SPECIAL STUD1 ES

The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm 19 17- 1941

Thomas H. Greei

New Imprint by Office of Air Force Histo ry United States Air Forct Washington, D.C., 198: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Greer, Thomas H. The development of air doctrine in the Army air arm, 1917-1941.

(Special studies) Reprint. Originally published Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955. (USAF historical studies: no. 89) Bibliography: p. 142 Includes index. 1. United States. Army-Aviation-History. 2. Aeronautics, Military- United States-History. 3. Air power. 4. Military art and science-United States-History-20th century. I. Title. 11. Series: Special studies (United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force History) UG633.G73 1986 358.4'00973 85-21378

ISBN 0-912799-25-0

This volume is a reprint of a September 1955 edition original- ly issued by the USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offlce Washington. D.C.20402 FOREWORD yhis monograph recounts the development of air doctrine in the Army air arm from 1917 to 1941. It includes concepts, both strategic and tactical, that emerged during World War I and the period following, up to the entry of the United States into World War 11. The study is based primarily on official Air Force records and upon interviews with officers of the air arm who have been especially associated with air doctrine. It was pre- pared for the USAF Historical Division by Dr. Thomas H. Greer, formerly a member of the Division and presently associate professor of humanities, Michigan State College. A number of changes in, and additions to, the original draft have been made by members of the Historical Division, notably Mr. Robert T. Finney and Dr. Albert F. Simpson. All such changes and addi- tions have been based upon Historical Division studies and data not available to Dr. Greer when he prepared the basic draft. Both the original draft and the final version were edited by personnel of the Division. Like other Historical Division studies, this history is subject to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.

iii

Contents

INTRODUCTION ...... , ...... , .. , .. . , .. . , . , ...... , , ...... , .. . .. , , ...... vii I THE AIR SERVICE IN WORLD WAR I, 1917-1918 ...... 1 Prewar Organization and Concepts 1 American Participation in World War I ...... , ...... , , ...... 3 General concepts of warfare and air employment . . . 3 Over-all air operations, organization, and control ...... 4 Pursuit aviation ...... 7

Bombardment aviation ...... _,... . , _.. .. , , ...... 9 12 12

1926 ...... 14 Diverging Views of the Nature o ...... 14 The War Department view ...... 14 Views of Air Service leaders ...... 15 The Struggle for the Control o er ...... 20 20 21 22 25 Evolving Doctrines of Air Employment 30 The general fun 30 33 36 38 Attack aviation ...... 39 Comparative sum ...... 40 I11 DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR FORCE IDEA, 1926-1935 44 44 44 Successful development of two-engine bombers : the B-9 ...... 45 46 47

and Douhet ...... 48 The employment of airpower ...... 52 Bombardment aviation; the preci escort problem ...... 57 Pursuit aviation .. 60 Attack aviation ...... 66 The Impasse with the Navy Regarding Land-based Bom- bardment ...... 67 Establishment Air Force (1935) ...... 70 IV REFINEMENT AND SUBSTANTIATION OF THE LONG- RANGE BOMBARDMENT CONCEPT, 1935-1939 76 Hemisphere Defense Policy as a Factor in Strat cepts and Air Doctrine ...... 76 Elaboration of Air Theory at the Air Corps Tactical School 77 The nature of war and the employment of air 77 Bombardment aviation ...... 80 Pursuit aviation ...... , ...... 83 Attack aviation ...... 87 The 'Crucial Fight for Production and Development of the Long-range Bomber ...... 89 Bomber program related to 89 Andrews presses for exclusive procurement of four- engine bombers , . .. . , . . ,. , ...... 91 development of the bomber ...... 93 The General Stail b 94 100 The Influence of Foreign Wars upon Americ 101 102 ...... 102 Spain ...... , ...... , ...... 102

Munich ...... , ...... , ...... I...... I..,,....,...... ,,.. 103 Adjustments in Air Organization ...... 103 V PREPARATION OF AIR DOCTRINE FOR WORLD WAR 11, 1939-1941 ...... 107 General Influence of the European War upon the Theory and Position of Airpower ...... 107 Tactical Lessons from the Air War Abroad ...... 108 Final Shaping of Air Doctrines on the Eve of Ame Involvement , ...... , , ...... 110 Purpose and nature of warfare ...... 110 The role and employment of airpower in war ...... 111 Bombardment aviation ...... 115 Pursuit aviation ...... 120 Attack and light bombardment aviation ...... 121 Blueprint for action: AWPD/l ...... 123 Establishment of Army Air Forces (1941) ...... 126 VI CONCLUSIONS ...... 128 FOOTNOTES ...... 131 BIBLIOGRAP 142 APPENDIX 1. Organizational Charts 144 2. Redesignations- of the Army Air Arm, 1907-1942 ...... 149 INDEX ...... 151

vf' INTRODUCTION whenthe debacle at Pearl Harbor thrust The history of civilized mankind shows the United States into a war for survival, us but three.. . revolutionary nlilitary in- the nation marshalled its forces on land ventions, or discoveries: discipline, gun- and sea and in the air. And although land, powder, and the airplane . . . The airplane, sea, and air forces all played vital roles in for the first time in the long and bloody securing the triumph, the part of the air history of human conflict, has given tq warfare the means of striking, not only arm was unique. For the first time in the at the army or navy of the opponent, history of war, airpower was employed as a but directly at the seat and source of his major striking force, drastically altering Power-at his citizenry, at his capital city, the course and nature of the struggle and at his industrial, commercial, and political decisively influencing the outcome. centers-without flrst having to overthrow American airpower was the product of the armed forces with which he seeks to men and machines-and something more. protect them.' Like every other kind of military force it depended basically upon ideas-ideas both The story of the development of air doc- of practicable and of potential employment. trine is the story of an unprecedented in- But unlike the time-honored forces of land tellectual achievement. It involves bold and sea, the air force had neither traditions flights of imagination, stern logic, and new nor theories developed over long centuries patterns of thought. It was achieved, as of experience.' Fighting on land dates back most new ideas are achieved, in the face to the dawn of human society; fighting on of fierce opposition compounded of inertia, water must be nearly as ancient. Through vested interest, and rigid thinking. But the tortuous history of warfare, men had when the crucial test came in 1941, Amer- time-lots of it-to devise the weapons, tac- ica had the makings of airpower-both the tics, and strategy of surface combat. Air men and machines and a carefully devel- warfare, on the other hand, came with dra- oped doctrine which could readily be trans- matic suddenness. It presented, within an lated into a plan of military action. That incredibly short time, awesome and revo- the doctrine was sound is affirmed by the lutionary weapons of destruction. Man's results of America's air war. imagination was staggered, or should have But air doctrine is a dynamic thing, and been, by the possibilities of this new me- the ideas of 1941 will not serve the needs dium, and he strove to envision its optimum of the present and future. We must keep use for defense and offense. Here, indeed, searching for and developing ideas in order was a challenge to the power of man to think and plan-and the stakes were high to keep pace with the continuous techno- in terms of national power and survival. logical and strategic changes. In that im- The importance of this new medium as seen portant task we can receive inspiration in the long view of history, has been force- and guidance by examining the doctrinal fully put by a contemporary military ob- steps and missteps of the air arm during server, Major George Fielding Eliot: its formative period, 1917-1941.

CHAPTER 1

THE AIR SERVICE IN WORLD WAR I, 1917-1918

s a preparation for the major role it was tactics, but a great row had already started A to play in World War 11, the American concerning organization. The subject of this air arm found its experience in the first argument was, of course, a matter of mili- World War was brief and limited. That war tary doctrine; for organization relates to had an important bearing, however, upon the control and purposes of any military the development of air doctrine in the in- component. The intimate connection be- terval between wars, because it was the only tween concepts of the use of aviation and actual combat test to which American air- the manner of its organization may clearly men and equipment had been put. Theories be seen in the early debates upon the issue. and practice maneuvers might be worked One might have suspected that agitation out in the light of later trends in technology to make aviation a separate branch would and methods of warfare, but one fact always have begun among the airmen themselves. remained: the only battle test up to 1941 It was from the outside, however, that such had been the action in World War I. Natu- proposals were first made. Rep. James Hay, rally, the conclusions drawn from that chairman of the House Committee on Mili- action gave initial direction to thought tary Affairs, in February 1913 proposed a about the employment of airpower and bill which would have created a separate continued during the following years to ex- Air Corps as one of the line components of ercise a substantial, though declining, in- the Army. But legislative hearings and cor- fluence upon it. respondence relating to the bill showed that PREWAR ORGANIZATION AND CONCEPTS most military men, including flyers, were opposed to it at the time. Assistant Secre- The American air arm was an infant in tary of War Henry S. Breckenridge saw mili- almost every respect when it was called tary aviation as “merely an added means upon to meet the challenge of World War I. of communication, observation and recon- Established by military order as the Avi- naissance,” which “ought to be coordinated ation Section of the Signal Corps in August with and subordinated to the general serv- 1907,* it had not achieved statutory recog- ice of information and not erected into an nition as such until July 1914, shortly be- independent and uncoordinated service.” fore the outbreak of war in Europe.’ Before Breckenridge emphasized the point that and after that time there was agitation to aviation was still in its infancy, that it was raise the air arm to the status of a separate destined for a long time to be an auxiliary branch of the Army, but this movement did of the line, and that its immediate future not meet with success until June 1920.2 In would therefore best be handled by the the prewar years and during the conflict Signal Corps.3 Col. George P. Scriven, Act- itself, American airpower was the “baby” of the Signal Corps. ing Chief Signal OfRcer, upheld this view. The question of the proper place and or- He also stressed the fact that the Signal ganization of the air arm was, in fact, the Corps had the technical information and most discussed problem relating to military qualified personnel to handle aviation aviation during the prewar years. Before needs-in his view aviators were young -~1914 little was heard of types of planes and men without the requisite scientific knowl- *See Appendlx 1. edge and mature judgment.‘ 1 2 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Air Service in World War I Although many flyers resented this sort service and the duties of an officer.” Scriven of reference to them, they appeared virtu- imputed further that there was deliberate ally unanimous in their opposition to the motive behind the friction which had been Hay bill. Outspoken were such future created. Behind their “unmilitary, insubor- leaders of American airpower as Benjamin dinate, and disloyal acts,” he charged, was D. Foulois, Henry H. Arnold, and William a burning ambition to set up a new and Mitchell. Lieutenant Foulois thought it was independent organization for aviation.6 too early for a separate Air Corps, but con- The growing personal bitterness and the ceded that separation was only a matter of rising demand for separation of the air arm time. Lieutenant Arnold felt that since the from the Signal Corps compelled the atten- Signal Corps was doing all it could for avia- tion of Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, tion, the situation was satisfactory. Cap- who in April 1916 directed the General Staff tain Mitchell went so far as to assert that to launch a thorough investigation of the creation of a separate branch would retard matter. At the same time he took special no- the development of aviation as a branch of tice of the impatient attitude of the youth- reconnaissance. In fact, there is only one ful aviators toward their nonflying supe- officer on record in favor of the Hay bill. He riors. Baker contended that what was was Capt. Paul Beck, who insisted that avi- needed was not a separate service, not a ation was not logically a part of the Signal new corps but a new man in command- Corps since sf its four functions, recon- man of mature and severe judgment, who naipnce, Are control, aggressive action, could restrain with discipline the exuber- and transportation, only one pertained to ance of youth.? Secretary Baker apparently signals. He disagreed with the contention had such a man in mind, for in February that separation should be postponed, charg- of the following year he appointed Brig. ing that the longer the Signal Corps con- Gen. George 0. Squier to replace General trolled aeronautics, the smaller would be Scriven as Chief Signal Officer.s the possibility that aviation would ever come into its own.5 The change in commanding generals rep- resented no solution to the underlying prob- The attitude of Captain Beck toward con- lem. secretary Baker himself admitted, in trol by the Signal Corps foreshadowed a the same month in which he ordered the widening rift between the aviators and their investigation of military aeronautics, that nonflying military superiors. This personnel the experience of World War I showed that friction was at least as important as theo- the air arm was no mere auxiliary service. retical differences in bringing about even- Aviation was capable of action as an offen, tual separation of the air arm from the Sig- sive arm, in addition to its function of nal Corps. The basis for the difficulty scouting, carrying messages, and control- seemed to lie in the special restrictions ling gunfire. In the near future, he pre- placed on flying officers with respect to age dicted, the United States would add and marital status. The aviators resented armored and armed planes to its air fleet, such treatment and also chafed under what and this development required the creation they regarded as the apathetic attitude of of a new fighting arm. Specifically, the the Chief Signal Officer and the General Staff toward military aviation. The “high time had come for a change in the relation brass,” for its part, found the aviators too of the Aviation Section to the Army. But outspoken and too indifferent toward con- Secretary Baker made no move for im- ventional military customs. the Chief mediate change, and the initiative once As more left to Congress. In March Signal Offfcer, Brig. Gen. George P. Scriven, was 1916 Representative Charles Lieb of Indiana explained in February 1916, the trouble had already gone beyond earlier proposals stemmed from the “aviation officers. , .un- for a separate aviation branch of the Army, balanced as to grades, young in years and by introducing the first of a long series of service, and deficient in discipline and the bills providing for a wholly autonomous De- proper knowledge of. the customs of the partment of Aviation.9 The Air Service in World War I THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 3 ”he acrimonious debate over organiza- AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN WORLD tion between old-line ground officers and WAR I the impatient flyers reflected. an equally sharp divergence of view with respect to the General concepts of warfare and air em- functions of military aviation. Since, before ployment the United States entrance into World War When America joined the war against the I, American airpower was hardly more than Central Powers in 1917, the divergent points a wish, these differences could not assume of view between the ground and air leaders very concrete form and were, indeed, more were carried from the field of theory to the speculative than factual. The ground officer field of action. This transfer tended to point of view, related to the actual planes strengthen the influence of the ground of- and operations of the Aviation Section be- ficers, because the war had to be fought fore 1917, saw military flying as an exten- with available, not potential weapons, and sion of the traditional means of communi- because the battle on the Western front cation and observation. As one veteran had already become frozen in a complex infantry officer put it thirty-five years later, pattern of ground operations. For the most “We first discovered that airplanes could go part, American forces had to fit into that faster and higher than horses. They took pattern; they had neither the manpower over reconnaissance from the cavalry.1o nor the equipment to alter the fundamental The flying officer, on the other hand, nature of the struggle. It was a struggle of looked beyond the machines at hand toward infantry, trenches, and artillery; of attack the potentialities of airpower. For example, and counterattack; of attrition and rein- between 1910 and 1914 aviators conducted forcement. It is no wonder that the high a number of experiments designed to de- command regarded air operations as an velop the military value .of the airplane. adjunct to the mighty ground forces which Lt. Paul Beck early experimented with had been committed to the mortal and deci- dropping bombs from an aircraft, and by sive combat. October 1911 the first American bombsight During the course of World War I Ameri- and bomb dropping device, invented by can aviators saw the possibilities of a dif- Riley E. Scott, had been tested; Lt. Jacob E. ferent kind of war and a more effective use Fickel experimented with firing a rifle at a of airpower. The great majority of those ground target from an airplane, and Capt. flyers, however, held junior rank in the Charles DeF. Chandler and Lt. Thomas Army, and their voices carried little weight Dew. Milling went a step farther by firing in the superior councils of war. So long as a Lewis machine gun from a plane; aerial air warfare was controlled by ground offi- photographs were taken; and two-way radio cers, there was slight chance that airplanes telegraphy between an airplane and the could be used for other than direct ground ground was demonstrated by Lts. H. A. support. Gen. John J. Pershing, commander Dargue and J. 0. Mauborgne. Speaking also of the AEF, summed up the situation in his some thirty-f ive years later, General Milling memoirs many years afterward. He referred asserted that the pioneer flyers had seen the to the tendency of the fliers to attach “too true role of aviation even while their equip- much importance” to missions behind ment was still in the “egg crate” stage. enemy lines for the purpose of interrupting Milling held that almost from the begin- communications. Pershing asserted that ning the airplane was seen not only as a “this was of secondary importance during means of observation and liaison, but as a the battle, as aviators were then expected striking arm against forces in the fleld and to assist our ground troops. In other words, supporting facilities to the rear. “Our doc- they were to drive off hostile airplanes and trine,” said Milling, one of the earliest men procure far the infantry and artillery in- to fly for the Army, “has been consistent formation concerning the enemy’s move- since 1913, within the limits oi our equip- ments.” Best results were not obtained, he ment .”ll concluded, until aviators were required to 4 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Air Service in World War I serve a while with the infantry in order to admitted frankly that in 1917 the Ameri- get its point of view; coordination of effort can air arm was also improved by assigning selected had no theories of aerial combat, or of any air operations except armed reconnais- ground officers to fly missions with pilots. sance. Despite Billy Mitchell’s eagerness to The general admitted that the primary aim blow up Germany, we hadn’t a single of military aviation was control of the air, bomber. Such things as formation flying, a but the ultimate objective remained tradi- new German development appearing on the Western front that spring, were unknown tional: “Once in command of the air,” to us. . . . Our first projected task was to Pershing wrote, “the enemy’s artillery and provide every two ground divisions with ground troops became the object of their one squadron of aerial reconnaissance and attacks.”12 one balloon company. For the moment, a complete lack of combat experience had When air officers expressed the view that left American aviation behind.14 the true objective of war might be the enemy’s national will and productive ca- By way of contrast, General Arnold pointed pacity, rather than armies in the field, they out that, when the United States entered were sharply corrected by their military World War 11, the air arm “had some solid superiors. When late In the war the Air theories of its own, even if they had been Service, in cooperation with the British, un- tested only in peacetime and by ubservation dertook preparations for independent bomb- on the battle fronts abroad.”lS In 1917 ing missions, the high command took fear- there were notions of airpower, but no co- ful and suspicious notice. Maj. Gen. J. W. herent formulation. And even those notions, McAndrew, Pershing’s chief of staff, accord- although they included the concapt of in- ingly admonished Maj. Gen. Mason M. Pat- dependent striking forces, were geared to rick, chief of Air Service. He approved in the primary idea of aiding the fleld ar- principle the proposal for cooperation with niies.Io the British, but he insisted that the bom- Overall air operations, organization, and bardment units must in any case remain an control integral part of the AEF. McAndrew em- The actual extent of America’s air par- phasized that it was especially important ticipation in World War I is worth noting. that the higher officers in bombardment be The number of personnel engaged overseas impressed with the necessity for concen- rose from a negligible quantity in 1917 tration of effort in each arm and for the to a substantial figure by 11 November coordination of all efforts toward a common 1918: 6,861 Air Service officers and 51,229 tactical end. He directed that these officers men. Forty-five squadrons were serving be warned against any idea of independence, with the various field armies, and to these and that they be taught from the beginning units at the time of the armistice were as- that their efforts must be closely linked signed 767 pilots and 740 airplanes. The with operations of the ground army. It combat record of the Air Service, AEF, in- should be thoroughly understood, McAn- cluded 781 enemy craft shot ’down, 150 drew concluded, that whenever ground op- bombing raids, and a total weight of 275,000 erations reached a crucial point, his head- pounds of bombs dropped.* In addition to quarters would designate the regions to be this record, American flyers performed bombed. Selection of targets during that thousands of individual missions in close time would depend solely upon their im- support of infantry, on reconnaissance, and portance to actual and projected ground for adjustment of artillery fire.*’ operations.Is Organized as integral parts of the larger While individual air officers had strong ground units-divisions, corps, armies, and opinions about what they might do if given the GHQ Reserve-all air elements overseas adequate support and equipment, they did were therefore commanded, in the full sense not go into the war with any substantial *This ngure may be compared with the 20,000,000 poundn dropped during the single “Big Week” (20-25 February 19441 doctrine of airpower. General Arnold later of World War XI. (See The Army Air Forces in World War 11, I11 [Chicago, 19511, 43.) The Air Service in World War I THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 5 of the word, by the leaders of those units. air action in those battles; in both instances Although the subordinate Air Service com- he was-able to concentrate units from vari- manders might suggest missions and were ous ground commands into a powerful responsible for execution of designated air unified force. The first action, at St.-Mihiel operations, final decision rested with the in September 1918, was part of Pershing’s higher unit commanders, who invariably plan to eliminate a German salient so that were ground officers. Even air units in the a subsequent drive might be launched GHQ Reserve were thought of, not as an in- against the enemy’s pivot (the Meuse-Ar- dependent striking force, but as a pool for gonne line). The American First Army was reinforcement of corps and army aviation, assigned the ground task, and Mitchell was as required by the tactical situation.’* This given responsibility for gaining the neces- organization reflected the ground officers’ sary air control. Although the air operation view of the function of the air arm as was controlled by him and the staff of the auxiliary to the land battle. Air Service of the First Army, Mitchell re- The air leaders, who were convinced of ported directly to Pershing (in nearby head- the need’to employ air units as a concen- quarters) and commanded an air force trated force, opposed the permanent assign- much larger than that of the First Army ment of units to the various ground com- alone-he had requested and had received mands. They favored the greatest possible the greatest aeronautical contingent ever concentration of air striking forces, under furnished to a single command up tq that direct control of an air officer, for whatever time. Obtaining such strength had not been missions might be required by superior au- easy, for he had to meet the resistance of thority. It was the Germans who fist ef- ground commanders who wanted the air fectively demonstrated what massed air- units elsewhere. As Mitchell put it, “As is power could do. During their great offensive usual under these conditions, every objec- of March 1918, they concentrated some tion has to be overcome, and every reason 300 aircraft for direct support of the ground has to be advanced as to the necessity for advance. After careful preparation and de- such things as distinguished from the con- tailed practice maneuvers behind their own centration of maximum force in another lines, the German attack planes were place.”2o thrown against Allied positions in the open- Marshall Foch, as well as Pershing, ap- ing days of the assault. Control of the air proved Mitchell’s recommendations, which having been quickly gained, they were able involved French, British, Italian, and to harass the movement of troops with vir- American air units. Some 1,500 aircraft of tually no interference. The tide of advantage various types were brought under his di- was not reversed until the Allies, in turn, rection-corps and army observation, army concentrated a large number of planes in artillery, pursuit, day and night bombard- the sector and by relentless counter-air ment, and reconnaissance. The logistical action regained control. According to and communications problem presented by American observers, the Allies in this case this mighty array was unprecedented, but had demonstrated two fundamentally cor- the job was done, and operational plans rect principles: concentration of force and were drawn up by Mitchell’s staff. The plan the priority of counter-air action.19 was both simple and significant as a fore- General Mitchell was one of the strongest runner of the means for control and em- exponents of those two principles, and as ployment ultimately adopted for American Air Service commander, First Army, he was tactical aviation. It assigned to the troops able to put them into practice in France, only what aviation they needed for their where his work at St.-Mihiel and the Ar- own operations-corps observation squad- gonne were landmarks in the development rons with protecting pursuit. All the rest, of airpower and the doctrine of employ- which constituted the great bulk of the ment. Mitchell’s writings contain full ac- total, was put in a central mass, which was counts of the preparation and execution of assigned to independent counter-air action 6 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Air Service fn World War I until air supremacy was obtained. On the 47 days, the Allied air force also registered day of the St.-Mihiel attack Mitchell posed successes against enemy troop formations. a brigade of mixed bombardment and pur- On one outstanding occasion Mitchell con- suit elements on either side of the German centrated the units of his command, plus salient. The brigades, 500 planes each, al- the bombardment aviation of the French ternated in striking the salient, driving off Air Division (which had been in reserve), and destroying enemy planes, and attack- for attack upon a large enemy force pre- ing all possible surface targets in the sali- paring to make a counter move. The armada ent. The concentration of force gave the proceeded to the target area at 15,000 feet, Americans virtually complete protection and although it was met by all available from German air interference.“ enemy units, resistance to the force proved After the smashing success at St.-Mihiel, futile. The Allied formations lost no planes, Mitchell prepared to participate in the still while destroying 12 of the enemy. They larger ground operation of the Meuse-Ar- dropped 39 tons of bombs, which, when gonne. In this offensive the Americans were added to 30 tons dropped elsewhere in the position of attacking from, rather by other units, established a one-day record than against a salient, but the same tactic for the first World War. The planned Ger- of air concentration was applicable. Mit- man assault did not get off, and Mitchell chell’s plan was to concentrate the mass of declared, “. . . it was indeed the dawn of his bombers and pursuit on the main axis the day when great air forces will be capable of ground advance; by so doing, he would of definitely effecting a ground decision on help clear the way and at the same time the field of battle.”23 protect the main body of troops. As the ar- Mitchell’s experience and success in con- tillery preparation began on the night be- trolling support forces during the World fore the assault, Mitchell launched his War were the basis for his generalizations counter-air action. Night bombers were sent regarding the proper organization of what out against enemy airdromes, rail stations, was later to be called tactical aviation. He supply depots, and communication centers. believed that, for any given operation, At dawn all of his aviation was in the air, available air units should be placed under the bombers striking straight ahead at the control of an Air Service commander. enemy ground elements. The Germans, ac- This air officer, having received the over-all cording to Mitchell, tried to force disper- plan of an operation from the superior com- sion of the Allied pursuit force by attack- mand, would proceed to draw an appropri- ing balloons all along the front. Mitchell, ate air plan which would include provisions however, stuck to his principle of concen- for concentration of units, liaison, signals, tration and followed a plan of employing and the actual attack operation. The air two pursuit groups and one bomber group plan would be coordinated with G-3 and in concert against a given point. Each group G-2 of the Army staffs and would then be nominally had 100 planes, of which about submitted for approval to the commanding 60 were operational at any given time. These general. Having been approved, the plan heavy attacks forced the enemy air to fight, would serve as guide for the plans af each and in these engagements the Allies enjoyed subdivision of aviation; those plans would the advantage until the Germans developed then be put into effect by field orders “in strength in the area and greatly outnum- the usual form” as military operations pro- bered the Allies. Even then, Mitchell re- gre~sed.*~ ported, the system of concentration enabled In describing the organization and con- the Allied units to inflict much more dam- trol of military aviation, Mitchell empha- age than they received.22Mitchell’s tactics sized that it should be handled essentially succeeded in breaking up enemy air forma- as an offensive combat arm. The extraor- tions and thereby gave general protection dinary flexibility of airpower, due to its to the American troops. great speed, was held up as the special fea- In the long battle, which dragged on for ture to be utilized. And, wrote Mitchell, The Air Service in World War Z THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 7 “Like any other military operations, con- the training methods and tactics which the centration of force at the vital point is what Allies had developed in the course of the air counts.” He recognized that this fact was battle with the Germans. not always appreciated by the ground While the British are credited with being troops. Since crucial air combat was often the first to mount guns on observer aircraft fought beyond the front lines to keep the in the early months of the war, the Ger- main enemy air away from Allied troops, mans were the first to construct a purely when individual hostile planes occasionally combat type of plane. Anthony Fokker, broke through the screen and zoomed over after inventing a fixed machine gun syn- the lines, the ground forces gained the im- chronized to fire through the propeller, de- pression of having been abandoned, whereas signed for the Germans a single-seater the reverse was actually true. Mitchell in- fighter, which eliminated the necessity for sisted that concentration of force be main- an observer-gunner and permitted the pilot tained in spite of such criticisms and urged himself to sight and fire by aiming his ship proper indoctrination of the troops in order at the target. Thus in this ancestor of all to avoid unfriendly feeling between ground pursuit planes the speed and maneuvera- and air services.26The views of Mitchell re- bility inherent in a single-seater were com- garding flexibility of airpower, concentra- bined with the superior accuracy of Axed tion of force, and control of aviation by air gunnery. When the Germans assigned their officers were to continue as leading doc- new Fokkers to the front lines in June and trinal principles of the air leaders in the July of 1915, air combat was completely period after 1918. revolutionized. At the same time the Fokker Pursuit aviation pilots began flying in gangs, echeloned for The use of airplanes for liaison purposes their mutual protection, to originate pur- and for close-support observation and re- suit formation tactics.27 connaissance was readily accepted by both With their numerical superiority in air- air and ground officers during World War planes suddenly neutralized by the supe- I. The doctrine supporting such employ- rior performance and armament of the ment was relatively simple and obvious; enemy pursuits, the Allies moved quickly to and though theory and practice developed regain the qualitative advantage. In 1916 harmoniously they became more or less the French outmatched the Fokker with static Such was not the case with the other their Nieuport XXIII; this machine at 110 main branches of military aviation, pursuit, miles per hour could outrun any other on bombardment, and attack. In each of these the front and was equipped with a free-fir- the theory and practice were to prove dy- ing Lewis gun mounted within the pilot’s namic and controversial. During World War reach on the upper wing. The Nieuport I the greatest development took place in XXIII remained the standard Allied fighter pursuit; the cocky little single-seater be- until late 1917. Meanwhile, mass pursuit came the chief focus and symbol of air- action became common on both sides. By power. July 1917 Baron Richthofen was leading The Americans had little to do with origi- his famed “circus” against large units of nating or developing pursuit doctrine dur- Allied fighters. The forces involved in these ing World War I. The first American unit to swirling jousts were approximately of group go into action was the 94th Pursuit Squad- size; the era of the individual pilot, fighting ron, Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker’s famous alone, was ended. The pattern for pursuit “Hat-in-the-Ring” outfit. Since the 94th did equipment, doctrine, and tactics thus be- not enter active combat operations until came established before the end of World 14 April 1918,21iit may be seen that the War I. It was accepted by the American Air total American unit experience was some- Service and remained basically unchanged thing less than seven months when it was until the outbreak of World War 11.28 cut short by the armistice. For the most In their postwar appraisals of the air ex- part, the Air Service took over and applied perience of World War I airmen agreed that 8 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE The Air Service in World War I the first and foremost principle emerging while an instructor in the Air Corps Tacti- from the war was that air supremacy was cal School, criticized details of the forma- the primary aim of an air force. Because tion tactics of World War I, charging that the first duty of pursuit was the destruction they virtually ignored the principle of al- of hostile aircraft and because air superi- titude, provided inadequate security and re- ority was considered prerequisite to all serve force, and allowed the formation other operations it was held that pursuit leader to lose command of his unit when was the most important element of the air he plunged into personal combat.:{’ After force. Pursuit’s ultimate success depended the war there was improvement in forma- upon equipment, selection and training of tion and command tactics, but teamwork pilots, numbers, organization, and tactics.2!) remained paramount. As to equipment, experience had shown Proper tactics for protection of friendly the superiority of the high-powered, single- aircraft and friendly ground troops by pur- seater, which had the requisite characteris- suit was a subject of considerable discussion tics of maximum speed and maneuvera- during the war and immediately thereafter. bility. Although monoplanes, because of Most observation and bombardment crews their higher speed and better visibility had deemed convoy or close protection by a been tried, the biplane for structural rea- flight of pursuit aircraft as the surest form sons was still safest and most reliable. It of air security; as protection against hostile became standard during the war and re- air attack many ground commanders de- mained so for 10 years thereafter. The suc- sired an aerial barrage, in which friendly cessful pilots were those who displayed the aircraft set up a “barrage” over friendly most energy, resourcefulness, sound judg- front lines to serve as a barrier to hostile ment, and offensive spirit. Certain physical aircraft. The Air Service, however, warned characteristics were soon recognized as of against these two defensive roles in which special value. In addition to a generally pursuit had been used in the war. Close sound and youthful physique, pilots re- protection was objected to on the grounds quired steady nerves, sharp eyesight, in- that it was “exchanging the shadow for the stinctive reactions, and excellent coordina- substance,” for such employment deprived tion. The record of World War I confirmed the pursuit airplane of its offensive capa- the importance of individual pilot differ- bility, the advantage of surprise, and the ences: some 200 pilots on both sides de- ability to choose the most favorable time stroyed a majority of all planes shot down. and place for air combat. Aerial barrages The leading aces revealed one outstanding were opposed on the basis that, in addition trait in common: eagerness for combat.3o to the defects of close protection, forces Organization of pilots into flights, squad- would be equally strong everywhere, and, rons, and groups-securing at each level therefore, equally weak everywhere; such the optimum combination of controllability employment of friendly pursuit would ena- and concentrated force-proved an impor- ble enemy airpower to concentrate and tant element in the battle for air suprem- break through at any desired point. More- acy. Intimately associated with organiza- over, it would be economically impossible tion was the problem of combat tactics. It for any nation to provide the number of was fully realized by the end of the Euro- planes that would be required to guarantee pean war that victory would not be achieved immunity of friendly territory from hostile by the exploits of individual aces acting on attack. The Air Service soon decided that their own. Team work became the basis of instead of being employed in close protec- all tactical developments, and this concept tion and aerial barrages pursuit would pro- was carried up through the largest opera- vide indirect protection by means of flexi- tional unit, the group. Pursuit formations ble offensive action, in which pilots could were given special attention as the neces- take full advantage of the elements of sur- sary basis of effective teamwork.:<*Captain prise, position, initiative, and aggressive- Claire L. Chennault, writing later (1933) ness. Given sufficient force, pursuit so used The Air Service in World War Z THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 9 would be able to destroy more enemy these raids in Great Britain was the crea- fighters and give more effective protection tion, shortly thereafter, of the Royal Air to friendly forces than when limited to a Force as a separate service; and within the purely defensive role. Thus, pursuit as- RAF was established an independent force sumed a broad, offensive role in war-and “for direct action against the heart of the was viewed as the basic arm of airpower and German industrial system.” This force was the key to air supremacy.33 given on 5 June 1918 to the command of Bombardment aviation Maj. Gen. Sir Hugh M. Trenchard. Tren- General Mitchell, writing immediately chard became widely recognized as the lead- after World War I, recognized the leading ing prophet and pioneer of strategic avia- role that pursuit had taken in military tion, and he strongly influenced the aviation. At the same time he had great thinking of later air leaders like Mitchell hopes for the development of bombardment, and the Italian D~uhet.~’ and he predicted that its principal value Although the work of Trenchard’s Inde- would lie ultimately in “hitting an enemy’s pendent Air Force (IAF) seems puny by great nerve centers at the very beginning comparison with the bombing figures of of the war so as to paralyze them to the World War 11, the effort was considerable. greatest extent possible.”34 As for actual From 6 June 1918 until the armistice, a lit- experience, the French first conducted in- tle more than five months, the force carried dustrial bombardment in January 1915,”6 550 tons of explosives to enemy targets- and the entire wartime growth of this four times the amount dropped by all types branch of aviation was limited to a period of American units during approximately of less than four years. Bombardment was the same period. Although Trenchard felt divided into two classes, tactical and stra- compelled, as a defensive measure to pro- tegical. Both were considered chiefly as a tect his striking force, to direct one-half means of bringing about defeat of enemy of his bombs against enemy airdromes, he armies in the field; the first involved attack carried the attack to some 50 towns and over the battlefield, and the second called cities. The results, in consequence, were for long-range strikes against centers of spread very thinly. Trenchard explained military supply. For the performance of its that he had faced the alternative of con- mission, strategical aviation was assigned centrating on one or two major targets or specialized day and night bombers as well ranging over a substantial number. He as protecting pursuit planes. Daylight op- chose the latter course because the force erations were in large part armed recon- allotted to him was too small to destroy naissance missions; night operations car- completely even a single large center, while ried the heavy destructive load~.~G the broader attack over a wide area dis- Most of the operations of so-called “stra- turbed civilian morale and required diver- tegic” aviation were not truly strategic op- sion of effort to defensive preparations in erations as later conceived and practiced. all towns within his reach. The physical During World War I bombardment was defi- damage resulting from these raids was al- nitely oriented toward the support of most negligible in any one city, but Tren- ground forces. However, the idea of true chard held that the ratio of the “moral strategic aviation was born during those effect” to material effect stood at twenty to years and evolved into definite theory and one.38 experimental practice. Chiefly because of Regardless of how one might assess the limitations in equipment, operations never relative damage and cost of Trenchard’s advanced beyond the rudimentary stage; program, there is no doubt about the influ- airplanes had not been developed with sum- ence of his theories on the future of air cient capacity to be decisive in a strategic warfare. In taking command of the IAF, sense. Yet the German Zeppelin raids on Trenchard accepted the charge of the Brit- London in 1917 pointed to the strategic ish Secretary of State for Air to undertake potential of airpower. One clear response to the bombing of German industrial centers. 10 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Air Service in World War Z L ”he commander of this special force related group, the Cologne group, and the Saar-Lor- his task to the established job of beating raine-Liuxembourg group. The article fav- the German Army. As he saw it, the IAF ored imqediate attack upon the Saa-r rail would attack “the German Army in Ger- system as the best means, considering the many” at its most vital pointits sources limited planes available, of knocking out of supply. With this object in mind, the last-named group. With increase of the Trenchard decided upon a day and night bombing force, the other three areas would effort against enemy production centers, become the prime In March thereby anticipating the round-the-clock 1918 an Office of Air Intelligence was program of the Allied Combined Bomber created within the G-2 section of GHQ, AEF. Offensive of World War 11. He admitted that This office included a bomb target unit, pro- higher losses would be sustained in day- totype of the organizations which played light attacks but argued that without such such an important role in the strategic op- operations the value of night bombing erations of World War 11. The functions of would be largely neutralized, because the this unit, as described in the Air Service enemy could arrange to work by day and History, included production of items disperse at’ night. Trenchard also pointed to which were to become very familiar in the the superior emciency of day bombing and next great air struggle: general target the dimculties of navigation and target maps, target classification maps, antiair- identiftcation in darkness, While he ex- craft defense maps, rail maps, industrial pected to reduce German military produc- area maps, mosaic books, and objective tion by such tactics, he also hoped to under- folders. Also included were detailed bomb- mine civilian morale and, if possible, the ing programs, records of operations, reports enemy government itself. To this end, he of effects of raids, and prescribed methods organized a group of bombers in England of attack upon various kinds of for attacks directly against Berlin, but the The American air arm had begun to bomb armistice intervened before any such mis- the Rhine cities before the armistice, and sions could be flown. His main forces, based General Mitchell claimed that within an- in the Nancy area of France, were never other year it would have reached the indus- able to fly farther than 350 miles to and trial districts around Essen as well as Ber- from their targets.30 Within the limits of lin itself.43This was no hollow boast. Before his planes’ range and numbers, General the end of the war preparations were well Trenchard broke the trail for strategic doc- advanced for a fairly extensive air offensive trine and practice. by the Allies.44Furthermore, the Americans The Americans, while influenced by had developed a definite and thorough doc- Trenchard, had parallel plans and opera- trine to support strategic bombardment. tions of their own during World War I. The best exposition of this doctrine may be From the beginning of their effort in 1917, found in a document prepared during the at least some of the Air Service leaders had war by Lt. Col. Edgar S. Gorrell, a their eye upon industrial bombing as the paper described later by Maj, Gen. Lau- most fruitful use of airp~wer.~OIn keeping rence S. Kuter as the “earliest, clearest and with this, general plans for night bombard- least known statement of the American con- ment, chiefly against industrial targets, had ception of air power. . . .”45 While in charge been laia down as early as August 1917. of the technical section of the Air Service, Although training of special night bombing AEF, Gorrell, in trying to anticipate the squadrons did not commence until June needs of the Air Service, for bombardment, 1918, studies had already been prepared to undertook a careful study of the bombing determine the critical enemy industrial situation and its possibilities. These initial centers and target systems. An Air Service efforts were to prove a useful start for him, bulletin of 9 April 1918 defined the four for on 3 December 1917 Gorrell was placed principal areas within bombing range: the at the head of the Strategical Aviation Mannheim-Ludwigshaven group, the Main Branch of the Air Service in the Zone of The Air Service in World War Z THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 11 Advance, AEF. He was now responsible for rowed for frequent use in the arguments drawing plans for employment of the stra- heard many years later at the Air Corps tegic force which would one day be availa- Tactical ble. In this task he was aided by several The strategical proposal established four assistants, including W/C Spencer Grey of main groups of targets. Three of these were the Royal Naval Air Service. Commander identical with those set forth in the Air Grey, regarded by Gorrell as the “world’s Service bulletin of 9 April 1918, referred to greatest authority on air bombing,” and above: * Mannheim-Ludwigshaven, Cologne, other British experts, who had participated and the Saar valley. The Main group was in bombardment missions, gave Gorrell the not specified although Frankfort, the prin- benefit of their combat experience. The re- cipal target on the Main, was assigned in sulting proposal for strategic operations the Gorrell plan to the Mannheim-Lud- was submitted to the Chief of the Air Serv- wigshaven group. In addition, in conform- ice late in 1917 and was approved by him ance with the target division adopted by as a guide for aerial preparation^.^^ British experts, the Gorrell plan specified a The CSorrell plan was a truly striking fore- Diisseldorf group.l* Gorrell agreed with runner of the doctrine which matured years Trenchard on the importance of combined later in the Air Corps Tactical School. The day and night operations against these author started with the observation that areas. He passed over the various arguments ground warfare had reached a stalemate for and against each method, insisting that and that some new mews of attacking the only by continuous attacks could the Ger- enemy had to be found in order to achieve mans be deprived of rest and hindered in victory. He pointed out that both the Allies making necessary repairs. In the beginning, and the Germans had begun to see the pos- Gorrell allowed, the Allies should use what- sibilities of aerial bombardment and that ever type of bombing equipment they had, the enemy was reportedly far ahead in but ultimately, round-the-clock operations actual preparations for such a campaign. would be The plan did not fol- Gorrell insisted that the Allies must there- low Trenchard’s concept of widely spread, fore adopt a bombardment project at once light attacks. It proposed, rather, that all and carry it into effect at the earliest pos- available planes be concentrated upon a sible moment. So imminent did this new single target each day, with the aim of its turn in warfare appear to Gorrell that he complete destruction. Gorrell believed that favored immediate action, “in order that we such tactics would result in the maximum may not only wreck Germany’s manufac- damage, both moral and physical, to the turing centers but wreck them more com- enemy. He thought that in face of such an pletely than she will wreck our’s next year.” assault the defenses would be over- While recognizing the importance of tac- whelmed; the “manufacturing works would tical bombing, the principles of which were be wrecked and the morale of the workmen well understood, he went on to plead the would be shattered.”60Here was a prophecy necessity for “strategic bombing against even more accurate than Trenchard’s of the commercial centers and lines of communi- Allied saturation attacks of 1944 and 1945. cations, with a view to causing the cessation It is necessary to observe, of course, that of supplies to the German front.” The way the Gorrell idea did not materialize during to stop German shells and planes at the World War I. This was not for lack of spe- front, declared Gorrell in anticipation of a cific tactical plans, for the proposal contem- point which was to echo down through the plated using the British technique of apply- years, was to destroy the producing fac- ing the principle of mass by bombing in tories. An army could be compared to a groups and combinations of groups. On 5 drill; the point would continue to bore only February 1918 Colonel Gorrell was pro- if the shank remained strong. If the shank moted to the position of Air Service officer (the supporting national effort) be broken, of G-3, GHQ, AEF; Col. A. Monell became the drill would fail. This metaphor was bor- Wee above, p. 10. 12 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Air Service in World War I his successor as chief of strategic aviaeon. of aviation and to provide squadrons or This change of personnel may have had groups with armored airplanes provided some influence on the failure of the plan with machine guns and small bombs for to become operative, but looking back a few just such work against ground objec- months after the armistice, Colonel Gorrell tives. , . .”62 General Mitchell, his imagina- correctly discerned the two more funda- tion quickly fired by what he saw in the mental reasons: the failure of American possibilities of attack aviation, was even aircraft production to measure up to the more enthusiastic. He extended the list of forecasts of 1917, and the opposition of likely targets to include enemy transport GHQ to any substantial strategic diversion. (both land and sea) and armored vehicles. Symptomatic of the latter attitude was the He proposed at the close of hostilities the step taken in the summer of 1918 to change organization of some regular units of at- the name of the Strategical Aviation Branch tack aviation as soon as new equipment to GHQ Air Service Reserve. This was done, could be completed and tested. The new it was explained, to correct the impression equipment, as visualized by Mitchell, would that the organization was not entirely co- be armored and designed for low-attitude ordinated and synchronized with the whole work-“They are almost flying tanks,” he AEF.51Gorrell’s theories were destined to lie e~plained.~~Thus, attack aviation was born dormant in the Army of postwar years; it of World War I, with substantial promise was not until the eve of the next World War of future development. In the interval be- that they emerged again, in slightly differ- tween world wars, the realization of that ent form, to win at last the blessing and promise was to prove disappointing, when support of the General Staff .* the problem of attack aviation became Attack aviation snarled in controversy, technical dif€iculties, Observation, pursuit, and bombardment and neglect. developed as distinct operations, using spe- Air plans during the armistice cialized types of aircraft, during the course The state of general development of of World War I. Not so with attack avia- American aviation resulting from World tion-the youngest of the principal War I may be seen in the of3cial branches of America’s air arm. In the clos- plans of the AEF immediately after ing months of combat the concept of attack 11 November 1918. In the event of resump- operations emerged in the Air Service (as it tion of hostilities, the Air Service was as- had earlier done in the German air arm), signed the general missions of preventing but the missions actually flown were inci- enemy air observation, conducting recon- dental to the normal activities of pursuit, naissance against the enemy, and hindering bombardment, and (rarely) observation air- the enemy’s concentration of troops and craft. The usual targets were related to supplies. The latter mission was to be counter-air action-planes on the ground, achieved in part by day bombardment of airdromes, and other light installations. the prihcipal German transportation hubs, The Allies did not develop a special-pur- supply dumps, and troop cantonments, to pose aircraft for such missions; the Ger- a depth of twenty-five kilometers (about mans, on the other hand, recognized the fifteen miles); night bombers would strike need early, and in 1917 developed a Junker into rear areas against strategic points, rail type especially suited to strafing. By the centers, military parks, and airdrome^.^* end of the war the Americans were ready It seems clear that by the time of the to follow Germany’s lead. In his Anal re- armistice, American air war plans were still port, General Patrick, Chief of Air Serv- oriented toward the support of ground ice, AEF, declared that direct attacks on troops, but they rested on the idea of con- ground forces from the air had shown a centration of force and counter-air opera- most demoralizing effect. “It will be well,” tions as the most effective means of render- he-- concluded, “to specialize in this branch ing such support. At least in the minds of *See Chapter V for this development. pioneer thinkers like General Mitchell, The Air Service in World War I THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 18 there was room, too, for novel and experi- behind the German lines at Metz. This mental operations-some in connection anticipation /of things to come was accom- with the ground battle and others quite panied by other, more radical notions. apart from it. According to Mitchell’s diary, Mitchell made plans for burning German General Pershing before the armistice ap- fields and forests by means of incendiary proved his proposal to use parachute troops bombs and for wiping out livestock with against the enemy. Mitchell undertook de- tailed plans for the operation, which in- poison gas. “I was sure that if the war volved the use of a large force of bombers, lasted, air power would decide it,” con- enough to drop a full division of infantry cluded Mitchell some years later.55 CHAPTER 2

THE HEROIC AGE OF DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT, 1919-1 926

ROM THE POINT of view of air leaders this matter the military and naval high F like General Mitchell, the armistice of commands accepted the experience of 1918 was not entirely a blessing, since it de- World War I as a prototype for modern prived them of the opportunity to demon- wars, while the air leaders tended to dis- strate what airpower could do. They felt, count that experience and to see future in a sense, cheated by fate, for the conven- conflicts in terms of the potentialities un- tional ideas by which the war had been veiled by the war. Even if it is only a truism fought and won continued to dominate that each new war starts where the pre- military thinking in the postwar years. ceding one leaves off, most regular Army Given a little more time, the air officers and Navy officers were content to accept it. might have validated their new doctrines in This view naturally found its final expres- the test of battle. As it turned out, they sion in the highest ranks, where the air could always be labelled theorists whose arm had virtually no representation; the ideas had never been proved by experience. War Department General Staff personified Nevertheless, men like Mitchell were brim- the conservative, ground-oriented concept ming with confidence and enthusiasm when of war. It became a symbol-and to the air hostilities ended. They were ready to send leaders a target-in the running fight over forth their pronouncements of doctrine and military doctrine. were hopeful that airpower would find a The War Department view new and powerful position in the organi- The man above the General Staff, Sec- zation of national defense. The air leaders retary of War Newton D. Baker, laid down knew that there would be staunch opposi- the conservative doctrine in his Annual Re- tion to this from high places in the Army port for the year 1919. In discussing the and Navy, but they were induced by their aerial bombing effort of the World War, own zeal to believe that the doubters would Baker not only discounted the results but be converted. By painful experience they clearly stigmatized the principle of attack- were to learn how tough that opposition ing civilian areas. He asserted that the loss could be. Mitchell, the most outspoken of life and property from such raids had no advocate, was broken in 1925,* and the appreciable effect upon the war-making advance guard of airpower retreated in power of the nations engaged and that such disillusion to more moderate ground. attacks “constituted an abandonment of the time-honored practice among civilized DIVERGING VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF WAR: peoples of restricting bombardment to forti- THE GENERAL STAFF AND THE AIR fied places or to places from which the civil- PROPHETS ian population had an opportunity to be The differences in viewpoint regarding removed.” Baker sought to blame such the capabilities and functions of the air methods solely upon the former enemy and arm rested upon essential and sincere dif- to suggest that the nature of war, at least ferences regarding the nature of war. In for civilized peoples, forbade them: The practice was a part of the ruthlessness *Mitehill was convicted by court-martial, 17 December 1925 on charges of unbecoming conduct (Article 95). HI8 sentenci with which the Central Empires sought to Involved suspension from duty for five years; Mitchell re- signed from the Army on 27 January 1916. terrify England and France into submis- 14 The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 15 gion. Instead it may be said that the will- wassso widespread and intense that it had ingness of the enemy casually to slaughter a poteflt bearing upon the development of women and children, and to destroy prop- military doctrine. erty of no military value or use. demon- strated to England and France the neces- Views of Air Service leaders sity of beating so brutal a foe, and it is Although the air prophets rejected the most likely that history will record these static view of the nature of war suggested manifqstations of inhumanity as the most powerful aids to recruitment in the nations by Secretary Baker, most of them expressed against which they were made.1 relatively moderate views about the changes imposed by the air weapon. Testifying be- Baker went on to conclude from bombard- fore a congressional committee in 1919, ment casualty figures that air attack on Maj. Benjamin Foulois took issue with the personnel was relatively ineffective during assertion that only small damage had been the war and that by far the most useful infiicted by Air Service bombs during the operation of airplanes had been for obser- war. Stating that results were good in terms vation and Are control. Thus, from the of the equipment available, he pointed to standpoint of efficiency as well as the “most the future and predicted that air fleets elemental ethical and humanitarian would be locked in battle for control of the grounds,” there was no place for strategic sky. The General Staff, charged Foulois, bombardment in modern war.2 was responsible for the lagging development After the mass bombings of World War of military aviation, whose action in war 11, one mightalook back upon such a view should be primarily offensive. But this as extremely naive. But there is no doubt doughty champion of airpower remained ’ that Baker was sincere and that he re- within bounds when he uttered his con- flected the overwhelming opinion, military cluding statement: in future wars, aircraft as well as civilian, of the Western world. would play a role second only to the This moral blockade, which in effect placed infantry.Y the air offensive beyond the pale of “civi- Official expressions of Air Service doc- lized” warfare, proved most dimcult for the trine showed a similarly moderate disagree- air leaders to overcome. It was easier for ment with War Department views on the them to convince doubters of the technical nature of modern warfare. A tentative potentialities of aircraft than it was to gain service manual, prepared in 1919 under the acceptance of strategic bombing as a de- direction of Col. Edgar S. Gorrell, assistant cent means of fighting. So strong was this chief of staff of the Air Service, fully ac- moral and psychological attitude in America cepted the classic conception that the Anal that the advocates of airpower generally decision in war must be made by men on found it advisable in the period between the ground, hand to hand. Victory for the world wars to speak of possible enemy army in the Aeld was the supreme objective, bomber attacks on American cities, and and the infantry was the key to victory. when later they sought support for Ameri- “When the infantry loses, the Army loses,” can long-range bombers, they specified stated the manual. Therefore, it was the enemy ships and bases, not cities, as the mission of the Air Service and all other targets. This ethical concern of the Ameri- arms to aid the chief combatant, the infan- can people was largely responsible, also, try. One special point was made to play up for the development of the idea of precision the unique power of aviation in this effort: bombing as opposed to mass attacks. An victory usually resulted not from material openly advocated program of mass bom- destruction of any large portion of the bardment would have found virtually no enemy’s forces, but from destruction of his support in the United States. It is beside will to fight, his morale. Since the air arm the point here to consider whether aerial affected morale out of all proportion to its bombing of civilian areas, by any method, material destructiveness, it seemed better is morally defensible in war; but during the suited than other arms to assist the 1920’s opposition to the air offensive idea infantry toward victory.’ 16 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Developmenf At the newly established Air Service called ‘‘a true and unalterable fundamen- Tactical School, Langley Field, ’Virginia,*a tal,” for it might well be altered at some similar concept of war was being taught in future time.6 1922. Major William C. Sherman, assistant A manual, “Fundamental Conceptions,” to the officer in charge of the school, Major prepared under the direction of the Chief of Thomas Dew. Milling, summarized the pre- Air Service, Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, vailing military theory in a school manual was introduced at the Tactical School in called “The Fundamental Doctrine of the the following year (1923). It accepted out- Air Service.” In discussing current military right the General Staff’s doctrine of war as doctrine Sherman echoed the sentiments of set forth in Training Regulations 10-5, the Gorrell manual referred to above by which enumerated the fundamental “Doc- stating that fluctuations in morale were the trines, Principles, and Methods” of the deciding influences in the land battle; vic- Army in war: the Army would utilize the tory was ultimately determined by the ratio national resources, as authorized by Con- of fear between the contestants. He declared gress, to overcome the will of the enemy by that fear of man exceeded all other terrors all available means; the primary objective and that this fear varied inversely with the would be the destruction of his armed distance between man and his enemy. forces. Following this introduction, which Missile weapons could therefore rarely de- was a direct quotation from TR 10-5, the cide a battle. An assault, or threat of an manual outlined strategy and tactics for assault, was necessary for decisive results. the air arm. Throughout its pages, however, From this it seemed clear that the air arm one point was underlined: all air action was and all other branches of the Army were auxiliary to the ground battle.6 One may auxiliaries of the infantry; the “professed wonder how this document was viewed by doctrine of the military world today” was the youthful air officers at Langley Field. that success or failure of the Army Contemporary writing and testimony by depended upon the success of the infantry. air leaders elsewhere gives hint of more Although at the moment the infantry was radical, divergent opinions. It is for this the “Queen of Battles,” this had not always reason that the official manuals and texts, been true in the past and might not be true many of which expressed only concepts in the future. When first employed, cavalry, imposed from above, cannot be regarded as equipped with superior weapons, had routed necessarily true statements of live air doc- foot-soldiers; subsequently, developments in trine during this historical period. It is surface weapons had virtually equalized necessary to distinguish, therefore, between mounted and unmounted soldiers. But a the doctrine of war as officially expounded disparity in the effectiveness of weapons by the Air Service and the doctrines did exist between the infantry and the air- actually believed in by its officers.-/- plane, for the latter could easily close in to One does not have to look far to find the the attack at will yet the infantry could airman who dared to challenge openly the not come to grips with it. The disparity of conservative concept of war held by the weapons and the inability of the infantry General Staff and the War Department. to attack the airplane, coupled with lack of Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, the leading fig- protection of friendly air forces and the ab- ure in America’s air effort during World sence of fields works or other shelter, War I, came home from France with a “strongly suggests the possibility of decisive burning ambition and a resolute will to action of airplanes against infantry . , . . 9, rahe the air arm to its “rightful” role in Indeed, said Sherman, in view of the possi- national defense. Serving high on the staff ble effectiveness of the airplane against of the Chief of Air Service from 1919 to 1925, surface troops the doctrine that the success Mitchell used his position, as well as his or failure of the infantry determines the talents for writing and speaking, to spread success of failure of the army could not be the gospel of airpower far and wide. He used

