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SWP Comments 2005/C 16, April 2005, 8 Pages Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Regime Change in Kyrgyzstan and the Specter of Coups in the CIS SWP Comments Uwe Halbach / Franz Eder The developments in Kyrgyzstan differ markedly from the regime changes in Georgia and Ukraine. Yet the overthrow of Askar Akayev’s regime again raises the question of how “contagious” changes of government are in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The forms of political power that have become established in this region range from “managed democracies” to authoritarian presidential regimes and neo- totalitarian systems. Sovereignty is centered largely in the person of the president, not in the will of the electorate. Since rigged elections were the catalyst for peaceful regime change in Georgia and Ukraine, speculation about the likely next candidate for a “democratic coup” shifted to countries where elections were scheduled and there existed at least the rudiments of a civil society and a politically interested public. The message went out from Tbilisi and Kiev that electoral fraud was a risky business for the powers-that-be in any system that was at least partly pluralistic. President Akayev’s reaction to this message, long before the recent parliamentary elections in his country, showed that he was most unsettled. First analyses of Georgia’s “Rose Revolu- the opposition, the vitality of civil society, tion” were skeptical about whether it and how readily the population can be would set a precedent. Not even Ukraine mobilized—these factors all vary from coun- was considered a possible next candidate, try to country. The parliamentary elections but developments there showed that held in the spring of 2005 in three states— Georgia did not remain alone. Holidaying Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova—and together in the Carpathians, the new also the way the disturbances in Kyrgyz- Ukrainian president and his Georgian stan diverged from the events in Kiev five counterpart issued a joint statement about months earlier, show that differences can “a new wave of liberation.” But in this be significant. euphoria they overlooked the fact that Tajikistan was ruled out early as a candi- the structural preconditions for peaceful date for regime change. The population was regime change within the CIS differ: the virtually not involved in any political activi- compactness of the ruling elite, the level ties in the lead-up to the elections. Presi- of organization and political maturity of dent Imomali Rakhmonov is firmly in con- SWP Comments 16 April 2005 1 trol, the opposition—leaderless and dis- tional amendments. The last such referen- united. What is more, the Tajiks associate dum, in 2003, confirmed him in office until concepts such as “change of government” 2005. Before the referendum his position with the terrible experiences of the 1992– had been weakened by a bloody clash 97 civil war. The regime intentionally between security forces and demonstrators exploits this mental connection and the in the southern Aksy region. high degree of depoliticizaton in society. The regime did not recover from this. It thus comes as no surprise that the presi- The ineffectuality of state institutions and dent’s party, the Democratic People’s Party the regime’s increasing lethargy—its in- of Tajikistan, won an overwhelming par- ability to react to crises—further under- liamentary majority of over 80 percent of mined the President’s authority. There are the vote; the degree of electoral manipula- clear parallels here to the final stages of tion is not the issue here. The consolidation the Shevardnadze era in Georgia. The cor- of the regime fitted into the pattern of ruption that had become inherent to the development after the end of the “national system also aroused criticism within the reconciliation” process that was intended ruling elite. Political appointments were to heal the wounds of the country’s civil increasingly made for payment rather than war—initially the Tajik political system was according to competence. This style of a paragon of political pluralism, in which recruitment led to very bad governance— even an Islamic party could share power, and this in the face of the country’s grave but then it gradually devolved into a presi- problems (high foreign debt, poverty, un- dential autocracy so typical of the region. employment, and drug trafficking). The Most attention was directed long in President repeatedly replaced his cabinet advance to the elections in Kyrgyzstan on and senior staff. Most of those ejected February 27 and March 13. The situation found themselves together again in the here was not dissimilar to that in Georgia opposition. Its current leaders—Kurman- and Ukraine—with the president’s period of bek Bakiyev, Feliks Kulov and Roza Otun- office set to expire, dissatisfaction with the bayeva—once held high posts in govern- “Akayev regime” among the elites and in ment and the diplomatic service. Discon- the population, a somewhat more liberal tent in broad sections of the