Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Regime Change in and the Specter of Coups in the CIS SWP Comments Uwe Halbach / Franz Eder

The developments in Kyrgyzstan differ markedly from the regime changes in Georgia and . Yet the overthrow of ’s regime again raises the question of how “contagious” changes of government are in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The forms of political power that have become established in this region range from “managed democracies” to authoritarian presidential regimes and neo- totalitarian systems. Sovereignty is centered largely in the person of the president, not in the will of the electorate. Since rigged elections were the catalyst for peaceful regime change in Georgia and Ukraine, speculation about the likely next candidate for a “democratic coup” shifted to countries where elections were scheduled and there existed at least the rudiments of a civil society and a politically interested public. The message went out from Tbilisi and Kiev that electoral fraud was a risky business for the powers-that-be in any system that was at least partly pluralistic. President Akayev’s reaction to this message, long before the recent parliamentary elections in his country, showed that he was most unsettled.

First analyses of Georgia’s “Rose Revolu- the opposition, the vitality of civil society, tion” were skeptical about whether it and how readily the population can be would set a precedent. Not even Ukraine mobilized—these factors all vary from coun- was considered a possible next candidate, try to country. The parliamentary elections but developments there showed that held in the spring of 2005 in three states— Georgia did not remain alone. Holidaying Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova—and together in the Carpathians, the new also the way the disturbances in Kyrgyz- Ukrainian president and his Georgian stan diverged from the events in Kiev five counterpart issued a joint statement about months earlier, show that differences can “a new wave of liberation.” But in this be significant. euphoria they overlooked the fact that Tajikistan was ruled out early as a candi- the structural preconditions for peaceful date for regime change. The population was regime change within the CIS differ: the virtually not involved in any political activi- compactness of the ruling elite, the level ties in the lead-up to the elections. Presi- of organization and political maturity of dent Imomali Rakhmonov is firmly in con-

SWP Comments 16 April 2005

1 trol, the opposition—leaderless and dis- tional amendments. The last such referen- united. What is more, the Tajiks associate dum, in 2003, confirmed him in office until concepts such as “change of government” 2005. Before the referendum his position with the terrible experiences of the 1992– had been weakened by a bloody clash 97 civil war. The regime intentionally between security forces and demonstrators exploits this mental connection and the in the southern Aksy region. high degree of depoliticizaton in society. The regime did not recover from this. It thus comes as no surprise that the presi- The ineffectuality of state institutions and dent’s party, the Democratic People’s Party the regime’s increasing lethargy—its in- of Tajikistan, won an overwhelming par- ability to react to crises—further under- liamentary majority of over 80 percent of mined the President’s authority. There are the vote; the degree of electoral manipula- clear parallels here to the final stages of tion is not the issue here. The consolidation the Shevardnadze era in Georgia. The cor- of the regime fitted into the pattern of ruption that had become inherent to the development after the end of the “national system also aroused criticism within the reconciliation” process that was intended ruling elite. Political appointments were to heal the wounds of the country’s civil increasingly made for payment rather than war—initially the Tajik political system was according to competence. This style of a paragon of political pluralism, in which recruitment led to very bad governance— even an Islamic party could share power, and this in the face of the country’s grave but then it gradually devolved into a presi- problems (high foreign debt, poverty, un- dential autocracy so typical of the region. employment, and drug trafficking). The Most attention was directed long in President repeatedly replaced his cabinet advance to the on and senior staff. Most of those ejected February 27 and March 13. The situation found themselves together again in the here was not dissimilar to that in Georgia opposition. Its current leaders—Kurman- and Ukraine—with the president’s period of bek Bakiyev, Feliks Kulov and Roza Otun- office set to expire, dissatisfaction with the bayeva—once held high posts in govern- “Akayev regime” among the elites and in ment and the diplomatic service. Discon- the population, a somewhat more liberal tent in broad sections of the population political climate than in neighboring as well as the business community was states, an opposition attempting to unite, aggravated significantly by the amalgama- and a relatively lively civil society. tion of political and economic power in the “clan.” This core group of the regime, which in addition to members of the presi- The Erosion of the Akayev Regime dential family included close friends and In the first half of the 1990s Kyrgyzstan staff, controlled the most profitable sectors presented itself as a model of “democratic of the economy and increasingly also the development” in Central Asia. It thus most influential media. It is this interlink- distanced itself from neighboring states ing of power and property in all post-Soviet such as Uzbekistan and capitalized on this states that makes regime change through self-portrayal: it became the highest per elections so difficult—and explosive. When capita recipient of Western financial aid in the ruling elite loses office, it must fear not Central Asia, amassing a huge foreign debt only for its political sway but its economic in the process. A brief “parliamentary privileges as well. spring” blossomed in this smallest Central This question caused acrimony at the Asian state. But by 1995 at the latest, Presi- last presidential elections in 2000, when dent Akayev, who had ruled since 1990, had Akayev was only allowed to stand again transformed the state into a presidential thanks to a Supreme Court ruling. The autocracy using referendums and constitu- ruling party pinpointed and eliminated its

