t . C ol. H arry M. Pike, U S A F Troop Carrier Aviation in the USAF 43 Lt. C ol. L eroy M. S tanton. USAF Military Responsibilities in the Atomic Age 5 j Col. J ulian M. C happell, USAF Tactical Support Aviation in the USAF 53 Lt Col. H oward D. S utterlin, USAF AIRMAN S READING 55 Stahn. Maj. Kenneth F. Gantz, USAF; The Foreign Policy of Soviet Rússia, Eugene M. Emme; Rússia and the Wesf in Iraiw Robert W. Schmidt; Japan, Enemy or Ally?, Paul E. Eckel; The Royal Air Force in the World War, Vol. III, Air Commo- dore H. E. Nowell, RAF: Military Justice under the 1948 Arnended Articles of War. Maj. Ira H. Smith, USAF; Haud- book for Spies. Maj. Robert E. Work, USAF; An Army in Exile, Lt. Col. Joseph L. Dickman, USAF: Briefer Comment.

VIR ANTHOLOGY 80

FOREIGN HORIZONS 88

EDITOR S NOTES Í)ÍJ

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Puoibhed quarterly by the Air University. Maxwell Air Force Base. Alabama. The primir.i e.Püb lcatl0Ii b,>en aPProved b>' ^ e Dlrector of the Bureau oí the Budget. 17 Jujk-, Students and faculty oí »he Air Unlverslty schools are provided íree copies as tcxiuai r. nn o r.r *UHd by F‘! ‘d PrlnMn,? P!an''- AU- Price. single copy. 50 cents; vearlv subscrl,- a? k s2 J Address orders to Air Universlty Book Department. Maxwell Air Force Ba.se. Alabama Properly credited quotations are authorized. ^ — ...... ------— The QUARTERLY REV1EW offers a prize of twenty-five dollars for the best GUEST EDITORIAL submitted for each issue. Entries will be judged by the Editor and the Editorial Board, whose judgment of quality and suitability for publication will be final. Right to reject all entries is reserved. Closing dates for receipt of submissions are 1 November, 1 February, 1 May, and 1 Angust. All entries are considered offered for general publication in the REVIEW (non-winners used entire or in part will be awarded a year's subscription). Topics of timely concern to the Air Force or closely related to air power should be ireated from a firm point of view in 800 to 1000 words. Mark entries for PRIZE EDITORIAL CONTEST. The QU ARTERLY REVIEW also offers a year’s sub scription for LETTERS TO THE EDITOR published en tire or in part. Comment is invited on any of the materiais we print or books we review— or brief discussion of other matters. Three hundred words or less luill normally be used, but longer letters will be considered in accord with general significance. Mark LETTER TO THE EDITOR.

...... Ideas are Weapons

COLONEL DAVID A. BURCHINAL

HE most powerful weap ons of war, both in its preparato- ry p ha se a n d i n i ts p ha se of eecution, are fou n d i n the minds of men. We call these weap on s i deas. T he out- standingT contribution that a m ili ta ry i n sti tu ti on such as the Air War College can m ake is to en gen der in its students the ability to think soundly, logi ca lly, and analytically and to gen era te i deas. Sound ideas stem from th e p rocess of thinking and provide the m ea n s for the solution of problem s whi ch are novel, Solu ti on s whi ch a re n ot fou n d i n the field of eperience. Ideas resulti n g from logi ca l, analytical rea s on i n g a re th e on lv accep table avenues for a p p roa chi n g an d trea ti n g wi th the n ovel problem . T oda y our military forces a re fa ced wi th a n overri di n g requi rem en t— the requi rem en t to find Solutions to problem s hidden in the future and not yet fou n d wi thi n the field ol eperience. Stated another way, sound ideas l ading to effecti ve problem solution are the n um ber- one requi rem en t of the m i li ta ry forces today. In this article I would li k e to trea t wi th som e p ast m i litary failures and the thinking processes which insp ired them , with lessons which have been derived from these failures by present- day thinking, and with som e of the m ore p rovoca ti ve i deas which have been advanced as a result of these lessons. T he factors involved in an an alytical trea tm en t of World War II are m ulti p le, com p le , a n d i n som e i n s ta n ces con trovers i a l. Military considerations are so intermingled wi th p olitical fac tors that a clear relationship of cause a n d effect cannot be establi shed wi thou t e ten si ve e a m i n a ti on an d an alysis. Since such trea tm en t wou ld be well beyond the scope of thi s a rti cle,

The views expressed in this article are not the official views of the Department of the Air Force or of the Air University. The purpose of the article is to stimulate healthy discussion of Air Force problems which may ultimately result in improvement of our national security. 4 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

I will endeavor to trea t p ri m a ri ly with the military factors involved and wi th m i litary thinking that resulted i n certa i n importa n t courses of a cti on . A prime factor in the m ilitary defeat of both G ermany and Japan can be tra ced to faulty thinking—thinking which per- m itted us decisive advantage. Germany in parti cu lar furnished many e amples. In her prep aration for World War II Germany had no imped- iment in the form of obsolete structure of doctrine to serve as a deterren t to sound, m odern strategy. She enjoy ed a ll the benefits of the initiative, a very vital advantage in the conduct of war. She could concei ve her strategy and proceed a t on ce to its i m p lem en ta ti on wi thou t the n eed for shedding obsolescent equ i p m en t. T h i s i n substa n ce she di d, bu t the sha dow of the German General Staff was evi den t i n her strategy of surface conquest— invasion and capture by land blockade, isolation, and strangulation by sea. In support of this traditional strategy she p rodu ced a short- range, tactical air army, erron eou sly thou ght of as an air force, to su p p ort b litzkrei g techn i ques. The blitzkreig was not new it merely e ploi ted sp eed an d mobility, which are ti m e hon ored fundam entais of war. Ger many beli eved th a t the success of her surface strategy would result in a successful war. But Germ any did not visualize England as a geographical com p on en t of Europ e p rop er. She therefore felt tha t i f she m oved the B ritish forces back to the B ritish Isles and kep t them there, she had rem oved the second front. S he di d n ot foresee the very active primary fron t— th a t i n the a i r—which soon develop ed from the B ritish Isles. In support of tha t p a rt of her basic strategy which called for isolation, blockade, and strangulation of the B ritish Isles, Germany enjoy ed the sam e a dva n ta ges of initiative and modem equipment. Once again faulty thi n k i n g reduced the effecti ve- ness of her military course of a cti on . E ven thou gh she was the prime prop on en t of the su bm a rine, Germany built an d com- mitted only fifty- three subm ari nes at the outbreak of war. This inadequate num ber—actually only two months of her produ c- tion in 194 — ensured tha t the objecti ves of isolation, block ade, and strangulation would n ot be achi eved, because the force com m i tted lacked the physical cap aci ty to achieve those results. I t further ensured tha t her belated efforts a t i n creased produ cti on wou ld fa.il, because she had provi ded the A llies with IDEAS ARE WEAPONS

the ti m e n ecessa ry to develop successful coun ter-measures. I n 194 , by the tim e she had realized significant production, Germany built two hu n dred and ei ghty - ei ght subm arines. In the same year the Allies sank two hundred and five and lost less m erchant ship p ing tonnage than in 1942. In the cornm ission of these fundam ental errors in thinking Germany proceeded to add error to error. She moved to Dun- kirk, where the British were com m i tti n g the rem n an ts of th ei r F i gh ter C om m a n d to the esta b lishment of a cap over the beaches. Because of the li m i ted range of thei r a i rcra t the British fighters were orced to spend most of th ei r ti m e en rou te to and rom the Dunkirk beaches. Actually less th a n fifteen per cen t of the British Fighter Command was concentrated at a n y on e ti m e i n the a i r over the bea ches. T h e G erm a n ha d on ly to apply the principies of war to air action, and the less tha n five hundred British fighters could have been knocked out of the a i r i n two da y s. G erm a n y cou ld have p ut overwhelm ing numbers against this stationary cap and destroyed it as it was com m i tted. I m m edi a te e p loi ta ti on of her air sup rem acy could have ensured that there would never be an aerial battle for B ri tai n . T h rou gh ou t the wa r the G erm a n A i r F orce n ever h a d a thi n k i n g com m a n der. Germany had great commanders on the ground and at sea in Romm el they p ossessed on e of the foremost military leaders of all ti m es. B u t to ou r good fortu n e G oering com m anded the L uftwa ffe. W e e p loi ted hi s bu n gling and in so doing gained our decisive air vi ctory m uch m ore easi ly than m ight otherwise have been possibe. L et me cite one from m a n y su ch errors in thinking, because this one had im pact on the en ti re E u rop ea n war. On December 2 , 194 , Goering issued a fateful order. By this time we had become quite well acqu ai n ted wi th G oeri n g and hi s staff. We were i n ten si fying ou r air offensive in preparation for the i n vasi on of Normandy. Goering’s evaluation of ou r air weapons and capabilities ran som ething like this: The main threat to Germany was the Allied daylight bomber German fighter pilots shou ld therefore avoid our fi ghters and con cen trate on the bom bers. T his decision gave us a free hand in em ploy i n g our fighter forces a ga i n st hi s. W e esti m a ted th a t i f he would i n si st on ca rry i n g ou t thi s order for si weeks, our losses would not be heavy in terms of tota l war, but at the end of thi s ti m e he wou ld have no fighter force. 6 AIR UN1VERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

Our target in the German Air Force was the pilot, because he represented the quality factor in that fighter force. After six weeks the quality factor disappeared írom the fighter cockpit, and the air war was over. Numerical replacements were readily available, but the quality was gone. Numbers alone are no substitute for pilot skill. In his failure to sense the way of air war, to apply the principies of war, to think through his military problem, Goering permitted his force to be destroyed. The results of this air victory were far-reaching. Instead of sending in fighter groups thirty-six and forty-eight strong we broke them down into units of eight and four. Instead of mass- ing our bombers against three or four targets we could now attack multiple targets with smaller units. The collapse of the German Air Force multiplied our capabilities immediately. The European Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that as a result of air attack Germany was mortally wounded by the beginning of 1945 and that she would have had to cease any effective fighting within a matter of months. They might have added that the task was made incalculably easier by faulty military thinking on the part of the German commanders.

I h E conduct of the Pacific war by Japan likewise offers many cases in proof of the statement that sound thinking and logical, reasonable ideas are a military necessity, though the evidence in this instance is of a negative character. With the attack at Pearl Harbor the initiative in the Pacific war and its advantages passed to the Japanese. Apparently they had no strategist on their stafís who could sense the importance of geography and its vital relationship to their war objectives. They failed to realize the strategic location of the Hawaiian Islands, for Japan could have taken them readily and quickly. We could not defend them. The loss of this key stepping-stone would have had a far-reaching effect on our ability to maintain the long lines of Communications across the Pacific and would have proved most difficult and expensive to surmount. Having been provided the Hawaiian Islands as a staging and suply base, we were able to develop smaller islands along the vital route to Australia and in fact establish the sea lanes of supply and reinforcement necessary to our forces in the South west Pacific-Australia area and in the South Pacific-Solomons IDEAS ARE WEAPONS

area. F a i lure to think the problem throu gh had com p ounded the m i litary difficulties which immediately beset Japan. By providing us with ready access to our forces, J ap an thu s ensured th a t the wa r i n the P a ci fic would be p rolon ged u n ti l we could outp rodu ce her and overwhelm her wi th the wei gh t of ou r attack. To be sure, other errors in thinking and evalution alon g the way hastened our victory in the Pacifi c. T h e ca rri er a i r du els at Coral Sea and Midway bruised us, but Japan lost the initia- ti ve i n the P a ci fic war. Two months later we invaded Guada- can al. Being unable to rep lace her ca rri er losses as readi ly as we could, J ap an com m i tted her tota l Naval air arm to land- based outpost op eration in the S olom on s- N ew G u i n ea area. P i ecem eal, outpost comm itment gave us numerical advantage an d p erm i tted destru cti on of those a i r forces as they were com mitted. As the e pansion of ou r mobilization base became effecti ve at the fighting fron t, ou r significant superiority over the J a p a n ese em erged. B y N ovem b er of 194 the Japanese Naval Air Force appro imated one-third of its status at the ti m e of Pearl Harbor. B u t the J a p a n ese I m p eri a l Staff had traveled so ar down the p a th of try i n g to hold her outp ost bases that J ap an sacri- fi ced an even grea ter cap abi lity. Specifically she com m i tted and deploy ed her A rm y air units to N ew G uinea in the sam e p i ecem eal fashi on and saw them qui ckly and easily destroyed. By April 1944, after hea vy losses at W ewak and H ollandia, her Army Air Force was reduced to less th a n ten p er cen t of its December 1941 cap ability. The Strategic Bombing Survey in the P a ci fi c was m oved to S tate: “ B y the en d of 194 we had a chi eved throu gh com ba t an d the a u gm en ta ti on of ou r forces, such clear-cut superiority over the J a p a n ese i n a ll elem en ts of A i r P ower that even tual victory was assured. Perhaps I have belabored thi s p oi n t p erhap s we do n ot need such rerninders that wars can be won— and lost— i n the m i n ds of men. But if we can thus i solate some of the flaws in p ast military thinking, then it follows that there are lessons tha t may be derived from the res u ltm g m i litary action. We can profitably use these lessons as an e p erien ce base from wh i ch sound ideas m ay be generated, ideas which should assist in solving the novel military problem . L et us look a t som e of these lessons. 8 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

I he military strategy of the last war, both Axis and Allied, was founded on a basic recognition that decisive results in war would occur as a result of land or sea action. From two land forces locked in combat stemmed the basic strategy involving “ capture.” That land force which achieved decisive supremacy over the other could, through surface maneuvering, exploit its supremacy by physical occupation of its opponenfs vitais. On the seas this decisive action involved the defeat of one sea force by the other. Exploitation of sea victory permitted a basic strategy of blockade, isolation, and strangulation when the enemy nation depended for its life on seaborne commerce. The actual course of the war did not íollow the strategic plans as originally conceived but emerged as a compromise course because of the impact of a new military truth— that the decisive categories of war had been increased from a historie two to a revolutionary three. Specifically air power became a decisive category in that war. In terms of basic strategy and tactical application air power, like land and sea power, has its own peculiar characteristics. It is, unlike the land force, poorly suited to capture. It is ideally suited to disarming and immobilizing the opposition. Like the sea force it can blockade, isolate, and strangle, but its objectives may include both enemy surface forces and the economic life of the enemy nation. No surface barriers exist which can keep it from its target. To complement the concept that air power can be decisive through operations in its own médium, another startling fact became clear. In achieving its decisive stature, air power had changed the nature of land and sea warfare. No longer could land or sea forces choose their time and place for engaging enemy forces in independent action. The vulnerability of sur face struetures and the relatively slow rate of movement of surface forces made them profitable targets for air attack. It soon became apparent that control of the air was essential to the success of any surface engagement. Referring to the cross- channel invasion, General Eisenhower stated that the air achievement was so complete that all other surface operations could be conducted in complete security. Further examination into and analysis of the sequence of IDEAS ARE WEAPONS 9

military events reveals another lesson of singular im portance, closely related to control of the ai r. Decisive air action precedes decisive acti on between sur ace forces. I n the P a ci fic war decisive ai r acti on si m ulta n eou sly comprised decisive naval action, for wi th the loss of her ca rri ers a n d ca rri er a i r grou p s Japan lost a n y vesti ge of sea sup rem acy she m i ght have once claimed. This lesson is dramatically recognized by our own Navy in its pronouncement that “Sea Power is Air Power. Another lesson convincingly demonstrated involves aerial defense. O ur Air Force, on ce launched against a target, went to the ta rget. I t wa s n ever stop p ed. I n term s of p rep ared attack the sa m e held true for the G ermans. They elected to stop , ollowi n g heavy losses over L ondon, but no op erati on launched against that City ailed to reach it and bomb it. The signi icant fea tu re i s th a t a i r p ow er does n ot h a ve th e ca p a b i lity, in terms of reasonable com m i tm en ts , to p rovi de a i r b a rri ers or cap s i n defen se of surface structures. The air weapon, by virtue of its fleibility, range, and speed, possesses cap acity to p en etrate any known type of defense. T here are m a n y other areas i n whi ch we m a y p rofit from the m i sta k es of ou r enem i es. W hen G erm a n y an d J ap an bega n to lose a i rcra ft in combat at a more rapid rate than they had a n ti ci p a ted, they step p ed up p rodu cti on to such a n e ten t th a t during the course of the wa r, even after the deci si ve a i r ba ttles were lost, th ey h a d a n ever increasing number of com bat a i r craft. T h ey a ttem p ted to rep la ce th ei r a i r losses wi th num erical qu a n ti ti es. W h a t they ha d failed to see and p rovi de for was tha t rep lacem ent dem anded qu ali ty i n the cockp i t, n ot m ere numbers. In Novem ber 1944 G ermany had her largest num er ical order of battle, but she was incap able of effecti ve air op eration. Coincidentally Japan likewise reached a peak in numbers of com bat a i rcra ft, but the ea rly-war pilot- e p eri en ce of nearly seven hundred hours had bccn whittled down to about two hu n dred hours. W hen her planes carn e i n to the a i r, th ey carne as clay pigeons, and were shot down at an average ratio of between thirty and forty to one. G erm an qu ality was reduced to forty - five hours of fly i n g e p eri en ce. W i th ou t firing a shot, these p ilots cou ld be forced to ban k, sp i n , an d crash. W e were n u m eri cally m i n ded too, b u t ou r enem i es ou tdi d us to such an e ten t that we en joy ed a t least a three-to-one training advantage over them du ri n g the later years of the wa r. It was 10 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

convincingly clear that the key to combat capability was found not in numbers but in quality.

I hese are but a few of the many lessons emerging írom World War II, lessons which our present-day thinking has screened out. They and many others are being analytically examined and evaluated with the view to developing from them sound ideas which may assist in solving future military problems. Let me illustrate this point with some current ideas which appear to be soundly conceived and which derive from the lessons just discussed.

Lessori One.— Air power emergecL during World War I I as the decisive force in modem war. Air action passes through its decisive phase chronologically before either land or sea action. If air action fails, there is no chance for successful surface action. If air action is successful, surface action is liJcely to be successful. Some of the ideas which these conclusions generate may be posed as questions: Can we afford to build three separate forces for future war, each designed to be decisive in its own sphere, or can we now by sound evaluation and projection discern a single decisive force which should be developed to the point where it possesses an overwhelming potential for decisive ac tion? Which course offers the greatest security per dollar spent? Can we afford an all-purpose military machine, or in this day of rapid technological advance is it possible to channel our energies and resources into those fields which appear most promising in terms of security?

Lesson Two.— No prepared air attack launched in efjective force ivas ever stopped short of its target. No air defense or cap yjas ever successful in protecting surface struetures from such an attack. This lesson seems to support the idea that to build an adequate aerial barrier around the United States or any one of its important areas would be prohibitively costly and carry no assurance of success. Another idea likewise emerges from this lesson. In the past, commanders of air force elected to discon- tinue attacks in the face of heavy losses, because the losses were not commensurate with the damage inflicted by conven- tional munitions. In the future the damage which may be in- IDEAS ARE WEAPONS 11

flicted by atomic or other weap on s of mass destruction should far outweigh the losses to the attacki n g force even i f those losses approa ch on e hu n dred p er cen t. F u tu re defense and future security would seem to stem from th e ba si c p rem i se th a t successful air defen se m ust be cap able of destroying an attack ing force or an aggression p otential before the a tta ck ca n be launched or the potential realized. This prem i se i n jects a new elem en t i n to the old doctrine of defense in depth. That doctrine involved defen se i n terms of space. T he new doctrine should include defen se i n terms of both space and tim e. G eograp hy alon e n o lon ger p rovi des the n ecessary depth to a defense. Natural barriers are sti ll effective against surface invasion they are screens to air attack. A tomic weapons coupled wi th range, sp eed, and p ower to p en etrate defenses enjoy ed by modern aircraft p resen t a p roblem th a t i s terri fying to con- tem p late. I t has created a feeling of insecurity unique in America. I do not intend to infer that our on ly security lies in precipitating war. I do i n ten d to S tate as em p ha ti ca lly as possible tha t ti m e has becom e a p ri m e factor in any preparations for our security. We are the greatest i n suran ce- m i nded n ati on i n the world. Insurance is simply p reparing for a fu tu re con ti n gen cy i n ti m e. et we seem neglectful of ou r national insurance, In two previous wars we have not had i nsurance and we have bui lt the forces for war a fter wrar has begun. I n the future, tim e m ay not permit us this luury. A billion dollars properly e pended as late as 19 m ight well have p revented the last war. That would have been cheap i nsuran ce i ndeed. I f our insurance for the n e t wa r encourages the start of that war through its in- adequacy, the cost m ay far e ceed our ability to pay.

Lesson Three.— Quality is the paramount consideration in developing combat capabilities. Numerical superiority is mean- ingless without quality. This factor applies equally to both personnel and equipment. The quality of our modern weapons must include superiority of the complete weapon— both man and machine— over any that an enemy can pit against us. If this lesson is fully e plored, we a re con fron ted w i th the idea that there are certa i n fundam ental relationships to be reckoned with. F irst is the necessity for hum an research— tha t is research i n to the hu m a n p a rt of ou r weap ons, research that rela tes the m a n to hi s m ech a n i ca l equi p m en t. T hi s research 12 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW will en com p a ss tra i n i n g m ethods, techn i qu es, a n d p rocedures, standards for selecti on and classification, new ways and means for the efficient utilization of inherent and acquired cap abi lities, and queries into physiologi ca l and psychologi ca l fa ctors. Human research m a y be i n va luable in assuring tha t we do not com p rom i se the qu ality factor of ou r manpower. But such sup eriority will not be achieved throu gh short- range planning and mobilization. It is another form of insurance, and time plays an im p orta n t role. T he p roba ble rapidity of a future attack means that our hum an quality factor is a pre-D-day requi rem ent. Concurrently with human research qu a lity of the com p lete weap on dem ands an effecti ve, i n teracti n g relationship between the desi gn er of war plans and the designer of weap ons. T here have been tim es in history as recent as W orld War II when techn ologi ca l progress i n wea p on s has ou tstripped the plans for utilization of these weap ons. T he techn ologi st m ust recei ve strategi c gui dance i n hi s efforts to shap e an d form our weap ons, and the strategist must reflect techn ologi ca l cap abi lity in his plans. T his is the way that com p lete weap ons are p rodu ced here are the lea ds to the develop m en t of com bat cap abi lity. When, if ever, has the necessity for clear thi n k i n g, sound analysis, and logi ca l predi cti on been so urgen t? I f the m i sta k es of the past can be seen and understood, if lessons from the past can be delineated clearly, then perhaps sound ideas from the minds of thi n k i n g m en can stri p som e shadow from our future p roblem s. Air War College

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~ílyO longer can the airman be distinguished by his speech. The kids who fty model planes today can often listen intelligently to the remarks of an aeronautical engineer, and if there are any expressions of traditional airmen’s slang that have not already been incorporated into American speech, I cannot recall them. All this is in strange contrast to the still- persisting quaintness of seamen’s talk, or horsemen’s talk, or of the talk of other special occupations which has never been adopted beyond the occupations themselves. I know of no better evidence that the increasing use of that great navigable ocean that touches every man’s door has already penetrated into every marís thought and every man’s daily talk. —General Muir S. Fairchild Vice Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force Speech, 3 June 1949 Industrial Vulnerability in the Atomic Age

L ie u te n an t Colonel George R. C harlton

NDUSTRIAL vulnerability to atomic attack is a major problem confronting the United States today. In the course of I our history there have been several occasions when our industrial capacity has turned the tide of war. Our potential enemies are well aware of our capabilities. Other nations sur- pass us in manpower and certain strategic raw materiais but none in industrial capacity. And World War II made it obvious to the world that the basis of military operations in modern war is industry. The advent of atomic warfare considerably changes previous concepts of defense. It may be true today that possible enemies do not possess the atomic bomb or other types of atomic weapons, but the scientists who períected our wèapon are almost unanimous in believing that other nations will be capable of producing a bomb within the next few years. The Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Stuart W. Symington, has stated in his latest annual report (1948) to the Secretary of Defense: “ The considered conclusion is that as of the end of 1952 we can no longer count upon a monopoly of atomic weapons.” We may conclude, then, that we have in the neighborhood of ten years before any sizeable atomic attack can be mounted against us. The problem of industrial vulnerability to atomic attack is a weighty and complex one. Upon its early solution may well rest our survival in any future war. The means of reducing vulnerability will require individual, collective, tactical, and strategic considerations. Our Government, in conjunction with

13 14 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW private industry, must soon formulate a definite plan of action. The World War II concept that exactment of a fifteen per cent loss to raiding aircraft was an effective defense no longer applies. Today if only ten per cent of a sizeable atomic attacking force penetrates our boundaries we may be defeated. The best defenses this nation can provide could not prevent a determined and capable enemy from penetrating our defenses in a surprise attack with atomic-laden aircraft. No defense can be considered impregnable. Our best hope lies in making targets in this country less attractive to an adversary. Our targets must be made less vulnerable. There are various methods of reducing the vulnerability of our industries, the most practicable and feasible of which are dispersing industry, building underground plants, and increasing the structural strength of present factories. However, suddenly to attempt execution of a program embodying these factors would cause a serious economic and social upheaval. Such a program must of necessity be accomplished gradually as the public becomes convinced of its necessity. In addition to the passive measures listed above, our Government must therefore embark upon an active and realistic public information program designed to publicize the danger of complacency to our national security. Only when the public is íully aware of the necessity of far-reaching measures will our Government gain the essential support in accomplishing the desired results.

T he preponderance of United States industry and population is concentrated in our large cities and associated urban areas. One sixth of our population and one half of our industries are presently situated in the sixteen American cities claiming a half million or more inhabitants each. Greater New York, with a population in excess of 11,500,000, is a major industrial center for machine tools, electrical equipment, optical instruments, and a multitude of other industrial products vital to a war effort. Major oil industries are located in Texas, Oklahoma, and Missouri, grouped in such cities as Hous- ton, Tulsa, and St. Louis. The hub of the motor transport indus try is in Detroit. With a population of over 3,390,000, Chicago is a major center for oil refining and steel processing, a key food-processing and industrial city, and a bottleneck in our rail and inland water system. Major steel and coal industries INDUSTRIAL VULNERABILITY IN THE ATOMIC AGE 1

are grou p ed m a i n ly in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Kentucky, and West Virginia and are gen era lly loca ted i n or a djacent to large cities containing numerou s com p lem en tary industries. T hese S teel, coal, and coke complees are hi ghly vulnerable to atomic bombing. Originally the country’s major a i rcra ft i n du stries were lo cated principally i n th e n orth ea s tern s ecti on of the U n i ted States. This was a logi ca l site, as the area p rovi ded cap i tal, management, complem en tary industries, and the skilled labor essenti al to the p rodu cti on of aircraft. G ra du a lly, under the impact of wage scales an d climate, many aircraft com p a n i es moved to the West Coast, where m ore favorable weather offered savi n gs i n con stru cti on an d h ea ti n g costs, as the a ccom p lishment of m u ch work ou t- doors reduced requ i red shop sp ace, and year-arou n d flying weather facilitated test flying and research and i m m edi ate m ovem en t of com p leted a i rcra ft from the p lants. By 19 9 the major a i rcra ft p lants were loca ted on the W est Coast in the Los Angeles area, an d i n the followi n g year, when P resi den t R oosevelt ca lled for , ai rp lanes, per cent of the n a ti on s a i rfram e and assem bly plants were loca ted on the East and West Coasts within 2 miles of the coa stline. The industry could not con cei vably produce such a quantity of planes and engines from e i s ti n g p lants. Consequently the govern m en t b ega n b u i lding airfra m e a n d en gi n e p lants, m ost of them i n the S ou thwest a t D a llas, Ft. W orth, O klahoma City, Tulsa, and N ew O rleans. T hi s p rogra m ten ded to decen tra lize the over-all concentration of aircraft i n dustries, so th a t the per cen t figure was shortly reduced to about 4 p er cent. Since the war and the subsequent near shutdown of all aircraft p lants, the m anufa ctu rers i n gen era l have gravitated back to thei r p re- wa r loca ti on s— the m a jor a i rfra m e i n du stri es to the W es t C oa st a n d en gi n e m a n u fa ctu rers to th e E a s t C oa st. By 194 the concentration in the Los Angeles area was grea ter tha n i n 1 9 4 . T hese m oves to p rewar loca ti on s are un derstan dable from the econ om i c vi ewp oi n t of the m a n u fa ctu rers b u t da n gerou s from the sta n dp oi n t of military security. The United States aircraft i n du stry is now probably less favorably loca ted from the m i litary point of view than i t was before the wa r i t is con si derably m ore vulnerable to destructi on than i t was du ri n g 16 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

the war.* President J. Carlton Ward, Jr., of the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation, has stated that six atomic bombs could wipe out the entire Los Angeles aircraft industry. If this is true, it is readily conceivable that a comparative number could destroy the major airframe and engine industries in the New York area. A few atomic bombs could destroy this country’s entire aircraft industry.