*The Air Bervlce Field OmCer8’ School at Langley became the tThis point 1s unanimously afermed by all omcers inter- ASTS ln November 1912. viewed by the author. The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 17 both bludgeon and rapier to drive home his theory. Occasionally during the early ‘~O’S, points; he could be shocking, satirical, ir- Mitchell subordinated air action, in more reverent, or all of those together. He was, or less conventional fashion, to the ground indeed, the gadfly of the General Staff and battle. For example, at one time he wrote, the hero of the Army’s fliers. In the first “We must all remember that the ultimate half of the ‘~O’S, it looked like Mitchell defense of a country depends on its man- “against the field.” He was a one-man show power. This means the infantry, with its for airpower, a formidable protagonist. He auxiliaries, fighting on the ground as man burned brilliantly and defiantly-and then, to man; and everything, whether it be in after overstepping the bounds of military the air or on the water, must be organized propriety once too often, his official light with a view to assisting this human force.”12 was extinguished. But before he was forced It can only be believed, however, that such out of the Army in 1926, “Billy” Mitchell statements were no more than a passing made the nation air-conscious-and what is concession to authority or the customary more, he planted the seeds of a new doctrine point of view, because Mitchell far more of- of war and airpower. That doctrine, in ten took a radical stand on the doctrine of general terms, was to become the American war, a stand which was in conformity with air doctrine for World War 11. the development of his thought. As early as Mitchell’s fellow officers were almost April 1919, Mitchell boldly issued his con- unanimous in their support of his military cept of the nature of war. He declared that concepts.’ He was generally regarded as the modern warfare included all the population American counterpart of the RAF’s Tren- of the nations engaged: men, women, and chard and the Italian Douhet.* His sup- children. In sharp divergence from the view porters often disagreed with Mitchell on of Secretary of War Baker, who ruled out details and generally admitted his tendency all attacks upon civilians, Mitchell insisted to exaggerate, but they regarded him as that, “The entire nation is, or should be, their champion and believed that his considered a combatant force.” Pressing on, exaggerations were necessary in order to he went to the heart of the issue; with un- accomplish his general aim. Their principal flinching logic he argued that the best difference with him was on the question of strategy often dictated destruction and kill- independent air organization; Col. Thomas ing at points distant from the ground or Dew. Milling, for example, thought Mitch- naval theater. The civilians attacked in ell’s demands for separation of the Air such operations might include large num- Service were premature (“It was just a bers of women, children, and others not baby! ”) .s Mitchell was overly sanguine capable of bearing arms, but they were about the rapidity of aviation’s progress, vastly more important as manufacturers of and “thus he alienated some of his sup- munitions than if they were carrying rifles porters, and made himself vulnerable.”1° in trenches.13 Thus Mitchell succinctly Gen. Henry H. Arnold, writing about stated the argument that had no answer. Mitchell many years later, was in- The hard facts of technological warfare clined to think that while his doc- placed the production line at the front; in trines were basically sound, his tactics were the course of World War I1 the restraining not very shrewd. Rather than softening up barriers of convention and humanitarian the attitude of the War Department toward feeling were to collapse completely, and full, the new air theories, the net result of though painful, recognition was made of Mitchellism was to harden the high com- the reality of “total war.” mand more than ever against them.ll Be Mitchell saw the new kind of war as be- that as it may, Mitchell’s utterances were ing waged chiefly in and from the air, of the first importance in the evolution of Stating the problem from a defensive point air doctrine in the United States. of view, he argued that protection against The “Fighting General” was not always such attacks upon the interior of a nation consistent in his statements of military could be provided only by an air force, 18 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development preferably one independent of control by aimed at not only the armed combatant in ground or naval commands. Offensive stra- the field, but also at the factory, the home, tegic operations, likewise, were conceived as and the nerve fibre of the civilian. essentially independent actions. Mitchell, In the new kind of warfare described by with typical hyperbole, declared in 1919 Mitchell, the tedious and expensive process that the technical progress of aviation was of wearing down the opposing surface forces advancing at such a pace that within 10 would no longer be necessary. Aircraft years an enemy winning mastery of the air could fly right over armies and navies into could dictate its own peace terms anywhere the heart of the enemy country. Once con- in the United States. Airpower had already trol of the air was secured, the objective of approached the point where it was more interior destruction could be achieved in an vital to national security than seapower; in “incredibly short time.” Thus, Mitchell con- the war of the future the sky would be the cluded cheerfully, the months and years of battlefield and production centers the tar- ground fighting, with its toll of millions of get.14 Armies in the field and navies on the lives, would be eliminated in the future.lS sea would be reduced to helpless superflui- It is hardly necessary to observe that ties. Mitchell was only half right in his forecast, Except for this full-blast charge against when it is judged by the course of World the prevailing concept of war, Mitchell’s War 11. Aircraft lere, indeed, to fly into the writings in the immedirte postwar period heart of the nations engaged and to deal were generally of a more moderate nature. untold damage to critical civilian areas. One reference to the infantry as the basic Mitchell greatly underestimated, however, element in war has already been noted the powers of air defense and the task of above. Again, while testifying before a destroying a nation’s living structure. He congressional committee in January 1921, may also have been mistaken in believing Mitchell declared unequivocally, that air war would eliminate surface war; I do not consider that the air force is to be certainly, in World War I1 the armadas of considered as in any sense supplanting the the sky simply added their toll of property Army. You have always got to come down and lives to the toll taken by the forces be- to manpower as the ultimate thing, but we low, although it must be remembered that if do believe that the air force will control all airmen had been allowed to conduct an all- communications and that it will have out’strategic air war instead of having to great effect on land troops, and a decisive one against a Navy.15 devote most of their efforts to support of surface engagements the war might have But while giving considerable attention to proved the soundness of Mitchell’s views. the support of surface forces in the early If he was in error, however, the mistake was years of his writing, Mitchell shifted stead- probably one of timing rather than direc- ily toward a preoccupation with the concept tion; with the vastly multiplied power of of total war by air.le By the year of his atomic or hydrogen warheads, propelled by court-martial, 1925, he was ready to reveal long-range guided missiles, another major his views to the general public. In his popu- war might well be decided by airborne lar book, Winged Defense, Mitchell asserted weapons alone. that victory in war required destruction of If Mitchell’s ideas were later to seem ex- the enemy’s power to make war-the fac- aggerated or naive, they were no more so tories, communications, food products, even than those of contemporaries across the sea. the farms, fuel, oil, and places where people As a matter of fact, there is considerable lived and carried on their daily lives. Pulling evidence that the views of certain foreign no punches, Mitchell went on to state, writers were influential in American avia- “Not only must these things be rendered tion circles during this period, while Mit- incapable of supplying the armed forces chell himself was appreciated abroad far but the people’s desire to renew the more than at home. A British writer, Brig. combat at a later date must be discour- Gen. P. R. C. Groves, was often quoted in aged.”17 Modern war, in other words, was speeches and articles by U.S. air officers The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 19 including General Patrick. Groves’ article method shrewder than frontal assaulbne in the Atlantic Monthly for February 1924 that would strike the vulnerable points of closely paralleled Mitchell’s concept of the the enemy’s armor. Referring to the classic new kind of war: example of the Trojan warrior Paris, who struck his shaft into the vulnerable heel Clearly the nature of air power renders it of Achilles, he called for direct action the perfect instrument for diplomatic pressure. It is also the key weapon of war against the hostile population. Such action . . . .The increase in the range, canrhg ca- might include a food blockade, disintegra- pacity, speed, and general efeciency of tion of the econonic system, or disruption aircraft, together with the actual growth of the normal activities of civilized life.*O in their number and the potentialities of Captain Liddell-Hart asserted that the production, implies that on the outbreak of will war between any of the principal European best way of subjecting the enemy’s was Powers whole fleets of aircraft will be so to disturb (or threaten to disturb) the available for offensive purposes. Each side normal life of a people that they would will at once strike at the heart and nerve prefer the lesser evil of surrendering their centers of its opponent: at his dockyards, policy. He discounted the possibility of a arsenals, munitiwe factories, mobilization “fight to the death” by the civilian popu- centers, and at those nerve ganglia of national morale-the great cities. lation. Normal men, he asserted, would not continue a struggle after it was seen to be Another Briton whose views were re- hopeless; they would surrender to force spected in the American Air Service was majeur. These last lines revealed the Capt. Basil H. Liddell-Hart. Author of Achilles’ heel in Liddell-Hart’s own thesis, a several books on military affairs, Liddell- weakness which was also to appear in the Hart in 1925 produced a particularly sig- air war theories developed later at the Air nificant study on the nature of war. This Corps Tactical School-right up to World slender volume, carrying the intriguing War 11. The civilian population was to show title of Paris: Or $he Future of War, fol- itself far tougher than anticipated, and the bwed the basic line of argument in Groves damage wrought from the air may well and Mitchell. It began with a philosophical have proved as destructive of the “real denial of the possibility of peace in the objective” of war as did the damage world; until the nature of man was inflicted by surface forces. c!xmged, he would make war. At the same The immediate influence of the line of time Liddell-Hart condemned the terrible thinking expressed by Liddell-Hart was sacrifice of blood and money in World War shown in a lecture by General Patrick. Ad- 1. He blamed this waste on a false doctrine dressing the Army War College on 9 No- of war-the doctrine of Napoleon and vember 1925, Patrick admitted that he was Clausewitz, which saw enemy armies as the quite impressed with the captain’s “little objective in war. The author pleaded for book.” He accepted its underlying assump- acceptance of the “real objective” of war: tions regarding the aim of war and agreed to permit a nation to live in prosperity and that direct action against enemy will, security. When this peace and happiness rather than slaughter of armies, was the was threatened from without, the military correct means of conducting war. Patrick effort should aim to alter the will of the also saw the air arm as the perfect weapon enemy by the most direct means, and by for waging war in the proper fashion, for a means which would least disturb the fu- the airplane alone could “jump over” en- ture prosperity and security of the nation. emy armies and strike directly the “seat of Ground warfare of the old-fashioned type, the opposition will and policy.”21 Air su- with its vast destruction of men and prop- premacy, he declared, was the easiest and erty, defeated the true end for which war surest way of breaking the hostile morale. was fought. Liddell-Hart insisted that the Asking his audience of ranking officers to enemy’s will could be conquered by a imagine the effect of the destruction of an *This article, with portions marked for use in General enemy’s industrial establishments, muni- Patrick’s speeches. was found by the author in Patrick’s Ale in the National Archives, Washington, D.C. tions factories, and communications, plus 20 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development “drenching with gas,” Patrick left it to air arm from the War Department had been them to estimate how long the enemy would advanced in Congress. This was a far step fight. Summing up his argument by a refer- from the modest prewar proposal to divorce ence to recent military history, Patrick put aviation from the Signal Corps, a move this leading question to his listeners: “Had which was unsuccessful at the time.* How- it been possible for the Allies to wipe out or ever, at war’s end a full-fledged campaign paralyze the Krupp works and other muni- was launched for an independent Depart- tions factories of the Germans, how long ment of Aeronautics. The most important of would their armies have been maintained the Congressional bills appearing at this in the time was the one submitted on 28 July 1919 In concluding his lecture, General Pat- by Representative Charles F. Curry of Cali- rick neatly tied the issue of the nature of fornia. It opened a period of some two years war to the issue of organization of the air of all-out struggle for independence by lead- arm. Granting that Liddell-Hart’s ideas ing officers of the air arm. Only after the were substantially correct, how could air- futility of this effort became apparent and power best be applied against the will of after Mitchell had been court-martialed did an enemy? Only, Patrick answered, by air the air leaders lower their sights; during force centrally organized and controlled by the remainder of the ’20’s and ’30’s they those who understood it.23Thus, he turned were to aim at a stronger, more autonomous to the question that had most agitated the air arm within the War Department. War Department and the Air Service since Demands for complete separation the end of World War I: how should the air arm be organized and controlled? This The Curry bill would have concentrated question was inseparably linked with the all aviation affairs in a Department of Aero- question of the employment of military avi- nautics. It provided for a Secretary to whom ation, and the two together constituted, would be entrusted “all duties heretofore perhaps, the principal over-all issue in the assigned to the War, Post Office, and Navy development of air doctrine: what was the Departments in so far as they relate to role of airpower in war? aviation.” In addition, the. Secretary would While the matter of proper employment be responsible for promoting all matters inevitably entered into the heated, drawn- pertaining to aviation, “including the pur- out arguments of the 1920’s, the question of chase, manufacture, maintenance, and pro- organization and control of the air arm duction of all aircraft for the United dominated all discussion. hndamentally- States.” Curry also proposed a regular air and putting the matter in a simple, general force to‘be organized within the framework statemenGthe War Department General of the Department of Aeronautics as a Staff insisted that the air arm be organized combat force, capable of independent so th%tit could support surface forces; air- or joint operations.24 It fully reflected men insisted that it be organized so that it the desires of all those, inside the Army and could carry out its independent mission at out, who took the extreme view of the im- the outbreak of hostilities. That the ques- portance of aviation and its untrammeled tion of organization should have preceded development. the question of employment or function, The issue having been thus sharply might seem illogical. It did so, doubtless, drawn, the battle began over the question because organization and control directly of independent air organization. It was to affected important, powerful personalities take the form of legislative proposals and and the large vested interests of the mili- counterproposals, of rival investigating tary and naval establishments. boards and committees, of sharply differing testimonies from both military and civilian THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AIRPOWER: experts. One of the boards worth noting in STEPS TOWARD AIR EMANCIPATION this connection was designated the Ameri- Even before the armistice of 1918, bold can Aviation Mission, better known as the

proposals for complete separation of the *See above. pp. 1-2. The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 21 Crowell Mission. On 1 May 1919, Secretary question of air organization was obviously Newton D. Baker directed the Assistant unacceptable to Secretary Baker. With the Secretary of War, Benedict C. Crowell, to Curry proposal and others pending in Con- organize a group for studying aviation prob- gress, Baker decided to establish another lems as they had been dealt with by the board, specifically to investigate the advisa- principal Allied powers during the World bility of a separate department of aeronau- War. The underlying purpose of this inves- tics. The make-up of the new group, con- tigation was to gain, through observation sisting of Ma]. Gen. Charles T. Menoher, abroad, ideas which might prove useful in nonflying Director of the Air Service, and meeting the aviation problem in the United four artillery officers, virtually assured a re- States. To aid him in conducting the mis- sult more in keeping with the Secretary’s sion, Crowell selected an able team, includ- views. The Menoher Board, which convened ing Howard E. Coffin, member of the Coun- on 8 August 1919, proceeded by examining cil of National Defense, a representative of relevant reports by other groups and indi- the Gerieral Staff, an Air Service officer, a viduals, consulting a limited number of wit- naval officer, and several executives of the nesses in person, and by obtaining tele- aircraft industry. In the late spring and graphic reports from some 50 division, early summer of 1919 the Crowell group corps, and army leaders who had actually visited England, France, and Italy, where operated with air units under their com- they conferred with aircraft manufacturers, mand. As might have been expected, the cabinet officials, and ranking officers of the bulk of the testimony from these sources armed services. In their final report to was opposed to an independent department Secretary Baker on 19 July 1919, they ex- of air, and the Menoher Board’s report, sub- pressed their favorable impression of for- mitted on 27 October 1919, counselled eign steps toward centralized organization against any such proposal. It declared that of military aeronautics. Their recommenda- independent air action could not prove de- tion for the United States was similar to the cisive against ground forces and insisted Curry proposal for a Department of Aero- upon maintaining the principle of unity of nautics; it suggested a concentration of re- command. The air arm, like the other com- sponsibility for aviation development in the bat branches, must be coordinated and con- hands of a Secretary for Air. Independent trolled by the commander in chief of the military operations, however, were not con- military operation. The Secretary of War, templated. The national air service would finding this report more to his liking, gave be primarily a training, development, and it his stamp of approval and forwarded it promotional activity; personnel and equip- to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs ment assigned by the Air Service to the on 31 October 1919.26 Army and Navy would pass automatically Arguments of the air crusaders under their full control. Although the mem- As investigating bodies piled up evidence bers of the Crowell Mission were in strong on both sides of the issue, individuals agreement on their recommendation (with within and without the military services the exception of certain reservations by the began to come forward with their own views naval representative), no direct action re- on air organization. These individuals fell sulted from this study. In making public into two principal groups, which, like the the report, Secretary Baker clearly stated investigating boards, tended toward clearly that he was opposed to a centralized air opposed positions. The most colorful group service, even if its function were restricted was no doubt that company of aviators re- to training and procurement. Efficiency de- turned from glory -overseas. Generally manded, he argued, that each fighting youthful, vigorous, and enthusiastic, they service exercise complete control over its were convinced that future wars would be personnel, training, equipment, and op- increasingly dependent upon airpower and erations.25 that aviation had to be regarded as an equal The answer of the Crowell Mission to the if not superior branch of warfare. They 22 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development favored a kind of organization which would had the help of such men as Benedict give full play to the myriad possibilities of Crowell and the industrialist Glenn L. airpower and one which would be con- Martin.2D trolled by men whose experience and sym- The points set forth by these men in 1919 pathy were with the new medium of fight- and 1920 on the subject of air organiza- ing. This could best be realized, thought the tion can be summarized readily. They ar- air crusaders, in a separate Department of gued, in the course of numerous hearings Aeronautics or under a unified Depart- and debates, that military aviation was no ment of National Defense, consisting of air, longer a mere auxiliary force. It was im- army, and navy as coordinate branches.27 portant in its own right. Mitchell pointed The group opposing them fought every out, for example, that the chief aim of the move to increase the power or prestige of air arm was to gain control of the sky; this the air arm. Its spearhead consisted of the aim had to be achieved by direct action in ranking military and naval personnel, the the air and not as an activity auxiliary to civilian heads of the War and Navy depart- some other operation. Lifting the curtain ments, and the General Staff, all of whom upan an idea which he would later stress regarded aviation as auxiliary to surface more vigorously, Mitchell also suggested forces. It included most of the nonflying that full development of the airplane might officers in both regular services, men who render surface navies useless. Major Foulois often looked upon the aviators as youthful pressed another point generally accepted by upstarts. Some of these old-line officers the air leaders. It was necessary, he said, fought the airmen because of jealousy of to have final authority for aviation vested their traditional prerogatives and position; in those who were genuinely interested in others were simply indifferent to what air- the air arm. Foulois charged that the Gen- power could do or were honestly doubtful eral Staff did not have that interest, that of its effectiveness as an independent force. through lack of knowledge and vision it Whatever their reasons, it soon became had subordinated the air arm to the needs clear that those who opposed air independ- of the other combat branches. What ad- ence represented the majority in the mili- vances had been achieved in military avia- tary establishments and held the positions tion were the results of the initiative of the of major influence. At this stage in the Air Service and in spite of the attitude of contest for control of military aviation, the the General Staff. Secondary arguments enthusiasm of the air crusaders proved no included the assertion that an independent match for the numbers and power of the air organization would eliminate duplica- opposition.28 tions in aerial expenditures and would give Nevertheless, the advocates of independ- needed encouragement to the important ent air organization had their hearing, and commercial aviation their arguments helped to develop and crys- Rebuttal by the high command tallize the many facets of air doctrine, Lead- The Director of the Air Service, General ing the fight were congressmen like Curry Menoher, did not share the view of the cru- of California, Senator Harry S. New of In- saders regarding the proposed independ- diana, and the returned aviator, Represen- ent air organization, and at least for the tative Fiorello H. LaGuardia of New York. time being, he joined the general line-up During the immediate post-war period, the against such a move. Asked by the Chief most aggressive and defiant spokesman of Staff for his attitude on the matter, within the service was Maj. Benjamin F. Menoher replied unequivocally that the Air Foulois. Somewhat more moderate in his Service must be a part of,the combatant insistence on air independence, but untir- forces, both military and naval. It should ing in his efforts, was General Mitchell. be considered a fourth combat branch of Further support came from officers like the mobile army, on a par with the infantry, Charles DeF. Chandler and Henry H. Ar- cavalry, and artillery. But Menoher made a nold. In civilian ranks the air crusaders hedge upon the future and forecast that The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 23 in wars to come, separate air operations Colonel Westover did not commit him- could be expected, similar to operations on self on the issue proper, except to insist land or sea. Looking into the future, he that higher authority be obeyed. Apparently saw the time when his position had at least some degree of flying squadrons may cruise through the support, because in his memorandum to air o’er land and sea for protracted periods Menoher he referred to the fact that oppos- of time, supplying and subsisting them- ing factions still existed in the Air Service. selves from aerial “colliers,” subject to tac- But while there was some division in the tical control by wireless and directional air arm over the question of independence, control by radio, and with sumcient am- the War and Navy Departments were united munition transports to sustain active combat operations sufficient to accomplish in opposition from top to bottom. Secre- the complete demolition of land or water tary Baker, heading the War Department craft, or the destruction through aerial hierarchy, made his position crystal clear combat of similar forces of the enemy. in his Annual Report for 1919. The infantry Until such a time arrived, however, Menoher was still the backbone of military opera- believed that aerial forces should be part of tions, and all other arms (land, sea, and the Army and Navy, in order that the plans air) should serve as mere auxiliaries. Sepa- of those two services could be carried to a ration of the air arm could only weaken successful conclusion.:~l over-all military efficiency ; the temporary unified control which might be achieved It is interesting to note that General during combined actions was no substitute Menoher was not the only Air Service officer for continuous, integrated training and op- who willingly accepted the position of the erations. Finally, the only indispensable General Staff relative to the organization of functions of aviation in World War I had the air arm. Lt. Col. Oscar Westover, who been those of support-observation and ar- was to become Chief of the Air Corps in tillery control. Baker did not preclude im- 1935, believed it was a question of submit- portant changes in the functions of air- ting to proper authority, which in this case planes in the future, but he insisted on con- was the War Department. Writing to Meno- sidering the “here and In the light her on 5 May 1919, Westover called atten- of wartime experience, the actual capabili- tion to the propaganda activities of General ties of aviation in 1919, and his concept of Mitchell and other officers in the Training the nature of civilized warfare, Baker was and Operations Group which Mitchell undoubtedly consistent and logical in op- headed. Westover stated that such activi- posing an independent air organization. ties called for immediate action; military inferiors must subordinate the expression Gen. John J. Pershing, the victorious of their own opinions to the opinions and commander of the AEF, lent his high pres- policies of their superiors. Mitchell’s public tige to the fight against air independence. insistence upon independent air organiza- In reply to a request by General Menoher tion was contrary to the War Department for clarification of his views, Pershing re- view and was therefore “subversive of dis- plied in simple, straightforward fashion. He cipline.” Westover recommended that declared that an independent air force was Mitchell and his executive assistants be so incapable at that time, or so far as he knew advised and that they be directed to make at any future time, of winning a war by it- their words and actions conform to War self: Such a force could not even win a Department policy. He went on to urge decision over an enemy ground force. On that Menoher demand a statement of loyal the other hand, asserted Pershing, a ground support from Mitchell; and if it could not force needed an air arm to operate success- be given, he favored relieving all the execu- fully against other ground elements. The tive heads of the T&O Group except Cois. air force was an essential combat branch Thomas Dew. Milling and Charles DeF. of the Army, like the infantry, cavalry, Chandler (“who are both loyal and em- and artillery; for success in war they must cient”) .a2 all be controlled, disciplined, and trained 24 - THEDEVELQPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development in the same way. Separate organization artistic temperament, or the opinion of sub- could only have been antagonistic to this ordinate Air Service Commanders, but must end; therefore, Pershing wanted to keep the be controlled by the judgment of Com- air arm in the War Department.34 manding Officers of troops. . . .”37 Field commanders who had served under While the War Department often found Pershing shared his view on the need for itself in disagreement with the Navy on integration of the air arm with the other important issues, the question of an in- combat branches. A board of superior offi- dependent air service found the two depart- cers of the AEF, headed by Maj. Gen. Joseph ments in powerful alliance. The Navy did T. Dickman, was appointed by Pershing on not deign to enter the lively controversy 19 April 1919 to draw lessons from the about the discipline of military aviators, World War regarding air tactics and organi- but it took a strong stand in opposition to zation. The Dickman Board reported, as a separate air organization. Josephus one might have expected, that “so long as Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, was a well- existing conditions prevailed” ground forces known opponent of separation, as was the would continue to be dominant in warfare. Assistant Secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt. The infantry FWS the principal arm, and Writing in the magazine, US.Air Services, aviation must be regarded as one of its in July 1919 Roosevelt declared that the auxiliaries. Nothing in the war, concluded Nayy must preserve its air arm intact. He the board, indicated that air activities saw the air branch of the Army in a simi- could be conducted independently of ground lar subordinate light. Roosevelt recognized troops so as to affect materially the out- the need for full cooperation and inter- come of the struggle. And it seemed unlikely change of plans between the two air serv- that air forces would ever supplant ground ices, but thought that removal of aviation and naval forces unless such a proportion from the Army and Navy to a third organi- of the population became “airfaring” as zation would invite disaster.38 were then Naval officers apparently shared the view In August 1919 the War Department in- vited from all its general officers comments of their civilian superiors. An unsigned on the Congressional proposal to create an statement purporting to summarize the independent Department of Aeronautics. Navy’s attitude toward the proposal for a The responses that came in echoed and re- unified air service was based on the premise echoed the fundamental propositions set that the nation had to be prepared to de- forth by Baker, Pershing, Dickman, and the fend itself in two general localities, at sea other top military brass. There were addi- and on land. The Navy took care of the first, tional arguments against a separate air the Army the second. No need for a third Service; though rated as secondary points, agency of defense was seen, since shore- they loomed large in the minds of the based aircraft, in their existing state of de- ground generals. Chief among them was velopment, could not act offensively over- the notion of discipline. One respondent seas unless first carried across the sea in wrote: ships. The dependence of all operations upon sea control, in turn, underlined the No people in this war needed discipline more than the aviators and none had less. importance of naval aviation as an essen- All the attention was given to handling the tial aid to the forces afloat. As the case for machines and but little thought was had integrated aviation services was thus so of discipline. The result was more or less clear and patent, there could be only two of a mob with great loss of efficiency, as classes of advocates of a separate air arm. strict discipline is the foundation stone of One class, the Navy summary generously military success.:iqi conceded, consisted of those persons who Another general agreed “that the factor of lacked full knowledge of the military and greatest importance in the aeronautical naval duties of aviation and who conse- service is discipline, The question of flights quently believed, quite innocently and sin- and observation must not be left to the cerely, that a unified service would be ad- The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 25 vantageous to the government. The other Patrick, who as its chief from 15 October class consisted of those who, for personal 1921 to 14 December 1927, performed the reasons, saw in the proposal an opportunity greatest service to the air arm of any man for increased rank and pay.X9 during the 1920’s. A classmate of General Whatever the merit of the two argu- Pershing’s, he was selected as chief with a ments-that of the air crusaders and that view to bringing discipline to the Air Serv- of their opponents in the War and Navy ice. Patrick, however, quickly absorbed the departments-none of the proposals for a outlook of the new branch, won his wings, separate Department of Aeronautics was and became a champion of the air force enacted into law during the immediate post- cause. His moderation, judgment, and hon- war period. The War Department, blocking esty were profoundly respected in the mili- all moves toward greater air autonomy, se- tary organization and in Congress; he de- cured statutory provision for its concept of fended the Air Service against powerful the place and function of military aviation. opposition and secured substantial gains for In the Army Reorganization Act of 1920 the it before his retirement.4z Air Service was made a regular combatant Patrick showed the qualities of both vi- arm, which jt had been de facto (by War sion and practicality. An old-line officer Department order) since 1918.40The legis- himself, he quickly displayed his adapta- lation did not alter the existing relationship bility to new ideas and became conversant between the Air Service and the General with doctrinal developments abroad as well Staff. After months of argument and grow- as in the United States. He was impressed ing bitterness, the Army high command had by Marshall Foch’s of t-cited declaration : triumphed over the fledgling crusaders. But “The potentialities of aircraft attack on a the contest was only beginning; it now en- large scale are almost incalculable, but it tered another phase which was to lead to is clear that such an attack, owing to its the Air Corp Act of 1926.41 crushing moral effect on a nation, may im- press public opinion to the point of dis- Creation of the Army Air Corps (1926) arming the Government and thus become After the air leaders became convinced decisive.” Looking realistically into such of the futility of the fight for complete in- future possibilities, Patrick also quoted dependence, they shifted to more moderate with approval another French general, objectives. Some, like General Mitchell, Duval, who had served as chief of the continued to bid high; they dropped the French Air Service during the World War: separate air service idea but agitated for a Its lair force’s1 power will grow with the tripartite Department of National Defense. number and development of its airplanes, Most air leaders, however, were willing to which will be more heavily armed, will postpone indefinitely such a sweeping re- be speedier, and will have greater radii organization of the armed forces and con- of action. The battle will no longer be centrated upon the more immediate goal confined to the zone occupied by the of developing a striking air force within the troops. In fact, the object may no longer be the opposing Army, as this may be ob- War Department. During the first half of tained by a campaign of terror carried on the 1920’s there were many aviation bills against’ the enemy country rather than introduced in Congress; innumerable inves- against its armed forces. The decision will tigations, hearings, and reports; but virtu- be reached in the air and the victor will ally no important legislation. Meanwhile, dictate peace on the ground. the cleavage deepened between flying and Patrick was using these sources for their ground officers. While the latter continued propaganda value, of course, and cleverly their grip upon the General Staff, the supplemented these with statements by former gradually won control of the Air ranking naval officers abroad. For example, Service itself. he quoted the British Admiral Kerr, who The man who symbolized the progressive, had said, prophetically: yet moderate, spirit of the Air Service dur- There is only one arm which can strike at ing this period was Maj. Gen. Mason M. once a real blow at each one and all of 26 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development the . . . links in the chain of the enemy’s bombardment units would be substantially communications. Each side will ’then en- augmented. Only with such an increase in deavor to be the flrst to attack by air, and air force strength could the functions of the unless we are ready to do this our people will feel war as they never felt it in all their Air Service be properly performed; the history. Poison gas, poison acids, high ex- auxiliary services of aviation (mainly ob- plosives, and incendiary bombs will be rain- servation) were now of minor importance ing from the air wherever there is a factory compared with the primary activities of se- or arsenal to be destroyed. curing control of the air (pursuit) and These and other quotations used by Patrick destroying enemy targets behind the lines in his lectures and testimony reveal at once (bombardment). Development of an effec- the influences upon his thought and his tive air force required both a sufficient practical skill in influencing the opinions number of the correct type of aircraft and of others. He shrewdly cited as a relevant centralized control. “The principle of con- authority his commander in chief, President centration of air forcp becomes a maxim,” Coolidge, who had stated laConically, “The said Patrick. And again, “I am, therefore, development of aircraft indicates that our convinced that the concentration of all air national defense must be supplemented, if force under one GHQ Reserve Commander not dominated, by aviation.”-’:$ is the most effective way of assuring aerial While General Patrick saw clearly the po- supremacy.” Thus, under the immediate tentialities of aviation and the ultimate direction of an Air Service officer, the air necessity for a Department of National De- force could launch a concerted offensive fense with three coordinate branches, he and successfully meet any attack by a hos- directed his main effort toward achieving tile air force. Such an organization, thought the greatest degree of strength and au- General Patrick, would be sufficiently mo- tonomy possible under the existing organi- bile to include coast defense as an addi- zation. What he sought primarily was ac- tional mission.45 ceptance of the principle of air force A special board was appointed by Sec- concentration, whether for tactical or stra- retary of War John W. Weeks to consider tegical purpose. He vigorously criticized General Patrick’s proposals for improve- the permanent assignment of air elements ment of the Air Service. This group, con- to individual ground units and agitated per- sisting of General Staff officers, came to be sistently for a change in that policy. Patrick known by the name of its chairman, Maj. approached the problem by .suggesting that Gen. William Lassiter. After a brief but in- the Air Service be divided into two cate- tensive period of interviews and discussions, gories, one consisting of observation squad- the board submitted its report on 27 March rons to be assigned directly to ground units 1923. Confirming the general views of and one consisting of pursuit, bombard- Patrick, the report stated that the principle ment, and attack squadrons, to operate of Air Service organization as found in the more or less independently. The latter Army Reorganization Act of 1920 had be- would be designated, strictly speaking, as come obsolete. Experience since the war, the “Air Force.”J4 Here was probably the progress in aircraft development, and a bet- earliest official expression of the air force ter conception of aviation employment idea, which was to find its ultimate realiza- called for a reconsideration of the organi- tion, within the framework of the War De- zation and control of the air arm. The partment, in the establishment of GHQ Air Lassiter group agreed with Patrick’s state- Force in 1935. ment of the inadequacy of equipment and General Patrick proposed a large relative recommended a development program ex- increase in the air force elements in order tending over a period of 10 years. It ac- to establish a balanced and effective tactical cepted, too, his division between observa- organization. The total number of obser- tion units and air force units. The board, vation groups within the Air Service would however, recommended assignment of ob- be reduced, and the number of pursuit and servation to each division, corps, and army, The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 27 whereas Patrick had favored consolidating It may be noted that this latter suggestion it in the corps. There was a difference by Patrick was not carried into effect until also in the recommended distribution of creation by President Roosevelt of the Joint air force elements. Patrick wanted all types Chiefs of Staff in 1942-some eighteen years (attack, bombardment, and pursuit) held later. Patrick also looked forward to the ul- in the GHQ Reserve; the Lassiter group timate creation of a Department of National assigned an air force of attack and pursuit Defense, which was to be realized in 1947. to each field army, while providing a force But for the time being he regarded such a of bombardment and pursuit for the GHQ radical reorganization as beyond practical Reserve. Notwithstanding these differences, possibility. In the meantime, he proposed to the Lassiter report was a modest step in the War Department certain preliminary War Department thinking toward the idea steps which would greatly augment the of a concentrated air force. Greater empha- striking power and effectiveness of the sis was placed on the GHQ Reserve than Army’s air arm. had appeared in the principles of Air Serv- Patrick’s major proposal in 1924 was that ice organization adopted in 1920. In place there should be created an Air Corps which of the single bombardment group provided would be subject directly to the Secretary of for in the existing GHQ table of organiza- War. He described the projected organiza- tion, the report called for a peacetime mini- tion as similar in status to the Marine Corps mum of two bombardment groups, plus in its relation to the Navy. By freeing mili- four pursuit groups. This provision fell tary aviation from control by the General short of the desires of Patrick, but the re- Staff, Patrick hoped to achieve an organi- serve was afforded recognition as “insuring zation in which men of air experience and mobility and independence of action” and competence would exercise the key influ- as a weapon for both tactical and strategic ence over aviation matters-from the lowest missions.4f; echelons up to the level of the Secretary Although the recommendations of the himself. Along with this change, Patrick Lassiter Board did not materialize as legis- recommended that a separate budget for lation, they had a considerable educational aviation be prepared by the air chief and value within and without the War Depart- that a single air commander be designated ment. The report was frequently reviewed to control all air operations, at least in the and quoted by subsequent groups studying initial stage of an emergency or war. Ac- the aeronautical problem, and it came, in cording to this proposal, the air commander effect, to represent War Department policy would be directed by the Secretary of War regarding Air Service ~rganization.~’In the to report to an army commander in chief following year General Patrick used the for orders when the army was ready to take board’s recommendations as a point of de- the field. But his instructions would be only parture for a further proposal of his own in terms of a general plan; the air com- respecting air organization. He emphasized mander would determine the manner and the growing necessity for a method of con- detail of execution.* Patrick also recom- trol which would insure the maximum ef- mended that the Army air arm be given fectiveness of airpower in the event of fu- responsibility for all aerial operations from shore bases. Finally, he asked for legisla- ture emergencies. tive action on the Lassiter Board recom- We should gather our air forces together mendations for expansion and development under one air commander and strike at the of air strength.40 strategic points of our enemy-cripple him While General Patrick was urging this even before the ground forces can come in line of action upon the War Department, contact. Air power is coordinate with land Congress continued to show concern over and sea power and the air commander the position and control of airpower in the should sit in councils of war on an eaual *This suggestion anticipated the actual arrangements for footing with the commanders of the land ground-air cooperation which, after months of successful use and sea forces.r* by the British in the Western Desert were Anklly adopted by American forces in North Africa in ’February 1943. --28 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- The Heroic Age of Doctrinal --Development nation’s defense. On 24 March 1924 a select units as required by the Army, and for co- committee, chosen from the membership of operating with the air components of the the House Military and Naval Affairs com- Navy and Marine Corps.-72 mittees, was appointed to inquire into the But if General Patrick and his supporters operations of the U.S. air services. This were encouraged by these developments, group of nine, headed by Representative F. they were disturbed by a countermove H. Lampert of Wisconsin, soon came to be which threatened to neutralize the effects known after the name of its chairman. The of the Lampert report. Taking cognizance of committee made probably the most exten- the agitation in Congress and of the trend sive study of the problem that was under- in the Lampert investigation, the Secretary taken during this period, examining more of War and the Secretary of the Navy re- than 150 witnesses over an 11-months pe- quested President Coolidge to appoint a riod. General Mitchell was again the star special board for study of the “best means witness for the advocates of air autonomy; of developing and applying aircraft in na- his basic ideas were supported by General tional defense.” The group, the President’s Patrick, Howard E. Coffin, Maj. Reed Landis, Aircraft Board, which was duly chosen by Maj. Carl Spaatz, and other air leaders. The Coolidge on 12 September 1925, came to be opposition lineup appeared unbroken from known generally as the Morrow Board, after the earlier contests of strength. It consisted the name of its chairman, Dwight W. Mor- of the Army General Staff, the General row. Its personnel was distinguished and Board of the Navy, and most of the high seemingly quite representative: Howard E. civilian offlcials of both War and Navy Coffin, Senator Hiram Bingham (formerly departmenk5” a colonel of the Air Service), a retired major The Lampert committee reported on 14 general, a retired rear admiral, a judge of a December 1925 with the following recom- Circuit Court of Appeals, two members of mendations: creation of a unified air force the House of Representatives, and a mem- independent of the Army and Navy, but one ber of the National Advisory Commission which would provide units as required by for Aeronautics (NACA). In the four weeks those two services; installation of assistant of hearings Mitchell, now reduced in rank secretaries for air in the War, Navy, and to colonel, again led the demand for a De- Commerce departments; and establishment partment of Defense, with equality for air of a Department of National Defense, to with ground and sea forces; other witnesses coordinate the armed efforts of the country. favoring some degree of increased autonomy It also recommended adequate representa- were General Patrick, Colonel Foulois, Maj. tion of both the Army and Navy air arms H. H. Arnold, and Maj. W. G. Kilner. Op- on the General Staff and General Board, posed to them as usual were the heads of respectively-by men who would “support the major services as well as a large num- the full use of aviation for the defense of ber of junior oflcers and some civilians. In the country.’’31 Shortly after the Lampert addition to examining over 100 witnesses, committee made its report, the House Mili- many of them the same individuals called tary Affairs Committee asked General by the Lampert committee, the Morrow Patrick for his proposal, which had been Board made a study of the work of previous gathering dust in the War Department. On investigating bodies, including the Lam- 27 January 1926 he forwarded his recom- pert group. Then, on 30 November 1925, the mendations, which were virtually the same Morrow Board stole the march on the Lam- as those he had sent to his military supe- pert investigation by issuing its report- riors more than a year before. Patrick pro- two weeks before the Lampert committee posed creation of a US. Air Corps, to be was able to release its ownfi3 under the Secretary of War and supervised Surprisingly enough, the conclusions of directly by a special Assistant Secretary, the Morrow Board, though drawn from the This Air Corps would have broad responsi- same general sources, were ‘directly opposed bilities for aerial defense, for providing air to those of the Lampert committee. The re- The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 20 port rejected the proposal for a Depart- Corps, thereby strengthening the concep- ment of Defense as an “added complexity” tion of military aviation as an offensive, and objected to a separate department of striking arm rather than an auxiliary serv- air as a breach of the principle of unity of ice. The office of Assistant Secretary of War, command. But while the Morrow Board with special responsibility for air matters, thus embraced the traditional view of the was created in the War Department, and General Staff, it recognized the rising pres- statutory provision was made for an air sure for increased recognition of the air section in each division of the General Staff. arm. Accordingly, the board recommended It was provided further that all flying units that the name of the Air Service be legally be commanded by rated officers, and a five- changed to Air Corps, that it be given spec- year program of expansion for Air Corps cia1 representation on the General Staff, personnel and equipment was authorized. and that an additional Assistant Secretary The Air Corps Act of 1926 brought a tempo- of War be provided for air affairs.54 rary equilibrium to the struggle over The War Department naturally favored organization and control. As a compromise the conclusions of the Morrow Board over it represented essentially a victory for the those of the Lampert committee, and was War Department and General Staff; and willing to accept the recommended minor although the air leaders accepted the pro- changes as a kind of compromise which visions of the act as the best that could be would hold off more radical proposals. On obtained at the time, they vowed to per- 19 January 1926, by direction of the Secre- severe until the ultimate goal of equality or tary of War, the Chief of Staff ordered the independence was The next major creation of an air section in each of the 5ve effort in this direction was to result in divisions of the General Staff. Each section creation of the GHQ Air Force in March was to be headed by an officer detailed from 1935. the Air Service, who would consider and Worth mentioning along with the Air recommend proper action within his divi- Corps Act was the establishment and devel- sion on matters relating to aviation. Maj. opment within the air organization of an Gen. John L. Hines, in issuing the order, institution which was to have a special im- admitted that the new plan seemed incon- portance in connection with air doctrine. sistant with the time-honored principal On 30 October 1920 the Air Service Field that no member of the General Staff repre- Officers’ School had been established at sent a particular branch. He believed, how- Langley Field, Virginia, its leading organ- ever, that the good results would justify izer and director being Maj. Thomas Dew. departure from the general rule, and, as if Milling. Its original aim was to equip stu- to calm the fears of some of his doubtful col- dent officers with the air tactics and tech- leagues, he added that “obviously the men niques necessary for direction of air units designated for such staff positions must be in cooperation with other branches of the of a temper of mind to appreciate not only armed forces. In 1926 student officers from the special needs of aviation but the needs other arms and services were also enrolled,* of the Army as whole.”55 a as a cross-training project within the mili- Congress, too, eventually saw in the Mor- tary establishment. At first the annual row report a way out of the bitter argument classes were small in numbers, even though over air organization. On 29 March 1926, from the beginning all ranks from First after studying various bills that had been Lieutenant through Lieutenant Colonel at- introduced on the subject, the House Mili- tended. In 1922 the name of the school was tary Affairs Committee introduced its own changed to the Air Service Tactical School.? bill. After debate and amendments in both Finally, on 18 August 1926, reflecting the chambers, this bill finally became law on new designation of the air arm, it was re-

2 July as the Air Corps Act of 1926. Follow- ~~~ ‘One lieutenant of Infantry attended the 1933-34 sesslon. ing the line of the Morrow Board, the act +In April 1922 Great Britain opened its RAF Staff College. This institution and the Air Service Tactical School were changed the name from Air Service to Air much alike. 30 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development named again-this time, the Air Corps Tac- The geaeral functions of military aviation tical School. What made for the greatest dimculty in From the beginning the Tactical School formulating any theory for the use of air- paid some attention to questions of over-all power was the unanswered question of the employment of air forces, and it was ex- strategic policy of the United States in in- pected that the school would concern itself ternational affairs. The use of airpower, or with the development of tactical ‘doctrines. any kind of power for that matter, can be During the flrst half of the 1920’s, however, properly conceived only in terms of a given instruction was based largely upon World strategic situation. In other words, what War experiences, emphasizing observation circumstances of conflict involving America and pursuit in support of ground forces. By were to be anticipated during the decade of the year 1925 the advent of new types of the 1920’s? Although dogmatic assertions planes and the anticipation of others of were being made regarding organization of still greater range and power encouraged the military establishment and the effec- the belief already held at the school that tiveness of various modes of warfare, great the air arm would become in actuality an uncertainty appeared on this underlying offensive striking force-and instructors at question. The publicly stated policy was one the school began to consider the problem of of pure defense of American continental drafting suitable doctrines to govern such shores and overseas possessions, and this a force. Graduhlly, from 1925 onward, the seems to have been accepted at face value notion grew at Langley that the mission of by a majority of Air Service officers.58The military aviation was not primarily the de- usual enemies postulated were a coalition feat of hostile aviation in the air-a func- of European powers headed by Great Brit- tion of pursuit-and the gaining of infor- ain, possibly in combination with Japan.* mation for use of the ground forces. Instead, Aside from the great unlikelihood that the the real mission was to eliminate the en- British would make an armed attack upon emy’s ability to wage war by neutralization the United States during the 1920’s there of his air force-primarily by destroying it were at least some officers who believed an- on the ground-and destruction of his vital other conflict much more probable. They establishments, both of which were func- were inclined to see a repetition of the tions of the bomber. Hence, the notion grew World War struggle, with the western Allies that bombardment was the most important once again lined up against a resurgent element of the air force. It’required some Germany and with the major action located years €or the appropriate doctrine to emerge in Europe.5QAt least one omcer, the com- in deflnite and detailed form, but the Air mandant of the Air Corps Tactical School Corps Tactical School was to be the breed- at the end of the decade, stated later that he ing ground for these important ideas.57 didn’t know, or at least could not remem- ber, what strategic assumptions underlay EVOLVING DOCTRINES OF AIR EMPLOYMENT the development of air doctrine at that time. It was surely a question that was Although the struggle over organization much evaded during the entire interval and control of airpower absorbed most of the time and energy of air leaders during between world wars, and a question which the postwar period, some progress was made no man, in all truth, could answer with in developing other aspects of air doctrine The absence of a clearly deflned strategic As previously stated, the question of control premise led to a striking contradiction with- af airpower was inextricably linked with concepts of air employment. It was natural, in the War Department. On the one hand, then, that employment should be discussed the department embraced the omcia1 policy in connection with the debates on air or- of defense of US. shore lines, ruling out ganization, and it is possible to discover, large-scale expeditionary operations; but on chiefly in those debates, the principal views the other hand, the training manuals, regu- *This defensive situation appears consistently in the maneu- on this fundamental issue. ver problems given to United States forces. The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 31 lations, and terminology implied a massive by surface forces. He ranked the Navy first ground battle similar to World War I. The (to keep a hostile fleet offshore), the air contradiction made matters especially awk- force second (to neutralize, through control ward for the Army’s air arm. Should it de- of the air over enemy ships, whatever forces velop a doctrine and a force primarily ap- might break through the Navy’s line), and plicable to coast defense, or to the support the Army third (to meet such forces as of offensive operations as in the past war might be put ashore in spite of naval and against Germany? Actually, it attempted to air defenses).”” But if the air arm was a do both and, fortunately, developed in the second line of defense against surface in- process theories and weapons which were to vasion, it was the first and only line of de- fit very well the situation of World War 11. fense against air attack. As early as 1919, In view of the fact that two main alter- Mitchell pointed out that, regardless of the native military situations were contem- naval situation, geographical factors ren- plated during the 1920’s, it was natural dered the inland areas of the United States that the functions of airpower applicable fairly secure from attack except by air. And, to both would gain the broadest support. as he emphasized later, “There is no de- Primary among these was the mission of fense against an air force except an air air supremacy or control. As General Mitch- force. No weapons operating from the ell put it, regardless of the military or naval ground can greatly affect aviation. We lost operation involved, air superiority in its vi- about one-tenth of one per cent of our ships cinity was indispensable. The extent of ac- in Europe from anti-aircraft fire from the tual control had to be sufficient to insure ground . . . .”(14 Air control over American observation of surface forces, deny obser- coast lines and cities would give protection vation to the enemy, and to permit such to both. activities as fire adjustment and command Although agreeing that control of the liaison. Mitchell believed that this goal air was a first priority mission for air force could be accomplished only by successful action of any kind, the Navy seriously ques- action against the enemy’s air force. “Con- tioned the value of airpower for coast trol. . , is obtained,” he declared, “by the air defense, except as a part of naval opera- battles of pursuit aviation. It can be gained tions.* Likewise, both the Navy and the in no other way.” His doctrine was to find Army General Staff seriously doubted the out where the opposing air force was, con- possibility of significant air attacks upon centrate rapidly upon that point with pur- American cities. But the air leaders could suit planes, attack and destroy the hostile see it as a real threat, and they insisted craft, and then proceed with the bombard- that air defense of the United States was ment of the enmey’s organizations and in- an air force function, and a major one at stallations on water or land.61 This theory that-regardless of the kind of war, de- would apply to coastal defense action, sup- fensive or offensive, in which the nation port of ground troops in a land battle, or might become engaged. General Patrick, even long-range bombardment operations; referring to the standard possibility of an it made all functions of aviation secondary attack by a coalition of European powers, to that of air control and all classes of air- pointed out that the United States would planes secondary to that of pursuit. have a long and vulnerable coast line, as Mitchell’s view of the priority of counter- well as the Canadian border, to defend. air force employment was accepted by both With the bulk of its productive capacity ground and air officers of the Army during lying within the geographical triangle, Nor- the period under consideration.62 Contro- folk to Bangor to Chicago, the United versy developed, however, when the concept States would have to concentrate the air of air control was applied specifically to arm in defense of that area, which was coast defense and air defense of U.S. cities. easily within range of bases in the western Mitchell rated the air arm as the second Atlantic and Canada.‘;5Many civilian air ex- *This thorny question will be given a separate discussion line of defense against invasion of our coasts. later in the chapter. Bee below, pp. 33-36. 32 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development perts supported the view of the Air Service trenches, and airplanes hovering or zoom- that nationd air defense was a major func- ing in close support. The high command of tion of the air arm. For example, J. Edward the Army, as well as the junior OfflCers of Cassidy, an engineering consultant well the line, had no interest in or sympathy for known for his interest in aviation, sharply strategic air operations; they continued to criticized the War and Navy departments see the airplane as another weapon to help for their refusal to accept the likelihood of the ground troops along. The air leaders, aerial attack on American centers. Ridicul- who saw the greater potentialities of the ing the assertion that planes did not exist airplane, did not yet have bombers of suffl- with adequate range for this purpose, cient range to put their dreams to test. The Cassidy declared that Great Britain could principal role of military aviation, after easily ship to Canada as many as 2,000 counter-air force, therefore remained close planes of types already in service. From support.6i bases there, such a force could cripple US. The theory of ground support distin- industries in the vital production triangle guished two major kinds of assistance to within 30 days. He declared also that either surface forces. One was essentially that of a Japan or Russia, by moving bases across the “service” and consisted chiefly of observa- Bering Strait to Alaska and thence south- tion and related functions auxiliary to the ward, could come within range of American infantry and artillery. The other was that cities. Or, as another possibility, one aircraft of an “arm,” and consisted of counter-air carrier off New York City could send force action and attack upon enemy per- bombers against the metropolis which could sonnel and equipment.* The auxiliary serv- wreck its business and financial district ices were to be rendered under close direc- and by use of poison gas could force the tion and supervision of the ground units to evacuation of the entire area. With refer- which the observation units were assigned; ence to American overseas bases, Cassidy it was believed, however, that pursuit, bom- made a near-prophetic supposition. He said bardment, and attack aviation should be that a few carriers (presumably Japanese) used more or less independently of the could take the Hawaiian Islands. By con- ground units.O8 How much independence of centrating upon one island of the group the air force elements should have became their planes could neutralize it and permit a question of sharp difPerence between establishment of a base there. From that ground and air officers, a difference which base, unless opposed by an equal air force, was to persist into World War 11. they could move at will against each of the The point of view of the ground com- remaining islands in turn.6s After Pearl mander was perhaps expressed most frankly Harbor such a conquest appeared as a prac- and campletely by Maj. Gen. H.E. Ely, com- tical possibility. mandant of the Army War College in 1925. If there was difference of opinion about In a free discussion following a presenta- the function of the air arm in coast defense tion of the air viewpoint by General Pat- and in defense of cities, there was substan- rick, Ely had this to say: tial agreement upon the role of aviation in The Air Force should feel itself flattered by support of ground troops. Air leaders uni- the high opinion we have of it; it isn’t that versally saw this as secondary to the we don’t love them, we love them too much, counter-air force mission; but, at least dur- we want them right with us all the time, ing the first half of the ~O’S,most of them but we don’t want them where some higher air man can say, “Come back, we need you agreed that attack of enemy field forces w& somewhere else.” About the time the com- the chief object once air control had been mander-in-chief of the Army wants the attained. In this respect, most ground and Air Service, it will be like the Cavalry often air officers alike were conditioned by their was in the Civil War, chasing wagon vivid memories of the World War; they trains-the Air Service will be off bombing visualized for the next war the familiar bat- ‘This functional dlvlslon was emphaslzed by the Air Service and was olflcially recognized by the War Department in AR 95-5, AR 95-10, and the Annual Report of the Secretary of tle scene of massed troops, barbed wire, War for 1922. The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development, THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 33 a factory somewhere when the commander- volved, including the heads of the general in-chief will wan: to bomb a certain objec- service schools, seemed to have the impres- tive. We had the experience-and this is sion that the Air Service wanted to fight a personal experience, not from hearsay- where the Air Service given a corps or future wars alone. This was not the idea division commander flitted away without at all, Patrick insisted. He believed that air fully transacting its business. That is why force units might carry out missions in- it is now an organic part of the corps and dependently of the ground troops; but such divisions.(;u missions would be absolutely in accord with The air officers, for their part, were flat- the general plan of operations of GHQ and tered by the opinion of the ground troops; would aim primarily at assisting other they argued, however, that it was not a components of the armed forces to Anal question of vanity, but of efficiency. The victory. Patrick said he would see that Air Service manual on doctrine in 1923 ac- changes in the wording of TR 440-15 were cepted without qualification the proposi- made, as necessary, to convey the correct tion that aviation should be directed toward meaning. The major functions of military the success of the infantry; but it contented aviation, as he saw them in 1924, were that in the furtherance of that principle, neatly summarized in his statement ap- the air striking arm must often wander far proved by the General Staff: “To assist the afield and that there were times when in- ground forces to gain strategical and tacti- direct action was more effective than direct. cal successes by destroying enemy aviation, The principle of concentration and unified by attacking enemy ground forces and other command was stressed repeatedly, as in the objectives on land or sea, and by protect- arguments of General Patrick, referred to ing ourselves from aerial observation and above. mthermore, aerial tactics differed attack.”72 basically from ground tactics, as did naval Argument with the Navy regarding coast tactics. The most efficient operation of the defense air force elements required, therefore, con- The problem between the Air Service and trol by personnel skilled in air operations. the General Staff relating to organization The greater the skill of the air commander, and control of military aviation has already the greater the contribution to ground sup- been given a considerable accounting. port .‘O Equally troublesome, and in some ways even The air leaders were also careful to sug- more exasperating, was the difficulty with gest that ground support, by whatever the Navy regarding coastal defense. Until means of control, was not the only function the advent of the airplane, the lines of de- of military aviation after gaining air con- marcation and responsibility between the trol. General Patrick, when requested to Army and the Navy were relatively simple comment on the possible uses of aircraft in and clear, but the rise of aviation vastly warfare, made the point that airpower, complicated the situation. Both services de- when developed, could carry destruction to veloped their own air arms, operating in the the vitals of an enemy nation, disrupt war same medium, while the broader question of industries, attack communications, and se- what airpower could do to seapower was cure information otherwise inaccessible. He unsolved. also saw aircraft in the next war as carriers General Mitchell, who “destroyed” the of troops and s~pplies.~~At the same time Navy many times over in his writings and Patrick wished to make clear that he speeches, was more enthusiastic about the favored complete coordination of air oper- capabilities of aviation against ships than ations with the efforts of the War Depart- against any other kind of target. To him ment. During the preparation of TR 440-15, and to his followers in the Air Service, the Fundamental Principles of Employment of problem seemed cut and dried; soon after the Air Service, he had opportunity to state the armistice, Mitchell worked out a simple his position. Patrick expressed concern that formula for. aerial defense of U.S. coasts. some of the coordinating authorities in- It involved, first, reconnaissance by air to 34 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development locate approaching air forces and surface ing claim by the official conclusions fleets; second, a series of sky battles to de- of the Joint Army and Navy Board, termine control of the air; third, after con- approved 18 August 1921. While granting trol was attained, direct attack on enemy that the probability of hits would be re- vessels. He worked out a plan of coordinated duced in the case of a ship maneuvering action for the third phase, which was to at high speed, the board stated that with- remain the ideal plan for concerted attack out fighter opposition, attacking bombers on ships for many years. It involved simul- could make an effective percentage of hits taneous action by low-level attack planes with small loss of aircraft. It confirmed, (using cannon and machine guns against further, that existing aerial bombs could deck personnel), high-level bombers (drop- sink or seriously damage any existing ping special purpose armor-piercing projec- types of vessel. Adequate quantities of tiles or depth bombs), submarines (guided bombers were seen by the board as to torpedo attacks by director aircraft), and possibly the decisive factor in coast defense, torpedo notwithstanding the limitations imposed by The basic plan seemed simple enough, but weather and range upon their operations. the key question remained: how effective In any future attack upon the American would such an attack be against well- coast, the Navy must share with the air manned, armored vessels? Mitchell pointed arm its primary function as the first line of to certain theoretical considerations that national defense.7g favored the airplane, such as the power of The Navy agreed that coastal defense the initiative derived from its superior should be shared with the Army and Air speed. He drew attention to the terrific ex- Service. But in what manner? What consti- plosive power of an aerial bomb, by com- tuted the surest and most efficient arrange- parison with its equal weight in a cannon ment for cooperation? General Mitchell an- shell, and asserted that the accuracy of swered such questions in typical unequivo- high-level bombing exceeded that of coast cal fashion. He believed that since “the artillery at twelve-mile range. Finally, after problem of destruction of seacraft [from considerable haggling and frustration, he the air] is now solved and finished,” the successfully arranged for actual bomb-drop- next step-was to provide an adequate air ping tests against retired naval ships. Small organization to assume the entire task. He vessels were easily destroyed in these experi- criticized the existing system of Army ments, but Mitchell’s triumphs came in the coastal defense as wrong; large fixed guns devastating strikes against battleships. On were more expensive and less efficient he 3 October 1920, for instance, the obsolete charged, than an equivalent force in bomb- Indiana was severely wrecked; on 5 Sep- ers. Mitchell proposed that an air force tember 1923, off Cape Hatteras, the Virginia be set up, which would have all antiaircraft and the New Jersey were sent to the bottom weapons under its control and would be with shocking ease. Of course, as the Navy responsible for frontier and coast defense. feverishly explained, those vessels had been The Navy, with its supporting air units, towed out into open water, were incapable would be removed entirely from the shore of maneuver, and were unarmed and un- line, and its assignment would be a purely manned. But even the admirals were offensive one against hostile forces on the abashed at the destructive power shown by high seas.’O General Patrick agreed with aerial bombs against the stoutest naval Mitchell on this proposition. As early as armor. Mitchell, in any event, was 1921,he had declared that the Army air arm thoroughly convinced; after the tests he de- could take over coast defense, that it could clared without reservation that existing perform all the functions of shore-line pa- types of airplanes could seek out and trol, sea search, and attack on hostile ves- destroy all existing classes of seacraft sels.’? In his Annual Report, dated 10 with negligible loss to themselves.7* September 1925, the Chief of the Air Serv- He was largely supported in this sweep- ice asked for additional air strength for The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- -35 this purpose. He pointed out, as had Mitch- based air activities within the control of ell, that the flexibility and striking power commaridants of naval districts and ad- of aircraft had greatly reduced the need vanced bases.79 These rather loose provi- for mobile guns on the ground, and he sions made it possible for both services to pleaded again that a study be made of the make a liberal interpretation of their airplane as the major weapon of seacoast authority. Army aviation, for example, as- defense.’* sumed the right to attack enemy vessels Whatever the opinions of the air leaders, “operating against the coast.” But at what the War and Navy departments moved range were enemy vessels to be considered slowly and cautiously in this no-man’s land as so operating? The Army desired no limits of overlapping jurisdiction. Effort after ef- on range. The Navy, for its part, was to in- fort was made during the interval between terpret its scouting prerogative to include wars to delineate precisely the respective bombing, at any range, of hostile vessels functions and responsibilities of both with which might be sighted, and demanded the regard to coast defense, but all failed to dis- right to use land bombers for this purpose. pel the ambiguity and conflicting interpre- It is easy to see how confusion of responsi- tations that persisted right up to Pearl Har- bility, unwholesome service rivalry, and bor. As far back as March 1917, the Aero- duplication of facilities and functions de- nautical Board, appointed specifically to veloped under these conditions. study this problem, had made a report to Although the Secretary of War and the the secretaries of War and Navy, who ap- Secretary of the Navy gsive joint approval proved its recommendations. This board to the successive agreements covering coast had favored joint development, organiza- defense responsibilities, Army leaders were tion, and operation of Army and Navy outspoken in their criticism of the dual aviation, instead of separate development arrangements. A special board of officers, within delimited areas of responsibility. headed by Brig. Gen. Charles E. Kilbourne, Although the naval air arm would fly chiefly was appointed by General Pershing on over water and the army chiefly over 12 February 1919 to study the problem. The land, the two would be constantly working Kilbourne Board reported that joint respon- together in any war with a first-class power. sibility for coast defense, in effect during For this reason, the Aeronautical Board had the war,:had proved unwise. All the Euro- gone so far as to propose joint training, pean powers had avoided this ambiguity, joint occupation of bases, and the great- and the United States should profit from est possible standardization of equipment. their example by giving responsibility to While opposing the specification of any ex- either one service or the other. The single act line separating Army and Navy air commander would have control of all means spheres, it indicated that such a line, if of coast defense, including naval vessels drawn, would coincide approximately with assigned tp the purpose. The Kilbourne the coast lines of the United States and her group favored the Army for the coast de- possessions. Before an invasion the Navy fense job, because the Army controlled the would have precedence along the coast and mobile ground units which, with the coast in the adjacent water areas; if a hostile defense forces, would have to meet any landing were achieved, the Army would hostile landing. A shift in command of assume precedence. With all this in mind, coast defense forces, at the time of such a the board had spelled out the general duties landing, as provided for in the joint agree- of each service in coast defense as follows: ments, would seriously handicap operations the Army air arm had responsibility for fire against the beachhead.R0 control of coast artillery and for defense of Leaders of the Army’s air arm were es- forts, navy yards, arsenals, shipbuilding pecially concerned about the overlapping works, utilities, and cities; the Navy had activities of military and naval aviation in responsibility for fleet air support, over- coast defense, and they offered from the water scouting from shore bases, and land- beginning a clear-cut and consistent doc- 36 - THE DEVELOPXENTOF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development trine on the matter. General Patrick, for ceded that the Navy should not be discarded example, in July 1923 urged the War De- until a proved substitute for it was found; partment to press for revision of the Joint but he was certain that, at the very most, Army and Navy Board directives. He ob- the Navy’s usefulness was limited to the jected specifically to allowing the Navy to high seas.HzSurface vessels within range of use land-based aircraft as scout-bombers land-based aircraft were doomed, and in and insisted that for reasons of economy consequence, “Expeditions zcross the sea as and security all land-based planes should occurred in the World War will be an be operated by the Army. He would have impossibility.”RGIt is hardly necessary to ob- limited the Navy’s tactical aircraft to fleet- serve that Mitchell underestimated the de- based types.x1In the following year Patrick fensive counter-measures of warships and, officially reiterated these views. He ex- above all, the formidable character of car- plained that confusion still existed as to rier aviation, although such an observation the coordination necessary and the func- is, of course, based on hind-sight. But even tions each service would perform in order more moderdte air leaders, who saw sea- to secure an actual defense. There was only power as dltered rather than eliminated, one practical solution: “The Army Air Serv- agreed with Mitchell on this point. It was ice should be definitely charged with all recwded as a matter of Air Service doctrine operations conducted from shore sta- ’chat oversea invasions would be impossible tions.”H2General Mitchell was of the same against any nation having an adequate air conviction. The Navy’s air units, he con- force.” Under this doctrine, seapower would tended, should stay with its ships and fight be relegated to the task of protecting ship- with them on the high seas. Complete con- ping lanes beyond the range of land-based trol of coast defense should be left to the aircraft. Army; to make this arrangement specific, Pursuit Aviation Mitchell suggested that all naval control During the immediate postwar era, pri- relating to coast defense should cease mary attention was given in the develop- within 200 miles of the shore.Ra But ment of air doctrine to those larger issues neither the Army nor its Air Service was which have been discussed so far in this successful in removing joint control or in chapter: the nature of warfare, organiza- drawing a line which would keep the Navy tion and control of airpower, and the at sea. On the contrary, the Navy was able general functions of military aviation. But in 1938 to effect a reverse twist of Mitchell’s steady progress was also made in spelling suggestion: it wangled a promise from the out tactical doctrines for each of the Secretary of War to keep Army bombers branches of the Air Service. While observa- from flying more than 100 miles to sea.* tion was generally recognized as the princi- The growth of airpower had raised the pal activity of the air arm during the problem, which proved to be a very knotty first World War, the indispensable role of one, of the proper control and employment pursuit in relation to all aviation activities of airplanes in coast defense. Since coast had been clearly established by 1918.t defense meant primarily defense against Pursuit’s primary task was then defined as naval vessels, that problem led to a larger keeping a specified area of the sky clear and more fundamental question: what of enemy planes. A tentative manual under would be the effect of military aviation upon preparation in 1919 described the area as seapower? The views of the air leaders equal in depth to the distance beyond U.S. are not difficult to find on this subject. front lines which was allotted to corps General Mitchell, ready as usual with the and divisional observation squadrons. The first and most extreme statement, declared aerial front to be maintained, at a in 1920, “Personally, I believe that aviation minimum, extended in front of the will completely drive the surface ships off battle line to the range of corps artillery.88 the water in the next war. . . .’’R4 He con- In the years just following the armistice a

*For dlscusslon of this development see below, pp 90-91 Wee above, pp. 7-8. The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE - 3’7 more sweeping concept of pursuit action “stepped up”). All elements in the forma- was officially embraced. As stated by Gen- tion were held within distances to insure eral Mitchell, the primary aim of pursuit mutual aid, and attacks upon enemy planes was not to clear an area, but to destroy the were to be made by successive waves of urlits enemy’s air force-thereby permitting all from the attack and support elements, branches of aviation to perform their spe- striking on converging lines.93It was upon cial duties. He forecast the greatest develop- this general basis, at least in theory, that ment of pursuit, “. . . because this is the pursuit tactics developed during the 1920’s. branch of aviation which assures victory in The biplane continued to be the standard the air.”8DAgain, he declared, “Pursuit design for pursuit during a 10 year period aviation is the basis of en air force, just as following the first World War. Several at- infantry is the base on which an army tempts were made to build a satisfactory rests.” Its superiority rested upon its equip- monoplane, but the engineers and pilots ment. Nothing could resist pursuit, Mitchell alike seemed to agree that only a biplane explained, because it was designed to at- could stand the stresses of pursuit maneu- tack another plane from every possible an- ver at high speeds. Capt. Claire Chennault gle-front, side, and rear-with concen- noted in his pursuit aviation textbook, trated firepower. No large, lumbering air- written in 1933, that the postwar period craft, or collection of them, could provide was, in fact, characterized “by neglect of adequate defense against pursuit. The only pursuit design.” Consequently, the speed of protection against pursuit was pursuit.9o pursuit was but slowly increased through Another mission assigned to this branch of the expedient of successively larger engines; aviation, secondary to relentless air combat, there was no real progress in airframe effi- was attack of personnel and equipment on ciency.!” Although there was not an im- the ground, Airdromes, troop concen- pressive advance in the general perform- trations, convoys, seacraft, and debarkation ance of pursuit, considerable thought was operations were listed as profitable tar- given to developing several types to serve gets.!” special purposes. Among the leaders in pur- The postwar period saw not only an en- suit theory and practice during this period largement of the concept of the pursuit was Major Carl Spaatz, who on 7 February function, but a significant evolution in the 1922 wrote that he conceived of four main tactics of air fighting. During World War pursuit activities, each of which demanded I air combat had been chiefly an individual a different combination of aircraft charac- affair, with each pilot fighting more or teristics. The offensivepursuit plane, whose less independently. It is true that by the job involved aggressive action to secure air time of the armistice, the importance of superiority, required, in order of priority, teamwork and concentration through for- strength of construction, unobstructed pilot mations was increasingly recognized; but visibility, and speed and maneuverability. even in 1919 the tactical unit was limited The defensive pursuit (escort-type) re- to the size of a flight of five or six planes. quired range equal to the aircraft it was When more than one flight was employed protecting, speed superior to the protected on any mission, they operated in a chain planes, flexible machine guns for the ob- formation, mainly for purposes of esprit de server, strength, and maneuverability. corps.o2 By 1923 the group, composed of Night pursuit had a special requirement for four squadrons, had become the standard an engine that needed no warm-up, fast rate pursuit tactical unit, with the squadrons of climb, and slow landing speed. Attack divided into flights. Each squadron and pursuit, which anticipated in concept the each group was normally deployed in three fighter-bomber of World War 11, demanded dimensions for the most effective concen- cockpit visibility, maneuverability, speed, tration and tactical advantage: the attack and armor plate.”; Major Spaatz in making force, the support force, and the reserve, these propositions was opening one of the each flying at a different altitude (usually perennial questions of air doctrine, that re- 38 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development garding the number of aircraft types. actual planning or tactics for strategic Should there be one all-purpose type for bombardment .ni each branch of aviation, or, at the other As to tactics, the theory of the 1920’s as- extreme, should there be a type for every sumed that both day and night operations specialized function? Experience was to were necessary and feasible. Control of the show that no final answer could be reached air, made possible by pursuit superiority, on this question. There is no evidence that would allow bombers to fly in daylight and any effort was made in the postwar to bomb accurately with small losses. For- period to meet the separate sets of mation flying in the standard inverted “V” specifications suggested by Spaatz, but the was prescribed for mutual defense against Air Service did allow considerable experi- enemy pursuit and for concentrated effect mentation with one-seater and two-seater upon the target. Day attacks were to be pursuits models. By the middle-twenties the flown at high altitude in order to minimize principal model appeared to be the one- damage from antiaircraft guns, while the seater Curtiss PW-8A (Hawk). Its 440-horse altitude for night attacks would be gov- power engine gave the Hawk a top speed of erned by the tactical situation. In either 178 miles per hour and a cruising range of case, the Air Service believed that losses 335 miles. It had a service ceiling of 22,000 from ground fire would be rare, and the ex- feet and armament of two .30-cal. or 50- perience of the World War was usually cited cal. machine to confirm the point. Special tactics, essen- Bombardment aviation tially those outlined by Mitchell? in 1920, While pursuit aviation held sway as the for attacking seacraft were stipulated.ns primary element of airpower during the All bombardment was organized in the early 1920’s, there was a steady decline in familiar pattern of flight, squadron, group, the status of bombardment. General and wing (the latter including pursuit Mitchell did what he could to uphold the units). In addition, there was a division of importance of the striking arm; but even he, bombardment into two classes, light and during this period, placed pursuit first. The heavy. The type of airplane conceived for Army in general, and even the Air Service, the former was a single-enginebomber, with backed away from the radical concept of space for a pilot and a crew of one or bombardment employment which had more. Its armament was to consist of frag- emerged at the close of the World War. The mentation bombs, small demolition charges, Gorrell plan for strategic operations against and fixed and flexible machine guns. The Germany, for instance, was generally for- plane was to have long range at cruising gotten, and the training regulations and speed, with provision for a large quantity of fuel. As a matter of fact, few planes of this manuals after 1918 emphasized the auxilia- type ever materialized; the move was to ry, supporting role of bombardment.* The multiengine models for all bombardment idea of strategic operations was not entirely types. The heavy class consisted of models neglected, but it tended to be overshadowed of two or more engines, designed to carry by re-emphasis upon missions in support of a great weight of bombs over long distances. forces in the field. The 1923 Air Service Several of this type appeared during the manual on doctrine specified a variety of 1920’~.~~ missions for the bombardment branch: at- The lag in development of bomber models, tack of naval vessels, action in the theater at least until after 1926, retarded the of operations against field targets, and growth of the aviation force and also the strikes in the zone of the interior against theories of employment. Probably one im- industrial centers and other key objectives. portant reason for the decline of the stra- But the whole context of the manual was tegic airpower idea in the immediate post- one involving large-scale surface operations, war period was the failure of bomber planes and very little attention was given to the to measure up to the sanguine expectations