SWP Comments 16 April 2005

2 most serious rival, Feliks Kulov, who in lution” à la Kiev and Tbilisi, it missed it by the late 1990s had looked set to overtake a wide margin. The events were no neat the President in terms of popularity—a “,” with disciplined and formality was found to prevent him from nonviolent mass demonstrations and nary standing as a candidate; after the elections a broken pane of glass—looting and street he was charged with abuse of authority battles dominated the picture. But the and sentenced to 10 years in prison, which opposition’s leaders, especially its acting put him out of the running. “security coordinator” Feliks Kulov, were Like the opposition in most post-Soviet surprisingly quick to restore a minimum of states, the Kyrgyz opposition showed con- peace and order to the capital. The gravest siderable weaknesses—it was fragmented, dangers for the success of the coup—the poorly organized, its lineup changed from uprising in the south, acts of violence by election to election, and it was personality- the mob in Bishkek, and the dual-power driven rather than focusing on political scenario between the old and the new par- programs. liament—seemed to have been banished by The beset regime portrayed the oppo- the end of March. sition in the crudest possible way—as But the situation remains tense. The troublemakers who were only out to OSCE has expressed great concern and destabilize the country. A “velvet revolu- appealed to the sense of responsibility of tion” supported by the West in this region, all involved, in Kyrgyzstan and abroad, to so the argument went, would end not in maintain peace in the country. It remains a peaceful change of government, but to be seen to what extent the new leader- in civil war. To strengthen his position, ship will be able to avoid power struggles in Akayev also raised the issue of Kyrgyzstan’s its own ranks in the next few weeks in the geopolitical role in Central Asia. Shortly lead-up to the new presidential elections before the first round of elections he an- called for July. In view of the political and nounced that the U.S. would not be allowed social turmoil in the country, this is a very to station AWACS reconnaissance planes at short time in which to organize trouble-free Ganci air base (Manas airfield) near Bish- elections. kek, while the Russian presence at the Kant Kulov’s resignation from his function as air base would be allowed to expand. This chief of the security services, which are message was directed at Moscow—Kyrgyz- still largely in the hands of Akayev faithful, stan, home to both Russian and Western led to speculation about internal power military bases, saw Russia as the more struggles and the ambitions of Kulov, who reliable partner because it did not promote was freed from jail on March 24. Will he “democratic coups” in the CIS. really let the interim president Kurmanbek Bakiyev assume political leadership of “postrevolutionary” Kyrgyzstan? Or is his The Coup departure from the interim government a In view of the above-mentioned weaknesses tactical move to gain leverage in advance of the opposition and the initial concen- of the presidential elections? tration of its in the southern prov- In a country where politics is strongly inces of Osh and Jalal-Abad, it came as a shaped by regional loyalties and clan surprise that the anti-regime movement structures, great significance is attached to spread and was soon mounting demonstra- political figures’ origin. Will leaders of the tions nationwide. On March 24 the regime interim government such as Bakiyev and collapsed virtually overnight, putting up Otunbayeva, both from the south, be able little resistance. Its helplessness astonished to master one of the most important even its critics. But if the opposition’s goal political tasks in Kyrgyzstan—reconciling in the coup in Bishkek was a “velvet revo- the south with the north? Bakiyev’s fol-