T he lack of a clear-cut official program regarding relocation or dispersai of aircraft industries is considered a primary reason for existing vulnerability. This fact has been ably summarized by Mr. Henry E. Glass of the Industrial Plan- ning Section, Air Materiel Command:

'‘Other factors, such as airport facilities, communlty facilities, power, light and sewage, are about the same at both inland and Coastal plants. By and large therefore, it was felt that any company re- locating in the interior of the country would not at all suffer a disad- vantage. We have come to the conclusion that the major obstacle in the way to relocation and dispersai is the personal likes, dislikes and the desire of the people involved. As individuais, the majority of the personnel involved would prefer to remain in Southern Califórnia or out on the East Coast near the big cities. This condition can only be overcome by convincing the persons affected that relocation and dis persai of the aircraft industry is essential to the nation’s defense. If Congress should approve such a program, we believe the aircraft com- panies would cooperate with the Services carrying it out.” ** It is possible then, that a firm, government-sponsored and approved' national policy would be effective in improving national security by planning and assisting in the execution of such a policy. To the majority of American people attack means physical assult, but there are varied and insidious ways of attack other than by military means. Wars seldom begin without preceding periods of tension. The overt act merely caps the climax, and we suddenly find ourselves in a “ shooting war”. Defense of our nation, therefore, entails far more than safeguards against physical attack; today it means, in the words of the President’s Advisory Commission on Universal Training, a “strong, united, healthy and informed nation.” A fully informed public is es sential in any proposed government program. Our history is

7See Robert E Marshak and others. Our Atomic World. (U. of New México, 1946». p. 34. "Henry E. Glass, Dispersion and Relocation of Aircraft Industry (Washington. D. C.. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1946». p. 2. INDUSTRIAL VULNERABIL1TY IN THE ATOMIC AGE 1

rep lete wi th e am p les of public opinion defeati n g governm en t- sp onsored p rogra m s n ot “ sold to the public beforehan d. The citizens of ou r cou n try m ust be con ti n uously and fully inform ed as to wh a t to e p ect i n even t of war. A nation sus- cep ti ble to a tom i c b om b i n g i s s u rely entitled to know the ull etent of its peril. We must not fail to be rea listic in facing the danger of atomic attack and all of its implications. Am erican dip lom a cy an d the A m eri ca n p u blic must see “ eye to eye on thi s p roblem . P op u lar approval of any governm ent program will ensure wi lling support i n the com m on defen se. I t is hop ed th a t p resent and future leaders of the U n i ted S ta tes wi ll adopt the wi se p olicy of keeping the Am erican public fully inform ed of international develop m en ts. T here are hu n dreds of publications available tha t effecti vely portray the vulnerability of ou r industries to atomic attack T he average m an does n ot have the i n cen ti ve, ti m e, or money to dig them out hence he is poorly inform ed on the p roblem . C ongress, by the judicious use of franking privileges in wi de dis- tri b u ti on of plans, studies, rep orts, a n d su rveys relating to industrial vulnerability, could do m uch to en lighten the public. A storehouse of valuable inform a ti on is avai lable at the G overn ment Printing Office for the aski ng. T hi s i n form a ti on , p laced in the hands of appropriate leaders of business and industry, would be effecti ve in m olding public opinion and support towards the i m p orta n t n a ti on a l goa l of reducing vulnerability by m inimizing the effect of a n y a tta ck . E very m edi a a t the di s- posal of Government public inform a ti on officers— press, radio, m a ga zi n es— shou ld be used to keep A m erican s fully inform ed. Today many large industries, seeking to avoid the congestion and e pense of large cities, are e p loi ti n g lower- cost a rea s an d new labor sources i n sm a ll town s a n d sem i - ru ra l sites for thei r postwar building enterprises. This m ovem ent tends to draw a percentage of the population from ou r large ci ti es and thereby reduces the vu lnerability of ou r industry and population. Gradual decentralization of i ndustry, therefore, i s n ot on ly practical but seem ingly econ om i ca lly feasi ble. A gradu al pro gra m to di sp erse and decentralize industry over a span of ten years or more would not p rove an insurm ountable p roblem . While it is true that all industries could not be adequately decen tralized in this period, truly effecti ve results cou ld be obtained. Government-sponsored economic program s in this 18 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW direction are a requirement, and public information can play a decisive part in any such undertaking.

“The primary step toward protection from a threat to our national security is a realistic facing of the danger. An enlightened public, aware of all facts incident to the problems of this atomic age, and of the potential dangers that can develop, is essential. This does not imply a propaganda campaign or an attempt to frighten people into taking precipitate action, but rather a rational presentation of the issues by military and scientifíc leaders. The objective is to secure popular approval and willing support of such governmental action as may be necessary to assure the common defense against both danger from without and subversion from within.” *

Vt HILE it has been estimated that by 1953 other nations will be able to attack us with atomic weapons, numerous authorities are of the opinion that such a blow is unlikely for about ten years. Therefore, with an entire decade available in which to reduce the vulnerability of our industries, much can be accomplished if prompt, aggressive, and continuing action is initiated now. Although such a program would undoubtedly require a certain amount of government control, industry should be willing to accept such Controls once it is convinced that national survival hangs in the balance. Let us, then, examine the four primary methods of reducing industrial vulnerability: (1) military operations, (2) underground facilities, (3) structural design, and (4) dispersion. First, military operations. Congress has recently approved legislation authorizing extensive aircraft radar detection net- works. Both ground and air components of our continental commands have recently reorganized to efíect a better inte- grated defense of our homeland. We can expect continued emphasis on air defense of our nation consistent with the means provided for this defense, but complete reliance cannot be placed in military operations alone to protect us from bombing. Other ways of reducing vulnerability must be undertaken. The second method involves going underground. Under- ground facilities in connection with existing factories are not visualized, being deemed impractical from the standpoint of cost alone. But future installations of particular strategic

•Colonel Matthew K. Deichelmann, "American Security." AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW. Vol II. No. 2 (1948). p 68. INDUSTRIAL VULNERABILJTY IN THE ATOMIC AGE 19

value may well be p la ced u n dergrou n d, dep en di n g u p on findings of study grou p s cu rren tly working on the problem . Germ an e p erien ce in W orld W ar I I is an available gui de to the p ra cti ca b i lity of placing industrial facilities underground. From it we should have learned that the time to construct undergrou n d facilities is before, not during a war. Germany made the mistake of overesti m ati n g the effecti ven ess of her air defense and underestimating the power of the A llied air attack. Our national planners should p rofit from thi s m i s ta k e— a n d rem em ber th a t the G erm a n s di d n ot ha ve to cop e wi th the atomic bomb. The Germ ans did not fully realize the necessity for p lacing industry u n dergrou n d u n ti l the wa r wa s n ea rly over. Plants were then p laced in all ty p es of eisting facilities— mines, rail- road and highway tunnels, caves, beer cellars, and subways. The principal G erm a n u n dergrou n d effort was di rected toward produ cti on of aircraft, V - bom bs, sy n theti c oi l, and ammunition, wi th m a n y other typ es of plants also going underground for produ cti on of motor vehicles, machinery, armament, tanks, and aircraft accessories. The Germans had detailed p lans for a p rotecti ve ty p e of con structi on called bunkerwerke. T hese were m u lti p le- story buildings of steel-reinforced con crete con structed p a rti a lly undergrou n d, wi th hea vy con crete p rotecti on a bove grou n d. T hese bui ldings were to contain not less tha n , squ a re meters of floor sp ace, to be self-sufficient, and to be capable of producing 1 aircraft or the com p onents thereof per month. This type of building should be p arti cu larly adaptable for use by industry in this country. We do not need facilities which are p laced wholly underground, as we do not e pect continued and sustained air attacks. W ith this typ e of con stru cti on the cost would be substan ti ally reduced i n com p ari son wi th tha t of a com p lete un dergroun d con structi on , and i ngress and egress of personnel and supplies would be considerably sim plified. Germ an e p erien ce has revealed m an y fa cts to be ta k en i n to con si deration in our pla n n i n g: 1 un dergrou n d con s tru cti on costs were three ti m es tha t of surface construction 2 the physiologi ca l effect on u n dergrou n d workers was not of suffi- ci en t detri m en t to p reclu de p rodu cti vi ty equ a l to th a t of sur face workers moderately soft sa n dston e or limestone is particularly adaptable to s u b terra n ea n con s tru cti on 4 th e 2 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

maintenance of an undergrou n d p lant is less tha n m a i n ten a n ce of a com p arable surface facility cost of produ cti on i n a prop erly desi gned and equi p p ed p lant should be less tha n an above-grou n d p lant of the sa m e floor sp ace it was p ractical to p lace almost any type of industry undergrou n d large cen tralized self-contained undergrou n d i n dustries are m ore feasi ble than a large n u m b er of sm all plants undergrou n d plants were n ot effecti vely dam aged by bom bi ng even when a direct hi t was scored. It is readi ly apparent that p roblem s of placing factories undergrou n d are n ot i nsurmountable. Under the di recti on of the M u n i ti on s B oard, the A rmy Corps of Engineers has com p leted a survey of eisting undergrou n d sites i n the U n i ted S tates. A lthou gh the results of thi s su rvey have not been m ade public, it is conceivable that e i sti n g sites of thi s ty p e wou ld con ta i n m a n y thou sa n ds of feet in storage or floor sp ace. B u t the a da p ta b i lity of eisting undergrou n d sites for use by i ndustry seems to be e trem ely li m i ted, and they are even m ore costly to con vert tha n con struction of original sites i n selected loca ti on s. T he use of eisting sites for storage or stockp iling of strategic raw materiais or for m unitions stor age would be m ore logi ca l. Other studies are cu rrently being made by the Corps of Engineers to ascerta i n the cost an d feasi bi lity of undergrou n d con struction. T hey include studi es concerning the resi stance of rock and soil to gu i de loca ti on of military and factory bomb- proofs. T he series of tests consists of undergrou n d e p losi on s in several different typ es of soil and rock. T he tests will start with 2 pounds of TNT and will progress to the detonation of a total of 2, pounds of TNT. It is hoped the data obtained will assist industrial engi neers in determining the most suitable earth a reas and the best ty p e of con struction for under grou n d factories. T he U ni ted S tates is ap p arently m oving at a snail’s pace and with e trem e cauti on wi th regard to moving any p art of indus try or other facilities undergrou n d. O ther nations are e p loi ti n g thi s p rocedu re to a large e ten t. M r. Ira W. McBride, writing in a recent issue of Ordnance advises: “ R um or and fact give evi dence that other nations are faster and less cautious than the United States in converting the undergrou n d for defense. Great Britam is rep orted to be en largi n g up on facilities constructed during the war. Another coun try, it is rumored, pressed p risoner-of-war labor into construction of the largest INDUSTRIAL VULNERABILITY IN THE ATOMIC AGE 21

undergrou n d a i rfield in the world. L ocated in a com m an di n g area, thi s field has great air striking potential. S weden is now produ ci n g a i rcra ft i n u n dergrou n d factories. United States newsmen were shown p art, bu t n ot all, of these p lants. Swedish officials were s om ewh a t va gu e a b ou t oth er u n dergrou n d fa- ci lities but admitted they had at least ten m ore. T here are m a n y p roblem s to be solved in p lacing any portion of ou r industry u n dergrou n d, a n d th ere a re p erhap s m ore practicable an d econ om i c m ea n s of redu ci n g vu lnerability. However, at least a p orti on of ou r most vital industries should be p la ced u n dergrou n d i n con n ecti on w i th oth er m ea n s of protective construction or decentralization. A tour of bombed G erm a n i n du s tri a l areas or of the wa stes th a t were once Hiroshi m a an d N a ga sa k i wou ld do m uch to awaken A m erican industrial leaders from apparent lethargy concerning vulner ability to air attack. Our Government can and must establish .a project in this field. I f subsidies are needed, our leaders m ust ta k e the i n i ti a ti ve i n p rocu ri n g the n ecessa ry legi slation. Now is the tim e for a cti on n ot when the bom bs b egi n to fali. Structural p rotecti on i s a th i rd m ethod of redu ci n g vu lner ability. It is apparent from da m a ge esti m a tes of the b om b i n g of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that sturdily con stru cted con crete- rei n forced bu i ldi n gs wi thstood a tom i c b la s ta n d resu lta n t fires much better than brick or wood- fra m e b u i ldings. C oncrete structures si tuated 2 or more feet from the cen ter of the eplosi on were relatively unharmed, while m ulti - story brick buildings were tota lly destroy ed a t di sta n ces of feet. T hese and other facts gathered from stu di es of the two J ap anese cities dictate en gi neerin g e p erim en tati on and design of p rotecti ve- typ e construction. Plan ts and industries considered criticai to our war effort m ust be desi gn ed to a fford m a im um structural protection. It is apparent that no feasi ble surface- typ e design will provide much protection at or near the cen ter of the e p losi on . H owever i t does a p p ea r th a t p rop er structural design will grea tly reduce destru cti ve effect at reasonable di stances. T he a dop ti on of en gi n eerin g- develop ed mimmum standards of design should con sti tu te on e p ha se of ou r over-all program to reduce vu lnerability. Precipitate dispersai of e isting industries, which is a fou rth possible m ethod of redu ci n g vu lnerability, is not endorsed. S uch a p rocedu re would create a prohibitive disturbance of ou r 22 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REV1EW society. Protection must be achieved gradually, probably by dispersing criticai facilities as they are constructed. When existing facilities deteriorate and renewal is indicated, replace- ment should be made with full consideration given to dispersion and other protective measures. Gradual decentralization, with long-range planning and dispersion during construction stages, would eliminate many hardships quick action would create.

T he cost and complexity of manufacturing atomic weapons dictates commensurate strategic objectives. The geo- graphic location of industries within the United States, while an important factor in determining enemy objectives, would be outweighed by a high concentration of essential war industries in relatively small areas. Dispersion of our industries, then, would appear to be the most practical solution to the problem of reducing industrial vulnerability. All other measures, with the possible exception of military operations, can be considered as ancillary. Gradual decentralization of industry and its associated population in peacetime can be encouraged by government-sponsored economic and social measures. Many large industries, attempting to avoid the congestion and expense of great cities and find lower-cost areas and new labor markets, have chosen small towns or even semi-rural sites for their new building projects. The current voluntary movement of industries from concentrated areas should be encouraged in every respect. The recent migration of much industry southward, although not made with any thought of reducing vulnerability, tends nevertheless to decrease our industrial vulnerability. Such movements of existing and proposed industries would be much more effective from a strategic standpoint if supervised and encouraged by the government. Farmers have been granted large subsidies for a number of years to bolster wheat, corn, and other crop production. Why should industry not be granted similar subsidies to encourage and facilitate so vital a problem as industrial dispersion? Government assistance in this matter would ensure planned dispersion and maximum protective measures. Voluntary movement of industry is gratifying, but would not national planning for dispersai be a more logical approach to reducing industrial vulnerability? The National Commissioner of Public Buildings has estimated that for 1949 the total national construction expendi- INDUSTRIAL VULNERABILITY IN THE ATOMIC AGE 2

tu re, both p ublic and private, will com e to ei ghteen an d on e- qu arter bi llion dollars. T his figure does not include the recen tly enacted m u lti - m i llion dollar lon g- ra n ge F edera l housing bill which p rovi des for the con structi on of 1, units over a si - year period at a rate of 1, units per year. One provi si on of the b i ll authorizes the Housing and Home Finance Administration to undertake broad techn i cal an d econ om i c research p rogra m s desi gn ed to i n crease hom e bu i lding and cut down costs. In implementing this housing program, serious consideration to vu lnerability should be given. S urely these hou si n g u n i ts should em body the cardi n al principies of adequate disp ersion an d p rotecti ve ty p e con stru cti on . T h e J a p a n ese e p eri en ce indicated that even primitive underground shelter was effecti ve against the shock wave and radiation from the a tom i c bu rst. Should not serious thought be given in government-sponsored h ou s i n g to the old- fashioned idea of providing basements? Our industries, which are the h ea rt, a rteri es, a n d A ch i lles’ heel of ou r military effort, must be made less vu lnerable to atomic attack and destruction. The most practical means of redu ci n g i n du s tri a l vunerability lies in dispersing at least the key industries vital to an immediate war effort. D i sp ersi on appears m ore a tta i n a ble than other p rotecti ve m easures, although any and all means within the capability of ou r nation must be employ ed.

Air Command and Staff School

------

low comes the picture of mass defeat, the most awesome spectacle of the war. It is in the bent bodies of old women who poke among ruins seeking some miserable ob-fect that will link their lives with the old days. It is in the shamed, darting eyes of the defeated. It is in the faces of the httle boys who regard our tnumphant columns with fear and fascination. And above all it is in the thousands of beaten, dusty soldiers who stream along the roads toward the stockades. Their feet clump wearily, mechani- cally, hopelessly on the still endless road of war. They move as haggard, gray masses. in which the individual has neither life nor meaning. I t is impossible to see in these men the quality that made them stand up and fight hke demons out of hell a few short monihs ago.

—Audie Murphy To Hell and Back Henry Holt, 1949 A Matter of Nomenclature

J. M. Spaight

N the course of the customary discussion after a lecture by Air Vice-Marshal E. J. McCloughry, Royal Air Force, at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, on I14 January 1948, he said in reply to a question: “ I always hesi- tate to use the words ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’, particularly now that, in the [Royal] Air Force, we talk about ‘Strategic Forces’ which are sometimes used ‘tactically’, and all the rest of it; but I think that here we understand what we mean when we talk about strategy.” The Air Vice-Marshal’s hesitation was not unnatural, for there is no doubt that “ strategic” has become a kind of term of art in both the British and U. S. Air Forces, and that its meaning is not always understood. It is apparently not understood, if one may say so with all respect, by Lord Cherwell, who used to be Mr. Winston Churchill’s scientific adviser during the war. In a review in the London Daily Telegraph of Professor P. M. S. Blacketfs book, Military and Political Consequences of Atomic energy*, he wrote: “ No one who remembers the attacks on Warsaw or Rotterdam will consider the allegation that it was Britain who started bombing open cities worthy of notice.” Now, no one in his senses would dream of making such an allegation. What a well-informed person would say— and this was the point at issue— is that, as between Britain and Germany, Britain started the strategic ofíensive. That is a historical, veriíiable fact. The attacks on Warsaw and Rotterdam, neither of which was, in any case, an open city, are not relevant to it. At neither place was the bombing strategical. Each city was under artillery fire already. At each the bombing was tactical.

•Published in the United States under the title, Fear, War, and the Bomb (Whittlesey House: McGraw-Hlll, 1949). Editor.

The views expressed in this article are not the official vieivs of the Department of the Air Force or of the Air University. The purpose of the article is to stimulate healthy discussion of Air Force problems which may ultimately result in improvement of our national security.

24 A MATTER OF NOMENCLATURE 2

The fact is that the word “strategic” has come to be used, in relation to air forces, in a sense at variance with the accepted meaning of strategy. The Oxford English Dictionary defines strategy as “the art of projecting and directing the larger military movements and operations of a campaign.” The contrasting term is tactics, which is “the art or Science of deploying military or naval forces in order of battle, and of performing warlike evolutions or manoeuvres.” The strategist thinks in terms of campaigns, of the planning and directing of them, the tactician in terms of battles, of the fighting or declining of them. The one might be described as the whole- saler, the other as the retailer in the business of waging war. Each is necessary to the other. Their functions are intercon- nected and complementary. They constitute a wheel within a wheel, with a common hub: the “wheel in the midst of a wheel” of Ezekiel’s Vision. Given these meanings, one would expect that in an air force the strategic command would be concerned with the planning and over-all direction of the operations which the tactical command would execute. Actually, the position is quite different. The strategic air command operates one kind of force, the tactical another, and the two commands are not concentric; they have their separate spheres. Their wheels become inter- meshed at times, but normally each revolves in its own orbit. To understand how this situation carne to pass, one must go back thirty years or more, fcr it was then that the kind of force which is now called, or miscalled, strategic first appeared. It was then called a special striking force or an independent force. The latter name was that given to the famous formation of the Royal Air Force which was established under General Hugh M. T. Trenchard in the summer of 1918 and which made damaging incursions into Germany from that time until the Armistice. This “Independent Force” was really an expansion of a smaller one, the 41st Wing of the Royal Flying Corps, which was formed at Ochey, France, near Nancy, in October, 1917, and whose commander was Brigadier General C. L. N. Newall (now Lord Newall). If the Armistice had not intervened, an Inter-Allied Independent Force, also under General Tren chard, would have come into being in 1919. The forces of 1917 and 1918 were strategic in the current sense of the term. The term was applied to them, however, only some years later. It had begun to creep into use by the time the later vol- 2 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW umes of the B ritish official history of the a i r war, The War in the Air, were written. Volume VI of the hi story, which includes a chap ter on the I n dep en den t F orce and was p ublished in 19 , refers to “ what m ight be termed strategic bombing and speaks of “a strategic bombing force such as th a t to whi ch M a jor General Tren chard was appointed. One will search i n vai n , however, in the record of the con tem p orary discussions for any use of the term strategic as a description of General Newall’s or General Trenchard’s force or of the k i n d of bombing in whi ch each was engaged. W hy was the labei abandoned? The reasons, one may surmise, were two. F i rst, the term “independent had been fou n d i n 1 9 1 - 1 to be op en to objecti on i n some resp ects. I t caused grave misgivings in France. “The word independent’ was, perhaps, ill-chosen, according to Volume VI of The War in the Air: “The realistic French mind at once conjured up a V i si on of an alien force conducting, from the F rench battle area, a p rivate war of its own according to the strange doctrine of black-coated gentlem en across the Channel. It was for tha t reason tha t the form a ti on of the sp ecial force was lon g resi sted by M arshal Foch. Secondly, the emphasis shifted, p roba bly under the i n fluence of Douhetism, from th e qu a lity of independence as a charac- teristic of the new kind of force to th a t of its function or purpose. I ndeed, M ajor G en eral J. F. C. F uller in his history, The Second World War, sp eaks of “ the D ouhet theory of strategic bom bi n g. T he essence of Douhefs teaching was that an air force, i f prop erly con sti tu ted an d used, cou ld wage and win a war without the intervention of any other arm. Having this power, it could no lon ger be regarded as a m erely tactical arm it passed over into the higher realm in which strategy rei gns. It became what the Smuts rep ort of 191 had foretold that it might som e day develop i n to— a force whose op erations “ with thei r devastation of enem y lands and destruction of industrial and populou s cen tres on a vast scale m ay becom e the p rincipal op erations of war. It was in Britain that the doctrine of the strategic air offensi ve took the firmest root. It inspired the creati on of Bomber Command of the R oy a l Air Force i n 19 . T he war-time head of that Command, Sir Arthur Harris, after e p laining how we began “ the strategic bombing of German industries in 194 , has stated in his book , Bomber Offensive, tha t “ N o other country i n the world had at that ti m e concei ved the p ossibi lity of A MATTER OF NOMENCLATURE 2

using an air force i n thi s wa y , to fight a war by itself, and, within certain limits, win a war outright. As we knew, com- plaints were to be heard before the secon d fron t was op en ed in 1944 that the R oyal Air Force was, in fact, fighting a war of its own. The short a n swer was tha t tha t was the on ly way in which it was p ossible to h i t the en em y then , an d th a t n ot to resort to th a t wa y wou ld ha ve been to a dm i t tha t the crea ti on of the stra tegi c force—Bomber Command—had been a mis- ta k e. I t wa s n ot a m i sta k e. The current contrast to “strategic in air force p hra seology is “ tactical. That, too, is an innovation— and a misappropria- ti on . I t sta n ds, m ore or less, for the “ arm y coop era ti on of earlier days. “ The tactical mission, writes Colon el William H. Wise, “is closely ti ed to the acti on of surface forces. H e quotes a U . S. A rm y F i eld M anual as stating that a tactical aii force i s “ sp eci a lly organized, equipped, and trained for op erati ons agai n st the en em y arm ed forces wittiin, m oving into, or withdrawing from a com b a t zon e. I t i s, i n fact, the old arm y coop erati on ai r force under a new name. T he difference between i t and the stra tegi c ai r force is that the latter is free to roa m far afield and the form er i s n ot. O n e m i litary writer, M r. Hoffman Nickerson, in his book Arms and Policy, has com p ared the strategi c ai r force with the “ independent cavalry whi ch used to op era te a t con si derable di stan ces from the a rm y i n the ca m p a i gn s of last century, and the tactical air force wi th the “ accom p an yi n g ca va lry which was kep t near at hand for close reconnaissance. Another difference, n ot un- connected with that just mentioned, is that the targets of a ta cti ca l force’ s bom bers are, apart from p ersonnel, the assem - bled p rodu cts of the en em y’ s war industry, while those of a strategi c force are the m a n u facturing points. “ Tactical b om b i n g, sai d L i eu ter. a n t G en era l J am es D oolittle, in M ay, 194 , “ is knocking over the m i lk pail each day, whi le strategi c bombing is an effort to ki ll the cow. A si m i lar distinction was impli ed in a statem en t by G en eral H. H. Arnold in his Second Report to the Secretary of War, 2 February, 194, in regard to th e G erm a n s h orta ge of oi l during the operations in France in the preceding year. “ How much of thi s sh orta ge wa s occa - sioned by strategic curtailm ent” he said, “and how much was

