Social Networks and Democratic Transitions by Joseph Siegle

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Social Networks and democratic transitions by Joseph Siegle

Transitions without social networks “Colored revolutions”: the promise and Belarus rarely comes to mind when one thinks of shortcomings of nascent social networks pioneers in the global democracy movement. Yet In the late 1990s and early 2000s, democracy as the Soviet Union drifted toward dissolution, advocates in Georgia, Serbia, Ukraine, and to Belarus was poised to emerge as one of Eastern a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan invested consider- Europe’s first democratic states. Opposition politi- able effort developing networks for political cal parties had formed in the late 1980s under reform, drawing on the experience and support glasnost and had begun challenging the ruling of established democracies. Building in part on Belarusian Communist Party. After Communist the lessons of the successful resistance to the Party leaders were discredited and forced to Communist regime in East Germany—which resign for supporting the failed putsch in Moscow culminated in the collapse of the Berlin Wall— in August 1991, opposition leader Stanislav these networks relied on principles and tech- Shushkevich was elected president of the par- niques of nonviolent protest popularized by the liament and head of state in September. He “Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare,” Gene Sharp. proceeded to lead Belarus on a path of political Organizationally, these movements reflected a openness, respect for civil liberties, and market- network-centric approach that eschewed central- oriented economic reform. ized structures and offered a tactical flexibility and maneuverability that helped cope with attempts to As with other post-socialist transitions, Belarus repress activities. endured a sharp economic contraction, steep inflation, and botched privatization. The former The prototype of these opposition networks was Communist Party capitalized on popular griev- Otpor, which played a key role in the “Bulldozer ances to charge the Shushkevich government Revolution” that brought about the downfall of with corruption and agitate for closer ties to Slobodan Milošević’s regime in Serbia on October Moscow. Lacking a unified democratic coali- 5, 2000. Otpor, a group of reform-minded young tion and cohesive civil society networks that people, claimed 100,000 registered members. could counter this rearguard action, Shushkevich Western support ranged from the strategic (inter- was politically isolated and forced from office nal organization and communications structure) to in January 1994. Six months later, Alexander the mundane (cans of spray paint). While Serbia’s Lukashenko was elected president. He rein- 2000 revolution was not “colored” (it claimed the stituted price controls, renationalized key seg- moniker of the Bulldozer Revolution after one of ments of the economy, shuttered independent the more memorable episodes from a day-long newspapers, and overrode separations of power protest in which bulldozer operator Ljubisav established for the parliament and Central Bank. Đokić, nicknamed Joe, fired up his engine and Domestic intelligence agencies were reconstituted charged the building of Serbia’s state television), and civil liberties repressed. Two badly flawed it offered a new, effective approach to organizing presidential elections later, social networks remain democratic resistance. In the years that followed, fragmented and Lukashenko—widely regarded similar scenarios played out in Georgia (Kmara, as “Europe’s last dictator”—retains power to this the Rose Revolution), Ukraine (Pora, the Orange day. 40 D e v e l o p i n g A l t e r n a t i v e s organizations, withhighly differentiated agendas inspired theformationof other independent Polishera.Thisprecedentspace ofthemodern helping tocarveoutthefirstindependentpublic this effort, anunderground press wascreated, Revolution) andKyrgyzstan (Kelel,theT 1 those repressed bythegovernment. lished theW 1976, opponentsofCommunistPartyruleestab- response tothecrushing of workers’strikesin from thespectrumofdemocratic transitions.In Poland’s experience reflects anotherperspective network ść: thepowerofaresilientSolidarno social soon gavewaytopoliticalinfighting. that changewasintheair, butearlyenthusiasm Revolution servednoticetoCentralAsia’s leaders a resurgent CommunistParty. Kyrgyzstan’s T acrimonious battleforpowerthathashelpedfuel Revolution havebeenlockedinanincreasingly prominent leadersandformeralliesoftheOrange and amediablackout.InUkraine,thetwomost responded withteargas,astateofemergency, in centralTbilisitodemandhisresignation. He tens ofthousandsprotesters hadgathered the pacesoonslackened.ByNovember2007, Revolution, embarkedonvigorous reforms. But presidential votein2004followingtheRose Saakashvili, afterwinning96percent ofthe reform process inSerbia.InGeorgia, Mikhail Milošević regime dealtaserioussetbacktothe by anunrepentant gunmanwithtiestothe of PrimeMinisterZoranĐinđićinarch 2003 have beennoexception.Theassassination ing. Theaftermathstothecolored revolutions norms andcivilsocietynetworksare stillemerg- though, especiallyinplaceswhere democratic The democraticroad isfrequently arocky one, Revolution).