- ~ ~~ *For dlscussion of the Oorrell plan, see above, pp. 10-12. tSee above, pp. 33-34. The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 39 of Mitchell and his fellow-enthusiasts. AS specialized branch of attack aviation.* Dur- late as June 1926, the general design of the ing the 1920’s, with the personal encourage- newest service bomber showed little im- ment of General Mitchell, considerable at- provement in aerodynamic structure over tention was given to developing precise con- the Martin MB-2 of 1920. All models were cepts of employment and tactics. Leaders underpowered, bomb loads were small in of both the air and ground arms agreed relation to size of plane, ceilings were un- that the aim of attack aviation was imme- der 13,000 feet, and the normal radius of diate support of the field forces; the spe- action was less than 300 miles. Perhaps the cified objectives included troop columns, best bomber of this period was the Curtiss tanks, roads, communications, airdromes, NSB-4 (Condor), built in 1924 and still and cantonments.lozThere was a major dif- being flown in 1930. It was a cleanly de- ference of opinion, however, concerning the signed biplane, powered by two 400-horse- control of these air units and the priority of power engines, and with a top speed of 100 targets. The ground commanders felt that miles per hour-hardly the weapon to ful- attack elements should be assigned to in- fill the prophecies of airpower! loo dividual field armies and remain at their Much of the delay in bomber develop- disposition, while the air commanders op- ment was attributable to insufficient equip- posed dispersion of force and argued for ment for conducting necessary engineering consolidation of all air force units under tests and studies. The Engineering Division GHQ. Also, the Army people favored front- of the Air Service complained of meagre line, morale-boosting action, aimed at appropriations, blaming the situation upon enemy trenches, concentrations, and gun the unfavorable attitude of the War Depart- positions. The airmen believed such attacks ment toward strategic bombing. At any to be wasteful and inemcient, and they in- rate, General Patrick expressed his dissatis- sisted that the normal targets for aviation faction with the slow rate of progress in lay beyond the range of artillery and con- 1924 and ordered the Engineering Division sisted of the supply and communication towcumulate data on the desired specifica- systems in the enemy’s rear.lo3 tions of an improved bomber and to prepare During this period the low-altitude, level it in the form of a circular proposal for dis- attack was most favored in the Air Service. tribution to the aircraft industry. Shortly Planned tactics called for a series of attacks thereafter, the Materiel Division urged that by flights, normally protected by pursuit the outmoded biplane bombers be com- cover. The weapons employed were machine pletely replaced with multiengine mono- guns, cannon, grenades, fragmentation plane models, and research was started to bombs, and chemical bombs. Dive-bombing And a satisfactory design. However, the was considered an inferior method, al- work was virtually limited to two-engine though when assigned to attack missions models, for in 1926 the chief of the Engi- some efforts were made to use pursuit neering Division (as well as the War De- planes in this fashion. High-altitude, level partment) recommended against the de- bombing was reserved as the approved velopment of four-engine aircraft. His method for bombing large targets far to reasons were: high production cost, diffi- the rear.lo4The attack plane itself was con- culty of operation, lack of maneuverability, ceived as a fast, maneuverable ship, with maintenance problems, and higher fuel as much forward firepower as possible and consumption.1o1It was not until some years with capacity for a large number of small later that designers broke through the bar- bombs. The models actually developed at riers of economy, doubt, and fear to build a this time, however, were but modified ver- bofnber which could serve as a true instru- sions of standard observation aircraft. ment of airpower. Mitchell had a special interest in develop- Attack aviation ing armor for attack planes and expected As the war ended in 1918, the Americans success in that direction. As early as 1919 had just begun to see the possibilities of a *See above, p. 12. -40 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development he also had hopes of mounting large-bore Westover was commandant of the school cannon on attack aircraft. Reporting on ex- when the text was released, but the authors perimental work being conducted at the of this interesting document are unknown. Dayton, Ohio, base, Mitchell wrote enthu- In any event, the fundamental doctrines siastically that cannon, up to three-inch enunciated therein became the core of air caIiber, could be used successfully and theory at the school and were reiterated in would "almost revolutionize our tactics in successive revisions of the Air Force text. the air and against objects on the ground." The text well represents the prevailing at- Anticipating the Stormoviks and similar titude of the Air Corps Tactical School, which from 1926 until 1941 opposed (almost models of World War 11, he stated that to the point of heresy) the doctrinal as- cannon already in experimental use (37- sumptions of the War Department. mm.) could pierce any tank made and could TR 440-15' took a broad view of war as hit the target without difficulty.lOj the use of every national resource-mental, Comparative summary of doctrines in 1926 moral, and physical-to bring about victory It is worthwhile to take a careful look at over an enemy. But, following the tradi- the status of air doctrine in 1926 when the tional military view, it specified that the Army Air Corps was created. Close examina- first move was to carry operations into hos- tion reveals th'at there were in existence by tile territory. The primary objective of the then two well-formulated plans for the use Army (including the air arm), furthermore, of airpower; actually, these two plans were was destruction of the enemy's armed to continue as principal alternatives right forces. The mission of the Air Service was down to the outibreak of World War 11. The defined as that of aiding the ground forces view that enjoyed full official support, es- to gain decisive success by destroying pecially from the General Staff and high enemy aviation, attacking surface forces levels of the War Department, was incor- and facilities, and by protecting friendly porated in TR 440-15, Fundamental Prin- ground units from hostile air reconnais- ciples for the Employment of the Air Serv- sance or attack. In addition, the Air Serv- ice, dated 26 January 1926. It represented ice was to furnish observation for informa- the traditional attitude toward warfare in tion and for artillery control, messenger general and airpower in particular, with service, and transportation for special per- recognition of the principle of concentra- sonnel.l0"Although the organization and the tion of combat aircraft and the possibilities training of all air units were based upon of some kind of strategic operations. The their role of assisting the ground forces, TR contrasting view, which was undoubtedly 440-15 stated that control of air units supported unofficiallyby the majority of air would vary according to their types and the officers, was comprehended in a single text- tactical situation. Some units would always book published at the Air Service Tactical operate as organic elements of ground com- School in April 1926. This text was for use mands; others might be attached tempo- in a course named Employment of Com- rarily or might cooperate by indirect sup- bined Air Force (later called simply Air port in the battle area or at a remote Force), and it set forth the most advanced distance. lo7 Following the recommendation theories regarding the nature of war and of the Lassiter Board,? the regulation pro- the function of military aviation. While vided observation aviation as an integral other texts at the school showed a conserva- part of infantry divisions, corps, and armies, tive bent, with due obeisance and reference with a reserve under GHQ. An air force of to pertinent regulations and policies of attack and pursuit units was assigned to higher authority, this manual appears to each field army, and a substantial force of have been written with a great degree of bombardment and pursuit aviation was independence-composed largely from theo- *TR 440-15, Fundamental Principles for the Employment of retical concepts of the problem, unre- the Air Service, 26 Jan. 1026, waa prepared under direction of Maj. Gen. M. M. Patrick, Chief of Air Service, and issued by stricted by directive from above. Maj. Oscar order of the Secretary of War. tSee above, pp. 26-21. The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 41 made a part of GHQ. It was assumed that point of various ground situations.” Reflect- when a field army became involved in ing the General Staff view, this text ques- important operations, it would be supported tioned the morale value of bombing civil- by GHQ aviation. Emphasis was placed ian population centers and deplored the upon the mobility and adaptibility of the fact that independent bombardment opera- GHQ air force, described as capable of tions were “popularly conceived to be the Great freedom of movement, making it true role of that class of aviation.”l1° In the possible to rapidly concentrate superior later view of a ranking Air Force general, forces at important points when necessary. this document represented “The deteriora- The GHQ air force may assist the army in tion of the strategic idea . . . .”l1I However, the execution of tactical missions by being strange as it may seem, the text for a com- employed on the battle front . . . or, in- directly, when conditions are favorable, by panion course at the Tactical School, carrying out special missions at great dis- taught in the same year, contained the tances from the ground forces. most advanced statement of air doctrine TR 440-15 admonished against breaking up then in existence. Employment of Combined the GHQ force, except in “special and tem- Air Force, a course which would appear to porary situations.” This powerful “all-pur- be on a higher doctrinal level than the Bom- pose” unit could be used for coast defense bardment course, rested upon a far different as well as for the operations already de- concept of the nature of war and the role scribed.IO8 of airpower. The function; and tactics prescribed for The Combined Air Force text stated the specific classes of aviation-observation, mission of the air force to be cooperation pursuit, bombardment, and attack-were with the military and naval forces “in fur- virtually the same as those discussed in therance of the national war policy.”112 this chapter under the appropriate head- Here the air arm was clear€y Conceived as a ings. Special attention was given to defin- coordinate branch of the nation’s armed ing the task of the bombers. Destruction of forces, rather than subordinate to the in- hostile military and naval targets was given fantry. Furthermore, the aim of war policy priority although allowance was made for was not to destroy enemy armies, but to other aims-such as the damaging of enemy destroy the enemy’s morale and win to re- morale. Bombardment might aid the in- sist. Any effective means, including destruc- fantry by striking objectives such as com- tion of field forces, could be chosen to this munications and military industrial cen- end; at the beginning of hostilities the best ters beyond the range of artillery. A means might be air attack on the enemy’s distinction was drawn between tactical and interior. Such action strategical bombing: the former was re- is a method of imposing will by terrorizing stricted to the combat zone and the latter the whole population of a belligerent coun- reached into the zone of interior. Although try while conserving life and property to the greatest extent. It is a means of im- strategic operations were not considered to posing will with the least possible loss by involve direct cooperation with ground heavily striking vital points rather than by forces, TR 440-15 emphasized that they gradually wearing down an enemy to ex- should be based on the “broad plan of op- haustion .‘ erations of the military forces.”loo If destruction of the enemy’s morale The 1926 text for the Bombardment through attacks on the interior was not course at the Air Service Tactical School possible at the outbreak of war, then the was even more conservative than the War air force objective had to be selected with Department regulation. It stated that the a view to destroying the enemy’s military bombardment operations considered in the strength. Most suitable objectives for this course would be those in conjunction with purpose were the hostile air force, troops, large forces of ground troops rather than lines of communication, concentration cen- those of an independent character. Hence ters, and industrial and transportation the approach was always “from the stand- centers.Iy“ 42 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development Control and assignment of air units fol- attack and should be completely destroyed lowed the basic pattern outlined in TR before the attack was shifted to other im- 440-15. However, in the Combined Air Force portant elements. Progressive destruction course even greater emphasis was given to of vital parts of the enemy system would the importance of the GHQ air force. It was lead eventually to collapse of the enemy seen as a mobile element of tremendous nation.Il5 power, which should be held intact to guar- The full meaning of this concept of mili- antee control of the air and to make deci- tary aviation, as conceived at the Tactical sive attacks whenever and wherever re- School, was perhaps best articulated in the quired. Elaborating the principle stated in pages of the text devoted to various phases TR 440-15, the Combined Air Force text of air operations. The first phase covered stressed the characteristics of mobility and the period of national mobilization and con- concentration : centration of forces in the event of war. By virtue of its great mobility this force can During this period the air force would be be used to make successive concentrations employed in a st,rategic, independent man- of air forces in different sectors of op- ner to prevent the completion of hostile eration and it can be moved from one thea- preparations. Its chief objectives would be ter of operations to another with compara- tive ease. With such a force, it is possible the enemy air force, mobilization centers, to concentrate superior forces at important munitions factories, communication ten- points where and when necessary to assume ters, and concentration areas, and it would and maintain offensive action.114 have the secondary aim of reducing civilian Thus the important ideas of Mitchell, morale as a by-product of these attacks. Patrick, and other air leaders regarding Defensively, the air force would operate to organization and control of combat aviation protect the seacoast; this would probably were upheld in the text. involve cooperative action by pursuit, at- Strategic operations against the enemy’s tack, and bomber forces against surface interior were given a place second only to vessels.116The second phase covered the pe- command of the air. The text admitted that riod between concentration of forces and the ultimate effect of strategic employment the actual contact of ground elements. The of air forces on warfare was to some extent main air effort would then be directed conjectural since lack of experience pre- against the enemy air force; control of the vented accurate prediction. However, it sky would have a crucial influence upon the stated that the power of aviation far ex- developing surface battle. Pursuit was to ceeded any other means of offensive action. seek out enemy aircraft and give protection Strategic air operations could and should to bombers and attack planes; attack units continue even when grouxid units were would strike at airdromes and troops; bom- forced to take the defensive; it was con- bardment would then undertake tactical as sidered the only means available to a com- well as strategic operations. Seacoast de- mander for striking quickly and decisively fense would in this phase consist of attacks at the enemy’s bases and concentration upon landing forces and ships approaching centers. It was also the weapon which could the ~h0re.l~~The third phase was the pe- be used to destroy morale and sources of riod following ground contact and deploy- supply with the least expenditure of effort ment of the main forces. Under conditions and materiel. The text pointed out further of open warfare the air force mission would that strategic operations would divert be essentially the same as in the second enemy personnel and materiel to defensive phase; but if a stabilized situation should action and thereby weaken his forces at the develop on the ground, it would call for point of decisive tactical operations. Fi- the greatest possible concentration of air nally, it was emphasized that strategic op- forces in GHQ reserve, to be thrown into erations had to be conducted according to action for either tactical or strategic pur- a well-defined plan. A key element of the poses as the need arose. Third-phase sea- enemy’s organization should be selected for coast defense would mean attack upon an The Heroic Age of Doctrinal Development - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 43 enemy who had established a base on shore. and the Employment of Combined Air Force Targets would be landing terminals, trans- text. While the question of air organization ports, debarkation points, and surrounding seemed temporarily answered in the crea- rail f acilities.llH tion of the Air Corps in 1926, the unresolved In the event, the division of air operations questions about the use of airpower pointed to a continued struggle over devel- into phases proved to be what unrealistic, opment, control, and employment. In the but it served, along with the earlier dis- decade which followed, the production of cussion, to illustrate the role of military radically new airplane models-weapons aviation in the national defense and offense, capable of successful strategic attack- as seen by instructors at the Tactical would turn the tide in favor of the air war School. The major issues of air doctrine concept and force another step in the di- were thus clearly joined between TR 440-15 rection of autonomy for the air arm. CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR FORCE IDEA, 1926-1935

HE PRINCIPAL change in the tenor of thinkers as Milling, Gorrell, Mitchell, T the arguments over airpower, in the Foulois, end Patrick. But tactical doctrine period from 1926 to 1935, derived from tech- for immediate use had to be fitted to the nological advances in aircraft production. performance of planes actually in existence. The standard theories, representing the tra- Aircraft specifications reflected, within ditional position of the War and Navy de- technological limits at a given time, the partments on the one hand, and the “new desires of the air doctrinaires; the perform- warfare” view of the Air Corps on the ance of the planes, once off the drawing other, held up face-to-face during the dec- boards and in the air, modified in turn the ade. Very few new ideas appeared in this articulation of theory. There were occasions prolonged debate, but the production of new when unforeseen technological advances weapons which could actually fulfill the upset major premises of doctrine, but these airmen’s visions gave them a renewed as- were rare. The period 1926 to 1935 was surance of ultimate success. As a conse- especially interesting as a time when air- quence, even while old-line military per- craft performance clearly responded to the sonnel refused to budge in their basic demands of doctrine, and in so doing, ex- assumptions, the air leaders plunged ahead ercised a revolutionary effect upon at least eagerly, developing their theories in greater one aspect of air theory.’ detail, confident that sooner or later their fundamental notions would carry the day. Efforts to stimulate improved aircraft By 1935 the War Department was forced design to make another compromise with the. ris- As was mentioned in the preceding chap- ing pressure when it established the GHQ ter,* little progress has been made in Air Force as a tactical unit of the Army. bomber design before 1926. In March 1927, But although the new weapons aided the trying to speed up the still lagging develop- general advance of airpower, they had a ment, General Patrick outlined to the chief concurrent effect which temporarily divided of the Materiel Division the minimum char- the air leaders themselves; they contributed acteristics needed for “expanding tactical to doctrinal revolution relative to functions requirements.” These were, indeed, modest of pursuit and bombardment. The center of specifications, only slightly higher than this revolution and of the over-all develop- those already built into the current Curtiss ment of air theory after 1926 was the Air NSB-4 (Condor). Patrick wanted a speed of Corps Tactical School. 115 miles per hour at 10,000 feet, bomb load of 2,000 pounds, radius of action of 400 DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGH-SPEED BOMBER miles, and service ceiling of 15,000 feet.’ The Keystone XB-1 and the Curtiss XB-2 From the earliest concept of airpower, were produced according to the above dating back to the first World War, there standards and were delivered for service has been an interesting interaction between test in 1928. Both proved disappointing, theory on the one hand and aircraft per- however, to the bombardment leaders. They formance on the other. Almost from the be- showed no significant advance in design ginning the unlimited potentialities of air- over existing types; and while the XB-2, power were appreciated by such pioneer *See above, pp. 38-39. 44 Development of the Air Force Idea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 45 chosen as the better of the two, was some- The chief of the Materiel Division balked at what superior in performance to the NSB-4, this proposal, indicating that it was un- it fell short of the plane hoped for by vet- sound, and for many months correspond- eran pilots like Maj. Hugh Knerr, the ence was exchanged on the subject. Fi- doughty commander of the 2d Bombard- nally, Knerr crystalized the matter once ment Group, who had his sights fixed far again by writing to the chief of the Mate- beyond the XB-2. He wanted an all-metal riel Division in February 1929. He urged de- monoplane day bomber with a minimum velopment of the day-bomber type which speed of 160 miles per hour and a ceiling of he had suggested more than six months be- 18,000 feet.“ He insisted that two types of fore. The specifications were only slightly bombers were necessary to meet tactical revised and this time carried the approval requirements: a high-flying, heavily armed of the bombardment board appointed to re- plane of short range for daylight, precision view aircraft specifications and of the Air operations,. and a long-range, heavy-ca- Corps Tactical School. Nevertheless, con- pacity plane for night-time, general at- trary to this request, the Materiel Division, tacks. He argued that no single model, cer- complying with final orders from General tainly none in existence, could effectively Fechet, developed the Douglas XO-35 as a serve both requirements, Knerr was antici- two-engine observation model; a modified pating with great accuracy the eventual version of this ship, the XO-35A, was to be development of day bombers (B-17 and used for day bombardment.’ The 0-35 was B-24) by thi Americans for operations a gull-wing monoplane with metal monoco- against Germany, and the design of night que fuselage and carried a crew of three. bombers (Wellington, Stirling, and Lan- Although representing some advance in caster) by the British for area attacks at aerodynamic structure, it was not ade- night. But‘ the General Staff was skeptical quately suited to either observation or in 1928 and urged standardization through bombardment purposes and was soon su- development of a single, all-purpose model, perseded by more specialized types.R presumably for economy and production reasons. The “bomber battle” between the Successful development of two-engine Air Corps and the General Staff was now bombers: the B-9 and B-10 on in earnest-and it would continue up to In spite of the apparent setback, Knerr 1940.‘ and the other bombardment enthusiasts Major Knerr pointed to the folly of re- continued to agitate for more powerful, stricting bomber design in the interest of specialized bombers. They succeeded during standardization and charged that such 1930 in having issued by the Air Corps a cir- hampering would lead to the loss of the cular design proposal for an advanced Army’s most powerful weapon through in- heavy bomber. Six leading manufacturers correct employment. He was upheld in this responded and submitted experimental view by Lt. Col. C. C. Culver, commanding models for comparative tests; these proved the 2d Bombardment Wing. Culver, like to be the most important bombardment Knerr, favored “a single purpose airplane competitions to date, and the models rather than one which may be susceptible showed aerodynamic improvements which to modification to adapt it to other uses, greatly heartened the bomber proponents. thereby making it a mediocre all-purpose The year 1930, which saw the initiation of airplane rather than a first-class single these design advances may be regarded, purpose one.”“ Despite these arguments, the therefore, as the major turning point in Chief of the Air Corps, then Maj. Gen. bomber development in the period between James E. Fechet, yielded to the view of the wars. Success of these two-engine models General Staff and directed the Materiel was to open the way to still faster and Division to proceed with development of a larger planes-planes with the range and fast, two-engine plane for day and night load which would make strategic airpower bombardment, as well as for observation.G a reality.!) 46 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea The two outstanding models in the D. Foulois, then Chief of the Air Corps. heavy bomber competition were the Boeing Foulois wanted their comments and recom- XB-901 (B-9) and the Martin XB-907 mendations regarding future bomber de- (B-10). The former, an all-metal, low-wing velopment. Many novel ideas were sub- monoplane of clean design, was delivered mitted, as might be expected, but the trend first for flight test. Two 600-horsepower en- of thought was distinctly toward a large, gines gave the Boeing entry a speed of 186 four-engine ship, capable of flying hundreds miles per hour at 6,000 feet, which was some of miles at high altitude and with heavy 60 miles per hour faster than the speed of load, to attack either sea or land targets. In any existing service bomber. The extra the Materiel Division intensive research wa!s speed was not attained through extra horse- launched to meet and solve the countless power, however, but by structural refine- technological problems involved in con- ments and reduction in drag resulting from struction of such a plane-more efficient incorporation of a retractable landing gear. streamlining, greater construction strength Even more striking was the performance to meet the higher speeds and wing- of the Martin entry, a plane that looked, as loadings, adequate defensive armor and well as acted, the part of a modern bomber. firepower, and more powerful engines. The It was a mid-wing, all-metal monoplane basic challenge was, of course, more than with retractable gear; when tested in 1932 the Materiel Division alone could answer; the Martin showed a speed of 207 m.p.h. the "ideal" plane of the bomber proponents and a ceiling of 21,000 feet. The over-all called for the best engineering thought performance rated it as the fastest and and production skill that American indus- most powerful bomber in the world.'" The try could 0ffer.I' United States had forged ahead in bom- The B-17 Flying Fortress bardment weapons and was to retain that In 1933 the Air Corps issued a new circu- the years which followed. lar design proposal for an advanced multi- Both the Boeing B-9 and Martin B-10 engine bomber. All but one of the inter- became official Army aircraft, and they ested manufacturers assumed that this established a new standard of performance meant a superior two-engine model; Boeing and design. During 1932 the Materiel Divi- engineers, however, decided to undertake sion took steps to improve all heavy bomber the development of a four-engine bomber of equipment. Emphasis was placed on mono- radical design. Only twelve months were plane design, all-metal construction, and allowed by the Air Corps for construction of streamlining; the transition from wood- an experimental model, but in September and-fabric to metal was virtually complete 1934, the XB-17 emerged as a workable de- by 1935." Even more significant, however, sign, The Boeing ship incorporated many was the consequence of the success of these improvements-all of the best aircraft fea- new bombers upon the development of tures which had been developed since con- larger aircraft. Supporters of the strategic struction of the B-2. It carried bombs in- bombardment idea had always seen the de- ternally, heated quarters were provided for sirability of large planes, since both range the crew inside the fuselage, every possible and load are primarily a function of size. protuberance was eliminated to make an However, until this time it had been be- aerodynamically clean structure, and ma- lieved that size mitigated against speed. chine guns were installed to be fired from Development of the B-9 and B-10 demon- enclosures in the fuselage. The service-test strated that aerodynamic efficiency could model, which made a sensational, record- be increased with size, thereby providing breaking flight from Seattle to Dayton in an open sesame for development of bigger August 1935 was a mid-wing, all-metal and faster bombers. monoplane of 103-foot span (the Martin Sensing the new possibilities, pilots re- B-10 had a span of 70 feet). Its weight was sponded eagerly to a questionnaire distrib- 35,000 pounds (the B-10 weighed 9,000), uted in March 1933 by Maj. Gen. Benjamin and it mounted four 850-horsepower radial Development of the Air Force Idca THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 47 engines. Top speed was 250 miles per hour tent with what the B-17 could do, the at 14,000 feet, and the service ceiling was leaders of the air arm championed experi- 30,000 feet. The XB-17 could carry a load of mental development and construction of 2,500 pounds for a range of 2,260 miles at still larger models. As early as July 1933, cruising speed; it was capable of a maxi- the Materiel Division had started a prelimi- mum bomb haul of 5,000 pounds for a range nary study for the design of a four-engine of 1,700 miles. So impressive were the pre- monoplane bomber to solve the problem of liminary tests of the Boeing entry that the maximum range with a 2,000 pound bomb Air Corps recommended the purchase of 65 load. Favorable results in pertinent tests at XB-17’s for delivery in 1936.13 Wright Field had prompted the Air Corps to Here, at last, was the Yind of airplane submit Project A, for the building of such a fondly dreamed of by the air planners. Such plane, to the War Department. It was ap- leaders in bombardment as Hugh Knerr, proved in principle, and in June 1934 the Frank M. Andrews, Follett Bradley, C. C. Chief of Staff authorized contractual nego- Culver, Herbert A. Dargue, Harold L. tiations with Boeing. The resulting XB-15, George, Robert Olds, Kenneth Walker, Don- far larger (149-foot wing span) than the ald Wilson, and Walter H. Frank were very B-17, was not completed until 1937, and it enthusiastic over this realization of a con- proved inadequate in performance. The en- cept-a long-range, self-defended, offensive gineering experience gained in its develop- terror of the skies-truly, a Flying Fortress. Lt. Col. Henry H. Arnold seemed at the time ment, however, was invaluable in the sub- more favorable toward bombers of medium sequent design and construction of specification, like the B-lo’s, which he had super-planes like the B-29 and the B-36.1G led in a spectacular mass flight to Alaska during the summer of 1934.14 But Arnold TREND OF DOCTRINE AT THE AIR CORPS could write later in his memoirs that when TACTICAL SCHOOL the first delivery of B-17’s was made to the The appearance of the B-9 and B-10 in bombardment group at Langley Field in the the early 1930’s, the performance of the spring of 1936, “This was the first real B-17, and the promise of even greater things American air power.” The B-17’s were not just prophecies, coastal planes, or promis- to come, sharply stimulated the develop- ing techniques, but, he wrote warmly, “for ment of air doctrine. If the center for tech- the first time in history air power that you nological advance in the Air Corps was the could put your hand on.” The four-engine Materiel Division at Wright Field, the cen- bomber was the main turning point in the ter for doctrinal progress was the Air Corps course of the development of airpower and, Tactical School, moved in July 1931 from concluded Arnold, of world power. The re- Langley to Maxwell Field, Alabama. At this tired general, who commanded America’s school instructors and students alike air might during World War 11, went on to wrestled vigorously with such problems as insist that technological advance, as ex- the nature of war, the employment of air- pressed in the B-17, had been the true key power, and tactical doctrines for the in- to America’s air strength. He discounted the theory, generally held in the air arm, dividual branches of military aviation. The that independent air organization could function of the school was not only to de- have brought airpower much sooner. The velop new ideas but, more important, to power lay not in organization or unsup- attempt to coordinate individual notions ported theory; it lay in the four-engine into a unified and consistent body of doc- b0rnber.l” trine. Although too far removed from actual But the B-17 represented in no way the experience, as some thought, the instructors final goal of the bombardment leaders. It at the school performed the very necessary was power achieved; it opened the way to task of specifying and detailing the items of still greater power in the future. Not con- air doctrine, which, though existing in gen- 48 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea era1 form since 1918, had lacked definite OCAC took sharp issue; and on 1 September and precise form.* 1928 Maj. Gen. James E. Fechet replied to Concepts of the nature of war: influence of Culver with a lengthy criticism of the Mitchell and Douhet school’s propositions and a directive to re- The view held at the Air Corps Tactical write the paper according to the concepts specified by OCAC. The author of Fechet’s School regarding the nature of modern war and proper aerial employment was outlined letter, signed by his executive officer, L. W. McIntosh, is not known; but the fact re- as early as 1926 in the text for the course, Employment of Combined Air Force.? In the mains that at this time, on paper at least, text the air arm was envisioned as a branch the OCAC appeared to be far ahead of the coordinate with the nation’s land and sea thinking of the Tactical School. forces, having as its aim the destruction of The general purport of the school paper the enemy’s morale and will to resist, pref- was to place the air arm as an auxiliary erably by means of attack on the interior. to the ground force. Correcting this view, It is difficult to determine to what extent OCAC declared that airpower was coordi- this concept was actually accepted by offi- nate with land and seapower and that it had cers at the school and in the Air Corps gained sufficiently in importance greatly generally. It appears to have been as radi- to “influence, if not entirely remove the cal a doctrine as any later promoted at necessity in some cases, particularly at the the school, but there seems little doubt beginning of a campaign, of the ground that such notions gained momentum dur- forces ever coming into contact.” Hence, ing the ‘30’s and were expressed with modern war might conceivably become an greater emphasis and detail. Some of all-air operation. To the premise that oc- this trend in the broad concept of cupation by infantry was necessary to end war was due, no doubt, to the technological a war, OCAC replied by rejecting the as- advance of aircraft. Some of it was due also sumption completely. Victory was achieved, to the influence of personalities outside the stated OCAC, when the enemy’s will to re- walls of the Tactical School-in this coun- sist was overcome; armies and navies were try and abroad. One figure of towering in- only means to that end, and airpower might fluence, though now a civilian, was Billy achieve it without reference to surface Mitchell; another was the famed Italian forces. prophet of the air, Giulio Douhet. The conservative position of the Tactical In spite of the advanced concept of war School, as represented in 1928, is mysterious contained in the Combined Air Force text and unexplained, but in any event it was of 1926, the ideas set forth as school doc- soon to be altered. Perhaps the sharp criti- trine in 1928 were extremely conservative. cism from OCAC was the turning point. So conservative was the official state- Certainly, no such statements were to ema- ment, supposedly representing the com- nate from Maxwell Field, whence the school posite judgment of the faculty, that it be- was transferred in 1931. Instead, the came a matter of serious dispute with the texts, lectures, and doctrinal papers there Office of Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC). smacked of the ideas of Billy Mitchell, who A paper, The Doctrine of the Air Force,-was was writing and lecturing tirelessly as a submitted to Washington by the Comman- private citizen. The earlier attitude of dant, Col. C. C. Culver, in an effort to gain Mitchell on the nature of modern war has sanction for a consistent air force theory been described in the preceding chapter;?? which might then be propagated at the by 1930 he had become even more consist- school and throughout the Army. On most ent and dogmatic in his radicalism. Some ~-crucial points, however, the officers in believed that this development resulted in *For dlscusslon of the origin and early years of the Tactlcal part, at least, from the influence of Douhet, School, see above, pp. 39-30. Comments on the iunctlon of the school are based on pertinent regulations, interviews by the who has been described as Mitchell’s coun- author wlth officers who have been associated with the school and the USAF Historical Division‘s History of the Air Corp; terpart in Europe. Douhet himself was also Tactical School. ?For dlscusslon of thls concept, see above, pp. 41-43. ?:See above, pp. 16-18. Development of the Air ForceIdea THE:DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 49 being quoted directly and frequently at the would be assumed by the means best con- Tactical School. In order to analyze and ceived for attack-namely the air arm. All evaluate the Mitchell-Douhet influence up- national resources should be marshaled for on doctrine in the Air Corps, it will be construction of the maximum bomber necessary to review briefly the career and force, which must be held ready in peace writings of Giulio Douhet. in order to strike immediately and deci- Douhet, an officer of the Italian Air sively in war. Other classes of aviation, Force during World War I, had come out save necessary reconnaissance, could be of that conflict with a firm conviction that ignored, while the bombers would be de- future warfare would be predominantly in signed to strike in mass-first, at enemy the air. Aggressive, stubborn, and egoistic, air forces on the ground and second, at he made something of the same kind of political and industrial centers. Thus, impression in his native country as Mitchell an air force might obtain victory without did in America. Douhet, however, was more intervention of surface forces, if it quickly successful personally in gaining ultimate secured command of the air and then used official support for his views. Under the it to bomb vital targets without respite. Fascist regime the doctrine and organiza- Douhet foresaw that under such con- tion of the Regia Aeronautica (Italian Air ditions the enemy civilian population might Force) closely followed the theories of be forced to yield within a few days.*O Douhet, whose doctrines meanwhile were re- Much of what Douhet wrote regarding ceiving approval in aviation circles abroad. the nature of war was to be supported by He was least known, perhaps, in the United later theorists and actual experience. Much, States; for although Douhet worked steadily on the other hand, was to prove overdrawn on his theories from 1909 until his death in or erroneous. Yet, as in the case of Mitchell, 1930, no published English translation of the trend of military development followed his works appeared in this country until in the general direction conceived by Dou- 1933.’* het. Air attack alone has yet to force the The ideas of Douhet were set forth in surrender of a major power (although the several of his writings, beginning with situation was approached in the strikes Command of the Air, published in 1921. against Japan in 1945), but more powerful This study was revised and republished in weapons of the future may one day make with the blessing of the Italian Air the Douhet thesis come true. The two ma- 1927 jor flaws in his thinking were his under- Ministry. In 1930 he wrote a book-length estimation of the strength of civilian morale article for the Rivista Aeronautica, entitled and his discounting of the effectiveness of “The War of 19-”; this article, written on pursuit (at least in terms of the aircraft request of the magazine’s editor, was an and tactics of his day).” This latter error imaginary projection of future war, fought was to be repeated in the dominant thought according to the Douhet theory. A summa- of the Air Corps Tactical School during the tion of his most important writings, includ- 1930’s.* ing the article and Command of the Air, Regardless of the evaluation of Douhet, was published in 1932.19It is not difficult to as determined by hindsight, he was taken summarize Douhet’s ideas regarding the very seriously in his time and had exten- nature of modern warfare, which he saw sive influence among air theorists. Just from the particular point of view of his own how much influence he had on American country. Douhet held that the next war .thought is a moot question; but the consen- would be a total war of peoples and national sus is that, directly or indirectly, it was resources; victory would go to the side substantial. Billy Mitchell is usually cited which first destroyed the material and as the American leader who came the near- moral resistance of the other. He believed est to reflecting Douhet’s ideas about the that armies and navies would play essen- nature of modern war,22but it is impossi- tially defensive roles, while the offensive ‘See below, pp. 58-60, 82-83. 50 - ”HE DEVELOPMENTOP AIR DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea ble to determine how much of Mitchell’s can neutralize anything.. .on the surface thought was original and how much he of the earth or water. It can operate,all owed external influences. In any cases, over the world from land bases. A nation to now expresses its strength by the sir power certainly by 1930, Mitchell and Douhet it has, capable of reaching through the air appeared to hold almost indentical views. the vital centers of other nations. . . . This True, the American wrote from a different means that aircraft should be develoOed geographic and strategic situation; had with sufEcient range and striking power to Mitchell been an Italian, he would doubtless threaten any nation that stands in the have sounded even more like the twin of way of national policy. Douhet. In his early writings, Mitchell gave And, supporting once again the special some attention to air attack against armies notions of Douhet, Mitchell declared that and navies, but gradually he shifted to the any military threat against a nation “must position which Douhet had assumed from be one against its population and resources, the Arst: armed forces could be ignored not against its army and navy . . . nomat- while driving home massed air attacks upon ter whether armed forces, on the water or the enemy’s vital centers.23 even in the air try to res*? t, they cannot In some respects, Mitchell came to appear stop b~mbardrnent.”~~/ even more radical than his Italian counter- How deeply did thd Douhet-Mitchell theories penetrate the thinking of Air Corps part. As egrly as 1927, he declared flatly that “The airplane is now the arbiter of the leaders? The evidence indicates that Ameri- nation’s destiny,” and “The airplane is the can airmen found inspiration and support future arbiter of the world’s destiny.”24In from the ringing claims and predictions of 1928 he was still making occasional refer- the two air prophets. They were not often ence to air attacks against surface forces,*5 familiar, from first-hand reading, with the but in 1930 he wrote that war is an attempt details of Douhet’s doctrine, and they some- by one nation to impress its will on another times disagreed with portions of it; but they by force. cheered Douhet’s emphasis on the impor- tance and power of aviation and regarded The attempt of one combatant, therefore, him as a vahable ally in the fight for recog- is to so control the vital centers of the other that it will be powerless to defend nition. General Ira C. Eaker has neatly itself. . . .From the dawn of history nations sudmed up the attitude of most Air Corps have Put armies in the fleld and launched officers by stating that Douhet was very them at these hostile centers. . . . Gradually useful for his publicity value and for quot- the theory grew up that the object was to ing as an authority in support of Air Corps destroy the hostile army, thereby opening arguments. to his doctrine, Eaker re- the nation for invasion. But development of As firearms has progressed to the point where garded it as extreme-possibly true for the an army is no longer able to advance rap- future, but not for the time being.28An ex- idly. . . . The advent of air power which can ample will serve to illustrate how Air Corps go straight to the vital centers and entirely officers might make use of Douhet’s writ- neutralize or destroy them has put a com- ing. On 9 May 1933, as a supplement to his pletely new complexion on the whole sys- testimony before a Congressional commit- tem of making war. It is now realized that the hostile main army in the fleld is a false tee, Maj. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois, then objective and the real objectives are the Chief of the Air Corps, sent 30 mimeo- vital centers. The old theory.. . is unten- graphed copies of a translation of Douhet’s able. Armies themselves can be disregarded air warfare doctrine to Rep. John J. Mc- by air power if a rapid stroke is made Swain, chairman of the committee. In the against the opposing centers. . . .26 letter of transmittal, Foulois stated that By 1935 Mitchell proposed airpower as a the paper “presents an excellent exposition means of world dominance, reaching be- of certain principles of air warfare.”20 yond Douhet’s concept of a weapon for It might be expected that if there was any survival and control in Europe. “Air power,” serious study of Douhet’s doctrine, it would Mitchell wrote in unpublished notes for an have taken place at the Air Corps Tactical article, School. According to Maj. Gen. Walter H. Development of the Air Force Idea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 51 Frank, Ret., who exercised direction of the Arnold could write in his memoirs that the school during its last years at Langley Field, school had been teaching the Douhet a translation of Douhet’s theory was made theories as an abstract science for several at Langley and issued to all students years.34Examination of doctrine, as it was there. There is no documentary evidence to taught and promulgated at the school, substantiate this, however, and the earliest shows that the concept of war as seen there copy of any Douhet translation to be found was similiar in most respects to the views in the school archives is one which was of Douhet. But it also differed in some ways, placed in the library after the move to Max- and the only fair conclusion seems to be well Field. This was a translation from the that Douhet was only one of many influ- Italian of Douhet’s article, “The War of ences which impinged upon the Tactical 19-,” in Rivista Aeronautica of March School. 1930. The library record shows that five General statements at ACTS on the na- copies of this article were produced and ture of warfare reflected the basic Mitchell- made available for reference in November Douhet view. The Air Force course text, 1931, but apparently little use was made of written in June 1934, established national them.* Gen. Laurence S. Kuter has denied morale and industry as more crucial objec- that Douhet had any considerable influence tives than enemy armies. The easiest and at the school, having stated that the only cheapest way to win a war was thought to translation he had ever seen was one made be by air attack upon the enemy’s popu- in 1933 by Mrs. Dorothy Benedict, aided by lation and production facilities. In support Capt. George Kenney. This was a transla- of such ideas, a number of foreign military tion from a French magazine, Les Ailes, of authorities (not including Douhet) were an article based upon extracts from three quoted: Gen. Eric Ludendorff, Gen. Max de of Douhet’s works. Mrs. Benedict’s transla- Montgelas, and Prof. Andr6 Ma~er.~~In pre- tion was reproduced by mimeograph in paring A Study of Proposed Air Corps Doc- Washington, D.C.,”O and copies were placed trine in January 1935, the school made the in the school library at Maxwell Field. Gen- following assumptions, among others: 3G eral Kuter has declared, however, that the 1. Air Forces must be employed offen- study was employed only for reference and sively. The ideal combination in war is was never used or quoted extensively in an air offensive and ground defensive. tests, lectures, or official utterances at the 2. The only practical means of defense Tactical School.31In addition to the article against air attack is counter-air at- from Les Ailes, there was a summary state- tack. ment, in mimeographed form, by Col. 3. In a war between major powers, an air Charles DeF. Chandler, Ret., of the “Air force phase, which may be decisive, Warfare Doctrine of Gen. Douhet.” This was will start before ground contact. copied from Chandler’s article in the US. 4. Initial operations are of the greatest Air Services for May 1933 and was available importance. No nation can afford to at the So far as is known, no other decline the role of aggressor and sacri- sources in English for Douhet’s writings Ace the opportunity of attacking an were available in this country until 1941.33 enemy that may be unprepared. Although actual use of Douhet’s writings Douhet himself would have been proud to appears to have been very limited, his basic have written the above, and Mitchell in ideas were apparently well known at the 1935 would surely have accepted it. The Tactical School. Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson, Axis powers apparently had similar notions, Ret., who was one of the leading theorists and they put them into practice before at Maxwell Field during the ’~O’S,has said another decade was ended-notably in Po- that he had never read Douhet all the way land and at Pearl Harbor. through and, in any case, disagreed with Instructors who participated in the Air his idea of mass bombing. Yet General Force course at Maxwell Field and in the *COPYNo. 2 used by the author, showed no record of having been charged ’out. preparation of school doctrines spoke in the 52 - THEDEVELOPMENT An DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea same vein when called upon to testify before area-the methodology of air warfare-that the Federal Aviation Commission. The com- the Tactical School was to make its most mission, appointed by the President in June original and signillcant contribution to air 1934 to study aviation problems in the doctrine. United States, was gathering ideas about The difficulty of formulating a cIearcut the prospective role of airpower in war. theory for employment of armed forces, in Among the many authorities called were the absence of a definite national strategic several leading theorists from the Tactical policy, has been noted in the preceding School, who presented to the commission chapter.* This difficulty remained after what was represented as the school attitude 1926 and persisted, in fact, until the toward this general problem. Maj. Donald late 1930’s. The officially pronounced Wilson and Capt. Harold L. George, instruc- policy of the American government con- tors in the Department of Air Tactics and tinued to be one of defense of its shore Strategy, perhaps best summed up the lines. The Army, in developing appro- school view of the nature of modern war- priate war plans, usually postulated a fare. Wilson saw war the inevitable result as European coalition as the attacking force, of increasing nationalism and overproduc- possibly in combination with Japan. The Air tion. Following the economic theory of war Corps saw such attacks mainly in the form which was so popular in the Depression era, of air strikes from Canadian, Mexican, or Wilson stated that the struggle for markets island bases, and thought of defense chiefly “can lead only to national conflict of in- through counter-air operations against terests.” Under such conditions the welfare those bases. No overseas offensive plans of a nation could be protected only by force. were worked out, although there were some What kind of force, in what kind of war?37 air leaders who anticipated a repetition of Both George and Wilson believed that air- the World War I situation. With these power was not merely a new weapon-but a rather vague and unrealistic strategical as- new method of waging war. For it was the sumptions, what kind of force and doctrine means by which the true aim of war (over- would the Air Corps evolve? How could such coming the enemy’s will) might be directly defense-mindedness be reconciled with the realized.38 Ground and naval forces would dominant Mitchell-Douhet offensive theo- be used only to the extent necessary to ries of strategic air attack? The two ap- mount an air invasion, which would be proaches were, indeed, contradictory; and aimed at the enemy’s industrial areas. And the consequence was a kind of organh- the only effective defensive measure tional schizophrenia and d~uble-talk.~~ against such an attack was a counter-air offensive.sg When reference was made at the Air Corps Tactical School to the actual strate- The employment of airpower gic .situation of the United States, the Given the nature of war as seen at the policy of pure defense was indicated. In Tactical School in the 19303, how could the 1930 text for the Air Force course, for airpower be most efficiently employed? example, this policy was given full in- This was a question which could not be dorsement and was applied without res- answered in sweeping generalities, but ervation to the problem of air employ- which demanded more careful analysis, ment. The organization of the air force, technical knowledge, and precise thinking. the text stated simply, should be based Primary attention was given to this ques- on defense of the country against invasion tion at the Tactical School during the by the most probable coalition of powers. period under consideration; and while there Accordingly, the composition and strength proved to be virtual unanimity regarding of the Air Corps should be developed pri- the importance of airpower in war, there marily for the purpose of successfully driv- emerged sharp and bitter difference con- ing home bombardment attacks against the cerning the manner of its development and invaders; the various classes of aviation application. Yet it was specifically in this *See above, pp. 90-31. Development of the Air ForceZdea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 53 should be balanced upon this premise.41 thetical situations, involving American Capt. George Kenney, former Tactical bases and frontiers, were introduced as il- School instructor, developed the same view lustrative problems, but only to explore or in a paper prepared at the Army War Col- demonstrate the uses of airpower. This was lege in April 1933. In view of American particularly true in the study of strategic military policy, which was one of national bombardment. Although from a practical defense, wrote Kenney, the Army Air Corps point of view, American planes had insuffi- would be employed as an essential element cient range to reach the vitals of any major of the Army in protecting the U.S. coasts. industrialized country, careful analysis was Its objectives would be: gaining air control; nevertheless given to the problems of target locating and attacking enemy vessels, land- selection, strategic bombing tactics, and re- ing parties, airdromes, lines of communi- lated matters. In most cases the actual cation, and industrial centers; and defend- study was made of appropriate targets in ing American vital centers, bases, and the United States-not that the instructors communications from air attack.42 necessarily believed that these would be- By 1935 the Tactical School was begin- come objects of attack, but because the nec- ning to make reservations in its statements essary data from other countries was more about the purely defensive mission of mili- difficult to obtain. Although the instructors tary aviation. In proposing a doctrine for were thinking in terms of offensive air ac- a GHQ air force in that year, the school tion against potential enemies, they found study pointed out that the primary place it more practicable and discreet to talk and assigned to air defense and counter-air force study in terms of possible air attack on the operations was dictated by the expressed United States. In other words, the school national policy, location of bases, and lim- instructors developed a doctrine of air em- ited range of existing aircraft. But, it in- ployment in terms of general capabilities of sisted, such employment of airpower should the weapon; they did not restrict themselves be practiced only while vital strategic ob- to the expressed national strategic policy, jectives lay beyond the effective radius of probable combinations of allies, or existing action of American bombers. For, aircraft equipment.45 The fact that the the principal and all important mission of school took this liberty was indeed fortu- air power, when its equipment permits, is nate. Had air doctrine been limited to de- the attack of those vital objectives in a na- fense of our coast line, the Army Air Forces tion’s economic structure which will tend would not have had the theory, the organi- to paralyze the nation’s ability to wage war zation, or the planes which carried it to and thus contribute directly to the attain- victory in Europe and Asia during World ment of the ultimate objective of war, namely, the disintegration of the hostile War 11. will to resist.43 Although references to anticipated na- Maj. Donald Wilson, when testifying before tional strategy remained general and vague, the Federal Aviation Commission, stated the instructors at the Tactical School were that the United States has need of a strong definite and specific in their views on proper air defense force, but he pointed out that organization and control of combat avi- the only way for the nation to neutralize ation. They spoke of the GHQ Air Force as the strategic disadvantage of purely defen- the only air force authorized by existing sive warfare was to build an air force which tables of organization, but they clearly an- could reach the homeland of a potential ticipated that in case of war task forces enemy from continental or advanced bases would have to be organized from it. When under U.S. contr01.~4 instructors referred to “air force” (either In teaching the subject of air force em- “an” or “the”), they had in mind a task or- ployment, the instructors at the Tactical ganization, normally composed of all four School solved the problem by ignoring the classes of combat aircraft, but containing actual strategical demands of the United in every case a nucleus of either bombard- States and by discussing pure theory. Hypo- ment or attack. It was believed that the 54 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIk DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea principles of operations, methods of em- of an air force were also stressed as leading ployment, and tactics of a task force would attributes. 48 parallel closely those of the GHQ Air Force. The general theory of employment of air- According to the official text, aerial units power rested upon the assumption that the would be allotted to an air force according traditional principles of war applied to the to the requirements of its general mission. air force. The official texts, from the earliest In this connection, it was assumed that in years of the Tactical School, gave particular most situations the operations of the bom- attention to this point. The principles were bardment component would be of para- consistently set forth as nine in number: mount importance; after determining the the objective, the offensive, mass, economy number and types of bombardment units of fprce, movement, security, surprise, sim- required, the air force would be balanced plicity, and cooperation. The selection of by the assignment of such numbers of pur- objectives was regarded as the primary duty suit, attack, observation, and auxiliary of the higher commanders of air forces- units as would permit the bombardment “the very essence of proper employment.” missions to be driven home The estimate of the situation would usu- Emphasis was placed, following the ally disclose the one objective best suited tradition of Mitchell and Patrick, upon high- to the accomplishment of the mission; once level, unified control of the air force. Criti- selected, the target should be attacked with- cizing the permanent assignment of strik- out vacillation, deviation, or dispersion of ing forces to field armies, the school derived effort on targets of only secondary im- a general theory for correct control of the portance. An air force, while unable to hold air force. It held, according to the text of a successfully attacked objective, possessed 1934-1935, that no tactical commander the power of destruction and the power to should be charged with a responsibility be- strike again and again.49 yond the capabilities of his units; an army As to the principle of the offensive, the commander, for example, could not be ex- air theorists repeatedly pointed out that pected to assume responsibility for the suc- air forces were by nature bound to aggres- cess of a group of armies. In order to secure sive action. They could not occupy any kind the advantages which accrue from the ra- of position and defend it. Even while con- dius of action and flexibility of an air force, ducting operations that were strategically it should be assigned and employed by no defensive (such as interception of hostile lesser commander than “he who has the bombers), the air action always had to be ultimate outcome at stake. Insofar as the offensive. The theorists recognized, too, the field forces are concerned no commander application of the principle of mass, and less than the GHQ commander has this re- they cited World War examples, St.-Mihiel sponsibility.”47 and Meuse-Argonne, as demonstrations of Before outlining the application of funda- the most effective method of employment. mental military principles to air force em- In this connection, the instructors observed ployment, the Tactical School considered that air units could achieve mass action by the special characteristics of aviation as rapid concentration from dispersed air- compared with other arms. Mobility, de- dromes, while surface forces normally had rived from the speed and freedom of move- to be kept physically close together in order ment of aircraft, was regarded as one of the to strike in force. Massing of air units at principal powers of aviation. Rapid concen- the decisive point required rigid application tration of an air force was possible at any of the principle of economy of force. This point within its radius of action, and this meant reduction of activity on quiet fronts ability had the effect of multiplying its and against unimportant targets, as well striking force in military operations. Only as unified control over all air units in a the requirement of adequate bases limited given theater. It involved also the principle the indefinite extension of the area of move- of movement, an inherent characteristic of ment. The great range and flexibility of use the range and flexibility of air action.5o Development of the Air Force Idea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 55 The principles of security and surprise plane-and to reduce pursuit to a point were seen to be as essential to air as to which was to handicap the American air ef- ground forces. Surprise could be readily fort in World War II.54 achieved in air action, because of the great As early as 1926 the Tactical School took speed of movement and the possibility, in the view that bombardment constituted the tactics, of taking advantage of atmospheric basic arm of an air force. This assumption conditions and the versatility of aircraft was rejected by the Offlee of the Chief of maneuvers. As a consequence of the speed Air Corps, on the ground that the situation of aircraft, the difficulties of communica- would determine which arm was basic. tion, and the short duration of aerial fire When the issue at stake was air supremacy, contact, the principles of simplicity and co- pursuit must be regarded as basic. OCAC op- operation were held to be even more essen- posed the designation of any one branch as tial to air than to ground operations. Coop- basic, but contended that if any were to be eration of all elements concerned in an so designated, it should be This, operation was regarded as indispensable to however, was the last occasion on record fulfillment of the principles of mass and when any authoritative Air Corps statement economy of force. recognized pursuit as basic. There was in- In the over-all development of air theory creasing emphasis upon the offensive prin- at the Tactical School the most striking ciple in war, especially in air war, and the change after 1930 was the increasing em- bomber pushed to the fore as the chief phasis upon bombardment and the concur- offensive air weapon. The Air Force text at rent decline of pursuit. At the close of the Maxwell Field for 1933-1934 stated unequiv- first World War, and well into the 1920’s, ocally that even if the over-all national pursuit had been regarded as the basic arm effort be defensive, the air force as a whole of the air force-indispensable to the ac- had to wage offensive action. And since de- tivity of all other branches.* But with the struction by airpower was wrought chiefly development of the high-speed bomber, first through bombing, bombardment was the the B-9 and B-10, and later the B-17, the principal arm of the air force.50Again show- picture began to alter radically. Billy Mitch- ing a direct parallel to Douhet’s ideas, the ell, the earlier champion of pursuit, by 1935 text proposed as the ideal strategic 1930 saw bombardment as the key element situation a combination of the air offensive in airpower. He wrote that “This phase of and the ground defensive.67And while Dou- air force work is the one outstanding de- het had said that all organization and velopment that occurred in the European equipment should be devoted to bombard- War. It is the thing that will bring about ment, ignoring other classes of aviation, the victory or defeat in future military con- Tactical School followed by stating that tests.’’62Mitchell was at this time writing “auxiliary” aviation could be developed only from the outside, but within the Air Corps, at the “expense of offensive power.”5s too, the 1930’s saw bombardment rocket General Chennault has written that the into a position of almost exclusive impor- Douhet theory that bombers could not be tance, while pursuit aviation fell into a stopped gained wide acceptance at the limited and narrowly defensive role. This school. Coupled with the apparent superior- was partly the result of the technological ity in performance of the new bombers over advances in bombardment and partly of the existing pursuit, acceptance of Douhet led growing influence of the Mitchell-Douhet the bombardment enthusiasts to an ex- doctrine. The struggle between personalities treme position. Some of the instructors be- supporting the rival branches of aviation lieved that pursuit could be abolished reached white-hot intensity at the Tactical altogether, and OCAC adopted the slogan, School-that “crucible in which Air Corps “Fighters are absolete.’’50 Chennault, the policy was distilled.”53 The result of the leading pursuit instructor at the school, struggle was to give dominance to the big analyzed the issue in 1933 in terms of the

*See above, pp. 31, 98-51. following.w fundamental auestions: O0 56 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Zdea 1. Should an air force be wholly of the there could be no effective defense in the bombardment type? air against mass bomber attacks. “The 2. Should fighter types predominate? spectacle of huge air forces meeting in 3. Should an air force be “balanced” as the air is the figment of imagination to types? of the uninitiated,” he declared. The 4. Of what value are ground defenses only protection was to seek out, bomb, against air attack? and destroy the enemy air force on the 5. Can fighters intercept and defeat raid- Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson, re- ers with any degree of certainty? flecting upon the issue some years later, conceded that the Tactical School went Chennault had his own answers to the too far in minimizing what pursuit above questions, but he saw the trend run- could do and neglected to give it sufficient ning the other way. The European nations, attention during the 193O’s.O5 But the revo- he wrote, were apparently concentrating on lution of theory was accomplished, and the bombers and had accepted the notion that bomber became the shining new symbol of the bombers, once launched, could not be airpower. stopped. The ideal weapon seemed to have Whether the bomber or the pursuit plane been discovered, Chennault added deri- ruled the sky, another fundamental ques- sively. But the United States, he went on, tion respecting air employment remained. could not subscribe to the European view; Was military aviation to be regarded chiefly it had to provide an effective defense as an auxiliary to the ground army, or was against the bomber as well as a counter- it to have a mission independent of the sur- striking force.61 face action? In the preceding chapter a Chennault was, indeed, a voice crying in comparative summary has been made of the the wilderness. Col. H. H. Arnold, more in two conflicting views as they appeared in step with the rising bomber sentiment, 1926.* From that time on the General Staff wrote in the same year that the idea was and high command of the War Department now generally accepted among world air continued their insistence that the air force powers that the bomber was the basic type should aim at destruction of the enemy of aircraft and that all other branches army; the Air Corps, and especially the should be built around it. Accordingly, faculty of the Tactical School, moved fur- stated Arnold, the United States should ther and further in the strategic direction. take its most modern bombers, and The Air Force text for 1930 stated that, with using their employment as the basic prin- the exception of counter-air force opera- ciple, determine the other types which tions, by far the greatest proportion of all would give the bombers maximum protec- operations would be against “strategical ob- tion.62 But it was Lt. Kenneth N. Walker, jectives.”60Some attention was, of course, instructor in bombardment at the Tactical given to support aviation, but the emphasis School, who developed this idea most during the 1930’s was on attack of the logically and completely. All other classes of enemy’s industrial system. Much of what aviation, lectured Walker, should be built was taught in this connection was regarded around the backbone of airpower, bom- as “forbidden doctrine by the War Depart- bardment, and their purpose should be to ment, whose defensive orientation frowned insure the success of the bombing attack. upon any suggestion of an overseas air of- “Military airmen of all nations agree that fen~ive.~’Nevertheless, the Tactical School a determined air attack, once launched, is succeeded in developing and teaching such most difficult, if not impossible to stop. . . .” doctrine-on ail abstract or theoretical The only reliable way to prevent an air basis. In the opinion of one former instruc- attack was to stop it before it got started- tor at the school, the trend went a bit too by destruction of the bombers on the far. While the Army ground officers made ground.68Capt. Harold L. George, another the mistake of regarding airpower as mere bomber enthusiast, was equally certain that *See above, pp. 40-43. Development of the Air ForceZdea THE DEVELOPXENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 57 flying artillery, some of the Air Corps time.”69 Douhet, likewise, was an advo- enthusiasts tended to advocate strategic cate of mass, area bombing. During the bombing to the exclusion of all else.OS 1930’s the Tactical School rejected this aspect of the Mitchell-Douhet theory Bombardment aviation: the precision doc- and invented its own special concept of trine and the escort problem industrial attack-precision bombing of This chapter has already shown that dur- ing the period under consideration, bom- the critical points of specified target bardment came to be regarded as the basic systems. A small group of officers, led by arm of the air force. It remained for the Kenneth N. Walker, Harold L. George, Air Corps Tactical School to work out de- Robert M. Webster, and Donald Wilson, was responsible for the origin and crystalliza- tailed tactics for this branch of aviation. tion of this pregnant concept.70 And while it might, with some justification, be charged that the school neglected pur- A complete account of the gestation, suit and attack, it made a highly significant birth, and growth of the precision concept contribution in developing bombardment and tactics is impossible. The idea of limited doctrine. The basic idea developed was that area bombing, accomplished by night mis- of sustained, precision attacks by heavy sions, was being taught at the Tactical bombers against the industrial structure of School in 1926.71 Within a few years this an enemy nation. This notion actually went notion was dropped, and the new precision back to the first World War, when Tren- idea, with its related tactics, began to take chard, Gorrell, and Mitchell planned and form. Certainly one factor that influenced tried out the theory of bombing production this evolution of bombardment thought was and communication centers.* But until the general public opposition to mass civil- 1930 the theory had been propounded only ian bombings. Another may have been the in the most general terms. What was traditional American respect for markman- needed-and what the Tactical School ship, going back to frontier days. Technical supplied-was a refinement of the con- developments in bomb-sight construction cept and a detailed methodology for ac- must also have been considered; Air Corps complishing the aim. The concept was observers were favorably impressed with actually altered somewhat from the kind demonstrations of the Norden Mark XV of thinking expressed by such men as bombsight in October 1931, and a substan- Mitchell and Douhet. Mitchell, for ex- tial Army order for its procurement was ample, wrote in. 1927 that the national placed in 1933. Improved models of the existence of the United States, could be Sperry sight were also ordered in the same disrupted by the destruction of a few key year.72With the successful tests of the B-17 centers (New York, Chicago, Detroit, Pitts- in 1935, it appeared that the Air Corps had burgh and the “Mackinaw Canal”)-“with- the plane and the bombsight which could in a very short time the nation would have accurately place heavy destructive loads on to capitulate or starve to death.” Obviously small, distant targets. thinking in terms of indiscriminate mass But the new concept seems in the main attacks on specified areas, he gave an in- to have been one of those rare creative ideas teresting illustration of what might be done that generate in several minds at about the to destroy New York City. Mitchell sug- same time. Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson, who gested that aircraft could stand off a hun- has tried to explain the growth of the idea dred miles or so and launch air torpedoes in his own mind, has said that he is not against the metropolis. The torpedoes? certain of its source. A student officer in the would carry hundreds of pounds of gas, school at Langley, Wilson went with it to explosive, or incendiaries, and would “hit Maxwell in 1931 as an instructor. In 1933 a place like New York practically every he began to teach the Air Force course;