Future of the Tactical Air Force. AIR UNIVERSIT UARTERL REVIEW Vol II. No 4 1949 , p. . 2 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW caused by tactical destruction of oil dumps and transport an d bridges is im p ossible to esti m a te. General Arnold, in his Third Report to the Secretary of War, on 12 N ovem b er, 194 , referred to the ten den cy of strategic and ta cti ca l op era ti on s to m erge a n d p oi n ted ou t th a t a strategic force m ust often u n derta k e ta cti ca l bombing. When in 1944-4 bases were gai n ed close to G erm an y, and even i n G ermany itself, the difference between the ki nds of op erations faded ou t a ltogether. “It was at this point, he States, “ wi th di sta n ce no lon ger a factor in differenti ati n g strategic from ta cti ca l op erations, that the air war reached i ts ulti m a te ob jecti ve. There was no lon ger an y need for labeis which had been useful enough in their ti m e but had becom e i n a p p rop ri a te to the new situation. But is there n ot som ethi n g wron g wi th labeis if they ca n be di sca rded and i t does n ot m a tter? Were they ever qui te the right labeis? Is “ tactical an im- provem ent on “ army cooperation ? Every air force i s a ta cti cal one in so far as it employ s tacti cs. A n d i s “ stra tegi c le mot juste for the oth er category? The original word “ i ndep en den t would be m i sleadi ng, too. It might be read as referri n g to an air force that di d not form p a rt of the a rmy, as the British Air Force di d before 191 and the A m erican before 194 . W ould it not bc better to sp eak of the cou n ter-offen si ve ai r force than of the strategic, or independent, air force? I t i s the term used in the rep ort en ti tled Survival in the Air Age, subm itted by Mr. Thomas K. Finletter and hi s colleagues to P resi den t T rum an on 1 January, 194 . The term strategic air force is, of course, in common use in the United States. There were two such forces, the th and the 1th, i n the E urop ea n thea tre of war i n 194 - 4 . T hese two now form th e S tra tegi c A i r C om m a n d, on e of the three com bat Commands established on 21 March, 1 94 the other two a re the A i r D efense Command and the Tactical Air Command, which only this year joi n ed to form the C on ti n en tal Air Com mand. Nevertheless, the F inletter C om m i ttee p referred to sp eak of a counter-offensi ve rather tha n a strategic air force as an elem ent of the a i r orga n i za ti on of groups which it con si dered to be necessary. “ W e must have in being, it said, “a counter-offen si ve force bu i lt arou n d a fleet of bombers, accom p an yi n g p lanes and lon g- range m issiles whi ch wi ll serve n oti ce to a n y n a ti on whi ch m a y th i n k of attacking us that if it does, i t wi ll see its factories and cities destroyed and i ts war A MATTER OF NOMENCLATURE 29

machine crushed. The strength of the counter-offensive force must be such that it will be able to make an aggressor pay a devastating price for attacking us.” The term proposed would be particularly appropriate to a force intended for action under the terms of the Atlantic Pact. The Pact is an insurance against aggression. It will come into operation only if one or more of the parties to it are first attacked. The term “counter-offensive” implies an initial offensive, and the fact that the offensive is launched by land forces does not make the reply to it by air the less a true counter- offensive. The term would at any rate not be so liable to be misunderstood as “strategic” undoubtedly is in relation to air forces or air operations. There is another reason, too, for a change of name. Wrongly or rightly— wrongly, on balance— strategic bombing has been given a bad name. It has come to mean city-wrecking on a great scale. People do not stop to consider that a city which has been turned virtually into a place d’armes or centre of war-production is a military objective. To spare it would be to sacrifice our own men’s lives. The ruin and rubble which the bombers leave behind them is a less evil for humanity than the cost in lives incurred in a bloodbath such as the Somme or Passchendaele over and above that incurred in the ordinary bombing operation. Perspective is lost in this matter. In the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Report, we are told of 100 German towns destroyed and 3,600,000 Germ an people made homeless by the Anglo-American bombing. We forget that in Rússia, according to the Nuremberg Trial Report, Pt. VII, 1710 towns and 70,000 villages and hamlets were totally or partly destroyed and 25 million people made home less by the German invaders. Strategic bombing has been denounced by military writers, i.e., General Fuller, as “the clumsiest, most brutal and most wasteful of all forms of warfare.” Mr. Nickerson calls it nothing but “ baby killing” and “ indiscriminate terrorism.” Indeed, General Fuller goes so far as to term it “ devastation and terrorization” , “barbarism”, and “ mongoloid destructiveness.” A change of name will not by itself prevent the repetition of such calumnies, but it will at least break an unhappy association of ideas and may lead to the essentially defensive nature of long-range bombing not being entirely ignored. I nglemere: Purley, Surrey Human Relations In Unification COLONEL JOSEPH C. REDDOCH

HEN the National Security Act was put into effect in September 194 , members of the several armed Servi ces vi ewed i t wi th va ry i n g degrees of skep ticism , optim ism , fear, or en thusi asm . F ew thou ght i t p erfect, for many of its Wprovi si on s were arrived at only after m uch discussion and considerable com p rom i se. N evertheless it is the best legi slation tha t could be obtai ned, and i t has created an orga n i za ti on objecti vely designed for modern security. However, the Act can do little toward influencing the con- vi cti on s a n d a tti tu des of Service indi vi duais. T he over-all success of ou r defen se effort depends just as much on individuais as i t does on the orga n i za ti on a l structure i n whi ch they work. Substantial hum an differences do rem ai n they m ust be recognized and studied, and means of solution m ust be sought. Perhaps, in this case, the individual is more importa n t tha n the p a ttern. The ability of people to work together may be influenced by the orga n i za ti on a l fram ework in which they op erate, but basically i t dep ends up on i ndi vi dual traits and a tti tu des. T h e p roblem of working harmoniously together has been p resent si nce cavem en first team ed together to m ove b lg stones. Man has become progressi vely more dep endent on his fellows, u n ti l in this modern and comple age there is vi rtu ally nothing we do which fails to a ffect others. T his interdep endence of m en em p hasi zes the necessi ty for thei r working together in understanding and harmony. In the military Servi ces, as well as in other fields, the need for better hum an relations is most pressing. The Departm en t of Defense is a trem endous orga n i zation and consequently somewhat ponderous and slow in

adapting itself hence the need for p rom p t acti on to effect im - provem ent i n hum an relations if benefits are to be realized in the foreseeable future. It is no secret tha t di fferences of opinion e ist between in dividuais of the va rious Servi ces. T he A i r F orce, for e am p le, favors flying pay in its present form , whi le m any A rm y p eop le do not. T hese two S ervi ces con ti n u e to di ffer as to the solution of Air Force m edi ca i S ervi ce p roblem s. B etween the N a vy and Air Force there has been con stan t con fli ct i n rega rd to the missions each shall play. T he super-carrier and the B- are the m a jor characters in an especially tense feud. D i fferences of opinion between the Army and Navy are also evident. W h eth er th e M a ri n e C orps should rem a i n a p a rt of the N a vy , and in what strength, has been a source of con ti n u ou s squab- bli n g b etween the N a vy a n d M a ri n es on on e ha n d, a n d the Army on the other. T hese are broa d a n d obvi ou s e a m p les, and i t is a tri bu te to the p rogress of unification that the controversies appear not so mark ed an d b i tter as they on ce were. B u t di sp utes rem ai n. Many of these di fferences sp ri n g from h on est a n d ba si c con - vi ctions, ei ther fundam ental or influenced by original training. By fundam ental, it is meant that individuais will naturally com e to di fferent S olutions to a problem , even when gi ven the sam e set of facts. T here are too m a n y va ri a bles a n d too m u ch op p ortu n i ty for-diverse opinion to develop for a m i litary prob lem to lend i tself to a p recise scientific or m athematical solu ti on . T wo hon est, ca p a b le, and wholly patriotic officers can arrive at different S olutions to a m ilitary problem throu gh use of the sa m e i n form a ti on . I n di vi du a i s wi th va ry i n g S ervice backgrou n ds wi ll em erge wi th di vergen t S olutions, theories, and concepts. This m ay be e plained by the intimate knowledge one has of a p arti cular part of the defense system and his vague and clou dy k n owledge of the rest. I t is n a tu ra l th a t he thi n k s i n terms of what he knows and understands best. We may charge this sort of person with lacking the breadth we would wish hi m to have, but we should not attack his integrity. Service di fferen ces m ay also stem from th e su rvi va l instinct whi ch m oti vates everyone. Applied to the military, it may take the form of plu ggi n g a con cep t or sup p orting an e p ansion in order to i n crease the si ze or prestige of the grou p wi th wh i ch on e i s a ffiliated, resulti n g i n b en efit to the individual in pay, prom oti on . p resti ge, or securi ty. S uch a cti vi ty , con tem p ti b le 2 A,IR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW thou gh i t i s, e i sts. I t often e ists in a subconcious State, the i ndi vi dual having comp letely rationalized his personal position. The press of the n a ti on i s responsible for many of the di fferences of opinion e isting in the Servi ces. I n n um erous instances newspapers have seen fit to capitalize on Servi ce di fferen ces and to e a ggerate them. The threat to the m i litary of eposure of correcti ble faults i s an u n com forta b le but altogether healthy one, but a very unhealthy situation is created when the p ress encourages Servi ce controversies solely for thei r sensation value. Nor is it advisable for Servi ce p ersonnel to seek p ress assistance in airing private and personnel grievances and slanting them to rep resen t a p a rti cu lar Servi ce vi ewp oi n t.

The over-all solu ti on , obvi ou sly, lies in educating Servi ce personnel to render primary allegi a n ce to the n a ti on as a whole rather tha n to an i n di vi du a l Servi ce. T hi s is si m p le i n theory but difficult to a ccom p lish. Sociologi sts tell us that a certa i n am ount of individual Identification with a grou p i s n ecessary. I t appears also tha t the larger the grou p the less i n ti m a te the feeling of identification becomes. Certa i n ly the tail gu n n er of the B - 1 “ S p eci a l Delivery was more i nclined to consider him self a p art of tha t a i rplane crew than a p art of the th A i r Force, or the Army Air Forces, or the n a ti on ’ s a rmed forces. Morale and esprit de corps dep end on fairly intimate identifi cati on wi th group s, and i t would be dangerou s to offer any solution which would seriously impair these elusive but all-importa n t con si derations. Nevertheless the hard fact rem ai ns tha t the m i ssi on or objecti ve is essenti ai ly national and not servi ce. T ha t fact must be recognized. I t should be i m p ressed down throu gh a ll echelon s, a n d edu ca ti on a l cam p ai gn s should be desi gn ed to e ten d i t further. The Army Troop I n form a ti on Program would p rovi de a good basis on which to e p and this project. T he p rogram should i nclude issuance of printed ma terial to be read at lei sure, sup p lem ented by com p ulsory di scussi on conferences supervised by qualified lecturers. Authorization of inter-servi ce transfers would help solve the unification problem. The law presently provi des for Army-Air Force transfers but does n ot i n clude the N avy. I f the con trol of such transfers dep ended on the desi res of the individuais and the sep a rate approva l of the two S ervi ces concerned, it is felt there would be an equi table num ber of transfers and that no on e servi ce would be crippled i n the p erformance of its own HUM AN RELATIONS IN UNIF1CATION

mission. Such a provision would enable enthusiasts to ftn d thei r n i che a n d work productively ra th er tha n sp en d th ei r ti m e a ttem p ti n g to bri n g som e p a rti cu lar mission to their Servi ce. In principie, inter-service transfers should also be op en to enlisted m en, but in view of thei r degree of sp ecialization and short en li stm en t p eriods, it is not considered p racti cal, e cept in isolated cases. A n officer thus transferring would recei ve full credi t for his e p erience and p ast p erform a n ce of duty, and his transfer would be subject to the a p p rova l of his original Service and his requested future Servi ce. A n other step we m i gh t ta k e i n volves the establishment of on e n a ti on a l military Servi ce an d on e u n i form . T h e arms would be sp eci alized and identified by some minor distinctive insignia. Certainly this would be a m ove toward a p hysi cal manifestati on and a rem i n der of the com m on ob jecti ve, althou gh i t m i gh t also be dam aging to m orale and esprit de corps. Nevertheless, such a p rop osa l merits serious consideration. Organization markings and branch insignia would serve to identify the individual more sp eci fically and afford hi m the opportunity to be distinguished as a member of a sp ecial ou tfit. The over-all aspect would be one of a m an dedicated to national security. He would sense this, as would those seeing him . H e would have more i n com m on wi th servi cem en of another branch. J oi n t schooling is another means of b ri n gi n g a bou t i m p roved hum an relations in the D epartment of Defen se. O n e p rop osa l often discussed sp ecifies establishment of a com m on school or academy to provide basic m ilitary and educational training to sup p lant the first two years at West Point and Annapolis. This would be followed by sp eci a lized training at West Point, Annapolis, and an Air Force Academy. In addition to appro i- mately doublm g the cap aci ty of the S ervi ce schools, which appears necessary a t thi s ti m e, a ll future regular officers would have two years of common training. This would be of trem en - dous value, p articularly so when in later years these officers are brou ght together a t joi n t conferences. A fter com m issioning from one of the three s ni or academies, th e o ffi c e r s h o u ld b e g i v e n c re d i t fo r a t t e n d i n g a dva n ced schools in other S ervices equal to tha t fo r attending those of his own. A dvan ced S ervice schools should m aintain student quotas i n a ra ti o s u ffi ci en t to p erm i t a gen erous sprinkling of other S ervices throu ghou t an y p a rticu lar class. A definite, fied ratio is n ot recom m en ded, since the S ervice needs are con ti n u ou sly 4 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

changing in quantity and prop ortion. But a fairly large an d realistic figure should be stressed i n stead of a “ token or “courtesy p ercentage. Joint instruction in specialized and techn i cal schools should also be em p hasi zed. Joint Service is an additional step that could be taken. I t is gen erally conceded tha t i t is easi er to ca rry on a feud at a di stance than whi le ta lking things over. Consistent with the needs for sp ecialized training and Servi ce i n thei r own branch, ma imum advantage should be taken of the op p ortu n i ty to assign officers to a sister Servi ce for a tour of du ty . W h en thi s is done an improved u n derstanding is invariably achi eved. Also, an increased kn owledge of over-all cap abi lities and limita- ti on s i s gained. This ulti m a tely results i n the officer develop i n g a clearer picture of the com p lete defen se p roblem hi s i deas and influence will apply more di rectly toward the com m on goa l. Improved p ublic relations within the Servi ces would aiso improve u n i fication. Not only must individuais work together to i n crease the effecti ven ess of the D ep a rtm en t of Defense, but national security stands in jeop ardy i f the p ublic, disgusted and confused by Servi ce squabbles, votes u n wi sely for its future security needs. Public confidence must be maintained by in creased awareness of the p u blic relations function by all personnel. H on est rep orti n g to the p u b lic should be the objecti ve prom oti on a l a cti vi ti es should be curta i led. It is beli eved tha t these recommendations, if carried out, would eventually result i n a m u ch h ea lthi er relationship between m em bers of the a rmed Services. Immediate results a re not promised, for i t would ta k e ti m e to i m p lem en t these sug- gesti ons. F ortunately some of the p rop osa ls are bei n g studi ed, and in a few i nstances acti on is bei ng taken. T he late Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, neatly summed up the problem in the followi n g words wri tten on ly last year: “ . . . I should like to reem p hasi ze. . . tha t true unification of the a rmed might of the United States cannot spring from legi slation alon e. T h e sp ark generated by the Unification Act must be fanned into flam e by the thoughts and actions of gen erais and admirais, ensi gns and lieutenants, soldi ers, sailors, and airmen, and ci- vi lians. We must all learn that we are working together for a common cause—the security of ou r cou n try— and tha t the good of all transcends that of a few. Air War College Sentinels of United States Foreign Policy

M ajor John D. R eid

HE coming of age of Air Power and its resultant importance to our national security dictate that the United States Air Force continually review its basic planning andT precepts in the light of changing domestic and international situations. The Air Force must periodically inventory its ideas and ideais, discarding those which have withered and become useless. It must understand its major responsibilities for the national welíare. It must adopt and pursue definite and proclaimed policies which relate to its peacetime role. On the surface this problem has an easy solution: that is to say, the Air Force must attain and maintain a state of read- iness for war. This is a bona fide mission, yet the simplicity of its staternent may obscure an equally important responsibility of the nation’s air arm. It must also be recognized that U.S. Air Power will exert a marked influence on the attainment of a stable and durable world peace. Actually the Air Force has already underwritten, perhaps unwittingly, its aspirations to participate in the forging of world peace. “ Air Power is Peace Power” is prominently dis- played on recruiting posters. It is broadcast on the radio and spread in the press. As a public relations slogan to stimulate enlistments, this claim is undoubtedly intended to serve a purpose. But the thought occurs that we may have coined a phrase which portends events of far deeper significance. “ Air Power is Peace Power” can conceivably be a belief, rather than a short-range recruiting slogan. There are definite indications that U. S. Air Power is destined to bulwark our peace aims and to buttress our foreign policy in search of world peace. The

The views expressed in this article are not the official views of the Devartment of the Air Force or of the Air University. The purpose of the article is to stimulate healthy discussion of Air Force problems which may ultimately result in improvement of our national security.

35 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

successful application of Air Power to the B erlin crisis shows tha t U. S . forei gn p olicy even now has a new bodyguard. In all likelihood this prop osed a ssoci a ti on of Air Power and forei gn p olicy needs little clarification for the student of world power politics. On the other hand there is little evi den ce of any wi desp read belief tha t the A i r F orce is m ore than an i n ert force i n the absence of war. Basically this stems from a lack of wha t con sti tu tes p eace. C erta i n ly the complacency of the peace-lovi n g n a ti on s i n the i n terval between the two W orld Wars did not achieve a true peace. Nor can the trem ulou s aftermath of World W ar II be appraised as a peace era. T his nation is commencing to realize that the absence of a shooti n g war, in itself, does n ot p resage p eace. P ostwar events have dem onstrated that peace is every bit as dynamic as war. U. S. forei gn p olicy is our official lon g- range plan for i n ternational relations. I t is basically oriented toward the goal of peace. In an address at W ashington in 19 , C ordell Hull, then Secretary of State, proclaim ed that “ The primary objecti ves of ou r forei gn p olicy are the m ai n ten a n ce of the p eace of our coun try, and the prom oti on of the econ om i c, the soci al, and the m oral welfare of ou r people. E ven ts si n ce then ha ve p roved tha t no proclam ation of forei gn p olicy will stand a reasonable chan ce of fulfillment unless backed by sufficient national power to give authority to the asserti on s of tha t p olicy. We cannot therefore lightly dismiss the U. S. power position in peace calculations, nor by the sam e tok en can the A i r F orce ignore its responsibilities in support of that position. E -Justice Roberts i s rep orted to ha ve sai d th a t the law of nations “ is the law of tooth an d claw. This is not a dainty summation of International politics, but in the absence of a ggressi ve p eace measures i t has always p roved tragically e act. We must, there fore, un derstand the urgen cy of wedding our forei gn p olicy to a p ower gu a rdian. G eneral MarshalPs final rep ort to the S ec retary of War phrased this thought as follows: “ W e must, if we are to realize the hopes we may now dare have for lasting peace, enforce our will for p eace wi th strength. B ut i f U. S. Air Power is requi red to su p p ort U . S . forei gn p olicy in a crusade for peace, the form a lized concept of the A i r F orce mission as that of maintaining combat-readi ness m ust be closely e a m i n ed to en su re di rect sup p ort of the p ea ce ca m p a i gns. In pursuance of thi s con cep t a n i m p orta n t corollary of the over-all problem p resents i tself. This problem concerns the SENTINELS OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

prop er dep loy m en t of U. S. Air Power. As a force for the atta i n - ment of p ea ce the A i r F orce m u st con si der its dispositions from a standpoint other than that of operational dep loy m en t. T hu s the i m p orta n t i ssue of strategic air bases arises. The duality of Air Force responsibility, in other words, requi res a study of the p olitical dep loy m en t of the nation’s Air Power. The prosp ect of acquiring and maintaining strategic air bases cannot have wi desp read appeal, either to the nation’s ta p a y ers or the a i rm en who m u st m a n them . M a jor A leander P. de Seversky, in his treatm en t of victory achieved through the a p p lication of Air Power, scoffs at air bases as a future Air Force requi rem en t, m a i n tai n i n g tha t future increases i n ai r- cra t range wi ll m ake them unnecessary. I t takes little imagi- nation to visualize that elim ination of these bases would relieve the A i r F orce of gru eling logi sti cs an d secu ri ty m easu res for thei r conti nued use. I n deed one can elaborate and, with the m athematical devices of the a i rcra ft desi gn ers, p rove that the globe- ci rcling aircraft of the future is nearing reality. If, however, the concept of A ir P ower as a dynam ic p eace p ower is valid, the political value of strategically loca ted bases a n d th ei r effect on forei gn p olicy cannot be ignored. Enthusiasts of lon g- ra n ge a i rcra ft who foresee tha t A i r P ower can be ap p lied from national con fines cannot be entirely refuted, nor is that the primary purpose of thi s a rti cle. R ather, laying aside the op era ti on a l cap abi lities of bases in war, we shall lim it the discussion to assessm ent of the va lue of strategic air bases to the successful accom p lishment of U. S. forei gn p olicy aims. A n y trea tm en t of stra tegi c ai r bases evokes i m m edi a te sp eculations on p ossible loca ti on s. T h e em b roi lment of power instru- m en ts in geop olitical actions is e pressed by N i cholas J. Spykman in America’s Strategy in World Politics: “Power is effective in in verse ratio to the distance from i ts s ou rce. H i s statem en t m ay be m odi fied to the effect th a t useful power must also be in proimity to the sovereignty or area against which it is applied. At any rate, we m ust carefully weigh the prospects of enhanci ng or dim inishing the power source ra ti o by the acquisition of forei gn bases. Admittedly any plan on the part of the U n i ted S ta tes to lease, buy, or otherwise aequire strategic air bases is fra u gh t with both dom estic and worldwide im p lications. et the politi cal advan tages whi ch these bases m i ght p resen t to a firm, well- defined national forei gn p olicy deserves careful scrutiny. T o 38 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

forecast these advantages, a brief insight into a historical precedent may be of value.

I n the period which followed the Napoleonic wars, Great Britain embarked on a remarkable program of overseas expansion. This program seems to have been impelled by three forces. The first was a desire for national economic betterment; the second, a formula for maritime dominance which could guarantee the success of her economic enterprises; and the third, an astute foreign policy closely attuned to the limitations and capabilities of sea power. To represent this program as foreordained or preplanned in all its details is to indulge in fantasy. To the contrary the formula which ultimately spelled British world prominence was a combination of sagacity and good fortune. Nevertheless Britain’s ascendency in the econom ic, naval, and diplomatic fields deserves close attention for the value which may be derived in prophesying a course of action for the United States. In particular a valuable lesson can be gleaned from certain matters pertaining to the alliance of British foreign policy and naval bases. Long before formal treatises appeared on the subject the British had sensed the importance of geopolitics and were obtaining strategic vantage points about the world upon which to pivot or concentrate their superior naval power. Dr. George T. Renner, author of Geography in the Air Age, stresses the importance to the world a century and more ago of “ ocean- basin geography,” this in a time when maritime power con- noted a secure power position for a nation possessing strong naval forces. The concept of ocean-basin geography inspired Britain to obtain local control of vital areas which served as stoppers or bottlenecks on the high seas. At the peak of her power Great Britain controlled Singapore, Capetown, Hong Kong, Gibraltar— in fact, all the major bottlenecks except the Panama Canal. These focal points, when converted into naval bases, guaranteed economic development of the adjacent areas and reminded neàghboring governments that British policies could be ignored only at the risk of forceful measures. There are certain aspects of this period of Britain’s history which should be noted. In the first place she strove to improve her relative power position through the employment of a firm foreign policy. In addition she utilized a display of naval bases, SENTINELS OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY 9 not only for their potential value to her fleet but also as visible rem i nders, in the absence of tha t fleet, tha t her proclam ations were to be reckoned wi th. F or those who m ay resent such power moves, another statement by Mr. Spykman is aprop os: “In a world of international anarchy, forei gn p olicy must aim above all at the i m p rovem en t or at least the p reserva ti on of the relative power position of the s ta te. Finally, and this is most im portant, it must be noted that the B ritish strategy of bottleneck bases belies the impressi on tha t her u lti m a te a i m was a world balance of power. She sub- scri b ed to a b a lance of power on ly as it pertained to the affairs of con ti n en tal Europ e. T hi s was occa si on ed by a n a wk wa rd geop olitical situation. I n ef ect G reat B ritai n could n ot in the nature of thi n gs p i t her sea p ower di rectly against the resur- gen t land armies of Europ e. B ri ta i n ’ s worldwide aim was a “margin of p ower. S p ykm an notes that a nation m ust attain a balance of power which affords freedom of action. In a sense this was true of the British policy, since she enjoy ed a freedom of action resulti n g from th e delicate power balance in Europ e whi ch wi lled her a margin of power elsewhere in the world. I n short the rea listic British forei gn p olicy, while cog- nizant of the b a lance-of-power policy as unsuitable to real world stability, was forced by the p hy si ca l di sp osi ti on s of E urop e’ s p ower States to m ake the best of a bad geograp hical barga i n , to be con ten t wi th forces i n p recarious balance on the C on ti n en t, an d to p rom ote a p rep on dera n ce i n the other world areas. It is fully realized that this historie era of British forei gn policy backed by strategic naval dep loy m en t, whi le rem a rk a b ly fa rsi gh ted, was n ot crea ted i n the hop e of attaining world peace. Britain was primarily con cern ed wi th her econ om i c develop m en t. N evertheless hei role as a world stabilizer is pro- fou n dly significant, if we are to p lan for the p rop er uti lization of ou r Air Power in support of a rejuven ated and statesm an like U. S. forei gn p olicy. Historians have termed the era of Great Britain s world leadership “ the Pa Britannica. The stability of those ti m es i s a goa l more likely to be wished for than achi eved i n the n ear future, but it is a worthy aim for our cou n try, which has succeeded to the p osition of leadershi p previ ously held by G reat B ritai n .

