Giulio Douhet and His Critics
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Thomas Hippler. Bombing the People: Giulio Douhet and the Foundations of Air- Power Strategy, 1884-1939. Cambridge Military Histories Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 294 pp. $99.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-107-03794-6. Reviewed by Thomas Keaney Published on H-Diplo (October, 2014) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York) One hundred years ago, in World War I, com‐ study is more than a biography of the individual. batants began initial reconnaissance fights in air‐ It is the richness of intellectual ferment that gives craft barely able to carry a two-man crew. By that this book its importance. time, Italian army officer Giulio Douhet had al‐ The book’s two sections address each of these ready spent a decade writing about warfare be‐ major themes: frst, Douhet and the development coming more about conflicts between nations of his ideas, “Douhet’s Strategic Thought”; and, themselves, not just between the military forces second, the intellectual ferment evident in Italy of those nations. As Thomas Hippler emphasizes, during the time period covered in the book, to Douhet, “a given nation’s morale and political “Douhetism under Discussion.” That division does cohesion” could become a target in warfare (p. not fully describe the focus, however, for while 36). And, with an associated interest in technology Douhet’s strategic thoughts appear in the frst sec‐ and how it changed warfare, he had naturally tion, that section also includes much discussion of moved on to envision the role of aircraft in such the corresponding ideas of his critics, also the sub‐ conflicts. Hippler successfully links these matters ject of the entire book’s second section, a point —the advent of total war and the role of aircraft— that might not be immediately evident in the through an analysis of Douhet’s writings from the book’s title. The book features Douhet, but is real‐ first decade of the century until his death in 1930, ly about Italian strategic thought on airpower detailing the significant changes evident in more generally. Douhet’s perspectives over time on the use of air Hippler has extensively researched Italian forces and their role in warfare. Just as important, sources and archives and that comes through in Hippler introduces the many contrary arguments the extent of his development of Douhet’s ideas that Douhet had to confront, particularly from over time. Apparently there is a lack of material those within his own country and service. This H-Net Reviews on Douhet himself as opposed to what he wrote— sion to a fnal position of declaring air defense im‐ he was a prolific writer—and that brings some possible. At times, Hippler reaches too far in pre‐ difficulties: in his writings, Douhet changed his fo‐ senting contrasts, as when he describes how cus and his mind on many occasions, often within Douhet shifted from a position of pacifism while the same year. Giving details or charting some on his path to a strategy of city bombing. The evi‐ sort of progression of his thoughts on air power, dence he presents is of Douhet’s early advocacy of therefore, poses particular problems for Hippler international laws against warfare or at least in‐ as he must deal with clear contradictions in ternationalizing the use of force (as within the Douhet’s early writings; Hippler at times refers to League of Nations), but the evidence takes the these contradictions as paradoxes, but they do not point further than that. Douhet made such state‐ often deserve that classification. Granted, Douhet ments while at the same time advocating the fur‐ was writing during a period of rapid advances in ther production of bombers and theorizing on the capabilities of aircraft and had to often modi‐ how to conduct offensive warfare, neither of fy his positions, but still, he did not leave a clear which fits within a definition of pacifism. path for historians to follow. Douhet argued very In the concluding part on Douhet’s strategic early on for the acceptability, or inevitably, of tar‐ thoughts, Hippler describes a major debate of the geting civilians and a country’s economic infra‐ time over the priority of achieving command of structure (by whatever means) in future wars, the air or initiating ground attacks. At issue is and by 1915 he specifically introduced aerial whether these would be two separate missions. bombardment as the means in the strategy for An added element, however, and not mentioned which he is best known. But the progression of his by Hippler, was Douhet’s plan to attack enemy air thoughts was not linear, and Hippler is left to ex‐ forces on the ground (destroying nests and eggs in plain some often odd