For amore detailedbackground ofPoland’s transition,seeMichaelBernhard(1993). orkers’ DefenseCommitteetohelp 1 T o advance ulip ulip and NA member ingoodstandingtheEuropean Union Poland hasdoubleditspercapitaincomeandisa tary democracy. Fourpresidential elections later, andtheestablishmentofparliamen- government dates inJune1989ledtoaSolidarity-ledcoalition freely. Thedecisivetriumphofindependentcandi - elections, andcivilsocietywasallowedtooperate contest someseatsinupcomingparliamentary were relegalized, oppositionpartieswere ableto Solidarity andotherindependentmovements renewed workingclassunrest. Aspartofthedeal, ment tocompromise withSolidarityandavoid opening presented- byglasnost—ledthegovern rating economicconditions—coupledwiththe stalemate continueduntil1988,whendeterio- remained thelegitimatevoiceofmostPoles.This ment controlled theofficial sphere, Solidarity underground- movement.Whilethegovern gle forindependencebymaintainingabroad did notwilt.Instead,theycontinuedtheirstrug- Yet Poland’s invigorated civilsocietynetworks longer playanofficial role. had paidoff: Solidaritywasbannedandcouldno or censored. Onthefaceofit,Jaruzelski’s gambit media andeducationalinstitutionswere closed independent organizations were banned,and 100 peoplewere killed.Acurfewwasinstituted, 1981. Thousandswere arrested andanestimated declaredgovernment, martiallawinDecember General W Intent onreversing thisnewindependentforce, officially recognized in1980. that theSolidaritymovementemerged andwas forreform.government Itwasfrom thisbackdrop helped organize thepopulationandpressure the array ofpoliticalandeconomicnetworksthat and engagementgrew steadily—resulting inan and geographiccoverage.Citizenparticipation TO. ojciech Jaruzelski,leaderofthemilitary

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Social networks in transition resources of the state, and key party posts— to the detriment of the majority. The imbalance There are many reasons why some countries persists because those that benefit are small in experience smoother democratic transitions number, easy to organize, and clear about what than others. However, as the experiences out- they would lose by a more inclusive governing lined above illustrate, one important distinguish- structure. In contrast, the disadvantaged majority ing feature is quality of social networks. These is geographically dispersed, difficult to organize, networks provide the resilient institutional sinew and poorly informed. Moreover, individuals face that holds a reform movement together through real risks in bucking the system, which they must the challenges and pushback that inevitably are weigh against the uncertain benefits they would encountered. Indeed, the relative depth of formal realize from greater pluralism. The result is an and informal social networks is demonstrably increasingly entrenched elite minority with ever instrumental in the relatively successful demo- greater resources to maintain their hold on power. cratic transitions of the Baltic states, Benin, Chile, Overcoming this imbalance requires organizing Mongolia, South Africa, and Central Europe more and educating this majority, then mobilizing it generally. By contrast, the comparative scarcity for collective action. Establishing networks of of robust social networks is one of the factors associations, civic groups, chambers of com- underlying the faltering experiences of Armenia, merce, labor unions, and other citizen groups can Ecuador, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Russia, and do just that. Networks build connections among Central Asia, among others. numerous individuals and small groups, greatly accelerating access to information. This informa- And pushback is a common feature of democratic tion, in turn, empowers individuals by ending their transitions. Fifty-five percent of all contemporary isolation and showing that their grievances are democratizers have experienced at least one widely shared. episode of backsliding. A third of these revert, at least temporarily, to autocracy—and the associ- Network-centric citizen groups, especially given ated higher probabilities of conflict, underde- the power of “Web 2.0,” can play a major role velopment, and humanitarian crisis.2 While the in building collective action. Such groups con- process of political transformation is inevitably nect like-minded people, link the individual to bumpy, understanding the factors that contribute a broader national or global issue, and harness to more successful democratic transitions can these individual aspirations to a focused plan help reduce significant hardship. Understanding of action around which the populace can rally. how to cultivate resilient social networks in Moreover, exposure to a network’s pluralistic countries with an authoritarian past (or present) is governing structure and the sense of ownership therefore a top priority. that comes from subscribing to a larger cause are powerful and enduring forces for greater politi- Why democratic networks matter cal participation. Networks simultaneously limit Networks help overcome collective action the need for centralized direction and allow for challenges maximum flexibility in the pursuit of reforms. In so doing, they spread the risk any one person faces An early hurdle democratic reformers face is while increasing the resiliency of a reform move- overcoming the “challenge of collective action.” In ment. autocracies, a small minority monopolizes the key levers of influence—the military, media, financial