America’ Stratefy In World Poltica, p. 41. p. 1 . 40 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

T hiS historie example of astute foreign policy, coupled with a display of power at scattered vantage points, has set a recognizable pattern for the United States. In certain respects our moral position in promoting a similar alliance of air bases and foreign policy is undoubtedly more secure. For example, the United States could not reasonably be accused of the economic ruthlessness of which British expansion was ac cused. In place of economic betterment our position adheres to the basic aim of preventing wars which may become so destruc- tive as to render it impossible to distinguish the victors from the vanquished in every aspect save perhaps the official proc- lamation of surrender. The basis of our foreign policy is a desire for world peace. The deployment of our Air Power is important for its influence in the attainment of that desire. The sound geopolities of British naval bases in the dominant period of sea power logically brings forth the question of the geopolitical implications of strategic air bases. It can be reasoned that any answer to this question must be predicated on at least the rudiments of geopolities in the air age. A point of departure, then, is the kinship of Air Power and geopolities. One of the earliest proponents of geopolities, Sir Halford MacKinder, devised a memorable thesis to forecast the tribu- lations which would confront the British Empire in the twentieth century. MacKinder foresaw that nineteenth century maritime power could be topped by land power, which would become more mobile as railroads and modern transportation developed. He held that the key to world dominance would some day be lodged in eastern Europe and that enlargement of the eastern European power position could lead to control of the land mass of Europe, Asia, and África— the “ Heartland,” as he chose to call it. Events have never completely confirmed his beliefs, but it is certain that his theories influenced German political thought and military planning prior to the last war. Although the Nazi strikes into África and eastern Europe were only transient, it was increasingly clear in the dark hours of those conflicts that consolidation and expoitation of the positions then held would inevitably reduce the Western Hemi- sphere, Australia, and other isolated land areas to impotent segments of the earth’s surface. MacKinder, however, did not include Air Power in his cal- SENTINELS OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY 41 culati on s i ndeed, cu rren t geop olitical th i n k i n g has thus far ten ded to s k i rt th e a i r factor. The Reverend Edmund A. Walsh, a p rom i n en t geop olitician, asserts th a t A i r P ower m odi fies but does n ot ca n cel ou t the hea rtla n d theory . T h i s p osi ti on i s taken by another authority, Burnet Hershey, who declares that, “R ssia, the present dominator of the h ea rtland from every point of vi ew, ha s th e s tron ges t a i r p os i ti on i n th e world today. His rem arks w’ere n ot sp eci fically prop ou n ded i n con - sideration either of military strategy or forei gn p oli cy m a tters, since they dealt p ri m a ri ly with the comm ercial aspects of in- tern a ti on a l aviation. Nevertheless the eastern European area lies strategically athwart air rou tes a lmost as prominently as it dominates large land areas and sensitive land rou tes. B earing in m ind, therefore, that the U n i ted S tates is n ot geogra p h i ca lly the most fa vored n a ti on for the application of Air Power and recalli n g tha t B ri ta i n ’ s stra tegy a ga i n st the Europ ea n land mass fea tu red a n en ci rclem en t wi th world bases upon which to pivot or con cen trate her m obi le n aval strength, it becomes clear tha t a si m i lar strategy for the U . S. m a y be geop olitically desirable i f not absolutely necessary. W e m ust assess the wi sdom of undermining our less favorable aero-geogra p h i ca l position by a withdrawal to the bases wi th i n the national an d terri tori a l boundaries, since thereafter, we shou ld ha ve to rely upon publicizing technologi ca l advances in aircraft ra n ge a n d p erform a n ce to com p en sa te for less effecti ve dep loy - ment. This course of action, it appears, would relegate our A i r Power to the sta tu s of a war weap on. I t would di sp lay that we di d n ot i n ten d to use thi s i m p orta n t i n s tru m en t of power in direct sup p ort of peace by the prevention, rather than the win- nmg of any p ossible future war. A deploy m en t of Air Power for geop olitical advantages, it must be recognized, is in itself on ly the means to an end. I t would be foolh a rdy to dep loy i n such wa n ton fashion as to leave a n a ti on ’ s ai r arm without cohesion and warmaking cap abi lity. The problem , as stated p revi ously, is to deploy i n such a m anner as to lend p olitical stamina to peace aims of ou r forei gn p olicy. This need not entail dangerous disp ersion. O n the con tra ry , i f hostihties should occur, it is conceivable tha t a t least som e of the bases held would be tenable and of op era ti on a l value.

ynet He,r,.hey “Sk.vways of Tomorrow, Feadllne Seri es. P oli cy A ssoclati on, N um ber AugUSt. 1944 . p. 4 . 42 AIR UNIVERS1TY QUARTERLY REVIEW

T he role of foreign policy is not difficult to understand. Foreign policy expresses the collective will and desires of the nation in matters pertaining to other nations. Mr. Joseph Jones, Associate Editor of Fortune and former State Department officer, has declared that foreign affairs “ are American affairs in which we admit that foreign countries have a legitimate interest; and they are affairs of foreign countries in which we claim to have a legitimate interest.” A familiar promulgation of U. S. foreign policy is the Monroe Doctrine, the capstone of U. S. foreign affairs for almost a century. Its phraseology tacitly admitted that other nations had a legitimate interest in American affairs by virtue of their New World colonies. Conversely the Monroe Doctrine recognized the legitimate interests of the United States in forbidding further New World colonization. Serious accusations have been leveled against modern U. S. foreign policy. Walter Lippmann holds that our Twentieth Century foreign policy has largely been insolvent.* Many claim that all too frequently it has been compounded of wordy principies and simple expediency, facts which have befuddled not only the U. S. public but also foreign statesmen seeking to align the destinies of their nations with those of this country. Granting the absence of a clearcut, long-range foreign policy for the future, it is, however, indisputable that this nation’s current actions bear ample testimony to at least an unwritten policy of rehabilitating the shattered portions of the globe and of contributing a large portion of our energies toward a durable and honorable peace. The Marshall Plan and our in- tense participation in the United Nations Organization attest to our desire to stabilize the world. This nation no longer with- draws from world politics whenever the course of events does not measure up to the hoped-for results. Much in the same manner as deliberate and forthright actions have preceded major foreign policy statements, we have acquired strategic air bases prior to any major documented policies on the subject. The war was the occasion for the air bases we now hold, and these were acquired for operational reasons. Many, however, we have been reluctant to relinquish. Bases in Iceland and Greenland are good examples. A Joint

‘ U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. |). 9. SENTI NELS OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY 4

Chiefs of Staff rep ort of 194 called attention to the northern approaches to the U. S. as criticai and suggested that we retain a firm grasp on these two va n ta ge p oi n ts overlook i n g our Arctic and Atlantic frontiers. The British have suggested the manning of bases. V i scoun t A ddi son, govern m en t leader in the House of Commons, stated that the Atla n ti c P a ct m i gh t p rovi de “ in the n ear future, a joi n t worki n g arran gem en t, p arti cu- larly affecting air power, which could be dep loy ed an d develop ed ra p i dly in defen se of peace. His colleague, S i r Samuel Hoare, four-time British Secretary for A i r, u rged the orga n i za ti on of necessary bases wi thout delay. It appears that regardless of form a l intent we are holding p resent bases for thei r value to the peace. The question may arise as to public support of a strategic air base p lan. This nation has previously been divided on the subject of any overseas dep loy m en t of its m ilitary power in time of peace. Stead ast in the practice of military action only as a mans of rep elling a nation alrea dy on th e m a rch, thi s n a ti on has clung to the belief that it should confine its m ilitary power within its national boundaries. That concept appears to be dying fast. Indeed it is questionable i f it has ever been more than a sedative to even its stoutest p roclaim ers. Hanson Baldwin writes in his book Price of Power:

“ . . . the basis of ou r whole p ast strategy has been to fight our wars overseas, and the basis of ou r dip lomacy as applied to strategy sometim es has been, always should ha ve been, an d hen ceforth m ust be, to insure the U n i ted S ta tes p osi ti on s b a s es i n readi ness over seas from whi ch our military power could be appli ed to the enem y, and allies-in-being, so tha t we wou ld not flgh t a wa r a lon e. . p . 1 If U. S. forei gn p oli cy i s, however, to be a ggressi ve for p eace, it is constrained to utili ze every m ean s to accom p lish the task. It foli o ws that strategi c ai r bases, acqui red in p ursuance of tha t m a n da te, n eed be rega rded n ot solely as launching sites foi U . S. A i r P ower i f a shooti n g wa r com m en ces bu t also as active, forth ri gh t weap on s for peace. I n a discussion of the problem of bases as it pertains to Britain, RAF Group Captain J G. Davis defined a solution: “ Our own a i m shou ld be, therefore, to dep loy ou r air forces as to p reven t wa r by the threat of action, rather than to follow our traditional ta rdy p olicy of rep ly i n g to b lows a lrea dy s tru ck . T h e th rea t of action by

The Employ ment of Air Forces in Imperial Defence and Combined International En- forcement Action, Mlmeographed Prize Essay in Air Universlty Libr ry . p. . 44 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

strategically deploy ed U . S . A i r P ower is a potentially great orce for peace. Its value to ou r forei gn p olicy canot be ignored. More tan gi ble recogn i ti on of the va lue of relating the mission of Air Power to di p lom a ti c ends m i ght be epressed i n numerous ways. Adequate liaison between the Air Force and the D ep a rtm en t of State will be increasi n gly necessary. E - panded instruction in forei gn p olicy in the Air Force S ervi ce schools would aid immeasurabiy in identifying and clarifying the p ossible bea ring of Air Power upon international affairs. We can envision standard tou rs of duty wi th the S tate D ep art ment for selected A i r F orce ofRcers. T hi s p rop osi ti on m a y violate military traditions of aloo n ess from p olitical affairs, but i t i s to be n oted th a t ou r government has recently entrust- ed ofRcers of the D ep a rtm en t of Defense wi th di p lom a ti c p osi ti on s of grave responsibility and sensitivity. The trend has been established by the pressure of international events, and the Air Force, as the p rime mover of national peace power, cannot ignore i ts responsibilities for statesm anshi p . Concentration of the A i r F orce wi thi n dom esti c borders would i gnore the effects whi ch m ore wi desp read dep loy m en t can p rodu ce i n the p olitical thi n k i n g of aggressor nations or nations which m ay waver between p owerful sovereignties. We are n ot assured of a favorable geop olitical situation as far as ou r dom esti c ai r sp ace is con cerned. I t is necessary, therefore, not only to e p loi t our present techn ologi ca l sup eriority in prep aration for war, if it comes, but also to i m p rove our geo political situation for p eace. I f U. S. A i r P ower is deploy ed ad- vantageously to con form to the geographical di ctates of the globe an d i n di rect and recogni zed sup p ort of our forei gn p olicy, it can be said that we have correctly appli ed geop olitics to the a i r age. The Pa Britannica, which resulted from an ap - plication of thi s p rincipie to an earlier age, wi ll be succeeded by a stable world free from the constant threat of war. Finally the continuous interplay of forei gn p olicy and stra tegi ca lly deploy ed A i r P ower must not be deprecated by the trustees of ei ther elem ent. N ei ther the m a k ers of forei gn p olicy nor Air Force p lanners can afford to p roceed u n i laterally toward desired ends. G rou p C a p ta i n D avi s, i n hi s trea tm en t of the p roblem as i t affects the B ritish Empire, notes tha t “ the defence of the B ritish Empire and C om m onwealth i s, as i t always has been, as much a political and diplom a ti c m a tter as a m i litary. The truth of thi s a sserti on a p p lied to the U n i ted SENT1NELS OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY 45

States must not be denied. The Air Force must regard diplomacy as a partner of defense and a strategic ally in the peace of- íènsive. Our Government, conversely, must utilize the mobility and the capabilities of deployment of the Air Force for attainment of its stated intemational objectives. Walter Lippmann has called U. S. foreign policy the “ Shield of the Republic.” A shield is a parrying weapon; in this sense our foreign policy may be thought of as an intemational saíe- guard by means of diplomatic maneuver. A shield is generally supplemented by a thrusting weapon, and in this respect our national power— land, sea, air, and industrial— must be inte- grated as that thrusting weapon for use in the diplomatic arena. U. S. Air Power, strategically deployed, can spearhead our composite of national power. It can ensure that U. S. foreign policy is recognized and respected throughout the world. In this manner the Air Force can logically substantiate its claim that Air Power is peace power. Air Command and Staff School

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% noic have a real intercontinental bomber, a bomber that can take off from bases on this continent. cross the oceans, or the pobar wastes, or the vast deserts. penetrate enemy defenses without friendly ftghter escort, destroy the strategic target. and then return non-stop to this continent.

— W. Stuart Symington Secretary of the Air Force Speech, 12 February 1949

lAsviation, world-encircling. world-shadowing aviation has come into being as the creature of war. Therefore, out of its parentage, it bears upon it the martes of the birds of prey. Like it or not, expensively and fearfully, ue are foreed to keep this weapon ready and even to improve upon it. It is the emblem and insígnia of man’s internai failure before God, which upon pain of death we must wear until either we destroy ourselves with it or we break out of our own self-created littlenesses.

— Oliver La Farge The Eagle in the Egg Houghton Mifflin, 1949 In My Opinion. . .

LIMITATIONS OF AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

T he Air Defense Command of the United States Air Force is in the process of developing an air defense System for this country. In May and June of 1949 the Command put into being the first increment of its proposed system— operation blackjack. This was the initial test on a unified basis of the equipment and personnel currently available for air defense work. blackjack was primarily a test of the Communications system developed by the Air Defense Command. From it carne several indications that we should perhaps question the feasi- bility of carrying on with the proposed defense system. By establishing such a system are we not trying to develop an impregnable defense barrier against possible, not necessarily probable, enemy attack from the air? The radar equipment employed in blackjack was in use at the termination of World War II. It is equipment that would have to be put to use if this country were to be attacked tomorrow or next week or a few months from now. Minor modifica- tions have been made, but essentially the equipment is the same, with the same deficiencies that existed four years ago. It still has limited range, is easy to jam, is restricted to line-of- sight limitations, and each set has a permanent echo pattern according to the surrounding terrain. As for identification equipment, it was discovered that we are still using materiel that has been compromised time and again in the past. Tests conducted by the Air Force at Muroc Air Force Base and Eglin Air Force Base reveal that we are also lacking in interceptor aircraft capable of satisfactory defense against hostile airplanes. For air defense work enormous sums of money will have to be spent for aircraft whose sole purpose is to intercept bombers or missiles. To be added to this money are the sums needed for research and development. The Air Force, which has been given the responsibility for the air defense of the United States, has asked for and received

The views expressed under the heading of In My Opinion . . . are not the official views of the Department of the Air Force or of the Air University.

46 IN MY OPINION . . . 4

from C on gress 1 1 m i llion dollars to m eet the minimum requ i rem en ts for such ai r defense. W i th thi s sum m ust be p ur- chased new and e p ensive radar ap p aratus, equi p m en t which would not sup p lem en t what we now p ossess, but would, because of the limitations mentioned above, replace it. I n addition there are other limitations which must be omitted here for security. Also to be obtained with this sum are si tes for the radar loca ti on s. A n d a m a jor share of the money must go into con stru cti on : barracks, m ess halls, adm inistration buildings, GCI Ground Control Intercept stations, control cen ters, and an e trem ely costly and e p ensive C om m unications system . It is apparent that 1 1 milion dollars will not go far. The USAF will ha ve to go back to Congress m an y ti m es, a t the rate of 11 million dollars a tim e, before i t can com p lete an adequate system . T he original figure appears to be highly in- sufficient it can only be considered a sm all down paym ent. Alon g wi th the i n tercep tor a i rcra ft an d con trol and warning stations already mentioned, the air defense system m ust have antiaircraft a rti llery. T o p rotect the m any vi tal ta rgets i n thi s cou n try, we must have many more guns than our field forces now possess. W e m ust have i m p roved weap ons whi ch do n ot have the limitations of present pieces. In all likelihood we will not be fi ri n g at the ty p e of aircraft whi ch were used against us in the past war future aircraft can be e p ected to fly faster and higher. To be effecti ve, we m ust develop a n ti ti rcra ft a rti l lery capable of hitting them. Such artillery rep resents no sm all part of the tota l cost of an air defen se system . T hese three elem en ts then — radar, aircraft, and antiaircraft artillery— form the basi s for a i r defen se. A t p resen t we have all three, but i n li m i ted qu a n ti ti es an d of qu esti on able value. They will be used because of the possibility of attack in the air. The probability of attack rem ai n s to be seen. Two wars have shown that no defense system could stop a bomber stream from rea ch i n g a n ob jective. A i r defen se com - manders wrere p leased when a i rcra ft an d gun s cou ld knock out ten p er cen t of the hosti le bom bers, T he over-all average was som ewhat less than that. T hese defenses were against bombers ca rry i n g con ven ti on a l high e plosi ve bom bs, limited in capacity for damage in comparison with new mass destruction weapons. In the future it must be e pected that the attack will not be m ounted wi th a few a i rcra ft but wi th form a ti on s i n the nature of arm a da s, ca rry i n g n ot con ven ti on a l high e plosi ves 48 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW but atomic bomb-type weapons capable of fearful and wide- spread destruction in one raid. Guided-missile-type bombs, traveling at speeds far in excess of the speed of sound, will also likely be employed. Combating them is a problem in itself. If our enemies send over great numbers of aircraft carrying enough atomic bomb-type weapons to attain a goodly part of their strategic objectives, and if our air defense system is capa ble of destroying only about ten per cent of their planes and probably a lesser percentage of their missiles, is the expenditure of such an enormous sum of money— probably billions of dollars— for an air defense system feasible and acceptable? Are there perhaps other places for us to put our money in order that the probability of attack might be made more remote? General Ornar Bradley, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated that Western Europe is our first line of defense. The United States, he says, should see that the nations involved in the North Atlantic Pact are given arms and equipment with which to meet the attack from any aggressor. He believes the first action in any future war would be an attempt to conquer the countries of Western Europe. General Bradley, in discussing our offensive and defensive requirements and those of our allies, gives the air defense of the United States a fourth priority, subordinated to (1) a U. S. strategic bombing force, (2) U. S. Navy and Western European naval operations, and (3) establishment of ground power in European and other nations. We do not wish to pillory air defense. If funds were of little or no consideration, a mighty defense system aimed at making this country literally unpenetrable would be mandatory. Un- fortunately such is not the case. There is a ceiling on what we can spend, necessitating the establishment of priorities. The proposed air defense system does not rate a high rung on the priority ladder. Air Command and Staff School Lt. Col. Harry M. Pike

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TROOP CARRIER AVIATION IN THE USAF O ne Problem Air Force planners must solve concerns the place of troop carrier aviation within the present Air Force structure. While it must be capable of important air cargo operations, the primary mission of troop carrier forces is to transport airborne forces into combat, re-supply them, èvacuate casualties, IN MY OPINION . . . 49

and evacuate the airborne force i tself if necessary and feasi ble. Progress in tactics, equip m ent, and techniques bearing on this mission has been negligible since the last war. One has only to revi ew the troop ca rri er effort requi red during the p ast war to rea lize that a large force of thi s ty p e cannot be maintained under cu rren t b u dget cei lings. Concen- tration then must be on a nucleus of highly trained, adequately equipped personnel, around whom a sizable force ca n be bui lt. T oda y troop ca rri er wi n gs a re assigned to vari ous num bered air forces. W h i le they som eti m es op era te wi th a i rb orn e a n d standard grou n d force un i ts, the bulk of th ei r effort is devoted to tra n sp orta ti on of miscellaneous cargo and personnel. An a ttem p t shou ld be m ade, therefore, to orga n i ze troop ca rri er a vi ati on i n such a m a n n er as to accom p lish both airborne training and normal a i r tra n sp orta ti on m i ssi on s. O b vi ou sly a troop ca rri er com m a n d w i th a ll troop ca rri er u n i ts a ssi gn ed i s the answer, but budgetary limitations, unfortu n a tely, do not now permit its establishment. Although troop carrier units m ust presently be used for rou ti n e tra n sp orta ti on du ti es because a dequ a te oth er m ea n s are not avai lable, it is not accep table tha t our han dful of tra i n ed troop ca rri er s ta ff personnel be sca ttered to the fou r wi nds. H ow, then, should this sp eci alized force be assi gn ed w i th i n th e A i r F orce to reta i n a n d further develop i ts p ri m a ry mission while sti ll furnishing vital a i r tra n sp orta ti on ? I f troop ca rri er a vi a ti on i s con s i dered a force, i ts p resen t a ssi gn m en t to n u m b ered ai r forces i s i m p rop er. V i olations of the p ri n ci p i es of management and organization are ap p aren t p i ecem eal operations, of primary valu e to th e va rious headquarters, are the p ri m a ry accom p lishments. Troop carrier forces a re th ea ter forces and should be uti lized on missions of importance to the theater as a whole. S i n ce a T roop C a rri er C om m a n d H ea dqu a rters w i th a ll units assigned is not feasi ble a t thi s ti m e, a m erger wi th the Mili ta ry A i r T ra n sp ort S ervi ce i s the n e t best an swer. W ith all military transport aircraft and units assigned to one head quarters, m ore econ om i ca l utilization can be e pected. This prop osed m erger shou ld stroctu ra lize itself into a headquarters with two num bered ai r forces: one a i r tra n sp ort i n i ts p resen t form, the other combat air tran sp ort troop ca rri er . S cheduled op erations within the continental U. S. and to forei gn term i n a i s would con sti tu te the m a jor effort of the A i r T ra n s p ort D i vi si on . AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

T h e C om b a t A i r T ra n s p ort F orce troop ca rri er w ou ld con - cen trate on A rm y airborne train in g and non-scheduled air tra n s p ort op era ti on s . I t w ou ld p la n a n d e ecu te tra i n i n g op - erations with airborne and air transp ort troops. T roop ca rri er a n d a i rb orn e forces a re tw o com p on en ts of a tea m , a n d certa i n joi n t a cti v i ti es a re n ecessa ry . S ta n d i n g op - era tin g p rocedu res m u st be established, sta ff fun ction s ou tlin ed, and resp on sibilities of each com p on en t agreed up on. A C om bat A i r T ra n s p ort A i r F orce H ea d qu a rters w ou ld p rovi de fa ci li ti es an d train ed p erson n el to accom p lish the n ecessary elem en ts of p lanning and sup ervision of training operations. N orm al rota ti on of officers th rou gh th e h ea d qu a rters w ou ld p rovi de a n ever- growin g nucleus of train ed staff officers. T o fi.ll cu rren t n eeds, p la n s for th e tra n s p ort of troop s for defen s e of vi ta l areas could be effected and ap p roved. E m ergen cy disaster op- eratin g p rocedures would save valuable tim e in relievin g suf- ferin g caused by acts of G od. A ccom p lishm ent of such op era tions would p rovide valuable train in g to both p lann ing staffs and com bat crews. A ir tran sp ort requ irem en ts, in the even t of war, will be staggerin g. A lthou gh e istin g m ilitary and civilian tran sp ort a i rcra ft a re too few , i t is i m p era ti ve th a t a ll tra n s p ort a i rcra ft be orga n ized to p rovide a m a im u m lift efifort. C ross tra i n i n g a n d rota ti on of p ers on n el b etw een th e tw o a i r forces a n d th e comm and headquarters would provide an acceptable trans p ort orga n i za ti on . M i li ta ry a i r tra n s p ort p erson n el w ou ld become p roficient in p arachute and glider operations, while troop carrier forces would gain valuable train in g in scheduled ca rgo tra n s p orta ti on . A d equ a te n u m b ers of a i rcra ft a n d tra i n ed crews cap able of p erform in g scheduled or non-scheduled, m a im um -effort op erations would then e ist. O ur strategic e ffort w ou ld b e s u p p orted m ore a d equ a tely b y s u ch a ca p a - bility. Standardization of equipm ent types and Service testing c ou ld b e a c c o m p li s h e d m ore e c o n o m i c a lly , re s u lti n g i n i m - p roved item s su itable for all air tra n sp orta tion needs. A com m and headquarters would be at such a levei as to plan opera tion s and develop p rocedu res for defen se an d su p p ly of vita l areas. D evelop m ent of doctrine and im p roved tactics would be en su red, a n d coop era ti on w i th a i rb orn e a n d A rm y troop s en - hanced, because of the single, adequately staffed headquarters. I f su ch a m erger is n ot a ccep ta b le, for rea son s u n k n ow n to the writer, a planning and operating comm and headquarters IN MY OPINION . . . 51

similar to Tactical Air Command is proposed. While this is not as desirable, from a standpoint of utilization of force, it would still be a great improvement. Although troop carrier units would continue to be assigned to various numbered air forces, they could be made available to the command for joint maneuvers and training. A training schedule could be promul- gated to rotate the various troop carrier wings through train ing periods of thirty to sixty days each. Total-effort maneuvers could be included each year to develop and polish troop carrier airborne operations. Day-to-day airborne training jumps could be performed during the training periods of the troop carrier groups. A flight section, permanently assigned the Command, could furnish effort for the Airborne School at Ft. Benning, Geórgia. Independent airhead operations could be coordinated with Tactical Air Command. joint amphibious operations with the Navy, and the land assaults with the Army. Joint staff training with the airborne headquarters would provide valuable experience to troop carrier staff officers.

Air Command and Staff School Lt. Col. Leroy M. Stanton

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MILITARY RESPOXSIBILITIES IN THE ATOMIC AGE

W arfare is a dynamic force, changing as its weapons change, increasing in scope and destructiveness. While World War II was termed a total war, future warfare will approach totality as never before. One result of this total nature of war has been to force military men to become students of world economic and political problems, as well as of strategy and tactics. Weapons now' available make possible strikes against our country directly from other continents. These blows may come without warning. Our military establishment, therefore, will no longer be able to plan and build forces after a war starts. Hence, we are responsible for the provision of weapons with qualitative superiority over those of possible enemies. Around these weapons a force m being, adequate to meet threats to our security, must be created. Strategic plans based upon the best intelligence must be formulated. But, if our military plans are to be sound, we must accept a vastly increased responsibility for broad and sound thinking in many areas. We cannot isolate the military establishment from the nation and the world of nations. We must solve military problems through realistic and 2 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW objecti ve p ercep ti on of the com p leities that enfold them . We find, for eample, that annual p eaceti m e e p endi tures for national defen se have greatly increased. H ow close to the absolute spending li m i t we ha ve com e i s a qu esti on the future must decide but certa i n ly , toda y , these e p en di tu res are so trem en dous tha t the m i litary establishment must plan more econom i cally and manage more efficiently than ever before to husband national resources. In international econ om i cs m i litary resp onsi bi lity has also skyrock eted. T h e M a rshall Plan is economic warfare and a good e a m p le of its vastly increased scale of op erations. T he Atlantic Pact and plans for m i li ta ry a i d to W estern Europ e are other program s whose success dep ends, to a consi derable degree, up on close coordination of many departm en ts of our government, including the m ilitary. Althou gh these p rogram s are the di rect responsibility of ci vi lian agenci es, they n ow requi re the p arti ci p a ti on of military leaders to a degree un- thou ght of before i n p eaceti m e. W e m ust be m ore than m erely aware of these facts. In the past, military parti ci p a ti on i n p olitical warfare and forei gn relations has been limited. After each war, e cept World War II, our military forces have been so drastically reduced that we have been unable to sup p ort n a ti on a l policies or for ei gn com m i tm ents. G eographical barriers and armies of friendly nations form erly perm i tted us to con du ct forei gn affairs with only p otential military power. Today this has changed. T he develop m en t of military weapons has erased geographical barriers, and W orld War II nearly eliminated the military forces of ou r traditional allies. Thus now, as never before, our forei gn p olicy commitments must be adequately backed by actual U. S. m ilitary power. If our national strategy is to be sound, close and continuous coordination between the governmental dep artm en ts dea ling in forei gn affairs and in m ilitary problem s is essenti al. Here again m ilitary men must be well informed if thei r parti ci p a ti on i s to be of value. In politics the military has always e erted con si derable influence during warti m e. I n deed m a n y a u thorities believe it has been too great. L et us leave the questi on of the p rop er degree of military parti ci p a ti on i n our nation’s warti m e for ei gn p olicy program for others to deci de. B u t the fact that we have won m ilitary victories in two world wars without winning a p eace in either leaves room to dou b t the wi sdom of past IN MY OPINION . . . 53 military advice in this sphere. Thus the need on the part of military men for a broader knowledge of political warfare and a better understanding of its role in time of war is under- scored. Today it is imperative that the military so prepare itself that its influence in a possible future war will lead to winning the peace as well as the military victory. In the psychological field we find an aspect of warfare that has only recently come into prominence. At the beginning of World War II most Americans, including military leaders, knew little of psychological weapons, and there is no doubt that our ignorance hindered the implementation of an effective program of psychological warfare. Although the future military role has yet to be determined, it is evident that the armed forces must give considerable attention to its possibilities. Today, the position of the United States in world affairs demands that our military leaders become thoroughly familiar with many vital subjects.