*See above, pp. 9-12. then, he relates, the precision concept be- tHe described these torpedoes as built like airplanes and controlled by gyroscopes‘ he referred with equal vision of the gan to unfold in his mind. He recalls that future to glide bombs. Mitchell’s mind was already reaching into the age of guided missiles. his earlier experience with railroads may 58 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea have started the chain of thought-he had through and bomb accurately without once observed that the operation of an en- prohibitive losses? This question immed- tire railroad system could be stopped for iately brought to the fore the issue lack of a certain lubricating ingredient. which, in more general terms, has al- Applying such a principle to the industrial ready been discussed: bomber versus structure on a larger scale, Wilson began pursuit. In 1930 the Tactical School was to see the possibility of a more efficient and clearly of the opinion that bombers opposed economical method of waging air war. And by enemy fighters would have to be sup- at virtually the same time this concept ported by pursuit escort.ii But within a appeared, more or less independently, to few years some bombardment enthusiasts other instructors in the department: to were declaring that nothing could stop the Walker, George, and Webster.i3 Although bombers, and that escorts were unneces- further refinement was yet to come, the sary. This sudden shift was due chiefly to precision concept was rather. fully ex- the appearance of the B-d and B-10 as high- pressed by 1935 in the Air Force text at the speed bombers. Until 1930 the pursuit plane school. It stated that enemy target sys- was more than a match for the bomber in tems-such as steel fabrication, transporta- air combat. But the B-10 made the competi- tion, finance, utilities, raw materials, and tion so even that it appeared that bombers food supply-had to be analyzed. Following might be safe from fighter attacks, and that came the very important step of selec- tests of the XB-17 gave promise of bomber tion, choosing of the relatively few objec- superiority over pursuit. From the stand- tives whose destruction would paralyze or point of technical development, the period neutralize a particular system. Successful from 1931 to 1935 seems to have been an attack on these objectives would not only all-time low in the status of pursuit relative break the nation’s ability to produce war to bombardment.i8 materials, but would so disrupt civilian life There was a strong difference of opinion that the population might well be forced to at the Tactical School on the question of sue for peace.T4 bomber escort, and it is difficult to state, The tactics for such precision bombing therefore, what the school doctrine was. For demanded accurate bombsights and day- a time, at least, there Was a Strong leaning time visibility. The school, therefore, aban- h~ardthe “no escort” position; this may doned its earlier teaching of night bombing have Come, at least in Part, from Douhet, as the principal tactic against industria] who believed that his bombers could defend objectives.75 Despite “miraculous modern themselves by mass formation fi~?.’~Gen- devices,” daylight was regarded as essential eral Chennault is of the belief that a large for efficient results; night methods were number 0 cers at Maxwell Field, as well allowable only when the strength of enemy as in OCAC, fully tx~-~bracedthe Douhet pursuit was SO great as to prohibit daylight theory of bomber invincibility. And he ad- strikeS.76 For defense against pursuit at- mits that circumstantial evidence from tacks and for concentrated effect upon the 1931 to 1935 supported their position. Pur- target, tactics ‘required formation flying; suit tactics, as well as design, had been for protection against antiaircraft artillery neglected; in addition, the test maneu- in daylight, high-altitude operation was vers of bombers versus pursuit were necessary. Thus, the full-blown theory and rigged in favor of the former. Chen- tactics of precision industrial bombing nault has charged that attempts to de- emerged in the 1930’s: high-level, daylight, monstrate fighter capabilities met with formation bombing of vital, pin point the same kind of ostrich treatment that targets. the Air Corps as a whole received There was one serious question about the from the General Staff when it tried to above formula for successful precision prove what airpower could do. “All sorts of bambing-a possible Achilles’ heel of factastic and arbitrary restrictions were the whole idea. Could the bombers get placed on fighters in maneuvers that were Development of the Air Force Idea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 50 supposed to simulate honestly conditions of inferior to the latest foreign pursuit, actual combat.”soAs a consequence of.these while the B-12 was the newest and several factors, pursuit looked futile in finest bomber in the world. Chennault also their interception problems against bomb- criticized the technical setup of the simu- ers. Chennault quotes the official umpire lated ground warning net and the tactical of the 1931 excercises at Wright Field as procedures imposed.upon pursuit. Finally, having said, “due to increased speeds and he opposed the basic philosophy of Arnold’s limitless space it is impossible for fighters approach to the problem. While Arnold had to intercept bombers and therefore it is in- written that the conclusion that pursuit consistent with the employment of air force was ineffective should be accepted only af- to develop fighters.”81Two years later, Lt. ter verification by further tests, Chennault Col. H. H. Arnold conducted maneuvers on stated that the nation had to have an effec- the Pacific Coast, pitting P-26’s, the Air tive antiaircraft defense, That a certain Corp’s earliest standard all-metal mono- pursuit model was ineffective in intercept- plane fighter, against the formidable B-12. ing a certain bomber model was, taken As a result of this and other experiences, alone, worthless knowledge. A more useful Arnold concluded that the whole question of conclusion to be drawn from the maneu- pursuit equipment and tactics,.would have vers, argued Chennault, would be a posi- to be reviewed. He believed that airspeeds tive statement of what improvements were had become so great that close firing necessary in pursuit-in organization, tech- was no longer possible; existing pursuit nique, and aircraft design. As it appeared to types were inadequate in daytime intercep- Chennault, what was needed was an effec- tion operations and of no value against tive aircraft warning service, intensive modern camouflaged bombers at night.82 training of pursuit in all phases of inter- Largely on the basis of such reports, Col. ception and attack, and immediate devel- Oscar Westover, commanding the provi- opment of a superior single-seater inter- sional GHQ Air Force, went even further on ceptor model.84 the issue: existing pursuit aircraft were Chennault demonstrated to his own satis- useless because of insufficient speed, and faction that even the existing, obsolescent it was doubtful if pursuit could be operated pursuit planes could make successful inter- efficiently or safely at the speeds required ceptions if adequate information was sup- to catch the bombers. Formations of bomb- plied to a central flghter control. In exer- ers, on the other hand, had such an effec- cises at Fort Knox in 1933, with a more tive firepower that there was warrant for complete ground net, Chennault’s plan of belief that they could accomplish their interception proved successful. From this missions without support. The modern experience he drew two important conclu- trend of thought, concluded Westover, was sions :85 that high-performance bombers, together 1. Pursuit could intercept bombardment with superior observation planes, would if furnished timely information and if sufRce for adequate air defense of the the defense had sumcient deptn to country.83 allow for necessary time factors. Chennault was furious with this attitude 2. Bombers, flying deep into enemy terri- toward pursuit and pulled no punches in tory, required friendly escort to pre- expressing his views. When OCAC sent vent heavy losses if not utter failure. Arnold’s report on the maneuvers to the Had these simple and basic principles been Tactical School for comment, Chennault accepted and applied vigorously by the Air produced an eight-page, line-by-line criti- Corps in some of the losses in World cism of Arnold’s statement. Among other 1933, War I1 might well have been averted. But things, the fiery pursuit instructor charged the “bomber boys,” who controlled the Air that Arnold’s statement that the types of Corps at that time, ignored Chennault. This aircraft involved in the maneuvers were was true of Arnold, who commanded the 1st equally-- modern was false:, the_~-_ -P-26 __ was.___ Bombardment Wing in 1933, as well as 60 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea other leading Air Corps officers.* In view fensive qrepower, yet actually, as of that of this fact it is surprising to find Arnold time, states Hansell, “we had no power tur- writing in his memoirs that the prevailing rets, no .50-cal. defensive guns, no accurate American doctrine in the 1930’s differed gunners.” The former instructor at the Tac- from Douhet on the issue of bomber escort. tical School goes on to make this remark- Arnold conceded that the exercises involv- able statement: “If our air theorists had had ing B-10’s and B-12’s were at first “decep- knowledge of radar in 1935, the American tive,” because of the small speed margin of doctrine of strategic bombing in deep day- the P-26. “Naturally,” he explained, “no- light penetrations would surely not have tions that unescorted bombers might be evolved.” It would have been too easy, ex- able to out-run defending fighters tem- plains Hansell, to rationalize the power of porarily existed.” the fighter defense against a medium-alti- The idea was further encouraged, Arnold tude bomber. Then, the General makes a went on, by information that the B-17 still more startling remark: “Our ignorance would be faster than any fighter yet seen of radar was surely an asset in this phase.” and would be heavily armed. “Neverthe- With radar, pursuit planes could easily have less, we became convinced-at least I demonstrated their power to intercept certainly did-that long-range, heavy bombers, and the whole unescorted, bombers must have not only increased long-range strategic thesis might have fire power and .mutual support, but also fallen.** It does not seem necessarily a fast maneuverable fighter escort which true, however, that the entire thesis could go with the bombers to their tar- would have collapsed; more probably gets. . . .” Actually, there is no evidence what would have happened would have to show that Arnold came to this con- been the development of a theory which viction before the outbreak of World retained strategic bombing, but provided War 11, and the American plan for a bomber it with the proper fighter escort. offensive against Germany (AWPD/l), pre- While the bombardment instructors at pared in 1941, made no provision for the the Tactical School inclined toward the kind of escort referred to by Arnold in his notion that bombers in formation could reminiscences. The best that plan could successfully defend themselves, they did not provide was a plea for immediate develop- quite take the view that pursuit escorts were ment of an escort plane-conceived, how- useless or undesirable. In this respect, they ever as a large, multiplace ship, not the were perhaps less radical than some of the “fast maneuverable fighter” referred to by officers in OCAC and in the tactical units. Arnold.86Maj. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. The consensus seemed to be that, as a has observed that the statement in AWPD/1 matter of policy, bombers should have es- represented, in fact, “the first [official] cort to prevent high losses. However, since recognition of the need for escort fighters.”BT few could visualize a single-seater pursuit Looking back over the years, General with range equal to the heavy bomber, they Hansell frankly admits that the supporters concluded that the big ships must, and if of bombardment at ACTS persisted in their necessary could, go unescorted to their most faith in the unescorted bomber, and that remote targets. It was in this last assump- the faith was based more on hope than fact. tion that the bomber enthusiasts were mis- The whole doctrine of precision bombard- taken; instead of pressing for development ment hinged upon the premise that the of the desired fighter type, they allowed bomber formation possessed adequate de- themselves to rest upon an unproved and, in the light of what happened in World *In juatice to the “bomber boys” it should be noted that in November 1933 the Tactical School announced that as a War 11, an incorrect belief.”O matter of policy it would continue to recommend the develop- ment of a fighter capable of escorting bombers. Furthermore, it was commonly believed that for engineering reasons it was impossible to produce a pursuit plane that could keeD Dace Pursuit aviation with a bomber without depriving the pursuit of its flghting characteristics. It also is Important to remember that the air arm’s budget wa6 small and that the airmen quite logi- The general impact of the high-speed Cally felt that the limited funds should go into the basic element of the air arm. bomber upon pursuit has already been dis- DeveloDment of the Air ForceIdea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 61 cussed at some length.* After 1926 pursuit as an instructor at the Tactical School at fell from its position as the basic arm of the Maxwell Field, was the leading figure in air force and entered a period of decline the pursuit department; he wrote the text and confusion. The fact that this branch of for the course and a special manual on de- aviation had entered an uncertain state was fensive fighter tactics. It might almost be revealed as early as April 1929, when the said that pursuit doctrine at the Tactical Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen. James E. School during the critical period 1931-1936 Fechet, directed that a special conference was Captain Chennault’s doctrine. He left be held at Langley Field “to determine the the school because of ill health, and was mission of pursuit and to make recommen- retired for physical disability in 1937. After dations if necessary for the technical his departure from the Air Corps, pursuit development required to permit efficient lacked the vigorous leadership he had given fulfillment of the pursuit mission.” The it, but he was soon tsshow in China what Air Corps Tactical School, charged with his theories could do in practice.”’ making preparations for this important In general, Chennault tried to uphold conference, posed the following questions the doctrine of pursuit which had come out for discussion :!’O of the first World War. In his Pursuit 1. What are the specific missions of Aviation text, completed in 1933, he stated single-seater pursuit? that “Since the World War there has been 2. Is pursuit more effective than bom- no new aeronautical develoment or inven- bardment in destroying enemy aircraft tion which render unsound the broad a) in the air b) on the ground c) dur- principles evolved during the war.” Those ing bad weather? principles he summarized as follows : ‘J2 3. Is pursuit more valuable when used 1. Attainment of air supremacy depends on the special mission of reducing upon success of the pursuit force. enemy airpower or when used to pro- 2. The primary function of pursuit is to tect bombers and other types? gain air supremacy. 4. To what depth can pursuit escorts be 3. The first objective of pursuit is to expected to penetrate if the enemy destroy the enemy pursuit. has equal pursuit? 4. Success of pursuit de&ds upon 5. Can pursuit accompany and pro- equipment, selection and training of tect bombers as now organized and pilots, numbers, tactics, and organiza- equipped on day raids? tion in units large enough to provide 6. Do bombers and attack actually need effective concentration of force. pursuit support as escort? Chennault observed that the air leaders in The above questions clearly show that seri- 1918 were firmly convinced of these prin- ous doubts were being raised regarding the ciples, and he decried the tendency to aban- function of pursuit; special concern with don them because of the “lessons” of one the escort problem is indicated, even at peacetime maneuver. He was obviously re- this relatively early date. It is hardly neces- ferring here to the bomber-pursuit tests sary to observe that no definitive answers conducted by Colonel Arno1d.t were found to these questions, either at To the extent that he referred to massed the pursuit conference or in the years pre- land battles of the pattern established in ceding World War 11. World War I, Chennault was not writing While some pursuit leaders transferred very realistically in 1933. The official stra- to the bombardment branch during this tegic policy of the nation was then one of discouraging period, and others assumed a defense of the coastline, and thinking in the defensive polemical attitude, one of them Air Crops had swung toward a concept waged an all-out, aggressive fight to restore of war far different from the tradi- pursuit to its “rightful” role in the air tional one. For example, his idea of attain- force. For five years Claire L. Chennault, ing air supremacy was related to a situa-

*€lee above, pp 55-56. Wee above, p. 59. 62 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea tion in which forces are in contact within perform. a limited area. Where belligerents were During his years at Maxwell Field, Chen- widely separated (as would be the case in a nault did not succeed in winning the flexj- war between America and a major Euro- ble, powerful role for pursuit that he de- pean power), pursuit could hardly hope to sired, By dint of great personal effort, maintain air supremacy over the hostile however, he did succeed in developing ef- country. The old-fashioned concept of pur- fective pursuit tactics, tactics that gained suit might, indeed, prove sound only in an ultimate indorsement by the Air Corps. At old-fashioned kind of war. It may have a time when many of the leaders showed been Chennault’s association of his theories little interest in pursuit, and some regarded with the World War concept of strategy, as it as obsolete, Chennault plunged into the well as his truculent manner, that contrib- job of making it more effective. When he uted to his failure to gain greater support began teaching at the Tactical School, the at the Tactical School. doctrine of mass tactics, rather than in- Chennault, however, did not actually dividual combat, had already become estab- limit his concept of pursuit function to any lished in principle. The idea of holding pur- particular strategic situation; the vital suit as a unified force, rather than feature of his theory was its breadth and dispersing it for defense of localities, was flexibility. Once the ground situation was also rec~gnized.~~But a great deal remained stabilized, he wrote, bombardment missions to be done to evolve and prove the specific against strategical objectives would become techniques. of paramount importance. Pursuit support Chennault began his study of tactics by for bombers would be rendered by either painstaking analysis of the lessons of general offensive sweeps or by escort, ac- World War I. He perceived, for example, the cording to the situation. Pursuit would al- demonstrated necessity for teamwork and ways be required to defend vital installa- adaptable flight formations. He saw the tions, at home or in the fleld. And, beyond shortcomings, too-the frequent failures of those activities, pursuit would be used pursuit to maintain the all-important ad- “whenever necessary to gain the air force vantage of superior altitude, weakness in 0bjective.”0~The Chennault philosophy of command position, lack of provision for pursuit was well expressed in a summary adequate security of force and for reserve, of questions and answers, believed to have and failure to develop a dependable method been prepared by Chennault in January for reorganizing a formation after its en- 1934 for a conference on doctrine. To the gagement in combat.gaIn constructing his question of the normal role of pursuit in own system of tactics, Chennault empha- the early phase of a war, this answer was sized effective formation flying.* The pur- given : pose of the pursuit formation, he explained, Pursuit has no “normal” role in any phase was to concentrate sufficient firepower to of war . . .: pursuit is a weapon of oppor- destroy the particular aircraft being at- tunity and should be employed strictly in accordance with the situation at a given tacked. Other factors to be considered were time. If war begins with long-range bom- simplicity of arrangement, maneuvera- bardment and with rival airdromes beyond bility, flexibility, and ease of control. The the radius of action of pursuit, then the smallest pursuit tactical unit was the ele- only role possible to Pursuit is active de- ment of two or three planes; then, in order, fense. If war begins in the “usual manner,” came the flight (two or three elements), the manner which may be called “histori- cally normal,” Pursuit will be employed the squadron (two or three flights), the both offensively and defensively.94 group (two or three squadrons), and the The pursuit leader was irked and offended wing (two or three groups). Flight units by suggestions that pursuit be restricted were normally divided into assault, sup- to the defensive role of interception alone. port, and reserve echelons. The assault was He would place no limits on the range of *A8 a mean8 of demonstrating and dramatlzing pursult for- mation maneuvers Chennault organized and led an acrobBtlc activities that fighters could and should trio dubbed “Thre; Men on a Flying Trapeze” whlch performed all over the country, Development of the Air Force Idea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 63 the leading and guiding unit, the support Tactics at night were to be strictly in- provided immediate assistance to the as- dividual, since darkness made it impractica- sault, and the reserve, held in the highest ble to employ pursuit formations. The great- formation position, was normally used to est problem, stated the text, was locating pursue and destroy enemy units after the the enemy planes in the air. Searchlights attack.Oi and flares must be used; after spotting his The technique of approach and contact target, the pursuit pilot would approach was related to the type of aircraft opposed. from below and open fire when reaching the Against enemy pursuit, the attack was to shortest possible range. This method should be made from the rear with a force at least equal to that of the hostile formation. This prove highly successful, the text stated, plan would enable each pilot to concentrate because the searchlights would blind the upon a particular opponent in the close personnel in the hostile aircraft, and at fire which followed. Against bomber forma- night a plane at lower altitude was almost tions, Chennault’s tactics were more elabo- always invisible to a higher observer.D9 rate. First, action with time-fuze bombs, Probably the most significant contribu- cannon, or 50-caliber machine guns neces- tion that Chennault made was the develop- sary in order to disorganize the defensive ment of a workable plan for fighter control formations. After forcing dispersion in this in the interception of bombers. Chennault manner, the pursuit units would then close saw a ground information net as an abso- in on the broken formations, delivering lute necessity to successful air defense, and their fire simultaneously from various an- although his views at first met with much gles. Pursuit tactics demand, said Chen- indifference and even resistance, they were nault, that full advantage be taken of the ultimately accepted by the Army. Against three-dimensional attack plan. Since the the teaching of the bomber enthusiasts that possible avenues of approach in space were employment of bombers was limited only virtually unlimited, it would be very dim- by their radius of action, Chennault argued cult for the bomber unit to organize an that it was, in fact, also limited by the effective scheme of fire either before or dur- amount of effective opposition that could ing the combat. As to timing of the attack, be thrown against it. But in order to stop the Chennault text suggested that bombers the bombers, pursuit pilots had to know were particularly vulnerable just before or where they were, and had to know in time. during their bomb run, although attacking Chennault was confident that his forma- them at that time exposed pursuit to pos- tion tactics assured destruction of the sible antiaircraft artillery damage. A more bombers if they were intercepted in time; favorable opportunity was after the bomb the only problem was securing sufficient release, as the enemy dispersed to evade information to assure the interception. ground fire; pursuit elements at this time Looking abroad in 1933, he noted that Ger- could pick out and attack individual many and England already had effective bombers. The text conceded that this al- aircraft reporting and warning systems, and lowed the bomber to perform its mission Italy was making plans for one. America, first, but the infliction of sufficiently heavy on the other hand, had made no progress losses might forbid repetition of the at- in this direction. On the basis of his inves- tacks.* So Par as individual pilot technique tigations, Chennault in 1933 wrote a study, was concerned, whether attacking pursuit The Role of Defensive Pursuit. It did not or bombers, Chennault emphasized two become an official text at the Tactical points: fearless closing to the necessary School, but later Chennault applied it’s range for accurate shooting and concen- tenets successfully in China, and its ideas tration of fire upon such vital points as influenced the later development of air de- personnel and vulnerable equipment,98 fense in this country.1oo *This tactic was probably applicable to conventional at- The Role of Defense Pursuit made a tacks, even of World War I1 but would hardly apply if the bombers wefe carrying atomlor hydrogen-explosives. formal analysis of the factors involved in 84 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Develosment of the Air Force Idea the bomber interception problem. Experi- of a “mobile intelligence system,” which ence had proved, it stated, that an effective could be shifted to any threatened sector. pursuit force could not be maintained on Chennault thought it unlikely that a po- air alert at all times, or even at such times tential enemy could launch an attack as to insure interception of an invading against the mainland without disclosing his force. Experience had also proved that pur- intentions soon enough to permit transfer suit planes on the ground were unable to of the mobile net to the danger zone. He rise and defend successfully if information urged that organization and training of an regarding enemy air movements was Air Defense Information Group t,o operate limited to the vicinity of the fighter base it- the net be started immediately; the initial self. In order to allow time for interception equipment needed would be locating de- and delivery of Are before the attackers vices, course-plotting instruments, com- could reach their objective, information had munications equipment, and other special- to come from a source distant from the de- ized facilities. The functioning of the group fending airdrome. How distant that point would be modeled on similar operations in had to be depended on such obvious factors England and Germany.lo2But once again as bomber speed, pursuit take-off time, rate Chennault’s voice went unheeded, and when of climb, and ability t6meet the attack by war came to America the nation had no the shortest line of flight. Chennault visual- effective aircraft warning system. ized an air and ground reporting net which In view of the uncertainty in the Air could satisfy these conditions. Information Corps regarding the role and capabilities had to be sent continuously, or at frequent of pursuit, it is not surprising to find a intervals, to a control center, in order to corresponding uncertainty about the type prevent the bombers from avoiding inter- or types of aircraft to be employed. Even ception by changing course; transmission before 1926 equipment development had would normally be by telephone although been regarded as unsatisfactory, and there radio might be necessary from marine posts was disagreement as to how many kinds of or isolated advance stations. Final evalua- pursuit there should be.* This latter ques- tion of all reports would be at the control tion still puzzled Air Corps leaders when center, where the pursuit commander would they met in, the pursuit conference at Lang- exercise authority over all the means of ley Field in April 1929. At that time they antiaircraft defense (planes, ground weap- discussed questions such as the following:lo:( ons, and searchlights). By means of a pow- 1. Is there need for two-seater pursuit? erful radio transmitter, the commander If so, what should be its role and per- would give direct instruction to all pilots, formance characteristics? guiding them to the attack. Chennault warned again and again that the presence 2. Is there need for a change in the speci- of pursuit near a vital area was useless un- fications of present one-seater pursuit. less intelligence was received from a con- If so, what? siderable distance. Such intelligence re- 3. Is there need for multi-seater pursuit? quired, in the case of an island or a point If so, what should be its role and per- on the sea coast, a net well extended to sea. formance? Should it be designed for With an unconscious note of prophecy, he long-range escort? stated specifically that such areas as Oahu 4. Should pursuit be designed for air and the Panama Canal could not be de- fighting only, or should it carry equip- fended unless marine posts were estab- ment for dropping bombs or gas lished.lol The morning of Pearl Harbor gave (which would necessarily reduce its tragic proof of his point. performance as a fighter)? For defense of the continental United 5. For attack on bombers, should pursuit States, Chennault recognized that the area be designed to launch bombs, liquid was too vast to cover completely with a fire, or other agents, in lieu of machine- warning net, as could be done in England gun Are? or Italy. He therefore advocated creation *See above, pp. 97-38, Development of the Air Force Idea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 65 Apparently no conclusive answers to such Republic P-35 and the Curtiss P-36 (fore- questions were reached in the conference runner of the P-40).100 Each was an all- or elsewhere, for the most which could be metal low-wing monoplane, with a 1,000- said on the subject in the Air Force text of horsepower radial engine; range was about February 1931 was that the value of two- 1,000 miles, ceiling over 30,000 feet and top seater pursuit remained controversial, and speed around 300 m.p.h. These well-de- “its development over the next few years signed planes, normally carrying two or will be watched with intense interest.”lo* four machine-guns, incorporated the latest By 1933 when Chennault was preparing features of retractable gear and streamlin- his pursuit text, he could summarize the ing. They represented a leap forward from actual state of affairs by writing that the the P-26 (top speed of 235 m.p.h., range of majority of pursuit units were equipped 360 miles) and regained for pursuit some with single-seaters and that a limited num- of the ground lost in the preceding years.107 ber of two-seaters had been issued for tac- Chennault favored development of single- tical service test. At the same time he sur- seaters for pursuit, but opposed the trend veyed the general lag in the development toward multiseater pursuit which gained of pursuit, compared with bombardment, momentum in the Army during this period. and explained how the new high-speed After the maneuvers of 1933, Colonel Arnold bombers had forced pursuit to the mono- had concluded that one-seaters were ineffec- plane design in order to maintain a margin tive against bombers and had therefore rec- in speed. The Boeing P-26’s, produced in ommended to the Chief of the Air Corps 1933, made all the existing biplane equip- that a multiseater be developed without de- ment obsolete. But Chennault was far from lay. Chennault, in his comments on Ar- satisfied with the performance of the P-26. nold’s recommendations, made a logically He called fcr immediate improvement, con- devastating criticism. He declared that a centrating attention upon the single-seater multiseater would be ineffective as an in- type. Of utmost importance, Chennault be- terceptor because 1) with its armament and lieved, was speed-to permit rapid engage- extra personnel, it would weigh nearly as ment and withdrawal. Speed was the indis- much as a bomber and therefore could not pensable factor in giving to pursuit its have superior speed, 2) it could not equal a required capability for the initiative and single-seater in quickness of take-off, climb, aggressiveness in combat; he was willing to and assembly, and 3) it was far more ex- sacrifice other elements, including acro- pensive to build, operate, and maintain. batic’ strength, in order to increase speed. Chennault recommended, instead, that a Chemiault had high regard, too, for ma- superior single-seater be developed to meet neuverability, especially a short turning the interception requirement. For this pur- radius, and for a ceiling above that of any pose he outlined the desired specifications, other military type. Pursuit range, he said, including an in-line, water-cooled engine, was limited only by pilot stamina and fuel which were later to be realized in the Cur- capacity.lo5 tiss P-40-the plane that became the back- Chennault, who served as a leading mem- bone of Chennault’s fighter units in China ber of the Pursuit Development Board while during World War II.lO* at the Tactical School, was in a position to The Air Corps Board also opposed the translate his ideas into official recommenda- project of developing a multiplace pursuit, tions. During that period he fought bitterly concluding that its performance would be against the idea of limiting pursuit to unsatisfactory for any purpose.1ooHowever, “monkey-stick” interceptors; he wanted agitation for such a type, either as inter- pursuit to be capable of long-range escort ceptor or escort, persisted during the 1930’s. and an offensive role as well. He and the Some air leaders, especially in bombard- board constantly demanded extended range, ment, thought the answer for long-range greater speed, and more firepower. By the escort was to convert a heavy bomber into end of 1936 they succeeded in obtaining the a super-armed defensive ship.*I0This idea 66 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea was ultimately to be tried out in World War criticism of the plane and the idea of multi- I1 (with a modified B-17), and the experi- place pursuit.? ment was a failure. However, the most popu- lar notion in connection with multiplace Attack aviation fighters was that an all-purpose plane whose During the late ’20’s and early ’~O’S,avia- primary function would be interception tion in support of ground forces continued should be developed. It is rather dimcult to to occupy major attention in the Air Corps understand how aviation experts could have and at the Tactical School. The War De- taken this proposition seriously, since all partment favored this type of employment experiments with multiplace pursuit, going for the air arm, and the air leaders did not back to World War I, had been unsuccess- yet have the kind of equipment required for ful.* Perhaps one reason for the support of strategic operations. Differences in the the idea was the fact that it appeared to the ground and air view of control and objec- General Staff to be a possible means of re- tives persisted; the Tactical School contin- ducing the number of Air Corps types, a ued to favor control of all striking forces by policy consistently encourages by the War GHQ, the gaining of control of the air as Department in the interest of standardiza- the first priority in the role of close support, tion, quantity production, and economy. At and the objective of interdiction of the bat- any rate, the promoters of a new design, tlefield. The branch of aviation primarily built to meet the demand for a multiseater, identified with ground support was attack, skillfully used this approach as a selling- and probably the most influential teacher of point. Beginning with the assumption that attack aviation at this time was Capt. “present and potential single-engine pursuit George C. Kenney.ll:j While serving as an planes are wholly ineffective against bom- instructor at Langley Field, from 1926 to bardment aircraft,” the statement describ- 1929, Kenney wrote the textbooks for the ing the Bell design (later to become the Observation and Attack courses. He devel- by XFM-1, “Airacuda”) claimed that the pro- oped tactics largely actual flying prac- posed model would serve not only as a suc- tice, using members of his school classes to make up formations and carry out various cessful interceptor, but also as an all-pur- maneuvers. It was during this period that pose fighter, bomber, observation, and Kenney developed many of the techniques attack plane. In November 1935 the Secre- and some of the weapons that were to prove tary of War approved the characteristics successful under his Southwest Pacific air for this experimental plane; its primary command in World War II.l14 mission was to be “sustained attack of hos- Soon after Kenney’s departure from the tile aircraft in flight,” but “The idea should Tactical School, attack aviation suffered a be kept in mind of a several purpose air- decline. One reason for this, perhaps, was plane capable of replacing various other the effect of the forced resignation of G2n- types now authorized.”ll1 The XFM-1 was era1 Mitchell in 1926.115Moreover, although to prove one of the most disappointing tech- he had been one of the principal supporters nical and tactical failures of the pre-World of this branch of the Air Corps, by 1930 even War I1 period. It apparently was a case of Mitchell had become obsessed with the sin- “too much engineering and too little tac- gle notion of strategic bombing. The influ- tics.” Chennault fought unsuccessfully ence of Douhet, who believed that all classes against the Wright Field experts on this of aviation except bombardment should be question of multiplace fighters. He has re- ignored, has already been mentioned.++By ferred to the XFM-1 contemptuously as a 1933, with the high-speed heavy bomber plane having no tactical use, but the en- almost a reality, and with the emerging con- gineers, Chennault says, “were fascinated cept of long-range, precision attack becom- with the intricacies of its construction.”lI? ing dominant at ACTS, ground support The judgment may be harsh and unfair, tIt should be noted that the idea of a multiplace fighter but Chennault has been vindicated in his is not 88 preposterous as Chennault thought. Current (1955) USAF night fighters carry from to three men. *Bee above, p. 8. $For Douhet’s ideae and influence. see above, pp. 4#-50. Development of the Air Force Idea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 67 aviation fell into neglect.l1° In a word, the ceiling of 20,000 feet, and armament of four development of the heavy bomber and its fixed and two flexible .30-caliber machine doctrine of employment, although the most guns. The A-12 couM carry internally ten important American airpower accomplish- fragmentation or chemical bombs, or four ment of the 1930’s, had a retarding effect 100-pound demolition bombs. Not satisfied upon attack, pursuit, and all other aviation with this performance, the attack instruc- activities. tors at the Tactical School called for a The theory of attack objectives and tac- faster, more maneuverable plane, with a tics remained virtually what it was when longer cruising range. These improvements, Captain Kenney wrote the text in the late plus a larger bomb load, were to come in ’20’s. Proper targets were considered to be 1936 with production of the Northrop the enemy air force and other vulnerable A-17.lZ2 objects beyond the range of artillery, espe- cially lines of communication and supply. THE IMPASSE WITH THE NAVY REGARDING Low-altitude, level attacks by small forma- LAND-BASED BOMBARDMENT tions were favored; weapons included ma- An unresolved conflict which affected all chine guns, small bombs, and chemicals. A branches of aviation during the period 1926- special innovation in this connection, nur- 1935 was the continuing argument between tured by Kenney, was the development of the Army and Navy regarding responsibility time fuzes and, later, parachutes, for use and authority for coast defense. It had spe- on fragmentation bombswith the purpose cial implications for long-range bombard- of allowing the delivering aircraft to clear ment since the principal function of this the target before the det0nati0n.l~~The branch was being of€icially explained as one morale effect of front-line strafing was rec- of coast defense. The Navy desired juris- ognized, but it was generally agreed that diction over all planes flying over water; if the risk to plane and personnel from small- the Navy were itself to provide land-based arms fire was too high for the advantage long-range aircraft, Army bombardment gained.ll* might thereby be denied its chief “legiti- The development of appropriate attack mate” function. And without having that aircraft was extremely slow. Until 1930 the function, there might be insufficient reason only standard models in use were modified for the continued support of a heavy bom- observation types.llgA difference of view re- bardment program in the Army. garding the desired characteristics no doubt The argument after 1926 was not so much contributed to the difficulty. The main ques- the earlier one of aircraft versus ships. The tion was related to size of plane and num- Navy still held to its reservations about ber of engines. Same favored a relatively what bombers could do when opposed by an light, single-engine type, while others active defense of naval air and surface wanted a larger, two-engine ship.120 All of units. The Air Corps, for its part, was still the early models specifically assigned for convinced that traditional navies were attack were single-engine, however. The doomed. Billy Mitchell, writing as a civilian Curtiss XA-7 of 1930 was the first attack in 1927, asserted that the greatest battle- monoplane, constructed with built-in ma- ship was actually more vulnerable to air at- chine guns. A year later the A-8, one of the tack than the smallest torpedo boat; naval first all-metal Curtiss planes, appeared. This functions of the future would have to be ship, with an in-line engine, was superseded carried on chiefly by submarines.123Chen- in 1933 by the A-12 (Shrike), which was es- nault in 1933 declared that there would sentially a redesigned A-8, built around a never again be a major naval battle within radial engine. A considerable quantity of range of land-based aircraft and predicted A-12’s were delivered in this period, and that long-range planes might well prove they became the chief attack plaQe.121They more effective than warships for controlling were two-seaters with a top speed of 186 commerce on the high seas.124Naval leaders miles per hour, range of about 500 miles, tended to disregard such claims; they sim- 68 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Development oj the Air Force Idea ply accepted aviation as a useful auxiliary sisted that the Navy could not restrict its and sought to gain control over all aspects land-based operations to scouting and pa- &it that related to seapower. The question, trolling. The Navy must also provide appro- then, was not so much whether airplanes priate types of bombers and trained person- could affect seapower. The argument, cast nel for making attacks at sea. He argued, in terms of coastal defense responsibilities, and with some point, that Army bombers was really one of who would control over- might be engaged elsewhere when the Navy water flying operations, particularly bom- needed help at sea and that the Army types bardment. of bombers and training were not suited to Recommendations of the Aeronautical operations over Board (representing both services) had The Joint Board paper, Functions of been followed in 1917 by the Secretaries of Army and Navy Air Components, when fi- War and the Navy in establishing a policy nally approved in December 1926, did not relative to this problem. The board, which carry the provision desired by Patrick re- had favored joint training and operation of garding the freedom of action for Army Army and Navy air forces in coastal areas, planes. The policy remained vague, permit- suggested the shore line as an approximate ting such air actions over water as were line of demarcation between Army and “incident to Army functions,” or “in sup- Navy activities, but insisted that there port of or in lieu & the Navy.” The Navy, would and should be considerable over- on the other hand, succeeded in holding the lapping of operational zones. In general, door open for its own air operations. The Army aviation was assigned the defense of sea service was authorized to provide all vital shore installations and Are control for types of aircraft, “primarily designed for coast artillery, while the Navy was given operations from carriers or other vessels, or over-water scouting and limited activities based on tenders, or for operations from in connection with naval ground stations.* shore bases for oversea scouting and for ob- This arrangement did not satisfy either the servation and patrol of sea communications Army or the Navy and left an uncertain and their defense against raids.”l*O Such a situation during the 1920’s. When the Joint broad and ambiguous authorization, while Army-Navy Board was reconsidering de- possibly appearing to restrict naval types, fense policy in 1926, Maj. Gen. Mason Pat- was actually subject to almost any inter- rick demanded a more specific statement pretation. of Army air functions. He was especially Efforts of the Army to clarify the situa- concerned that this should include explicit tion and make more definite the. role of its provision that 1) Army aircraft assigned to bombers in coast defense proved futile. Sec- coast defense be free to fly over water to retary of War Patrick J. Hurley became per- the limit of their practical operating radius sonally concerned about the matter in Au- and 2) Navy land-based aircraft be designed gust 1930 and warned President Hoover that and normally used for sea scouting and the situation was endangering the national patrol only. Patrick wished to avoid the un- defense.l?’ Following this, Gen. Douglas necessary duplication of bombers by both MacArthur, Chief of Staff, attempted a services. But the Navy had a different view. high-level solution to the problem tlirough Rear Adm. W. A. Moffett, senior Navy mem- negotiation of an agreement With his oppo- ber of the Aeronautical Board, was even site number, Adm. William V. Pratt, Chief more opposed to duplication than was of Naval Operations. According to Mac- Patrick. He believed that all aircraft (in- Arthur’s subsequent report to the Secretary cluding pursuit) operating over water of War, this endeavor was successful. The should be feished and controlled by the Chief of Staff had this to say of the agree- Navy. Granting that the Joint Board had ment, which constituted a modification of already assigned pursuit defense of the the basic paper, Joint Action of the Army coast to the Army, Moffett nevertheless in- and Navy, prepared by the Joint Board: Under it the naval air forces will be based Wee above, PP. aa-89. on the fleet and move with it as an im- Development of the Air Force Idea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 69 portant element in performing the essential operations in actual defense would include mission of the forces afloat. The Army air the fgllowing operational phases: 1) recon- forces will be land based and employed as naissance and offensive operations between an element of the Army in carrying out its mission of defending the coasts, both the outermost range of the air force and in the homeland and in overseas posses- the line of contact with ground forces, 2) sions. Through this arrangement the fleet the support of other forces after the enemy is assured absolute freedom of action with came within the range of ground weapons, no responsibility for coast defense, while and 3) operations “in connection with the the dividing line thus established enables use of all arms on our frontier,” under the the air component of each service to pro- ceed with its own planning, training, and rules governing cooperation with land procurement activities with little danger of forces.lso duplicating those of its sister service.128 Although the Air Corps had no positive A year later, testifying before a congres- assurance that the Navy would restrict its sional committee, MacArthur declared that own land-based aviation, it at last had re- a “complete understanding” had been ceived, in the above letter, a specific au- reached with Prati.’’The Navy was to be thorization from the Army for development based on the sea, with only a few land of larger planes. On the basis of this om- bases for training and maintenance. With cially recognized requirement for long- typical MacArthur flair, he stated that the range oversea reconnaissance and attack, solution was based on “well-established the War Department approved the Air military and naval principles” and was “ac- Corps’ Project A* in June 1934.131 This en- cepted and believed in by all groups con- gineering and research project for explor- cerned.” In a tone of simple finality he con- ing the problem of maximum range resulted cluded that the question of air defense of directly in the construction of the XB-15 our coasts was “completely and absolutely and indirectly in the design of the B-29 and settled.”’ 21) other “super” bombers. By means of The agreement seemed clear enough, all achieving a recognized and explicit role in right, to the General Staff and its War coast defense, the Air Corps had opened the Plans Division. Accordingly, it was decided door to big plane development. to spell out the function of the Army air Air Corps leaders, however, were uncer- arm in coast defense, and a collaborative tain of the future status of Army long- study by WPD and OCAC was undertaken. range aviation and feared the build-up of The results of this study served as the basis land-based air forces by the Navy. Mac- for a letter, dated 3 January 1933, from the Arthur had seen a “complete understand- Chief of Staff to commanding generals of ing” with the Navy on this issue, but armies, corps areas, and departments. The apparently the Navy reserved its own inter- letter recognized two classes of aviation con- pretatiol. In spite of the MacArthur-Pratt nected with frontier defense: 1) corps and agreement of 1931, the Navy continued the army observation units normally assigned expansion of its naval air stations, devel- to ground organizations, mobile forces, and oped various types of land-based planes, and harbor defenses and 2) “GHQ Aviation, the employed bombers under the designation principal and only component of which, in of “patrol” and “torpedo” types. Early in addition to army reserve aviation, is the 1934 the Army members of the AeronauticaI Air Force which normally operates initially Board charged that this latter practice con- directly under the Commander of the Army stituted a violation of the MacArthur-Pratt Group.” The observation component of the understanding, but the Navy Bureau of air force, it was declared, should include Aeronautics denied the charge. Finally, special equipment suited to long-range re- when Adm. Ernest J. King succeeded Pratt connaissance over land and water in order as Chief of Naval Operations, he repudiated that approaches to critical areas might be the agreement of his predecessor in omce.13? covered “to the limit of the radius of action The 1935 revision of the Joint Board paper of the airplanes.” Furthermore, air force *See above, p. 41. 70 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea governing Army-Navy cooperation did not ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GHQ bring any substantial improvement to the AIR FORCE (1935) situation although it added specific authori- After the Air Corps had been created in zation for Army air operations over the sea 1926, there was a period of temporary calm when engaged in “direct defense” of the in the struggle for greater air autonomy. coast. It also authorized the Army to supply The question of proper organization and aircraft for “support of naval forces to as- ultimate authority for aviation matters. still sure freedom of action of the fleet.”133This figured as an important issue of air doc- latter provision could be interpreted to trine; but the majority of air leaders was mean long-range bombers for attacking inclined to believe that practical considera- enemy surface vessels when the main fleet tions limited, for the time being, what could was engaged elsewhere. But the Army air be accomplished in that direction. In the leaders were deeply concerned over the years that followed 1926 there appeared to Navy’s intentions as both services continued be two principal schools of thought: one to build under a free interpretation of Joint favored a continued campaign for outright Board policy. In November 1935 Brig. Gen. independence; the other favored a further Frank M. Andrews, commanding the newly- compromise step, if necessary, which would established GHQ Air Force, unburdened his permit the building up of an actual air fears to Gen. Malin J. Craig, MacArthur’s striking force. By 1933 the latter, moder- successor as Chief of Staff. Andrews believed ate view strongly prevailed. Renouncing that the Navy would attempt to usurp Air temporarily the more extreme goal, most Corps functions in coast defense and in of the responsible leaders of the Air Corps over-water operations generally, and he concentrated their endeavor upon the cited other leading Offfcers-Kenney, Ar- limited objectives of creating a unified, all- nold, Pratt, Knerr, and H. L. George-as purpose tactical air organization and pro- holding the same view. He was particularly viding for a separate budget and air staff.13j disturbed by a report from Lt. Col. H. A. The more radical, minority view is worth Dargue, assistant commandant of ACTS. examining; for although this argument was Dargue, who attended Pacific fleet maneu- unsuccessful at the time, it doubtlessly con- vers during the summer of 1934, quoted tributed to the achievement of the relatively Adm. W. H. Standley as having said that moderate step in 1935. Overseas aeronauti- the Navy was satisfied with existing agree- cal developments, apparently progressing ments and was going to build an over-water under separate organizations, continued to striking ‘force of at least 1,000 land-based inspire the more extreme thinkers in this plmes. On the basis of this and other con- country. The necessity for independent or- tacts with the Navy, the Air Corps omcers ganization, based on British experience, was were persuaded that the sea service wanted nowhere more clearly set forth than in the charge of all operations “out of sight of Andrews, whose heart and soul were writings of James M. Spaight, a noted air in the long-range bomber and who saw the scholar. His study, The Beginnings of Or- coastal defense assignment as the principal ganized Air Power, demonstrated the im- existing justification for its development by portance of central supply and control serv- the Army, was worried that the entire pro- ices in the building of air strength, gram might be undermined by the “ten- Airpower, Spaight argued, should be co- dency of the Navy to come ashore.”* In his ordinate with sea and land forces; it could years as chief of the GHQ Air Force, An- not truly exist where it was regarded and drew was to learn that he would have to managed in a subordinate, auxiliary sense. defend the program not only against the Spaight took a sensible view as to air em- Navy, but against the General Staff and ployment, emphasizing that airpower, like War Department as well.? seapower, could not win wars alone. But ex- *This phrase was used by MacArthur in hls testlmony of 25 May 1932. ?See below, pp. 89-101. Development of the Air Force Idea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 71 ploitation of the full potentiality of the air from bases across the sea or from impro- sphere required independent organiza- vised bases. near the mainland. Labeling tion.lS6 contrary claims as fallacious, the board This general line of argument was picked went on to state that aviation development up, with special application to the United had actually increased the difficulties of States, by proponents of air independence. overseas invasion and had thereby strength- Since national policy was invariably stated ened the defense. The Army’s air arm, in- in defensive terms, these advocates geared deed, had a function, but it was not one of their case to the problem of air defense. The imaginary air defense. It was the strategic air defense mission could not be fulfilled by and tactical support of land operations. An- an army or a navy, asserted Lt. Kenneth N. other War Department investigating com- Walker in testimony before an investigat- mittee, the Baker Board, took a similar ing group. Army and Navy air units, while stand in the following year. Allowing that required for their own purposes, were not the close proximity of European nations designed for air defense of the United might favor independent air organization States. War Department doctrine, for in- because of the possibility of a sudden air stance, held that all combatant arms, in- attack, the Baker Board concluded that cluding the Air Corps, had to contribute to these conditions did not apply to the United “execution of the infantry mission.” How States and that the existing military or- could an air force whose size and composi- ganization was therefore superior for this tion were determined by the needs of the country’s Army in fulfillment of a distinct mission Capt. Robert M. Webster, representing meet the needs of national air defense? the air view before a later investigating “How,” WaYker pursued, “can the air de- group, pointed to the Drum Board state- fense of the United States be assured by ment as another proof that the terms “air officials who deny its necessity and whose defense and air power have not received the doctrines fail to consider it?” The same sanction of our omcialdom. Their usage is questions, of course, might have been asked heresy while they are the salient words in of naval aviation, whose mission was sup- the military vocabularies of our possible port of the fleet. There was only one logical enemies.”140Capt. Harold L. George has- answer: air defense was of “such impor- tened to refute the Baker Board’s notion tance that a separate Air Force must be that the geographical location of the United created for that purpose-and charged with States reduced the necessity for independ- that resp~nsibility.”~~~ ent organization. On the contrary, said Walker, when referring to the attitude of George, in Europe the land armies would military officials, had in mind statements become locked very quickly; hence there such as those made by a special committee was greater need for air forces as integral of the general council of the War Depart- parts of armies. The American situation was ment. This committee, headed by Maj. Gen. one in which an air war might be conducted Hugh Drum (and generally known as the for an indefinite period before ground ele- Drum Board), investigated the question of ments came into contact. The only force employment of the Air Corps and made a re- available against attacking air units was port on 11 August 1933. The board assumed the air force; it must be organized separ- a strategic situation involving defense of ately to perform that mission eff e~tive1y.l~~ the northeastern United States against an The demand for independence, led by attack launched by a European coalition. men like George, Webster, and Wa,&er, was The air arm would be used in such circum- hopeless in 1935. The power was on the stances mainly in support of a ground cam- other side, as it had been since 1918. The paign against Canada and for defense of solid opposition of the General Staff and vital centers.IsRThe board made a particu- the War Department was buttressed by the lar point of denying the possibility of a seri- position of the Navy. Supporting the con- ous air attack on the United States, either servative conclusions of the Drum and 72 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea Baker boards, the Navy took the view that of centralized control of air forces. All com- there was no necessity for change in exist- bat air units of the Army shvdld be assigned ing organization and policies. A prepared to GHQ.143Agencies outside of the military statement declared that approved the notion, too. The Federal Avia- The geographic-strategic situation of the tion Commission, appointed by President United States is such that it is immune to Roosevelt in 1934, to study aeronautic& attack except ota the sea, and that its flrst problems, urged that continued attention line of defense remains the Navy, which be given to the employment of the air force includes Naval aviation. . . . Claims of per- as an independent striking unit. In its final formance of airplanes do not warrant belief that trans-oceanic air attack is to be feared report the commission stated its conviction now or in the future.142 that aircraft had passed beyond the posi- The combination of powerful forces, regard- tion of useful auxiliaries and that “An ad- less of logic and theory, made the achieve- equate striking force against objectives ment of air autonomy impossible at the both near and remote is a necessity for a time. modern Army. . . .”14* Independent organization was not to be A number of important factors combined realized in 1935, but another important by 1935 to make possible the translation of idea was. It was the air force idea, which the air force idea into an organized tac- really went back to the flrst World War, but tical unit. During the late 1920’s there had which had gathered momentum and recog- been a series of record-breaking flights nition during the pqstwar years. This notion which gained tremendow popular atten- was that, in addition to service elements tion-the Kelly and Macready transconti- such as observation for ground units, the air nental hop; the Air Service round-the-world arm should provide a unified and powerful success; the Lindbergh, Chamberlin, and offensive striking force. Maj. Gen. Mason Maitland flights; and the Spaatz-Eaker en- M. Patrick, Chief of the Air Service, gave durance record of 1929. These achievements, official expression to this concept as early plus the personality of America’s outstand- as 1922* when he called for establishment of ing airmen, aroused public interest to a a strong force of pursuit, bombardment, high degree and stimulated the technologi- and attack units under direct control of a cal development which gave promise of still GHQ Reserve commander. No tactical unit greater performances. Another favorable in- such as a GHQ air force was actually set up fluence was the election in 1932 of Franklin at the time; but after creation of the Air D. Roosevelt, who had developed an early Corps in 1926, the air force idea gained in- interest in aviation as Assistant Secretary creasing support in all quarters. The ability, of the Navy and who later became the first which it promised, to strike heavy blows for flying President. The aircraft industry and command of the air, tactical support, and air leaders, including such pioneers as Billy against objectives behind the lines, was gen- Mitchell, were encouraged by the new Presi- erally appealing. Technological advances, dent’s attitude; he was the first Commander augmenting the power and employment in Chief to show serious interest in the idea possibilities of offensive aircraft, strength- of an air striking ened the advance of the air force concept. The reorganization of the Army, which Although the Army as a whole was cold to had been started before Roosevelt’s election, strategic operations and to independent air opened the way to a new place for the air organization, it recognized the value of a arm in the defense structure. Tactical units concentrated striking force for its own pur- formerly under nine corps areas were re- poses; such recognition became embodied in grouped into four field armies-to be ready Army regulations in March 1928 (AR 95- for instant response to orders by the Com- 10). At the Air Corps Tactical School, the mander in Chief. In 1933 the Air Corps was Air Force text stated in 1930 that other asked to indicate how it could best partici- world powers had recognized the principle pate in the new program, and following its above. p. 36. response came the appointment of the Development of the Air Force Idea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 73 Drum Board to study the question of em- recommending a broad policy covering all ployment of the Air Corps. The Drum report phases of aviation. Clark Howell, editor of favored the establishment of a standing the Atlanta Constitution, was chairman GHQ air force, which could be used for stra- of the group, which consisted almost en- tegic reconnaissance, long-range bombing, tirely of civilians. After several months of and tactical support of ground forces. Fi- interviewing and study, the Howell Com- nally, the near-debacle of the Army’s at- mission reported on 22 January 1935. It tempt to carry air mail focused public at- leaned toward greater independence of air tention on the air problem and resulted in organization and might have so recom- the appointment of two more investigating mended had it not been for the appearance bodies in 1934. The general consequence of of the Baker report only a few months ear- these investigations was to highlight the in- lier. In view of the Baker recommendations, adequacies of military aviation and to give the Howell group decided to watch and additional support to the limited objectives wait-to give the GHQ air force experiment of the air leaders.14a an opportunity to prove itself. The Howell The War Department Special Committee report predicted that as aircraft capabilities on the Army Air Corps (Baker Board) was increased, progressively greater freedom of appointed 17 April 1934 under the chair- action would have to be granted the air manship of Newton D. Baker, the wartime arm; it regarded the GHQ air force as a step Secretary of War. The board had a total of in that certain direction.14s six civilian and six military members, in- In accord with suggestions from its own cluding General Drum of the General Staff Drum and Baker boards the War Depart- and General Foulois, Chief of the Air Corps; ment moved to establish the GHQ Air Force as on all previous War Department bodies as a new tactical unit of the Army. Plans studying aviation problems, the nonflyers were completed, and the new organization outnumbered the flyers. Charged to make a was given an effective date of 1 March 1935. “constructive study and report” upon the All air combat units located in the several Air Corps as an agency of national defense corps areas were consolidated into this new in peace and war, the Baker Board spent force, which was placed for purposes of 25 days taking testimony from 105 wit- training and employment under its Dwn nesses; it received, in addition, some 500 commanding general. The latter reported written statements from Air Corps officers. directly to the Chief of Staff in time of The report, issued on 18 July 1934, proved peace and to the theater commander in time highly influential and was generally ac- of war. Supply and individual training re- cepted as a guide to action, as the Morrow mained the responsibility of the Chief of Air report had been in 1925.* It summarized Corps, who was on a level coordinate with the long list of investigating bodies that the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force. had examined the question of a separate air The corps area commanders retained ad- organization and agreed with their prepon- ministrative jurisdiction over the bases derant opposition to such an arrangement. where air units were stationed. Head- However, while reflecting the conserative quarters for the force was established at view of the War Department toward air- Langley Field,’with subordinate wing head- power and air autonomy, the board did rec- ommend establishment of a GHQ air force quarters at Barksdale and March fields; made up of all air combat units, trained as each wing consisted of one or more groups a homogeneous force and capable of either of bombardment, attack, pursuit, and re- close support or independent a~ti0n.l~’ connaissance aviation, in varying combina- A study group more favorable to the air- tions. The first leader of the new organiza- man’s view was the Federal Aviation Com- tion was Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrew, mission, created in accordance with the Air formerly chief of the Training and Opera- Mail Act of 12 June 1934 for the purpose of tions, OCAC, and a member of the General

*See above, pp. 28-29. Staff.149Under his guidance the concept of 74 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE Development of the Air Force Idea the GHQ Air Force as a unified striking As to the method of control of the GHQ Air force was to become a reality. Force, the War Department proposal con- After the creation of the GHQ Air Force it ditioned this upon the stage of warfare in remained to be seen just what its role would progress. During the period of “strategkal be. As early as December 1934 Brig. Gen. C. development,” prior to the contact of E. Kilbourne of the General Staff had in- ground forces, the air commander would itiated a move to reach agreement on this control the force under a general directive question. His conservative “sighting shot” from GHQ. During the preliminary period was circulated for comment within the Air of contact between ground forces, GHQ Corps and elsewhere; it conceived of the would assign to the air commander special GHQ air organization as an all-purpose missions involving major objectives; dur- force. Operations of the force were divided ing decisive ground battles, GHQ would as- into four categories: beyond the sphere of sign specific missions or direct the air com- ground forces, immediate support of ground mander to take instructions from the forces, defense of seacoasts, and defense of commander of the army engaged.lS1 rear areas. Among the specific objectives Although Kilbourne’s draft subordinated included in the firs& category, the enemy the idea of strategic aviation, OCAC ac- air force was ranked first. The importance cepted the general line of these proposals; of other objectives beyond the sphere of gone was the “independent” spirit of the ground forces would depend upon the situa- WAC of 1928, when it advocated a Mitchell- tion; hostile communications, munitions type thesis.* The Air Corps Tactical School, storage and factories, troop concentrations, however, sharply criticized the Kilbourne power plants and other utilities, and popu- paper, both in general and in detail, and lation centers (in reprisal only) were stipu- individual officers, like Maj. Carl Spaatz, lated. Operations in immediate support of also decried the limited role assigned to the ground forces were subdivided into two striking force. In the end the War Depart- phases: the approach to battle and the ment largely ignored the criticisms, and the hsttle itself. During the first phase the revision of TR 440-15, dated 15 October most important activities would be inter- 1935, embodied the more conservative doc- diction of enemy air action, reconnaissance, kine.152 The categories of operations estab- enemy communications, and attack upon lished in the Kilbourne paper were retained, troop concentrations, moving columns, and and the individual objectives listed were al- strikes against ammunition dumps. most the same. The function of an air force During the battle, the GHQ Air Force was stated as the furtherance of the mis- would be called upon to deliver massed sion of the “territorial or tactical com- attacks upon key points in the enemy mand” to which it was assigned. The higher position, upon enemy units preparing commander would employ the air force for an assault, and upon enemy reserves. within or beyond the sphere of action of his Should the enemy be defeated in battle, the ground troops, either in support or in inde- air force would attempt to block the line pendent operations; he could specify gen- of retreat; should U.S.forces be beaten, the eral missions or parti’cular objectives.lS3 air force would interdict enemy air opera- While air leaders sought to place their own tions and perform necessary demolitions. desired interpretations upon TR 440-15, In the War Department view, all elements they were not satisfied with the general con- of the air force would have important func- cept of airpower which it presented. tions in ground support, “Success on the The War Department regarded the GHQ battlefield being the decisive factor in Air Force, with its omcia1 doctrine as an war. . . .”lSo In connection with the remain- excellent and lasting solution to the prok ing operational categories, coastal defense lem of air organization and employment. and defense of rear areas, the Kilbourne General MacArthur, hoping that the ar- draft proposed appropriate procedures for rangement would quiet the furor of the past reconnaissance, attack, and interception. *See above. p. 48. Development of the Air Force Idea THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 75 years over the status of the air arm, saw the Corps, there was still no provision for a GHQ Air Force as “ideally suited to the separate air budget, and corps area-com- country’s needs.” In order to insure con- manders continued to exercise administra- tinuity of policy, MacArthur thought that tive jurisdiction over air personnel. Further- the military authorities should refuse to more, the General Staff remained the Anal consider, at least for flve years, any change authority, and airmen thought that full in the status Air leaders, on the other development of aviation could not come un- hand, were divided in their attitude toward til ultimate authority rested in the hands the new arrangement. Billy Mitchell at- of flyers themselves. However, the GHQ Air tacked the plan as a “subterfuge” which Force was a real advance. It was a clear merely “divided aviation into more parts.” recognition of the air force idea, the con- But the majority accepted the GHQ Air cept of unifled air striking power. And in Force as a step in the right direction. It was the new tactical unit there lay the flrst op- admittedly a compromise move which fell portunity for building a strong force in be- short of the desired goal: military aviation ing-one that could dramatize and demon- was indeed split between Air Force and Air strate the potentialities of airp0~er.l~~ CHAPTER 4

