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Download File Inconsistent Colors The role of Social Movement Organizations in post-Color Revolution states Written by Kaley Hanenkrat Advised by Elise Giuliano Submitted in partial completion of the graduation requirements set forth by the Barnard College Political Science Department Table of Contents Chapter 1 A New Wave Rises ................................................................................. 3 Why Otpor, Kmara, and Pora? ............................................................... 7 Social Movement v. Revolution ............................................................. 9 Thesis Outline ......................................................................................... 12 Chapter 2 Literature Review ................................................................................... 15 Chapter 3 Colorful Democracies or Failed Consolidation? .................................... 23 Kmara - Enough Roses in Georgia ......................................................... 27 Pora - A Time for Orange ....................................................................... 41 Otpor - Resistance and the Bulldozer of Democracy ............................. 53 Chapter 4 Conclusion - Future Applications and Implications ............................... 73 Special thanks to Hannah Dwan for her enthusiastic editing and encouragement. 2 Abstract Over the course of the last decade, Eastern Europe and Central Asia have experienced similar non-violent, pro-democratic social movements led by Social Movement Organizations. In contrast, though, post-social movement states are not equally democratic today. In this essay, I analyze where the SMOs that led three of the Color Revolutions, Kmara, Pora, and Otpor, changed the course of democratization in Georgia, Ukraine, and Serbia, respectively. From this analysis, I conclude that the decision of SMO activists to actively engage with the newly established democratic regime as both opposition and as following a social movement is more beneficial for democratization than passively challenging and more feasible than other means. “To make democracy work, we must be a nation of participants, not simply observers.” - Louis L’Amour Chapter One A New Wave Rises At the end of the 20th century, sweeping changes in the global political environment shook up the status quo as the Soviet Union collapsed and a new era began in Eastern Europe. The region, ruled by authoritarian regimes for decades, faced a great opportunity and responsibility - building democracy. Throughout eastern Europe and central Asia countries began building their first independent governments and the world saw a third wave of democracy rise.1 However, citizens of these new states quickly realized that the transition from an authoritarian empire to an independent democracy is difficult to initiate and maintain. Many of the first democratically elected leaders of these new states did not truly support democratic practices and frequently fell into authoritarian tendencies. From afar, we saw Yugoslavia's President Milosevic brutally suppress opposition to his regime through military force on the streets of Belgrade, Serbia2 and overwhelming evidence that Ukraine's President Kuchma ordered the murder of a popular 1 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 1. 4. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 5. 2 Vejvoda, Ivan. "Civil Society versus Slobodan Milosevic: Serbia 1991-2000." Civil Resistance & Power Politics. 'Ed'. Adam Roberts & Timothy Garton Ash. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. 298. 3 opposition journalist, later found decapitated and buried in a field near the woods outside Kyiv.3 Yet hope for democracy did not die. As the 21st century approached, opposition activists organized in new ways to bring democracy to the region. In Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, activists built non-violent Social Movement Organizations (SMOs), named such things as “Otpor” meaning “Resistance” in Serbian, “Kmara” meaning “Enough” in Georgian, and “Pora” meaning “It is time” in Ukrainian. Bulldozer, Rose, and Orange - these “revolutions” were vibrant in color, massive in size, and changed the world’s understanding of what it takes to bring down a dictator. Leading the movement, though, were primarily young activists who were born behind the Iron Curtain, raised in the instability that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and who unified with the goal of electing democratic governments that were free of corruption. Were these SMOs meant to be both the warriors of democracy and its guardians? In the movements that brought democracy to these states, young people, frequently students, strategized for years to ensure that democracy would finally come. These youth mobilized thousands of people, provided logistical support for protests, and were usually the first wave of protestors in the SMOs they created.4 Frequently, these youth-led SMOs became the umbrella organizations for all opposition organizations in the movement because of their energy, strategy, and attitudes toward creating political change. In the years that have followed, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine have faced many challenges to their democratic integrity internally and externally and activists have responded to these challenges in a spectrum of ways. Sometimes activists in 3 Wilson, Andrew. "Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution' of 2004." Civil Resistance & Power Politics. 'Ed'. Adam Roberts & Timothy Garton Ash. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. 338. 4 Kuzio, Taras. "Civil society, youth and societal mobilization in democratic revolutions." Communist and Post- Communist Studies. 39. (2006): 365-386. 366. 4 civil society overcame these challenges. Other times, the challenges went unanswered and pushed states towards de-democratization. Why have groups who led incredibly similar movements had incredibly different effects on democratization? To answer this question, I explain how Serbia’s Otpor succeeded, Ukraine’s Pora failed, and Georgia’s Kmara never really tried to develop post-Color Revolution democracy. I argue that post-autocracy youth SMOs have a unique potential to influence democratization, unlike other organizations, institutions, or politicians. To develop my argument, I demonstrate how this unique potential can be achieved through a variety of means (with a wide range of success) but ultimately must be used in some manner if democratization is to occur. Through my analysis of Otpor, Kmara, and Pora and their respective states, I have formulated a model for youth organizations’ post-Color Revolution options. The post-Color Revolution actions and developments of Otpor, Kmara, and Pora have fallen under two categories - NGO and political party - and each have subcategories as follows: A. NGO 1. Elections Monitoring 2. Activist Training 3. Think Tank 4. Political Organizing/Watchdog Organizations 5. Lobbying/Special Interest Groups B. Political party 1. Regime Coalition 2. Opposition Party 3. Ruling Party Post-movement youth organizations can - and often do - divide into the two major categories and develop a variety of these options. Though this list is not exhaustive, it offers the most important examples of what activists can implement. The comparison of the successors of Otpor, Kmara, and Pora and how effective they are at encouraging democratization provides a useful model for 5 what we want other post-democratic social movement societies to create in their government and civil society. Certainly SMOs successor organizations can take on a variety of different roles, split into different organizations with the same roles, or anything in between. My working definitions of each of these options are as follows: Elections Monitoring - Independent organization that observes elections and reports on irregularities in voting procedures. Activist Training - Organization that provides seminars, pamphlets, or other assistance for activists seeking to build their own social movement or just pressure leaders for political reform. Think Tank - Organization that produces public policy generally from a particular perspective or focused around a particular issue. Political Organizing/Watchdog Organization - Organization that takes part in and coordinates any number of popular political activist strategies including voter mobilization, petition writing, canvassing, and organizing protests. Political organizing is heavily influenced by “watchdog organizations” that publicize negative government actions. Lobbying/Interest Groups - Organizations, generally with a specific interest such as environmental or education policy, that meet with politicians and pressure them to champion their causes. Regime Coalition - Forming a political party that is part of the coalition in parliament that supports the ruling regime. Opposition Party - Forming a political party that opposes the ruling regime. Ruling Regime’s Party - Joining the political party of the regime either actively or through political appointment to government offices. As I discuss how these three groups developed and what their successors are doing currently, I will refer to these definitions. Not all of these options have been blatantly pursued by Otpor, Kmara or Pora, but I provide them because there are characteristics of each defined option that 6 have been exhibited in some way. To answer my question, it is important to understand all influences of youth SMOs. Why Otpor, Kmara and Pora? When selecting cases, I chose based on the similarities between the youth SMOs and differences in the political environment
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