Air War College Col. J. M. Chappell

TACTICAL SUPPORT AVIATION IN THE USAF

S ince World War II increasing concern relative to the apparent lack of attention being given to air support of surface units has been expressed. Apprehension regarding tactical aviation has been stated publicly by leading military and political officials, with the result that many citizens have themselves begun to question this phase of our defense planning. The facts are, however, that the Air Force has a.t the present time trained tactical air units, capable of expansion necessary to meet the requirements of any joint air-surface operation the military establishment is capable of supporting. These units are equipped with modera, high-performance ground support aircraft equal or superior to whatever types an enemy may possess. Many critics believe the Air Force should maintain large numbers of tactical support units, not realizing that our sur face forces are small and require only a modicum of air sup port. The Army today has approximately two and one-half divisions in the European Theater, five divisions in the United States, of which one is full strength and four are part strength 4 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REV1EW

but which are bei n g built up , a n d less tha n fi ve di vi si ons in the Far East. This total Army strength, i f com bat ready, i n sofar as equi p m ent and trai n i n g are concerned, is rou ghly equal to one field army. Past e perience reveals that normal air sup p ort for on e field army can be furnished by one tactical air force. At present the C on ti n en ta l Air Command has the equivalent of on e ta cti ca l air force i n trained and equipped units, plus another equi valent force now trained in air defense functions and capable of being converted to ta cti ca l op erations in a few months. D isregardi n g those A i r F orce u n i ts ou tsi de the con ti nental U n i ted S ta tes, i t i s obvi ou s th a t the A i r Force is m ore tha n p rep ared to up hold i ts share in any immediate joi n t ai r- surface op eration. Eception to the la st s ta tem en t m a y be ta k en by those who have e p ressed con cern over the ca p a b i lities of jet- typ e ai rcraft to p erform the grou n d su p p ort m ission. A dm i ttedly the i n tro- duction of jet- typ e ai rcraft i n to grou n d su p p ort op erations has increased the di fficulti es of thi s ty p e of air op eration. But great strides have been m ade during the past fou r years in the design of jet aircraft an d thei r armament installations most of the difficulti es have been overcom e. I t should be rem em bered that the first P- ’s were desi gn ed as hi gh alti tu de, hi gh p erform ance aerial fighters. A ttem p ts were m a de to a da p t them to the grou n d su p p ort role, and a dm i ttedly the results were p oor. Since then several jet fighters designed p rimarily for grou n d sup p ort op erations have been introdu ced i n to ta cti ca l units and a steady i ncrease i n thei r grou n d su p p ort ca p a b i lities has resulted. T h e results of ta cti ca l and operational suitability tests of the latest jet fighter-bombers p rove they are cap able of performing all of the m i ssi on s p erformed by P-4 ’s and P- 1’s during the last war an d a t the sam e ti m e p rodu ci n g more accurate results. As for epansion capabilities, the Air Force can en large i ts ta cti ca l air units in am ple ti m e to su p p ort a dequ a tely any e p anded surface force. During the past war, when the i nduc- tion system, training programs, training stations, and the nations industry were op era ti n g at p eak cap aci ty, i t took approimately one year to get a di vi si on ready for overseas shipment. Supporti n g a i r units were trai n ed and equi p p ed i n a com p arable length of ti m e. T h ey can rep eat thi s p erformance now and i n the future. Air Command and Staff School Lt. Col. Hoivard D. Suttetlin Stalin. by Isaae Deutscher (Oxford U. Press, $5) Reviewed by Major Kenneth F. Gantz HE AUTHOR of thi s definitive study of the ca reer of the Red Sphin calls it a p olitical biography. I t is actually a rem a rk a b ly objecti ve and thorou gh e a m i n a ti on of the webT of individuais and circum stances within which a dictator arose a n d th e effect of his rise on the revolution. Mr Deutscher’s e planation of how a shrewd an d ruthless man can come to power through the channels of political sp adework and the collecti on to hi m self of the i n fluence of powerful p arty com m i ttees of which he becom es a m em ber is particularly illuminating. Joseph Stalin was bom Vissarion Ivanovitch Djugashvili in a little town in the oriental, tribal, feudal Caucasus in 1 9 to the p overty a n d squ a lor and the class hatred of a fam ily of serfs. A t the age of nineteen he became involved in clandestine political a cti vi ty an d bega n to di sp lay p roficiency as a tech- nician of revolution, helping to stage the first successful May D ay in the Caucasus and organizing strikes under the n a m e of Koba The Indomitable. By 191 he had spent sevtn years in p rison or banishment. In comparison with the gifted i n tellectuals of his p arty he had seem ed m ore the crude handym an of u n dergrou n d a cti v i ty tha n a grea t p a rty leader like the imperious aesthete Trotsky of inspiring eloqu en ce or the i dea listic Lenin of com p rehen si ve mind and boundless p olitical resources. H e had rem a i n ed i m - mersed in the drudgery of daily revolutionary work, with no inkli n g of the b road internationalism of his master Lenin and his colleagues and no p art i n thei r storm y doctri n a i re con- gresses. T hi s was the source of his strength. T he son of serfs, althou gh M a r i st an d a clum sy e pounder of Lenin’s ideas, was, i n con tra s t to the p rojectors of world revolution, a Russian revolutionary, the peasant driven by the urge to throw off the burden, becoming master of the ta cti c a n d m a n eu ver of rebel- lion. When Lenin changed the concept of the p a rty from a AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

loose orga n i za ti on em b racing all the working class and the Socialist intelligentsia and orga n i zed i t as a va n gu a rd of the more determined elem ents of the working class for di sci p lined action, he fou n d K ob a an i n strum ent at hand, a practical worker, for membership in the guiding Central Committee. It was Koba, now Stalin The Man of Steel, who rushed back from S i b ria in the February revolution of 1 9 1 to tak e over the P etrogra d S ovi et on the strength of seniority in the party and S ta lin who led the p a rty u n ti l Lenin could get back into R ssia. When the first Soviet G overnment was formed, it included Stalin, and when the Government delegated urgen t business to an i nner Cabinet, Stalin was, with Lenin and Trot- sky, m ade one of the five. Stalin, the man of pra cti ce, the ad- ministrator who could act, had become indisp ensable to L en i n in his fight with the ultra-revolutionary dream ers. After three years of ci vi l war Stalin was virtu a lly the behind- the- scenes ruler of R ssi a, h a vi n g been voted i n to p osi ti on s of deci si ve i m p orta n ce by hi s u n com p rehendi ng rivais. As Com- m issar of Nationalities he dealt p ri m a ri ly with Russia’s vast Asiatic and Eastward- look i n g p rovinces. H is first-hand knowledge of thei r primitive populations was unsurpassed, and as they reasserted them selves deci si vely in the spiritual climate of Rssia, he drew devoted sup p ort from thei r leaders, to whom he had interpreted R ussian com m unism . As C om m issar of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate he controlled every bran ch of the a dm i n i s tration from top to b ottom throu gh hi s m i ssi on to create an efficient civil Servi ce. A n d S ta lin’s parti cu lar business on the P olitbureau, the real government, was the day- to- day m anagem ent of the p a rty , the m a rshaling of the party i n accord wi th the P olitbureau’s directi ves. H e was therefore at one ti m e the e ecuti ve voi ce of government, the overlord of government personnel, and the personification of the C om- munist party for the loca l leaders of huge blocks of the p opu- la ti on whose A si a ti c ca st of mind like his was forei gn to the Europ ea n i zed S oci a li st i n tellectuals who were p a rty leaders. This formidable p ower entered up on i ts p en ulti m a te stage on th e roa d to di cta torship with the creation in 1922 of the post of General Secretary of the C en tral Committee, to which Stalin was appointed. The Politbureau m ay have been the brain and spirit of the p a rty , but the G en eral Secretary, who prep ared i ts agenda and docum ented its debates, who trans- lated its deci si on s to the p a rty functionaries, in turn depending AIRMAN‘S READING

on him for a dva n cem en t, coulcl prejudice its views and distort the e ecu ti on of its decisions as he desired. W i th the head of the p a rty , F a th er- of-the-Revolution Lenin, still alive Stalin was in practice master of the p a rty a n d the R ssi a th e p a rty ruled. At the death of Lenin the story became one of crafty p laying of ri va l against rival, who one by one, including the arch-foe T rot- sky, succumbed. In 1929 he could i n augurate by p ersonal de- cree the second revolution, the Five- ear Plan, an enormously com p le social upheaval of appaling cost to 1 , , people. T he com m i tteem an wi thout p eer had becom e D ictator. L i ke his earlier chapters Mr. DeutscheFs accounts of the second revolution, the great purge of the T h i rti es, a n d the di - recti on of the G erm a n wa r a re well- rou n ded an d p en etra ti n g analyses of the stemming of events from th e p ers on a lity and motives of th ei r leadi n g actor. In and around the flow of the cen tral biography are woven e cellen t m ap p i ngs of numerou s tributaries. Outstanding are the tra ci n gs of the su p p ressi on of Menshevism by Bolshevism , the feud between S ta lin and Trot- sky, S talin’s departure from the internationalism of Leninism to the con cep t of the sel - su fficiency of the R u ssi a n revolution, Stalin’s dealings with rivais, real or potential, Stalin’s oriental- ization of the p a rty a n d th e facing away from E u rop e, an d, above all, the turning of the revolution, which began from a grea t p op u lar movement led by i dealogu es, towa rd a p olice State by surrender to i ts own i n s tru m en t, e clusive power concen trated for i ts own defen se i n the few at its p eak. This la st i s the tra gi c th em e th a t gi ves u n i vers a lity to Mr. D eutscher’s book. T hrough it the story of Stalin and the story of the R u ssi a n revolution bear on the wa y s of all human beings. Lenin w’as caught in the great dilemma that besets the soci eti es of men: whether to permit a catholic reedom of diver- sity in which cardinal unities may be lost or to en force a dogm atic conformity by annointing a chosen and centripctal few. Fearing that the revolution might be dissipated, Lenin chose the latter— and begat a dictator. A fter tha t choi ce the sequence of thi n gs th a t carne seem s almost mechanistic in Mr. D eu ts ch er’ s rich and well-documented telling. Stalin is, in the opinion of thi s revi ewer, m an datory readi n g for the A i r F orce officer and for an y p erson who needs to com e closer to a rea lization of the gu lf th a t sep ara tes the lay of mind of a ruler of a nation so much different from hi s own habits of thinking as perhap s to pass his understanding. AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

The Foreign Policy of Soviet Rússia, Vol. II, 1936-1941, by Max Beloff (Oxford Univ., $5.00) Reviewed by Eugene M . E m m e

NFORTUNATEL many of the numerous studies concerning the foreign objectives and actions of the Soviet Union have been of short-lived usefulnessbecause of their a p r i o r i assum p tions or their skim p y factual foundations. M r. M a B eloffs secon d volu m e on th e Foreign Policy of Soviet Rússia, li k e th e fi rs t, is a m a s terfu l a ttem p t to wed u n em oti on a l analysis to reliable facts. P ickin g up the m ain narrative where the first volum e ended. just after H itlerian G erm an y had rem ili- ta ri zed th e R h i n ela n d i n M a rch 1 9 , th i s volu m e sp a n s th e even tful course of In ternation al affairs from the viewp oin t of Soviet diplomacy until the Wehrmacht p lunged into R ssia in June 1941. U ndeniably historical in his ap p roach, M r. B eloff h a s n e v e rth e le s s la i d b a re m a n y o f th e b a s i c e le m e n ts o f S o v i e t p olicy in cop iou s an d docu m en ted deta il, m a k in g his two- volum e work of invaluable usefulness to serious students of con tem p ora ry a ffa i rs a s w ell as of m eri t to th e m ore h i s tori - c a lly m i n d e d .

D evotin g alm ost half of the second volum e to the “ B reak- down of C ollective S ecurity p receding and including the M unich crisis, M r. B eloff p refaces this section with a valuable discussion of the strategy and con duct of the N arkom in del P eop le’s C om m issariat for Foreign A ffairs via official dip lo- m atic channels, as well as of the tactical dip lom atic functions of C om in tern rep resen tatives an d other adheren ts of the M oscow “ line abroad. W ith scholarly detachm ent Soviet Russia’s d o u b le - b a rre lle d d i p lo m a c y i s fi rs t e a m i n e d w i th re s p e c t to the S panish C ivil W ar, which, as m ay be recalled, was highly p u b li ci zed b y b oth B erli n a n d M os cow a s a s tru ggle sy m b ol- izing the ideological conflict between fascism and com m unism . Then the main stream of International affairs in Europe, of necessity, receives full treatm ent until the tom bstone engraved at M unich was placed upon the grave of “ collective secu rity which R ssia con sidered had been em bodied within th e fra m ew ork of th e L ea gu e of N a ti on s . T h e p a ssi ve p os i ti on of G reat B ritain and F ran ce, in con jun ction with the unsym - pathetic reception accorded Soviet diplomacy in most of West ern Europe, lent substance to the fears in the Krem lin of a AIRMANS READING 9

more acti ve crusade against Bolshevism led by the T hi rd R ei ch, perhap s in collusion with Im p erial J ap an . A ttem p ti n g a bal- anced appraisal of Soviet diplom a cy du ri n g the rise of German hegem ony in W estern Europ e, the a u th or p resents valuable but brief chapters on “R ssia, Turkey, and the Straits, “R ssia and the F ar East, 19 -19 9, and “ R ssia and the M iddle East, 1929-19 9. After the vi olation of the schem e for “ p eace in our ti m e, when P rague was forci b ly seized by Germany in M arch 19 9, Soviet diplom acy assum ed a new course, the analysis of which con sti tu tes the m a jor p orti on of th e rem a i n der of Mr. BelofTs detailed study. I t was a p olicy of isolation and neutrality maintained upon Mar ist-Leninist doctrines until the “ S econ d Imperialist War as Stalin labeled i t i n 1 9 9 becam e the “Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Mr. Beloff eamines this policy when both the Western Powers and Germany sought the fri en ds h i p of R ssia during the sum m er of 19 9 and traces it through the conclusion of the N a zi - S ovi et Pact August 2 , 19 9 , the fou rth p a rti ti on of Poland, the Soviet war with F inland, and the course of affairs eventually lea di n g to th e en try of the Soviet Union into war as a bellig- erent in the W est whi le maintaining neutrality in the East.

Mr. BelofTs concluding chapter, “ The Principies of Soviet Foreign Policy, presents an en lightening discussion on the m ethodologi ca l problem fa ci n g those con cern ed wi th the delicate task of i n terp reti n g the ob jecti ves a n d ta cti cs of Soviet dip lom a cy . S i n ce factual inform a ti on is seriously lacking for an objecti ve e am i n ati on of the a ctu a l motives of Soviet leaders in m aking decisions on forei gn p oli cy m a tters, a b elief con tra ry to th a t held by those who wi llingly accep t the “ con tem p ora ry sp eculations of forei gn jou rn a lists, the author admirably attem p ts to ou tline what he considers to be the fundam ental tren ds and u n derlying purposes of the forei gn p olicy of the Soviet Union. In brief he m akes no p atent thesis but ably synthesizes the now p revailing interpretations of Soviet diplom a ti c stra tegy , n ot wi thou t first offerin g valid criticism for the wi desp read oversi m p lification of a m ost com p le problem . Mr. Beloff, for e a m p le, does n ot accep t the thesi s tha t the Kremlin s actions are essen ti ally fou n ded u p on a p ri ori ty or op p ortu n i sti c basi s i n di p lom a ti c m a tters, for it cannot be as sum ed or proven th a t di p lom a ti c deci si on s are a reasoned AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW choi ce. O n the other hand the emphasis upon the “ physical, a u tom a ti c, a n d com p u lsive elem ents of Soviet diplom a cy , those policies which are e p lai ned ei ther by the continuous influence of historical traditions or geographical necessities e. g., “ the urge to the sea or by rationalizing the dominating gospel according to S ai nt M ar as i t has been refined since 191 , Mr. Beloff dism isses as i gnoring reality. It is the impassioned merriage between the territorial power- com p le of Rssia and the fervent, class-stru ggle geared ideology of Mar ism-Leninism which the author prop oses as a central con cep t for i n terp reti n g S ovi et forei gn p olicy. Simi lar in historical analogy to the e p a n si on of Islam and of Arab rule or to the i n ter-relationships of the C ou n ter-Reformation and the Habsburg dy n a sty , the weddi n g of Rssia and Marism in 191 has produ ced an i deology whi ch i s i rreconci lably dedicated to the e ti n cti on of non-communist States on on e ha n d and the preservati on of the R u ssi a n S ta te as a B olshevik Sym bol of a better life on the other. Above all, the bearers of thi s ideology are “ bou n d to p u t the p reservati on of thei r regi m e above all con si derations, while thei r belief in the inevitable victory of the i n tern a ti on a l proletariat p rovides the Communist faithful with a conviction of “absolute righteousness and an “e trem e fleibility in daily action.

“ T he S ovi et G overnment is then like other governments necessarily and at all ti m es faced with a possible di vergence between i ts short term objecti ves— security and consequent progress within its own fron ti ers— and lon g term objecti ves— the e ten si on of the area of Sovietization. Which alternative will hold the field at any parti cu lar time will on thi s a n a lysis, depend upon the e ternai situation as view- ed throu gh Mar ist-Leninist spectacles. W here a si ngle powerful enem y has em erged i n the cap i talist environment, Soviet diplomacy has sought to i solate it, as during the “ collecti ve security period from 19 4-19 . Where the outside world is in turmoil, and the capi ta list powers indulging in intemecine strife. the opportu n i ty for e pansion recurs. as in 19 9-1941. p. 94

The conduct of Soviet forei gn p olicy during the “Great Patriot- ic War and the revitalization of international Communist agitation after the con clusion of hostilities only confirms Mr. BelofTs generalization. In the final analysis, Mr. Beloff has contributed a reference work of con si derable m erit, one faithfully annotating most pertinent facts to demonstrate the source of his I nformation AIRM AN’S READING 1 as well as to p rovide the basis for con ti n u ed research i n dep th. It should be pointed out, however, that the author fra n k ly adm i ts tha t he does n ot a ttem p t to p resen t a definitive analysis but rather has sought to weave those facts in general accep t- ance into a m eaningful fabric. F or e am ple, he traces the dip lom atic dam age done S oviet p restige abroa d by the b loody purges of the R ed A rm y leadershi p in 19 - 19 . H e also records C olon el Charles A . L i n db ergh’ s si gn i ficant role in undermining French and British estimates of the s tren gth of the R ed A i r F orce w h i le m agn i fying their apprehension for the Luftwaffe) during the criticai days just preceding the Munich Conference. The author does not, however, e ploi t the two volurnes of Documents and Materials Relating to the Out- break of the Second World War published in English by the Foreign Office of the U.S.S.R. in the summer of 194 . I n addi- ti on , he wa s u n a b le to e p loi t fully two e cellen t m on ograp hs of very recent vintage which would have been of value: Mr. Wheeler- B en n etfs Munich: The Prologue to Tragedy and Mr. Namiehs D iplom atic P r elude, 1938-1939. While this is not just another study of the w orkings of Soviet dip lom a cy , M r. BelofTs literary style, qu i te a p a rt from his m ethodologi ca l approach, is requently dry and laborious. For the a lert reader, however, thi s is no handi cap , even though the form a t of the work itself i n vi tes ey estra i n . A t the en d of the second volum e can be fou n d a series of maps illustrating the terri tori a l chan ges i n E astern E urope, 19 -1941, a classified bibliography covering the citations used in both volum es, and a useful inde . With his final sentence, M r. BelofT concludes that “ the student of Soviet forei gn p olicy is likely to arise from th e ta sk with a stren gthened con vi cti on that hi story above all is the study of the i m p erfect, the contingent, and the unique. To authoritatively disagree wi th this statem en t one would necessarily have to disprove every p age of two len gthy volum es on which the non-Mar ist policies of the Soviet Union appear as unscientific and im perfect as those of any state and M ar ist prognosis has yet to be p roven infallible.

Department of the Air Force Library 2 AIR UNIVERS1TY QUARTERLY REVIEW

Rússia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948, by George Lenczowski (Cornell Univ., $4.50) Reviewed by Robert W. Schmidt

ÚSSIA and the West in Iran, 1918-1948, i s an accoun t of S ovi et attem p ts to e tend R ussi an control over Iran . and the various moves and counter-moves which were Rm ade to thwart R ussi an desi gns. The Communist Party which took over the government of Rssia after the close of the F i rst World W ar considered I ran to be the k ey to C om m u n i st con qu est of the O rient. In the beginning the Soviet Government was forced by ci rcu m sta n ces not only to ignore I ra n but also tem p orarily to give up R ussian terri tory on the n orthern border of I ra n to short- lived rep ublics. Once the Communists had Consolidated their position in Central Rssia, however, the rep ublics were duly liquidated, and prop a ga n da an d m i litary operations were e tended i nto Iranian territory. Nevertheless it soon became apparent that m i litary opera ti ons, if con ti n ued, would create a condition unfavorable to Rssia. Soviet forces were wi thdrawn, and a Treaty of Friend- ship between I ran and R ssia was signed at M oscow on 2 February 1921. A nationalist revival in Iran began in this gen eral period under the leadership of Reza Khan. In spite of the T rea ty of Friendship, Communist agents continued to be acti ve in I ran. By arresti n g m any of the p a rty leaders R eza Khan was able to m ore or less keep the Communists in Iran under con trol. A s an additional means of cou n teracting Russian activity and pressure the government of Iran turned to the United States and Germany for techn i cal personnel and advisers. F rom a slight beginning, German influence in Iran grew un ti l it reached trem endous p rop orti on s a t the ou tbreak of the Second World W ar. Almost immediately after the beginning of World War II, Rssia and Great Britain intervened in Iran in order to assure them selves that I ran would n ot becom e a base for G erman op erations against either Rssia or ndia. This intervention took the form of a m ili ta ry occu p a ti on of strategic transporta - tion and communication areas by R ssi a i n N orthern Iran and A1RMAN'S READ1NG by Great Britain in Southern Iran. Both countries announced th a t they ha d n o desi gn s u p on I ra n i a n terri tory a n d th a t th ey would wi thdraw si m on ths a fter hosti lities had ceased. British forces, a fter i n tern i n g G erm an and other enem y nationals, confi n ed them selves to strategi c areas an d i n terfered with the internai life of the cou n try as little as p ossible. R ssia, on the other hand, occup ied p ositions that had rela- ti vely little or no relation to the announced purposes of the occu p a ti on , closed the occup i ed terri tori es to all ecept Rus- sians and I ranians, and i n terfered e ten si vely in the internai affairs of the occup i ed areas. T o a ll appearances R ssia considered the occu p ati on a p relim inary step to outright anne - ation of the terri tory . D urin g the war I ra n i a n p rotests agai n st R ussi an acti vi ti es were of no avail. After the surren der of Germany, Iran protest- ed against continued occupation, and British and A m erican troop s were withdrawn, in spite of the fact that R ssia was showing an increasingly hostile a tti tu de towa rd G rea t B ri ta i n and other western nati ons. I ra n then p rotested even m ore vehem ently against the continued presence of Russian troops i n N orth ern I ra n . B efore R ussian troop s wi thdrew from I ra n , however, they aided loca l elements in Iranian Azerbaijan in ca rry i n g ou t a revolt against the Iranian Governm ent. Futher- more, the I ra n i a n G overn m en t was forced to gra n t R ssi a an oi l concession. While R ssi a was thu s en ga ged, I ra n p rotested to the W es t ern powers, but no relief was forthcoming. Iran then appealed to the U n i ted N a ti on s . H ere, too, there was tem p ori zi n g a t first. Eventually the U n i ted S ta tes G overn m en t took a n i n teres t i n the case an d su p p orted I ra n as a m ea n s of preventing further Russian e pansion. In the face of Iranian opposition, of world opinion, and of the sup p ort of the U n i ted S ta tes. R u ssi a n troop s were finally with drawn. A fter som e m on ths the cen tra l govern m en t of Iran was finally able to restore order in the areas an d to crush the revolt of the com m u n i st elem en ts in A zerbai jan. The author’s descriptive analysis of the S ovi et p rogra m and techniques of epansion in Iran is very well done. I n fact it appears to be the soundest p art of the book a n d w i ll be of inestimable value to governm ent, m ilitary, and business p ersonnel who p lan to work in countries adjoining R ssia or who 4 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW must deal with Communist orga n i za ti on s. I t wi ll gi ve them valuable i n s i gh t i n to C om m u n i st m ethods. This revi ewer feels that Mr. Lenczowski has a tendency to overem p hasi ze the p art p layed by western nations in stopping R ussian encroa chm en ts i n I ran. The British certa i n ly knew how to take advantage of elem ents i n I ra n whi ch opposed C om m unist e p ansion and used them to the fullest e tent possible, but i t i s dou btful whether m uch could have been accom p li shed wi thou t these I ra n i a n elem ents of op p osi ti on . T h e chap ter describing the elements in Iran which opposed com- munism is very good. A number of useful docum ents are i n cluded i n the ap p endi . The volume has an inde and footn otes but n o gen eral bibliography. Department of the Air Force Líbrary

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Japan— Enemy or Ally? by W. Macmahon Bali (John Day, $3) Reviewed by Paul E. Eckel HE author of thi s i n terp reta ti ve a n d criticai study is Australian, a form er B ritish Commonwealth rep resent- T ati ve on the A llied Council in Tokyo, and concurren tly Australian Minister to Japan. At the outset of his book M r. Bali admits his prejudices in that he is prim arily concerned with setti ng forth vi ews whi ch wi ll “protect and p rom ote the best interests of the B ritish nations, and parti cu larly of my own cou n try, A ustralia p. . He confesses that his “ first interest in Japan is undoubtedly a n ega ti ve on e: to assure by every means that she shall not regai n the p ower to becom e an aggressor in the foreseeable future p. . T here are two m a jor con cep ts set forth in the book: 1 that there has been n o fundam ental chan ge i n J ap an ’ s soci al struture or in the political ou tlook of her leaders and 2 tha t fear of R ssia and com m unism has caused A m erica to covet Jap an as a fri en d a n d a lly rather than punish her as a hated enem y. I n ei ght chap ters the author approaches these two ideas, not too convincingly, from a va ri ety of angles. While M r. Bali admits that considerable good has been ac- AIRMAN'S READING

com p lished by the Am erican m ilitary organization SCAP in Japan, he does not beli eve tha t such an orga n i za ti on , hi er- archical in structure, is sui ted to foster dem ocra ti c p rocedu res, since a m ilitary adm inistration tends to elim inate individual- ism and freedom of discussion. T he author stoutly maintains that any apparent changes in Japan’s social and p olitical con - cep ts are on ly superficial, that the very channel of Allied control— the Japanese Government— is still reactionary, composed almost entirely of unconverted m ilitarists, bureaucrats, and imperialists. He feels that the “ clever J ap anese are ou twi tti n g the A m ericans at every turn and p lotti n g an other G rea ter East Asia movement which may well materialize to menace the P a ci fic, and especially Australia. T here is m uch in the p resent S C A P p rogram whi ch needs rethi n ki n g. A ccordi n g to the a u thor’ s observati on s over a period of two y ea rs he i s con vi n ced th a t the econ om i c an d financial policy of the J a p a n ese G overn m en t has been ca rcfully calculated to fru s tra te th e A llied aims of 194 . In other words the J a p a n ese G overn m en t i s on ly ostensibly cooperating with SCAP but in reality has been working alon g the lines pursued by G erm any after W orld W ar I , whereby tha t cou n try was able to ob ta i n dra sti c redu cti on s i n rep a ra ti on s a n d a t the sa m e ti m e covertly prepare for rearmam ent by obtaining credits and industrial sp ecialists from a b roa d. M r. Bali is so con vi n ced tha t econ om i c i m p eri a lism is returning to Japan that he has recom m en ded the adop ti on of a p rogram of sanctions for the purpose of preventing the establishment of industries which m i ght be con verted to war uses i n a n other m ad ga m ble for con trol of Asia. While i t is tru e th a t the a u th or b ri n gs to light many problem s and dan gers whi ch occu p a ti on a u thori ti es en cou n ter i n thei r a ttem p t to rule an em p i re of m ore than seventy m illion people, there appears to be an overem p hasi s of these dan gers and the dire consequences which m ay follow i f the C on trols on the p resent J ap anese leaders are relaed. It is the author s apparent contention that the United States, by m aking Jap an the “ workshop of East Asia, is aiding her to achi eve those econ om i c i m p eri a listic ambitions which she failed to ga i n b y force of arms. America aims to help Japan rega i n her postwar position in fou r wa ys: 1 by p erm i tti n g Japan “ to reta i n i n du s tri a l plants which the Allies had previ- 06 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW ou sly intended to rem ove as rep arations, 2 by giving Japan “direct financial help to restore her secondary industries, to re- equi p her pla n ts, to secure overseas raw materiais and overseas m arkets, by restoring “to the large J ap anese business grou p s m a n y of the freedom s of which S C AP had earlier in ten ded to dep rive them, and 4 by withdrawing some of the “new freedoms which SCAP had previ ously gi ven to J ap a n ese trade unions p. 1 . The Japanese have realized that such a p rogram will create i n J ap an a safe field for A m erican loans and credit and are con vi n ced tha t “ A m eri ca ’ s fear of Rssia would force her to p reven t econom i c collapse in Japan p. 1. The author firmly believes that the Japanese feel tha t they are n ow i n di sp en sable to the U n i ted S ta tes. The strategic problem s facing the Ameri ca n occu p a ti on forces in Japan and the Far East in general are n ot adequately trea ted. T h e si n ster purposes of the USSR, overt an d covert, are on ly lightly touched on, so much so tha t the reader gains the di sti n ct i m p ressi on tha t they are relatively insignificant when com p ared to the alleged insidiousness of the a i m s of Japan’s “Old G u a rd to sa b ota ge the econ om i c a n d soci a l re- forms already un derway in agricultu re, labor, education, and industry. I t is not always clear what worthwhi le p lan for re- form M r. Bali would su bsti tu te for S C A P ’ s p rogram . He concludes his study on a rather weak note when he States tha t “by giving firm friendship and effecti ve help to the Japanese people . . . p. 194 all will com e ou t n i cely in the end. University of Pennsylvania ------

The Royal Air Force in the World War, Vol. III, 1940-45, by Captain Norman Macmillan, M.C., A.F.C. (Geo. G. Harrup, 15/) Reviewed by Air Commodore H . E. Nowell, C.B., O.B.E., RAF OLUME III of Captain Norman Macmillan’s “ Royal Air Force i n the W orld War 194 -4 is an admirable factual Vstory of the op erations of the op p osi n g a i r forces i n the Middle E ast, North fri ca , M edi terranean, and Italy, with suf- ficent material covering the land and sea operations included to b ring out clearly the im portant and often the deci si ve role which the air. forces p layed in the final defeat of the A i s powers in the areas un der revi ew. A1RMAN’S READ1NG

I t ou ght n ot to be n ecessa ry to mention the salient factor of air warfare so clearly brought out in Captain M acm illan’s narrative, nam ely, that land and sea op erati ons can on ly be successful to th a t si de wh i ch C on trols the ai r over the area of op erations. This control, or a i r s u p eri ori ty as i t i s m ore com - monly termed, need not necessarily go to the side which has a clear majority in numbers: as for i n stan ce, the G erm a n sup e ri ori ty i n n u m b ers in her operations over Crete in 1941. I t can be won by that side which has superior training, discipline, and determination to win. This is so clearly shown in W avell’s op erations in the Western Desert. H ere th e n u m eri ca lly inferior British Air Force defeated the I ta lian air forces, desp i te the disp arity in num bers. A n other them e whi ch runs throughout the narrative in Volume III is the vital importance of secure Communications and the ability of air forces, gi ven freedom of action, to disrupt or protect them. This applies particularly where land Communi cati on s lie across m i les of inhospitable desert or where they cross narrow seas or pass through narrow defiles. T he op era ti on s i n Greece show clearly the important part played by the L uftwa ffe in preventing the weak British and Greek air forces from attacking the German columns marching through the difficult passes towards A thens. I n the cam p ai gn s i n C y ren a i ca a ga i n st the I ta lians and Germans, singlv and com bined, the battle of Communications played a decisive role, p a rti cu larly in the later battles leadi n g to the ca p tu re of Tripoli. Romm el’s army, dependent for its success on the free em p loy m en t of his arm our, was crip p led when the A llied air forces vi rtu a lly cut the sea lanes between Italy and North fri ca a n d so dep rived him of his m uch needed petrol. Again we see the same results i n th e final phases of the battles in Tunisia in the continuous successful attacks against shi p s an d troop ca rry i n g a i rcra ft between S i ci ly and Tunis. In Italy the use of the Air Force to cut Communications leadi ng to thei r battle area vi rtu a lly “ sealed ofl the a rea of op era ti on s a n d p reven ted th e m u ch n eeded G erm a n rei n force- ments from rea ch i n g th e fron t. One point which is not mentioned in this book but which future hi storians may consider to have been a decisive factor in the over-all defeat of Germany lies in the decision of the Alli es to go to the a ssi sta n ce of Greece. F rom a short term AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW point of view this was a debatable deci si on , si n ce the di sp a tch of troops and aircraft from C yren a i ca to G reece so weakened Wavell’s forces tha t retreat from B en gh a zi to the E gy p ti a n fron ti er was forced u p on hi m b y the determined German advance. B u t the G erman Suprem e C om m an d was running to a very fine schedule i n the p lanned operations against the Soviet. Germany had not counted on a winter cam p ai gn i n R ssi a. The splen di d defen ce p ut up by the G reeks and B ritish, culmi- nating in the disasters in C rete, had n ot been foreseen when the p lan against R ssia had been drawn up. N early fou r valuable weeks were sp ent by G erm a n y i n these op erations. This delay threw out of gea r the offensive against R ssia and resulted i n the wi n ter campaign, which was the beginning of the en d of German aspirations in that area. I have only one real criticism to make of the whole of Cap- ta i n M a cm i llan’s narrative. In pages 1 1 and 1 2 the author com p ares the roles of T edder and Harri s to the detriment of the latter. There can be n o com p arison. Each had an entirely different set of ci rcum stances wi th which to contend. T edder ha d to fuse the .efforts of the land and sea and air into one com p rehensi ve whole Harris, working to the directi ve gi ven hi m by the W a r C a b i n et, wa s to slog a n d go on sloggi n g G er many with all the m i gh t a t hi s di sp osa l. A ny deviation from thi s role was to H arris a negation of his orders and so it was on ly natural for hi m to resi st wi th all his p ower and argu m en t. Each was highly successful in his allotted role. British Joint Services Mission Washington, D. C.