REFINEMENT AND SUBSTANTIATION OF THE LONG- RANGE BOMBARDMENT CONCEPT, 1935-1939

HEMISPHERE DEFENSE POLICY AS A FACTOR IN enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine was an STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND AIR DOCTRINE integral part of the defense of the United States. Possible violations were seen in the itler’s rise to power in Nazi Germany form of encroachments on the political in- H and the forming of the Axis al%nce dependence of American states or in ac- of Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1937 had quisition of control of additional territory a clarifying effect upon American strategi- in the Western Hemisphere by a non- cal thinking and military doctrine. Before American power. The Air Corps Board as- these dramatic developments, the omcia1 sumed that enforcement of the Monroe policy of the United States had been to de- Doctrine in case of such violation would fend its shore lines, and the imaginary begin with measures of diplomacy. However, invasion conjured up was usually a should diplomatic overtures fail, armed British-led coalition against the north- force might be necessary in any country of eastern region of the country.’ As the the hemisphere, and they might have to new and real threat took shape in the be employed in one or more of a variety of late 1930’s, it was seen that an initial attack ways. Military operations, for example, was not likely to be made directly against might be limited to quelling internal dis- the United States, but against other por- turbances and restoring legitimat,e govern- tions of the Western Hemisphere. By infil- ments to power. On the other hand, they tration, subversion, or military pressure, might consist of resisting major invasion the Axis might seize control in vulnerable efforts from the air and sea or of ejecting parts of Latin America; from those bases non-American forces which had gained a they could threaten the United States it- foothold. The Air Corps Board believed that self. the Army’s air arm, to contribute to hemis- Hence, a more definite strategic situation, phere defense, required a substantial force upon which a firm military policy could be in being of long-range reconnaissance built, was materializing.* The notion grad- bombers. This force, “capable of offensive ually became established that while defense action from Alaska to the Straits of Magel- of the shore line must be taken for granted, lan,” would meet the initial requirements the United States should at the same time for enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine make preparation to enforce the Monroe and would discourage possible violations.2 Doctrine. And although even this broadened In the following year, 1939, another study concept was essentially defensive, it ob- of air defense of the hemisphere was con- viously called for offensive military capa- ducted at the Air Corps Tactical School. bilities. This application was clearly recog- It stated categorically that the air force nized in the Army’s air arm by 1938 when must deny bases in the hemisphere to any the Air Corps Board undertook a special non-American power; the most vital areas study of the Air Corps mission under the were specified as Newfoundland, north- Monroe Doctrine. The report concluded that eastern Brazil, and the vicinities of Rio *For discussion of the errlier lack of realistic strategical de Janerio and Santiago, Chile.3 The study thlnklng. and the resultant dlfUcultles for mllitsry planers. see above, pp. 51-53. saw a German-Italian coalition as the most 76 Refinement and Substantiation THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 77 serious potential threat to the security tinual struggle for world markets. The of Latin America, estimating that those sovereign states involved sought to solve nations could divert as many as 500 these conflicts by diplomacy and &her planes against the Western Hemisphere. measures short of war, but armed force To meet such a possibility, the Tactical remained the Anal arbiter. If a nation was School planners thought some 20 squad- to continue as a great power, it had to be rons of super-long-range bombers would be prepared to support its national policy by needed. Ideally, these squadrons would be military might. Borrowing from Frank based at Fortaleza in northeastern Brazil, Simonds’ Price of Peace, the instructors Rio de Janerio, and Santiago, but less asserted that the core of national policy effective operations could be conducted consisted of insuring economic prosperity, from United States bases in Panama and security, and ethnic unity. Since these Puerto Rice.* elements constituted the basis for peace and contentment of the nation’s citizens, ELABORATION OF AIR THEORY AT THE it became the duty of every government AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL to use all possible means of attaining The broader concept of national policy them. The United States, as a “have” na- and strategic considerations arising from tion, was mainly concerned with keeping the growing emphasis upon hemisphere de- what it already had; but it had to be pre- pared to defend its interests against the fense was welcomed in the Army’s air arm. “have-not” nations which desired to im- Since aviation was regarded by air leaders prove their status.5 as primarily a weapon of offense, they had always felt a bit constrained by the es- This gloomy view of the capitalistic tablished national policy of defense. The production system envisioned ceaseless Monroe Doctrine, 86 applied to the hemi- warfare among the major powers. The sphere in the 1930’s, opened the door to a enemy, even when defeated, was seen as kind of air operation which was, at least bound to join the struggle again, once his tactically, offensive. It also involved long- economic system was rehabilitated. For range action and large planes, both of modern wars “are essentially economic which were required for offensive air war- wars, caused by the clash of rival produc- fare. In this revised wame of reference, the tion machines,” and “there can be no per- instructors and students of the Tactical manent peace without removing from School proceeded with the development of world production enough of the producers air doctrine-taking into consideration to secure a balance between available prod- such fundamental matters as the nature ucts and world outlets.” The Air Corps of war, employment of airpower, and tactics officers cbncluded that for the present and for the various branches of military avia- “probably for the full extent of our mili- tion. tary careers, we will see wars which have no broader purpose than a temprapj The nature of war and the employment of readjustment .”a airpower As to the general methods by which The view of war at the Tactical School these interminable wars were to be fought, in the late 1930’s remained virtually the there was held out some promise of grad- same as it had been in the earlier years ual advance from violence. The history of of the decade.* War was regarded as the conflict was seen as a progression from the inevitable result of conflicting national hand-to-hand stage, through the contem- policies, arising chiefly out of economic porary missile stage, to the forces. Students in the Air Force course “future war of intellects where there will at Maxwell Field were being taught in be no contact between combatants. This 1935 that overproduction, brought on by future method may have been already in- the Industrial Revolution, caused a con- augurated by Russia with the prime pur- pose of self-defense. It has been said that *For diacus8ion of the concept of war in the early ‘30’8, see above, pp. 51-sa. Russia has waged war since she regained 78 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE - Refinement and Substantiation her equilibrium after the Revolution-and offensively. A statement issued at the Tac- ‘this simply means that she has tried to tical School conceded that avowed national change the minds of sudicient people con- strategy was defensive and that for various cerning the established forms of govern- ment to bring about tolerance for the form reasons it was undesirable to maintain the she is experimenting with. attitude of an international bully. But al- This interpretation of the aims of Soviet though the United States talked of defense, the paper declared, it had to realize that propaganda was used as a basis for predic- tion: “If we progress, which we always ultimate military success was gained only through the offensive. While assuming a have, we will some day leave the phase of violence and enter a phase of educational defensive attitude, the United States should conflict.” But intelligence progresses slowly, build a powerful offensive force; and once and until the futility of violent war is the fight began, the nation should attack- generally recognized, war will be waged “or if the opportunity presents, we would with the most effective means for destruc- not be above taking the offense initially; in tion.; which case we convince ourselves that the conflict could not be avoided anyway.’’1o For the immediate future, airpower was seen as the primary weapon of destruction The views of the Tactical School instruc- in war. And war would take the form, not tors on the primary objectives of an air of attack upon armies and other surface offensive were a continuation of the ideas forces, but upon the nations themselves. developed in the early ‘30’s.* Main emphasis The real purpose in warfare was to gain the was placed upon the ultimate objective of submission of the enemy, and this aim dislocating the enemy’s national structure could be achieved most quickly and em- through precision attacks against vital ciently by disrupting national life. Airpower points. However, attention was also given to was the direct means to that end, for it the necessity of destroying the enemy’s air could leap over armies and navies to strike force, and it seemed generally agreed that at the economic and social fabric of the counter-air force action would take prece- enemy.* Lt. Col. Donald Wilson, director dence over the national structure objec- of the department of Air Tactics at Max- tive.]* In any case, it was believed that the well Field, elaborated this point in a note principal elements of the airpower of a his colleague, Maj. Muir S. Fairchild: nation should be held and employed as a to unified force, no matter what the mission. Air warfare requires an entirely different approach. It requires thinking which can Concentrated action, independent of sur- grasp the object of war and a realization face operations, was regarded as the most that any nation’s war potentid is basically appropriate use of military aviation; func- rooted in the people in the nation’s home tions in support of ground forces were territory. Any method which causes the viewed as a necessary but subordinate con- people to prefer the terms for peace to sideration.’* continued suffering is effective. The air- plane with the proper military intelligentx In stressing the principle of concentra- provides a means which can reach these tion and the priority of the counter-air force people immediately upon the outbreak of mission, the Tactical School instructors hostilities. Even though we do not plan to could point to the parallel case of the use our forces in this manner, such a U.S. short-sighted policy will not prevent the Navy. Indoctrination in naval tactics had enemy from doing so. Such action on the resulted in universal acceptance, inside the part of the enemy may cause such disrup- Navy and out, of the proposition that the tion that we have no other course except fleet should not be divided and that its to sue for Wace.D offensive power should be directed toward a The employment of air forces should be single and all-important objective-the geared to the new kind of war and the hostile fleet. The mission of coast defense potentialities of the airplane. It was believed and the political pressure to base units in essential in this connection that regardless widely scattered ports were never allowed by of national policy, airpower should be used ‘For dlscusslon of this development, see above, pp. 57-58. Refinement and Substantiation THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE - 7g the Navy to interfere with its primary re- we should accept the force as it is and sponsibility. One Air Corps instructor ex- that we depart from instruction that gives this force responsibilities that are incon- pressed the wish that his fellow officers were sistent with its actual functions, as stipu- equally well indoctrinated with the same lated by higher authority.14 principle of war as applied to air forces. Notwithstanding the logic of Webster’s dis- He regretted the scattering of GHQ air units sent, the leaders of the Department of Air all over the country and emphasized what Tactics persisted in keeping the Air Force he considered to be the foremost principles course on a theoretical basis. They were of air employment : concentration of force looking not to the past or present but to the and the objective of the enemy air force. future. And in that future they saw air- He recognized that other objectives existed, power unlimited. but he insisted, The difference in viewpoint within the An air force that is designed for its true ob- Department of Air Tactics was paralleled jective will not be inadequate to its lesser by the difference between the general teach- obligations. It cannot measure up to its real task, however, if it is designed for the ings in the Tactical School and other service transportation of troops, the movement of schools of the Army. Maj. Warren R. Carter, supplies, participation In battle, or in futile while a student at the Army War College in defensive operations. 1938, clearly defined this divergence in a And, quoting Napoleon, the instructor con- carefully prepared paper. He pointed out cluded, “Exclusiveness of purpose is the that there existed two main schools of secret of successes.”1a thought relative to the employment of air- Questions of air employment, as studied power: one held that the primary role was and discussed at Maxwell Field, continued immediate support of ground forces; the on a theoretical basis, with little reference other held that it was long-range strategic to the actual strategical position and needs operations. The latter view was the basis of the United States. The advantage of this of instruction given at the Air Corps Tacti- approach, from the standpoint of construc- cal School, while the former, more limited ting doctrine, has already been pointed concept, was taught at the Army War Col- out.* It is interesting to observe that there lege. The Command and General Staff was some internal criticism of this policy School, according to Carter, offered a third in the Air Force course. In December 1935 point of view, which was a cornpromise.lK Capt. Robert M. Webster, a meniber of the The dichotomy noted by Major Carter was a Department of Air Tactics, proposed to the continuation of the basic rift that had director that a change be made in the na- crystallized as far back as 1926. This has ture of the program. As taught over the already been discussed as fundamental to past several years, stated Webster, the Air the difference between the ground and air Force course had been confined to an expo- points of view during the period following sition of airpower. He complained that it at- the first World War.?? The two conflicting tempted to illustrate the “grander princi- positions were set forth in TR 440-15, 26 ples of employment,” with which few, if January 1926, and in the Tactical School any, students would be even remotely con- manual, Employment of Combined Air cerned.? More attention needed to be given, Force, issued in the same year. The under- thought Webster, to tactics in probable lying reason for the differing attitudes and military situations. He pointed out that an instruction, in 1938 as well as in 1926, was air force actually existed in the Army, in the setting of the sights. The ground and it seems more appropriate that we view and the view of the service schools spend an increasing amount of our time in were cast upon past and present methods trying to find how we are going to utilize of warfare seen in a practical, immediate that force under restrictions imposed by our military policy. It seems proper that light; the air view and the view of the ~~ Tactical School were upon future methods ‘For elaboration of this point in connection with doctrinal evolution of the early ’~O’S, see above. p. 53. as illumined by trained imagination. twebster’s prediction was to prove erroneous: graduates of the ACTS were to become the core of the planning staffs for the $For comparison of these points of vlew as established In grand offensives against the Axis. isas, see above, pp. 40-49. 80 - Txs DSVSLOP~~SNTOF Am DOCTRINE Refinement and Substantfation Bombardment aviation chief employment of military aviation The bomber continued to hold its posi- should be an offensive striking force tion as the dominant air weapon in the directed against the enemy national struo- thinking at the Air Corps Tactical School. ture or armed forces according to circum- It was seen as the basic arm of the air stances. Slessor gave detailed attention force, while pursuit and other branches of to the subject that so intrigued Air Corps aviation relnained generally in eclipse. officers at the Tactical School-the selec- Creation of the GHQ Air Force in 1935 tion and priority of targets in a sustained as an offensive striking force in being program of strategic bombardment.le It strengthened interest in the bombers and is not known to what extent Slessor’s book stimulated the development of specific doc- may have influenced the Americans-there trines for the use of this new force. Maj. is no evidence that it was used in the en.Frank M. Andrews, first commanding United States before World War 11. In any general of the GHQ Air Force, epitomized event the ideas had already taken form at the prevailing philosophy of air leaders the Tactical School some years before publi- when he addressed the Army War College cation of his volume. If used at all, Slessor’s on 1 October 1938. Showing the required work was probably viewed as a welcome obeisance to the official national policy of confkmation from abroad of what was al- defense, Andrews declared that the United ready emerging here. States could best defend its frontiers by In sum, the evolving doctrine of bombard- attacking the enemy. And, opening the ment called for precision attacks upon vital way for his long-range bombers, he said and vulnerable points in the enemy’s na- that the attack should be made “as far tional structure. The main outlines of this from our shores as we can reach him” This doctrine had been well expressed by 1935, fact forced attention, continued Andrews, and it remained only to work out in greater upon the predominant role of bombardment detail the specific methodology.* In fulfill- aviation in the defensive problem confront- ing this need, the instructors at the school ing the CIHQ Air Force. “I do not minimize continued to ignore the actual strategic the importance and value of reconnais- situation of the United States and the exist- sance, pursuit, and attack aviation . . . ing limits of range, bases, and equipment. but bombardment aviation is and always They proceeded, unhampered, to build the will be the principal striking force in air theory and tactics of strategic attack &s if operatione. Air power is measured in terms the potential enemy country lay within the of bombardment aviation.”16 The Chief of operating radius of our bombers. Maj. Gen. the Air Corps, Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., who was connected also supported this concept. In advising the with the Tactical School from 1934 through Secretary of War on procurement matters, 1938, and who was closely associated with he wrote that the primary need of the Army this theoretical development, is well quali- for airplanes was in the category of long- fied to describe how the instructors set range bombers-aircraft which would “in- about their challenging task. The central sure the Army’s responsibility in defending problem was that of enemy target selec- the United States,” and which would permit tion : the reinfofcement of Hawaii, Panama, and Within the radius of action of the bomber Alaska with at least a portion of the GHQ are presumably hundreds of industrial tar- Air F0rce.l’ gets of greater or lesser importance. How It is worth noting that the bombardment do we go about selecting which targets to attack? , . . It was essentially a problem concepts evolving at the Tactical School for industrial economists, but no economists were paralleled by the leading air thought were available and no money was availa- abroad during the late 1930’s. John C. Sles- ble to hire them, in view of the War De- sor, an RAF officer destined to become its partment’s attitude toward such an ap- chief of staff, in 1936 published a classic proach. So the School did the best it account airpower. thesis the *For description of the basic theory of precision bombing, of His was that as constructed in the early 1030’s. see above, pp. 57-58. Refinement and Substantiation THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR mctnrn~- a1 could. It reasoned that other great nations very large portion of the entire aircraft were not unlike our own, and that an industry in the United States had been analysis of American industry would lead to nullifed just as effectively as if a great sound conclusions about German industry, many airplanes had been individually shot or Japanese industry, or any other great up, or a considerable number of factories power’s industry. Major [Robert M.1 Web- had been hit. That practical example set ster and Major [Muir 8.1 Fairchild . . . did the pattern for the ideal selection of pre- most of the research that was conducted cision targets in the United States Tacti- here at the School on our own national in- cal doctrine for bombardment. That was dustrial structure . , . . Fairchild‘s inves- the kind of thing that was sought in every tigation into our own economy developed economy. . . .lo some such picture as this. Our economy is General Hansell’s account, given here highly specialized. For instance, the New in detail to show the approach and the diffi- England States make the great majority of our brass and copper items. Raw materials culties, is readily substantiated by papers for these items are transported by rail pri- in Tactical School Ales. The instructors marily to New England. There they are sought, through official and unofficial processed or manufactured and shipped out channels, to secure needed information and to using plants elsewhere in the country. assistance. In April 1938, for example, the Likewise, almost all the shoes in the coun- school commandant wrote to the director try are made in one locality. Most auto- mobiles are made in one locality. Within of the Army Industrial College, requesting each of these industries, there are in turn study of certain technical questions. Among the questions specwed most important specializations. as One factory may make all the hardware was: What would be the effect on our in- for a number of automobile manufacturers. dustrial war effort of denial of increasing Another may make all the frames; still an- percentages of electric power in the north- other all the transmissions. A small group eastern industrial area? At what percentage Of faCtoFiM may make a11 the ball bearings would loss of power disrupt this effort? An- for a great many industries. A few machine other query asked if there was any single tool manufacturers may make tools on which all industries are dependent. And key industry, largely concentrated geo- serving this specialization or these groups graphically, whose destruction would be of specialities, are certain great services: more immediately diastrous than the loss of the rail transportation system, the electric a’substantial percentage of electric power in power system. the telephone and telegraph the vital industrial area.20These questions, communication system. An analysis of this great complexity indicates that munitions and similar ones written by individual in- industries are especially sensitive to a rela- structors to personal friends at the Army tively small number of plants, which make Industrial College, illustrate the kind of speciallmd parts, or systems which provide effort made to obtain data and the groping specialized service. The classic example of for solutions to the problem of target the type of specialization, and hence, vul- selection.21 nerability. literally fell into our laps. We discovered one day that we were taking de- It will be observed that the evolving stra- livery on new airplanes, flying them to tegic bombardment theory called for ex- their points of reception, removing the pro- treme accuracy in destroying small targets pellers, shipping the propellers back to the like individual plants and power stations. fSCtOrieS, and ferrying out additional air- There was little doubt among most instruc- Planes. The delivery of controllable pitch Propellers had fallen down. Inquiries tors that such accuracy could be achieved showed that the propeller manufacturer with the improvement in planes and bomb- waa not behind schedule. Actually it was sights, in spite of enemy antiaircraft meas- a relatively simple but highly specialized ures. This hope was to be only partly ful- Spring that was lacking, and we found that Alled in the aerial offensives against the all the springs made for all the controllable his, and this element in tne thinking of Pitch propellers of that variety in the United states came from one plant and the Tactical School proved to be a serious that that Plant in Pittsburgh had suffered flaw in the whole theory. At least one air from 8 flood. There was a perfect and clas- officer in the ’~O’S, according to his own sic =mPk. To all intents and purposes a testimony after the war, dissented from 82 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF An DOCTRINE Refinement and Substantiatidn the “pickle-barrel” doctrine. General Eaker could fight through to the objective regard- has stated that he was more conscious than less of interference by pursuit and anti- were some of the theorists regarding the ef- aircraft artillery. He rated the bomber’s fect of fighter defense upon bombing ac- speed, altitude, and defensive firepower (in curacy. Consequently, Eaker (who spent that order) as the principal safety factors.24 only one year at the Tactical School) fav- Colonel Knerr was even more explicit than ored a modified area-bombing theory rather Andrews, who ultimately recognized the than the one generally approved at Maxwell necessity of long-range escorts.25Knerr took Field. Such a tactical plan, explained Eaker, the view that the proper function of the would have represented a compromise be- pursuit plane was to shoot down bombers; tween the British wartime theory of gen- it served properly as an interceptor but not eral area attack by night and the Ameri- as an escort.26 The Air Corps Board, in a can doctrine of daylight precision.g2 study issued in May 1939, took the position Notwithstanding such criticisms, the Tac- that the bomber’s speed reduced the need tical School theorists held to their convic- for escort and that a pursuit plane with tion that the bomber could and would hit the required range would probably lack targets of small dimension..They also per- adequate fighting characteristics for coping sisted in their belief that heavily armed with enemy interceptors.*’ planes could penetrate to great distances The idea of the invincibility of the bomber without the necessity of pursuit escort.* was supported not only by the leaders of While conceding that flghter protection was the bombardment branch of the air arm, desirable, the general view was that suffi- but by outstanding pursuit pilots as well. cient range could not be built into fighters With the retirement of Capt. Claire Chen- to enable them to accompany bombers all nault in 1937, there -reMained in the Air the way. But with or without escort, the Corps no powerful voice to speak up for bomber would get through. Even ofRcers the capabilities of the fighters.? Maj. Clay- like Eaker, who later stated that he had ton Bissell, one-time pursuit instructor at always adhered to the escort theory, sub- ACTS and a tactical commander at scribed in 1938 to the view that nothing Wheeler Field, T. H., in 1936 took a pessi- could stop the bombers. Collaborating with mistic view of the prospects for successful General Arnold in a popular book on avia- bomber interception. Asked by Capt. James tion, he said that for years air strategists E. Parker, instructor at the school, to elabo- had assumed that aerial attacks would be rate his opinions on the subject, BisselI turned back by antiaircraft fire and pur- wrote that bombardment had become the suit, but that modern trends suggested that major weapon of aviation. Furthermore, the no method could be depended upon to pre- bolriber was superior to all existing coun- vent all enemy planes from reaching their termeasures, including pursuit and anti- objective. The authors of the book expressed aircraft artillery. Some type of plane capa- conAdence that defense against aerial at- ble of overcoming the power of the bomber tack would ultimately be found, but only was necessary, conceded Bissell, and “If the two suggestions were offered, the possibility need is great enough, money and genius of developing an electric ray to stop gasoline will be directed to the production of such engines or moving underground. Decisive aircraft.” The problem was simply a mat- interception by pursuit was evidently re- ter of relative speeds. Pursuit could not garded as unlikely.23General Andrews, com- neutralize bombardment, stated Bissell, un- manding the GHQ Air Force, and his chief less it enjoyed a speed advantage of 40 to of staff, Col. Hugh Knerr, likewise had 50 per cent; and until that should be possi- faith that the bomber would reach its tar- ble, “there is no pursuit aviation.” Given get. Andrews told officers at the Army War the requisite speed, the problem of attack- College that bombardment avjation had ing and destroying a bomber was viewed proved time and again that its bombers -- M relatively simple.2sBut clearly, no plane *For dlscusslon 02 this question, a8 it was argued in the early - ’30’8, sea above, pp. 58-60. tFor Chennault’s stand on thls problem, see above, pp. 58-59. Refinement and Substantiation THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 03 with the speed advantage stipulated by Bis- of the Chief of Air Corps regarding the sell was even remotely available, and in status of pursuit instruction in 1939, he such terms it appeared that the bomber had indicated a picture of gradual recovery in little to fear from pursuit. emphasis from a low point reached about After the appearance of the XB-17 in 1935. Harmon wrote with some pride of this 1935, this plane became the principal stand- trend, which he had supported. While rec- ard of reference for discussion and planning ognizing the importance of bombardment of bombardment models.* The four-engine development, he disliked the doctrine of aircraft with transposable bomb and fuel “bombardment invincibility” and favored a capacity was generally recognized as the balance between the principal branches of most suitable, both for reconnaissance and aviation. “We assign pursuit a very im- attack; the B-17 came to be accepted as a portant role,” wrote Harmon, “second only small or medium model of this general type, in importance to the main dependence and development was aimed toward still placed on the striking force.” For specific larger planes.2o While officers within the illustration, he referred to the increase in Air Corps we.e exuding confidence in the the length of the Pursuit course taught at striking and defensive powers of the new the school and to the greater attention bomber, some criticism was voiced from the given to pursuit employment in the Air outside. Alexander de Seversky, the famed Force course.32 There is considerable evi- aircraft designer, believed that the much- dence, too, in the texts and lectures at heralded Fortress was deficient in both fire- ACTS, that the role. of pursuit was being power and armor. By way of comparison, he given somewhat greater recognition than pointed to the fact that the B-17 had no it had received in the early 1930’s when tail guns, while the British Wellington car- the high-speed bomber first dazzled the ried a double .30-cal. “stinger” mounted in imagination of air leaders. The text for the a power turret.30 Seversky’s criticism was Pursuit course issued in September 1939 to prove well founded in this respect, for stated that the primary mission of pursuit when the B-17’s were committed to combat, was defensive, consisting of defense of bases they had to be modified to fit the needs of and of aircraft in flighcin other words, the European theater. In justification of the interception and escort.3g Capt. Earle E. Air Corps’ position, it should be said that Partridge, pursuit instructor, in one of his the Army designers were emphasizing regular classroom lectures emphasized the speed, range, and altitude as defensive fac- need for escort operations. Accompanying tors, rather than armament. And the B-lTs, fighter cover should be provided for bomb- which were “sold” to the military establish- ers whenever they expected to encounter ment and the public chiefly for use in sea enemy interceptors, he said, and “Under search and sea attack, were not expected certain conditions, such as in daylight, to encounter the heavy pursuit opposition when the visibility is excellent , , . it may later put up by the Luftwaffe over Europe. become imperative that friendly pursuit The Air Corps, furthermore, was cognizant aid the supported air force unit by furnish- of the need for accurate and effective defen- ing close Another lecture in sive fire by its bombers. In June 1939 the the Pursuit course referred to the Air Corps Board recommended as a top- employment of fighters in direct assist- priority project the development of fire- ance to ground forces. This mission cculd control systems for both medium and heavy be accomplished, stated the instructor, by bombers.31 denying hostile aerial observation and at- Pursuit aviation tack, by protecting friendly reconnaisqmce, When Col. Millard F. Harmon, assistant and, when other missions did not interfere, commandant of ACTS, wrote to the Office by strafing and bombing sweeps against The two-engine Dough8 B-18 was actually in quantit pro- surface forces.g5 ductlon ln the I8te 1930’s. but Air Corps le8derS regardeg it us aulte inferior to four-engine ships. The strugsle for procurement Of the B-17. end the broader Iirue of two-englne or four-engine It would be misleading, however, to sug- bomber& wlll be di8cuwed 8t length In a I8ter sectlon. Bee belOW. pp. 89-101. gest that pursuit was by way of regaining $4 - ’I’m DEVELOPMENTOr AIR DOCTRINS Refinement and Substantiation the pition of importance which it had en- could not have the requisite combat per- joyed after World War I. It has been seen formance; furthermore, diversion of pro- in the preceding chapter that Chennault duction to fighters when the total number supported a losing cause in his fight for of aircraft was limited would mean a corre- greater pursuit recognition in the early sponding loss of strength in bombers. Wil- 1930’s.* The essentially limited, defensive son concluded, in light of the foregoing, role into which pursuit had been cast, was that escort should be adopted only in a not thrown off in the period before the sec- military situation where its use appeared ond World War. The same school text, indispensable to the profitable conduct of which in one place referred to pursuit in bombardment operation~.~’ the role of accompanying support, in an- Since interception was generally recog- other place emphasized that interception nized, in terms of the American military missions would of necessity comprise virtu- situation, as virtually the only important ally all pursuit operations. This was the re- mission of pursuit, it was natural that dis- sult of limited range, explained the text; cussion of tactics would be related to that enemy bombers were invulnerable so long role. Colonel Wilson believed, at least until as they remained beyond the fighters’ ra- much larger defense forces became availa- dius of action. As a consequence, pursuit ble, that the general tactical aim of pursuit had to await the enemy instead of seeking would have to be harrassment of attacking him ouL“In a word it becomes a defensive aircraft, rather than their complete destruc- force.”soSuch a role was a far cry from the tion. Pursuit attack, or even its threat, flexible, offensive-defensive, opportunistic would require enemy bombers to carry concept in the mind of Chennault. heavy armament in place of a maximum Lt. Col. Donald Wilson, director of the De- bomb load, to fly in defensive formation, partment of Air Tactics and Strategy, pre- and to suffer loss of accuracy in dropping sented a logical summary of the purpose their ~rojectiles.~~Colonel Harmon referred and status of pursuit in a carefully drawn to this as the limited aim approach for pur- memo for Colonel Harmon in June 1939. His suit. Because of the lengthy borders of the statement probably approached the con- United States, he explained, it was practica- sensus of the instructors at the Tactical ble to provide only a thin line of general air School, for Wilson submitted it in an effort defense, in addition to more concentrated to bring about an official school policy re- local defense of key centers or installations. garding pursuit. The net effect of his analy- Such an approach would impose substantial sis was to restrict flghters to the intercep- limitations upon the efficiency of attacking tion of hostile bombers. Wilson saw air forces.SBMaj. James E. Parker, instructor in defense of vital industrial centers as a con- the Pursuit course at ACTS, estimated that tinuous need in case of involvement in war the loss in pay load of bombers, as a result no matter where the theater of operations of such tactics, might be as high as 35 might be. Not until adequate defense was percent .40 provided for all key areas of the nation Reference has been made in the previous would it be safe or proper to employ pur- chapter to the fact that Capt. Chennault suit in “auxiliary missions.” And even if laid the groundwork for pursuit combat tac- that time were reached, a decision to use tics during the early 1930’s. He was also one pursuit in such fashion would have to be of the first to recognize the necessity of a based upon demonstrated need and proof of ground information net for successful pur- effectiveness of fighters in auxiliary roles. suit interception of hostile bombers.? Chen- Wilson himself had a low estimate of the nault’s recommendations on the latter sub- relative usefulness of pursuit, except in air ject were severely criticized at first. Maj. defense operations. Turning particulmly to Clayton Bissell, for instance, declared in escort work, he seemed to think that a September 1936 that he was not convinced Aghter with the range of a heavy bomber of the soundness of any scheme for an ex-

‘Far dlscuislon of the decllne of pursuit and the efforts of tCheanault’s aIr dghtlng tactics are described in pp. 62-63; Cbennault to restore Iti role, Lee above, pp. 66-66. 80-62. his plans for rlrcraft warning service are given in pp. 63-64. Refinement and Substantiation THE DEVELOPWNTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 85 tensive ground communication network. He rope and Asia, Alexander de Seversky stated that the amount of manpower re- roundly criticized their quality and per- quired to operate such a network along long formance. American fighters, alleged Sever- coast lines would be prohibitive. Bissell was sky, were inferior to foreign types in range, inclined to escape from the dimculties in- altitude, and firepower.45 Air Corps pilots volved in establishing an effective ground would have disagreed sharply with Sever- information system by taking a defeatist sky’s estimate of the B-17; however, there view of the whole interception problem.*41 was considerable feeling that U.S. fighters Dissension over this issue continued until had indeed fallen short. The Curtiss P-40 1938. According to Capt. Earle Partidge, (Warhawk), the standard service pursuit in pursuit instructor at ACTS, most observers 1941, proved suitable only to secondary the- became convinced of the feasibility of a aters of action; as an interceptor, the P-40 warning net by the results of the Fort Bragg was not the equal of the RAF’ Spitfire or exercises in October of that year. During the German Me-109. Its principal weak- those maneuvers, in which civilians manned nesses were insumcient firepower and in- a majority of the observation posts, a ferior general performance at critical alti- ground information system was employed tude~.~~Certainly, no one could have that worked’ satisfactorily. Captain Par- asserted with any plausibility that Ameri- tridge told his students that, “The entire can fighters were the best in the world. scheme of genpral defense by the pursuit One reason for the continued lag in pur- unit is based on the successful operation of suit development, even as the threat of im- an aircraft interception net.”’2 The pursuit minent war became manifest, was simply course text issued in the following year in- that funds for aircraft development were cluded a long section describing the aircraft restricted, and air leaders assigned priority interception net; the description followed to b~mbardrnent.~?There is evidence to sug- closely the provisions which Chennault had gest, however, that the lag resulted also incorporated in his 1933 manual, The Role from lack of sufficient interest and support of Defensive PUrs~it.‘~His theory had ap- by the leaders of the air arm. Maj. Gen. parently gained official indorsement at the Grandison Gardner has stated that engi- Tactical School, although it was not put neering problems held back the design of an into effect by the Army before World War 11. effectiva. long-range fighter,4s but those The Pursuit text for 1939 had an inter- problems, while dimcult, would seem no esting section devoted to tactics of inter- greater than the ones solved by technical ception at night. It provided for formation experts building the super-bomber. General flying with navigation lights until the ele- Eaker has offered the opinion that air ments were actually detached to make the leaders gave insufficient attention to inter- assault. While Chennault had felt that ceptors, because they did not envisage for darkness limited action to single-plane at- this country the heavy bomber assaults tacks, the 1939 text suggested attacking which were thrown against Britain.4eEven elements of either two or three ships, de- less attention was given to development of pending upon the width of the bomber for- long-range fighters, because the prevailing mation: The text followed Chennault in bombardment theory held that long-range calling for searchlight cooperation and de- escorts were impracticable and unneces- livery of fire from the rear.? Normally, ac- sary.60 The conclusion seems inescapable cording to the text, pursuit attacks were to that, although financial and engineering be broken off when bombers entered the factors exercised a contributing influence, zoneof antiaircraft Are and were to be re- the lag in pursuit design resulted chiefly sumed after they had passed through it.44 from doctrinal shortcomings. Writing in 1942, after American planes Development of pursuit was further ham- had faced a limited test of combat in Eu- pered by lack of agreement upon the num- ~- ber of types desired and the features of *Bee above pp. 01-89 tFor Chenhault’s nigiht-fighter tactics, see above, p. 69. performance considered most essential in 86 - THE mVELOPMEIW OF AIR DOCTRINE Refinement and Substanttation each. While the bombardment enthusiasts By 1938 the pursuit development program were nearly unanimous in their views re- was focused upon two main types: a “clear- garding the ideal bomber-a multiengine, cut uncompromised single seat Interceptor long-range, high-altitude, and largeca- Fighter” (either single- or two-engine) and pacity aircraft-the pursuit leaders re- a several-purpose, multiseater fighter mained as divided as they had been since (chiefly for escort and long-range intercep- World War I.* Maj. Bissell favored only tion).54 But a year later, the door had one type of pursuit, as well as one for each swung open again to three types, instead of other class of aviation; such a plan, he two. The ACTS Pursuit text for 1939 stated argued, would be most econgmical and that the Air Corps was, or soon would be, would facilitate mass production. He equipped with three types of fighters, in- thought that the overriding criterion for cluding the interceptor and the multi- pursuit, regardless of type, was seater, mentioned above, plus the standard Other pursuit leaders thought the prob- single-seat pursuit which had been in use lem a bit more complicated than did Bis- for years. The latter would be required, said sell. They managed, it is true, to agree on the text, for general defense and as a sup- the elimination of one type, which had been plement to interceptors in local defense., a controversial issue ever since the World The multiseater fighter was to be used for ’ War-the two-seater pursuit. Following a long-range interception, patrols, trailing, survey among all pursuit units in the air and night defense; no mention of escort arm and a conference by the top pursuit duty was made in the text.55 commanders of the GHQ Air Force, the The planes actually produced and de- Chief of the Air Corps in June 1938 ap- veloped in the period 1935-1939 were of the proved a development program which three types described in the Tactical School omitted two-seater~.~~However, the ques- manual. By 1939 the standard pursuit tions of number of types and their charac- equipment was the single-engine, single- teristics remained. Col. Hugh Knerr, chief seater “compromise” type: the P-35 or P-36, of stafP of the GHQ Air Force, argued for and their replacement, the Curtiss P-40,”8a an interceptor type only. He strongly fav- low-wing, all-metal monoplane. The innova- ored a small, heavily armed ship, which tion was the in-line, liquid-cooled engine; might be labelled a “flying machine gun.” in fact, the P-40 evolved as an experiment Accordingly, Knerr proposed a plane of to compare the relative emciency of such an minimum size and wdight, with maximum engine with the radial, air-cooled type. The speed, maneuverability, and firepower, and experiment proved successful, at least with flown by a small pilot, He stated later that respect to maximum speed; the P-40 could the Bell P-39 (Airacobra) was built to this make 350 miles per hour, compared with 310 conception, but that it fell short because of for the inadequate engine power and excessive The interceptor type of pursuit was being weighting with auxiliary equipment. The developed at the same time. Design of the P-39, consequently, lapked the desired ceil- Bell P-39, with its 37-mm. cannon, has al- ing and performance. Furthermore, special ready been mentioned as having been fav- limits on the size of the pilot were not im- posed for assignment to this plane, as Knerr ored by Colonel Knerr. Of radical design, with Allison engine mounted behind the had hoped. Knerr averred, in passing, that, cockpit, the P-39 had more speed and flre- ‘The Japs took this hbterceptor conception P-40, it laid down by the GHQ Air Force and built power than the but had shorter the Zero to it. . . .” The shortcomings of range and proved more dimcult to fly. American pursuit plaqes during this period Greater hopes for a successful interceptor were generally attributable, Knerr has con- were placed upon the two-engine, single- cluded, to the fact t t “we were not able seater Lockheed P-38. This plane, considera- bly larger than any single-seater previously to crystallize our doctrine. .”53 . . built, had a superior rate of climb, speed, ‘For diicusdon 01 this divislon during the postwar years. 8GO above. Pp. 37-88. 64-66. range, and ceiling. The P-38, which was to

I Refinement and Substantiation THE: DEVELOrMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 87 become one of the outstanding planes of bombs. Smaller objects were regularly World War 11, was designed to mount four missed, and even machine-gun Are, wrote .bO-caliber machine guns and one 20-mm. Bissell, was inaccurate against precision cannon. targets. Reviewing the tactics of this branch The third type, the multiseater pursuit, of aviation, he concluded that low-altitude whose development had started in 1935, attacks (under 1,000 feet) would secure never went beyond the experimental stage. some surprise but would result in heavy The Bell XFM-1, powered by two Allison losses of aircraft and inflict negligible dam- pusher engines, failed to come up to expec- age. Attack planes, said Bissell, had ade- tations. Designed primarily as a powerful quate firepower but lacked accuracy.5o interceptor, it suffered from slow rate of Doubts such as those expressed by Bissell, climb, low speed, and poor maneuverability. plus observation of air operations in the It did carry heavy armament, four machine Spanish Civil War, led to a thorough study guns and two 37-mm. cannon, but this fire- of attack equipment and technique. Fol- power was of no use unless it could be lowing a directive from the War Depart- brought to bear.58 The money and energy ment, the Chief of the Air Corps in August spent on this futile project might well have 1937 directed the Air Corps Board to under- been used instead to develop a long-range take a study and to make recommendations single-seat fighter. As it turned out, the re- on the question of redesigning attack quirement for such a plane, which became planes. The suggestion from higher au- indisputable during World War 11, was met thority was that level bombing at medium by the P-38,,which the Air Corps had de- altitudes be considered the primary tactic of signed as an interceptor. The P-38 had the this branch of aviation, instead of machine- feature of size, in addition to the normally gun Are. It was argued that the light desired features of an interceptor; it was bomber had proved effective in Spain as a readily convertible, therefore, to long- weapon of ground support and that ma- range operations.* chine-gun fire from fast-flying aircraft was Attack aviation inaccurate except at dangerously low alti- No substantial improvement occurred in tudes.RoIn connection with this and similar the status of attack aviation during the late suggestions by the War Department, air 1930’s.f Although ground support opera- leaders were generally wary lest changes in tions were considered by the War Depart- equipment provide an entering wedge for ment as perhaps the most important func- increased emphasis upon ground suppcrt tion of the air arm, the air leaders functions. They tended to answer that at- themselves were inclined to give it second- tack planes should be designed for their ary attention, and attack aircraft were as- primary purpose, counter-air employment, sociated with the ground support mission. rather than for close support of ground Furthermore, there was uncertainty regard- units.s1 This question of the probable and ing the methods and equipment for provid- proper mission of attack aviation naturally ing ground support; some air ofFicers were complicated the question of correct equip- convinced that the existing technique was ment and tactics. ineffective. Major Bissell, who had partici- The studies initiated in 1937 produced no pated in tactical exercises in the Hawaiian conclusive results on the attack issue. In Islands, reported in September 1936 that April 1939, General Arnold communicated attack planes were unable to place their his persisting doubts to Lt. Col. Carl Spaatz, bombs accurately on small targets. The air- chief of the Plans Section, OCAC. He wrote craft which he observed, Curtiss A-21’s, car- that the status of attack aviation was in ried no precision bombsights and succeeded serious question-“what it is, its charac- in hitting only large area targets with their teristics, its performance, and its proper *It ihould be noted however that until 1043 when the P-51 place in the scheme of things in the system wu avallable in qu&tltg, the’Eiehth Air Force had no long- range fighter rultable for eicort operatlonr over Europe. of national defense.”62In reply to Arnold’s ?For ducurrlon of the decline of thlr branch of avlatlon, roe above, p. 66-67. request, Colonel Spaatz submitted a state- 88 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Refinement and Substantiatton ment of the existing status and doctrines tions over ground support missions and of attack aviation. Its mission was the upheld the traditional Air Corps view that destruction or neutralization of personnel f ront-line attacks represented an improper and light material. Attack was regarded as employment of airpower. It was believed more useful than heavy bombardment for that the most effective way of rendering close support of an infantry breakthrough support to ground forces was by 1) gaining or in opposition to a strong enemy ground assault. The attack planes must be fast and air superiority over the battlefield, 2) iso- maneuverable, suitable to either area or lating the battlefield through destruction of precision bombing; machine guns, chemi- enemy communications, and 3) attacking cals, and bombs comprised their arma- troop concentrations wherever found.66 As ment. Spaatz added, however, that the to method of assault, the official doctrine attack ship had not been proved tactically. still preferred low-altitude, level formation The extent to which it could be used suc- sweeps to individual dive-bombing tactics.67 cessfully at low altitudes must be the sub- In 1936 the Northrop A-17 became the ject of Searching analysis. It was entirely standard attack plane, replacing the Curtiss possible, Spaatz thought, that experience A-12 (Shrike). Incorporating the general might show the superiority of pure bom- characteristics called for in the 1930's, the bardment types, operating at higher alti- A-17 was an all-metal, low-wing monoplane, tude. Or it might be found that a better with one 800-horsepower radial engine. It type for ground support would be a plane had a top speed of 220 miles per hour, ceil- much smaller than the existing attack ing of 20,000 feet, and range of 730 miles. bomber, faster and more maneuverable. In It could carry 650 pounds of bombs, with any event, the Spaatz statement empha- five .30-caliber machine guns.68 But even sized that the attack bomber was an experi- while the A-17 was being delivered in some mental type, from both the tactical and en- quantities, the trend of design was toward gineering point of view.63 The extent of a multiengine, faster, larger ship. The neglect of ground support aviation is elo- principal advantages to be seen in a multi- quently attested by this confession of doubt engine plane were greater armament ca- and uncertainty in OCAC. pacity, speed, and defensive ability; these Meanwhile, official reports, texts, and characteristics were in some measure real- manuals set forth the doctrine of attack ized in the two-engine Curtiss A-18, which aviation, more or less as it had been devel- was given a trial by the Air Corps in the oped in the 1920's, without any hint of late '30's. This airplane did not give the reservation. An Air Corps Board report of 7 desired performance, but it sustained hopes May 1939 referred to attack a weapon of that a bimotored design might prove suc- as cessful, and it proved to be the forerunner opportunity, designed for low altitude work. of the Army's light bomber.60 The latter It expressed the general view of air leaders type was the outgrowth of a move made by stating that the proportion of attack by General Westover in 1937 to secure a aviation to bombardment should be small; more powerful plane for ground support U.S. aircraft-producing capacity ,should be purposes.7oIn September 1938 he requested devoted chiefly to those types which would official War Department approval for an be of greatest value in the initial phase of attack-bomber of the following character- an attack on the United States.64The At- istics: two engines, high speed (350 miles tack text at Maxwell Field described the per hour), range of 1,200 miles, ceiling of standard mission and tactics. While recog- 20,000 feet, and crew of 3. The armament nizing the likelihood of changes in equip included six .30-caliber machine guns and . ment, the text asserted that the tactics a load of over 2,000 pounds in bombs. The of this branch of aviation would remain request was approved in short order, and basically ~nchanged.~~The school main- the beginnings were made which were to tained the priority of counter-air opera- lead to the successful Douglas A-20." Refinement and Substantiation THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 89 THE CRUCIAL FIGHT FOR PRODUCTION AND from the standpoint of traditional methods DEVELOPMENT OF THE LONG-RANGE BOMCIER of warfare and a balanced military force, es- pecially in terms of immediate availability. The shortcomings in attack aviation, as The Air Corps was thinking of a new in pursuit and other branches, were in large kind of war, involving an air offensive, and measure the result of the overriding empha- in terms of a more remote future action.* sis placed by air leaders upon strategic The Navy was concerned almost exclusively bombardment. With the appearance of the with sea control, without respect to the high-speed bomber in the early ’~O’S, and plans and programs of ground and air. The particularly with the advent of the B-17, underlying causes of the controversy among the major effort of the Air Corps was ab- the services were, then, the divergent con- sorbed in the bombardment program. Air cepts of the nature of war, varying esti- leaders believed that they saw in it the mates of the capability .of the airplane, means of a true strategic offensive-the differing time considerations, and unwill- realization of the promise of airpower. They ingness or inability of each arm to see the were no doubt justifled in their belief and defense picture as a in their effort. Bombardment was to prove, Bomber program related to coast defense indeed, the backbone of the air force in It has already been seen that the develop- World War I1 and a principal factor in gain- ment of large aircraft by the Air Corps had ing ultimate victory for the Allied arms. been justified 85 a means of coast defense.t If in the struggle to build strength in bom- In June 1934 the War Department had ap- bardment some other considerations were proved Project A for exploring the problem sacrificed, the consequence is understand- of maximum range for a reconnaissance- able. The American idea of airpower rode bomber; this project brought forth the with the bomber program. B-15. In May 1935 the Secretary of War From 1935 until the Nazi attack on Po- approved a bigger and better venture, Proj- land in 1939 was a crucial period for bom- ect D, aimed at still greater size and range, bardment procurement and development. which produced the giant B-19.73 Both of The Air Corps had its theories and its plans, these costly experiments were supported by but without suitable equipment it could not the War Department, not to secure -proto- have molded the force which was later to types for strategic bombardment, but to help crack the Axis. Looking back upon develop the most efficient aircraft for use that period from the vantage point of hind- in coast defense. During the period that sight, it seems hardly conceivable that the these projects were under way, Air Corps Air Corps leaders should have faced such a leaders continued to stress that they desperate struggle in procuring the big desired large planes only for protection of bombers. But the flght was real, and it was the hemisphere. earnest. It was, in fact, a three-cornered Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, Chief of the struggle involving the Air Corps, the Gen- Air Corps, related his plea for a stronger eral Staff, and the Navy. And in this bit- air force to the military dangers abroad. ter contest the air arm was almost always Addressing the National Aeronautical As- opposed by the two senior services. sociation in November 1936, Westover de- Involved in this conflict which nearly clared: “If and when the great European wrecked the Air Corps program were, to be conflict occurs, the only way in which the sure, personalities, prestige, the vested in- neutral nations in the world can keep out terests of the services, and competition for of that conflict is to have such a strong limited defense funds. But more important national defense that none of the belliger- than those elements were the Arm and ents involved dare violate their neutral- honest convictions of strong men who were it^."'^ No suggestion was given of possible approaching the question from three differ- These disagreements between the air arm and the General Staff existed since World War I and were crystallized in formal statement in leas (see above, pp. 40-43), ent points of view. The General Staff looked tFor diocussion of thls polnt. and the controverry with the ~RVYrearrdim control of land-based air ooerstlons over water, at the question of bomber procurement- see above, pp. 67-70. 90 - THE D~VSL~PMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE Refinement and Substantiation offensive operations by the big bombers. the Army was to be prepared to ful- Likewise, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, All that responsibility regardless of the pres. commanding the GHQ Air Force, related ence or absence of naval forces. Perform- his arguments for long-range aircraft to ance of this function, concluded the board, the coast defense requirement. The advan- included operations over water.78However, tages of the large plane over the smaller in a supplementary report the board com- one, said Andrews, were greater power of plained that the Joint Action was based self-protection, less danger of forced land- upon a restricted concept of airpower, R con- ings, economy of operation per bomb de- cept which considered it a mere auxiliary to livered, and ability to contact the enmy surface forces. It called for immediate re- sooner and to hold him longer under sur- vision of the Joint Action, in order to pro- veillance and attack.76 In response to a vide a more adequate basis for the develop- query from Maj. .Gen. Stanley D. Embick of ment, planning, and training required by the General Staff, Andrews stated flatly the Air Corps for maximum pera at ion.^^ that the air weapons under development General Arnold also called ’for a clearer were purely defensive. “It is utterly absurd policy on the question of responsibility for to consider them as anything else and I coast defense. He indicated, in June 1037 think we should emphasize this point on that the whole question of whether the all A year later found Andrews Air Corps should have long-range planes stressing the same theme in a lecture be- was tied to the question of employment of fore the Army War College. Seeking to the GHQ Air Force. If the Navy were given counteract criticisms of the big bomber the task of air defense of the coast line, projects, he told his audience: said Arnold, there was no justification for From some sources comes the statement the Army having long-range ships. The en- that the modern development of large tire case for larger planes in the Army, he bombers is for the purpose of aggressive implied, rested upon a clear assumption of action on the part of the United States. Often we hear of our large bombers spo- the coastal defense responsibility. If the ken of 811 ‘Weapons of Offense,’ ‘Super- Air Corps did not perform that mission, it bombers,’ and similar appellations. These should logically limit its aviation to close term8 are unfortunate and misleading. support units, with the maximum range of At the same time, Andrews pointed to the aircraft being that necessary to reinforce fact that commercial airlineswere planning Hawaii and Panama.80As late as 1030 the ships of greater weightrup to 250,000 impression persisted, outside of the Army pounds, and he emphasized the superior as well as in, that the Air Corps bombers efficiency of such aircraft in defending the were being built purely for defense. Maj. nation.77 George Fielding Eliot, the popular civilian Quite naturally, the Air Corps oontinued writer on military affairs, expressed the to be concerned about arrangements with opinion that the chief use of the American the Navy for joint defense of the,seacoast. air arm in case of war would probably be The powers of Army bombardment had not to attack hostile fleets and advance bases, been spelled out in the Joint Action papers “For this purpose we require bombers of to the satisfaction of the air leaders, and greater radius of action, as far as we can the fear persisted that the Navy would achieve this, than any possible enemy develop a land-based, long-range force of possesses.”81 its own. Evqry effort‘was made to clarify The Navy, meanwhile, was maneuvering the coastal defense agreements so as to to eliminate the Air Corps from long-range provide a clear-cut mandate for continued operations over water. It insisted that off- and unhampered development of Army shore reconnaissance and attack were es- heavy bombers. The Air Corps Board in sentially part of the Navy’s function of October 1036 stated that the existing Joint controlling the sea and fulfilling its duty as Action paper gave to the Army responsi- the nation’s first line of defense. Naval bility for direct defense of the coast and that leaders were willing to concede that under Refinement and Substantiation THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 91 Joint Action provisions, the Army had re- Eaker infers that someone had removed it. sponsibility for direct defense of the coast, There remains, so far as Eaker knows, no which fact would of necessity require some other documentary proof of the order.*’ flying over water, but they attempted to While the Navy moved to check long- block long-range operations. Their boldest distance flights by the Air Corps over water, move in this direction was to secure from the it also made progress in opening the way to War Department high command an agree- long-range, land-based flights by qaval ment to limit Air Corps planes to a distance craft. In November 1938 a significant of 100 miles offshore. How this ban was change was incorporated in the Joint Action achieved remains something of a mystery. agreement. In connection with provision General Arnold, touching the subject in his for naval air action in coast patrol and in memoirs, has attributed the Navy move protection of sea communications, the speciflcally to a striking Air Corps naviga- change stipulated that naval aircraft “may tional success in the spring of 1938. As a be required to operate effectively over the GHQ Air Force test maneuver, three B-17’s sea to the maximum distance within the took off from Mitchel Field, New York, on capacity of aircraft development.”86Thus 12 May to intercept the Italian liner Rex was speciflcally authorized the development on its normal Atlantic run. With only the which the Navy had sought and the Air general location of the ship known to them Corps had feared. By the early part of 1939 by radio, the Fortress pilots were able, in the Navy had six major air bases prepar- spite of heavy cloud cover, to sight the Rex ing to handle some 25 heavy bombardment 725 miles east of New York, fly over her, squadrons.8o and return to base. Arnold believed that Andrews presses for exclusive procurement shortly thereafter the Navy brass communi- of four-engine bombers cated with some one on the General Staff, following which an order came down limit- While the contest was proceeding with ing all Air Corps activities to a 100-mile the Navy regarding the Air Corps’ function zone the coast-“one of the most damp- in coast defense, General Andrews endeav- off ored to persuade the War Department that ening orders the War Department cver future bomber procurement should consist issued.” The most curious thing about this directive was that it was never seen in of four-engine types only. The General Staff writing by any member of the Air Corps had gone forward with approval of experi- mental development of the large planes, as (if, in fact, it ever put on paper).82 was a means of meeting the Army’s responsi- Maj. Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Jr., who has made a special investigation of the matter, bility for defense of the shore line. It balked, states that air leaders were convinced that however, at the proposal to limit bomber an Army-Navy understanding on the ban procurement to such planes; the General Staff saw in such a suggestion the danger existed, but “I do not believe that we found that the Air Corps would concentrate en- good sound documentation substantiating tirely on strategic operations, to the neglect the agreement.”83General Eaker is perhaps of ground support. Andrews argued forcibly the nearest surviving witness to this re- in favor of the four-engine craft on grounds markable episode. He says that he was of all-around efficiency for either function, present in the office of General Andrews, but in the ensuing bitter debate the General who was commanding the GHQ Air Force, Staff harbored the suspicion that the real when a telephone call for Andrews was put reason was a predilection for independent, through by the Chief of Staff, Gen. Malin long-range C. Craig. According to Eaker, Craig issued As early as July 1935, Andrews set forth the order verbally to Andrews at that mo- the advantages of large planes over those ment, and Andrews placed a memorandum of more limited size and range. He advised of the call in his personal Ale. After the his Army superiors that long-range air- death of General Andrews in May 1943, the craft offered greater efficiency, economy, memo could not be found in his papers; and usefulness. They could perform mis- 92 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINEE Refinement and Substantiation sions beyond the capability of smaller ships: any additional four-engine planes until a direct air reinforcement of overseas posses- War Department study of the subject could dons and observation and attack of offshore be targets up to a distance of 1,500 miles. General Andrews, however, was willing While carrier-borne planes could compete if necessary to fight alone on this issue. in range with medium bombers, they were In October 1937 he expressed opposition far out-reached by the heavy bombers. a General Staff proposal to order 91 two- Futhermore, asserted Andrew% the large engine bombers out of funds for the fiscal ship was no more vulnerable to attack than year 1939. He declared simply that there the smaller one. The fact that it fmmed 8. were available no two-engine planes suited large target for enemy pursuit and anti- to carrying out the mission of the GHQ aircraft artillery was compensated for by Air Force. Studies had demonstrated, said its greater strength and defensivefirepower. Andrews, that successful coast defense re- In view of these considerations, the COM- quired aircraft with a 1,000-mile radius of mander of the GHQ Air Force recommended action. No two-engine plane approached that the War Department purchase born- this capability, while the B-17 had an bardment reconnaissance planes Of the effective radius of 750 and the B-15 was greatest capacity and range available, in expected to have 1,000. On the basis of these such numbers as funds would Permit. figures, Andrews recommended procure- Future bomber development, he added, ment of B-15’s if available for FY 1939; should be in the direction of still greater otherwise, B-17’s.90 The General Staff con. range and size.88 tinued to ignore Andrews’ repeated protests When procurement of additional bombers and exhortations. The following year, in for the Air Corps was pending in the June 1938, the GHQ Air Force commander War Department in June 1937, Andrews opposed another move to purchase addi- pressed again for exclusive purchase of tional two-engine bombers. This time An- four-engine planes. In a letter to The Ad- drews changed tack somewhat and based jutant General, he gave a broader explana- his opposition on the assertion that the tion of his position than he had presented plane under consideration, the Douglas B- earlier. Andrews related his argument for 18, was unsatisfactory and obsolete in com- the big ships to the unique strategic posi- bat performance. After referring to seven tion of the United States; he accepted the previous letters on this subject, Andrews national policy of defense and assumed that pointed out that the B-18 had a top speed any serious threat to this country must of only 215 miles per hour (compared with come across the oceans. The best way of 315 for the B-17) and a considerably slower meeting such attacks, launched from car- speed at altitude above 10,000 feet. Since riers or from bases seized and prepared in speed and altitude were regarded as the the Western Hemisphere, was to strike the chief defenses of a bomber, it was clear that enemy bases and naval forces at the maxi- the B-18. was deficient in this respect. All mum range possible. Andrews saw the heavy the major nations, said Andrews, were bomber as the most efficient means for developing pursuits with speeds in the accomplishing this aim, as well as for the neighborhood of 400 miles per hour; a direct reinforcement of overseas possessions. bomber like the B-18 would be at their Once again, therefore, he urged that future mercy. Warming up to the issue, he went on procurement of bombers be restricted to to charge that the purchase of such planes four-engine types. It is interesting to ob- would handicap the national defense and serve that Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, co- would be without justification since better ordinate in authority with Andrews, did planes (B-17’s) were avai1able.O’ The Ckn- not concur in this recommendation. West- era1 Staff politely acknowledged receipt of over, who was mqre inclined to compromise Andrews’ protest and replied that the mat- in order to avoid friction with the General ter had been given “most serious considera- Staff, suggested delay of the purchase of tion” by the War Department. However, Refimment and Substantfatian THE DEVELOPMSNT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 9s the high command held to its decision to States for operations against the homeland purchase the B-18’s and stated that the of potential enemies. Any war in the Orient, action was believed to be “for the best in- explained Spaatz, would necessitate the use terests of national defense.”92 of long-range bombers operating from Alas- Air Corps demands for unlimited develop- ka, the Philippine Islands, and Hawaii. Sim- ment of the bomber ilarly, he thought, America needed such planes for action in the Atlantic. Aircraft While the chief argument of air leaders of at least one European power, England, for development and procurement of long could attack the United States in a one- range bombers was related to the Army’s way ocean crossing and land on controlled mission of coast defense, the more funda- territory in this hemisphere. In order to be mental reasons for their development began able to retaliate, America would require to And expression after 1935. The Air Corps planes of twice the range, capable of mak- saw in the hemisphere defense concept a ing a round-trip flight across the Atlantic. strong justification for the use of big planes, Spaatz saw bomber development moving but American air doctrine would have properly, therefore, in the direction of called for them even if the defense issue greater range-as a means, ultimately, of had not been present. It was simply a mat- striking at the vital centers of enemy na- ter of believing that superiority in the air, tions. The same reasons which dictated long regardless of shifting strategic require- cruising ranges for naval vessels, he con- ments, would always depend upon cluded, now applied to aircraft.R* maximum development of air weap- ons. America could not afford to be General Westover, replying to a General outranged by any possible enemy; and Staff request for comments on the advan- since range was chiefly a function of size, tages and disadvantages of long-range America must lead the world in building bombers, expressed a similar view in July large planes. The air leaders were not quite 1935. Aside from the greater operating econ- sure what the strategic consequences of this omy and emciency of large planes compared development might be. But whether air with small, their superior range made them forces were striking across short distances, essential to defense of the United States. between continents, or around the globe, America, to be safe, needed planes whose the power with the largest planes would range outdistanced the striking ability of have the advantage. Fundamentally, it was potential enemies. Drawing aside the cur- a question which ground officers might well tain on the hopes of the Air Corps for un- have appreciated in analagous terms of limited development, Westover declared insistence on development of the best gun that, if technically feasible, the United or the best tank. What complicated matters States should build planes with up to 10,000 for the Air Corps and created such strong miles, or even greater, operating range.0c opposition was the enormous cost of de- No wonder the General Staff began to doubt veloping super-planes. The very expense of the concurrent professions of air leaders it frightened the other arms, for it threat- that they wanted hig bombers solely for ened to deprive them of their own required coast defense (the only discreet position equipment. In addition, of course, the Gen- which could be taken publicly). The just eral Stafffeared that the big bombers would suspicion grew that the Air Corps had un- divert Air Corps funds and attention toward limited desires for ever-larger planes and strategic operations and away from the that the defense argument was simply an ground support which they regarded as in- expedient for obtaining the biggest planes dispensable to military success.03 then available. Maj. Carl Spaatz was among the flrst in Within a few years the air leaders dropped the WAC to emphasize a mission for large the defense pretext altogether and be- bombers beyond mere defense of the coast. gan to speak their minds more openly. One IEe wrote in January 1935 that long-range reason for this change, perhaps, was the planes would be required by the United fact that the Navy threatened to usurp the 64 - mE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE Reflnemdnt and Substantiation d function of coastal air defense from the bomber was, of course, the basic weapon of Army, and the Air Corps believed it neces- such an attack; the strategic advantage sary to justify its development program on rested with the country whose bombers broader strategic grounds.* Also, the omi- could reach the enemy while the enemy nous Axis aggressions were quickly trans- could not reach back. Defining the develop- forming the defense-mindedness of the ment issue very sharply, Andrews observed country and opening the way to considera- that America had two air problems: for tion of more powerful offensive weapons. In “today” the nation required bombers which January 1938 General Andrews made a could establish a defensive sphere around forthright presentation of his position to the Western Hemisphere; for “tomorrow” the Secretary of War. He sought to free Air the nation must be prepared for intercon- Corps development programs from limita- tinental air warfare. The United States tions related to surface forces. In the past, should be the first, he urged, to span the said Andrews, the air arm had been built oceans in a non-stop, round-trip flight. “I mainly on the principle of maintaining a believe,” concluded Andrews, “that any of certain ration of support for the Army and our large airplane companies would be glad Navy. This remained correct to a certain to contract to build a bomber capable of a extent, he conceded, but airpower was also tactical range of 10,000 miles.”08Col. Hugh a new mode of warfare and required con- Knerr, Andrews’ chief of staff, hoped that sideration for development beyond the the commander would make a strong state- sphere of support. Airpower was as vital to ment of airpower in his final report to the military efficiency of a great nation as the War Department. Knerr wanted air were land and seapower, and bombardment strength sufficientto “control any situation represented the backbone of air strength. that may arise from Alaska to Cape Horn Hence, limits should be removed from the and from Guam to Nova Scotia - Ber- Air Corps in its struggle with rival air forces muda.”OOSuch a program would call for the for bases and equipment.OOA few months la- most vigorous development and procure- ter, in May, Andrews asked for the develop- ment and was a far cry from the earlier ment of a bomber weighing 250,000 pounds talk of pure defense of the coast. (the weighed In justification, B-17 36,000). The General Staff blocks the way he wrote: “Until a point is reached wherein world stabilization in approximate size of Andrews, Knerr, and other air leaders aircraft is attained, the United States can- could present their statements and argu- not afford to be behind in aviation develop- ments; but however compelling they might ment and experimentation. We cannot af- appear, it was the General Staff that ford ever to find ourselves subject to air wielded the power. Until about the middle of raids which cannot be replied to in kind.”O’ 1936 the General Staff seemed sympathetic, In January 1939, shortly before complet- if not enthusiastic, toward Air Corps re- ing his tour as commander of the GHQ quests for long-range bomber development, Air Force, Andrews made a public declara- but from that time until the end of 1938 the tion of the Air Corps’ demand for unlimited Army high command imposed successive re- development. Addressing the National Aero- strictions upon four-engine procurement nautical Association meeting in St. Louis, and development that slowed down and he put into expression the extreme doctrine nearly strangled the Air Corps’ bomber pro- of offensive airpower that had been develop- gram. If it had not been for the unrelenting ing for some years at the Air Corps Tactical efforts of airmen like Andrews and Knerr, School. America must be strong in the air the program might indeed have been fatally to survive in “this world of ‘might makes damaged. As it was, the immediate results right.’ ’’ And airpower, said Andrews, was of the struggle were a stinging temporary primarily a means for direct attack on the defeat for the principles and career aspira- national structure of an enemy. The big tions of the leading Air Corps protagonists. General Andrews, at the termination of his *For diseusslon of the Navy’s moves In thts dlrectlon, see above, pp. 90-91. four-year tour as commander of the GHQ Refl?wnent and Substantiation ”IiE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR mCTRINE - 95 Air Force, was assigned to a minor post and the long-range bombardment proponents. allowed to fall to his permanent rank of But Embick and Spalding agreed that an colonel. Knerr, having suffered consider- effective military force in being could be able physical wear-and-tear in the contest, created out of the meager funds appro- was retired from the service on grounds of priated by Congress only if research funds ill health. Both had persistently opposed were diverted to procurement of equipment. the clearly stated policy of their military As Spalding explained it, he would put an superiors on a crucial issue; their personal end to development of “unessential” itelm careers appeared, at least for the time be- when “the Army needs large quantities of ing, to be determined by the necessities of excellent equipment that has already been service discipline.lO0 Within .a few years, developed. The amount of funds allocated however, both officers were to be fully vindi- to Research and Development in former cated, promoted, and given positions of high years is in excess of the proper proportion authority in the Army.* for the item in consideration of the rearma- While commanding the GHQ Air Force, ment program.”lol In brief, he preferred Andrews regarded its primary mission as some equipment immediately, rather than strategical, while the General Staff wanted better equipment later. it to be tactical support of ground forces. With the same kind of reasoning, General Perhaps in his desire to develop the strate- Spalding decided that no equipment should gic capabilities of his force in the face of be purchased, even if available, unless it heavy opposition, Andrews went to0 far; could be economically employed in pres- perhaps in its desire to preserve the tacti- ently assigned missions of the Army. On 25 cal emphasis, the General Staff went too June 1936 he submitted the results of a far the other way. In any event, the high War Department staff study, which stated command had the power; and fearing the that no mission could reasonably be fore- tendencies toward strategic operations, it seen requiring the use of the B-17 or the determined to crack down and impose its projected XB-15. The latter plane was at concept on the air force. The key to the the time under development and test, con- issue was seen to be the question of procure- struction having been authorized by the ment and development of long-range bomb- War Department in 1934. Similar in de- ers, since the type of equipment furnished sign to the B-17, it was an all-metal, mid- would dictate the function of the air arm. wing monoplane, with a span of 149 Ieet The new and restrictive policy of the (compared with the B-17’s 103 feet). The Wneral Staff began to unfold in the fall of B-15 had an operating range of 3,500 miles, 1936. The leading figures in this move, the compared to 2,000 for the B-17. But its antagonists in the drama with the air lead- speed was to prove much too slow for serv- ers, appear to have been the Deputy Chief of ice use-less than 200 miles per hour at SW,Ma). Gen. Stanley D. Embick, and the maximum.1o2Spalding concluded, notwith- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Brig. Gen. standing the contrary judgment of the George R. Spalding. Both of these officers Chief of the Air Corps, that no additional were appointed to their positions at about four-engine planes should be procured by the same time in 1936, and both worked for the Army except for experimental purposes. what they hoped would be a balanced and Furthermore, the study indicated that economical military force, ready to defend sufficient funds to keep abreast of world the nation’s shores. One aspect of their pol- aviation had already been appropriated for icy was to reduce to a minimum throughout planes of super range. The bomber recom- the Army, funds, and personnel devoted to mended for procurement was the Douglas research. This attitude naturally was op- B-18 (range of 1,200 miles) which Spalding posed to the expensive projects desired by believed could fulfill all reasonable require. *Andrew& upon hir untlmely death In Iceland in May 1W held the rahk of lieutenant general and commanded tQ; ments and could be justified in initial cost, European Theater of Operatlons. United States Army during World Wm 11. Knerr as major general served a; deputy maintenance, and operating facilities. The Cemmander for administration of the Unhed States Strateglc Alr Forcer (U88TAF) in Europe. interested sections of the Oeneral Staff 96 - ”HE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Refinement and Substantiation concurred in Spalding’s recommendations, “but not at such a rate as will give us new and the study was approved for the Secre- aircraft before we have learned to operate tary of War by General Embick on 2 July those under procurement, nor should it 1936.1°9 proceed in a direction contrary to our na- Shortly after this blow to the Air Corps’ tional and military policies.” The Project D procurement program, an even more seri- airplane was a weapon of aggression, de- ous threat developed in connection with clared Spalding, and he proposed that ac- experimental work. Project D had been ap- tion on the option be deferred until a top- proved by the War Department in I935 as level conference could be held to reconsider an experiment in the problems of maximum the whole question of big bomber develop- aircraft range. The final product, the giant ment in relation to War Department policy. B-19, was not completed until 1941; but if The study and the suggestion were ap- Spalding had had his way, it would never proved by the Chief of Staff, Gen. Malin have been finished at all. And while neither Craig, on 10 August.105 the B-15 nor the B-19 were to prove success- The top-level conference proposed by ful operationally, their construction pro- Spalding met on 28 August to consider the vided the engineering experience which larger problem and the specific issue of made possible the later B-29, B-32, and proceeding with Project D. Representing B-36.1°4 On 8 August 1936 Spalding sub- the air arm were Generals Westover, Arnold, mitted a staff study on the question of pro- and Andrews, and Lt. Col. Oliver P. Echols, ceeding with Project D by exercising the chief of the engineering section at Wright Army’s option to procure the airplane at a Field. The General Staff was represented by cost of about $1,100,000. The Douglas Air- Brig. Gen. J. H. Hughes (0-3), Spalding craft Company had already invested con- (G-4), Col. A. R. Chaffee (Budget), and Col. siderable funds preparing for construction Sherman Miles (WPD); Lt. Col. J. H. Burns of the super-plane, and the Chief of the Air (OAS/W) represented the Secretary of War. Corps had requested that the War Depart- The air leaders presented their standard ment take the necessary action to authorize arguments concerning the greater economy Douglas to go ahead. Spalding, reviewing and efficiency of large airplanes. Westover the facts bearing on the question, believed stressed that the Project D ship would meet that the project should be canceled. He the strategic requirement for flexibility- pointed out that the Air Corps had under the ability to carry large loads, to conduct construction 13 B-lTs, which equaled or ex- long surveillance missions, and to move by ceeded in range the bombers of any other its own power to any theater of operations. nation. In addition, the Project A plane However, he stated that two groups of (XB-15) promised a range of 5,000 miles super-range aircraft should fulfill defensive and was superior to any plane known to needs, and that the remainder of the be under development elsewhere in the bombers should be of medium size. The world. In view of these facts, thought the General Staff officers were apparently un- G-4,.there was no justification for purchas- impressed by these arguments and empha- ing, even for experimental purposes, the sized the need for more bombers to fly in Project D aircraft (B-19), with a proposed close support of the Army. They reckoned range of over 10,000 miles. What the Army that a plane with an effective radius of ac- needed, he urged, was procurement of tion of 800 miles would cover all needs for standard, available bombers, such as the Army support, including missions against B-18, which Spalding described as compar- enemy communications and production. ing favorably “with any bomber in the Most Army bombers, they thought, should world.” It was necessary to have these be even smaller, small enough to use im- bombers on hand, assigned to squadrons, so provised landing fields in forward areas. that crews could be trained in their use, While agreeing that a “few” long-range powers, and limitations. Research and de- ships were needed for direct reinforcement velopment must proceed, Spalding granted, of overseas possessions, the ground generals Refinement and Substantiation THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 97 concluded that the bulk of the bombers ing procurement to two-engine planes ex- should be of the size of the B-18 or smaller. clusively.lOS But the crisis in this matter, as All members of the conference agreed that well as in development, was to be reached the War Plans Division (WPD) should pre- in the summer and autumn of the following pare a directive to clarify the situation; it year. should state the national defensive policy In May 1938 the Chief of the Air Corps and the role of the Air Corps, and make (Westover) requested that the B-15 be re- consideration for continued technical de- placed by the B-20 as the Project A air- velopments in aviation.loG plane. One model of the B-15 had been de- Following the conference, General Spald- livered, tested, and found to be to0 slow. ing drew up his final recommendations on Westover now desired to apply funds set the Project D question and submitted them up for two additional B-15’s to the purchase to the Chief of Staff. In a preface to these of one B-20; the latter was a speedier, some- recommendations, he stated flatly that the what more expensive modification of the Project D airplane was distinctly a weapon B-15. General Embick, upon receiving the of aggression and that no requirement ex- request from Westover, decided to make it isted for such a plane in the national de- (and the whole long-range bomber ques- fense. Spalding next pointed out that the tion) the subject of another staff study. government had no legal obligation to ex- Accordingly, he sent a memo to Brig. Gen. ercise the option to have the plane con- George,P. Tyner, who had succeeded Spald- structed. However, recognizing that Colonel ing as G-4. Embick made the following Echols had given verbal assurances to Doug- general statement in his communication : las Aircraft and that Douglas had made 1) national policy contemplated defense, a considerable investment in the project, not aggression, 2) the defense of sea areas Spalding recommended that the option be beyond the coastal zones was a function of exercised in order to maintain good faith the Navy, 3) the military superiority of and to support the Army’s authorized repre- large planes over smaller ones remained to sentatives. At the same time, he emphasized be proved, 4) the Air Corps, in carrying out that this move should in no way be inter- the lunctions assigned to it under Joint preted as representing War Department Action, appeared to need no ship larger policy on long-range bombardment. Thus, than the B-17, and only a very few of them, the B-19 squeaked through when General for reinforcing Oahu and Panama.lOg The Craig accepted the recommendation and ap- nature of the crisis for the Air Corps is proved it for the Secretary of War on 4 especially clear in this statement by Em- September 1936.1°7 bick, for it was given at the very same time The clash in viewpoint and doctrine be- when the Navy succeeded in banning Army tween the air arm and the General Staff flights beyond the 100-mile limit.? It is ap- were clearly illuminated by the words and parent that the Navy and the General Staff, actions of Spalding and his superiors in for reasons and policies of their own, were 1936. In spite of the continued appeals of exerting a common pressure to restrict the Andrews and other long-range bombard- development, procurement, and operation ment supporters, the General Staff moved of long-range bombers by the Air Corps. steadily to throttle the program. The gen- General Tyner, however, in his reply to eral line of this action was to attempt to Embick offered a dissenting judgment. He limit or cut off entirely the procurement of observed that the characteristics of a four- B-17’s and to block the development of engine plane of range superior to the B-17 planes larger than the B-17. While, for ex- had been omcially approved by the Secre- ample, Andrews was pleading for exclusive tary of War on 27 November 1937. Before purchase of four:engine bombers in 1937,* that approval was given, all interested di- the General Staff succeeded in obtaining a visions of the General Staff had concurred directive from the Secretary of War, limit- in the proposal. Likewise, continued the new