2 notably, 75 percent of democratizers that experience these reversals regain their democratic trajectory within three years (Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein 2009). 42 D e v e l o p i n g A l t e r n a t i v e s tend tobemore stable,betteroff economically, prosperity. Nationswithstronger socialcohesion works iscriticaltolong-term societalhealthand shown, however, (re)building these socialnet- the writingsofRobertPutnamandothershave taught citizenstobewaryof whattheyshare. As informantshave Surveillance andgovernment citizen fearofparticipationandtakinginitiative. democratic societiesoftenrequires movingpast Creating strong societalnetworksinpre- pyramid schemes. extralegal paramilitaryassociations,orfinancial Examples includetheKuluxlan,mafia, be organized onnondemocraticlines. internally may pursueparochial orcriminal interests and Importantly, not allassociationsbuildtrust:they networks are thetiesthatbindasocietytogether. ing ashared nationalidentity. Inthisway, social this process are enormouslyimportantforbuild- interests. Thecross-group linkagescreated in cal persuasionstocometogetheraround shared areas, ethnicgroups, incomeclasses,orpoliti- networks allowcitizensfrom different geographic dence inandcommitmenttoasociety. Horizontal between individuals—bondsthatincrease confi- It developsmutuallyrewarding relationships Participation innetworkshelpsbuildtrust. trust, betweencitizensandtheirleaders. democracy isaseriesofcompacts,basedon on whichdemocracydepends.Atitscore, then, majority andtoparticipateinthecivicinstitutions pursue policiesalignedwiththeinterests ofthe ers rely oncitizenstosupportthemwhenthey legitimate iftheyaredemocraticlead- togovern, Similarly, realizing thattheymustbeperceived as and disillusionedwiththedemocraticprocess. conditions donothold,citizensgrow alienated tive leadersthrough theballotbox.Where these toral calendartoreplace unresponsive orineffec- they are towaituntiltheallottedtimeonelec- regularity ofanelectoralprocess, forexample,if have sufficient confidenceintheintegrityand Citizensmust do othersystemsofgovernment. Democracies rely ontrusttoagreater extentthan Social networksbuildtrust ject tolowerlevelsofcorruption(Putnam1993). less susceptibletocrimeandviolence,sub- media. visitors,especiallythe banned mostinternational why dictatorshipsinZimbabwe andBurmahave pressure.blunts concertedinternational Thatis what ishappeninginadistant countryoften nized opposition.Conversely, ignoranceabout hold powerinthefaceofanincreasingly galva- mightwanttoexert an autocraticgovernment attention, moreover, constrainstheabusesthat potentially powerfulleverforchange.External awareness ofrepression—introducing another tures. Linkagestotheoutsideworldalsoraise the advantagesofentrenched powerstruc- country. Betteraccesstoinformationhelpsoffset edge, experience,andresources from outsidethe benefit more readily from thetransferofknowl- flows withinasocietybutalsoallowmembersto Social networksnotonlyensure openinformation transition. ideal organizational structures duringtimesof individual orgroup inanetworkmakenetworks suppleness andtherelative autonomyofeach decision making—andadaptaccordingly. This porate rapidlyevolvingdevelopmentsintotheir more likelytobewell-informedandableincor are doingtheirjobs.Membersofanetworkare and allowsindividualstoassesshowwellleaders of accountability. Informationaidstransparency Access toinformationisanindispensablefeature radicalism. political movement,mitigatingtendenciestoward hasamoderatingeffectturn, ontheprioritiesofa a narrow personalagenda.Accountability, in tives topursuethecollectiveinterest ratherthan support oftheirconstituencies,theyhaveincen- Because leadersmustsecure theapproval and and leadershipissubjecttochecksbalances. als andorganizations. Poweristypicallydiffused or group butrequire buy-infrom manyindividu- Networks are notdominatedbyasingleperson Networks ensureaccountability -