Military Justice Under the 1948 Amended Articles of War, by Major Louis F. Alyea, USAF (Oceana Publications, $2.50) Reviewed by Major Ira H. Smith HIS compact volume is a carefully prep ared summary and e p lanation of the va rious sources of criminal law, as applied to the United States military forces di sti n - gTuished from the N a va l forces , and p a rti cu larly to the A i r AIRMANS READING 9

Force. I t is valuable as a basic reference in that i t assem bles, for the first tim e under on e cover, all those va rious separated bits of legi slation, comm on law, e ecutive directives and legal i n terp reta ti on s whi ch, ta k en togeth er, a u th ori ze a n d set up ou r present system of military justice. This work does not define or e plain the various day-to-day situations and discip linary problem s tha t con fron t u n i t com - manders and the appointing authorities of subordinate courts. On the other hand it is a learned and p ai n staki n g treati se on basic authority for the whole system . S up erim p osed up on thi s is a detailed e p lanation of the many provisions for appellate revi ew i n th e ca ses of sentences which involve bad conduct discharge, di shon ora ble di scharge, or dism issal from th e S ervi ce. Among the valuable features is a com p lete te t of the 1 9 2 Articles of W ar as we now know them, which includes m inor am endm ents m ade in 192 , 1942, and 194 and the complete Congressi on al revi si on in the 194 am en dm en ts to the A rti cles of War. In order to show th e ch a n ges th e reta i n ed p rovisions of the old arti cles are set forth i n stan dard typ e, those old p ro visions which have been rescinded are clearly inclosed i n brack- ets, whi le the new p rovisions, effective 1 February 1949, are printed in bold- face type. By this sim ple m eans the reader can qu i ck ly discern the changes in each Article. I n addition to this there are a u thor’ s com m en ts at the end of each A rti cle, where appropriate, e plaining the changes and at times the reasons therefor, i n cluding Congressional debate and discussion. Another similar feature is the i nclusion of a top ical ta b le of con ten ts, wi th bold- face cap ti on s i n di cati n g A rti cles of War tha t have been am en ded i n an y way, togeth er wi th su b- ca p ti on s which summari ze the con ten ts of lon g arti cles of unlettered subp aragraphs. This volum e should be p arti cu larly welcom e to two classes of officers. F irst, it is valuable to those techn i ci an s who are the lawyers of the Air Force, i.e., the legal officers and judge advocates. F or them far-reaching but little discussed p ortions of the m i litary justi ce system becom e an op en book. T he C on gres sional efforts to do away with form er i n justices in the disciplin ary aspect of the m i litary Servi ce are com p eten tly e plained. Secondly, this book will have considerable value to unit officers who make the initial and sem i-annual eplanations of the Articles of War to enlisted personnel, as provi ded i n A rti cle of AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

War 11 . The current tren d of obtaining discipline and good Servi ce throu gh edu cati on an d u n derstanding rather tha n throu gh force wi ll be aided by the abi lity to answer airmen’s qu esti on s th rou gh reference to or readi ng from thi s volume. T he discussion of the va ri ou s a u tom a ti c ap p eals and revi ews shows the great lengths to whi ch C ongress has gon e i n an effort to have the fairest and most advanced criminal system in the history of the world. I n short, M a jor A lyea has made a valuable and ti m ely con- tri b u ti on to the a dm i n i s tration of the new Air Force. His work i s n ot a su bsti tu te for the n ow- resci nded T echn i cal Manual 2- 2, Military Justice Procedure, which wi ll have to be rewritten. Meanwhile M ajor A lyea, throu gh hi s research and initiative, has laid the grou n dwork for a lon g- range approa ch to the use of the A rti cles of War and pertinent e ecutive orders. O n this basis alon e the book i s recom m ended for the use of legal officers, judge advocates, members of cou rts- m a rti a l, and commanders of all echelon s. Headquarters, Air University

Handbook for Spies, by Alexander Foote (Doubleday, $3) Reviewed. by Major R obert E . W ork N full appreci ati on of the com m erci al value of the ti tle Handbook for Spies it must be stated here, a t the outset, th a t thi s book i s n ot e a ctly what the name implies. Aleander F oote, the a u thor, would hi m self no doubt be one I of the first to a gree th a t such a han dbook i s y et to be written, and it is not entirely unlikely that he would also agree that such a ha n dbook n ever will or can be written, certa i n ly not in the sense th a t the ti tle of thi s volume implies. Espionage, either as technique or S ci ence, i s m uch too fluid, too va riable i n m ethod to allow any appreci able p art of the picture to be condensed to p ap er as standard instructions. True, a type of “Ten Commandments control does govern the modus operandi of espionage. These commandments, such as the develop m en t of reliable nets, good Communications, perfect cover stories, are cardinal, regardless of the n a ti on a lities or AIRMAN'S READING 1

individuais involved. A nd what M r. F oote has accom p lished is perhap s m ore a good demonstration of the i n vi olability of these com m a n dm en ts tha n the p resen ta ti on of a work i n g ha n dbook . But in spite of his misleading though business- wise title, F oote has written an account of the innermost workings of th e S ovi et sp y network in S witzerland during World War II that is no doubt as reliable as an y work on the subject that is ever likely to appear in print. A ccordi n g to hi s own testi m on y the a u thor is p roba bly the very best authority available to deliver this e pose. Ke was at all times prominent in the Swiss net and for a p eri od e erci sed absolute control over i t. H e p erson a lly tra n sm i tted m u ch of the i n formation concerning Nazi Germany that was forwa rded from S wi tzerland to the Soviet m ilitary intelligence throughout the war. An Englishm an by birth, F oote has a com m unistic back- ground that dates to the Spanish Civil War, in which he participated openly as a comm unistic sym pathizer. F rom this backgrou n d as a s ta rti n g p oi n t, he relates in considerable deta i l how he trod the p a th to I n tern a ti on a l esp i onage. T he reader m ay e p erien ce a certai n sense of impatience as he follows Foote through the rationalization and the subconscious inner process of apology tha t he m i res throu gh before he finally gets down to hi s i n vi s i b le i nks an d stolen docum ents. A t an y rate the reader will be reli eved when F oote is finally adm itted to the inner ci rcle and actu ally takes up his work in one o the w orld’s oldest p rofessions. This initiation is accomplished in the best cloa k - a n d- da gger fashion. After C rossi n g most of Europ e, m ovi n g accordi n g to the strictest orders, he finds him self a t h i gh n oon on e da y sta n di n g in fron t of the P ost O ffice in Geneva, Switzerland. He is wearing a whi te scarf and holding a leather belt i n hi s ha n d. A wom a n , carrying a net shopping bag containing a green parcel and holding an orange in her hand, approa ches. T h e colorful stage- prop s a re i n p erfect accordan ce wi th hi s p ri or bri efings. The wom an is no less p erfect in her role, an d F oote describes her i n the best M a ta H a ri tra di ti on . S he stops at his side and says, “ E cuse m e, where did you buy that belt? He rep li es, “ I n an i ron - m on ger’ s shop i n P a ri s. A n d wi th th a t the p rearran ged tableau is com p lete. A u thor F oote has step p ed 2 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW across the threshold i nto the half-world of sp y and counter-spy. From here on F oote accom p lishes the surprising task of satisfying the two distinct and widely separated segments of his readi ng p ublic. The first, and by far the most prep onderant of the two, m a y be referred to as the “ n on - p rofessi onal or lay- reader group. For thi s segm en t the p a p er jacket of the book was p a rti cu larly designed. This cover shows the usual sinister, hat- down, collar-up, shadow-enshrouded figure. He is carefully observing movements of a lithesome, flaon-haired, beret- top - ped beauty as she steals away from the quarters of some un- su sp ecti n g a n d n o dou bt th orou ghly drugged General with her overnight bag stuffed wi th docum en ts. F or thi s grou p of his readi ng p ubli c F oote has sp rinkled i n all the cha racteristic little condim ents that sp ice the sp y world of Oppenheim. But in this book, with their aurora of tru th a bou t them , they becom e real and startli n g in a sense that O p p enhei m at his best di d not equal. Here is all the terminology m ade fam iliar in fiction. Here are the si tuati on s tha t m ovi es are m ade of. But here the sp y- gam e is factual, historical, with an actual war between living countries as the scene. The second or “professi onal grou p of F oote’ s readers will be a dvi sed to e erci se thei r sense of selecti vi ty an d thereby qui ckly p ass over much of what the first grou p m a y dwell upon at length. T he value of the work will be enhanced considerably. This second grou p i n cludes the m any known or unknown in divi duai s who are or have engaged in sim ilar a cti vi ti es. I t includes those who p ossess an honest academ i c i nterest in esp i onage, and it no doubt also includes various Communists interested i n the e ten t of the e p ose. T hese p eop le wi ll find tha t m uch of the book rings true. They will be convinced or at least i n cli n ed to believe that Aleander F oote was a R ussian agent of con si derable i m p orta n ce. T h ey wi ll recogni ze hi s ter minology and vernacular as a u then ti c, a n d thi s wi ll lend cre- dence to his description of eactly how the Communist net in Switzerland operated. T hey will fi n d thi s to be a n i n teresti ng starting point for con jecture as to wha t the com p leion of present Communist nets might be. The “professi onal reader will also be interested i n the ap - parent connections between the Swiss net and the ill-fated and now defunct Canadian network and how the initial clue leadi ng to the close- ou t of the Canadian net was apparently traceable to F oote’ s di fficulti es i n S wi tzerland. The “ trade AJRMAN’S READING 73 will also find much to consider in Appendix A, in which Foote gives some notes on the wireless code he used in commuications with Moscow— simple yet remarkably secure. And it is almost certain that the “ trade” will carefully examine his implication that the best type of interrogation, be it of your own agents or suspected enemy agents, is by the written question and answer method, provided that no duplicate copies are available to the interrogatee. But perhaps the final evaluation of Foote, of his book, and of the work he says he performed must be left to that master in the “ professional” category who is able to use Foote’s own rule of thumb to judge Foote himself. This he describes when he says, “After one has dealt with secret agents in all walks of life one begins to have a feeling regarding them and their genuineness.” Even were such an evaluation possible now, it obviously could not be made here. Suffice it to say that Handbook for Spies is written by a man who seems to know his field and whose reliability is underwritten by the British with whom he is presently employed in a government Office in London. It could hardly be said that Foote’s book in any way makes profound reading. But it must be added that it does make good reading. For with considerable authority it does depict the actual operations of a recent Communist spy network. From that account various conclusions may be drawn that can be of considerable value and certainly of great interest.

Directorate of Intelligence Headquarters, USAF

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An Army in Exile, by General W. Anders (Macmillan, $5) Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Dickman HEN the II Polish Corps was demobilized and its troops evacuated from Italy to England in the summer of 1946, there was m arked the end o f an epic t h a t has few equals in modern times for heroic achievement in the fac W of overwhelming difficulties. The Polish army rose from humil iating defeat and degrading enslavement to take its place among the Allied forces and assume its share of the struggle 4 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

a gai n st the com m on enem y. I t i s tra gi c that these ga llant soldi ers di d not also recei ve thei r reward from the vi ctory instead of marchi n g i n triumph to their homeland they were led to vi rtu a l eile on a forei gn soil. General Anders’ book op en s wi th the i n va si on of Poland by Germany in September 19 9, at which tim e he was in command of a cavalry brigade. Driven back by the Germans, and then suddenly attacked from the rear by the Russians, the Poles were qui ckly forced to cap i tulate. Thousands, including Gen eral Anders, who had been wounded twi ce whi le a ttem p ti n g to escape to Hungary, were taken p risoner by the Russians. General Anders sp ent almost two years in S oviet prisons, where he obta i n ed a b i tter knowledge of the m ethods of the i n famous N.K.V.D. In August of 1941, shortly after G ermany declared war on R ssia, he was released from p rison and instructed that by agreem ent between the R ussi an government and the Polish government, loca ted i n L on don , he wou ld orga n i ze a n d com mand a Polish arm y, com p osed of ormer prisoners of the R ussi an s, to fight the Germans. A ssem bling and organizing the army presented e trem e di fficulti es. C ollecti n g p oi nts were establi shed, a n d to these com m en ced a flow of emaciated, e hausted creatures released from p risons and labor ca m p s sca ttered from the U k ra i n e to Sib ri a . T h ey ha d to be rehabi litated and trained, in the face of shorta ges of equi p m ent, clothi n g, an d rati on s. A n a ttem p t to loca te large n u m bers of unaccounted-for prisoners revealed the shocking fact that thousands had been sum m arily e ecuted by the R ussians. F rom the rep orts b rou ght back by the retu rnees, it was concluded that half of the 1 , , P oles de- ported to R ssia had been e ecuted or died from p rivation or brutal trea tm en t i n the two years si nce the war began. General Anders’ constant inquiries to the Russian authorities concerning the fate of these u n fortu n a tes p rodu ced on ly evasions or deni als. It became apparent that the P olish army could n ever op erate c hesi vely and effecti vely as lon g as i t was on R ussi an soil. The Russians were ei ther unwilling or unable to p rovi de adequate sup p ort to the P olish troop s. F u rther, their plan of em p loy m en t envi saged p i ecem eal assignm ent of Polish units to R ussian com m an ds thi s p lan General Anders attributed to the Rus sians’ desire to “ e p en d the P oles un ti l none were left. F i n a lly, after m on ths of negotiation hampered by R ussi an obstruction- AIRMAN’S READING

ist tactics and anti-Polish propaganda, permission was obtained in July of 1942 to evacuate the P olish army to Iran. Once outside R ssia the Polish army came under op era ti on a l con trol of the B ritish. Training was completed in I ra q and Palesti ne, and i n D ecem ber 194 m ovem ent was comm enced to I ta ly. The Poles recei ved thei r bap ti sm of fire at Monte Cassino, where they were given the assignm ent of cap tu ri n g the abbey and the town of Piedimonte, beyond. Their coura- geous achi evem en t in this acti on is a m a tter of history. I n the subsequent op erations of the E i ghth A rm y, the P olish Corps participated in the drive northward, capturing Ancona and Bologn a . T hen , wi th the rest of the A llies celebrati n g the end of the wa r, the Poles could only stand by and watch their cou n try han ded over to the R u ssi a n s, as the resu lt of the Teheran and alta agreem en ts. A ble to choose b etween retu rn to Russian-dominated Poland or evacuati on to a resettlem en t corps in England, of over 1 , tha t m a de the e odus from Rssia with General Anders in 1941 only 1 elected to retu rn in 194 . An Army in Exile is not only a fascinating personal narrative and an intensely interesting history but also a revealing ac- cou n t of the m ethods a n d m oti ves of the R u ssi a n s. G en era l Anders knowledge of R ssi a i s i n ti m a te an d hi s descri p ti on i s forth ri gh t. A n d i f there is also a trace of b i ttern ess i n hi s feelings about the Allies’ handling of Poland, that is understand- able and p ardonable.

Headquarters, Air University

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BRIEFER COMMENT

A Dictionary of International op m en ts si n ce W orld W ar I which Affairs, by A. M. H yam son are of continuing importa n ce.

THE American Council on Public Public Affairs Press $3.75 Affairs has rep rinted this book from the B ritish edition of the Public Opinion and Forei gn Policy, sam e title. I t conslsts of by L ester Markel and others. pages of entries alphabetically arranged and will be of primary PUBLIC opinion has become a value as a reference handbook. powerful instrum ent of national Major em p hasi s is gi ven to devel- policy, a weapon we must come AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

better to understand and utilize. political events and economic This volume e am ines the influ- trends of recent years he studies ence of public opinion at home such p roblem s as the rehabi li- and abroad on U.S. foreign policy ta ti on of Germany, Russia’s posi- and concludes that we are failing ti on i n i n ternational affairs, p op- to gi ve i t the em p hasi s i t deserves: ulation changes, and soci al “ . . . at hom e we are con fron ted system s— all wi th a vi ew towa rd wi th a p ubli c op i n i on th a t i s on ly making our present world a better one-quarter informed. abroad . . . one in which to live. The many wi th. ..lon ej tha t is wi dely dis- charts an d m y riad facts make for trustful of us. Unless these atti - an adequate reference volume. tudes are chan ged, the consequences may be grave. The Oxford Univ. $6 authors, writing under the aus- pices of the Council on F orei gn Flight into History, by Elsbeth E. Relations, suggest rem edi es. Freudenthal. Harper $3.50 SUBTITLED The Wright Brothers and the Air Age, thi s i s the i nsi de story of the race between m any Dictionary of Modern Economics, m en to be the first to fly. Centered by B yrne J. Horton. on the Wrights, the drama is also PREPARED with the advice and shared by Chanute, L ilienthal, coop eration of leadi ng A m erican Langley. Ma im, Farm a n , S a n tos- economists, this is a comprehen- Dumont, Herring, Curtiss, and sive coverage of thet basic con- others. T he attem p t of the W rights cep ts and terms of econ om i c to make the Science an d theory theory and practice. Digests of of aeronautics into a paying importa n t laws, condensati ons of business— the beginning of modern Suprem e C ourt deci si ons, descrip- aviation industry— was the prima- ti on s of governmental and private ry cause of much of thei r friction agenci es op era ti n g i n econ om i c wi th thei r contemporaries. A very fields, and innumerable ci ta ti on s interesti n g hi story of the first of reference books on specialized decade of flying 19 -191 . asp ects of economics are p rovi ded. Univ. of Oklahoma $3.75 The entire field of econom i cs is compressed in this handbook u n der short a lphabetical entries. Les F orces A riennes Fran aises de 19 9 194 , by Col. Pierre Public Affairs Press $5 Paquier and others. A minutely detailed account of World n Transition, by G. D. H. the op erations of the F rench A i r Cole. Force i n W orld War II as part of IN part a m odern history-govern- the L ’ A viation F ran aise au Com- m en t- econ om i cs te t, thi s volume bat series. Attention is first de- also con tains the author’s views voted to the 19 9-4 campaign. on how all peoples can best attain wi th em p hasi s on the B a ttle of decent living standards and i n France in the sum m er of 194 . dividual freedom s. M r. Cole care- The sections that follow then fully reviews importa n t world cover the A rmy of the A i r during AIRMAN’S READING

the a rm i sti ce, the F ree F rench A i r evolution of the P resi dency, leg- Force, the F rench A i r F orces based islative bodies, political system s, in England and N orth fri ca , a n d and electi ons. A fter p oi n ti n g out the em p loy m en t of French avia- thei r defects and shortcom i n gs, ti on i n the B a ttle of Germany of novel and controversi a l prop osa ls 1944-4 . Each pursuit, bom bard- for basi c altera ti on s a re set forth. ment, and reconnaissance opera- Brookings Institution $3.50 tiional unit is covered.

Berger-Levrault, Paris 375 fr . A Tent on Corsica, by M arti n uigley. Behind the C urtain, by John HERE is a moving, yet plausible Gunther. ta le of air warfa re as seen throu gh MR. GUNTHER’S first report the ey es of several crew members from Europ e si n ce the wa r i s of a C orsica- based B-2 outfit in contained in this volume. A ctually 1944. O p erating under the m a d- he visited only fou r “ cu rta i n dening tensions springing from the coun tries— ugoslavia, Hungary, ordeal of com p leti n g mi ssi ons Czechoslovakia, and P oland— in against targets i n G erm a n - h eld addition to I taly, Greece, T urkey, N orth ern I ta ly, which only one Germany, France, Holland, and man in fou r survived, each ai rm an England. Writing with consider- involved had to m ake his own able animation and apparen t highly specialized adju stm en t. F or haste, he records his interviews Steve Thompson, more th ou ghtful with E urop e’ s i m p orta n t figures, an d sen si ti ve tha n hi s ten tm a tes, com m en ts on living conditions and thi s wa s a p a rti cu larly grievous political develop m en ts, a n d offers ta sk . B u t thi s book i s m ore th a n interesti n g ti d- b i ts rela ti ve to a character study, for there are train travei, hotels, and m eais. gri p p i n g p ortra y a ls of Marauders While lively en ou gh, thi s book roa ri n g th rou gh hea vy flak and misses being on e of his “ m ost ur- gu n n ers sp i tti n g th ei r dea dly m is- gent analyses of politics, problem s siles at enem y fighters, plus a and personalities, which the ten se rescue scen e of a nearly jacket blurb would have us believe. drown ed flier who had parachuted i n to en em y wa ters. W artim e Harper Rome, impoverished and wretched, is the place where tensions were Toward E fficient Democracy, by relieved on short leaves. I t i s un - Arthur C. Millsp augh. fortu n a te tha t the a u thor, in mirroring certa i n ty p es, i . e. , T H I S i s a book a b ou t ou r govem - grou n d officers and war corre- ment and its organization. Dr. sp ondents, ap p arently allowed p er- Millsp augh believes the United sonal bitternesses to clou d som e States Government, as it is pres- of his p resentati ons. A lthou gh thi s ently orga n i zed, i s i n ca p a b le of book la ck s the scop e a n d i n ci s i ve- efficient operation only by a fun ness of such W orld W ar I I novels dam ental reorga n i za ti on of its as Guard of Honor and Stalingrad, various components can it ade- it has m uch to recom m end it. quately m eet the requi rem ents of the m odern age. H e e am i n es the Lippincott $2.75 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW

The Hoover Commission Report. Atomic Age, by Lord R ussell. This book was first published by TWO years ago C on gress created George A llen and Unwin, London. a commission, headed by former Presi dent H erbert H oover, to study Macmillan $2.50 and rep ort on the possible reorga n i za ti on of the E ecu ti ve Branch of the governm ent wi th a vi ew Technology and International Re- towa rd greater economics and lations, edited by W i lliam F. efficiency. This volume summarizes Ogburn. the C om m ission findings and recommendations. Each major de- TECHNOLOGICAL inventions and partm en t— e. g., the Departm en t of scientific discoveries such as the State, Veteran’s Administration, airplane and the release of a tom i c Bureau of the B u dget, an d the energy by n u clear flssion have National Military Establishm ent— created new and p owerful forces was studied by the C om m ission’ s underlying relations among na members, all of whom are e p erts tions. I n this volume seven au- in their various fields. As for the thorities contribute essays on military establishment, it was various phases of thi s relation- conclu ded th a t the a u thority of ship: uincy Wright, discussing the S ecretary of Defen se should the new technology and world be m aterially stren gthened and order B ernard B rodie, analyzing th a t su bstan tial savings could be new techn i ques of war and their effected wi thou t wea k en i n g our influence on national policies military might. Hornell Hart, studying the i n flu ence of recent inventions on the M cG raw -H ill $3.75 size of nations and Mr. Ogburn and the others, writing on m ass communication, steam and Steel, The Atomic Age, by B ertrand and air an d a tom i c p ower. Russell and others. Univ. of Chicago $4 CONSE UENCES of the m ost significant event of our age— the harnessing of atomic energy — a re Eperiments on Mass C ommuni sum m arized in this small book. cation, by Carl I. Hovland and Si English sp ecialists, M . L. others. Oliphant, P. M. S. Blackett, R. F. Harrod, B ertrand R ussell, Lionel T H I S i s the thi rd of a fou r-volume Curti s, an d D . W . B rogan, have series, Studies in Social Psychol- con tributed single essays dealing ogy i n W orld W ar II, on the with atom ic p ower’s effect on the work of the R esea rch B ranch of military , econ om y , p olitics, and the Army’s Information and Educ- morais of not only England and ation Division. Volumes I and n other nations but civilization in were revi ewed i n the S um m er 1949 general. Professor Blacketfs study. issue of the UARTERL RE Military Consequences of Atomic VIEW . The research rep orted on Energy , wi ll be of etrem e i n ter- here was i ntended to evaluate est to A i r F orce readers, as will Army films made to acquaint the essay entitled. V a lues in the soldi ers with the issues behind A1RMAN’S READING 9

the past war. A udi ence evaluation be constructed in the sm allest lab- of films, the effects of films on ora tory i n the p oorest coun try the soldi ers of varying degrees of in- materiais are wi dely available and telligence, and the results of pre- cheap , the m ethods for p rodu cti on senting “ one side versu s “ both com m on kn owledge. I n the even t sides films on controversi a l sub- of World W ar I I I B W is almost jects are a few of the top i cs stu d- certa i n to be used, i f on ly in des- ied. The findings throw n ew light peratlon , and on ce sta rted, con - on the changes in opinion and ti n u ed to the b i tter en d. F ollowing knowledge thls m edia is cap able the gen era l eplanation of BW, of produ ci n g. a vi gorou s p lea is m ade for the necessity of avoiding a war which Princeton University $5 will em p loy such a gen oci da l weap - on. A n e cellent bi bliography is Atoms in Action, by George E ussell furnished, limited only by the Harrison. paucity of inform a ti on on a subject surrounded by p ossibly m ore HERE is the solution for those security Controls than shield seeking a kr.owledge of modern atomic energy . appli ed p hysi cs wi thou t becom i n g Whittlesey House: McGraw- involved i n equ a ti on s or formulae. The most comple phases of the Hill $2.75 physical Sciences, including atomic energy , radar, and electron i cs, are D ay W i thou t E nd, by V an V an eplained by Dr. Harrison in sim- Praag. ple graphic language. This most AMONG the several com p eten t interesti ng and lucid book i s a n com bat novels p ublished since enlarged version of the 19 9 World W ar I I this volum e alon e edition which was originally un- is rem iniscent of Norman M ailer’s derta k en up on the recom m en da- ou tsta n di n g The Naked and the ti on of the A m erican Institute of Dead. While considerably shorter Physics. For those wi sh i n g to delvt and minus the searchi n g p sycho- deep er mto a particular phase of logi ca l and sociologi ca l insight, it physics. the book i n cludes an e - mirrors wi th the sa m e sta rk rea l- cellen t bi bliography of writings, ism the horrors and fears and both technical and popular. miseries of a grou p of American Wm. Morrow & Co. S5 foot soldiers en ga ged i n m orta l com bat. T h e i n fantrym en in this story, all ordi n a ry m en, belon g to Peace or Pestilence, by Theodor a p latoon fighting in the St.-Lo Rosebury. area. B u t ca u ght i n the m a elstrom of a cunn i ng enem y, sui ci dai or- ASSEMBLED here for the first ders from thei r own b a tta lion, and ti m e for p ublic consumption are fifty - ei gh t e cru ci ati n g days a t the released facts on biologi ca l the fron t, th ey ten d to resem ble warfare. D r. Rosebury speaks with anim ais more than m en. T hi s is authority as wartim e chief of the a p owerful, b i tter story, told by a Air-Borne Infecti on p roject at man who undoubtably was there. Camp Detrick. Maryland. Facts gi ven a bout BW are tha t uni ts can Wm. Sloane $3 AIR ANTHOLOGY