SWP Comments 16 April 2005

3 lowers were limited initially to his home The Regional Context region of Jalal-Abad, where the most violent Some of the unsolved challenges faced by demonstrations took place after the the new political leadership in Bishkek also elections. But as former prime minister, concern other parts of the Central Asian governor of the central Chu Province, and region. This is the case with one of the deputy in the national parliament, he has country’s most obvious structural prob- gained sufficient political influence and lems—its geographic, ethno-demographic, respect at the national level as well. The cultural, economic, and political division same is true of Feliks Kulov, a representa- into four north and three south provinces. tive of the political elite of the north, who It was manifested in the concentration of was long at the center of power and has oppositional activism in the southern prov- since gained nationwide prominence as the incial centers of Jalal-Abad and Osh. The best-known opponent and former prisoner integration of the south into Kyrgyzstan’s of the old regime. It remains to be seen state and nation building has been the un- whether politicians with a strong local fol- fulfilled task of every political leadership lowing like Azimbek Beknazarov, whose in Bishkek. This part of the country with arrest in 2002 sparked off the disturbances its potential for inter-ethnic conflicts (a in the Aksy region, will enter into the post- third of the population here are Uzbeks), Akayev power struggle. its distinctive feeling of being politically An urgent task for Kyrgyzstan’s new disadvantaged by the north, and its eco- leadership is to dispel fears in the Russian- nomic underdevelopment, lies in the and Uzbek-speaking sections of the popu- most critical subregion of Central Asia—the lation about ethno-nationalist tendencies Fergana Valley, where the borders of three within the interim government. The unrest states intertwine. This is also the hotbed of in the south awoke memories of the inter- Islamist opposition activity in the region, ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks which is driven by one particular group— which claimed hundreds of victims in that the international Islamic extremist party part of the country in 1990. A stereotype Hizb ut-Tahrir. This pro-Caliphate move- has arisen that sees Kyrgyz as opponents of ment, which combats the entire political the regime and Uzbeks as supporters of the order in post-Soviet Central Asia, allegedly old order, but in reality Uzbeks also took has three thousand supporters in Kyr- part in the south’s anti-Akayev revolt. gyzstan. It has called for a boycott of the The central challenge for the new leader- elections. ship is the economy. After Tajikistan, But another specter is haunting the Kyrgyzstan has the worst socioeconomic presidential palaces of Central Asia—if the data of the whole region. The political change of government in Bishkek proceeds unrest after the elections, which had ele- more or less peacefully, it will set a most ments of hunger revolts, caused further unwelcome precedent. The counterparts of damage to the economy. Bakiyev is con- toppled President Akayev have no interest sidered competent on the economy. The in a successful “tulip revolution” in their new leadership in Kyrgyzstan, like in neighborhood. Georgia and Ukraine, has the difficult It was here in Central Asia, where a task of distancing itself as far as possible series of elections took place in 2004 and from the corruption and kleptocracy of more are scheduled for 2005, that the the former regime. Accordingly, Bakiyev ruling elites reacted most vehemently to has made the fight against corruption his the shock waves sent out by the “rose revo- main objective. lution” in Georgia. By 1999 at the latest, the Central Asian autocrats had made out Islamist subversives as their main political opponents, but since November 2003 the

SWP Comments 16 April 2005

4 “export of rose revolutions” has become ence” against the “illegitimate” govern- another political threat. The rulers have ment. A court then ordered the dissolution now taken on the type of argument of the party. The Kazakh authorities also cultivated in Russia: regime change like took action against international NGOs—in that in Georgia, so the line goes, was a tool particular the OSI. But Kazakhstan is not of the West’s geopolitical expansion into considered a candidate for regime change; the former Soviet sphere of influence. despite growing criticism from within the Uzbekistan, which like Turkmenistan is a political and economic elites, Nursultan repressive Central Asian presidential autoc- Nazarbayev’s apparatus seems to have racy par excellence, provided the earliest political life in the country still under con- example of preventative measures by prun- trol. The dissatisfaction of the population ing the suspected buds of a “rose revolu- also does not compare with that in Georgia tion.” The authorities introduced harsh and Kyrgyzstan before the respective restrictions against international non- change of government; after all, resource- government organizations. In April 2004 rich Kazakhstan is the most successful state the Open Society Institute (OSI) in Tash- in the region in economic terms. But pres- kent, financed by the Soros Foundation, idential elections are to be held in 2006, was forced to close. In January 2005 Presi- possibly even in December 2005, and this dent Islam Karimov spoke before parlia- increasingly raises the question of Nazar- ment and warned of the destructive in- bayev’s successor. fluence of foreign ideologies and NGOs, It was the Kyrgyz president who reacted which served as tools of foreign powers. with the angriest rhetoric. In an article in In Kazakhstan in November 2003 par- the Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya gazeta liamentary deputies demanded a new in June 2004, Akayev compared foreign electoral law and pointed to the dangers democratization policies with “Bolshevist that would result from electoral fraud— export of revolution.” In September he and which in Georgia had led to the coup. warned in a speech in Moscow that the The elections of September 2004 were further spread of “rose revolution tech- then indeed suspected of having been nologies” was aimed at destabilizing rigged. Western observers were relatively the CIS. The closer the elections came in restrained in their assessment of this Kyrgyzstan, the more radically and one- electoral fraud, but some voices within sidedly he depicted the opposition as a the Kazakh political elite condemned it product of a foreign conspiracy that would sharply—the incumbent chairman of the lead to national disaster. parliament, Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, spoke of a massive violation of voters’ rights. This statement was of great significance Foreign Interference? because Tuyakbai was also co-president of The foreign connections of civil society the governing party which won at the polls; organizations, in particular the Soros after this he went over to the opposition. Foundation, which since 1993 has main- Representatives of one of the country’s tained a network of OSI branches in the leading opposition parties, “Democratic states of the CIS, were cause for commen- Choice of Kazakhstan,” appeared side by tators in Moscow and other capitals in side with Viktor Yushchenko’s supporters the region to depict “democratic regime during the Ukrainian election campaign. change” as something launched from After their return to Kazakhstan and under abroad. The difference between inter- the impression of the “,” national foundations and organizations on December 11, 2004, the party called supporting processes of democratization upon “all healthy forces in society” to take on the one hand, and direct interference “resolute action, including civil disobedi- in favor of regime change on the other,