population political climate than in neighboring as well as the business community was states, an opposition attempting to unite, aggravated significantly by the amalgama- and a relatively lively civil society. tion of political and economic power in the “clan.” This core group of the regime, which in addition to members of the presi- The Erosion of the Akayev Regime dential family included close friends and In the first half of the 1990s Kyrgyzstan staff, controlled the most profitable sectors presented itself as a model of “democratic of the economy and increasingly also the development” in Central Asia. It thus most influential media. It is this interlink- distanced itself from neighboring states ing of power and property in all post-Soviet such as Uzbekistan and capitalized on this states that makes regime change through self-portrayal: it became the highest per elections so difficult—and explosive. When capita recipient of Western financial aid in the ruling elite loses office, it must fear not Central Asia, amassing a huge foreign debt only for its political sway but its economic in the process. A brief “parliamentary privileges as well. spring” blossomed in this smallest Central This question caused acrimony at the Asian state. But by 1995 at the latest, Presi- last presidential elections in 2000, when dent Akayev, who had ruled since 1990, had Akayev was only allowed to stand again transformed the state into a presidential thanks to a Supreme Court ruling. The autocracy using referendums and constitu- ruling party pinpointed and eliminated its SWP Comments 16 April 2005 2 most serious rival, Feliks Kulov, who in lution” à la Kiev and Tbilisi, it missed it by the late 1990s had looked set to overtake a wide margin. The events were no neat the President in terms of popularity—a “tulip revolution,” with disciplined and formality was found to prevent him from nonviolent mass demonstrations and nary standing as a candidate; after the elections a broken pane of glass—looting and street he was charged with abuse of authority battles dominated the picture. But the and sentenced to 10 years in prison, which opposition’s leaders, especially its acting put him out of the running. “security coordinator” Feliks Kulov, were Like the opposition in most post-Soviet surprisingly quick to restore a minimum of states, the Kyrgyz opposition showed con- peace and order to the capital. The gravest siderable weaknesses—it was fragmented, dangers for the success of the coup—the poorly organized, its lineup changed from uprising in the south, acts of violence by election to election, and it was personality- the mob in Bishkek, and the dual-power driven rather than focusing on political scenario between the old and the new par- programs. liament—seemed to have been banished by The beset regime portrayed the oppo- the end of March. sition in the crudest possible way—as But the situation remains tense. The troublemakers who were only out to OSCE has expressed great concern and destabilize the country. A “velvet revolu- appealed to the sense of responsibility of tion” supported by the West in this region, all involved, in Kyrgyzstan and abroad, to so the argument went, would end not in maintain peace in the country. It remains a peaceful change of government, but to be seen to what extent the new leader- in civil war. To strengthen his position, ship will be able to avoid power struggles in Akayev also raised the issue of Kyrgyzstan’s its own ranks in the next few weeks in the geopolitical role in Central Asia. Shortly lead-up to the new presidential elections before the first round of elections he an- called for July. In view of the political and nounced that the U.S. would not be allowed social turmoil in the country, this is a very to station AWACS reconnaissance planes at short time in which to organize trouble-free Ganci air base (Manas airfield) near Bish- elections. kek, while the Russian presence at the Kant Kulov’s resignation from his function as air base would be allowed to expand. This chief of the security services, which are message was directed at Moscow—Kyrgyz- still largely in the hands of Akayev faithful, stan, home to both Russian and Western led to speculation about internal power military bases, saw Russia as the more struggles and the ambitions of Kulov, who reliable partner because it did not promote was freed from jail on March 24. Will he “democratic coups” in the CIS. really let the interim president Kurmanbek Bakiyev assume political leadership of “postrevolutionary” Kyrgyzstan? Or is his The Coup departure from the interim government a In view of the above-mentioned weaknesses tactical move to gain leverage in advance of the opposition and the initial concen- of the presidential elections? tration of its protests in the southern prov- In a country where politics is strongly inces of Osh and Jalal-Abad, it came as a shaped by regional loyalties and clan surprise that the anti-regime movement structures, great significance is attached to spread and was soon mounting demonstra- political figures’ origin.
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