A GALLERY OF MILITARY PORTRAITS FROM JAMES GOULD COZZENS’ PULITZER PRIZE NOVEL GUARD OF HONOR

Captain Hicks and Major Post There was now a general agreement about what parts of the text were wrong; but Captain Hicks had not yet found two fighter pilots in complete agreement on what would be right. He had gone to Sellers Field to talk to a Major Post, a noted AVG flyer. Major Post had lost an arm in China, and though they had fixed him up a good mechanical substitute, he did not like it; and he did not like being relegated to Operations Officer at Sellers Field’. It was soon plain to Captain Hicks that Major Post, consciously or unconsciously, also disliked at sight anyone who had all his limbs, was not a fighter pilot, or carne from Ocanara to bother him with a lot of talk. Seeing that Captain Hicks wore no wings and had no ribbons, Major Post stared at him in a surly way while the project was explained. He then said: “ How the hell are you going to rewrite it?” Captain Hicks, who was thirty-eight to Major Post’s twenty- eight, and who was, in civilian life, a magazine editor whose judgment might often do much to determine what several hundred thousand people like Major Post were going to read, and so, going to think and believe, accepted this criticism in good part. Nathaniel Hicks said that he was not writing the new manual himself. He was getting tne views of qualified pilots on the proper changes. He would write these up in a report and, on the basis of them, prepare a synopsis of new material. This would go to the Training Aids Division of AAF Headquarters, which handled manuais. It would be for them to write and publish the revision. Major Post said: “ What am I supposed to do?” Captain Hicks suggested, if the major had time, that he go

80 AIR ANTHOLOGY 81

over the present text, of which this was a copy in case he didn’t have one, and simply mark out everything he thought was wrong. Captain Hicks had already done this with Captain Wiley, at the School of Applied Tactics at Orlando; and with— “ Who the hell is he?” said Major Post, taking the manual brusquely and slapping it open on his desk. “ He was with the Eagle Squadron, flying off Malta,” Captain Hicks said. “ He has seven Axis planes.” “ Axis!” said Major Post. ‘‘Wops, I suppose he means.” “ Five of them were German,” Captain Hicks said. He was a good-tempered man and ready enough to subordinate his civilian dignity or consequence to those who were in the after all important fighting end of the war. However, bumptiousness irritated him now just as much as it used to when staff writers put up loud, persistent, and foolish arguments about things that few or no writers seemed capable of understanding— what was good and interesting because it interested them personally, for instance, and what was intrinsically interesting to people at large. Captain Hicks had a frank, round face not suited to conceal his feelings. A warm color appeared on his temples below his short, fuzzy, blond hair. His blond mustache, cropped to a stiff growth of quarter-inch hairs, stiffened more, and his eyes began to snap, for he liked a fight when he was finally forced to it.

General Beal T he general’s face was frowning and intent, strained around the mouth and eyes, and Nathaniel Hicks could see that he was repeating a lesson that he had made himself learn in a field entirely foreign to him. General Beal probably did not see any real need to fill in big overall stories, or did not see it until the Commanding General ordered him to. The need then became, of course, actual and absolute. It occurred to Nathaniel Hicks that General Beal, though accepting the order, felt the indignity of any obligation to ‘‘put over the AAF story,” to assure the public that the AAF was good, on its toes, doing its duty. General Beals own instinct might be to shut up and get on with the war. They were going to win it; so do that first, and tell the story, if you had to, afterward. Nathaniel Hicks was obliged to admire a simple, unlimited integrity that accepted 82 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REV1EW as the law of nature such elevated concepts as the Military Academy’s Duty-Honor-Country, convinced that those were the only solid goods; that everyone knew what the words meant. They needed no gloss— indeed it probably never crossed General Beal’s mind that they could be glossed, that books had been written to show that Country was a delusive projection of the individual’s ego; and that there were men who considered it the part of intelligence to admit that Honor was a hypo- critical social sanction proteeting the position of a ruling class; or that Duty was self-interest as it appeared when sanctions like Honor had íantastically distorted it. In his simplicity, General Beal, apprised of such intellectual views, would prob ably retort by begging the question; what the hell kind of person thought things like that? Formal logic was outraged; but common sense must admit he had something there. Few ideas could be abstract enough to be unqualified by the company they kept.

Colonel Jobson

A week alter their arrival, a full colonel— Nathaniel Hicks identified him latér as Colonel Jobson, Director of Personnel Analysis— happened to observe their desirable apartment. The colonel, who had just got down, was in the act of locking his not-very-desirable bedroom door. The door of the apartment at the end of the corridor was open. A number of officers, all first or second lieutenants, were cheerfully, and perhaps from Colo nel Jobson’s standpoint, over-luxuriously, having a drink beíore dinner in the big living room. Nathaniel Hicks carne out while Colonel Jobson, his morose face drawn down, stared. When Nathaniel Hicks was near enough, Colonel Jobson said to him: “ What’s that up there; a common room, or something?” Though, in fact, that was just what it seemed to be much of the time, Nathaniel Hicks, in the Army only four months, did not venture a pleasantry. He said: "No, sir. It’s part of an apartment.” “Who lives there?” “ I do, sir. With two other officers.” “You in AFORAD?” “ Yes, sir. Colonel Coulthard’s Directorate.” “ H m !” Colonel Jobson said. “ Flying pretty high for a first AIR ANTHOLOGY 83

lieutenant, aren’t you?” Without waiting for an answer, he turned and clumped off down the hall. As it happened, Colonel Jobson’s irritation was disinterested. The next day, he was moving into a house where his family would join him. But if no house had been waiting, if he had needed to live at the hotel, the little dodge oí being left off the list would hardly have availed them. The irritation was under- standable enough. Colonel Jobson could not be unaware of the fact that lots of these amateur officers had for years, and as a matter of course, flown much higher than men like himself, who devoted their lives to serving their country, could ever hope to fly.

Captain Solomon Captain Solomon was a swart, perky little man with Service Pilofs wings. His job beíore the war had been persuading civic organizations in small cities to establish airports, and thus avoid being left behind by the Air Age. If his persuasion proved successful, he was ready with plans, and could put them in touch with contracting and equipment firms. Captain Solo- mon’s nature was free and friendly; when he met anyone he began the conversation by asking that person to call him Manny. As Adjutant he was in a position to do people small favors and he did them willingly. He had the successful— though perhaps small-time— promoter’s íacility with smiles, compliments, and slaps on the back, which after all cost nothing. In the end, they usually paid off, even with people who recoiled at first from the pushing good fellowship and friendly inquisitiveness. Captain Solomon knew that what every man is most interested in is himself; and if you want to please him, you must show the same interest. In the end, the merry smiles and warm indications of liking would win.

Captam Duchemin “Well, the scene was the Scheherazade Bar and the loot seemed to be in fine fettle. He was goggling at some chicks there; but you know how I shrink from the gross taint of commercial- ism. Bless his little heart, I thought, the old AAF can do better than this for a brother ofhcer of a sister arm— ” “ Keep shaving, pal.” “ I am. So then I just happened to remember June.” Beaming 4 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW broadly, he brok e i n to song, laying his hand on his fleshy chest and waving his razor: “ Oh, June, li k e the m ou n ta i n s, I ’ m blue— he brok e off and hastily began to run the razor down hi s cheek. “ I n fine voice this m orning he said. “ Wait till I soar and sing in Manny’s flying machine Then, there was some un i nished business wi th m y lovely little E m erald, and some- th i n g a bou t th ei r a u n t goi n g to T a m p a . S o I rang up, and aunty had sure en ough gon e. T he occasi on offers and the youth complies Captain Andrews s face showed signs of uneasy strain. Cap- ta i n A n drews led a chaste an d sober life, and though i t was not in his nature to ake a censori ous a tti tu de abou t wha t other people chose to do, he did not approve. H e di d not want to li sten . O n the oth er hand, he di d not want to ap p ear priggish. Nathaniel H icks was sure tha t C a p ta i n D u chem i n recogni zed and relished this little dilemma. Like Captain Andrews, C ap ta i n D u chem i n di d n ot ta k e a cen sori ous a tti tu de about wha t other people chose to do but, a fter all, a belly full of beer and a gi rl in bed were solid goods, su i ted to the n a tu re of man. People who really did not want them had something wron g with them people, a good dea l more num erou s, who really di d want them, but rerained for various arti ficial reasons from getting them, struck Captain Duchemin as ludicrou s. “So, Captain Duchemin said, “quick as a flash, we whipped ou t there. T he loot look ed a ll right to me. He joi n ed hea rti ly in the i n trodu ctory inquiries about each other’s healths an d the echange of com p liments. I prep ared som e refreshm ents and we e tinguished a few li ghts to avoi d eye strai n— he wi p ed his razor a n d b ega n to sp lash his face with water. When he could, he said, “ My lovely little E m erald and I drifted ou t to a fine broa d ha m m ock on the vera n da h to stu dy the stars, unfortu n a tely a t the ti m e obscu red by a few thunderstorms. I left the loot goi n g good. H e bu ried his fa ce i n a towel, wiped the basi n ou t wi th i t, and threw i t on the floor. “ L ook he said, pointing beyond Nathaniel Hicks, who involuntarily turned his head. Captain Duchemin darted hi s ha n d up to the shel and, taking N athaniel Hicks’ bottle of shaving loti on , p oured a qu a n ti ty i n to hi s other palm . “ N ever tou ched i t he sai d, putting it back and applying the palmful to hi s cheeks. “Well, he said, beaming again, “now, comes catastrop he T he sham e of it I just hope it never gets back to the C hi ef Signal Officer Clear case of con duct un becom i n g T here was AIR ANTHOLOGY 85

June, her waim little heart pitter-patting, ripe for romance, and halfway through some sweet nothing he was whispering to her, the loot goes to sleep! Mind you, I don’t say I cared about him; but I cared about me. My lovely little Emerald, studying the stars (in absentia) with pleasing enthusiasm and eager soft abandon, had about completed the course. Her able mentor was on the verge of tendering her the diploma, when out pops June, sore as any lady would be. The cup is dashed from my lips. I have to start resuscitating the loot and getting a taxi. What an end to a beautiíul evening!”

Major Sears Major Sears, though not an Army man, but appropriately enough a former State Police lieutenant, stood and moved in that perfect position of the soldier which is seldom seen outside pictures in New Infantry Drill Regulations. With no visible effort or strain, Major Sears carried his head erect on the correct vertical axis; his neck and head squarely to the front, chin in, eyes levei. His straight shoulders, lifted chest, and narrow, evenly-held hips set off the íresh creases of his khaki shirt and trousers. His shoes gleamed. His brass belt buckle shone colorless as a clean mirror. The insignia on his collar tabs were centered to at least one thirty-second of an inch. Colonel Ross, though he didn’t, and didn’t purpose to, practice himself any such excesses of bearing and grooming, looked at Major Sears with sua approving eye. If you are going to do a thing— especially if you are a young man in your thirties and have a chance of doing it successfully— you should do it right. In performing his duties, one of which was to see that Ocanara personnel looked, as well as behaved, like soldiers, Major Sears properly began with himself.

Master Sergeant Dominie Pellerino Master Sergeant Dominie Pellerino, General Beal's Crew Chief, had gone early to eat, at half-past eleven. Quickly fed, he put a toothpick in his mouth and sauntered, by an in- conspicuous route, from the Ocanara Base Mess to the Elec- trical Shop abutting on the vast cavern of Hangar Number 2. Tracing his way through the machines and work benches to the supply section and stock room, he signaled the clerk at the issue window. The clerk pressed a button that unlocked the AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW si de door. Sergea n t P ellerino passed alon g the ranges, di m ly electric-lighted, of racks and bins. A t the end was another door, with the words: Knock and Wait stenciled on it. This had been the darkroom of a p hotographic laboratory before the laboratory m oved to a bui lding of its own. Nomi- nally, the present use of the old darkroom was m i scellaneous storage— a pla ce to p u t those bi ts of equi p m ent and odds and ends whi ch had been drop p ed rom accoun tabi lity, but which a wise Shop Chiei never threw away. T hey, or parts of them , might come in handy on some job som eti m e and, a n y wa y , he m i gh t wa n t to fiddle wi th them for hi s own am usem ent. T hus in one category were used m otors and generators of various sizes resi stors and condense rs relays and solenoi ds thermal overloa d resets and A N connectors. I n the other category was the m ost con si derable i tem a whole M arti n p ower-operated gu n tu rret, wi thou t the guns, from a crashed B-24. M aster Sergea n t S torm, Chief of the E lectrical Shop, had ideas about rewi ring it. While thi s storage use was real, and enough to justify the assignm ent of sp ace that would be little good to a n y on e else, it was not the principal use of the da rkroom . T he da rkroom provi ded qu a rters for what was known, n ot un n aturally, as the K n ock a n d W a i t C lub. This was an informal grou p of the top sergea n ts i n en gi n eeri n g a n d m a i n ten a n ce, crew and shop chi efs, m arked out from th e com m on run by their importa n t p osi ti on s, a n d by th ei r resulti n g sp eci a l a tti tu des of mind and manner. Their habits were un hurried they spoke with laconic assurance. They had e tra privileges and established p erqui si tes to whi ch th ey helped themselves wi th a u thoritative aplom b. Almost everyone in the A ir Servi ce G rou p k n ew of the C lub’s irregular eistence, and knew who belon ged to it but as a m a tter of form, the members acted as though all was very secret. T hi s was one of those p ractical, give-and-take arrange- ments, a co-opera ti on wi th thei r various commanding officers, who taci tly agreed to be ignorant as lon g as they p lausibly could be i gnorant. I t was a practicable arrangem ent, because membership in the Club was self-limiting. To be free to frequ en t th e da rkroom , a m a n had to be good. Unless he k n ew how to orga n i ze hi s work and discipline his personnel so that his absence for an hour or two m a de n o difference i n the p rogress of the jobs on han d, he could not go AIR ANTHOLOGY

to the C lub wi thout soon losi n g hi s stripes. He must have the judgm en t and e p erien ce to know e a ctly what his valuable abilities entitled and enabled hi m to get away wi th. A com p e- tent organizer and disciplinarian endowed with judgment and eperience was a treasure. H e was m uch m ore i m p orta n t than most of the officers supposed to be over him a point made plain by the fa ct tha t he ha d m ore rea l power and lar more effecti ve authority than most of his officers. The lieutenant could gi ve all the orders he wanted, but none of them wou ld be ca rri ed ou t u n ti l the sergeant decided whether it was necessary and reasonable. I i t was held to be unnecessary or unreasonable, i t would n ever be ca rri ed ou t. B u sy m oti on s m i gh t be m ade, but on e th i n g a ter a n oth er wou ld go wrong until ca rry i n g i t ou t wa s p a ten tly impossible. T he lieutenant learned, if he was cap able of lea rn i n g, n ot to gi ve th a t k i n d of order. If he was not capable of learni n g, he fou n d him self fied up for roya l chewi n gs by the hi gher echelon , a n d for even tual reassignm ent as unsatis actory. W hen a top sergeant gave orders, it was different. R easonable or un reason able, n ecessary or unnecessary, they were really orders. A ny GI who didn’t jum p to obey, ully and completely, then and there, wi thou t a rgu m en t or stalling or gold- bricking, was asking for, a n d wou ld certai n ly get, the dirty end of every stick. T hey would ram him so ull he wouldn ’ t be a week in wishing he were dead.

From GUARD OF HONOR. Copyright, 194 , by James Gould C ozzens. Reprinted by permission of Harcou rt, B race and Company, Inc. FOREIGN HORIZONS

SOVIET AIR POWER Asher Lee From The Nineteenth Century and After, June 1949

HE SOVIET UNION deservedly holds the blue riband for inaceessibility. Her highly develop ed system of secrecy is Tworth m a n y fighter squadron s a n d a n ti - a i rcraft guns to Air Marshal Constantin Vershinin, who is head of the S ovi et Air Force and who p lans the air defence of Rssia. But in spite of Soviet security, intensive research and study over the years permit the specialist to assess, wi thi n reason, the strength, orga n i sa ti on a n d fighting value of Russia’s air squadron s n ot with com p lete accuracy, of course, but that is no more p ossible i n M oscow tha n i n L on don or Washington. No one can predi ct the da te or the climatic conditions in which Soviet air squad ron s m a y ha ve to do battle. N early all air weapons are toda y in the m elti n g p ot. E cep t for a few A m erican si -jet p lanes, the lon g- ranged jet bom ber is not yet an operational reality. Flying faster tha n sound has been achieved e p erimentally, but not in normal aircraft conditions that make supersonic flight a serious military factor for at lea st two or three years. Radio and radar-controlled an ti - ai rcraft shells and rock ets may or may not revolutionise air defence in the n e t few years. The atomic bomb is untested against serious air op p osi ti on . Its hitting power may be further reduced by defensi ve di s persai and undergrou n d factories. The range of military rock ets of the V 2 ty p e, th ei r degree of accuracy and their eplosi ve potential are as m uch a subject for scientific conjecture on Soviet rock et ranges near Irkutsk as on America’s White Sands or on the A ustralian rock et ranges. O n e thi n g m u st be sai d a t on ce a bou t the S ovi et A i r F orce of to-day. It has benefited enormously in the last fou r or five years from G erman scientific brains, technicians and tacti- ci an s i n a lmost every field of aviation. In mobility, in the design of its jet- engi nes, in the i m p rovem ent of its avi ati on fuel, in the manufacture and use of radar equi p m ent and in the FOREIGN HORJZONS 9

develop m en t of rock ets, G erm a n i n fluence is predominant. We can accep t the p ublished testim ony of Colon el Grigori A. T okaev that the S ovi et A i r F orce sci enti fic legacy from the Lu twaffe in 194 was considerable. E qui p m en t from dozen s of Germany’s aircraft factories and e p erim en tal air stations was decan ted i n to the K rem li n ’ s ea ger lap. In World W ar N o. 2 one of the grea tes t of the S ovi et a i r weaknesses was the absence of any kind of ra da r equ i p m en t in operational aircraft. It is not surprising that three Am erican Superfortresses which force- landed in S ib ria at the end of the wa r were p ounced up on and retained by the S oviet as war booty. V aluable radar bom bi n g equi p m en t was aboard. The operational use of ra da r i s on e of the k ey s to m odern lon g- ra n ge bom bi n g. B ri ta i n ’ s A i r C hi ef Marshal Arthur Harris should be listened to on this point. In his book Bomber Often- sive, he writes: U nless an effecti ve non- visual ra da r na vi - ga ti on a l aid is provi ded, the task of the night bomber is immensely difficult. ’ N ow a ll Soviet lon g- ra n ge bom bi n g of Germany in W orld W ar 2 was done at night without the use of radar. No surprise then if it was second-rate and ineffecti ve. The U. S S. R. never used more than 2 lon g- ra n ge bom bers on a n y of these op erations. Three-quarters of the b om b loa ds were usually wide of the ta rget a rea. N owadays the thousands of German Air Force prisoners and G erm an em igre factory workers at p resent in the U. S. S. R. are helping to remedy thi s S tate of affairs. T here are G erm a n ra da r tech n i ci a n s lec- turing and e pounding at the aviation schools at F runze, Novosibirsk, S verdlovsk, Khabarovsk, Baku and elsewhere. The U. S S. R also has the use of thousands of German radar workers from the S i em en s T elefunken and Askania factories working in Leningrad. Kuibischev and Kiev. In the ne t few years, these G erm ans m ay atone for som e, but n ot all, of the Soviet ignorance of the use of ra da r i n wa r The Germans not only bequeathed thei r radar equi p m en t and techn i ci an s to the U. S. S. R . T he S ovi et have also acquired the secrets of a whole range of N a zi ra di o- con trolled bom bs and rock ets whi ch th ev a re n ow e p loiting. T here are the H en schal radio bombs that the Germans used against Atlantic convoys and in the S alem o op erations off Italy in 194 . World W ar No. 2 saw these bom bs in the e p erim ental stage— the G ermans pressed them p rem aturely into operations, but the Russians ha ve ha d ti m e to develop them a t lei sure. T he sam e story of 9 AIR UNIVERS1TY QUARTERLY REVIEW

German legacy is to be told a bou t radar-controlled and antiaircraft rock ets, such as the H en scha l V projecti le. I n fact, any future opponents of the S ovi et A i r F orce m ay have to reckon wi th the whole gam ut of Luftwa ffe scientific weapons. Nearly the complete string of Germany’s e perimental air stati on s fell into the Soviet lap at the end of World W ar No. 2. However, lon g before the S ovi et U ni on got hold of the G er man flying bomb V I and the lon g- range rock et V 2 , Rus- si an techn i ci an s had been working on their own dom esti c models of these ai r weap on s. S om e sa y the doy en of Soviet rocket scientists is Constantin iolkowsky. W ith his colleagues Rynin, Perelman, Petrovi tch, and S cherchevsky, he was m aking large fuel rock ets a t the S ovi et A G I research cen tres at Moscow, Leningrad and Kazan, in the 192 - period. AGI is the cen tral orga n i sa ti on for S ovi et ai r desi gn, produ cti on an d eperi m en ta ti on . I n the 1 9 ’ s, the S ovi et acqu i red som e refu- gee workers from G erm a n y ’ s ch i ef rock et cen tre at Peene- munde. Most notable was H erman Oberth. S ta lin reali sed too late that heavy rock ets were to becom e a m a jor weap on of war. Instead, he concentrated on develop i n g a sm all rock et projecti le, used wi th m oderate success on his fighter ’planes throu ghou t W orld W ar No. 2. But the Soviet flying bomb was a failure. I n the la st three or fou r years, however, R ssia has been m aking up the leeway. T he S ovi et have already i m p roved on the p erformance of Nazi rock ets an d flying bombs. Of the two wea p on s, the rock ets a re likely to be develop ed m ost— esp eci ally for use from the i n creasi ng num ber of new Soviet lon g- range submarines. But the range of Russian heavy rock ets delivering a ton of eplosi ves wi ll n ot e ceed about m i les for a year or so. Nor will they e ceed 1 , m i les i n the foreseeable future. S ovi et m etal- scientists and radio-control eperts have the sam e p roblem s to solve as those of other coun tries. The metal encasi ng rock ets gets hot, the fuel in the rock ets ta k es up a lot of room a n d wei ght. T h e di fflculti es of con trolling by radio large m i ssi les tra velling at over , miles an hour are far from solution. In fact, really effecti ve lon g- range milita ry rock ets are a t the m om en t bey on d the wi t of man. Numerically, the Soviet Air Force is sm aller tha n i t was a t the end of World W ar No. 2. It has a personnel strength of about half a m illion, but that is only the tota l of the m en an d wom en in uni form . T here are, of course, thou sa n ds of other ci vi lian helpers— test pilots, cooks, clerks and the like. From FORE1GN HORIZONS 91

the peak war op era ti on a l strength of about 22, planes, sp li t u p i n to a b ou t a i r regi m en ts , ea ch wi th a s tren gth of thirty to thirty-five planes, the Russian A ir Force is down to about 1 , planes and about air regi m ents. T hi s reduc- ti on i s n o di sa rm a m en t gestu re. I t is si m p ly the slow- down effect of building larger and more m odern p lanes in the last three years. T he war-tim e m onthly peak production of 2, to , mi litary planes, e cluding trainers and production in the Cominform sa tellite countries, is down to about 2, to 2, a m onth. B ut this sm aller S ovi et A i r F orce has m uch grea ter h i tti n g p ower an d i s a m u ch b etter i n stru m en t of air defen se tha n the ra th er clum sy m achine which enjoy ed a i r dom i n ati on agai n st a m uch weakened L u twa ffe on the E astern Front for the la st two y ea rs of World W ar No. 2. T h e S ovi et A i r F orce m a de e tra ordi n a ry p rogress duri n g the S econ d W orld W a r. W h en i t h a d to go to wa r w i th G ermany in the summer of 1941, it was on the whole, a second- rate fighting machine. Large numbers of its fighters were obsolescen t an d had top sp eeds of little m ore than m iles an hour. Many of its bombers lacked the protection of adequate gu n n ery and a rm ou r p lating. The standard of blind flying was low. T here was a gen eral lack of mobility fatal to an air force largely designed for ta cti ca l continental air warfare over vast E urop ea n sp aces. D u ri n g the war, things improved rapidly. By 1944 Soviet designers, L avrochkin, M ikoyan, Gurevich and akovlev were turning out fighter planes almost as good as the G erm an F ocke W u lfs and M esserschm itts, British Spitfires and T em p ests or American Thunderbolts a n d Mustangs. Soviet cannon-firing fighters with top speeds of miles an hour were the rule, ra th er th a n the e cep ti on , i n the Soviet Air Force of 194 . Soviet twin-engined planes designed by Ilyushin and Petlyakov had also becom e m odernised and were then com p a rable i n p erform an ce wi th thei r G erm an op p osite numbers. L arge- scale p roducti on of American Dakota transport planes was in full swing at Moscow and Tashkent. P ro duction of fou r- en gi n ed hea vy bom bers, which had been slowed up between 1941 and 1944, resum ed at the p rewar rhy thm during the last year of the wa r i n M oscow a n d K a za n . I n a d- di ti on , S ovi et A i r F orce ra di o C om m u n i ca ti on s a n d the su p p ly orga n i sa ti on s were vastly im proved. But when the end of the wa r carne, the S ovi et A i r F orce was lacking in many operational resp ects. I t had n ever p i tted 92 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW itself for long against a modern air force of approimately its own si ze. E i th er its equ i p m en t ha d been too obsolescen t to deal with the L uftwa ffe or else i t had so outn u m bered the L u ftwa ffe tha t the G ermans were si m p ly overwhelmed in the air. The Soviet Air Force had had no e p erience of op erating radar equi p m ent, jet- p rop elled p lanes, large rockets, radio-controlled bombs or aircraft carriers. I t had shown the world little of the hitting power of its lon g- range bomber force reformed in the Spring of 1942 under General Golova n ov s com m an d and Stalin’s parti cu lar patron a ge. T he S ovi et ai r defense system had hardly been tested, for the L u ftwa ffe was never able to launch a full-scale attack on S oviet cities. The German raids on M oscow i n the su m m er of 1941 were m odest i n si ze, averag- i n g a bou t seven t - five planes per attack, and they petered ou t after half-a-dozen operations. But what of the organisatiOn and fighting value of the Soviet Air Force of toda y ? O ver two- thi rds of the 15,000 air craft in units are orga n i sed i n to a dozen ta cti ca l air armies of about 1, aircraft each. T hese are un der the di rect a u thority of the R ed A rm y C om m a n ders, who have their permanent headquarters at Odessa, M insk, L eni ngrad, Tiflis, Tashkent and C hita. I n addition, there i s a F i gh ter C om m an d of a bou t 1, planes and a L ong-R ange Bomber C om m an d equi p p ed wi th to 1, fou r- en gi n ed m achi nes. B oth these forces are i n dep en den t of the R ed A rmy. The fighter air regi m ents com e un der the com m a n d of General Vassilyi Stalin, whose rapid war-time prom oti on reeked of unwonted n ep oti sm at the Krem lin. The Soviet Bomber Commander-in-Chief is General Golova n ov. B oth B om ber and F ighter Comm ands are di rectly con trolled by M arshal Constantin Vershinin. Just as the tacti cal air regi m ents com e under the a rmy, so the N a va l Air Forces com e un der the S ovi et F leet com m anders. T he strength of the naval air regi m ents totai s about 2, p lanes, of whi ch about 1 per cent. are m u lti - en gi n ed torpedo-bombers. T he rem ai n- der are fighters and fighter-bombers which would be used m ore to defen d S ovi et p orts or to su p p ort R ed A rmy Coastal op era ti on s tha n they wou ld to su p p ort the S ovi et N a vy a t sea. Soviet transport p lanes number about , . This figure includes the civil air-li nes. T hese need to be taken i nto the mili ta ry a ccou n t because they could and would be qui ckly inte- grated with the m ilitary transport un i ts, some of whi ch are also p art of the L on g- R a n ge B om b er Command. The war-time FOREIGN HOR1ZONS 9

