Market Reform Regimes, Elite Defections, and Political Opposition in the Post-Soviet States: Evidence from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan
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MARKET REFORM REGIMES, ELITE DEFECTIONS, AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN THE POST-SOVIET STATES: EVIDENCE FROM BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN, AND KYRGYZSTAN Barbara Junisbai Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science, Indiana University December 2009 UMI Number: 3390277 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI 3390277 Copyright 2010 by ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Doctoral Committee ____________________________________ Jack Bielasiak, Ph.D. ____________________________________ Regina Smyth, Ph.D. ____________________________________ Henry Hale, Ph.D. ____________________________________ William Fierman, Ph.D. December 1, 2009 ii © 2009 Barbara Junisbai ALL RIGHTS RESERVED iii DEDICATION In loving memory of Cecilia Iniguez (1973-2006), who shared girlhood secrets and dreams and knew things about me that I have long since forgotten. I miss you. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like first to express my sincere gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee, who challenged me to find the larger implications of a research agenda that was at first narrowly cast, who with critical and appreciative eyes read through drafts of manuscripts that grew out of my field research, and who encouraged me to apply widely for fellowships and present my work at conferences and workshops. My chair, Jack Bielasiak, reminded me to make clear and grounded connections between the micro- and macro-levels of my argument and gave honest advice about too many important matters to recount. William Fierman, who taught me almost everything I know about the Soviet successor states, pushed me to seek a fair balance between empirical accuracy and theoretical stylization. Regina Smyth encouraged me to state my argument concisely and up front and to clearly distinguish my work from that of other scholars. Henry Hale provided much-needed encouragement and faith in me throughout the dissertation process and changed my view of the dissertation from the endpoint of a graduate career to the beginning of an intellectual life. All of the professors from whom I took courses and with whom I worked during my six years at Indiana University contributed to my approach to research and my conception of political science. Robert Rohrschneider and Sumit Ganguly asked hard questions about causal mechanisms and showed me the usefulness of diagramming relationships and processes. Jerry Wright inspired me to meticulously collect as much data as I could get my hands on. Jeff Isaac taught me to conceive of political science as driven by ideas as much as by evidence. Scott Long and Patricia McManus taught me to keep immaculate research logs and to create tables that tell a story. Clem Brooks motivated me to seek novel explanations and worry less about finding “the” answer and more about making a compelling argument. v Last but not least, I am deeply indebted to Yvette Alex-Assensoh and Marjorie Randall Hershey, who did much to broaden my intellectual interests and whose quiet confidence in me did much to help me gain confidence in myself. Their receptiveness to my research questions, their willingness to provide much-needed advice, and the examples they set as strong scholars and mothers did more to prevent me from giving up on graduate school than they might realize. Dissertation fieldwork in Kazakhstan was made possible by a grant from the Title VIII Research Scholar Program, which is funded by the U.S. State Department, Program for Research and Training on Eastern Europe and the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (Title VIII) and administered by American Councils for International Education: ACTR/ACCELS. Fieldwork in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan was funded by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad fellowship. In Kazakhstan, where my research began, Sabit Zhusupov (1947-2007) set up interviews with elites in the ruling coalition, and a family member of an elite defector to the opposition organized my first interviews with the political opposition and set the wheels in motion for this study. Without their help, I would never have had access to the diverse group of elites in power and in the opposition that I was able to interview. The staff of the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan was friendly and willing to suggest numerous helpful contacts, as well as find time in their busy schedules to be interviewed. The dissertation write-up was funded by a World Politics and Statecraft grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation and from a Mellon Dissertation Write-Up Fellowship from the Russian East European Institute at Indiana University. I also thank the organizers and participants of the 2009 Social Science Research Council dissertation workshop on vi Resources in Eurasia (April 16-18, 2009, held at Georgetown University’s Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies), who gave me the opportunity to present an early version of my argument and provided excellent feedback. I am similarly thankful to Scott Radnitz, who generously shared a draft of his forthcoming article on the colored revolutions with me, and to Alima Bissenova, discussant for the panel on Post-Soviet Political Development in Central Asia of the Association for the Study of Nationalities 2009 World Convention (held at Columbia University, April 22-24, 2009), who reminded me of the critical perception gap separating business defectors and the general public. In writing the dissertation, I tried to incorporate all of their invaluable suggestions; the dissertation is stronger as a result. I have benefited immensely from and am enormously grateful for the support of my family. I thank, from eldest to youngest, Kulyash Zhusupova and the Zhusupov clan, Norma Wallace and the Wallace clan, Nancy Johnson and the Johnson clan, my husband, Azamat Junisbai, and our three loving and patient children, Sanjar, Asiya, and kroshka Alisher. “‘And now,’ cried Max, ‘Let the wild rumpus start!’”1 1 Sendak, Maurice. 1963. Where the Wild Things Are. New York: Harper Row. vii ABSTRACT Barbara Junisbai Market Reform Regimes, Elite Defections, and Political Opposition in the Post-Soviet States: Evidence from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan This dissertation shows how market reforms can inadvertently foster constituencies within the ruling coalition who are willing to publicly oppose post-Soviet autocrats. In two cases of market reforming autocracies, Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan, defectors from the business elite have actively challenged the president, although with varying degrees of success. In Belarus, a contrasting case of market rejecting autocracy, continued economic centralization has preempted the emergence of a class of wealthy business elites (also known as oligarchs or capitalists) who might develop the incentive and capacity to launch a political challenge to the president. Directors of Belarus’s state-owned enterprises are appointed by the president and are thus too dependent upon him to take the risk of engaging in contentious politics. Although small-scale privatization has meant the slow development of private business, small and medium business owners (entrepreneurs) similarly refrain from unsanctioned political activity that could risk their livelihoods. This is true even in market reforming Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where entrepreneurs are unlikely candidates for opposition politics. While evidence from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus bolster the conclusions of a growing body of research, I provide a novel causal explanation linking market reforms to political contestation in post-Soviet autocracies. In addition to dispersing economic resources, as others have argued, market reforms engender intra-elite conflict over the allocation of power and wealth, which is skewed in favor of a small group of elites in the president’s inner circle. Intra-elite conflict has forced some business elites into opposition politics, but only after the less risky options of loyalty to the regime and exit have failed. viii _______________________________________ _______________________________________ _______________________________________ _______________________________________ ix TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundations and an Alternative Hypothesis 11 Chapter 3: Research Design, Methodology, and Fieldwork 49 Chapter 4: Patterns and Variation in the Political Opposition 113 Chapter 5: Market Reform and Variation in Elite Defection 169 Chapter 6: Opposition Strengths, Weaknesses, and Strategies 213 Chapter 7: Conclusion 255 References 266 Curriculum Vitae 292 x Chapter 1 Introduction The Puzzle With a few notable exceptions, deep and lasting institutional change conducive to democracy has proven elusive in the former Soviet Union, where autocrats have stayed in power by controlling political participation and restricting political contestation. At the