*We above, pp. 82-03. teee above, pp. SO-81. 08 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE RePnement and Substantiation G-4, the Woodring program of aircraft pro- “greater success, greater certainty, and at curement had been indorsed by the Gen- far less cost by our own naval forces.” Hav- eral Staff and approved by the Secretary on ing in mind: 18 March 1938; it provided for a total of our strategic situation and the functions 2,320 planes, including 144 of a type larger relative thereto for which we maintain a than the B-17. The general statements in Navy, it seems obvious that there is a point beyond which development of our bomber8 Embick’s memo, thought Tyner, raised should not be directed toward increased questions of policy not in accord with the size and range, but instead should be di- Woodring program, so recently approved. rected toward the perfection of types that Tyner apparently believed that the Wood- meet our strategic needs, in the way of ring program should stand, and he recom- greater efEciency, lessened complexity, and mended approval of Westover’s request for decreased cost. substitution of the B-20 for the B-15.I1O Then, in a shrewd stroke, Embick recom- mended that this general subject be studied Embick received support for his point of by the Joint Board.l12 Aware of the Navy’s view from Col. A. R. Chaffee, chief of the desire to restrict Air Corps bombardment, Budget and Legislative Planning branch of Embick doubtless anticipated that the the General Staff. Chaffee used a strictly naval officers would support the view of the financial approach to the issue. He stated Army high command on this issue, thus that the Woodring program to build and presenting a powerful united front at the maintain a force of 2,320 aircraft involved highest level, against which the Air Corps a planned annual procurement expendi- might not prevail. The paper was approved ture of $24,000,000. In order to produce the for the Secretary of War on 16 May, the correct number of bombers, Chaffee calcu- same day that it was submitted by Embick lated, the unit bombek cost would have to to the Chief of Staff.ll8 be about $350,000. But the B-20, costing On 2 June 1938 General Craig, Chief of initially more than $1,000,000, could hardly Staff, sent the recommended request to the be had, even in quantity, at the required Joint Board for study of the problem. It is figure. Therefore, he concluded, either the most interesting to note that Craig’s letter contemplated appropriation would be ex- was actually drafted in WPD, under the ceeded, or bombers would be procured in in- specific direction of Embick. Attached to the sufficient numbers to make up their proper draft was a pencilled note to Craig, signed proportion among the 2,320 planes author- by Embick. It recommended signature and ized.’.’ .‘ stated, “I am convinced that definite action On the basis of the staff study, General by the Joint Board is imperative.” The let- Embick reluctantly decided to approve sub- ter itself, unchanged in any part by Craig, stitution of the B-20 for the B-15. All of was virtually a duplication of the state- his reasons are not known, but the ones ments sent by Embick to Tyner in his origi- given were the shortage of time remaining nal memo of 9 May. In addition to making in which to obligate funds (out of FY 1938) the point that the responsibility for sea de- and the extent to which experimental de- fense belonged to the Navy, the letter velopment had proceeded on Project A. In stressed the responsibilities of the Air Corps his memo to the Chief of Staff, however, as a part of the Army as a whole. Large Embick used the issue as a springboard for planes did not contribute to fulfillment of checking further development of long-range those responsibilities, and the letter con- bombardment. He presented his conviction cluded: that the development program was not be- Aside from their undemonstrated utility, ing directed toward proper strategic ends. the relatively high cost of the large, long- If long continued, Embick warned, the range planes must be considered in relation Army would find itself with a few very to the effect of that cost on the other re- large and vulnerable planes, of limited use quirements of the Army Air Corps. The total funds made available to the Air Corps (for lack of prepared bases) and best must, in turn, be integrated with those ap- adapted to a role which could be filled with portioned to other Army requirements, in Refinement and Substantiation ”HE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE - 99 order that the Army may fulffll its poten- After the board action the General Staff tial role against all enemiee. . . . moved swiftly to impose the new restrictions The letter requested that the Joint Board by all possible means. The Chief of Staff recommend limits beyond which Army directed G-4 to revise the aircraft require- planes should not be deve10ped.l~~The Navy ments schedule for N 1940 in light of the leaders must have smiled, indeed, to see the Joint Board statement. General Tyner Army, in effect, asking the Navy to place accordingly recommended that all four-en- limits on Army development. The letter and gine types be excluded and that funds origi- the request serve to illustrate how seriously nally set up for them be diverted to procure- the General Staff regarded this issue with ment of attack and light bomber types.ll’ the Air Corps and the lengths to which it This move went beyond the recommenda- might go in order to check the long-range tions of the Joint Board, which had con- bomber program. ceded that at least some of the Air Corps The General Staff got what it wanted, bombers should be of the B-17 type. But and what it expected, from the Joint Board that was not all. The revised estimates, con- (whose senior member was the Chief of trary to the inferential recommendation of St& himself). On 29 June the Joint Board the Joint Board, confined experimental informed the Secretary of War that it saw funds to medium and light bombers, pur- no probable military requirement for air- suit, and other light aircraft. All divisions craft larger than the B-17. On the other of the General Staff concurred with Tyner, hand, the Air Corps would be called upon and the Secretary of War on 3 August ap- to perform many missions which could be proved these paralyzing restrictions on executed successfully by planes of lesser long-range bomber development. Attached range and lower cost than the B-17. Accord- to the paper was a highly significant, hand- ingly, the Joint Board recommended that written note from Craig to Colonel Burns, no service planes larger than the B-17 be the executive of the office of the Assistant procured and that most of the bombers Secretary of War. It said laconically, “This purchased be smaller, less expensive planes. is O.K. and solves the problem of 17-B’s & It was specified, however, that these rec- the maximum bombers. . . .”ll8 Craig and ommendations were not to be construed as Embick apparently believed that they had limiting experimentation and development. the big bomber in a sack and had pulled the On 30 June, the day following its dispatch, cord. Indeed, if the cord had held, the the letter, with its denying ordinances, was United States would have had even fewer approved ‘by the Secretary of War.115 Flying Fortresses than it had when war Even before the board acted, the Secre- came in 1941, and it might never have had tary of War moved to reverse authority pre- the B-29 OF B-36. viously given to substitute the B-20 for the After General Westover, as Chief of the B-15 in Project A. Embick had reluctantly Air Corps, received the new directives from approved the proposal on 16 May, and the the War Department, he drew up a carefully Secretary had indorsed it on the 17th. But prepared letter urging reconsideration of 0 days on June, several after Craig’s re- the recent General Staff decisions. Westover quest was submitted to the Joint Board, the expressed grave concern over abandonment Assistant Secretary of War (acting for the Secretary) advised the Chief of the Air of the Woodring “balanced” Air Corps pro- Corps that he could purchase neither the gram, and reminded his superiors that it two B-15’s previously authorized nor the had been adopted after protracted study by substitute B-20. Funds set up for that pur- both the General Staff and the Air Corps. pose would be applied, instead, to procure- He stated that the four-engine, long-range ment of B-18’s.llfiApparently, the Secretary bomber had likewise been fully approved was sufficiently certain of the outcome of after lengthy consideration of its merits. the Joint Board study that he felt justified Even the the Joint Board, wrote Westover, in stopping the procurement in anticipa- accepted the B-17 and left the way open tion of the new limitation. to experimental development of still larger 100 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE RePnement and Substantiation aircraft. He asked that on all these issues 1938. In the months that followed there was the General Staff reconsider its recent di- a marked change of heart in the General rectives,llBAfter delaying a reply for some Staff, resulting from the ominous develop- five weeks, the General Staff at last relented ments in Europe and direct pressure from a bit in its answer to Westover.* On 5 Octo- the Commander in Chief. The events of Sep- ber he was informed that earlier repudia- tember, culminating in the Munich confer- tion of the Woodring program had been ence, served as the principal turning point. modifled ahd that it might still be regarded General Arnold, writing some years later, as a guide in preparing budget estimates. indicated that it was President Roosevelt Four-engine bombers, nevertheless, were to himself who set the new direction. The be excluded from procurement for both FY Commander in Chief, impressed by the deci- 1940 and 1941. Yielding to Westover’s plea sive influence of airpower in the diplomatic for research funds, the General Staff grudg- maneuverings in Europe, called a top-level ingly agreed to rescind the previous prohibi- conference at the White House on 28 Sep- tion on the use of experimental funds for tember, just before the Munich meeting. four-engine airplanes. But in making these Present were Secretary H. H. Woodring concessioris, the General Staff could not re- (War), Secretary Charles Edison (Navy), frain from justifying its general position Secretary Henry Morgenthau (Treasury), and lecturing a bit to the Chief of the Air Harry Hopkins, General Craig, Brig. Corps. The progress in aviation was appre- Gen. George C. Marshall, Adm. Harold ciated, the letter advised. “None of this Stark, Arnold, and various assistants. To progress, however, has changed the con- meet the threat abroad, Roosevelt came out ception that the Infantry Division continues unreservedly for a build-up of airpower; as to be the basic combat element by which he saw it, airplanes were the implements of battles are won, the enemy field forces de- war most likely to influence Hitler’s activi- stroyed and captured territory held.”? The ties. Somewhat to the shock of the ground requirements of the Air Corps were under- and naval officers present, Roosevelt called stood, but thp requirements of other for an immediate move toward mass pro- branches were regarded as equally impor- duction. He wanted to see an actual rate of tant. The War Department desired to bring output of 10,000 planes per year, with an all arms to an equal status of readiness for all-out capacity for 20,000. Reiterating his any emergency. Furthermore, the letter stand that the United States was responsi- drew attention to the increasing application ble for air protection of the entire hcmi- of mechanization to the ground forces and sphere, he placed his Anger an the need for indicated that this trend opened new oppor- long-range planes to do the job. Immedi- tunities for air attack. In the future, con- ately following this meeting, which clearly cluded the General Staff communication, signified that restrictions on bomber pro- the Air Corps would be guided in its de- curement were now to be stripped away, velopment program by the needs of close Arnold drove Craig to his office and gave support aviation as well as the need for stra- him “a get-rich quick course in the ele- tegic and distant missions.12oWestover’s re- ments necessary to make an Air Force.” action to this lecture and advice can only Craig was, noted Arnold, “a very apt pkpil, be imagined, but he must have taken some and from then on until his tour was com- satisfaction in having salvaged the crucial pleted, fought for our program.” Looking development program-. back upon the conference with Roosevelt, President Roosevelt removes the block Arnold could view it as the “Magna Carta” The nadir had been touched for the pros- for the Air Corps. The “battle of the White pects of the long-range bomber in August House” had been won, and the high brass, *The reasons for the delay and the relaxation of attitude are which had formerly blocked the big bomber, not fully known. No doubt the mounting tension in Europe culminating in the Munich conference of 29 September had i were now under direction to speed its moderating effect upon the high command. The attitude of President Roosevelt. discussed below, must also have been an production.I2l important influence. *At thls point in the letter, someone has pointedly scribbled thin question in the margin: “What about Munich?” General Marshall, who had replaced Em- Refinement and Substantiation THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE - 101 bick as Deputy Chief of Staff, ltd the way Department economy policies had forced in promoting the new program at the Gen- the acceptance of planes with obsolete mili- eral Staff level. On 29 November 1938 Mar- tary characteristics and discouraged air- shall wrote to Craig that he fully supported craft manufacturers from developing supe- the effort of General Arnold (who had be- rior designs.12* Slowness of action by the come Chief of the Air Corps on 29 Septem- General Staff, resulting from lack of inter- ber after Westover’s death) to build up a est or from desire to withhold funds, powerful bomber force. He listed reasons definitely retarded the development of ord- favoring increased procurement of B-17’s: nance, radar, and other auxiliary equip- safer operation, ability to reinforce the ment.125But the most obvious result of the overseas possessions, extensive sea patrol restrictive policy was in planes delivered, or range-all the arguments that had been rather not delivered. From October 1935 set forth for years by Andrews, Knerr, West- until 30 June 1939, the Air Corps requested over, Arnold, and the rest. Since the B-17 206 B-17’s and 11 B-15’s. Yet, because of was considered the outstanding bomber in cancellations and reductions of these re- the world, Marshall urged its procurement quests by the War Department, only 14 in maximum quantities in order to meet four-engine planes were delivered to the air the program for increased airpower called force up to the outbreak of World War I1 in for by President Roosevelt.*22 September 1939. The failure to obtain the The President himself soon made public heavy bombers severely handicapped train- his attitude on the airpower question. On 12 ing, development of tactical doctrine, and January 1939 he sent to Congress a special the building of a strong, ready-to-go offen- request for immediate additional defense sive organization.120 appropriations to meet the rising threats from abroad. Referring particularly to avia- THE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN WARS UPON tion needs, he declared that complete re- AMERICAN AIR DOCTRINE vision of estimates appeared necessary, and Although development of air theory was that, “Increased range, increased speed, in- hampered by lack of airplanes and equip- creased capacity of airplanes abroad have ment, it continued to show progress, as re- changed our requirements for defensive lated earlier in this chapter.* As foreign aviation.” He was undoubtedly giving the wars began to spread and deepen, the air green light to the B-17’s when he stated theorists looked abroad for possible guid- that the additional planes recommended ance and lessons. The evidence suggests, would considerably strengthen the air de- however, that combat in foreign countries fenses of the United States and its overseas during the period 1935-1939 exercised rela- possessions.*2d tively little influence upon the evolution of Although the intervention of the Presi- air doctrine in America. That doctrine was dent had the effect of rescuing the long- largely an indigenous affair, based on pro- range bomber program, the earlier opposi- jections of World War experience and plans, tion of the General Staff had already re- the visions of Billy Mitchell, and the notion sulted in irreparable damage. It is difficult, of precision operations developed by the if not impossible, to estimate the extent of Air Corps Tactical School. In general, the this damage; some of the effects were more American theorists saw little in the over- subtle than the body blows administered by seas wars to modify their conceptions and a Spalding and Embick. Brig. Gen. A. W. good deal which appeared to confirm them. Robins, chief of the Materiel Division, ad- Most observers agreed that the struggles in vised General Westover in August 1938 that China, Ethiopia, and Spain were in no sense insufficient funds for personnel and equip- major wars or real tests of modern airpower. ment had hampered the research functions They were regarded as limited proving of his division. Because of this, reported grounds for the weapons and techniques of Robins, the Air Corps had fallen behind cer- support ~1viation.l~~ tain technical developments abroad. War ‘For section on air theory at ACTS. see above, pp. 17-88. 102 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE Refinement and Substantiation China drews could not refrain from noting that General Arnold, in reviewing the Sino- the outcome of the war would have been Japanese War in October 1937, was much very different if Ethiopia had possessed an impressed by the Japanese Air Force. Of effective air force. The Italians used only Chinese aviation he could say little, observ- two African ports for mounting their inva- ing only that it lacked adequate strength sion-Massaua, on the Fkd Sea, and Moga- and training and had therefore hardly been discio, on the Indian Ocean. “A force of committed. But the Japanese, said Arnold, even short range bombers-like our Martin while employing aviation for ground sup- B-1OB’rfrom airdromes located centrally port, also revealed an awareness of sound in the vicinity of Addis Ababa could proba- tactical doctrine. They did not use their bly have denied to the Italians the use of airplanes as mere artillery, he told his lis- both of these teners at the Army War College. They At the Tactical School a more precise sought, first of all, air superiority; then they analysis of the Ethiopian campaign was selected as targets enemy airdromes, rail made the subject of a lesson in the Attack centers, war vessels, and airplane factories. course. Maj. Ralph Stearley, teaching the Arnold was impressed by this but saw in it course, explained that the Italian Air Force nothing novel. He concluded: played a vital role in the entire invasion The employment of the Japanese Air Force but that attack operations had proved the is directly in line with the most up-to-date most important. These had taken the form teachings of our own Air Corps Tactical of behind-the-lines assaults on troop col- School and with the doctrines of our own umns and supply points and close support OHQ Air Force. That is significant. There is abroad in the world a flrst rate air power over the battlefield by means of machine- which knows how to use its air strength.128 gun fire, fragmentation bombs, and chemi- Any doubters in Arnold’s audience were to cals. The unified command of air forces be convinced of the truth of this statement helped, according to Stearley, and airpower on the morning of Pearl Harbor. had shown itself indispensable to victory.13o Ethiopia Spain The Ethiopian War, launched by Benito The Civil War in Spain, which erupted in Mussolini in October 1935, taught no les- July 1936, saw a much larger employment sons to American air observers, but offered of aerial forces; but it was not regarded by further illustrations of their doctrines. Gen- American air observers as a real test of eral Andrews, addressing the Army War modern airpower. General Westover, appar- College in October, 1936, referred to the ently nettled by questions of why aviation campaign as an example of what airpower had not proved more decisive in Spain and could do. He asserted that Italian airpower China, answered that no major strategic had virtually transformed the Mediter- air opePations had been undertaken in those ranean into an Italian lake--“Mare Nos- theaters. Action had been limited to sup- trum”-and had forced the hitherto port missions, which had been “successful omnipotent British Navy to evacuate Malta as far as they have gone.”131The chief rea- and seek an uneasy anchorage in Alexan- sons given for the restricted action in Spain dria. “It is quite possible,” suggested An- were the lack of an effective air force on drews, “that Italian Air Power-bombard- both sides of the conflict and the reluctance ment aviation-prevented England from of both combatants in the civil war to de- openly assisting Ethiopia against Italy.” As stroy or depopulate the country. In conse- for actual support of ground operations in quence, the air activities could not “by the Africa, Andrews observed that the Italians wildest stretches of imagination” be re- had few vital targets at which to aim. They garded as air force operations; they con- rendered useful assistance, however, by sisted, rather, of sporadic missions by light breaking up troop concentrations, exploit- bombers and other types, using small bombs ing breakthroughs, and by transporting and machine-gun Are.132A few of these mis- troops and supplies. On the other side. An- sions could be singled out for special atten- Refinement and Substantiation THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 103 tion, because of their effect or implication. one hand and England and France on the Major Stearley, in his lesson devoted to the other moved swiftly to a crisis in Septem- Spanish war, made particular reference to ber 1938, it became apparent to all com- the successful Loyalist air attack on an petent observers that the German Air Force Italian motorized column during the Gua- was the decisive power behind the negotia- dalajara offensive of March 1937. Virtually tions. It has already been noted that Presi- unaided, the Russian-built attack planes by dent Roosevelt perceived the lesson and ac- this action turned the Rebel offensive into cordingly took vigorous steps to build a rout and temporarily saved An- American airpower.? Maj. George Fielding other significant mission was the Rebel Eliot referred to the Munich agreement as bombing of Barcelona, which, while not car- an extortion based on Germany’s threat of ried out in heavy force, ozered a taste of air war. “It is blackmail which rules Europe what a serious attack upon civilian centers today, and nothing else: blackmail made might be As to tactics and types of possible only by the existence of air aircraft, the principal observations made in power.”1s6Within the Air Corps, General Spain were concerned with attack aviation.* Andrews seized upon the Munich episode General Arnold used the Spanish War to as proof of the influence of pilitary avia- illustrate various points of American air tion,’”’ and at the Tactical School Maj. Muir doctrine. While agreeing with other com- S. Fairchild made a thorough analysis of mentators that the powers and capabilities the affair for the benefit of students in the of bombardment had not been put to test, Air Force course. He called attention to he felt justified in drawing conclusions, this “astounding spectacle”-three of the chiefly negative, regarding other phases of world’s leading powers bowing to the im- the air war in Spain. It had been demon- perious will of recently vanquished Ger- strated, Arnold asserted, that aircraft must many. England, France, Russia, and Czech- be used for their designed purpose if they oslavakia, argued Fairchild, had far greater are to be successful. The converted Junker economic, military, and naval power than transports, for instance, showed themselves Germany. Yet they sacrificed basic princi- easy marks for the Russian Chato fighters. ples, national self-interest, moral obliga- Also, combat tactics must be modified to tions and solemn treaties in order to ap- suit the types of airplanes engaged. While pease the Axis powers. Why? The answer pursuit normally attacked from the rear, it lay in German air strength: 3,350 bombers was found advantageous to approach the on hand in June 1938 and a rate of produc- Junkers frontally since they carried no for- tion of 12 bombers per day. Here, then, con- ward-firing machine guns. Finally, the cluded Fairchild, was true airpower and weakness of both Loyalist and Rebel air- what people thought it could do. At Mu- power showed that an air force was more nich, he said, it had brought what President than a mere collection of planes. It must Roosevelt aptly called, “peace by have adequate numbers of aircraft of the And when the Nazis marched into Prague proper types, be correctly armed, and be the following spring (March 1939), there flown by t.rained crews under centralized was no thought of resistance against this command.185These statements by Arnold act of cold aggression. The conquest of suggest the readiness of Air Corps leaders Czechoslovakia was “covered” by the mere to draw upon combat action abroad for sup- existence of German airpower. port of their theories and programs. ADJUSTMENTS IN AIR ORGANIZATION Munich The establishment of the GHQ Air Force The effects of airpower not used, but available as a threat, proved even more in- on 1 March 1935 had temporarily quieted fluential on American thought than the demands for greater air autonomy and lessons of combat. As the diplomatic strug- provided the basis for several years of rela- gle involving Germany and Italy on the tive stability in air organization.?? Agita- Wee pp. 100-101. *See above, p. 07. $For discussion of this accomplishment, see above. pp. 73-75. 104 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE - Refinement and Substantiation- tion for independence did not cease ments seem slightly unbelievable, coming altogether, but there was widespread incli- from a veteran of the long struggle between nation on the part of all concerned to “give the air arm and the General Staff. In Octo- a chance” to the new arrangement and see ber 1937, for example, he publicly praised how it would work. In Congress few sug- the War Department for its handling of air gestions for a change in organization were matters since 1908-this at the very mo- brought up from 1935 to 1939, and those ment when the General Staff was forbid- consisted chiefly of old proposals, .advanced ding procurement of four-engine bombers during preceding years, which now had lit- by the Air Corps.i4aAt about the same time, tle support.1:+9Outside of the government Westover was telling a convention of Army several individuals and aeronautical pub- reserve officers: “Take it from me, the Sec- lications continued to propagandize for a retary of War has an air program, the big- separate air department. Maj. Alexander gest air program this nation has ever had de Seversky was among those who were in peace time. He is keenly alive to our trou- openly critical of the War Department’s bles and our needs. The least we can give hindrance of aircraft development, and he is our whole hearted support and full coop- asserted that airyower could never come erati~n.”~~~All of this, in view of the cir- into its own unless recognized as a primary cumstances, has a strange ring. arm instead of an auxiliary. Maj. A1 Wil- Westover was an unrelenting propagan- liams, a resigned Marine Corps pilot and dist for maintaining the air arm within the aviation writer, also argued forcefully in War Department. He made it clear on every favor of a separate air service within a De- possible occasion that he was personally partment of Defense. Aero Digest, the in- and officially opposed to any thought of a fluential trade publication, used the full separate Air Corps. He looked upon the strength of its feature articles and editorials issue as a question of loyalty. Addressing to agitate for air independence.I4(’ the graduating class at the Tactical School Within the Army, however, the prevail- in June 1936, Westover stressed loyalty as ing sentiment was to abandon ideas of sepa- the fundamental military quality in an om- ration, at least for the time being. Shortly cer. No doubt aware of some of the hereti- after creation of the GHQ Air Force, Gen- cal views being taught at the school, he eral Andrews, its first commander, sounded warned of carrying them too far: “Initiative, the keynote by pleading for support of the unintelligently and aggressively applied, new program as the best means of advanc- may often place one in the position that his ing airpower and the national defense. Gen- acts may not be considered wholly loyal, and eral Arnold looked to the ultimate estab- everyone should guard against such impli- lishment of a Department of National cations.”144As late as January 1938, he was Defense, but believed that it would require still anxious to defend the General Staff several years of planning and that in 1935 from criticism. The only difficulty in Air the air arm was not ready to stand unsup- Corps development, he proposed to tell Con- ported. Other air officers generally shared gress, resulted from inadequate appropria- such views, but the man who accepted the tions: It is my earnest belief that our present subordinate position of aviation most un- ’ reservedly was General Westover.14’ Until Air Corps, size considered, is the military equal of that of any other nation. Such the time of his death in September 1938, progress, of itself, is one of the best possi- Westover consistently opposed any move to- ble answers to the statements charging re- ward air independence. Such a move would striction and control by a “ground minded” be a backward step, he insisted; the way General Staff . . . . Our present position forward was to develop within the existing could not have been attained in the face of such opposition as is intimated by some organization. To what extent Westover was of the critics of the present organization.145 voicing the views of the General Staff and He went on to reiterate all the standard to what extent he was expressing his own War Department arguments against air convictions is not known. Some of his state- autonomy, emphasizing the necessity for Refinement and Subotanffatfon THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR mCTRIRE - 105 unity of control. Westover concluded, “The Westover’s position and continued control air force is an essential weapon, but, the by the General Staff grew steadily stronger, Army with its team of forces, including althougH it was not expressed in public. aviation, remains the ultimate decisive Col. W. G. Kilner, lecturing at the school factor in National Defense.”14B in April 1938, pointed out that the Air General Andrews, commanding the GHQ Corps Board, the GHQ Air Force, and the Air Force, could not refrain from bringing school had made good progress in develop- some obvious inconsistencies and distor- ing tactical doctrines since the organiza- tions to Westover’s attention. Andrews, as tion of the GHQ Air Force, but that the has been shown, also desired to support the state of personnel (in strength and ratings) organization of the air arm within the War left much to be Lt. Col. Donald Department, but he could not accept the Wilson, director of the Department of Air picture presented by the Chief of the Air Tactics and Strategy, believed it was of the Corps. Commenting in polite terms on an utmost importance that the air arm be article of Westover’s, entitled The Army given autonomy. Writing to his colleague, Is Behind Its Air Corps,” Andrews stated Major Fairchild, in August 1939, Wilson that the write-up credited the War Depart- stated that only improved organization ment for all Air Corps accomplishment, could keep the military abreast of chang- without mentioning certain faults and defi- ing conditions. There was, in the existing ciencies in past.and present Army policies. structure, too much of a time lag between Stating the case in bald terms, Andrews the development of good air force ideas told Westaver that the development of ma- and their application to national defense: teriel was accomplished through Air Corps The things being done now we advocated efforts and iq spite of the War Department’s years ago-it will never be thus with our lack of initiative. present set-up of two departments each charged with only a part of military action In fact, my experience in the Air Corps and neither basically interested in the mast indicates that every reform and progressive critical form of military action.. . witness forward step has been forced through, in the constant furore caused by every at- the face of lack of interest, inertia, and tempt to increase the range of military some cases, active opposition of the War aircraft-witness the failure of either de- Department. Take for example the Air partment to have any conception of the Corm Act, and the formation of the GHQ possibility of the use of air forces as a new Air Force. I do not think that anyone can method of warfare rather than as auxilia- clah that these were freely initiated by ries to help the army flght an army or the War Department.147 navy flsht a navy.leo Andrews turned to the question which was Notwithstanding their private dissatisfac- then at issue with the General Staff-the tion with the subordinate position of procurement of fourengine bombers. He aviation, the air ofRcers made no open move stated that the War Department’s pro- for greater autonomy during the period un- curement of obsolete B-l8’s, instead of der consideration. One significant change in the new B-17’s would not contribute top-level relationship was made by the high to fulfllhnent of the Army’s mission command, but this did not affect the posi- of coast defense. If and when the War tion of the air arm as a whole. When the Department truly recognized the need for GHQ Air Force had been created in 1935, adequate personnel and suitable bombers, its commander was placed on a level co- and sincerely fought for their provision, ordinate with the Chief of the Air Corps, then it could be said, concluded Andrews, and he reported directly to the Chief of that “the Army is behind the Air Corps.”1*8 Staff. This arrangement of divided author- At the Tactical School the feeling against ity proved unsatisfactory, as might be ex 106 - THE DEVELOPMENTOr AIR DOCTRINE Refinement and Substanttation- petted, and to correct the situation the very beneficial at a time when accelerated Chief of the Air Corps on 1 March 1939 wasb expansion was getting under way. Un- given jurisdiction over the GHQ Air Force fortunately, the move was shortly to be un- as well as OCAC. This restoration of unity done and the earlier division restored on of command within the air arm proved 19 November l940.l5l CHAPTER 5

PREPARATION OF AIR DOCTRINE FOR WORLD WAR II, 1939-1941

t was apparent to all thoughtful ob- metamorphosis in this respect, Instead of I servers of international affairs that the parrying and blocking Air Corps sugges- major European powers were heading for a tions as they came up from below, the staff showdown in 1939. The Munich agreement turned increasingly to request the views represented a stopgap appeasement of the of the air leaders in their areas of com- Axis; a more decisive test of strength lay petence and to treat with greater respect ahead as England sought to catch up in such views as were presented. The Air air strength. There might have been a full Corps, naturally, took full advantage of capitulation to Hitler’s bid for hegemony, this opportunity to influence opinions and but it appeared more likely that the next judgments at the higher level. In March German move would provoke an armed re- 1939, for example, General Arnold laid action. In this atmosphere of tension and down certain principles of air action and expected war, the development of air doc- related them to the strategic situation fac- trine went forward in a more realistic and ing the United States, with a view toward grim spirit. The American air planners submitting this total picture to the Chief were more than ever conscious that their of Staff. He stressed the following points: theories might soon be put to the test of 1. Initial air objectives of an enemy life-and-death action. would be the air bases at Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Panama, and other ex- GENERAL INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN WAR posed areas. UPON THE THEORY AND POSITION 2. A well-led and determined air attack OF AIRPOWER could not be stopped by the defenses, although serious losses might be in- The electric effect of Munich and Pres- flicted. ident Roosevelt’s reaction to that event 3. It was the duty of the Air Corps to upon the development of American air- provide a powerful striking force and power has been indicated in the preceding the necessary strategic bases, so that chapter.* During the months which fol- an actual or potential enemy could be lowed, right down to Pearl Harbor, events attacked at his bases before launching in Europe and Asia continued to add pres- an air assault against the United sure to the demand for powerful military States. aviation. Those events also gave support All of the views expressed by Arnold had to the doctrines of airpower and warfare been stated previously by such leaders as which had been developing in the Air Corps. Mitchell, Andrews, and Westover, but they As the real threat to national security be- were now given a more favorable reception gan to take shape, it became increasingly by the General Staff. Individual opinion clear that the answers of the airmen Mered was to a large extent submerged as the greater promise than did those of the tra- War Department buckled down to the task ditional infantry-artillery school. The Gen- of building and training an effective air eral Staff itself underwent a remarkable force before the anticipated European war

‘848 above, pp. 100-101. broke out, An illustration of progress along 107 108 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE Preparation of Air Doctrine this line was the approval in August 1939 of South American countries, particularly in the procurement of 45 heavy bombers for Brazil and Argentina. Arnold declared that the GHQ Air F0rce.l the situation presented the constant threat Hitler’s attack on Poland in September of internal disorders, which might result in 1939 gave new impetus to the armament transforming those states into European prpgram, but the subsequent “phony” war satellites opposed to the United States and on the French front encouraged some skep- its democratic ideals. Quick arrival of air tics in this country to believe that the con- assistance by the United States would be a flict would not spread substantially. Hitler’s vital factor, thought Arnold, in case of dis- smash through the Low Countries and ruptive action by European conspirators. &cross France in the spring of 1940 dis- It was advisable, then, that the nation pelled all such illusions. Aggression was maintain long-range planes, not only for now pointed in the direction of the Western the defense of Panama, but as the first line Hemisphere, and a heightened sense of ap- 0;f defense for the Monroe Doctrine. And prehension and urgency gripped the United for this purpose the Air Corps needed planes States. President Roosevelt, addressing Con- having a radius of action of 2,000 miles gress on 16 May, emphasized the new threat (well beyond that of the B-17).4 The high of attack from the air. The doctrines of command of the War Department was soon Mitchell, Andrews, Arnold, and other advo- found to be embracing and disseminating cates of airpower now came from the mouth these arguments. The Assistant Secretary of the Commander in Chief as he declared of War, Robert P. Patterson, justified the that the oceans no longer represented de- need for B-17’s to William S. Knudsen, head fensive barriers. Speaking the language of of the Office of Production Management. air warfare, he told of the high speed and Patterson explained in October 1940 that ranges of modern aircraft-giving in dra- the range of the four-engine plane was matic form the air timetable from potential mandatory for the distances involved in enemy bases to New England and the Mid- hemisphere defense. In addition, there was dle West. He concluded by calling for a the possibility of operations in the Far East, program to provide 50,000 planes and a where the long-range bomber would be the production capacity for at least that many only weapon which could exert immediate each year.* The facts of war abroad had pressure. As a consequence of its situat.ion, established a situation which gave support concluded Patterson, the United States, to the theories and requirements of the more than any other world power, required Air Corps. four-engine airplanes.: Air Corps leaders fully appreciated the situation. All of the probable military even- TACTICAL LESSONS FROM THE tualities would call for powerful long-range AIR WAR ABROAD forces : hemisphere defense, offensive action As soon as the European war broke out in the Far East, or an offensive in Europe in earnest, the Air Corps sent observers as an ally of England. But hemisphere de- abroad to ascertain what lessons could be fense had already become an actual under- learned in air tactics. Shortly after Pres- taking; hence, air leaders were inclined to ident Roosevelt proclaimed a state of gear their doctrines and requirements pri- limited national emergency on 8 September marily to that c~nsideration.~General 1939, General Arnold selected two of his Arnold, for instance, in preparing a state- ablest officers, Carl Spaatz and George Ken- ment for presentation to Congressional ney, for this purpose. They sent back re- committees in 1940, defended his requests ports on the fall of France and the Battle for long-range bombers strictly on the basis of Britain.a Additional omcers of various of hemisphere defense and the Monroe Doc- grades were ordered across during 1940, trine. He pointed to European infiltration and in May of that year the War Depart- into the industrial and political life of ment established the Special Observer Preparation of Air Doctrine THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 109 Group in London. By this means and by theories proved in Poland were related pri- other special missions, the Air Corps was marily to ground support operations, they kept informed of significant tactical and involved such concepts as uniAed control technical developments in the air war.’ of the air force, achievement o€ air control, The interest of the Air Corps in the ex- and isolation of the battlefield. Major Fair, panding European war was revealed in an child, in reviewing this success of the Luft- orientation lecture for students at the Air waffe, could say, Corps Tactical School, in .the winter of We have observed with pardonable satis- 1939-40. Ma]. M. S. Fairchild explained that faction that the German air force has close attention had been given to the minor actualiy been employed exactly in accord- ance with the School’s concept of proper conflicts in China, Ethiopia, and Spain, and employment to accomplish such a mission. that many important lessons had been That this employment has been eminently learned and incorporated in school instruc- successful is attested by the startling ra- tion.* He pointed out, however, that the pidity of the German penetration into the major concepts of modern air employment interior of a desperately defending nation.11 had not been tested in those campaigns. Generals Arnold and Eaker, writing two With the Germans having conquered Po- years later, agreed that the Germans had land and having turned toward the West, followe‘d American principles in attacking Fairchild anticipated a major airpower Arst the enemy air force: when dawn broke showdown between the principal contend- on 1 September 1939, all the airdromes in ing forces in Europe. When these forces be- Poland were burning. It was in accord with came locked in battle, the results should the “best modern air teachings.” American definitely prove or disprove the validity of airmen, hearing the reports from Berlin, the doctrines developed at the school.RFair- said, in effect, “They have done it according child was particularly anxious to learn to the book.”12 what would happen when German air war- The daring operations of the Germans fare was’ directed against the British. If in Norway further demonstrated what the and when this happened, he declared, proper use of airpower could do. The reac- American airmen could witness “a demon- tions of air leaders were well summarized in stration of the final and ultimate method the observations of Maj. A1 Williams, of employment of Air Power in modern former Marine Corps pilot and aviation war.”D commentator. Writing in June 1940, he While Fairchild and others waited for pointed to the effect of German airpower Hitler to begin the deadly experiment in upon British seapower: the British had strategic air warfare, they could draw posi- failed to cut enemy sea communications tive conclusions from what the GAF had through the narrow Skagerrak and had accomplished in Poland. The Air Corps was failed to protect landings in Norway be- in general convinced that, insofar as these cause of the dominance of German avi- operations tested American air theory, the ation. This situation and the evidence from results constituted a strong confirmation. the land war on the continent convinced Lt. Col. Donald Wilson, director of the De- Williams that no surface force could oper- partment of Air Tactics at Ads, was par- ate safely within the range of hostile air- ticularly enthusiastic in this connection. power-unless control of the air were Arst Writing in September 1939, he stated, “He obtained.l3 [Hitler] is our greatest booster-without But the most impressive lesson of the even so much as a request from us he has air war during 1940, in the view of Air voluntargy undertaken the job of demon- Corps theorists, was the proved need for strating our theories. So far the coordina- long-range striking power. Strategic oper- tion between our theories and his practice ations were of foremost importance accord- is,so marked that someone is going to be ing to American doctrine, and the accused of - Although the observers were especially eager to And sup- ‘For dlscusalon of these Iesrrons, aee above. DD. 101-3. port for their beliefs from the test of war. 110 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Preparation of Air Doctrine While admitting that German aviation had Germaa pursuit forces, operating in close clearly demonstrated the capability of well- support of the bombers, failed through such organized tactical operations, they were tactics to gain the general control of the quick to point out that no belligerent had air which was required. If the Germans thus far made satisfactory use of strategic had “understood” strategic bombing, bombing forces. Maj. Gen. Delos Emmons, Spaatz declared, and had constructed .ap- who had succeeded General Andrews as propriate weapons and tactics, they could commander of the GHQ Air Force, drew at- have reduced Britain to a shambles in tention to the British weakness in this re- 1940.l; spect. He believed that England had made a Alexander de Seversky, the civilian aero- serious mistake in concentrating on defen- nautical expert, fully endorsed this view. sive airpower (interceptors and light He explained the ultimate victory of the bombers) when offensive power (heavy RAF in the Battle of Britain as the result bombers) was needed. The lack of a sufR- of superior theory and equipment. The les- cient number of large bombers cost the son concerning equipment, he emphasized, British a grand opportunity when the Ger- was the importance of quality, rather than mans dashed across northern France, for quantity. The German fighters were no the enemy lines of communication were match for the eight-gun, high-performing highly vulnerable and were jammed with Spitfires. German bombers were designed troops and materiel. The RAF possessed for tactical support rather than strategic some planes of the required range to reach operations and therefore were deficient in such targets, but not enough of them to range, armor, and firepower. Control of effect a major disorganization of the Ger- the air was the overriding necessity in a man supply system. Spaatz confirmed Em- struggle of this sort, and second-best planes mons’ view of the British deficiency and were not good enough.l0 suggested that the lesson applied to the United States with even greater force, since FINAL SHAPING OF AIR DOCTRINES ON THE the ranges involved in hemisphere defense EVE OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT were far greater. As soon as air warfare With an eye on Europe, with a renewed became serious, Spaatz observed, “the de- conviction ’of the soundness of its own mand was always for heavy bombers.”14 theories, and with a feeling that they might Turning to the Germans, Spaatz believed soon be tested directly, the Air Corps moved that they lacked not only proper equip- to sharpen its doctrinal thinking during ment, but the proper theory of airpower as the period 1939-1941. Particularly at the well. Serving as an observer in England Air Corps Tactical School, study and analy- during the Blitz (May to September 1940), sis were applied to the purpose and nature he quickly reached the conclusion that the of warfare, the role of airpower in war, and attack would fail because of misuse of avi- the mission and tactics of the individual ation by the Germans. Their leadership, branches of aviation. In July 1941 the air thought Spaatz, was wedded to the old planners in Washington were required to concept that airpower was restricted to transform their theories into a practical support ‘of fast-moving ground troops and plan for air action against the nation’s po- that it did not have an independent mis- tential enemies. The resulting document, sion of its own. This tactical concept had designated AWPD/l, was submitted in been successfully implemented in Poland August and approved by the War Depart- and France by the Stuka-Panzer combina- ment. It represented the Anal development tion upder conditions of air supremacy. of American air doctrine prior to the U.S. The bombing of Britain, however, was a entrance into World War I1 and was to strategical task which the Luftwaffe proved serve as the actual blueprint for air oper- ill prepared to accomplish. The German ations against the Axis. bombers were inadequately armed and had Purpose and nature of warfare. no capability for precision attacks; the At the Tactical School discussion of the Prewration of Air Doctrine THEDEVELOPMENT 01 AIR DOCTRINE- 111 aims and methods of warfare followed the accomplish political acquiescence, and avi- line of development which had unfolded ation also promised the best means of in- there during the early 1930’s.* The ideas suring defense of the United States. There- were buttressed, however, by the signal fore, he concluded, America should think events overseas. Cdlonel Wilson told officer- chiefly in terms of air warfare and should students at Maxwell Field in October 1939 make plans accordingly.18 that the course of the European struggle The role and employment of airpower in had underlined the fact that conventional war and smug concepts of the nature of war While the Air Corps made steady progress must be banished. He pointed to lessons in obtaining indorsement of its doctrines in from history, in both the distant and the War Department manuals and policy state- proximate past, to show that the “conserv- ments, a gap persisted between the most ative majority” had always failed to appre- advanced theories taught at the Tactical ciate the significance of new weapons and School and the officially approved doc- new methods. The military high command trines. The gap was based on a difference must learn from the fatal mistakes of de- in emphasis, rather than content, but the fense-mindedness and ground-mindedness; difference was so great that the two points the new kind of warfare called for flexible of view appeared in marked contrast. The thinking and a high degree of air-minded- contrast becomes immediately evident in a ness.I7 Major Fairchild spelled out the idea comparison between the lectures at the of the purpose and method of war, as seen Tactical School during this period and the by the Tactical School. The aim was to official statements printed in -Army Field further national policy by imposing the Manual 1-5, “Employment of Aviation of national will upon hostile powers; the na- the Army,” published on 15 April 1940. tional will might be directed toward physi- Major Fairchild, considering the question cal acquisition, securing “political acqui- of the proper employment of airpower, told escence” of other nations, or physical or students in October 1939 that the optimum political defense. The method of accom- way to use airplanes was “to conduct AIR plishing the aim in all cases was by over- WARFARE.” He agreed that airpower was coming the will of the enemy nation. flexible and could be used in many ways, but Ground forces traditionally overcame the he insisted that every weapon should be em- enemy will after destroying opposing armed ployed in a manner which would make the forces; but airpower, insisted Fairchild. al- maximum contribution to victory. The most lowed a “new method of waging war.” It effective stroke that airpower could make was a means of striking directly at the was against the enemy heartland. Conse- ultimate objective in war, which was the quently, Fairchild urged, “Let us make our enemy will. This doctrine was essentially preparations now-in advance-to wage Air what the school had been preaching for Warfare, rather than to employ our valu- some years, but Fairchild was able in 1939 able Air Force to reinforce the supporting to drive home particular points, based upon fires of the artillery.”lDIn the concluding the recent -European happenings. Conced- lecture on the air warfare section of the ing that ground forces might still be the Air Force course, Fairchild summarized the best means of achieving one of the aims of school view of proper strategic employment national will-physical acquisition, he held of aviation. The basic question, he sub- that the United States was not likely to mitted, was target selection; it was a most have such an aim since it already possessed difficult question since air forces had the sufficient territory. The most likely na- capability of attacking every type of armed tional needs were defense and the securing force, as well as the national structure it- of “political acquiescence” by other nations self. He saw four categories of objectives: to our policies. Munich, argued Fairchild, the hostile air force, ground force, naval had demonstrated the power of aviation to force, and national structure. Which of