SWP Comments 16 April 2005

5 was sometimes intentionally obscured. dently did not merit foreign support. For example, commentators regarded The consequences of this calculation were statements by U.S. ambassador Richard summed up by the Azeri commentator Ali Miles encouraging the Georgian opposition Abasov: “The West’s recognition of the as exerting direct influence there. Before presidential election results in Azerbaijan his posting in Georgia, Miles was Chief of made it easy for the government to smash Mission to Belgrade, where he was said to all opposition critical of the system.” Dis- have had close connections with the anti- sidents in Armenia also increasingly com- Milošević opposition. On November 20, plain about what they see as the inconsis- 2003, America for the first time publicly tent reaction of the “West” (particularly accused a post-Soviet state of rigging elec- the EU) to antidemocratic steps by their tions, thus precipitating the fall of the government. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, too, Shevardnadze regime. In Kyrgyzstan, too, the West continued to support Akayev’s statements by U.S. ambassador Stephen “policies of reform” long after they had Young warning President Akayev not to been recognized domestically as empty extend his period of office—due to expire rhetoric. under the constitution in 2005—were interpreted as Western interference in the internal affairs of the country. “Geopoliticization” of The influence attributed to the Soros Domestic Developments Foundation in particular is long-term and Following the events in Georgia and complex. Specifically, it aims to provide Ukraine, pundits in the CIS predicted a information about elections and strengthen new phase of political transformation in civil society. Youth and student organiza- post-Soviet Eurasia, a new period of quali- tions such as Kmara (“Enough!”) and Pora tative change both within states and in (“It’s Time!”) were among the foreign- their relations to each other. Some saw two sponsored forces to challenge the rigged camps emerging in the CIS—one of “revo- election results in Georgia and Ukraine. lutionary Westernizers” and one of Russian- They are modeled on the Serbian student leaning “indigenous conservatives.” If this movement . In Kyrgyzstan youth were accurate, a range of regional organi- movements such as KelKel were formed, zations in post-Soviet Eurasia would be which maintained relations with their affected. A change of course in Kyrgyzstan’s counterparts in Georgia and Ukraine. foreign policy would affect regional insti- No recognizable pattern has yet emerged tutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation in Western reactions to regime change in Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Orga- the CIS region. In the fall of 2003 the West nization, the Central Asian Cooperation Organi- supported the change of government in zation and the Eurasian Economic Community. Georgia; but it was very reticent to criticize Kyrgyzstan is a member of all of these over- the dynastic transfer of power within the lapping forums for economic and security Aliyev family in Azerbaijan, which took cooperation. The change of government in place against the background of electoral Ukraine has already called into question fraud. In view of this, the ruling elites of the existence of a regional structure par- the CIS came to the conclusion that the ticularly fostered by Russia—the Single Eco- West only aids regime change where there nomic Space—which Russia, Kazakhstan, is a coherent, organized and articulate Ukraine, and Belarus are involved in. To opposition, when support for it in society is date, however, the interim government in recognizably broad, and when the regime Kyrgyzstan has indicated continuity in its is unmistakably decrepit. In Azerbaijan, foreign policy. The new foreign minister one could thus conjecture, the opposition’s Roza Otunbayeva was ambassador to Wash- alternative to “stability under Aliyev” evi- ington and London, and UN representative

