39 T I V E S E V I T A N R E T L A G N I P O L E V E D SOCIAL NETWORKS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS by Joseph Siegle Transitions without social networks “Colored revolutions”: the promise and Belarus rarely comes to mind when one thinks of shortcomings of nascent social networks pioneers in the global democracy movement. Yet In the late 1990s and early 2000s, democracy as the Soviet Union drifted toward dissolution, advocates in Georgia, Serbia, Ukraine, and to Belarus was poised to emerge as one of Eastern a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan invested consider- Europe’s first democratic states. Opposition politi- able effort developing networks for political cal parties had formed in the late 1980s under reform, drawing on the experience and support glasnost and had begun challenging the ruling of established democracies. Building in part on Belarusian Communist Party. After Communist the lessons of the successful resistance to the Party leaders were discredited and forced to Communist regime in East Germany—which resign for supporting the failed putsch in Moscow culminated in the collapse of the Berlin Wall— in August 1991, opposition leader Stanislav these networks relied on principles and tech- Shushkevich was elected president of the par- niques of nonviolent protest popularized by the liament and head of state in September. He “Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare,” Gene Sharp. proceeded to lead Belarus on a path of political Organizationally, these movements reflected a openness, respect for civil liberties, and market- network-centric approach that eschewed central- oriented economic reform. ized structures and offered a tactical flexibility and maneuverability that helped cope with attempts to As with other post-socialist transitions, Belarus repress activities. endured a sharp economic contraction, steep inflation, and botched privatization. The former The prototype of these opposition networks was Communist Party capitalized on popular griev- Otpor, which played a key role in the “Bulldozer ances to charge the Shushkevich government Revolution” that brought about the downfall of with corruption and agitate for closer ties to Slobodan Milošević’s regime in Serbia on October Moscow. Lacking a unified democratic coali- 5, 2000. Otpor, a group of reform-minded young tion and cohesive civil society networks that people, claimed 100,000 registered members. could counter this rearguard action, Shushkevich Western support ranged from the strategic (inter- was politically isolated and forced from office nal organization and communications structure) to in January 1994. Six months later, Alexander the mundane (cans of spray paint). While Serbia’s Lukashenko was elected president. He rein- 2000 revolution was not “colored” (it claimed the stituted price controls, renationalized key seg- moniker of the Bulldozer Revolution after one of ments of the economy, shuttered independent the more memorable episodes from a day-long newspapers, and overrode separations of power protest in which bulldozer operator Ljubisav established for the parliament and Central Bank. Đokić, nicknamed Joe, fired up his engine and Domestic intelligence agencies were reconstituted charged the building of Serbia’s state television), and civil liberties repressed. Two badly flawed it offered a new, effective approach to organizing presidential elections later, social networks remain democratic resistance. In the years that followed, fragmented and Lukashenko—widely regarded similar scenarios played out in Georgia (Kmara, as “Europe’s last dictator”—retains power to this the Rose Revolution), Ukraine (Pora, the Orange day. 40 Revolution) and Kyrgyzstan (KelKel, the Tulip and geographic coverage. Citizen participation Revolution). and engagement grew steadily—resulting in an T I V E S A array of political and economic networks that The democratic road is frequently a rocky one, helped organize the population and pressure the though, especially in places where democratic government for reform. It was from this backdrop norms and civil society networks are still emerg- that the Solidarity movement emerged and was ing. The aftermaths to the colored revolutions officially recognized in 1980. have been no exception. The assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in March 2003 Intent on reversing this new independent force, by an unrepentant gunman with ties to the General Wojciech Jaruzelski, leader of the military D E V L O P I N G A T R Milošević regime dealt a serious setback to the government, declared martial law in December reform process in Serbia. In Georgia, Mikhail 1981. Thousands were arrested and an estimated Saakashvili, after winning 96 percent of the 100 people were killed. A curfew was instituted, presidential vote in 2004 following the Rose independent organizations were banned, and Revolution, embarked on vigorous reforms. But media and educational institutions were closed the pace soon slackened. By November 2007, or censored. On the face of it, Jaruzelski’s gambit tens of thousands of protesters had gathered had paid off: Solidarity was banned and could no in central Tbilisi to demand his resignation. He longer play an official role. responded with tear gas, a state of emergency, and a media blackout. In Ukraine, the two most Yet Poland’s invigorated civil society networks prominent leaders and former allies of the Orange did not wilt. Instead, they continued their strug- Revolution have been locked in an increasingly gle for independence by maintaining a broad acrimonious battle for power that has helped fuel underground movement. While the govern- a resurgent Communist Party. Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip ment controlled the official sphere, Solidarity Revolution served notice to Central Asia’s leaders remained the legitimate voice of most Poles. This that change was in the air, but early enthusiasm stalemate continued until 1988, when deterio- soon gave way to political infighting. rating economic conditions—coupled with the opening presented by glasnost—led the govern- ment to compromise with Solidarity and avoid Solidarność: the power of a resilient social network renewed working class unrest. As part of the deal, Solidarity and other independent movements Poland’s experience reflects another perspective were relegalized, opposition parties were able to from the spectrum of democratic transitions. In contest some seats in upcoming parliamentary response to the crushing of workers’ strikes in elections, and civil society was allowed to operate 1976, opponents of Communist Party rule estab- freely. The decisive triumph of independent candi- lished the Workers’ Defense Committee to help dates in June 1989 led to a Solidarity-led coalition 1 those repressed by the government. To advance government and the establishment of parliamen- this effort, an underground press was created, tary democracy. Four presidential elections later, helping to carve out the first independent public Poland has doubled its per capita income and is a space of the modern Polish era. This precedent member in good standing in the European Union inspired the formation of other independent and NATO. organizations, with highly differentiated agendas 1 For a more detailed background of Poland’s transition, see Michael Bernhard (1993). 41 T I V E S E V I T A N R E T L A G N I P O L E V E D Social networks in transition resources of the state, and key party posts— to the detriment of the majority. The imbalance There are many reasons why some countries persists because those that benefit are small in experience smoother democratic transitions number, easy to organize, and clear about what than others. However, as the experiences out- they would lose by a more inclusive governing lined above illustrate, one important distinguish- structure. In contrast, the disadvantaged majority ing feature is quality of social networks. These is geographically dispersed, difficult to organize, networks provide the resilient institutional sinew and poorly informed. Moreover, individuals face that holds a reform movement together through real risks in bucking the system, which they must the challenges and pushback that inevitably are weigh against the uncertain benefits they would encountered. Indeed, the relative depth of formal realize from greater pluralism. The result is an and informal social networks is demonstrably increasingly entrenched elite minority with ever instrumental in the relatively successful demo- greater resources to maintain their hold on power. cratic transitions of the Baltic states, Benin, Chile, Overcoming this imbalance requires organizing Mongolia, South Africa, and Central Europe more and educating this majority, then mobilizing it generally. By contrast, the comparative scarcity for collective action. Establishing networks of of robust social networks is one of the factors associations, civic groups, chambers of com- underlying the faltering experiences of Armenia, merce, labor unions, and other citizen groups can Ecuador, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Russia, and do just that. Networks build connections among Central Asia, among others. numerous individuals and small groups, greatly accelerating access to information. This informa- And pushback is a common feature of democratic tion, in turn, empowers individuals by ending their transitions. Fifty-five percent of all contemporary isolation and showing that their grievances are democratizers have experienced at least one widely shared. episode of backsliding. A third of these revert, at least temporarily, to autocracy—and the associ-