*See sbove. DD. 51-51. these was primary and decisive? On what 112 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Preparation of AiT Doctrtnc basis could a decision properly be made? and these could not be checked by seapower. Fairchild answered quite simply that em- If the air force could prevent establishment ployment depended upon the strategic of enemy air units contiguous to North situation, that no general statement could America, it would succeed in defending the be made without reference to a specific set country against all types of enemy armed of circumstances. Factors entering into a forces, since air control was indispensable decision at any given time were: considera- to other kinds of operations. Accepting this tion of national security, whether the na- mission for the air arm, Fairchild saw three tion was on the strategic offensive or de- priorities for air employment in national fensive, the nature of the opposing military defense: power, and whether the enemy national 1. Prevention of establishment of hostile structure was vulnerable and within range. air forces in threatening positions and The national structure, Fairchild hastened the defeat of such forces as might have to stress, was the ideal target, but other become established. objectives might be the only feasible or logi- 2. Destruction of enemy surface expedi- cal ones in a specific situation. For example, tionary forces at sea and defeat of such if the United States were fighting Mexico, elements as may have gained a beach- the best target would be the Mexican head. ground forces, because Mexico had no jm- 3. Defeat (in cooperation with Navy, or portant economic structure. On the other independent thereof) of enemy sea hand, the Germans might properly concen- forces within range, so as to protect trate their air attack upon the British navy sea lanes.*l in order to break an effective sea blockade. It may be noted that the last two priori- Should enemy airpower establish itself ties stipulated by Fairchild involved air within range of the American national versus sea action. This led to a broader dis- structure, then the Arst priority target cussion of the impact of airpower upon sea- would be the hostile planes and bases.”) power generally. Regardless of the still un- Fairchild observed that the strategic resolved argument between the bomber and offensive was the only means of winning the battleship, Fairchild believed that far- a war, but that the United States appeared reaching adjustments were already re- unable, because of its geographical position, quired in thinking about the capabilities of to conduct such an offensive. The only way seapower. In the first place, because of the that it might be done would be by building threat of land-based aircraft, naval battles super-range aircraft or by-securing air bases of the future would take place farther from from possible allied powers, located nearer shore than had formerly been the case. Sur- potential enemies. 1% seemed clear that face fleets might be forced occasionally to even if this were lic~~anged,sea and land run the risk of operating in zones of hostile forces could not be successfully employed airpower, but even the Naval War College offensively outside of the Western Hemi- had agreed, said Fairchild, that future sphere unless the United States were joined engagements would probably occur on by active allies in Europe or Asia. Of course, the high seas. In the second place, should America become entangled in an- regardless of the location of major surface other struggle similar to that of the first engagements, the prerogatives of naval World War, she might wage an offensive victory were now limited by airpower. from France or England. Fairchild con- Historically, the victor at sea eniDyed free- cluded, ,however, that the actual situation dom of the seas for his own shipping and faced by the United States in November denied it to the defeated enemy; he could 1939 compelled it- to assure the strategic de- also escort an invading force to enemy fensive. Such a program, he thought, put shores while the enemy could not strike airpower into the primary military role; the back. Modern airpower, however, could con- only effective attacks-on the nation, at trol the sea lanes within its radius of ac- least initially, would have to come by air, tion-could keep out the sea victor and pro- Preparation of Air Doctrine THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 113 tect the commerce of the vanquished. tion of an Air Corps field manual, adopted Seapower, concluded Fairchild, was still a the views of the Air Board and incorporated substantial reality, but it no longer carried them in large measure in the final version with it the traditional prerogatives. Com- of Field Manual 1-5, Employment of Avia- plete freedom of the seas required air, as tion of the Army, issued on 15 April 1940. well as surface, dominance.22On the morn- This manual was the first of a series de- ing after Pearl Harbor the air leaders in signed to cover all phases of Air Corps tac- Washington felt impelled to go beyond tics; it was devoted to over-all employment, Fairchild’s assertion. The Air War Plans Di- while later manuals (FM 1-10, 1-15, etc.) vision advised the Chief of Staff that “Sea were concerned with specific aviation Power is no longer reliable as a primary in- branches, such as pursuit. Completion of strument of American defense. Air power an Air Corps field mama1 such as FM 1-5 must replace it as the principal means of had been repeatedly delayed by “rapidly defense. . . .”23 changing organization and marked con- Fairchild and the air planners were flict of views of all concerned in its prepara- spokesmen of the advanced air doctrine. A tion.” It was finally approved (superseding more conserva%e statement of the role of TR 440-15,15 October 1935) only after coor- aviation, or at least a different emphasis, dination with the Air Corps agencies con- was carried in the highly influential Air cerned, interested combat arms, and WPD.2G Board Report of September 1939. The Air Consequently, as might be expected, the Board was appointed by order of the Secre- manual represented a considerable attenu- tary of War in March for the purpose of ation of the air doctrine which had been studying the entire question of air force distilled at the Tactical School, conforming employment and making recommendations rather to the more eonservative general to the Chief of Staff concerning appropriate principles of airpower enunciated by the organiation and doctrines. General Arnold, Air Board. as Chief of the Air Corps, presided over the Following closely the recommendations of board, which included the Assistant Chief the Air Board Report of September 1939,27 of Staff (G-3), the Assistant Chief of Staff the FM 1-5 statement of general employ- (WPD), and the commander of the GHQ ment and missions for the Air Corps was Air In its final report, the board moderate, but not contradictory to the stated that airpower was indispensable to dominant point of view in the Air Corps as national defense, especially in the early a whole. General Andrews (who had been stages of war, and that the bomber was the appointed by General Marshall late in 1939 basis for airpower. The importance of range to be G-3 of the General Staff) approved the was also emphasized by the board. National manual and pointed out, with apparent security demanded that American bombers satisfaction, that it did not indorse the radi- have a lager radius of action than any cal theory of air employment.28 As a possible enemy bombers, so that the enemy matter of fact, FM 1-5 called for the kind could not strike with impunity against vital of employment that the doctrinal developers U.S. installations. The requirement of bases at the Tactical School would have fully BC- was set forth as a part of the total mecha- cepted, given the national strategic defen- nism of effective airpower; bases must *be sive. It has been noted above that Majm located so that aviation could cover all land Fairchild assumed that the strategic de- and sea areas from which a decisive attack fensive was the only role that the United might be States could take at the time. He had estab- The conclusions of the Air Board, ac- lished three priorities of air employment, cepted as a representation of the views of given such a situation, and none of these the Army as a whole, had great influence included strafegic bombardment operation.* at all levels and in all branches of the serv- The missions specified in FM 1-5 were vir- ice. The Air Corps Board, which had been tually those required by Fairchild’s defen- engaged for several years in the prepara- *See above, p. 112. 114 - THII! DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Preparation of Air Dactrfne sive priorities. The reason why FM 1-5 in terms with which most airmen could not seems out of line with the trend of thought argue, those same doctrines failed to give a at the Tactical School is that the manual very accurate picture of the strategic concentrated upon this assumption of a na- theories held and taught by the Air Corps tional defensive role, ‘whib instruction at leaders. the school concentrated upon the assump- Probably the most significant provisions tion of the offensive as a strategic ideal. in FM 1-5 were concerned with the desig- Relatively little emphasis was given in nation, assignment, and control of various FM 1-5 to the offensive air warfare that so groupings of military aviation. These were excited the imagination of Fairchild, Wil- based upon the recommendation of the Air son, and their colleagues. Naturally, then, Board, which had attempted, by functional while they regarded the manual as accepta- grouping of aviation, to insure the proper ble, they considered it rather tame stuff fulfillment of the various responsibilities of compared to their more theoretical concep- the air arm. The four general groupings tions. Four basic missions were assigned to established in FM 1-5 were: training and the Army air arm by FM 1-5; of these, two special purpose aviation (noncombat), were purely defensive. The remaining two reconnaissance and liaison (assigned per- were extremely vague abggestions of pos- manently to ground units), overseas gar- sible offensive action : operations outside rison aviation, and GHQ aviation. GHQ the United States and its possessions “as aviation was defined as including all air- required by the situation,” and “other oper- craft not assigned to the other three group- ations in which the Army engaged.”20The ings and consisted of combat, reconnais- manual agreed with Fairchild’s view that sance, and transport types. According to actual employment ’would depend upon the the manual, four kinds of forces wouM be situation. But no mention was made of the drawn from GHQ aviation for the conduct enemy “national economic structure” as the of offensive and defensive air operations. ideal target. The manual merely stated that The first of the four types listed was desig- when operations were carried on beyond the nated striking forces; these elements would sphere of surface forces, “selection of ob- be expected to carry air attacks to great jectives . . . is governed by the strategic distances beyond their operating bases, and plan and may have only an indirect bearing would aim chiefly at enemy aviation. De- upon the tactical operations of these [sur- fense forces, mentioned second, would pro- face] forces.” Important objectives “may be vide the necessary close-in air defense of found,” explained the manual, in vital cen- the most vulnerable and important areas ters, in lines of communication, and in “es- within the zone of the interior. Support tablishments in the economic In forces were described as those which would a later section the manual gave further “form a nucleus of aviation, especially consideration to possible strategic opera- trained in direct support of ground troops, tions. It proposed air attacks against enemy and designed for rapid expansion to meet objectives in the following order: air forces, war requirements.” Finally, FM 1-5 spoke ground forces, naval forces, joint forces, and of special forces-to meet miscellaneous re- materiel. Action against materiel, the man- quirements for bombardment and recon- ual emphasized, had to be based upon a de- naissance in minor operations or coastal tailed analysis of target systems and had to defense. The manual remarked that the be methodical and ~ustained.~~Thus, it may various functional groupings would at times be observed that FM 1-5 contained the basic overlap or supplement one another. Rein- rudiments of the air doctrine developed at forcement ‘of overseas garrison aviation the Tactical School, but the leading ideas with elements of support or special forces were vaguely suggested or tucked away in would be regarded as normal, while “one inconspicuous places. Thus, in 1940, al- or more” striking forces might be used in though offlcial doctrines of the Army set support of surface forces when the situa- forth the defensive functions of the air arm tion demanded.a2 Preparation of Air Doctrine THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 115 The chief motivation underlying the pro- Bombardment aviation vision for functional forces of aviation by In Air Corps theory during the period the Air Board was no doubt the fear that under study, the bomber continued to be the GHQ Air Force, as previously organ- regarded as the basic element of airpower. ized, would give insufficient attention to At the Tactical School, Maj. F. M. Hopkins its ground support mission. Andrews had developed the argument that, at least built the force around bombardment, and theoretically, it was impracticable to pro- his general attitude seemed to be that bom- vide sumcient pursuit defense to stop bomb- bardment could handle all missions that ing attacks. He supported the conclusion were assigned to his command. Although generally accepted at the school that the it had been generally assumed that, in case only effective defense against bombers was of war, task forces would be provided by to attack them at their This ves- the GHQ Air Force,* no provision had been tige of Douhet theory, shortly to be dis- made for preparing such forces on a spe- proved by experience in the European war, cialized, functional basis. FM 1-5, clearly was the basis for continued emphasis on reflecting the Air Board report on this ques- production and training for bombardment, tion, provided that GHQ Aviation should to the neglect of pursuit. develop functional forces, which would then The leading concept, nurtured at the (in case of war2 be attached to large ter- school during the 1930’s, of bombardment ritorial or tactical commands for the ac- attack on the enemy national structure, complishment of certain missions. When was fully developed by the end of the the necessity for their attachment was decade. Major Fairchild gave perhaps the ended, their control would revert to GHQ. classical explanation of this concept in a General provision was made in FM 1-5 gov- lecture on 9 November 1939. He asked what erning the relationship of an attached task was meant by attack on the national eco- force to a larger command. While so at- nomic structure. Did it mean bombing and tached, the air unit (commanded by its air gassing of the civilian population? This, he officer) would receive from the higher com- answered, was one recognized method of mander an assignment of general missions attack on an enemy nation, and the to be performed within designated time European powers appeared to be preparing periods. Support aviation would normally for such action. Fairchild raised certain be handled as a theater of operations weap- objections, other than the obvious humani- on, bat allowance was made for attach- tarian ones, to this method. Most impor- ment to those units of all or a portion of tant, said he, was that no one know how the assigned air strength. “Support avia- hard such an attack had to be in order to tion may thus act with greater promptness break civilian morale. The experience in and better understanding in meeting the China suggested that Japanese bombing requirements of the supported unit.”33The had actually strengthened, rather than new manual while providing for definite weakened, the Chinese will to resist. At support forces, did not provide fully enough best, Fairchild concluded, such methods for successful ground support operations. seemed likely to achieve results that were The designated peacetime forces within temporary and noncumulative. “For all GHQ were referred to as a nucleus and as these reasons the School advocates an en- a laboratory for development of methods;34 tirely different method of attack. This they did not constitute a strong, tested force method, is the attack of the National Eco- in being. The complicated and perplexing nomic Structure.” It had the virtue of re- questions involved in effective air-ground ducing the enemy’s war producing capacity cooperation were insufficiently answered, and putting pressure on the civilian popu- and it was not until World War I1 that sat- lation at the same time and with equal isfactory doctrines for tactical aviation were effectiveness. Furthermore, the results of worked out on tlie fleld of battle. damage to the economic structure were *&c above, pp. as-&. cumulative and lastingeac 116 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Preparation of Air Doctrine The theory underlying the importance credited by the experience of the war. The of economic targets rested on the fact that British had shifted to a preference for a nation’s economy was extremely intricate night tactics even before 1939 and the de- and sensitive. Fairchild showed how, even sign of their heavy bombers showed that in peacetime, a minor supply interruption ;hey were intended chiefly for such oper- could hold up an entire industry; under the ations. Wartime experience strengthened strain of war, the economic system was the view of RAF officers that day bombing even more vulnerable.* Selection of targets was too costly, and their initial efforts with required careful, prolonged, and profes- the American B-l?C, designed as a day sional analysis. It was necessary to gather bomber, only confirmed their opinion. The information, by all possible means of intel- judgment of the RAF was based upon the ligence, during peace, so that a systematic defeat of the Luftwaffe in 1940 as well as plan of attack could be evolved for use in their own missions over the continent in war. Fairchild stated it as the opinion of 1940 and l94Ls9 the school that a properly planned cam- The Air Corps held to its theory of day- paign of bombardment would cause the light, unescorted operations by heavy breakdown of successive links in the econ- bombers in spite of criticism from the Brit- omy of an enemy nation and would rep- ish and reports from its own observers and resent the maximum contribution that tactical units. One is tempted to believe airpower could make toward the ultimate that the only important lessons “learned” aim in war.37 from combat abroad were those which The dark question-mark that still hung sdted the mind of the Air Corps; experi- over the plan for strategic bombardment ence which contradicted American doctrine was related to the defensive capability of was generally explained away by various the bombers themselves. Could they ac- kinds of rationalizations. General Arnold complish precision attacks in daylight with- himself repudiated the “doctrine widely out prohibitive losses to themselves?? The propounded in certain Air Corps circles %r official doctrine, as expressed in F’M 1-10, many years’’ that fighters could not shoot Tactics and Techniques of Air Attack (20 down bombers in formation. Experience November 1940), favored daylight attack abroad, he .believed (in November 1939), but did not rule out the contingency that had proved that doctrine wholly unten- night operations might prove necessary. It able.40 A little later, Arnold noted with also indicated that fighter support would grave concern reports from abroad of tre- be needed wherever strong opposition had mendous losses of bombers, particularly to be overcome and that it should be pro- when attacked by pursuit. He directed that vided when possible.3s However, the domi- a searching analysis be made of American nant view at the Tactical School prior to methods, with a view toward improving the America’s entry into World War I1 was tactics and equipment of both bombers and that daylight bombing was essential to the fighters; specifically for this purpose he whole precision idea, that bombers would called a conference of representatives from usually have to fly without escort (because the GHQ Air Force, the Materiel Division, of the limited range of pursuit), and that the Plans Division,.and office of the Chief of they could provide sufficient defensive fire Ordnan~e.~’Prior to this medng a confer- to permit them to accomplish their mis- ence of experienced pursuit pilots was sions without high losses. called by the commander of the 8th Pursuit Although it is not surprising that the Group to discuss the problem raised by Air Corps theorists developed such ideas in General Arnold. These pilots were unani- the absence of actual tests, what is remark- mous in their opinion that existing types able is the tenacity with which they held to of bombers, either singly or in formation, them even when these ideas were dis- were extremely vulnerable to pursuit. They This fundamental argument had already been elaborated at estimated that day bombers opposed by the Tactical School during the 1930’s. See above, pp. 57-58. tFor discusslon of thls vital question during the early ’30’s.cee above, pp. 58-60. pursuit were subject to ihe possibility of Preparation of Air Doctrine THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 117 a 50 percent loss and concluded that the defensive formations, armor, and gunnery. only safety for long-range bombers lay in They searched German and British day- operating at night or under heavy cloud light tactics for weaknesses which might ex- cover.42 Leaders of bombardment units plain their failure and point the way to shared the view of the pursuit pilots on this American success. Maj. Gen. J. E. Chaney, question. On 26 December 1939 Maj. Harold representing the AAF in the Special Ob- L. George advised General Emmons, the server Group in England, reported on 5 commander of the GHQ Air Force, that September 1941 that the Luftwaffe’s failure “THERE IS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND to crush British industry and morale had BUT THAT AMERICAN BOMBARDMENT been due to German errors rather than any UNITS COULD NOT TODAY DEFEND inherent weakness in the airpower idea. THEMSELVES AGAINST AMERICAN PUR- Goering, said Chaney after a careful study, SUIT UNITS.” George recommended addi- had never put enough bombers over Eng- tional gun installations for the bombers and’ land, nor had he concentrated them on the better training of crews, especially in flexi- proper targets.46This report confirmed the ble gunnery.43 Emmons, reporting to the observations of Spaatz regarding the short- Chief of the Air Corps on his findings, in- comings of German strategic aviation.* dorsed the above expression of views. Said Arnold repeated these views in a summary Emmons, “Aerial operations of the present some years later. He listed the following European conflict confirm the results of as the causes of German failure in the air the World War; that is that the present in 1940: poor fighter tactics, inadequate bombardment plane cannot defend itself armament of bombers, collapse of air force adequately against pursuit attack.” He gave replacements, and friction between bom- the essential advantages of pursuit over bardment and fighter leaders in the Luft- mbardment, which accounted for this ~affe.~’As for the British, the Americans ar- fact: concentrated firepower, greater ac- gued that they, too, had not made proper curacy of Axed guns, smaller size of vulner- use of the daylight bomber. The inef- able parts, and protection of the pilot by fective performance by the B-17C’s under the engine.44 Arnold appeared convinced RAF control h“d been due to incorrect pro- after the Battle of Britain that day bom- cedures (bombing from too high altitude bardment could not succeed when strongly and in too small formations), mechanical opposed: “During daylight in good weather, and maintenance difficulties, and inade- when pursuit aviation is present in strength quate training. The Air Staff in Washing- in an area, it can pretty nearly bar the air ton was convinced that improved equip- to the bomber.”45 ment and training would solve the problem But in spite of these pronouncements, no and was determined thzk the British “les- suggestion wm made by Arnold or other sons” should not alter the fundamental American air leaders that the doctrine of American con~eption.~~The fact remains daylight, precisim bombardment should be that although the air leaders might, with dropped or modified. Here is a striking il- good reason, have rejected the negative lustration of the momentum of an idea. So evidence of air combat with respect to their persuaded were the Air Corps planners that theories, they went boldly into the war their theory of attack was superior that with no positive evidence of any kind in they refused to abandon it even in face their support. What they had was a fervent of the hard facts of experience. A switch conviction-a faith-in the effectiveness of to night tactics would have undermined precision bombing and in the defensive the whole idea of precision and key target power of the bomber f~rmations.~~That selection. The leaders chose, instead, to faith produced ultimately a striking force hold stubbornly to their principles and to which astonished the military world. How- make all possible efforts to carry through ever, it is only fair to say that the force day operations successfully. They gave at- was employed at a heavy cost in men and tention to improving bomber armament, *For Bpaata’s comments, see above, p. 110. 118 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Preparation of Air Doctrine - materiel, and that it would have failed of Corps doctrine that the four-engine bomber ultimate success had effective provision not was the bade weapon of airpower was now been made at last (1943) for long-range fully accepted by all agencies concerned, fighter escorts. and implementation proceeded as rapidly as During the period 1939-1941 the Air physical facilities would permit.51 Corps was not hampered by the restric- The only remaining threat to the build- tions on bomber development and procure- up of the Air Corps bomber force was the ment that had been imposed during the lingering possibility that the Navy would lean prewar years.* President Roosevelt succeed in building its own land-based had flashed the green light in September bomber force at the expense of the Air 1938,t and in May 1940 had called for a Corps. Lt. Col. Harold L. George wrote in force of 50,000 airplanes.?? Thereafter, October 1941 that the Navy would make manufacturing facilities, not the opposi- every effort to gain control of land-based tion of the General Staff, were the principal bombardment and that steps must be taken limiting factor. The standard heavy to counter-act such moves. Spaatz was bombers under production were the B-17 equally sensitive to this threat, for he saw and the B-24 (Liberator); the latter had that diversion of heavy bombers to the Navy been established as a kind of “running would mean an equivalent loss to the mate” for the Fortress. In January 1939 strength of the Army air arm. He pointed to General Arnold had asked the Consolidated the fact that, in spite of planes on order, Aircraft Corporation to build a four-engine there were actually only 83 B-17’s in the heavy bomber with an operating range of United States in October 1941 and only 31 3,000 miles, speed in excess of 300 miles at bases overseas. The issue with the Navy per hour, and a ceiling of 35,000 feet. Pre- persisted right on through the war, but the liminary designs were presented by Consoli- Air Corps successfully defended its priority dated to the Materiel Division in March, on long-range, land-based bombers.b2 and in the following December the XB-24 The Air Corps had reason for satisfaction was successfully flown at San Diego. It was of approximately the same weight as the over the favorable climate for bomber pro- curement during this period; it also made B-17 (35,000 pounds), had a span of 110 substantial progress in the matter of de- feet, a tricycle landing gear, and twin ver- veloping still larger aircraft. The Air Board tical stabilizers. The B-24 featured a high, thin, narrow wing of exceptional aero- report of 15 September 1939 called for a dynamic efficiency. The fuselage, consider- standard reconnaissance-bomber having a radius of action of at least 2,000 miles (com- ably larger than that of the B-17, provided pared with less than 1,000 for the B-17). more room for the crew. The Liberator The report stated, further, that no perfor- was to prove a capable companion in arms mance characteristics could be regarded as to the Fortress.5oIn the early fall of 1940 a static requirement; the underlying neces- the Materiel Division let contracts to Boe- sity always was to build planes which could ing for 500 B-17’s and to Consolidated for checkmate the air efforts of potential ene- 500 B-24’s. This move marked the opening of the Air Corps’ heavy bomber production mies and which would enable the United program. In the spring of the following States to carry the air offensive into enemy territory.53During this period the War De- year, President Roosevelt announced that partment and Congress took a favor- production of the big ships would be stepped able view of requests for air research and up to a rate of 500 per month and indi- development. In the year following the fall cated that this was aimed at achieving com- of France (June 1940), branches of the mand of the air for the democracies. The Assistant Secretary of War for Air told Army other than the Air Corps spent $25,- Arnold, “the job is now up to us.” The Air 000,000 on research. The Air Corps alone spent $102,000,000; of this amount nearly *For discussion of the struggle over the long-range bomber, see aboYe, pp. 89-101. half was used for service tests of the heavy tSee above, p. 100. teee above, p. 108. bomber .b4 Preparation of Air Doctrine THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 119 The recommendation of the Air Board for prove successful for combat operations. The a bomber with a 2,000-mile radius of action Air Corps, wisely, had two “super-eggs” in was supported by Colonel Spaatz in a study the nest before the American entry into submitted on 1 September 1939. This study World War 11; one of these, the B-29, proved led ultimately to production of the Boeing the value of such a precaution. B-29, the super-bomber which would spear- But air leaders did not rest content with head the final air assault upon Japan. the procurement of B-17’s and B-24’s, or Spaatz advocated immediate development with the development of the B-29 and B-32. of heavy bombers with greater range and In keeping with the doctrine that perform- better high-altitude performance than those ance is always relative and that research of existing types. Such planes, he believed, must go on continuously, requests were were essential to the performance of any made for experimentation with still larger strategic air operations in the potential ships. In June 1940 General Chaney wrote a Far Eastern theater.g5 Shortly thereafter, letter to General Marshall, emphasizing the the Air Corps requested that Boeing develop urgent need for development along this such,a bomber. In the summer of 1940 the line. The primary basis for Chaney’s argu- company submitted a design to a board of ment at the time was that the United officers headed by Col. Oliver P. Echols; States should have weapons which would this design, which conceived a plane of permit the conduct of strategic offensive about twice the weight of the B-17, action against potential enemies. He saw was approved as the XB-29. In some as the ultimate objective a bomber capable respects its successful construction may of carrying the war to Berlin from the be regarded as the outstanding aerial United States, in retaliation for any aggres- engineering triumph of the war. So clean sive acts which the Germans might make was the aerodynamic structure of the B-29 against America. Possession of such planes, that this ship, much larger than the B-17, thought Chaney, would do more to insure nevertheless offered no greater air resist- the security of the Western Hemisphere ance. On the basis of impressive wind- than any other measure within the power tunnel tests with models, the Air Corps or- of the nation. dered three full-size ships in August; the What Hitler and his people really feared flrst of these was successfully flight-tested was attack upon their homeland. Possession on 21 September 1941. It had a new-type by the United States of super-bombers wing of maximum efficiency, with a span would deter Germany from encroaching of 140 feet, pressurized compartments for upon America, unless in the meantime the the crew, remotely controlled machine-gun Luftwaffe outbuilt and outranged this turrets, and extensive electronic equipment. country in the air.j8 Chaney was strongly The four radial engines gave the plane a supported in his point of view by Arnold, top speed of 370 miles per hour and a ferry- who, even at the time he was approving the ing range of 4,400 miles.:O In appearance initial trial order of B-29’s, wrote to Mar- as well as performance, the B-29 (Super- shall asking for bigger planes. Arnold urged fortress) was truly superb. quantity procurement of B-29’s and experi- Just as the Air Corps had obtained the mental development of a larger ship as soon B-24 as a companion to the B-17, it sought as the aeronautical industry reached the another super-bomber as insurance for the point where it could produce it. This pres- B-29. Shortly after opening negotiations sure for development by the Air Corps was with Boeing, the Air Corps made similar to lead to production of the Consolidated overtures to Consolidated. A mock-up of the B-36, the inter-continental bomber. Al- resulting XB-32 (Dominator) was delivered though the B-36 was not available until in April 1941, but flight tests of actual mo- after the close of World War 11, it was to dels did not begin until 7 September 1942.57 serve as an important weapon in the post- The ship had performance characteristics war struggle with the Soviet Union. It similar to the B-29, but it was never to would not have been available then, 120 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Preparation of Air Doctrine had it not been for the Air Corps and the failure of top-level commands and doctrine of dynamic development. Part agencies to realize the importance of pur- of the actual experimentation leading suit and the urgent need for its develop- up to the B-36 was connected with comple- ment.O0 Emmons replied with an historical tion of the giant Douglas XB-19, test-flown account of the status of pursuit from the in June 1941.”9This ship, the largest mili- time‘of World War I. He concurred fully in tary plane ever built, was the culmination Arnold’s feeling that pursuit had been neg- of Project D, approved by the War Depart- lected during the past decade and charac- ment in 1935.* The interval between the terized the situation in these words: “For a inception and completion of that project number of years thought has been centered gives some notion of the time factors in- principally upon bombardment. Pursuit volved in the building of airpower. has been a sort of stepchild. . .there has grown up a general opinion throughout the Pursuit aviation Air Corps that pursuit is a sort of necessary In the prgceding chapter it was shown evil and without much value.” Emmons that increasing recognition was given to declared that the air leaders must correct the importance of pursuit, following an all- the situation and drive home the facts of the time low reached during the early 1930’s.t. air lessons from abroad. Especially needed The air war in Empe, particularly the for improvement of pursuit, he thought, Battle’of Britain, served to point up even were more careful selection of fighter pilots further the vital role of the fighter. Un- (as a specialty) and more realistic training fortunately, the emphasis was upon the in maneuvers and gunnery.O1 After the interception function; the role of fighter dramatic air spectacle of the summer and escort, which is what the Americans were fall of 1940 in Europe, Arnold became more to need most in the skies over Europe, con- than ever convinced of the importance of tinued to be neglected. And the develop- air fighting. He asserted that the generally ment of equipment to fill the escomt need recognized theory that air forces were most proved to be misconceived. The multiseater vulnerable on the ground had been dis- fighter, qeveloped on faith rather than ex- proved by the war abroad. Attacks on dis- perience, was unsuccessful; and the even- persed airdromes had been shown to be tual provision of long-range single-seaters inefficient and unsound. “We are back,” was a desperate adaptation, improvised in concluded Arnold, “to Pecognition that an the heat of battle. air force in being must be destroyed in the General Arnold, alarmed by bomber loss8s air or in factories.” Fast pursuit planes had overseas, took a personal hand in. the pur- proved to be the best destroyers, and the suit question as early as November 1939. RAF Fighter Command had shown that a He directed General Emmons, commander strong defense could make bomber attacks of the GHQ Air Force, to make a careful expensive and study of the problem and to submit a plan The mission of pursuit, as officially de- for adequate development of pursuit tactics fined in F’M 1-15, Tactics and Techniques of and planes. Arnold expressed the feeiing, Air Fighting (9 September 1940), was to which had been sensed by pursuit leaders “deny the hostile air force freedom of the several years before, that the tactics and air.” This was clearly a defense-oriented development of fighter aviation had not statement, which indicated that the mission received their proper share of attention and was to be achieved in the following ways: suppcrt. He suggested some interesting ex- destruction of enemy formations in flight; planations for the neglect of pursuit: the “bomber invincibility” doctrine propounded breaking the enemy’s power and will to at- for some years at the Air Corps Tactical tack through attrition of his forces; and School; the fact that senior air officers limiting the striking capability of his bomb- tended to shy away from pursuit flying; ers by the threat of pursuit opposition.0a The latter referred to the limited aim *For discussion of Project D, nee above, pp. 96-97, tFor discurslon of the recovery of pursuit. see above, pp. (W-84. theory of antiaircraft defense, which had PreBaration of Air Doctrine THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 121 been taught at the Tactical School for late as the summer of 1940 they concurred some time.* Its purpose was to reduce the in recommending approval of the develop- effectiveness of enemy bombers and ulti- ment of such a plane as a long-range escort mately to prevent their attacks by inflic- fighter, and it was approved by the Secre- tion of heavy losses. Tactics for successful tary of War.IiHBut no mention can be found air defense also followed the principles es- anywhere of any serious effort to convert tablished at the school. They were based single-seater fighters into escorts by ex- upon an effective ground information net tending their range. Hence, America and a flexible system of alert. Readiness of entered the war with no proved type of aircraft and pilots on the ground was re- long-range fighter to perform the important garded as the most efficient kind of alert, escort function. circumstances permitting. In special cases, Attack and light bombardment aviation air alert or defensive air patrol aght be The recommendation of the Air Board in called for. ForQyation flying, based on the September 1939, which led to provision for element of two o)’ 4me planes, was stand- support forces as a part of GHQ aviation, ard procedure for all Qhter operations.G4 has already been discussed.tt The specified Although the mission of pursuit was seen mission of the support forces, as outlined as primarily one of air defense by intercep- subsequently in FM 1-5, was practically the tion of enemy bombers, it included also the same as the mission traditionally assigned function of escort into hostile skies.o5These by the air arm to attack aviation. Proper two employments of pursuit called for two targets were vulnerable surface installa- types of planes: the interceptor and the tions and forces, principally in rear areas, long-range flghter. The “compromise” type and included logistical establishments, com- of single-seater, represented by planes munications, supplies, fortifications, and like the standard Curtiss P-40, did not ap- vehicles or troops. It was not thought profit- pear to satisfy either of these requirements. able, however, to attack equipment and Hence, development continued in the direc- personnel when they were well dispersed.“!) tion of the two separate types: for the in- At the Tactical School more precise con- terceptor, the Bell P-39 and Lockheed P-38 ceptions of ground support operations were seemed the most promising mode1s.t The explained in the Air Force course of instruc- long-range fighter represented by all odds tion. Ma]. F. M. Hopkins declared in Novem- the greatest problem. FM 1-15 specified that ber 1939 that the method of support would it would be a multiseater ship, designed depend upon the nature of the land battle for patrol, interception, and escort. The and the phase of operations. For theoretical manual conceded that this was a newly- purposes, Hopkins related his lesson to the created type, “for which combat tactics four phases of battle, concentration, ad- have not been evolved. The development of vance from concentration, battle, and pur- effective tactics . . . is contingent on their suit, recognized and taught in the service availability for tactical flying tests.”66This schools of the Army. During the period of

last was a Iwference to the controversial and concentration, it I appeared that attack on experimental Bell XFM-1. Serious doubts enemy rail lines would be the most effective about the usefulness of this type of plane way of disrupting mobilization. Marching had been expressed years earlier, and a con- formations seemed very vulnerable, espe- ference of experienced pursuit pilots in cially at defiles and chokepoints, during the December 1939 agreed that a multiseater period of advance from concentration. Dur- fighter would present nearly the same de- ing the battle phase, Hopkins favored con- fensive problems as bombers.07 Nevertheless, centrated use of support aviation against the Chief of the Air Corps, the Tactical movements of enemy troops and sup- School, and the Air Corps Board continued plies; he considwed such action to be more to support the multiseater fighter idea. As efficient than attack against personnel on *See above. p. 84. the battlefield proper. Perhaps the great- tFor dlscusslon of pursuit types and the development of inter- ceptors, see above, pp. 85-87. $see above, pp. 113-15. 122 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE Preparation of Air Doctrine est exploitation of attack forces was possible FM 1-5. Controversy over the type of equip- during the pursuit phase of operations, ment continued, and in June 1941 the issue after an enemy had been broken. All avail- of the dive-bomber and diving techniques able planes should be thrown against the was pushed forward by Robert A. Lovett, retreating columns, in order to turn their the Assistant Secretary of War for Air. He defeat into a rout. Hopkins pointed out advised General Arnold that, in his judg- that in all phases of the battle, one target- ment, insufficient attention had been given supply-should be kept constantly in to close cooperation of air with ground mind.TOSpecified targets singled out by air troops. Pointing to the success of German leaders as especially suitable to strikes by tactics, especially in Greece and Crete, attack aviation were airdromes, mobile Lovett stated thd he believed the number columns, light bridges, and supply depots.71 of dive-bombers on order was inadequate. Perhaps the most significant development He therefore asked Arnold to reoppn consid- during this period, affecting the execution eration of the quantities of dive-bombers of ground support missions, was the chang- for the Air Corps. While recognizing the ing idea about equipment. The attack air- usefulness of the Douglas A-20 as a light plane and its tactics had been under ques- bomber, Lovett saw the need for a comple- tion and study for some time.* When the mentary form of close-up attack. The Air Air Board undertook a general study of Corps had always been cool toward dive aviation employment in March 1939, it went bombing as a technique of ground support, into the problem of the proper airplane for and there was no change of heart at this ground support operations. In its report time. Arnold, however, politely replied that the following September, the Air Board a conference of interested War Department eliminated the attack and attack-bomber agencies should be called to consider the types from its requirements and recom- general problem raised by L~vett.’~ mended the light bomber as the basic unit The dive bomber suggestion made little of support forces. This move was based upon headway, but reports from the Russian the conclusion of the board that bombs front in the fall of 1941 revived interest were the most valuable weapons against in the traditional type of attack plane. The the usual targets of support aviation and two-engine A-20 was now accepted as the that the proper type of plane would there- standard weapon for ground support, but fore be one built especially for bomb-carry- there was a growing demand for a smaller, ing. The machine gun was regarded as of more maneuverable plane, armed with can- limited effectiveness as a ground attack non, machine guns, and small bombs for weapon because of the ready dispersion of use against enemy armor. In November targets suitable to destruction by that weap- the Operations Division of OCAC called for on, the ineffectiveness of fire at high air- development of such a plane, indicating craft speeds, and the proved vulnerability that no suitable type existed. It was stated of aviation in low-altitude attacks. The that the discarding of attack aviation had board believed that light bombers, sup- resulted from observations of the Spanish ported by the necessary pursuit, reconnais- Civil War, in which such aviation had ap- sance, and transport aircraft, would best peared unsuccessful. The more recent fulfill the mission of ground In operations in Russia had shown, on the line with this recommendation, FM 1-5 es- contrary, that attack aviation could be very tablished light bombardment as the striking effective in ground support. The Air Force element of support forces; the principal Combat Command, successor to the GHQ offensive armament specified was the bomb, Air Force, urged that light bombardment with chemical spray and machine guns rele- be redesignated attack and that procure- gated to secondary importance.53 ment of attack-type planes be expanded. The issue was not definitively settled, It observed that the A-20 could not however, by the Air Board report or by dive and that the converted Navy dive

*We above, pp. 81-88 bomber (designated A-24) had insufficient Preparation of Air Doctrine THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 123 armament for attack of armored vehicles and unrea1istic.f-f By 1937 a more definite and grounded aircraft. The Combat Com- strategic outlook was possible, and the mand reported, however, that it had re- successful aggressions of Adolph Hitler after quested delivery of Brewster A-32’s and September 1939 sharpened the focus beyond believed that they would be satisfactory.i5 doubt €or military observers. As the danger The A-32 was considerably heavier than the to the free world became increasingly evi- A-24 and carried four 20-mm. cannon. As dent, especially after the summer of 1940, it turned out, the A-32 did not prove very the United States and Great Britain drew successful, and it was replaced during ever closer together. The leaders of each World War I1 by the North American A-36 nation were well aware of their interdepend- (a converted P-51). Other standard pursuit ence, and planning on both sides of the models were to see service as fighter-bomb- Atlantic was geared to the concept of com- ers. With planes of this type the Air Corps mon interest and mutual aid. Thus, spe- adhered to its traditional attack tactics of cific doctrines could be shaped to a rather low-altitude, level attacks in formation, precise military prospect; American plans with fighter cover provided when avail- during 1941 were drawn on the premise of able.i0 cooperation with Britain and her allies in Blueprint for action: AWPD/l the war against the Axis.-f-f-f Earlier in this chapter references have The first and most important statement been made to the influence upon air doc- of common strategic principles was arrived trine of the war overseas, the growing sense at early in 1941 after a series of conversa- of possible American involvement, and the tions in Washington between a US. staff moves to prepare tactical theory and equip- committee and representatives of the Bri- ment for such an ordeal.* On 9 July 1941, tish Chiefs of Staff. The final report with the threat to the security of the United (ABC-1) , which offered a plan whereby the States clearly manifest, President Roosevelt United States and the British Common- made a request for logistical information wealth might defeat Germany and her allies which called forth a definite articulation of “should the United States be compelled American air doctrine. This doctrine, con- to resort to war,” was submitted on 27 tained in a paper designated AWPD/l, re- March.iXIt was assumed that an American ceived official approval at the highest level; war would involve Italy and Japan as well and when Pearl Harbor plunged a reluc- as Germany; hence, strategy was conceived tant nation into the abyss, that statement on a global basis. Essentially, it called for was on the books as the American air war defensive measures to protect the Western plan. As a top Air Force general has re- Hemisphere and the United Kingdom; marked, “when the time for critical deci- maintenance of strong positions in the Near sion arrived the American concept [of air East, India, and Far East; and protection warfare] was wholly indorsed, completely of sea communications. Offensive strategy accepted, and officially implemented in the was based upon the belief that since Ger- approval of a paper entitled ‘AWPD-1.’”V many was the predominant member of the In very large measure the far-flung action Axis, “the Atlantic and European area is by the Army Air Forces in World War I1 considered to be the decisive theatre.” The was the execution of AWPD/l.+ main effort was to be made there, and The events leading up to the President’s operations elsewhere would be subordinated request of July 1941 had resulted in the to that end. Measures aginst Germany were establishment of a clear strategic picture for to include economic pressure by blockade, the United States. It will be recalled that “a sustained air offensive against German air doctrine during the ’20’s and ’30’s had Military Power,” raids and minor offensives been developed in something of a vacuum; against the continent, and the build-up of existing notions regarding national military $See above, pp. SO-31, 52-53. tttFor a conclse but comprehenslve account of Anglo-Amerlcan policies and prospects were, at best, vague strateelc plannlng In lD41, see The Army Air Forces In World War 11. I. (Chicago. 1948) 135-44. A more comprehenslve treat- Wee above. pp. 107-10. ment of the subject can be found In M. Matloff and Z. M. Snell, taee below, p. 124-a~. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare (Washlngton, 1953). 124 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Preparation of Air Doctrine forces for an eventual land offensive against power of her armies. The Army, however, Germany. All agreements were, of course, tended toward the belief that such measures tentative and subject to approval by the would not bring about the defeat of Ger- respective governments. When war did many and that a major showdown with Ger- come, the over-all strategy adopted was es- man armies on the continent of Europe sentially that of ABC-1. Months before that would be necessary.81 time the War Department had developed Within the War Department it was de- its own detailed war plm, RAINBOW cided that the Army air arm, while still a No. 5, in conformance with the strategy of part of the War Department, would prepare ABC-1; on 14 May 1941 the Joint Army and independently the estimate of air needs re- No. 5 Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW was quired by the President’s directive. The Air approved by the Joint War Plans Division, newly created within Strategy and Plans were therefore well the Air Staff, was assigned this task, and it advanced when President Roosevelt re- opc._&ed as an Air Staff agency, rather than quested the secretaries of War and Navy to as Sbordinate to the General Staff’s War prepare for him “over-all production re- Plans Division, Thus, the plan was wholly quirements required to defeat our potent.ia1 an airman’s document. The members of the enemies,” so that the Office of Production AWPD at this time were fortunately well Management would have a realistic guide in qualified for the crucial job, and the com- planning facilities for national production. mittee which put the plan together con- In compliance, the secretaries presented sisted of graduates of the Air Corps Tactical on 11 September a “Joint Board Estimate School, deeply imbued with the school’s on- of United States Over-all Production Re- cept of airpower. The committee consisted quirements.”sO of Col. Harold L. George, division chief, Lt. The Joint Board correctly believed it Col. Kenneth N Walker, and Majors Lau- impracticable to arrive at any realistic flg- rence S. Kuter and Haywood S. Hansell.e2 ures concerning men and munitions needed Work on the plan (AWPD/l) began on 4 for war without flrst establishing an agreed- August and continued under pressure of upon strategic policy for United States time until 11 August. It was approved in forces. Consequently, the first part of the rapid succession by G-3, WPD, General Ar- Joint Board reply to the President was a nold, General Marshall, Mr. Lovett, and report on the strategy best calculated to Mr. Stimson, and was included in the Joint defeat the enemy; this was followed by Board’s report of 11 September. Probably separate estimates by the Army, the Navy, the demand for speed influenced the situa- and the Army Air Forces of their respective tion; but in any case, the air plan was ac- needs in personnel and materiel. The strate- cepted by the high command virtually with- gical view of the Joint Board was essentially out change although the views expressed in that of ABC-1. In spite of the entrance of it were not entirely consistent with those the Soviet Union into the war on 22 June, of the War Department. On this occasion the board was convinced that Germany and the Air Staff tacitly assumed a position of her allies could not be defeated by the equality with the Army and Navy powers then opposing them. In order to in- Such independence had a significant bear- sure their defeat it would “be necessary ing upon the nature of the doctrine enun- for the United States to enter the war, and ciated and the means proposed for its im- to employ a part of its armed forces in the plementa t ion. Eastern Atlantic and in Europe or Africa.” Analysis of the strategic concept in the The services, however, were in some disa- Joint Board portion of the report reveals a greement as to how these forces should be substantial difference from the air view, as applied. The Navy favored a concentration stated in AWPD/l. The Joint Board, re- on the use of sea and air forces and the flecting predominantly the Army attitude, employment of land forces only in regions emphasized the ultimate necessity for deci- where Germany could not exert the full sive action on the ground. Preparation ol Air Doctrine THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE - 125 Naval and air power may prevent wars centratien of all bombing toward their de- from being lost, and by weakening enemy struction, Precision tactics would be called strength may greatly contribute to victory. for at first, but as morale began to crack, By themselves, however, naval and air forces seldom, if ever, win important wars. area bombing might prove effective.R0 It should be recognized as an almost in- Strategic bombardment theory had de- variable - rule that only land armies can veloped to the point where it was possible finally win wars. for the planners to specify in AWPD/1 the Accordingly, the Joint Board thought that exact target systems, and numbers of tar- an economic blockade was, for the time be- gets, which it would be necessary to destroy ing, the most effective weapon available in order to achieve the general objective. against the Axis. Maintenance of British Four key systems were delineated: electric control in the Middle East and logistical power, transportation, oil, and aircraft support of the Russian front were regarded production; and the number of precision as essential, because they offered the best targets to be destroyed in connection with opportunifies for a successful land offensive each system was given. No specific number against Germany.n4The board envisioned a was given for the attack on civilian morale. strategic defensive in all theaters until the At the proper psychological time the entire build-up of forces permitted a final offensive bombing effort could be shifted to that action. Then, after enemy air and naval It is notable that the target sys- forces had been worn down by attrition, tems delineated in AWPD/1 more nearly and enemy governments had been weakened approximated the postwar recommenda- by subversion and blockade, a decisive task tions of the United States Strategic Bomb- force would be launched in Europe, and ing Survey than did the target program the defensive would be continued in the Far actually followed by the Army Air Forces East. It was anticipated that the defending during the conflict.Hx German forces would be weakened as a re- Since the targets tagged for destruction sult of prolonged air attack on their lines of were nearly all precision targets, it was production and communication, but the clear that the planners would have to knock-out blow would be scored on the call for daylight precision attacks. They groundsR5 posed the next logical question: “Is it feasi- The strategic view of the air leaders ble to make deep penetrations into Ger- varied considerably from the more tradi- man territory and conduct precision bomb- tional military concept just described. Ac- ing without prohibitive losses?” After cording to AWPD/l, the.air mission in Eu- discussing the problem briefly, in light of rope would be offensive from the start; RAF methods and the proved effectiveness operations in support of a ground attack of German fighters and antiaircraft artil- were seen as a subsequent mission only “if it lery, AWPD/1 stated that, “by employing becomes necessary to invade the continent.” large numbers of aircraft with high speed, The analysis of the situation and the pro- good defensive fire power, and high alti- posed plan of air action read like a Tactical tude, it is feasible to make deep penetrations School lecture. The German offensive into Germany in daylight.” Hedging a bit, against Russia, the paper explained, had the paper conceded that escort defensive placed an additional strain upon the Nazi fighters, to close off the rear avenue of ap- economic structure. “Destruction of that proach on the bombers, might be necessary. structure will virtually break down the ca- It concluded, further, that the degree of re- pacity of the German nation to wage war. liability of conducting sustained offensive The basic conception on which this plan is air operations would be “greatly enhanced” based lies in the application of air power by development of an escort fightersnn for the breakdown of the industrial and On the basis of contemplated daylight economic structure of Germany.” The con- operations, the air planners determined eeption involved, the paper continued, what force of aircraft would be required selection of a system of objectives and con- to accomplish the strategic objectives. 126 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Preparation of Air Doctrine AWPD/1 called for 10 groups of medium bomber it supported, slightly higher ppeed, bombers (B-25, B-26), 20 groups of heavies heavy armament in machine guns and can- (B-17, B-24), and 24 groups of very heavy non, and armor for each crew member. The bombers (B-29, B-32). In addition, provision escorts would normally take position on the was made for 44 groups of super-bombers flanks and rear of the bomber formations. (4,000-mile radius), which would operate When enemy fighter attacks developed, the from bases outside of the United Kingdom. escorts would maneuver to defend at the These latter, which were only in the early points under fire; in short, they would at- stages of design,* were seen as an ultimate tempt to form a screen between enemy requirement, although it was believed that fighters and the bombers. The maximum operations should and could be carried on number of escorts required was placed at with smaller planes as an expedient. Only one squadron for each group of bombers.92 10 pursuit groups were specified in AWPD/l This “destroyer” type of escort was to prove for defense of bases in the United Kingdom; unsound in conception; the answer to the this small number was based on the as- problem had to be improvised during the sumption that the RAF would continue to war-single-seaters with extended range.?? provide the main defense of the British Isles Establishment of Army Air Forces (1941) and on the fact that air base facilities were The war not only put Air Corps theories severely limited there. A striking feature of to the test, but it added pressure to the AWPD/1 was the absence of provision for swing toward greater independence for avia- long-range escort fighters. Although some tion. Col. Follett Bradley had predicted pri- of the authors of the plan doubted the vately in 1940 that only a major war could need for them, a stronger reason why they bring about a change in the dependent sta- were not included was the fact that no tus of the air arm; several months before suitable type existed. The planners stated Pearl Harbor a major step in that direction that it was mandatory that an escort fighter was taken by the establishment of the Army be developed without delay-a fighter “with Air Forces, and soon after the close of hos- range comparable to the bomber it sup- tilities, the long-awaited Department of the ports. . . .”Do The fact remained that the Air Force came into being.??? Bradley, not this fighter was not there, and lack was anticipating a war right away, had favored the principal flaw in AWPD/l. The authors the policy of building up the air arm within of the plan were not primarily to blame; the Army, rather than agitating for separa- mistakes in doctrine and judgment in the tion. In this view he differed with Col. Hugh high echelons of the air arm during the Knerr, who urged air leaders “to aggres- preceding decade appear to have been re- sively go after our convictions hammer and sponsible for this shortcoming.? tongs and never give an inch to the War Although General Arnold was to write Department.” Bradley argued that diplo- later that attention had been given to de- macy might win more for aviation than veloping escorts before the war, and that belligerency and suggested “more patience he would have preferred never to have sent and a smoother turn of expression, com- an unescorted bomber over Germany, Gen- bined with envelopment tactics instead of a eral Hansell has stated that the reference in frontal assault.”08No doubt the great ma- AWPD/1 (12 August 1941) was the “first jority of officers shared Bradley’s view; after recognition of the need for escort fighters.”D1 the air expansion program began in 1940, Even at that, it proved to be a belated rec- attention was largely shifted to the prob- ognition of the wrong type of escort. The lems of equipment, training, and growth. plane whose development was urged in $It Is surprlslng to note that. the air planners were even more oblivious to this shortcoming in their tactics after actual AWPD/1 was conceived as a large, heavily experience in bombing Europe. AWPD/42 (9 September 19421 made no reference even to the need for escorts and gave a highly gunned, multiseater. Among the require- optimistic picture of the ability of unescorted bombers to knock down enemy flghters. This view wa8 shortly upset by later raids ments proposed were range equal to the over Germany‘ in one big mission, for example (Schwelnfurt, 14 October 10451 00 unescorted Fortresses were lost, 17 suffered *For initiation of this super-bomber development in June major damage, ind 121 others were hit. (Hansell, lect., 19 Bept. 1940. see above, pp. 119-20. 1051, p. 31: AAF in World War 11. 11. 704.) Wee, especially, pp. 34-36. tttProvlded by terms of the Netional Security Act of 1941. Preparation of Air Doctrine THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 127 Even during the hectic period of wartime 95-5,20 June 1941. This regulation created expansion, however, the idea of greater the Army Air Forces, which was to be di- autonomy was not forgotten. The relation- rected by a chief, who would also be the ships between the GHQ Air Force (created Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. His job, virtu- in 1935) and OCAC continued to be unsatis- ally the one Arnold was already filling in factory. Reference had been made in the practice, was to coordinate all the activities preceding chapter to the fact that admin- of military aviation. Under the jurisdiction istrative unity between the two had been of the Chief, Army Air Forces, were placed established on 1 March 1939, only to be the Chief of the Air Corps (still charged taken away again on 19 November 1940.* primarily with training and materiel) and By the latter act, the GHQ Air Force was the Commanding General, Air Force Com- placed under control of the Army com- bat Command (a redesignation for GHQ mander of field forces; soon afterwards it Air Force). The Chief of the AAF was pro- was placed under GHQ, an agency estab- vided with his own Air Staff, over and above lished at the Army War College in 1940 to the staffs attached to the two major head- assist the Chief of Staff in his capacity as quarters on the echelon below. In addition, commanding general of the field forces. The there was established an Air Council, whose splitting off of the GHQ Air Force from the function was the periodic review and coordi- Air Corps was balanced in some degree by nation of major aviation projects of the the appointment .of General Arnold as Act- Army; it consisted of the Assistant Secre- ing Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. On this tary of War for Air, the Chief of Army Air higher echelon it became possible for Ar- Forces, Chief of the War Plans Division nold to insure greater coordination in avia- (General Staff), Chief of the Air Corps, the tion activities.04 Another assist came from Commanding General of the Air Force Com- the British, but with no deliberate aim on bat Command, and other members as ap- their part. As.mentioned earlier in this pointed by the Secretary. chapter, staff conversations between the Establishment of AAF gave the air arm British and American forces began early in the organization that it was to carry into 1941, as a means of making common plans World War II.?? It was a significant advance against the Axis threat.? When these con- toward autonomy from the less satisfactory ferences took place, there was always a provisions of 1935; General Arnold, filling separate officer to represent the RAF, which several positions in the military hierarchy, was an independent service. The practice was able actually to give strong direction to began of having Arnold attend and sit as the entire air effort. Some difficulties re- the equal of his RAF opposite number. In mained, of course. Division of functions was this manner, although the air chief was still not clear between OCAC and AFCC, legally subordinate to General Marshall, which continued in a coordinate relation- who also attended these conferences, he ship. Likewise, delineation of duties was nevertheless sat with him and Admiral not clear between the Chief, AAF, and the King (Chief of Naval Operations) as a vir- Chief of the Air Corps, and considerable tual equal. The same arrangements were duplication existed among the various staff to prevail in meetings of the Joint Chiefs of agencies.O6 As the war progressed, some of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff .05 these difficulties were straightened out. Secretary Henry L. Stimson, following After the war came the last step on the continued protests from the air arm re- ladder to air independence, achievement of garding divided authority and the need for the Department of the Air Force. Thus was greater autonomy, decided in the early part to be fulfilled one of the earliest and hardest of 1941 to correct the situation. Acting fought principles of American air doctrine: upon general instructions from the Secre- unified control of military aviation by the tary, the Army succeeded in reaching an air leaders themselves. agreement which took specific form in AR $In March 1942 the Internal structure of the AAF was changed; *See above, pp. 105-8. OCAC and AFCC disappeared. being replaced by a Policy Staff, tete above, pp. 128-24. an Operational BtaR, and the variou8 commands. CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

ERTAIN CONCLUSIONS concerning the 3. As early as World War I, the air leaders C development of American air doctrine saw the potential role of airpower in war. in the period 1917-1941 may .readily be The doctrine for actual employment was drawn. They may be summarized as follows: geared largely to technological develop- 1. The view of air leaders regarding the ments. However, all during the period under underlying aim and purpose of war showed study, there was a continual argument with considerable evolution during the period the War Department. The latter viewed air- under study. In 1917 the view corresponded power primarily as a means of independent, to the traditional military concept: war was strategic operations. By 1941, air doctrine seen as an extension of politics, a means of heavily emphasized the strategic offensive final resort, whose aim was to crush enemy role (against enemy airpower and the resistance by physical occupation. By 1941 enemy “national structure”) and slighted the Air Corps teachings described war other functions of airpower (although from largely as the result of the persisting eco- 1939 on there was an increasing emphasis nomic conflict among modern industrialized on the development of close-support doc- nations. Its purpose was seen as the elimi- trine). The air arm also.held that no limits nation of rival production by destruction of should be placed on the range and area of economic facilities or by alteration of the operatiops of military aircraft; in this latter enemy will to produce. connection the Air Corps fought a running 2. The air view of the nature of war- battle with the Navy for the right to fly fare also underwent substantial change. In over the sea. 1917 the air leaders accepted the view of 4. On the question of organization and Napoleon and Clausewitz: warfare consisted control of airpower, there had been agree- properly of the destruction of the enemy’s ment from the beginning on this principle: armed forces. As the potentialities of air- airpower should be developed and controlled power unfolded, the air leaders began to see by airmen, independent of restraints by the new possibilities. At first they saw the air older services. The majority of air leaders becoming a major sphere of combat, in sup- did not favor immediate air independence port of the surface struggle. Then, within a after 1918, but they saw it as ultimately few years, they saw a vision of war almost necessary and worked strenuously in that exclusively in the air; land and sea forces direction. Much of their effort during the could be disregarded while air forces struck period under study was directed against the directly against the hostile will and produc- powerful resistance of the War and Navy tive capacity. The pioneers in this concept departments to any such changes. Logic of warfare were Mitchell and Douhet. By and the course of events were on the side 1941 the Air Corps theory had refined this of the air arm, and virtual autonomy was view; the air offensive would take the form achieved in 1941 with the organization of of a precise attack upon carefully chosen the Army Air Forces. So far as operational key points in the enemy’s national struc- control was concerned, air leaders consist- ture. Collapse of the structure, it was ently put forward the view that air units thought, would lead the enemy population should be held in large, mobile organiza- to surrender. tions-for flexible employment in mass as

128 Preparation of Air Doctrine THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE - 129 the situation required. They opposed the of objectives. This represented a shift from permanent attachment of combat aviation the earlier, World War I idea of major at- to surface armies and the dispersion of tacks at night in a modified area pattern. striking elements. While recognizing the According to the developed theory, heavy need for general coordination of all forces bombers would attack from high altitude by a superior command, they insisted that and in large formations; it was generally immediate control of air units always be believed that their defensive firepower in vested in air commanders. Unfortunately, crossfire would render fighter escort unnec- all of these doctrines were not placed im- essary. While Mitchell and Douhet envis- mediately in effect when American expedi- ioned mass, indiscriminate bombings of tionary forces began major operations in enemy centers, the developed Air Corps North Africa during World War 11. It was theory was highly analytical, selective, and not until 1943 that the Army placed in op- precise. eration the Air Corps doctrine concerning 7. During and immediately after World the control of aviation in connection with War I, air doctrine gave primary place to ground campaigns. pursuit aviation. However, as noted in para- 5. Doctrines governing employment of graph 6 above, pursuit was supplanted by the particular branches of aviation have bombardment as the basic arm after 1930. been affected to some extent by national Whereas pursuit had been conceived origi- strategic policies and the state of tech- nally as a general-purpose, off ensive-def en- nological development. Air Corps theorists, sive weapon for air control, it later was however, did not restrict their thinking to reduced to little more than a weapon of such limiting factors. They developed of- local defense. While some attention was fensive concepts even when such ideas were given to fighter escorts, the type of plane in opposition to national policies. They de- conceived for this function in the late 1930’s veloped plans of employment which could proved unsuccessful. The judgment of pur- be executed only by airplanes not actually suit experts was largely ignored, and the in existence. The air leaders, if anything, development of the disappointing multi- sacrificed application of principles to the seater was allowed to proceed. In this in- practical situation, in favor of development stance, the Air Corps leaders showed a tend- of tactics and materiel for the future. ency to refuse to face the facts and the 6. Doctrines governing bombardment opinions of the men best qualified by expe- aviation showed steady evolution during the rience to judge. Consequently, while period under consideration. By the early America was to lead the world in bombard- 1930’s the bomber replaced pursuit as the ment, she was to fall behind in fighter de- basic arm of the Air Corps. This resulted velopment. largely from the technical advance of the 8. Attack aviation at the close of World large planes over the smaller ones. At one War I appeared to have a promising future, point, theory reached the extreme of as- but the promise was not wholly fulfilled. serting bomber invincibility, and other Air Corps theory gave a strictly secondary types of aircraft were relegated to unimpor- place to support aviation, and insufficient tant roles. The method of strategic bom- stress was placed upon the development of bardment developed in the air arm was appropriate doctrines and materiel. Air that of precision attack in daylight upon leaders held consistently to the notion that pinpoint targets in a predetermined system support forces should be concentrated at 130 -THE DEVELOPMENTOr AIR DOCTRINE Preparation of Air Doctriwe the highest level of operational command, detailed composition and employment of that .they should be employed in mass, and support units. There was failure also to that they should be used only against vul- reach clear-cut agreement on the optimum nerable targets in the rear, beyond the type of'equipment and tactics for ground range of ground fire. However, they did not support. The United States, as a conbe- succeed in working out the precise rela- quence, entered World War I1 with inade- tionships and practical arrangements be- quate preparation in this important branch tween ground and air commanders, or the of military aviation. NOTES INTRODUCTION 26. Arnold, Global Mission, p. 55. 1. George F. Eliot, Bombs Bursting in Air (New 27. Maj. James E. Parker, ACTS lecture, History York, 1939), PP. 11, 13. and Development of Pursuit Aviation, 3 Nov. 1938, P. 9, in USAFHD 4646-65. CHAPTERI 28. Zbid., pp. 10, 12, 20, 23. 1. R. Earl McClendon, Air University Documentary 29. ACTS, Pursuit Aviation, Sept. 1933, p. 111, in Research Study, The Question of Autonomy for USAFHD 4778-6; Air Service Information Cir- the U.S. Air Arm, 1907-1945, I, 1, 6-7 [herein- culars Nos. 72, 73 (12 June 1920), No. 84 (20 after cited McClendon Study]. Sept. 1920), No. 88 (30 June 1920); ASFOS, Training Reg. No. 2. Zbid., I, 99-100. 440-14, 1922. 30. Air Service Information Circular No. 73 (12 3. Zbid., I, 33, citing ltr., Breckenridge to Col. Geo. June 1920) ; ACTS, Pursuit Aviation, Sept. 1933, P. Scriven, 7 Aug. 1913, and 63 Cong. 1 Sess., p. 111. H.R.Hearings on H.R. 5304, pp. 22-23. 31. Ltr. AAS Comdr., 2d Army to C/AS AEF, 18 4. Zbid., I, 34, citing Hearings on H.R. 5304, pp. Dec. 1918, in World War I Orgn. Records, Natl. 6-9. Archives; Air Service Information Circular No. 5. Zbid., I, 35-37, citing Hearings on H.R. 5304, pp. 84, 20 Sept. 1920. 38-40, 50-53, 76-85, 89. 32. ACTS, Pursuit Aviation, Sept. 1933, pp. 84-85. 6. Zbid., I, 40, 43-44, citing 3d ind. (basic un- 33. !bid., p. 10: Unfted States Amy in the World known), CSigO to AG, Feb. 1916. War, 1917-1919 (Washington. 19481, m. 7. Zbid., I, 45-46, citing 64 Cong. 1 Sess., H.R. 229; Mitchell, Tactical Application, p. 2; Air Hearings on Army Approp. Bill, 1917, pp. 838- Service Information Circular No. 72 (12 June 40. 1920) ; AESOS Training Reg. 440-14. 1922. 8. General Services Administration, National Ar- 34. Mitchell, Tactical Application, p. 3, chives, “Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Army Air Forces” (Washington, 1950), 35. AS Bul., vol. 111, No. 101, 9 Apr. 1918, in Air List of Commanding Generals of Air Arm. Service History, AEF, ser. L, VII. 9. McClendon Study, I, 46-48. 36. Bul. of the Info. Sec., Air Service, AEF, vol. 111, no. 132, 16 Apr. 1918, in Air Service History, 10. Interview by author with Col. Marshall H. AEF, ser. L, VII. Quesenberry, Ret., 22 July 1952. 37. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Ret., and Dr. Bruce Hopper, 11. Interview by author with Brig. Gen. Thomas D. “Strategic Bombing,”. in Ten Eventful Years. Milling, Ret., 4 June 1952. ed. Walter Yust (Chicago. 1947), IV, 176; inter- 12. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World views by author with Brig. Gen. Thomas D. War (New York, 1931), 11, 337. Milling, Ret., 4 June 1952; Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Ret., 31 July 1952: Lt. Gen. Harold L. George. 13. 1st ind. (memo for C/S GHQ AEF from C/AS, Ret., 31 July 195% Gen. Joseph T. McNarney; 29 May 1918), C/S to C/AS, 18 June 1918, in- Ret., 5 Aug. 1952. cluded in Air Service Hiutory, American Expedi- tionary Force, Series B, VI, in ‘World War I 38. Maj. Gen. Sir H. M. Trenchard, “Report on the Orgn. Records, Air Serv. Hist. Records, Natl. Independent Air Force,” Tenth Supplement to Archives, Wash., D.C. London Gazette, 1 Jan. 1919, pp. 134-35. 39. Zbid.. pp. 134-36. 14. Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 52. 40. Eaker and George interviews cited in n. 37. 15. Zbid. 41. OC/AS, Night Bombardment Section, June 1918, Milling interview, cited in n. in Air Service History, June 1918, in Air Service 16. 11. History, ser. B, VI: AS Bul., vol. 111, no. 101, 9 17. Mason M. Patrick, The United States in the Apr. 1918, in Air Service History, ser. L, VII. Air (New York, 1928), pp. 49-50. 42. Air Service History, ser. M, 11, 35-66. 18* Air Service* Report Of the Chief Of the 43. William Mitchell, Skyways (Philadelphia, 19301, Air Service, A.E.F. (Washington, 1921), p. 37. P. 278. 19. Maj. Ralph F. Stearley, ACTS lecture, History, 44. Brig. Gen. Haywood s. Hameii, Ret., lecture at Development, Organization, Training, 3 Jan. Air Unjversity, The Development of the U.S. 1939, pp. 8-10, in USAFHD 248.2208B-1. Concept of Bombardment Operations, 16 Feb. 20. William Mitchell, “Air Service at St. Mihiel,” 1951, p. 4. xxxvI1l (August 1919)* 361- 45. Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Air Power-the 64. American ConceDt. n.d.,.- D. 12, in USAFHS Ln. 21. Zbid.. pp. 364-65. Off., Washington, D.C. 22. William Mitchell “Air Service at the Argonne- 46. Col. E. S. Gorrell, “Early History of the Stra- Meuse,” World’s Work, XXXVIII (Sept. ioig), tegical Section, Air Service,” 1919, Air Service 555-58. History, ser. B, VI, 371-72. 23. Zbid., p. 558. 47. Zbid., pp. 373-75. 24. William Mitchell, Tactical Application of Mili- 48. Zbid., PP. 376-77. tary Aeronautics, 5 Jan. 1919, pp. 8.9, in USM 49. Zbid., P. 380. €ID 167.4-1. 50. Zbid., pp. 386-87. 25. Zbid., pp. 9-10. 51. Zbid., pp. 398-400. 131 132 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Notes 52. ACTS lecture cited in n. 19, pp. 6-7. 22. Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, lecture at Army War College, The Army Air Service, 9 Nov. 1925, 53. Mitchell, Tactical Application, pp. 5-6. PP. 8-9, in USAFHD 4743-87. 54. Plan of Employment of Air Service Units, 3d Army, AEF, by command of Maj. Gen. Dickman, 23. Zbid., p. 9. sgd. Malin Craig, C/S, n.d., in Gen. William 24. R. Earl McClendon, Air University Documentary Mitchell Papers, Reports, No. 41, Library of Research Study, The Question of Autonomy for Congress. the U.S. Air Arm, 1907-1945, I, 85-86 Iherefn- after cited McClendon Study]. 55. Isaac D. Levine, Mitchell, Pioneer of Air Power (New York, 1943), PP. 146-48. 25. Ibid.. I, 75-80. 26. Zbid., I, 87-89. CHAPTERI1 27. Zbid., I, 72. 1. Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the 28. Zbid., I, 72-73. President, 1919, (Washington, 1920), p. 68. 29. Zbid., I, 89-90. 2. Ibid.. p. 70. 30. Zbid., I, 91-92. 3. Maj. B. D. Foulois, Statement on Necessity for the Creation of a Department of Aeronautics, 31. Memo for C/S from Maj. Gen. C. T. Menoher, in Jones Collection [a large miscellaneous col- D/AS, 28 July 1919, in Natl. Archives 9520-29, lection of notes on flying history1 Proposal for Army War College, Records of the WDGS, a Separate Air Force, Vol. I, in USAFHD 4726- 1903-1922. 2. 32. Memo for Gen. Menoher from Lt. Col. 0. West- 4. Air Service Notes on Recent Operations, 18 over, 5 May 1919, in Natl. Archives 321.9, T&O June 1919, pp. 1-2, in USAFHD 167.4-7. Div., Div. of Mil. Aero. Records, 1918-1920. 5. Maj. Sherman, Fundamental Doctrine of the 33. Annual Report of the Secretary of War . . .1919, Air Service, 1922, PP. 1-3, in USAFHD 4730- pp. 68-75. 76. 34. Gen. J. J. Pershing to Maj. Gen. Charles T. 6. Air Service, Fundamental Conceptions, 1923, pp. Menoher, 12 Jan. 1920, in Rpt. of D/AS to S/W, 1-2 in USAFHD 4729-78. 1920. 7. Author’s interviews with surviving air leaders. 35. McClendon Study, I, 74-75. 8. Interview by author with Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, 36. Comments received from General Ofacers in Ret., 31 July 1952; Louis A. Sigaud, Douhet and August 1919 in Opposition to Creation of a Aerial Warfare (New York, 1941), pp. iii, 129. Dept. of Aero., in Jones Collection, Proposal for Separate Air Force, I, 1. 9. Interview by author with Brig. Gen. Thomas D. Milling, Ret., 4 June 1952. 37. Zbid., I, 3. 10. Edward Warner, “Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: 38. Ibid., I, 83-84. Theories of Warfare,” in Edward M. Earle, 39. Navy Dept., The Proposal for a Unified Air Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1944), Service, n.s., 1 May 1924, pp. 1-3, in Jones Col- p. 501. lection, Vol. II. 11. H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), 40. WD GO 81, 28 Aug. 1918. P. 122. 41. McClendon Study, I, 97, 99-100. 12. Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, “Air Power vs. 42. Interview by author with Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Sea Power,” American Review of Reviews, LXIII Ret., 31 July 1952. These conclusions are also (Mar. 1921), 277. supported by documentary evidence. 13. Recommendations Concerning the Establish- 43. All of the quotations are from Extract from ment of a Department of Aeronautics, prep. Hearings before Select Committee on Inquiry under direction of Brig. Gen. Wm. Mitchell by into Operations of U.S. Air Services, p. 520, in Col. Townsend F. Dodd, 17 Apr. 1919, p. 4, in Jones. Collection, Vol. IV. Jones Collection, Vol. I. 44. 1st ind. (AG to C/AS, 25 Nov. 1922), Gen. 14. Zbid., PP. 3-5. Patrick to AG, 6 Feb. 1923, in AG Hawaiian 15. Statement of Brig. Gen. Wm. Mitchell, 4 Jan. Dept. (8-8-22), as cited in McClendon Study, I, 1921, P. 21, in Jones Collection, vol. II. 109-10. 16. Warner, “Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky,” p. 498. 45. 3d ind. (AG to C/AS, 18 Dec. 1922)~M* M. patrick to AGO, 7 Feb. 1923, in Rpt of a Corn. 17. William Mitchell, Winged Defense: the Develop- of OAicers Appointed by the S/W. 27 Mar. merit and Possibilities of Modern Air Power 1923, in USAFHD 3794-107; General Statement (New York, 1925), p. 127. of the C/AS, in same Rpt., app. 11, P. 8. 18. Zbid., PP. mi, 126-27. 46. Rpt. cited in n. 45, pp. 3, 5, 6; app. I, p. 4; aPP. VII, p. 3. 19. Brig. Gen. P. R. C. Groves, “For France to An- swer,” Atlantic Monthly, CXXX (Feb. 1g24), 47. McClendon ’*‘13. %-marked COPY found in Wen. Patrick’s File, 48. Ltr., M. M. Patrick to AG, 19 Dec. 1924, P. 3, in 1922-1926,” Records of the Air Service, 1917- USAF’HD 145.91-100. 1926, Natl. Archives. 49. ma., p. 4; Conf. on the Army Air Service, fol- 20. CaPi. Basil H. Liddell-Hart, Paris: Or the lowing lecture by Patrick, 9 NOv. 1925, P. 31 in Future of War (New York, i925), pp. 1-37. USAFXD 4743-87. 21. Zbid., PP. 31-37. 50. McClendon Study, I, 113-16. Notes THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE - 133- 51. Zbid., I, 117-19. 74. Wm. Mitchell, “Air Power vs. Sea Power,” 52. Comments on Gen. Patrick’s Proposal for an American Review of Reviews, LVIII, (Mar. Air Corps, n.s., n.d. (stamped PLANS DIVI- 1921), 273-77, and Rpt. of Bombing Maneuvers SION) pp. 1-2, in Jones Collection, Vol. 11. OffCape Hatteras, 5 Sept. 1913, PP. 1, 22, in Reports No. 29, Mitchell Papers. McClendon Study, I, 119-21. 53. 75. Extracts from rpt. of Joint Army and Navy 54. Zbid., I, 122-24. Board, 18 Aug. 1921, in memo for Exec. from 55. WD Air Omcers on the General Staff, 19 Jan. Lt. Col. J. E. Fechet, C/T&O GP., 18 Oct. 1921, 1926, in USAFHD 145.91-100. in Natl. Archives 660.2 - Coast Defense, Div. of Mil. Aero Records, 1918-1920. See also State- 56. McClendon Study, I, 132-37. ment of Brig. Gen. H. A. Drum before House 57. The Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-1931, p. 1, Comm. on Mil. Affairs. . . , pp. 63-64, in Reports, in USAFHD 245.01; Training and Testing, at AA No. 36, Mitchell Papers. FSAT, Nov. 1942-Oct. 1943, Air Defense, I, 1-3; 76. Mitchell, Rpt. of Bombing Maneuvers Off Cape interview by author with Gen. J. T. McNarney, Hatteras, pp. 23-24; Air Service, Statement of Ret., 5 Aug. 1952. Brig. Gen. Wm. Mitchell, Asst. C/AS, 4 Jan. 58. Interview by author with Gen. J. T. McNarney, 1921, p. 15. Ret., 5 Aug. 1952 and Maj. Gen. E. B. Lyon, 77. Memo for AC/S WPD from M. M. Patrick, 10 3 June 1952; ltr., Maj. Gen. C. L. Chennault, Nov. 1921, p. 3. Ret., to author, 4 Aug. 1952. 78. Annual Rpt, C/AS, p. 89. 59. Interview by author with Brig. Gen. T. D. Mil- ling, Ret., 4 June 1952. 79. Ltr., Bd. of Army and Navy OWcers relative to development of the aeronautical service to S/N, 60. Interview by author with Maj. Gen. Walter H. 12 Mar. 1917, in Jones Collection, Misc. File re Frank, Ret.; 5 June 1952; Brig. Gen. H. S. Han- Air Matters. sell, 7 June 1952. 80. Air Service, Extract from Kilbourne Rpt. on 61. William Mitchell, The Mission of an Air Force Coast Defense, p: A, in USAFHD 167.4-16. in the Military Organization of the U.S. (draft of article, n.d.), in Reports, No. 31, Mitchell 81. Ltr., M. M. Patrick to AG, [?I July 1923, in Papers, Library of Congress. Jones Collection, Misc. File re Air Matters. 62. Lyon interview cited in n. 58; Sherman, Funda- 82. Ltr., M. M. Patrick to AG, 19 Dec. 1924, p. 3, mental Doctrine of the Air Service, p. 8; Air in USAFHD 145.91-100. Service, Fundamental Conceptions, prep. under 83. Wm. Mitchell, Rpt. of Bombing Maneuvers Off dir. of C/AS, 1923, p. 2, in USAFHD 4729-78. Cape Hatteras, p. 24. This point is also conflrmed by reference to War Department fleld service regulations and 84. Memo for Capt. Maxfield cited in n. 73. training manuals. 85. Mitchell, “Air Power us. Sea Power,” p. 277. 63. Mitchell, The Mission of an Air Force. . . . 86. Mitchell, Winged Defense. p. xvi. 64. William Mitchell, Tactical Application of Mili- 87. Sherman, Fundamental Doctrine of the Air tary Aeronautics, 5 Jan. 1919, P. 11, in USAFHD Service, 1922, p. 11, 13. 167.4-1; Air Service, Statement of Brig. Gen. Wh. Mitchell, Asst. C/AS, 4 Jan. 1921, p. 2, in 88. Air Service, Notes on Recent Operations, p. 80, Jones Collection, vol. 11. in USAFHD 167.4-7. 65. M. M. Patrick, Air Force Tactics, Nov. 1923, pp. 89. Mitchell, Tactical Application of Military Aero- 2-3, in Natl. Archives, Gen. Patrick’s File, 1922- nautics, pp. 1-2. 1926, Records of the Air Service, 1917-1926. 90. Air Service, Statement of Brig. Gen. Wm. Mitch- 66. Edward J. Cassidy, The Air Service Question, ell, 4 Jan. 1921, p. 2; Mitchell, Our Air Force 1925, p. 5. (New York, 1921). p. 46. 67. McNarney interview cited in n. 57; ltr., Gen. 91. Air Service, Fundamental Conceptions, p. 13. George C. Kenney to author, 22 Oct. 1952. 92. Air Service, Notes on Recent Operations, p. 81. 68. Air Service, Notes on Recent Operations, 18 June 1919, pp. 21, 63; Group Program for the 93. M. M. Patrick, Air Force Tactics, p. 10, and lec- Year 1921 of the T&O Group, with attached ltr. ture by Patrick at Franklin Institute, 17 Sept. of approval by C/AS, 29 Jan. 1921, in Natl. 1924, both in Natl. Archives, in Gen. Patrick’s Archives 321.9-T&0 Div., Div. of Mil. Aero. Rec- file. ords, 1918-1920; Air Service, Fundamental Con- ceptions, pp. 2-3. 94. ACTS, Pursuit Aviation, Sept. 1933, p. 12, in USAFHD_. 4778-6. 69. Cod. on Army Air Service, cited in n. 49. 95. 2d ind. (ltr., Maj. W. H. Frank, Exec., OCAC 70. Air Service, Fundamental Conceptions, pp. 8-9. to co Ellington Fld, 20 Jan. 1922), Maj. Carl 71. Memo for AC/S WPD from M. M. Patrick, 10 Spaah to c/AC, 7 Feb. 1922, in Natl. Archives Nov. 1921, P. 1, in Jones Collection, vol. I. 452.1, Airplanes, Gen., Correspondence, 1918- 1935, Records of the Air Corps, 1917-1942. 72. M. M. Patrick, Ft. Leavenworth Lecture, 27 Mar. 1924, in Natl. Archives, Gen. Patrick’s mie. 96. Am, The Oncia1 Pictorial History of the AAF Records of the Air Service. 1917-1926. (New York, 1947), P. 189.