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Some lessons learned of the Freedom House index in 2005. Conversely, democratizers such as Brazil, Romania, and Examining the relationship between the existence Turkey scored below the median on the trust of networks and democracy is difficult because of scale in 1990, and rank in a lower democracy tier the paucity of comparable cross-national data on 15 years later. associations. Defining associations and account- ing for differences among them present vexing This pattern corresponds to the close links challenges. One common proxy for the richness between the richness of associational life and the of associational life in a society is degree of trust. quality and durability of democracy across provin- Citizens in societies with higher levels of trust are cial governments in Italy famously documented by more likely to participate in and join associations Robert Putnam. Controlling for income, citizens of various types. Launched in 1981, the World in northern Italy have tended to participate in vol- Values Survey now covers 80 countries and some untary membership organizations at much higher 80,000 people—capturing information on per- rates than citizens in southern Italy. These orga- sonal values, attitudes, participation in associa- nizations were typically recreational and cultural tions, and trust via some 200 questions. These groups, such as soccer clubs, choral societies, data allow for an analysis of the relationship hiking clubs, literary circles, and Lions Clubs. between trust and democracy, the latter being Communities with higher association participation defined by the Freedom House democracy index. also had higher rates of newspaper readership— another indicator of information access and The relationship between depth of societal engagement in community affairs. The institu- trust and subsequent successful democratiza- tional performance of regional governments in tion appears reasonably strong (see Figure 1).3 provinces with a richer associational life was far Controlling for income, democratizing societ- superior—as defined by greater stability among ies that had higher levels of trust in 1990 have cabinet ministers, more timely approvals of annual attained significantly stronger democracy scores, budgets, and more extensive and responsive on average, in 2005. For example, Bulgaria, service delivery in day care centers, health clinics, Mexico, Poland, and South Korea all scored in the or agricultural loans. Associational density was a top quartile on the rankings for trust in 1990. They far better predictor of institutional performance each subsequently scored in the top 10 percent than other commonly cited explanations for good Figure 1. Relationship between societal governance such as social stability, education, trust in democratizers and subsequent urbanization, personnel stability, or political party. level of democracy Citizens in northern provinces were also far more 40 satisfied with their local governments; they had 35 more direct contact with their local government 30 representative and these discussions tended to 25 focus on issues of public interest rather than on 20

15 requests for personal help (for licenses, jobs, and

10 so on). rust in O thers (1990)

T 5 0 Contacts between politicians and citizens in 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Democracy in 2005 southern Italy, in contrast, tended to be more typical of client-patron relationships. Predictably, Sources: World Values Survey; Freedom House citizens in less associationally rich communi-

3 Democracy is measured using the Freedom House Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. The Freedom House index generates an annual rating between 2 and 14 for every country in the world. 44 D e v e l o p i n g A l t e r n a t i v e s irrigation scheme. in socialcapitalandfavorsthedurabilityof tives forreciprocity ensures ongoinginvestments tive. Craftingassociationalrulesthatcreate incen- a sequenceoffuture actionsare farmore produc- paying costs—andcredibly commitmembersto nation—allocating benefitsand responsibility for Associations thatsetoutclearrulesforcoordi- their successandsustainability(Ostrom 1997). of associationsisthemostcriticalelementto sions andfree ridership—foundthatstrength disparate householdswithincentivesfordiver dination challengeofteninvolvinghundreds of irrigation schemes—anotoriouslydifficult coor effective managementofsmallholderagricultural (Narayan 2002,1997). attendance, andhigherpercapitaincomelevels levels ofinfantmortality, betterchildhoodschool far higherproject performance—aswellaslower age, participatedintwoormore associationshad found thatvillagesinwhichinhabitants,onaver study of121ruralwaterprojects, DeepaNarayan outcomes issupportedinotherresearch. Ina social networksgeneratesuperioreconomic The notionthatsocietieswithbetterintegrated elsewhere. dependent, andpowerlessthantheircompatriots ties reported feelingmore exploited,alienated, can begiventostrengthening theexistingpublic societal cohesion,relatively greater emphasis societies thatare startingfrom astrong baseof is apriorityfortargeting assistance.In external in asocietyundergoing atransition,accordingly, Understanding thedepthofhorizontalnetworks will facilitatesuccessfuldemocratictransitions. institutions ofoversightandaccountabilitythat collective actiondisadvantages,andadopt tion across alarge numberofpeople,overcome much betterplacedtoquicklyexchangeinforma- Nations withcrosscutting social networksare path donotbeginfrom the samestartingpoint. Countries embarkingdownthedemocratic Implications

