Air University Quarterly Review: Fall 1949, Vol. III, No. 2
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EDITORIAL STAFF Major Kenneth F. Gantz, Ph.D., Editor Captain Edmond N. Gates, Assistant Editor Grace G. Lane, Editorial Secretary EDITORIAL BOARD Colonel James W. Chapman, Jr., C S Education, President Colonel George E. H enry, Deputy Commandant, AWC Colonel John C. H orton, Deputy Commandant, AC&SS Colonel Joseph Ladd, Deputy Chief, Evaluation Division L ieutenant Colonel Jack L. Bentley, AU Secretary Dr. Charles M. T homas, Dept. of the Air Force Library Mr. A lder M. Jenkins, Publications Section, Academic Div. ATTENTION Views expressed in this journal are those of the authors, and are not to beconstrued as the official opinions or policies of the Department of the Air Force or the Air University. The purpose of this journal is to stimulate healthy discussion of Air Force problems which may ultimately result in improvement of our national security. Appropriate contributions of pertinent articles and corre- spondence which present new views, or refute or support old ones, are solicited. THE U nited States Air Force AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW V olume III FALL 1949 N umber 2 IDEAS ARE WEAPONS 3 C ol. D avid Burchinal, USAF INDUSTRIAL VULNERABILITY IN THE ATOMIC AGE 13 L t . C ol. G eorge R. C harlton, USAF A MATTER OF NOMENCLATURE 24 J. M. S paight HUMAN RELATIONS IN UNIFICATION 30 C ol. J oseph C. R eddoch, USAF SENTINELS OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY 3:5 M aj. J ohn D. R eid, USAF IN >IY OPINION . Limitations of an Air Defense System 4(j L t . C ol. H arry M. Pike, U S A F Troop Carrier Aviation in the USAF 43 Lt. C ol. L eroy M. S tanton. USAF Military Responsibilities in the Atomic Age 5 j Col. J ulian M. C happell, USAF Tactical Support Aviation in the USAF 53 Lt Col. H oward D. S utterlin, USAF AIRMAN S READING 55 Stahn. Maj. Kenneth F. Gantz, USAF; The Foreign Policy of Soviet Rússia, Eugene M. Emme; Rússia and the Wesf in Iraiw Robert W. Schmidt; Japan, Enemy or Ally?, Paul E. Eckel; The Royal Air Force in the World War, Vol. III, Air Commo- dore H. E. Nowell, RAF: Military Justice under the 1948 Arnended Articles of War. Maj. Ira H. Smith, USAF; Haud- book for Spies. Maj. Robert E. Work, USAF; An Army in Exile, Lt. Col. Joseph L. Dickman, USAF: Briefer Comment. VIR ANTHOLOGY 80 FOREIGN HORIZONS 88 EDITOR S NOTES Í)ÍJ " // /> // V w << « « « " Puoibhed quarterly by the Air University. Maxwell Air Force Base. Alabama. The primir.i e.Püb lcatl0Ii b,>en aPProved b>' ^ e Dlrector of the Bureau oí the Budget. 17 Jujk-, Students and faculty oí »he Air Unlverslty schools are provided íree copies as tcxiuai r. nn o r.r *UHd by F‘! ‘d PrlnMn,? P!an''- AU- Price. single copy. 50 cents; vearlv subscrl,- a? k s2 J Address orders to Air Universlty Book Department. Maxwell Air Force Ba.se. Alabama Properly credited quotations are authorized. ^ — ............ - -------------- — The QUARTERLY REV1EW offers a prize of twenty-five dollars for the best GUEST EDITORIAL submitted for each issue. Entries will be judged by the Editor and the Editorial Board, whose judgment of quality and suitability for publication will be final. Right to reject all entries is reserved. Closing dates for receipt of submissions are 1 November, 1 February, 1 May, and 1 Angust. All entries are considered offered for general publication in the REVIEW (non-winners used entire or in part will be awarded a year's subscription). Topics of timely concern to the Air Force or closely related to air power should be ireated from a firm point of view in 800 to 1000 words. Mark entries for PRIZE EDITORIAL CONTEST. The QU ARTERLY REVIEW also offers a year’s sub scription for LETTERS TO THE EDITOR published en tire or in part. Comment is invited on any of the materiais we print or books we review— or brief discussion of other matters. Three hundred words or less luill normally be used, but longer letters will be considered in accord with general significance. Mark LETTER TO THE EDITOR. .................... ............................................ Ideas are Weapons COLONEL DAVID A. BURCHINAL HE most powerful weap ons of war, both in its preparato- ry p ha se a n d i n i ts p ha se of eecution, are fou n d i n the minds of men. We call these weap on s i deas. T he out- standingT contribution that a m ili ta ry i n sti tu ti on such as the Air War College can m ake is to en gen der in its students the ability to think soundly, logi ca lly, and analytically and to gen era te i deas. Sound ideas stem from th e p rocess of thinking and provide the m ea n s for the solution of problem s whi ch are novel, Solu ti on s whi ch a re n ot fou n d i n the field of eperience. Ideas re- sulti n g from logi ca l, analytical rea s on i n g a re th e on lv accep table avenues for a p p roa chi n g an d trea ti n g wi th the n ovel problem . T oda y our military forces a re fa ced wi th a n overri di n g requi rem en t— the requi rem en t to find Solutions to problem s hidden in the future and not yet fou n d wi thi n the field ol eperience. Stated another way, sound ideas l ading to effecti ve problem solution are the n um ber- one requi rem en t of the m i li ta ry forces today. In this article I would li k e to trea t wi th som e p ast m i litary failures and the thinking processes which insp ired them , with lessons which have been derived from these failures by present- day thinking, and with som e of the m ore p rovoca ti ve i deas which have been advanced as a result of these lessons. T he factors involved in an an alytical trea tm en t of World War II are m ulti p le, com p le , a n d i n som e i n s ta n ces con trovers i a l. Military considerations are so intermingled wi th p olitical fac tors that a clear relationship of cause a n d effect cannot be establi shed wi thou t e ten si ve e a m i n a ti on an d an alysis. Since such trea tm en t wou ld be well beyond the scope of thi s a rti cle, The views expressed in this article are not the official views of the Department of the Air Force or of the Air University. The purpose of the article is to stimulate healthy discussion of Air Force problems which may ultimately result in improvement of our national security. 4 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW I will endeavor to trea t p ri m a ri ly with the military factors in- volved and wi th m i litary thinking that resulted i n certa i n importa n t courses of a cti on . A prime factor in the m ilitary defeat of both G ermany and Japan can be tra ced to faulty thinking—thinking which per- m itted us decisive advantage. Germany in parti cu lar furnished many e amples. In her prep aration for World War II Germany had no imped- iment in the form of obsolete structure of doctrine to serve as a deterren t to sound, m odern strategy. She enjoy ed a ll the benefits of the initiative, a very vital advantage in the conduct of war. She could concei ve her strategy and proceed a t on ce to its i m p lem en ta ti on wi thou t the n eed for shedding obsolescent equ i p m en t. T h i s i n substa n ce she di d, bu t the sha dow of the German General Staff was evi den t i n her strategy of surface conquest— invasion and capture by land blockade, isolation, and strangulation by sea. In support of this traditional strategy she p rodu ced a short- range, tactical air army, erron eou sly thou ght of as an air force, to su p p ort b litzkrei g techn i ques. The blitzkreig was not new it merely e ploi ted sp eed an d mobility, which are ti m e hon ored fundam entais of war. Ger many beli eved th a t the success of her surface strategy would result in a successful war. But Germ any did not visualize England as a geographical com p on en t of Europ e p rop er. She therefore felt tha t i f she m oved the B ritish forces back to the B ritish Isles and kep t them there, she had rem oved the second front. S he di d n ot foresee the very active primary fron t— th a t i n the a i r—which soon develop ed from the B ritish Isles. In support of tha t p a rt of her basic strategy which called for isolation, blockade, and strangulation of the B ritish Isles, Germany enjoy ed the sam e a dva n ta ges of initiative and modem equipment.