turns. his parlance), thus obviating the need for air com‐ One aspect of Douhet’s theories that Hippler bat as a separate mission. Here and in other addresses is the Italian’s leap into the future in as‐ places in analyzing the evolution of Douhet’s sessing the nature of warfare while remaining thoughts, Hippler does the reader no favor by as‐ grounded in current experience and the lessons suming knowledge of Douhet’s fnal formulations of the First World War. Hippler’s explanation is in his book The Command of the Air (1921; rev. ed. Douhet’s “ahistorical historicism,” which, if I un‐ 1927). Without those fnal formulations as back‐ derstand it properly, describes a process of recog‐ ground, the reader is left with no reliable means nizing historical change but disregarding the im‐ to follow or measure the path of Douhet’s mediate lessons of the past as limited and back‐ thoughts on air power strategy as those ideas ward thinking (p. 75). Such a formulation is used move from aircraft as an auxiliary force to air‐ to define how Douhet’s theories on the use of air‐ craft dominating warfare. A several-page summa‐ craft rested on the promise of technology, not on ry of the key points from The Command of the Air any demonstrated capabilities. would have helped enormously. Hippler provides some themes to guide the These minor criticisms aside, Hippler does reader through the decades of Douhet’s writings, well in capturing and assessing Douhet’s thoughts pointing out the association with Alfred Thayer on warfare, his responses to critics, and his effects Mahan and sea power theory, linking the com‐ on his own country’s air force. By putting Douhet mand of the air with that of the sea, for instance. in the middle of the debates on air power taking Another important trail is how Douhet moved place in Italy in the 1920s, the author draws in from emphasizing air defense as a primary mis‐ very well the competing ideas of Douhet’s critics 2 H-Net Reviews concerning the relative importance of support for one and only touches lightly on a variety of cam‐ ground and naval forces, air to air fghting, and paigns. It does dwell importantly on the question fragility of the civilian population under air at‐ of strategic bombing, here considered attacks not tack. In this regard, Hippler seems certainly cor‐ aimed at surface forces, but at the country’s lead‐ rect in depicting the Italian air force during the ership or “the social, economic and political life of period as the most intellectually productive of any the country” (p. 252). In this respect, Hippler theo‐ country. In this context, Douhet is regarded as a rizes, or at least asks the reader to question the ul‐ player, but not a dominant one, in “the founda‐ timate effects of, air attacks that result in the de‐ tions of air-power strategy” (as stated in Hippler’s capitation of a country’s leadership or a rebellion book’s title) of the time. And, his influence on of the people against their leadership, conditions what that strategy and force became was limited. that might lead to civil war or internal political Finally, as shown in this account, Douhet, though chaos. Dwelling on these implications rightly apparently an ardent Italian fascist, linked none brings the book’s account of Italian debates of the of his theories to that ideology, and vice versa. time into the present, making the arguments ap‐ After Douhet’s death, the future of the Italian plicable to not just major state on state war but air force lay in the hands of his critics, and Hip‐ also to the hybrid forms of conflict now under‐ pler describes as most prominent Armedeo way. The ideas presented on this subject are well Mecozzi, to whom he devotes an entire chapter. worth further examination, as is the book overall. As opposed to Douhet, who was not a pilot, Mecozzi served as a combat pilot in the war and was accomplished in both air to air fghting and in air to ground attacks. This experience left him not at all ahistorical about the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery and the need for what are now termed tactical aircraft, not just bombers. Thus, Mecozzi dealt with tactics and specific capa‐ bilities (and limitations) of aircraft, subjects that were of much less interest to Douhet. Because of his perspectives and ideas, Mecozzi deserves this separate chapter, and Hippler integrates well the areas in which he agreed and disagreed with Douhet. This chapter becomes probably the most important one of the book, as it investigates issues discussed at the time that remain unresolved or are still open to interpretation: division of target‐ ing authority between air and ground forces, val‐ ue of attacks on forces themselves or on their sup‐ porting industries, and the value of targeting civil‐ ian morale.