SWP Comments 16 April 2005

6 in Georgia during the “rose revolution”; as interests in CIS countries were a strategic such she has diplomatic contacts to the priority. Russia would therefore “react very West and will continue to cultivate them; sharply to the export of revolutions to the but a one-sided pro-Western course in- CIS countries.” In commentaries on the volving a turn away from Russia is not to change of government in Ukraine, Russia be expected of the new leadership. presented itself as a status quo power in the Nevertheless, since the diplomatic former Soviet sphere of influence. Some debacle in Ukraine and the coup in Kyrgyz- analysts compare this stance with the role stan, a sense of disillusionment has been of czarist Russia in the Holy Alliance in the growing in Russia regarding its own lead- first half of the nineteenth century when ing role in the CIS region. Under the in- conservative Russia was at the forefront of fluence of Washington—so the conservative the European monarchies in combating the CIS camp fears—new regional structures “revolutionary plague of 1848.” with a definite pro-Western orientation In the case of Kyrgyzstan, Russia reacted could arise, or a conglomerate like GUUAM differently than it did during the Ukrainian (an acronym for Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbe- elections. At a meeting with his Kyrgyz kistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) could be counterpart, Russian foreign minister revived. This was a bloc initiated in 1996 Sergei Lavrov ruled out taking sides in by Georgia and Ukraine, which stood out elections in CIS countries. Shortly before for its rejection of Russian hegemonic the polls opened, Russian officials spoke policies in the post-Soviet region and its with leaders of the Kyrgyz opposition. pro-Western orientation in security These allegedly assured the Russians that matters. President Mikhail Saakashvili the opposition was not pursuing an anti- hopes to relaunch this forum under new Russian course. Russian analysts have also conditions: “It will become an organization learned lessons from the diplomatic of new democratic states on the territory debacle in Ukraine—they increasingly em- of the former Soviet Union.” But Azerbaijan phasize that relations with neighboring and Uzbekistan—which has pulled out of states must take account of the whole the group again—obviously cannot be con- society, not just the ruling elite. sidered “new democratic states”. Even The status quo alliance in the CIS is Georgia’s democratic development ushered opposed by a camp developing under the in by the “rose revolution” is still far from leadership of Georgia, Ukraine, and Mol- consolidated, an assessment shared by dova. Meeting in Chişinău in March, the external observers, Western diplomats in presidents of Georgia and Moldova signed Tbilisi, human rights organizations, and two declarations—one on democratic the Council of Europe. values, the other concerning secessionist regimes supported from abroad, which they termed “black holes in Europe.” Both Russia—A Status Quo Power countries oppose Russia’s role as a mainstay Russia has made particular efforts to for autocratic regimes in the CIS region and exploit the unease among Central Asian supporter of separatism in Transnistria, ruling elites caused by the “rose revolu- Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. tions” in order to strengthen its own stra- The advocates of the status quo rallied tegic position in the region. In January above all around Russia and its criticism of 2005, for example, presidents Putin and the OSCE. From Minsk to Tashkent, ruling Nazarbayev voiced their concern at the elites are growing increasingly frustrated “export of revolutionary technologies” to with the OSCE election monitors in the CIS the CIS region. Speaking at the Council on region. In 2003 the CIS set up its own Foreign Relations in New York, Russia’s election-monitoring body, which proceeded defense minister asserted that Moscow’s to qualify even the most blatant electoral

SWP Comments 16 April 2005

7 farces in the region, for example in Belarus, as “open, free, democratic, and legitimate.” The Russian foreign ministry accused the OSCE of being prejudiced against the post- Soviet region, complaining that the organi- zation restricted its criticism of deficits of democracy to the states of this region and, through its fixation on democracy and human rights, ignored central issues of security policy. But Russian commentaries did not assess the change of government in Bishkek in the same geopolitical terms as they did the earlier events in Georgia and Ukraine. Kon-

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und stantin Zatulin, director of the Russian Politik, 2005 CIS Institute, put it laconically: “There is All rights reserved no anti-Russian conspiracy, not here.”

SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

SWP Comments 16 April 2005

8