twin-engined P.S. 4, the Soviet version of the D a k ota , i s b ei n g rep laced by the m ore p owerful twin-engined Ilyushin 12. In addition, I lyushin is building a heavier fou r- en gi n ed tra n sp ort plane and there is a tran sp ort version of Tupolev’ s fou r- en gi n ed bom ber, the TU. . The TU. , comparable in p erformance with the British Lincoln or L a n ca s ter, i s th e cu rren t ty p e of Soviet lon g- ra n ge bomber and m ost of Golova n ov’ s ai r regi m en ts are at p resen t fitted with it. I t has ei ght guns, i n cluding four cannon, fou r engi nes of about 2, h.p. each and can carry about tons of bombs for a ra n ge of about 1, miles. T he S ovi et fou r- jet bomber designed by I lyushin is not yet in squadron Servi ce, but should appear soon in sm all numbers. R adar bom bing aids will shortly be standard in all Soviet lon g- ra n ge bom ber uni ts. Soviet jet- fighters and fighter-bombers have been replacing the wa r- ti m e con ven ti on a l fighter planes in A ir Force units since 194 . Svetzov, chiei Soviet jet- en gi n e designer, has been working on jet-engines since before the G erm a n wa r, but by the summer of 194 the U.S.S.R. was still without its first jet fighter squadron . T h en carne the G erman windfalls. H undreds of Junkers 4 and B. M . W . jet-engines were acquired in 194 from th e J u n k ers D essau factories and the aero- engi ne plants in ustria, Czechoslovakia and H ungary. T he L uftwa ffe abandoned to the S ovi et A i r F orce dozens of sam p les of the single- jet H ei n kel 1 2, the twin-jet M esserschm i tt 2 2 a n d the two- jet A rado 2 4. L on g before the first fifty British Rolls- Royce jet engines arrived in the U.S.S.R. in 194 , the Soviet were fly i n g thei r own a k and M i gg jet p lanes. T o-day they have between 1, and 2, jets in squadron s. T h ey a re m ore heavily armed than British jets. T he S ovi et fighters have and -mm. cannon, against the more gen eral British 2 -mm. gun, but thei r en gi n es have n ot the sam e p ower an d so the planes are n ot as fast as the latest types of British Meteor and Vampire. M ost S ovi et jet-engines in Service have a stati c thru st of about 4, lbs. , thou gh en gi n es of about , lbs. thrust will shortly be in squadron Servi ce. A n d wha t a b ou t the m en b ehi n d the p lanes? W hat about the hu m a n factors of morale, training and leadershi p ? The morale of the S ovi et A i r F orce wi ll nearly always be high. I t gained great national prestige in World War No. 2. It is. of course, a bad second to the R ed A rm y in the P ress and 94 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW annals of the U . S. S. R. B u t i t has recei ved a generou s a llow- ance of national back-slapping and a generou s a lloca ti on of war decorations, li ke the orders of Victory, Suvorev, A leander Nevsky, Bogdan, G lory, Red Star and P atriotic War. If the stap le breakfast diet for many is Vodka, there is also a gener ous alloca ti on of fru i t, m eat, cheese an d chocolate at main meais there are also sp ecial Air Force holiday centres. T here is, on the whole, a hea lthy a tm osp here in the Soviet Air Force engendered by healthy grum bling about aircraft an d s n i or officers, by a blind passion for flyi ng, and a devoted p atriotism to th ei r coun try. Basically, training in the Soviet Air Force is run on sound lines. In the holoca u st of defeat and wi thdrawal in the summer of 1941, there were chaoti c p hases. F lying instructors were sent for fron t- line duties, there was a shorta ge of planes in the schools, p arti cu larly for the vi tal later op erational stages of training. But the Soviet got over that and they are now back to p ea ce- ti m e schedu les. L u u ry training standards can be indulged in once again. oung Soviet hopefuls begin at the aero clubs, of whi ch there are over in the U. S. S. R. Some of the sm a ller ones have only a b ou t ten old- fashioned biplane trainers with perhap s half-a-dozen flying instru ctors. B ut the larger clubs at Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, Kuibischev, Irkutsk, Tashkent and elsewhere ru n to twen ty to thi rty m odern planes with one instructor per machine. They pick out promising boys and girls a t school. T hey gi ve them basi c techn i cal training, elem entary navigation schooling as well as a bit of flying at the a ero clubs. T hese clubs have over 1, young aspirant pilots u si n g thei r facilities. The ne t stage is military flying prop er. Soviet citizens are selected for the A i r F orce during their period of military con- scription, which has been, of course, a non-stop feature of Soviet life ever since the 191 revolution. A ir Force personnel are usually an elite choi ce. T he basi c m i litary flying training ta kes a bou t two y ears. T he first three m onths are sp en t i n marchi n g, dri lling, handling guns, p hysical training and a fairly hefty dose of political instruction. The inevitable lectures on theories of flight, air navigation, aircraft i n struments, map readi n g— all are there— the stock ca ta logu e of topics which goes b efore flying prop er. The written and oral eamination follows. T h en a y ea r or so of ci rcuits and bumps, and short cross- cou n try flights. The Soviet air instructor at this stage is FOREIGN HORJZONS 95

guessing whether his p rot g shows m ore p rom i se as a bom ber or as a fighter pilot. H e m akes up his m ind and the youn g p i lot is given his wings and drafted to a bom ber, fighter or reconnaissance school. About half the y ou n g p i lots go to fighter sp eciali st schools like those at Kirovobad, Grozny or Dyagilevo. If one had to select a p oi n t o m a jor i n terest i n the S ovi et air training system it would be the m ergi n g of the sm a ll warti m e sp eci a list bomber, fighter and reconnaissance schools into giant training centres catering for several thousand pupils. Here S ovi et ai r gu n n ers, fighter pilots an d radio operators are schooled i n one bi g com m u n a l flying camp. Flight mechanics, army support sp eci a lists and bomb-aimer-observers rub shoulders in the same mess huts. This makes a fine breeding ground for the e cha n ge of ideas. It generates fleibili ty , ca m era deri e and sym p athy between bomber, fighter and reconnaissance crews. Apart from that. these com bi n ed tra i n i n g cen tres are more econ om i ca l to run than a large num ber of sm all cam p s. T here is a p lace carved out for wom en i n the S ovi et A i r Force training schemes just as you would e p ect. G i rls get the sam e chan ce as the boys i n the aero clubs and the best of them becom e flying instructors. During the war military train ing centres for wom en were set up in the U rais, at Astrakhan and just east of M oscow. S ovi et ai rwom en p layed a slightly grea ter role in their country’s Air Force annals than wom en in other countries. Like British women, they made, and are still makmg. a major con tri bu ti on i n a i rcra ft factories. Like British women, they were used for a i r p h otogra p h i c i n terp reta ti on an d they T n a n n ed a n ti - a i rcra ft batteri es. S ovi et a i r wom en, like their Anglo- S a on cou n terp a rts, ferried ai rcraft to a n d from th e b a ttle areas. S ovi et wom en were, however, e - cep ti on al in that some of the best p i lots di d fly on combat duties— usually on short-range night-bomber operations and as fighter pilots u su a lly in a defen si ve role, coveri n g S ovi et ci ti es and i n du stri a l cen tres. I t would be sheer feminist or Stalinist e aggeration to say that they played, are p laying, or will play more than a token part in operational flying duties. One per cen t of Soviet Air Force combat sorti es wou ld m ore tha n cover thei r p ast or future contribution. On the ground, however. they played and continue to play an im p ortant role. With the post-war i n trodu cti on of radar, S ovi et ai rwom en m ay become m ore important in guiding young Ivan’s flights, in identifying the approach of hostile p lanes and p lotti n g the 9 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW paths of raids or flights in and out of the U . S. S. R . B u t there wi ll never be a si zeable race of Soviet Amazon combat crews, who wi ll em barrass their male op p osi te num bers, both friendly and enemy. Most Soviet women, in spite of undoubted emanci- pation opportu n i ti es, wa n t to b ring up a fam ily. M ilitary flying is a lon g way from the home. The great weaknesses in S ovi et ai r training are i n the realms of radar and lon g- range bombing. In World W ar No. 2, the Soviet had a very second-rate lon g- range bomber force, led by Air General Golova n ov. T he transport an d close sup p ort demands of the R ed A rmy, the lack of sound navigational tra i n ing, the eftecti ve A n glo- A m eri ca n bom bi n g of ta rgets a ll over Germany, Central Europ e a n d the B a lkans, all con tributed to clip Golova n ov’ s lon g- range wings. I n the p ost-war period, Russia’s air leaders undoubtedly regret thei r lack of k n ow- how in strategic bombing, and are doi n g all they can to rem edy the situation. M oscow R adio m ay p our ou t bogus post-war pity for G erm a n y ’ s battered ci ti es just in order to make political cap i tal. Their tra n sm i tters m ay blare out the fairy story that it was the wicked Fortress, L iberator and Lancaster crews from U.S.A. and Great Britain who vented their barbarian bombing sp ite on the poor German population. But all the same, Soviet air leaders like N ovikov, G rom ov, G olova n ov and V ershinin took m ore than a p assi on ate i n terest during the war i n both British and American strategic targets, p lanes and bombs. Who are Russia’s air leaders toda y ? I n the P olitburo M alen- kov and M olotov have m ost i n fluence on air m a tters at the directi on and con trol levei . S ta lin is an ious to build a large strategic bomber force and to bui ld large n um bers of trans- ocea n rock ets on the G erman blueprint of Dr. Sanger, b u t the e-Generalissimo is not well-versed in the difficulti es of develop i n g m odern air weap ons. V ershinin, C.-in-C. of the S ovi et A i r Force and G en eral Sudets, his chief-of-staff, have a reasonably free hand i n develop i n g thei r own i deas. C olon el Tokaev has publi shed statem en ts on the Soviet Air Force i m p lying that the th reat of purges or imprisonment plus a centralised bu- reaucracy handicap the develop m en t of the Soviet Air Force. There is little evi dence to sup p ort this view. Sudets and Ver shinin are well aware that the average rei gn of thei r predeces- sors was from one to two years— that Soviet air chi efs like Alksnis, L oktionov, R ychagov and Novikov lost the K rem lin favour and suffered vi olent trea tm en t. B u t V ershinin and FOREIGN HORJZONS 9

Sudets, his chie -of-staff, are full-blooded com m a n ders, and like most Russian airmen, accept the normal operational risks of life in war and peace. So do Generais Repin, Grendal, Scheg- alev and N i k i ti n , A i r M arshal Vershinin’s planners. What are thei r a i r p lans and hopes? D e ensively, they must build up the chai n of ra da r s ta ti on s a lon g the A rcti c, B a lti c and Black Sea coasts as well as alon g the shores of the F a r Eastern M aritim e provi n ces. A s qu i ck ly as they can, they are manufacturing and installi n g these ra da r stati on s whi ch wi ll gi ve wa rn i n g of the height, direction and num bers of incoming planes. T hey are practising and training intensively so th a t th ei r ra da r op era tors ca n i n terp ret th e b lips’ in the cathode ray tubes reliably and quickly. But it is a lon g p rocess which will ta k e several more years to com p lete. A p a rt from ra da r, they wi ll need to stiffen thei r fighter and anti-aircraft defen ces. N o doubt when the ti m e com es, m an y of the fighter regiments at present un der ta cti ca l com m an d wi th the A rm y an d N a vy, will be switched to a master Fighter Command resp on si ble for the s tra tegi c defen ce o: the U. S. S. R. It is, however, a vast area to defend, and should always be vulnerable to fei n ts and ta cti ca l variations by incoming bombers. Offensi vely, the Soviet A ir Force will do well in a tactical role, and it should succeed strategi ca lly if it confines itself to night and bad-weather bombing. In daylight operations, its lon g- ra n ge bom bers, unescorted, would be ready victim s of jet- fighters. W e can assum e that the Soviet have no immediate plan for lon g- ra n ge da y light bom- bardm ent, ap art from th e use of the rock et. T h e a i r squ a dron s of the S ovi et A i r F orce are being made as mobile and self-contained as possible. T hi s is p a rtly the Russian answer to the th rea t of atom bombing, p artly the inevitable result of having multi - a i r fronts m prosp ect both over the B lack Sea, W estern Europ e, the F a r E ast and the A rcti c. L on g before a i r leaders like Generais Arnold and S p aatz laid stress on the future stra tegi c i m p orta n ce of the A rcti c a i r-lanes, S oviet aircraft were m aking test flights over the North Pole rou tes. O n e of Golo- vanov’s lon g- ra n ge bom ber divisions sp ecialises in Arctic flying and operates from S i berian bases. B ut ap a rt from R u s s i a ’ s i n - eperi en ce w i th ra da r equ i p m en t, wh i ch i s m ore vi ta l tha n ever for N orth P ole ai r op era ti on s, she i s ha n di ca p p ed by the lon g distances from h er present bom ber bases to potential ta rget areas. A mere glance at the m ap across th e n orth ern h em i - 9 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW spheres from B eri n g S tra i t to the B a ren fs Sea, from Scandi- navia and Greenland to Alaska, will show how the A rcti c ai r di stances are at p resent weighted against the U. S. S. R. In any final survey of Russia’s air power, one inevitably com p ares i t wi th that of the U n i ted S ta tes. A lthou gh the Price of Power’ Royal Institute of International Affairs finds Russian industry more vulnerable to b om b i n g tha n th a t of U. S. A., this is compensated for to som e e ten t by the i gn or- a n ce ou tsi de R ssi a of where the vi tal war factories in the U. S. S. R. are loca ted. I n du strial intelligence, as the records show, was a weakness in the war against Germany. It is likely to be a n even grea ter weakness of any power waging war against the U. S. S. R. On the other hand, A m erica has a big techn i cal lead i n radio-controlled bombs and rock ets, i n the develop m en t of lon g- ranged jet- p rop elled bombers and in total industrial potential. Both powers are com m i tted to p roviding air forces for others, but it is likely that this will prove a grea t er drain on the S ovi et tha n on the U. S. A. Moreover, the forces of the W estern Union are likely to p rovi de a better op erational return and more i n dustrial coop era ti on , tha n the sa tellite coun tries of the C om i n form. In the overall man-power situation, R ssia and her satellites are likely to provi de fewer first- class p ilots tha n the W estern Powers. N ot that S oviet p ilots are not fearless, well trai ned and com p etent— i t is si m p ly that the Balkan and Transcaucasian populations are likely to p rodu ce less first-class airm en and techn i ci an s p er million head of popula ti on tha n the i n h a b i ta n ts of Western Europ e, N orth America and the Commonwealth. The Russian Air Force would do well in a short C on ti n en ta l war where tacti cal air power played a dominant role. I n strategi c wa rfare, ei ther offensi ve or defensi ve, i t will be vulner able and relatively ineffectual. The wide-open spaces that daunted N ap oleon and H i tler’s W ehrmaeht will provi de op en- ings for incoming bombers. T he lack of the a tom i c bomb, the loca ti on of her bomber bases, her ine perience in strategic bombing make her deficient in the kind of lon g- range hitting power tha t cou ld add bluster to the K rem lin’s negotiations with foreign Powers. P erhap s because of these weaknesses, Russian Air Power may be a factor for p eace. I f i t i s n ot to be so, it should n ot be un deresti m a ted, for Soviet technicians learn quickly and Soviet airmen fight bravely. Editor’s Notes

S ome new features have been planned for the next issue of the REVIEW. First, we want our readers to contribute our guest editoriais. Accordingly we are offering a prize of twenty-five dollars for the best editorial submitted for each issue, to be chosen by the Editor and the Editorial Board, whose judgment of the suitability of entries for publication will be final, the Editor reserving the right to reject all entries. Entries should be between 800 and 1000 words long and should offer a firm opinion on a timely matter of concern to the Air Force or otherwise closely related to air power. Topics of very specialized or local interest should be avoided, as should those of such passing significance that they would be cold by the time they could appear in a quarterly. Other submissions than the prize winner will also be considered as offered for publication in the REVIEW, and suitable materiais will be used in our new department “ In My Opinion . . either entire or in part. Contributors of published pieces will be awrarded a year’s subscription. Individuais wishing to sound off at greater length on controversial subjects are invited to contribute up to 2000 words to “In My Opinion . , or a full-length article of 5000 words or less. The QUARTERLY REVIEW is a professional journal for the professional airman, published by the Air University to disseminate advaneed thought on problems of air power, particularly those relating to the strategy and tactics of air warfare. It is especially intended to provide a forum for expression of controversial points of viewr on matters of professional significance. Also beginning in our next issue will be a department of Letters to the Editor. We invite çomment on any of the materiais we print— normally we like three hundred words or less, but send along whatever you think you need. Anything published, even in part, wins a year’s subscription. If you want to amplify or to argue with any of our authors or disagree with a book review or the book itself, here is your chance— Letter to the Editor, “ In My Opinion . . .” , or full-length article.

L ieutenant James G. Cozzens reported in early September of 1942 to the Director of Individual Training, Hq. AAF, for duty with a cadre of specialized officer personnel being assembled under Col. Harvey Holland to plan and establish the AAF School of Applied Tactics, location as yet undecided. His fine novel, The Just and the Unjust, had recently added popular success, it was the August Book-of-the-Month Club selection, to his reputation with criticai readers, steadily growing through the Thirties, for impeccable technique and sure instinct for phrase which he applied to the writing of long narratives principally devoted to what was called character study in the old books of criticism. Another way to put it might have been that he is more interested in his characters and in understanding them than in a series of happenings hung together to make a “ plot.” Within a few days after Lt. Cozzens was settled down at a desk at Gravelly Point he was not unreasonably assigned to what was eventually

99 100 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REV1EW to become the Training Literature Section and put to work preparing a training manual on flying, a job not unlike the one occupying Captain Nathaniel Hicks in Cozzens’ GUARD OF HONOR, which has been awarded the 1949 Pulitzer Prize for the best American novel of the year (see p. 80). When Orlando was selected as the site for AAFSAT, Lt. Cozzens went along with the Training Literature Section to Orlando in November 1943 for the ensuing six months. In the Training Aids Division, to which hs section belonged, he found an organization composed of writers, artists, professors, engineers, lawyers, advertising men, publishers, and other such professional non-military types who had been cast into the military mold by six weeks in the Miami Officers Training School but had been set to labors related to their civilian specialties. He had constant opportunity to acquaint himself with the effect of the military upon such men and the effect of such men upon a military organization which found itself putting all sorts of queer fish in its uniform to accomplish newly complex jobs the old army had not dreamed of as requiring expertise beyond that of a second lieutenant of infantry. Orlando is the real scene of Guard of Honor, a study of men like Cozzens and his associates and the military, professional and Citizen soldiers, with which events had brought them face to face, and the most distinguished novel yet written with the war as subject matter. The two most-discussed novels of the shooting war, The Naked and the Dead and The Young Lions, both of the this-is-the-way-it-was school, recreate combat with the verisimilitude of motion picture photography but fali far behind Guard of Honor in another great prospect of art— the piercing comprehension of human being, what men are and why they are, that made Shakespeare concern himself with other matters than the detail of fence in the duel between Hamlet and Laertes. And what happened to Cozzens? After producing manuais for two years he worked out the last year or so of the war in the Pentagon as advisor to the Air Staff on public relations matters and stage manager of General Arnold's press conferences, whence he separated into the Inactive Reserve to spend three years on Guard of Honor.

O utstanding among soon-to-be published books of interest to airmen will be General Hap Arnold's Global Missiori and General Kenney Reports. According to the publishers (Harpers), Global Mission tells the story of the development of American air power and the great decisions of the Second World War in all the intimate detail that only the wartime Com- manding General of the Army Air Forces and a member of the Combined Chiefs and Jaint Chiefs of Staff could know. Certainly its author dealt with most of the great and not-quite-so great figures who stood out from the backdrop of a war that wrapped itself around the whole Earth. He sat at Casablanca and Cairo and Quebec and Teheran. In the Pentagon he was "Mr. A.” and to the thousands who crowded into his antechambers the “ A ” stood for Air Force. He spoke up for Air before the committees of Congress and in the sessions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Presidents and Prime Ministers of great nations. And he drove, constantly drove, the procurement, the training, the manufacture, the planning and the shaping. and the commitment and employment of the most powerful EDITORS NOTES 101

war force the world had yet seen. If Global Mission embraces its author’s vast expenence, it will be one of the most important books on the war. General Kenney s 200,000-word story of the way from Buna is said to be based on a diary he kept during the war. and the word from his publishers, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, is that he has kept the movement and the suspended immediacy of unfolding action in its telling. Probably the thing most remembered about General Kenney is his brilliant victory in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, and we have long awaited his personal, detailed account of how he fought it. But there are other names that are remembered—Dobodura, Marilinan, Wewak, that sounds like an indiscre- uon, Nadzab, Lae. Rabaul, Cape Gloucester, Los Negros, Hollandia, Noem- íoor, Sansapor, Morotai, Leyte, Ormoc— a rosary of islands that had to be told, one by one, to escape them. To the many thousands of airmen who struggled to leave them behind, General Kenney’s book, which he subtitles a personal history of the Pacific war, will be a revelation of the man whose thinkiing and decisions were largely responsible for the details of their own personal history of the fight in the Southwest Pacific. For students of the war and historians and for the generations ahead it will be a pnmary source for an understanding of what Americans were like in that new island-hopping warfare that began in July of 1942 under the shadow of impending battle for Australia and how they did things in that kind of warfare and, particularly, why they did them.

H istorical papers of first importance for the study of the impact of air power in the Second World War have recently been acquired by the Library of Congress in the more than 150,000 papers o f G eneral Carl Spaatz. to be known as the General Spaatz Collection. Of principal mterest in the Collection, which annotates not only the air phases of the war but also the rise of American air power, is what General Spaatz called the Diary, really an assembly of documents, rather than a series of autobiographical notes, put aside over a period of twenty- six years from 1922, when General Spaatz began the practice of con- signing to a personal file documents, memoranda, notes, comments, and correspondence which he felt were of more than passing interest. Of the 30.000 documents in the Diary 22,000 represent the war and postwar years. Also in the category of papers personally collected by General Spaatz are many special reports, a longhand Journal kept in England in 1940 during the Battle of Britam, the full report of the endurance fiight of the Question Mark in 1929, thirty-three volumes of the “ Semimonthly Report of Bombing Results" of the Strategic Air Forces in Europe, “ The Commanding Generai s Log," a bnef of mcoming and outgoing messages from General Spaatz tour of duty in the Pacific during August and Sep- tember 1945, a series of documents relating to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a file of several thousand copies of incoming radio messages, and several hundred photographs of historical events and personages to be added to the nineteen volumes of strategic bombing photographs from the European war which General Spaatz presented to the Library two years ago. A portion of the documents of the General Spaatz Collection are duplí- cate copies of official Air Force records deposited with the Collectic i under 102 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW the terms of a three-way agreement to which General Spaatz, the Depart ment of the Air Force, and the Library of Congress are parties. The great mass of these papers have been arranged under some forty subject categories in a division of the Collection known as the Subject File. Under these subject headings are found the usual folders of correspondence. memoranda, and general reports, together with special reports and studies, collected by archivists of the Strategic Air Forces in Europe. Deposited with the Collection are segments of the papers of many lead- mg figures in aviation. such as General H. H. Arnold and Lord Tedder. There is also a copy of the journal of Major General F. L. Anderson, Gen eral Spaatz' deputy in charge of operations, and extracts from the corre spondence of General Ira C. Eaker. The eventual worth of the General Spaatz Collection to scholars and researchers of military history awaits its employment, but there can be no doubt that it provides an outstanding entry into understanding of the conduct of the war and a valuable source for the study of the philosophy of air power. These are documents collected around an idea rather than as a result of the mechanism of an organization. They were selected for preservation by a man whose career embraces the rise and growth of air power in the military power of the United States. As the concept of air power developed and grew in his mind, he accumulated and preserved the tangible records of daily activity that interested him because they did relate to the concept. It is not too much to say that General Spaatz is one of the two or three men who holds in his person the story of the development of American aviation into the great war machine of 1944 and 1945. T h e story is now in these papers on public deposit. It awaits the historian and the philosopher of air power.

.A.SHER L ee, author of “The Soviet Air Force," reprinted in our Foreign Horizons department, is a former Wing Commander in the Royal Air Force and one of Britains foremost authorities on the Luftwaffe. His German Air Force, with foreword by General Carl Spaatz «Harpers, 1946», a study of the rise and fali of the German air arm, is a sound, non-technical. sometimes brilliant, and in part definitive, treatment of the thesis that through domination of the air Germany nearly achieved her ambi- tion of world domination but that Hitler and Goering eventually crippled the Luftwaffe by forcing its growth as a political weapon instead of a military one. Mr. Lee is now engaged in writing a book-length study of the Soviet Air Force. The Nineteenth Century and After, which very pleasantly gave us permission to reprint Mr. Lee’s article. was founded in 1877 as a literary review to publish poetry and general articles. Tennyson wrote a “Prefatory Sonnet'’ for its first issue and Matthew Arnold contributed an essay. In its later issues the work of Arnold, Ruskin, Swinburne, and Tennyson frequently appeared, Tennyson’s famous poem “The Revenge: A Ballad of the Fleet” finding its first publication in The Nineteenth Century. as the magazine was thcn called. K. F. G. THE CONTRIBUTORS

Col. David A. Burchinal was a now Chief, Troop Carrier Section. member of the United States Air Command and Staff School Strategic Bombing Survey and . . . Col. Julian M. Chappell < U.S later was with the Special Pro- M.A.». a graduate and formei jects Division. Air War College: is Academic Director of the Air War now Chiei, Program Analysis Di- College. is presently attending the vision, Hq. U S A F . . . Lt. Col. N a t i o n a l W a r C o l l e g e . . . Lt. Col. George K. Charlton, a graduate oí lioward D. Sutterlin 1. Spaight M. Emme Air Commodore H. E. Nowell is Maj. John L). Reid 'U.S.M.A.». with the British Joint Services a íecent -uaduate of the Air Com Mission, Department of Defense mand and Staff School. is pres- . . . Major Ira H. Smith

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