Similarly, astudy ofthe - - - and facilitatemore successfuldemocratictransi- capacity thatcanchallenge politicalmonopolies They alsobuildthenorms,skills, andorganizing improved levelsofwell-beingandsocialharmony. a valuableresource inthemselves, contributingto democratic societies.Thesenetworksrepresent networks are astrategicinvestment inpre- Initiatives tostimulateandstrengthen societal transition, subjecttopersistentpushback. adjust expectationsforwhatwilllikelybealong will beiterativeinthesecontextsshouldalsohelp that democratizationandnetworkdevelopment early daysofthecolored revolutions. Recognizing openings emerge—as occurred inPolandorthe ment thatreformers canseizewhendemocratic an enablingenvironment fornetworkdevelop- In thesecases,thefocusshouldbeoncreating informants. their neighborsmaybegovernment time emerging insocietieswhere citizensfear pendent voices.Societaltrustwillhaveahard thathaspurposelyrestrictedgovernance inde- are frequently thesymptomofyearsautocratic network ofassociations.W zation shouldwaituntilasocietyhasdense This review doesnotsuggestthatdemocrati- possibilities. ters ofmembershiporganizations, tonameafew coalition building,anddevelopmentoflocalchap- norms ofpublicspiritednessandinclusiveness, training fornationalleadersandyouthinculcating known fortheirstrong socialcohesion,leadership studytourstosocieties campaigns, external and training,socialmarketingeducational from allsegmentsofsociety, mediaexpansion national serviceprojects thatintegrateyouth of societalfragmentation.Initiativesmayinclude for inter-group collaborationandredress practices this process viaprojects thatprovide incentives actors canencourage itself mustown,external to long-termendeavorandsomethingthesociety Recognizing thatnetworkpromotion isamedium- a toppriorityistocreate them. institutions. Insocietiesthatlackthesenetworks, eak societalnetworks

t i v e s e v i t a n r e t l A g n i p o l e v e D tions. Importantly, membership associations of Narayan, Deepa (ed). 2002. Empowerment and many types, and not just overtly political orga- Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook. Washington: nizations, contribute to enhancing information World Bank. exchange, social organizing, and citizen self- initiative—critical ingredients for reform, par- Narayan, Deepa. 1997. “Focus on People’s ticularly in societies where political activities are Participation: Evidence from 121 Rural Water prohibited and the democratic process is starting Projects.” In Institutions and Economic from a very low point. Building social networks Development: Growth and Governance in Less- is also relevant for societies starting down the Developed and Post-Socialist Countries, edited democratic path without a deep tradition of asso- by Christopher Clague. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins ciational life, since these societies are more likely University Press. to experience backtracking. Investing in social networks in these contexts expands opportunities Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy for successful democratic transitions in the short Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: term and, perhaps more critically, for sustaining Princeton University Press. them over the long term. Ostrom, Elinor. 1997. “Investing in Capital, References Institutions, and Incentives.” In Institutions and Economic Development: Growth and Governance Bernhard, Michael. 1993. “Civil Society and in Less-Developed and Post-Socialized Countries, Democratic Transition in East Central Europe.” edited by Christopher Clague. Baltimore: Johns Political Science Quarterly 108 (2): 307–326. Hopkins University Press.

Halperin, Morton, Joseph Siegle, and Michael Weinstein. 2009. The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace (revised edition). New York: Routledge.