Aeronautics, pp. 11-12; memo for Capt. Max- 98. M. M, patrick Air Force Tactics, 14-19. field, AS USN, from Brig. Gen. Wm. Mitchell, PP. 5 Feb. 1920, in Natl. Archives 660.2 - Coast De- gg. Air Service, Fundamental Conceptions. PP. 6-7: fense, Div. of Mil. Aero. Records, 1918-1920. AAF,Pictorial History, PP. 196-197. 134 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Notes 100. AHS-6, The Development of the Heavy 452.1; 2d ind. (to above memo), CO 2d Bomb. Bomber, 1918-1944, pp. 63-64, 66. Wg. to C/AC, 9 June 1928. 101. Zbid. 6. Zbid., p. 9, citing memo for C/MD from C/AC, 27 June 1928, in AAG 452.1. 102. Air Service, Fundamental Conceptions, p. 14; Patrick, Air Force Tactics, pp. 10-11; ltr., Maj. 7. Ibid.. D. 9. citing memo for C/MD from CO 2d Gen. Claire Chennault, Ret., to author, 4 Aug. Bomb.-Gp., 15 Feb. 1929 and 2d ind. (memo for 1952. C/MD from C/AC, 2 Feb. 1929), C/MD to C/AC, 15 Jan. 1930, both in AAG 452.1. 103. Air Service, Fundamental Conceptions, p. 14; Air Service, Notes on Recent Operations, p. 95; 8. AAF, The Pictorial History of the AAF (New ltr., Chennault to author cited in n. 102; ltr.; York, 1947), pp. 183-84. Gen. George C. Kenney, Ret., to author, 22 9. AHS-6, p. 70. Oct. 1952. 10. Zbid., pp. 70-72, citing Proceedings Bd. of Of- 104. Air Service, Fundamental Conceptions, P. 14; flcers, 26 Oct. 1932, in AAG 452.1, Directive; ltrs., Chennault to author, cited in n. 102, and MD, Annual Report, (1932), p. 11. Kenney to author, cited in n. 103. 11. AHS-6, p. 72; “A Proud and Imposing Rec- 105. TWX, Mitchell to D/AS, 6 Nov. 1919, in Natl. ord,” Aero Digest, vol. 54 (April 1947), 143. Archives 472, Armanent, Div. of Mil. Aero. Records, 1918-1920; ltr., Kenney to author, 12. AHS-6,PP. 72-74. cited in n. 103; AAF, Pictorial History, pp. 13. Zbid.. pp. 74-76; Pictorial History. p. 198. 200-20 1. 14. Interview by author with Maj. Gen. Walter H. 106. TR 440-15, 26 Jan. 1926, p. 1. Frank, Ret., 5 June 1952; Pictorial History. PP. 107. Ibid., p. 2. 78-79. 108. Zbid., pp. 5, 7-8. 15. Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), pp. 154-57. 109. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 16. 14-15, 77. 110. ASTS, Bombardment, PP. 54, 67, 72, as cited AHS-6,PP. in The AAF in World War ZZ (Chicago, 1948), 17. ACTS, The Doctrine of the Air Force, n.d.; ltr. I, 45-46. of transmittal, C. C. Culver to C/AC, 30 Apr. 111. S. 1928; 1st ind. (ltr., C. C. Culver to C/AC, 9 June Maj. Gen. L. Kuter, Air Power-the Ameri- 1928), C/AC to Comdt. ACTS, 1 Sept. 1928, in can Concept, n.d., P. 21, in Ln. Off.,USAFHD, Natl. Archives 321.9, Doctrines of the AAC, Washington, D.C. Central Decimal Ale, AM, 1917-1938. 112. ASTS, Employment Combined Air 6 of Force, 18. Louis A. Sigaud, Douhet and Aerial Warfare Apr. 1926, p. 1. (New York, 1941), pp. vii-ix. 113. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 19. Zbid., pp. 9-10, 14. 114. Zbid., p. 16. 20. Zbid., pp. 20-24; Col. Charles deF. Chandler, 115. Zbid., pp. 11-12. Ret., “Air Warfare Doctrine of Gen. Douhet,” U.S. Air Services, May 1933 (mimeographed re- 116. Zbid., pp. 23-25. production), in USAFHD 145.93-13; Giulio 117. Zbid., pp. 27-29. Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Din0 Ferrari (New York, 1942). 118. Ibid., pp. 31-33. 21. Edward Warner, “Douhet, Mitchell, and Sever- sky . . . ,” in Edward M. Earle, Makers of Mod- CHAPTER111 ern Strategy (Princeton, 1944), pp. 495-97. 1. These general statements are based upon a 22. For instance, Louis A. Sigaud dedicated his consensus expressed in interviews by the author book to “General William Mitchell, the Ameri- with the following air officers: Maj. Gen. W. H. can Douhet.” Frank, Ret., 5 June 1952; Brig. Gen. Hume 23. Warner, “Douhet, Mitchell, and Seversky , . . ,” S Peabody, Ret., 9 June 1952: Brie. Gen.- .__. --.H - . pp. 498-99. Hansell, 7 June 1952; Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson, Ret., 21 July 1952; Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Ret., 24. Mitchell, Airplanes in National Defense,” An- nals of Amer. Academy of Pol. Science, vol. 131 31 July 1952; Lt. Gen. H. L. George.- , Ret.. 31 July 1952. See also attachment to- memo’&; (May 1927), 39, 42. AS/W, Procurement Program for the Air Corps 25. Mitchell, Strategy of the PaciAc, 1928, p. 2. In from 1940 to 1945, 24 Nov. 1937, cited in Cra- Articles, No. 19, Mitchell Papers, Library of ven and Cate, eds., The AAF in World War ZZ, Congress. I (Chicago, 1948), 60. 26. Mitchell, Skyways (Philadelphia, 1930) , pp. 253- 2. AHS-6, The Development of the Heavy 55. Bomber, 1918-1944, P. 67, citing memo for C/MD 27. Mitchell, Notes for Article, 27 Jan. 1935, in from C/AC, 31 Mar. 1927, in AAG 452.1 Di- Articles, No. 24, Mitchell Papers. rective. 28. Interview by author with Eaker, 31 July 1952. 3. Zbid., PP. 67-68, citing 1st ind. (memo for H. C. Other officers interviewed on this question were Pratt from Lt. H. H. George, 21 May 1928), Brig. Gen. T. D. Milling, 4 June 1952; Gen. J. Maj. Hugh Knerr to CO 2d Wg., 2 June 1928, T. McNarney, Ret., 5 Aug. 1952; Brig. Oen. H. in AAG 452.1. S. Hansell, 7 June 1952; Maj. Oen. W. H.Frank, 4. Zbid., p. 8. Ret., 5 June 1952; Maj. Oen. E. B. LYOn, 3 June 1952; Lt. Oen. H. L. George, Ret., 31 July 5. Ibid., PP. 8-9, citing 1st ind. (memo for CO 2d 1952; Brig. Oen. Hume Peabody, Ret.. 9 June WK. from C/AC, 28 May 1928), CO 2d Bomb. 1952; and Lt. Oen. Delos Emmons, Ret., 12 July OP.to CO 2d Bomb. Wg., 2 June 1928, in AAO 1952. Notes THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 135

~~ 29. Ltr., Foulois to McSwain, 9 May 1933, in USAF- 1928), C/AC to Comdt. ACTS, 1 Sept. 1938, HD 145.93-13,ACIAC Plans, Misc. folder. both in Natl. Archives 321. 9, Doctrines . . . , 30. Sigaud, Douhet, p. viii. This was the same trans- Central Decimal File, AAF, 1917-1938. lation that General Foulois sent to Rep. Mc- 56. ACTS, Air Force, 1933-1934, p. 2, in USAFHD Swain. 4625-3. 31. Maj. Gen. L. S. Kuter, Air Power-the American 57. ACTS, Air Force, Feb. 1935, in USAFHD Concept, pp. 2-3, in Ln. Off., USAFHD, Wash- 4624-120. ington, D.C. 58. Chandler article cited in n. 20, p. 4; ACTS, A 32. Chandler article cited in n. 20. Study of Proposed Air Corps Doctrine. 33. In 1941 Louis A. Sigaud published his Douhet 59. Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 20, 26. and Aerial Warfare, drawing from the original 60. Capt. C. L. Chennault, Role of Defensive Pur- writings. In 1942 the standard English edition suit, 1933, p. 4, in USA- 4589-9. of Douhet’s major works, translated by Din0 Ferrari, appeared. 61. Zbid., p. 7. Rpt. GHQ AF (Prov.), in Rpt. of C/S, 34. Interview by author with Maj. Gen. D. S. Wil- 62. of 1933, son, Ret., 21 July 1952; Arnold, Global Mission, 1933, p. 3. P. 157. 63. 1st Lt. K. N. Walker, lecture, Bombardment 35. ACTS, Air Force, pp. 2, 3-7, 9-11, in USAFHD Aviation-Bulwark of National Defense, pp. 4633-38. 5-6, 11, in USAFHD 4633-4. 36. ACTS, A Study of Proposed Air Corps Doctrine, 64. Capt. H. L. George, Testimony. . . , May 1935, 31 Jan. 1935, in Natl. Archives 321.9, Doctrines in USAFHD 4666-1B. . . . , Central Decimal File, AAF, 1917-1938. 65. Wilson interview, cited in n. 1. 37. Maj. Donald Wilson, Testimony before Fed. 66. ACTS, The Air Force, Apr. 1930, p. 70. Aviation Comm., (date on mimeographed copy, 67: Ltr., Maj. Gen. Grandison Gardner to author, May 1935), PP. 1-2, in USAFHD 4666-1B. 21 Aug. 1952; Wilson interview, cited in n. 1. 38. Capt. H. L. George, Brief of Testimony pre- 68. Lecture, Brig. Gen. H. S. Hansell, Development sented to the Fed. Aviation Comm. (date on of the US. Concept of Bombardment Opera- mimeographed cofiy, May 1935), pp. 1-3, in tions, 16 Feb. 1951, p. 6. USAFHD 4666-1B. 69. Mitchell, “Airplanes in National Defense,” pp. 39. Wilson, Testimony . . . , pp. 4, 7. 40-41. 40. This summary is drawn from study of the 70. Interviews by author with Eaker, George, Wil- documents and also from interviews by the son, and Hansell, cited in n. l. author with Bfaj. Gen. E. B. Lyon; Brig. Gen. 71. Craven and Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in T. D. Milling, Ret., Brig. Gen. Hume Peabody, World War ZZ, I (Chicago, 1947), 598, citing Ret.; Lt. Gen. H. L. George, Ret.; Lt. Gen. ASTS, Bombardment, p. 62. Delos Emmons, Ret.; and Gen. J. T. McNarney, 72. Zbid., pp. 598-99, citing memo for Col. W. J. Ret.; as cited in notes 1 and 28; also, ltr., Maj. Paul from Dr. Chauncey E. Sanders, sub.: Re- Gen. C. L. Chennault to author, 4 Aug. 1952; Arnold, Global Mission, p. lationship of the Development of AAF Bombing 157. Doctrine to the Development of the Modern 41. ACTS, The Air Force, Apr. 1930, p. 110, in Bombsight, Mar. USAFHD 10 1947. 4775-21A. 73. Wilson and George interviews, cited in n. 1. 42. Memo for the Asst. Comdt., AWC from Capt. 0. W. Kenney, 29 Apr. 1933, p. 1, in USAFHD 74. ACTS, Air. Force, Feb. 1935, pp. 1-8,in USAFHD 4743-75. 4775-30. 43. ACTS, Study of Proposed Air Corps Doctrine. 75. AAF in World War ZI, I, 598, citing ASTS. A Bombardment, p. 62. 44. Wilson, Testimony . . . , pp. 7, 13. 76. ACTS, The Air Force, Apr. 1930, pp. 52, 56. 45. These Conclusions are based upon testimony of former leading instructors at ACTS : interviews 77. Zbid., pp. 64-65. with Eaker, George, Hansell, and Wilson, cited 78. Peabody interview, cited in n. 1; C. L. Chen- in n. 1. nault, Comments on Letter to C/AC, dtd. 26 46. ACTS, The Air Force, Feb. 1931, pp. 2-3, in Nov. 1934, sub.: Employment of Tactical Units USAFHD 4775-9A. with Modern Pursuit and Bombardment Planes, 7 Mar. 1935, p. 1, in USAFHD 4686-35 A & B, 47. ACTS, Air Force, 1934-1935, p. 6, in USAFHD Pursuit Aviation folder. 4775-30. 79. Chandler article cited in n. 20, pp. 4-5. 48. ACTS, The Air Force, Feb. 1931, PP. 7-10. 80. Ltr., Chennault to author, 4 Aug. 1952; Chen- 49. Zbid.. ppI 13-14; ACTS, Air Force, 1934-1935, nault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 20-21, 26. lecture on Principles of War Applied to Air Zbid., P. Force Action, p. 5. 81. 22. 82. Ltr., H. H. Arnold to C/AC, 26 Nov. 1934, p. 17, 50. ACTS, The Air Force, Feb. 1931, PP. 14-15. in USAFHD 4633-111. 51. Ibid., P. 16; ACTS, Employment of Combined 83. Rpt. of GHQ AF (Prov.), 1933, in Rpt. of the Air Force, 1925-1926, pp. 6-8. C/S, 1933, p. 12. 52. Mitchell, Skyways, P. 278. 84. Chennault, Comments . . . ,” cited in n. 78, pp. 53. Claire L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New 1-2, 4-6. York, 1949), p. 27. 85. Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 22. 54. This conclusion is generally confirmed even 86. Memo for C/S, sub.: Munitions Requirements by the ofacers who gave the strongest support for the AAF, n.d., n.s., (attached to AWPD/l, to bombardment, e.g., Wilson, George, and 12 Aug. 1941), pp. 2-3, in USAFHD 145.82-1; Hansell, as well as by Chennault. AAF in World War ZI, I, 600. 55. ACTS, The Doctrine of the Air Force, n. d.; 87. Lecture at Air Univ., 19 Sept. 1951, p. 23. 1st ind. (ltr., C. C. Culver to C/AC, 9 June 88. Hansell, lecture cited in n. 68, p. 8. 136 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE Notes 89. These observations are based upon wide ex- 126. Joint Board/349 her. 273). 1 Dec. 1926, ap- amination of available documents and inter- proved by S/W, 8 Dec. 1926, in USAFHD, views by the author with Hansell, Frank, Mc- AC/AS Plans, Aero. Bd. Action. Narney, George, Eaker, Wilson, and Lyon. Also 127. Ltr., S/W to President, 22 Aug. 1930, in AAO letters to author from Gardner and Kenney. 323.5 (Special), cited in USAFHS-6, p. 134. 90. Memo, ACTS, Langley Fld., Va., sub.: Pursuit 128. Annual Rpt. of the C/S in Rpt. of the S/W to Conference, 15 Apr. 1929, pp. 1, 12-13, in the President, 1931, p. 38. USAFHD 4686-35A & B, Pursuit Aviation folder. 129. Gen. D. MacArthur, Statement on Coastal 91. Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 19-20, 29-30; Defense, 25 May 1932, cited in The Army Air ltr.. Chennault to author. 4 Aun. 1952. Forces in World War IZ, I, 62. 92. ACTS, Pursuit Aviation, Sept. 1933, pp. 111-12, in USAFHD 4778-6. 130. AAF in World War ZZ, I, 62-63; ltr., Douglas MacAuthur to CG’s of armies, etc., 3 Jan. 1933, 93. Zbid., pp. 113-14, 118. AG 660.2 (7-7-32), copy in USAFHD 4633-111. 94. Summary of answers to certain questions re pursuit aviation . . , , 19 Jan. 1934, in USAFHD 131. AAF in World War ZZ, I, 63-64. 4647-121, Instructors Conf. folder. -32. AHS-6,PP. 135-36 and app. A, note 18. 95. Memo cited in n. 90, p. 6. 133. Joint Board 350 (ser. 514), Joint Action of 96. ACTS, Pursuit Aviation, Sept. 1933, pp. 10-11, the Army and Navy, 1935, pp. 17-18. 33-34, 84-85. 134. Memo for Gen. Craig from Andrews, 25 Nov. 97. Zbid., 35-37, 45. 1935, in Personal F’ile-C/S, Andrews Papers, 98. Ibid.. pp. 44-45, 47-48, 76-77. Library of Congress. 99. Zbid.. p. 37. 135. R. Earl McClendon, Air University Document- 100. Chennault, Way of Fighter, p. 23. tary Research Study, The Question of Auto- a nomy for the U.S. Air Arm, 1907-1945, I, 101. Chennault, Role of Defensive Pursuit, 1933, 138-39. pp. 14-21. 136. James M. Spaight, The Beginnings of Organ- 102. Zbid., Pp. 22-23. ized Air Power (New York, 1927). 103. Memo cited in n. 90, p. 15. 137. 1st Lt. K. N. Walker. Testimony before Fed. 104. ACTS, The Air Force, Feb. 1931, p. 106. Avn. Comm., (sum. dtd. May 1935), pp. 1, 3, 105. Zbid., pp. 12-14. 5-6, 9, in USAFHD 4666-1B. 106. Zbid., pp. 15-16; Chennault, Way of a Fighter, 138. Rpt. of Spec. Com., Gen Council, 011 Employ- PP. 24-25; ltr., Chennault to author, 4 Aug. ment of AAC, 11 Aug. 1933, in USAFHD 1952. 145.93-47, Drum Board envelope. 107. Pictorial History of AAF. p. 191. 139. Final Report of War Department Special Com- 108. Chennault, Comments on Letter to C/AC . . . , mittee on Army Air Corps (Washington, 1934), cited in n. 78, pp. 7-8. PP. 13-17. 109. 3d ind. (Capt. Harry A. Johnson, C&GSS to 140. Capt. R. M. Webster, A Statement Presented C/AC, 18 Jan. 1935), Air Corps Bd. to C/AC, to the Fed. Avn. Com., (sum. dtd. May 1935), 15 July 1935, in Dept. Records Br. [DRBl p. 24, in USAFHD 4666-1B. 452.1, Pursuit Planes, Cent. Dec. File. AAF, 141. Capt. H. L. George, Brief of Testimony Pre- 1917-1938, AGO, Alexandria, Va. sented to the Fed. Avn. Com., (sum dtd. May 110. Wilson interview, cited in n. 1. 1935), pp. 8-9, in USAFHD 4666-1B. 111. 8th ind. (basic missing), AG to C/AC, 19 142. Prepared statement of Navy Dept. in answer Nov. 1935, and attached statement, in Natl. to general questions from Fed. Avn. Comm. Archives 452.1 Airplanes, Gen., Security Class. (no title shown on typescript copy), Aug. Records, Correspondence, 1936-1942, Records 1934, p. 25, in USAFHD 145.93-97. of the Air Corps, 1917-1942. 143. ACTS. The Air Force, Apr. 1930, pp. 22-23. 112. Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 29. 144. Rpt. of Fed. Avn. Comm., Sen. Doc. No. 15, 113. This statement represents the consensus of 74 Cong. 1 sess, 31 Jan. 1935, pp. 119-20. all air ofacers interviewed by the author. 145. McClendon Study, 11, 151-52. 114. Ltr., Gen. G. C. Kenney, Ret., to author, 22 146. Zbid., 11, 153-57. Oct. 1952. 147. Zbid., 11, 157-63. 115. Ltr., Chennault to author, 4 Aug. 1952. 148. Zbid.. 11, 165-67. 116. Wilson interview, cited in n. 1. 149. Zbid., 11, 168-69; Andrews, The GHQ Air 117. Ltr., Kenney to author, 22 Oct. 1952; ACTS, Force, lect. at AWC, Oct. 9, 1937, p. 1, in Attack Aviation, 2 Jan. 1934, p. 3, in USAFHD 4743-61. USAFHD 4775-62B. 150. Doctrines of the Army Air Corps, pp. 5-6, 118. Interview by author with Col. Marshall H. attached to memo from Brig. Gen. C. E. Quesenberry, Ret., 22 July 1952; ltr., Kenney Kilbourne, 21 Dec. 1934, in US- 4633-109. to author, 22 Oct. 1952. 151. Zbid., pp. 6-10. 119. Pictorial History of the AAF, p. 200. 152. File 321.9, Doctrines of the AAC, Jan.-Oct. 120. ACTS, Attack Aviation, 2 Jan. 1934, pp. 12-13. 1935, in Natl. Archives, Central Decimal File, 121. Pictorial History. DD. 200-201. AAF, 1917-1938. 122. Zbid.. p. 201; ACTS Attack Aviation, 2 Jan. 153. TR 440-15, Employment of the Air Forces of 1934, pp. 13-14. the Army, 15 Oct. 1935, p. 5, in 062.12 (8-27- 123. Mitchell, “Airplanes in National Defense, p. 30), in Natl. Archives, Central Decimal File, 39. AGO, 1916-1939. 124. Chennault, Role of Defensive Pursuit, p. 3. 154. McClendon Study, 11, 172-73. 125. Min. mtg., Aero. Bd. 22 Nov. 1926, in USAFHD 155. Zbid., 11, pp. 169-72; interviews by author with 145.93-94 AC/AS Plans. Aero. Bd. Action. Peabody, Milling, Lyon, Frank, and Hansell. Notes THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 137 CHAPTERIV 27. Air Corps Bd. Study No. 35, Employment of 1. This contingency. labeled RED or RED- Aircraft in Defense of the Continental U.S., 7 ORANGE, was regarded as real enough to be May 1939, annex 111, p. 5, in USAFHD 167.5- recognized in basic war plans until 1938. It was 35. omcially excluded by ltr., AG to CG GHQ AF, 28. Ltr., Maj. Clayton Bissell to Capt. James E.. 29 Jan. 1938, in Natl. Archives 381, War Plans, Parker, 8 Sept. 1936, pp. 1-5, in USAFHD 4647- Security Classified Records, 1936-1942, Records 137. of the Air Corps, 1917-1942. 29. See, for example, the recommendations in memo 2. Air Corps Bd, Rpt. of the Air Corps Bd, Study for S/W from Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, C/AC. No. 44, Air Corps Mission under the Monroe 12 Nov. 1937, P. 2, in Woodring Program, AC/AS Doctrine, 17 Oct. 1938, p. 3, in USAFHD 3794-44. Plans; exhibit “E,” attached to ltr., Maj. Gen. 3. ACTS, A Study of Air Defense of the Western F.M. Andrews to AS/W, 24 Nov. 1937, in Per- Hemisphere, 12 May 1939, Synopsis, p. 7, in sonal File, C/S, Andrews Papers, Library of USAFHD 145.93-142. Congress. 4. Ibid.. Synopsis, p. 10A. 30. Alexander P. de Seversky, Victory Through Air 5. ACTS lecture. The Functions of Air Power in Power (New York, 1942). Our National’Strategy, 25 Sept. 1935, pp. 1-6, 31. Final Rpt. of the Air Corps Bd. on Revision of in USAFHD 4624-30A. the Five-Year Experimental Program, 23 June 6. ACTS lecture, Mar. 1935, p. 5, in USAFHD 4775- 1939, in DRB, Lyon File Book 13, AAF Records. 30. 32. Ltr., Col. M.F. Harmod to Brig. Gen. B.K. 7. Ibid., p. 1. Yount, OCAC, 25 Nov. 1939, in DRB 452.1, Pur- 8. Ibid.. PP. 2-3. suit Planes, Central Decimal File, AAF, 1939- 1942. 9. Memo attached to ltr., H.S. Hansell to Fairchild, 15 Aug. 1939, in USAFHD 4640-16, Incoming 33. ACTS, Pursuit Aviation, Sept. 1939, p. 67. in Memos, ACTS Ale. USAFHD 4777-113B. 10. ACTS, Discussion-Quiz, 1936-1937, p. 2, in 34. Capt. E.E. Partridge, ACTS lecture, Support of USAFHD. Air Forces, 13 Dec. 1939, P. 9, in USAFKD 4646- 82. 11. ACTS lecture, The Primary Objective of Air Forces, 13 Apr. 1936, pp. 6-10, in USAFHD 4624- 35. ACTS lecture, Pursuit in Direct Support of 80; ACTS, Quiz-Air Warfare, pp. 1-4, 2 Mar. Ground Forces, p. 19, in USAFHD 4646-83B. 1939, in USAFHD 4621-55. 36. ACTS, Pursuit Aviation, Sept. 1939, p. 65. 12. Maj. M.S. Fairchild, ACTS lecture, Air Power 37. Memo for Col. Harmon from Lt. Col. Donald and Air Warfare, 1938-1939, in USAFHD 4621- Wilson, 6 June 1939, pp. 5, 7-8, in USAFHD 55. 4633-59A. 13. ACTS, The Primary Objective of Air Forces, 38. Ibid., p. 8. pp. 12-14. 39. Harmon to Yount, 25 Nov. 1939. 14. Ltr., Capt. R.M. Webster to D/Air Tactics and 40. ACTS lecture, Pursuit Employment, 20 Feb. Strategy, 21 Dec. 1935, in USAFHD 4640-17, 1939, P. 3, in USAFHD 4646-73A. Outgoing Memos, ACTS. 41. Ltr., Bissell to Capt. J. E. Parker, 8 Sept. 1936, 15. Memo for Asst. Cmdt. AWC from Maj. W. R. pp. 4-5. Carter, Employment of Army Air Forces, 12 Apr. 1938, in Natl. Archives 321.9, Doctrines of 42. ACTS lecture, Pursuit in General Defense, 12 the AAC, Central Decimal File, AAF, 1917-1938. Dec. 1938, pp. 3-4. 16. Andrewa lecture, 1 Oct. 1938, PP. 20-21, in Natl. 43. ACTS Pursuit Aviation, Sept. 1939, pp. 70-97, Archives 352.13, Lectures, Records of the Air in USAFHD 4777-113B. Corps, 1917-1942. 44. Ibid., pp. 99-102. 17. Memo for S/W from Westover, 12 Nov. 1937, 45. De Seversky, Victory Through Air Power. P. 2, in USAFHD 145.93-23, Woodring program 46. Description of the P-40 is given in The Ol%cial folder, AC/AS Plans. Pictorial History of the AAF (New York, 1947), 18. John C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (London, p. 192. 1936). 47. Interviews by author with Gen. Joseph T. Mc- 19. Hansell, 1ecti:re at Air War College, Air Univ.. Narney, Ret., 5 Aug. 1952, and Lt. Gen. Delos The Development of the U.S. Concept of Bom- Emmons, 21 July 1952. bardment Operations, 19 Sept. 1951, pp. 10- 48. Ltr., Gardner to author, 21 Aw. 1952. 12. 49. Interview by author with Eaker, 31 July 1952. 20. Ltr., Brig. Gen. H.C. Pratt to Col. Harry B. 50. Emmons interview; interview by author with Jordan, 19 Apr. 1938, in USAFHD 4640-17, Out- Maj. Gen. Walter Frank, 5 June 1952. going Memos, ACTS. 51. Ltr., Bissell to Parker, 8 Sept. 1936, pp. 6-7. 21. For another example, see ltr., Maj. M.S. Fair- 52. Memo for Asst. Cmdt. ACTS, from D/Dept. of child to Maj. G.V. McPike, 28 Sept. 1939, in Air Tactics, 30 Sept. 1937, in USAFHD 4647- USAFHD 4640-17, Outgoing Memos, ACTS. 111; 3d ind. (ltr., CG GHQ AF to C/AC, 16 Mar. 22. Interview by author with Eaker, 31 JrJy 1951. 1938), C/AC to C/MD, 15 June 1938, in DRB 23. H. H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, This Flying 452.1. Pursuit Planes, Central Dec. File, AAF, Game (New York, 1938), PP. 130, 135-39. 193911942. 53. Huie, The Fight for Air Power, 89-91, including 24. Lecture by Andrews, 1 Oct. 1938, p. 26. direct auotation from Knerr. 25. Interview by author with Brig. Gen. Hume Pea- 54. 3d ind. (ltr., CG GHQ AF to C/AC, 16 Mar. body, Ret., 9 June 1951; interview with Maj. 1938), C/AC to C/MD, 15 June 1938, in DRB Oen. Walter H. Frank, Ret., 5 June 1951. 452.1, Pursuit Planes. 26. William B. Huie, The Fight for Air Power (New 55. ACTS, Pursuit Aviation, Sept. 1939, pp. 12-13. York, 1942), PP. 89-90, quoting Knerr. 56. Ibid.. P. 2. 138 - THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE Notes 57. Pictorial History, pp. 191-92. 79. Air Cortx Bd. Surmlement to Study No. 31. An- 58. Ibid., p. 195. alytical-Study of-joint Action of tiie Army and Navy, 1936, p. 22, in USAFHD 167.5-31. 59. Ltr., Bissell to Capt. J. E. Parker, 8 Sept. 1936, pp. 2-3, 8, in USAF'HD 4647-137. 80. 2d ind. (ltr., CG GHQ AF to AG, 1 June 1937), Actg. C/AC [Arnold] to AG, 3 June 1937, found 60. Ltr., C/AC to Pres., Air Corps Bd., 18 Aug. 1937, in incl. to memo for Gen. Arnold from Brig. Gen. in USAFHD 149.93-276. L.W. Miller, 15 Apr. 1943, in Goldberg-Notes, 61. 1st ind. (ltr., Arnold to CG GHQ AF: 18 Aug. Ln. Off., USAFHD, Washington, D.C. 1937), GHQ AF to OCAC, 5 Nov. 1937, in USAF- HD 145.93-116. 81. George F. Eliot, Bombs Bursiing in Air (New York, 1939), p. 133. 62. R&R, OCAC, Arnold to Spaatz, 8 Apr. 1939, in DRB 452.1, Attack Bomber, Central Dec. Files, 82. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 19491, pp. AAF, 1939-1942. 176-79; Pictorial History, P. 85. 63. Memo for C/AC from SDaatz. 11 Am. 1939. in 83. Ltr., Smith to author, 20 May 1952. DRB 452.1, Attack Bomber, Centrai Dec. Files, AAF, 1939-1942. 84. Eaker interview, cited in n. 49. 64. Air Corps Bd. Study No. 35, Employment of Air- 85. Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and craft in Defense of the Continental U.S., 7 May Navy, Joint Board/350 (ser. 514), Change 2, 30 1939, annex IV pp. 4-5, in USAFHD 167.5-35. Nov. 1938. 65. ACTS lecture quoting text, 1938-1939, in USAF- 86. AHS-6, p. 137, citing memo for C/AC from HD 4640-108. C/PS, 19 Jan. 1939. 66. ACTS lectures 1 and 2, History, Development, 87. This conclusion is drawn from a careful study Organization, Training, 3 Jan. 1939, pp. 9-10, of the War Department correspondence relating in USAFHD 248.2208B-1: memo for Gen. Pratt to the issue of the four-engine bomber procure- from Lt. Col. Donald Wilsm, 23 May 1938, in ment. USAFHD 4633-37,; Misc. Corresp., ACTS; inter- view by author with Brig. Gen. H. s. Hansell, 88. 1st ind. (ltr., AG to Andrews, 18 June 1935), 7 June 1952: 1st ind. (ltr.. Bria. Gen. G. V. Henry. Andrews to AG 22 July 1935, in Natl. Archives Cmdt. Cavalry Sch., to'CG-GHQ AF, 21 Juiy 452.1, Airplanes, General, Security Class. Rec- 1938), Col. W.H. Frank, C/S GHQ AF to Henry, ords, 1936-1942, Records of the Air Corps, 1917- 9 Aua. 1938. in USAFHD 4633-56. Attack-Misc.. 1942. 1937--1939 folder. 89. Ltr., Andrews to AG, 1 June 1937, and 2d ind. 67. Interviews by author with Lt. Gen. Ira Eaker, thereto, C/AC to AG, 9 June 1937, in USAFHD Ret., 31 July 1952; Lt. Gen. H. L. George, June 149.93-276. 1939, p. 25, in USAFHD 4775-57B. 90. Memo for C/AC from Andrews, 20 Oct. 1937, in 68. Pictorial History, p. 201. Natl. Archives 452.1, Airpln.nes, General, Secu- rity Class. Records, 1936-1942. 69. Ibid., p. 202; ACTS lecture The Attack Airplane, 9 Jan. 1939, pp. 9-11, in USAFHD 4640-108. 91. Andrews to AG, 25 June 1938, in 452.1, Natl. Archives, Airplanes, General. 70. Memo for S/W from Westover, 12 Nov. 1937, in Woodring Program, USAFHD 145.93-23, AC/AS 92. AG to Andrews, 22 Aug. 1938, in 452.1, Natl. Plans. Archives, Airplanes, General. 71. Ltr., C/AC to AG, 1 Sept. 1938, and 1st ind. 93. These conclusions are drawn from the detailed thereto, AG to C/AC, 17 Sept. 1938, in DRB evidence which is given below. They are strongly 452.1, Attack Bombers, Central Dec. File, AAF, supported, too, by the general remarks made In 1939-1942. the author's interviews with Peabody, Emmons, 72. These generalizations are based on a compre- Wilson, Eaker, George, McNarney, Milling, Lyon, hensive examination of the documents and are Frank, and Hansell. See also, ltr., Chennault to made by the author at this point to facilitate author, 4 Aug. 1952. understanding of the detailed events to be re- 94. Memo for Exec., OCAC from Spaatz. C/T&O counted. Div, 5 Jan. 1935, in Natl. Archives 321.9, Doc- 73. Memo for C/S from AC/ G-4. 8 AUE. 1936. in trine of the AAC, Cent. Dec. Ale, AAF, 1917- Natl. Archives 452.1, Central .Dee. File, AGO, 1938. 1916-1939. 95. 1st ind. (ltr., AG to C/AC, 18 June 1935). C/AG 74. Address, 30 Nov. 1936, p. 6, in USAFHD 4666- to AG, 12 July 1935, in Natl. Archives 452.1, 6. Central Dec. Ale, AGO, i916-1939. 75. Ltr., Andrews to AG, 15 Sept. 1936, in Natl. 96. Memo for S/W from Andrews. 24 Jan. 1938, in Archives 452.1, Airplanes, General, in Security Personal file, S/W, Andrews Papers, Library of Class, Files, 1936-1942, Records of the Air Corps, Congress. 1917-1942. 76. Ltr.. Andrews to Embick, 28 Dec. 1936, in Natl. 97. 2d ind. (basic missing), Andrews to C/AC, 6 Archives 452.1, Airplanes, General, in Security May 1938, in Personal Ale, C/AC, Andrews Class, Records, 1936-1942, Records of the Air Papers, Library of Congress. Corps, 1917-1942. 98. Andrews, Modern Air Power, speech delivered 77. Andrews lecture, the GHQ Air Force, 9 Oct. 16 Jan. 1939, PP. 5, 8-10, in Andrews Papers, 1937, P. 5, in USAFHD 4743-61. Library of Congress. 78. Air Corps Bd. Study No. 31, The Functions of 99, Ltr., Knerr to W. H. Frank, n.d., copy in Per- the AAF, 29 Oct. 1936, p. 14, in 167.5-31, USAF- sonal Ale, Data for GHQ AF Report, Andrews HD. Papers, Library of Congress. Notes THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 139 100. Hansell interview; ltr,, Maj. Gen. Hugh Knerr, ter Yust (Chicago, 1947), IV, 178; Milling Ret., to author, 9 June 1952. interview; Lyon interview. 101. Memo for C/S from AC/S G-4, 30 Oct. 1936, 128. Address by Arnold to AWC, 8 Oct. 1937, p. 9, cited in Mark 5. Watson, Chief of Stab: Pre- in USAFHD 4743-64A. War Plans and Preparations (Washington 129. Address by Andrews to AWC, 15 Oct. 1936, 1950, p. 42. PP. 19-20, in USAFHD 145.93-107, AC/AS 102. Pictorial History, p. 198. Plans, Lectures folder. 103. WD Staff Study, Augmentation in Aircraft to 130. ACTS lecture, The Use of Aircraft in Ethiopia, be included in FY 1938 Estimates, 25 June 2 Feb. 1939, PP. 10-19, in USAFHD 4640-121A. 1936, in incl. to memo for Gen. Arnold from 131. Address by Westover before Reserve Ofacers Brig. Gen. L. W. Miller, 15 Apr. 1943, in Ales, National Convention, Oakland, Calif ., 23 Sept. Ln. Off., USAFHD. (Note supplied by Dr. Al- 1937, pp. 6-7, in USAFHS 4743-65. fred Goldberg). 132. Capt. Demas T. Craw, ACTS, An Analysis of 104. AHS-6, p. 86. the Spanish Civil War, 1938, in USAFHD 105. Memo for C/S from AC/S G-4, 8 Aug. 1936, 4721-19. in Natl. Archives 452.1, Cent. Dec. Ale, AGO, 133. ACTS lecture, The Spanish Civil War, 1938, 1916-1939. pp. 13-20, in USAFHD 4642-2A. 106. Memo for C/S from AC/S G-4, 14 Sept. 1936, 134. Hansell interview. in Natl. Archives 452.1, Cent. Dec. Ale, AGO, 135. Address by Arnold before the AWC, The Air 1916-1939. Corps, 8 Oct. 1937, p. 5, in USAFHD 4743-64A. 107. Memo for C/S from AC/S G-4, 29 Aug. 1936 136. Eliot, Bombs Bursting in Air, p. 81. (approved by Craig, 4 Sept. 1936) in Natl. Archives 452.1, Cent. Dec. Ale, AGO, 1916- 137. Address by Maj. Gen. F. M. Andrews before 1939. the Natl. Aero.-Assn., Modern Air Power, 16 Jan. 1939, pp. 11-12. 108. Ltr., AG to C/AC, d Oct. 1937, in USAFHD 149.93 276, Bombardment folder. 138. Fairchild, ACTS lecture, Air Power and Air - Warfare, 1939, PP. 10-13, in USAFHD. 109. Memo for AC/S G-4 from Embick, DC/S, 9 May 1938, in Natl. Archives 452.1, Cent. Dec. 139. R. Earl McClendon, Air University Documen- Ale, AGO. tary Research Study, The Question of Au- tonlomy for the United States Air Arm, 1907- 110. Memo for C/S from AC/S G-4, 13 May 1938, 1945, 1950, Pt. pp. 205-13. in Natl. Archives 452.1, Cent. Dec. Ale, AGO. II, 140. Zbid., PP. 201-4. 111. Memo for DC/S from C/Bud. & Leg. Plan. Br., 14 May 1938, in Natl. Archives 452.1, 141. Ibid., pp. 196-200. Cent. Dec. Ale, AGO. 142. Zbid., pp. 194-95; ltr., AGO to C/AC, 19 Oct. 112. Memo for C/S from DC/S, 16 May 1938, in 1937, in USAFHD 149.93-276. Natl. Archives 452.1, Cent. Dec. Ale, AGO. 143. Address by Westover, 23 Sept. 1937, p. 10, in 113, Ibid. USAFHD 4743-65. 114. C/S to Joint Board, 2 June 1938, in Natl. 144. ACTS, Annual, 1937, Extracts from Address Archives 452.1, Cent. Dec. Ales, AGO. of Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, 2 June 1936, pp. 2, 4, in USAFHD 4778-104. 115. Joint Board/349 her. 629), 29 June 1938, in 145. Westover, Proposed Statement of C/AC in Natl. Archives 452.1, Airplanes, Gen., in Se- Connection with Hearings on HR 3151, Pt. I, curity Class. Records, 1936-1942, Records of pp. 11-12, Jan. 1938, in Jones Collection, Misc. the Air Corps, 1917-1942. File re Air Matters. 116. Memo for C/AC from AS/W, 9 June 1938, 146. Zbid., Pt. 11, pp. 7-9. in Natl. Archives 452-1, Cent. Dec. Ale, AGO. 147. Andrews to Westover (personal), 27 Sept. 117. Memo for C/S from AC/S G-4, 19 July 1938, 1937, in Personal File, C/AC, Andrews Papers, in Natl. Archives 452.1, Cent. Dec. Ale, AGO, Library of Congress. 118. Ibid. 148. Zbid. 119. Ltr., Westover to AG, 31 Aug. 1938, in USAFHD 149. Kilner, ACTS lecture, Problems Met by the 149.93-23, Woodring Program folder, AC/AS GHQ AF, 18 Apr. 1938, p. 9, in USAFHD. Plans. 150. Memo for Maj. M. S. Fairchild from Wilson, 120. 1st Ind. (ltr., Westover to AG, 31 Aug. 1938), attached to ltr., dtd. 15 Aug. 1939, in USAFHD A0 to C/AC, 5 Oct. 1938, in Woodring Program 4640-16, Incoming Memos folder. folder. 151. McClendon Study, 11, 185-86. 121. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), pp. 177-80. CHAPTER v 122. Memo for C/S from DC/S, 29 Nov. 1938, in 1. AHS-6, The Development of the Heavy AAG 452.1B, cited in AHS-6, pp. 33-34. Bomber, 1918-1944, pp. 35-36, citing memo for AC/AC WPD from C/AC, 14 Mar. 1939, in AAG 123. Message to Congress, 12 Jan. 1939, in The 321.9, Employment of AC, and 1st ind. (memo Public Papers and Addresses of F. D. Roose- for C/AC from C/MD, 24 July 1939), C/AC to velt (New York, 1941), 1939 vol., pp. 71-72. AS/W, 5 Aug. 1939, in AAG 452.1C, Heavy 124. 1st ind. (memo for C/MD from C/AC, 26 Bombers. July 19381, C/MD to C/AC, 5 Aug. 1938, in 2. Address delivered by Pres. Roosevelt to the AAG 452.1B, cited in AHS-6, P. 30-31. Cong., 16 May 1940, in Dept. of State, Peace 125. Emmons interview. and War; U.S. Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, 1943), pp. 527-28, 530. 126. AHS-6, p. 18; Emmons and Hansell interviews. 3. Memo for Gen. Arnold from Capt. H. S. Han- 127. Gen. Carl SPaatz and Dr. Bruce Hooper, “Stra- sell, OCAC, 25 Nov. 1940, in DRB File OCS tegic Bombing,” Ten Eventful Years, ed. Wal- 16125-435, WDGS (Spec. File), 1922-1942. 140 - THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE Notes ~~ 4. Statement of Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold before 33. Study No. 3A cited in n. 32, pp. 6-9, 25. Cong. Committees, in Defense of LR Aircraft, 34. Zbid., p. 2. 1940, in USAFHD 167.6-24A, Item No. 2. 35. Maj. Hopkins, ACTS lecture Tactical Offense 5. Memo for Mr. Knudsen from Robt. P. Patter- and Tactical Defense, 31 Oct. 1939, pp. 1-21, in son. 17 Oct. 1940, in USAFHD 149.93-276 Bomb. Air Force lectures, vol. I. Plans, AC/AS Plans. 36. Fairchild, ACTS lecture National Economic 6. H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), Structure, 9 Nov. 1939, pp. 1-3, in Air Force, p. 192. vol. I. 7. Craven and Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in 37. Zbid., pp. 4-6. An extensive survey of possible World War ZZ, I (Chicago, 1948, 109, 577. target systems is given by Fairchild on pp. 7-35. 8. Maj. Fairchild, ACTS lecture, Orientation 38. FM 1-10, 20 Nov. 1940, pp. 45, 50, in DRB course, 1939-1940, p. 6, in USAFHD 4633-95. 062.11, FM 1-10 (6-11-40), Cent. Dec. Ale, AGO, 9. ACTS, Air Force, 27 Oct. 1939, I, 15-16, in 1940- 1945. USAFHD 2566-2. 39. The Army Air Forces in World War ZZ, I, 596, 10. Memo for Lt. Col. L. F. Stone, C&GSS, from 600-602. Wilson, 23 Sept. 1939, in USAFHD 4633-37, 40. Ltr., C/AC to CG GHQ AF, 14 Nov. 1939, in Misc. folder. DRB 452.1, Pursuit Planes, Cent. Dec. Ale, AAF, 11. ACTS lecture by Fairchild, pp. 6-7. 1939-1942. 12. H. H. Arnold and I. C. Eaker, Winged Wariare 41. Memo for CG GHQ AF, et al., from Maj. Gen. (New Yokk, 1941), pp. 130-31; interview by au- H. H. Arnold, C/AC, 20 Dec. 1939 in Natl. thor with Maj. Gen. Walter Frank, Ret., 5 Archives 337, Conferences, Correspondence, June 1952. 1936-1942, Records of the Air Corps, 1917-1942. 13. A1 Williams, “Real Air Power for the Defense 42. Ltr., Lt. Col. W. E. Kepner, Cmdg. 8th Pursuit of the United States,” US. Air Services, XXV Gp.. to CG OHQ AF, 22 Dec. 1939, in Natl. (June, 1940), pp. 18-19. Archives 337, Conferences. 14. AHS-6, pp. 42, 47. 43. Maj. H. L. George, Com. 96th Bomb. Sq., 15. Gen. Carl SIjaatz, “Strategic Air Power,” to CG GHQ AF, 26 Dec. 1939, in Natl. Archives Foreign Affairs,vol. 24 (Apr, 19461, pp. 386-87. 337, Conferences. 16. De Seversky, Victory Through Air Power (New 44. 1st ind. (ltr., C/AC to CG GHQ AF, 14 Nov. York, 1942), pp. 43-73. 1939), CG GHQ AF to C/AC, 11 Jan. 1940, in DRB 452.1, Pursuit planes, Cent. Dec. Ale, AAF, 17. Lt. Col. Donald Wilson, ACTS lectures, Prin- 1939-1942. ciples of War, 26 Oct. 1939, pp. 1-22, in USAFHD 2b66-2 Air Force lectures, vol. 45. Arnold and Eaker, Winged Warfare (New York, I. 1941), p. 176. 18. Maj. M. S. Fairchild, ACTS lecture, The Aim in War, 28 Oct. 1939, PP. 1-18, in Air Force 46. AAF in World War ZZ, I, 602-3. lectures, vol. I. 47. Arnold, Global Mission, p. 201. 19. Zbid., p. 18. 48. AAF in World War ZZ, I, 600-602. 20. Maj. M. S. Fairchild, ACTS lecture, Primary 49. This conclusion is based upon examination of Strategic Objectives of Air Forces, 7 Nov. 1939, the written evidence and upon interviews by pp. 1-17, in Air Force lectures, vol. I. author with Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker. Ret., 31 21. Maj. Fairchild, ACTS lecture, “Strategic Of- July 1952; Maj. Gen. Walter Frank, Ret., 5 fense and Strategic Defense,” 1 Nov. 1939, pp. June 1952; Gen. J. T. McNarney, Ret., 5 Aug. 32-35, in Air Force lectures, vol. I. 1952; Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson, Ret., 21 July 1952; Lt. Gen. H. L. George, 31 July 1952; 22. Maj. Fairchild, ACTS lecture, Influence of Air Brig. Gen. Hume Peabody, 9 June 1952; and Power on Naval Warfare, 6 Nov. 1939, pp. 3, ltr., Maj. Gen. C. L. Chennault to author, 4 5-6, 9, 11-17, in Air Force lectures, vol. I. Aug. 1952. 23. AWPD, memo for C/S, Air Estimate of the 50. AHS-6, p. 80; The Oncia1 Pictorial History of Situation-6:30 a.m., Dec. 8, in USAFHD the AAF, (New York, 1947), p. 199. 145.81-3. 51. AHS-6, PP. 47-48, 81-82. 24. Memo for C/AC from AG, AG 320.2 (3-22-39) F, 23 Mar. 1939, in USAFHD 145.93-116, May 52. Zbid., pp. 51, 140-44. 1932-May 1939. 53. Air Bd. Rpt, 15 Sept. 1939, tab F, pp. 4-5, in 25. Air Board Rpt, 15 Sept. 1939, tab C, PP. 1-3, USAFHD 1116-61. in USAFHD 1116-61. 54. Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans 26. Memo for C/S from Brig. Gen. F. M. Andrews, and Preparations (Washington. 1950), p. 47. AC/S G-3, 2 Feb. 1940, in Natl. Archives 062.11, 55. AHS-6, p. 38. FM 1-5 (12-26-39), Central Dec. Ale, AGO, 56. Zbid., p. 89-90. 1916-1939. 57. Zbid., p. 93. 27. Zbid. 58. Ltr., Brig. Gen. J. E. Chaney to Gen. 0. C. 28. Memo for C/S from Brig. Gen. F. M. Andrews, Marshall, 4 June 1940, in USAFHD 149.93-276. 2 Feb. 1940. 59. AHS-6, p. 87. 29. FM 1-5, Employment of Aviation of the Army, 60. Ltr., C/AC to CG GHQ AF, 14 Nov. 1939, in 15 Apr. 1940, p. 1, in Natl. Archives 062.11 (12- DRB 452.1, Pursuit Planes, Cent. Dec. Ale, 28-39), Cent. Dec. Ale, AGO, 1916-1939. AAF, 1939-1942. 30. Zbid., PP. 10-11. 61. 1st ind. (ltr., S/AC to CG GHQ AF, 14 Nov. 31. Ibid., PP. 29-36. 1939), CG GHQ AF to C/AC, 11 Jan. 1940, in 32. Rpt. of the Air Corps Bd, Study No. 3A, FM DRB 452.1, Pursuit Planes, Cent. Dec. Ale, 1-5, 20 Nov. 1939, (recorrected, Mar. 1940) pp. AAF, 1939-1942. 1-3, in USAFHD 3794-3A; Air Board Rpt, 15 62. Arnold and Eaker, Winged Warfare, pp. 175- Sept. 1939, tab B,PP. 1-2. 76. Notes THE DEVELOPMENTOF AIR DOCTRINE- 141

63. FM 1-15, Tactics and Techniques of Air Fight- 77. Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Air Power-the ing, 9 Sept. 1940, p. 38, in DRB 062.11, FM 1-15 American Concept, n.d., p. 1, in Ln. Off., (5-20-40), Cent. Dec. Ale, AGO, 1940-1945. USAFHD. Wash., D.C. 64, FM 1-15, 9 Sept. 1940, pp. 16, 38; Rpt. of Air 78. United States-British Staff Conversations Corps Board, Study No. 3A, FM 1-5, NOv. 1939, (ABC-l), 27 Mar. 1941. pp. 44, 46; Arnold and Eaker, Winged Warfare. 79. The AAF in World War XI. I, 135-41. p. 181-82. 80. Zbid., p. 131. 65. Rpt. of Air Corps Bd., Study No. 3A, FM 1-5, 81. Xbid., p. 145. 20 Nov. 1939, p. 42, 47-48. 82. Zbid., p. 146. 66. FM 1-15, 9 Sept. 1940, pp. 15-16. 83. Zbid.. p. 147. 67. Ltr., Lt. Col. W. E. Kepner to CG GHQ AF, 84. Joint Board Estimate of U.S. Over-all Produc- 22 Dec. 1939, in Natl. Archives 337, Conferences, tion Requirements, Joint Board 355 her. 707). Correspondence, 1936-1942, Records of the Air 11 Sept. 1941, pp. 10-15, in USAFHD 145.81-23. Corps, 1917-1942. 68. RdrR, OCAC, Mat. Div. to Plans Div., 14 June 85. Xbid.. app. 11, Pt. I. 1940, and ltr., C/AC to AG, 25 Apr. 1940, both 86. AWPD/l, Munitions Requirements of the AAF. in DRB 452.1, Pursuit Central Dec. Ale, AAF, 12 Aug. 1941, tab 1, pp. 1-2, in USAFHD 1939-1942. 145.82- 1. 69. Rpt. of the Air Corps Bd., Study No. 3A, FM 87. Zbid., pp. 12-13. 1-5, 20 NOV. 1939, pp. 37-39. 88. USSBS, Summary Report (European War), 30 70. Maj. F. M. Hopkins, ACTS lecture, Influence Sept. 1945. of Air Power on Land Warfare, 3 Nov. 1939. 89. AWPD/l, 12 Aug. 1941, tab 1, pp. 10-12. PP. 4-18, in Air Force lectures, vol. I. 90. Memo for C/S transmitting AWPDIl, 12 Aug. 71. Ltr., Gen. G. C. Kenney, Ret., to author, 22 1941, pp. 2-3; AWPD/l, tab 8. pp. 1, 3-4; tab C. Oct. 1952. 91. Arnold, Global Mission, p. 149; Brig. Gen. H. S. 72. Air Bd. Rpt. 15 Sept. 1939, tab D. pp. 1-2. Hansell, lect. at Air University, Development 73. Rpt. of the Air Corps Bd., Study No. 3A, p. 33. of the U.S. Concept of Bombardment Oper- 74. Memo for C/AC from AS/W, 2 June 1941, and ations, 19 Sept. 1951, p. 23. 1st. ind., 19 June 1941, in DRB 552.1, Bombers, 92. Zbid., tab 3, Escort Fighters. pp. 1-3. Cent. Dec. Ale, AAF, 1939-1942; ltr.. Maj. Gen. 93. Ltr., Bradley to Col. W. H. Frank, Jan. 1940, in Grandison Gardner to author, 21 Aug. 1952. Personal Ale-"A," Andrews Papers, Library 75. R&R, Hq. AAF, 18 NOv.-30 Dec. 1941, in of Congress. Natl. Archives 319.1, Reports, Misc., Security 94. McClendon Study, pp. 186-88. Class. records, 1936-1942, Records of the Air 95. Watson, Chief of Stag, Prewar Plans and Prepa- Corps, 1917-1942. rattons, pp. 280-81. 76. Ltr., Kenney to author, 22 oct. 1952. 96. McClendon Study, pp. 190-93. Bibliography

The principal sources used in the preparation of 5. Central decimal Ale of the Army Air Forces, this study, with a brief appraisal, are listed below: 19 17 - 1938 (unclassified) A. Archival materials located at the USAF His- 6. Central decimal Ale of the Adjutant Gen- torical Division, Air University, Maxwell Air eral’s Office, 1916-1939 Force Base, Alabama : 7. Records of the War Department Genefal 1. Air Corps Tactical School textbooks Staff, 1903-1922 2. Air Corps Tactical School lectures 8. Records of the Office of the Secretary of 3. Service manuals and regulations War, 1932-1942 4. Miscellaneous addresses by air officers at Appraisal: The proportion of bulk in the above Maxwell Field and elsewhere listed record groups is very high in relation 5. Miscellaneous articles, published and un- to the amount of information useful for published this study. A large number of documents were located here, however, which could 6. Miscellaneous correspondence Ales from not be found elsewhere, and these sources Maxwell Field and Office of the Assistant are essential to a complete study of air Chief of Air Staff, Plans doctrine. Especially important are the docu- 7. Copies of war plans and estimates of mili- ments representing the point of view of tary requirements higher headquarters; such materials were 8. Extracts from Congressional hearings not to be found in the collection at the 9. Reports of commissions and Congressional USAF Historical Division. In the volumi- committees investigating airpower and or- nous correspondence Ales the chief Ale num- ganization ber used was 452.1, with numerous cross- 10. Reports of the War and Navy Department Ales provided from that number. on air subjects C. Archival materials located at the Depart- 11. Miscellaneous reports on Air Service, AEF; mental Records Branch, AGO, Alexandria, GHQ Air Force; and other major air units Virginia and organizations 1. Central decimal Ale of the Army Air Forces, 19 17- 1938 ( ) 12. Air Board reports and studies classifled 13. Miscellaneous studies by individual Army 2. Central decimal file of the Army Air Forces, officers and others concerning airpower 1939-1942 (classified) (official and unofficial) 3. Central decimal Ale of the Army Air Forces, 1939- 1942 (unclassified) 14. Student-officer studies prepared at the Tac- tical School and the Army War College 4. Central decimal Ale of the AGO, 1940-1945 15. Miscellaneous papers connected with AW- 5. Records of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, PD/l Plans, 1942-1945 16. Rosters of instructors and students at the 6. Special Ale of the War Department Gen- Tactical School eral Staff, 1922-1942 17. Summaries of courses taught at the Tac- 7. Special Ale of the War Plans Division, 1921- tical School 1941 18. Minutes of proceedings of the Aeronauti- Appraisal: The Ales listed above fall into the cal Board and the Joint Board same general category of usefulness as those listed in B., above. Appraisal: The above listed materials are in- dispensable to any statement of air doctrine D. Archival materials located in the Library of as developed at the Air Corps Tactical Congress (Manuscripts Division) School, which was the leading school for 1. William Mitchell Papers advanced study of military aviation during 2. Frank M. Andrews Papers the period under study. They constituted Appraisal: The bulk of these personal papers the largest single source from which mate- are of great interest in connection with the rial for this study was obtained. particular men involved, but they do riot B. Archival materials located at the National shed much new light on the general sub- Archives, Washington, D.C. ject of air doctrine. On the other hand, n 1. Records of the Air Service, 1917-1926 few items of real significance can be gleaned 2. Division of Military Aeronautics Records, here. 1918-1920 E. Materials located in the Army Library, OfTiCe 3. Records of the Air Corps, 1917-1942 of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, 4. Records of the Army Air Forces, 1918-1945 D.C. 142 Notes THEDEVELOPMENT OF AIR DOCTRINE- 143

1. Annual reports of the War Department, the documents and the events themselves. 1917-1941 They provide, in conjunction with the per- 2. Congressional reports and hearings tinent written sources, the key to a mean- 3. Miscellaneous government publications ingful explanation of the major trends and Appraisal: The proportion of useful material problems. here is quite low, but it was essential to G. Correspondence by the author with key air use certain of these sources, which were force personnel more readily available in this depository 1. Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, Ret. than in most others. 2. Maj. Gen. Grandison Gardner by F. Interviews the author with key air force 3. Gen. George C. Kenney, Ret. personnel 4. Maj. Gen. Hugh Knerr, Ret. 1. Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Ret. 5. Brig. Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Jr. 2. Lt. Gen. Delos Emmons, Ret. 3. Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Ret. Appraisal: Letters to the above officers were sent out at an advance stage in the prepara- 4. Lt. Gen. Harold L. George, Ret. tion of the study, as a means of flnding an- 5. Brig. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. swers to specific questions not clearly re- 6. Maj. Gen. Edwin B. Lyon solved by the documents or the personal 7. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Ret. interviews. In this respect, the replies proved 8. Brig. Gen. Thomas Dew. Milling, Ret. to be extremely helpful. 9. Brig. Gen. Hume Peabody, Ret. H. Published books and periodicals 10. Col. Marshall H. Quesenberry, Ret. Appraisa2: In general, relatively little reliance was placed upon this source, except for 11. Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson. Ret. reference to influence outside of the services. Appraisal: These personal interviews were in- The footnotes will reveal, however, the ex- dispensable to an accurate interpretation of tent of use of this type of material. AVIATION 1111 ARMY ORGANIZ.ATION, ( 1920 - 1934 1

SECRETARY OF WAR

I- I I I I 1 t UILITARY OPERATIOMS AID PERSONNEL DlVlWY IITEUICEWCE DlVlSlOM rRAlMlMC DNWloM SUPPLY DlVISM WAR PLAYS DlVtSM ACIS. c-l ACIS, C-2 AClS, C-3 ACIS, C-4 ACIS, WPD i J - THE ARMY AIR ARM'

CHIEF OF AIR CORPS

EXECUTIVE

CHIEF CLERK CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FINANCE SECTDW

1 I h 1 r I I TRAININ6 I OPERATIONS IWFORUATION -MATERIEL DIVISION ASST. CHIEF OF AIR COHPS I ASS1 CHIEF OF AIR CORPS

EXECUTIVE I UTE LL16EM EXECUTIVE RESERVE R~~~&sPUBLICATIONS PHOTO6 RAPHI C

MATERIEL ESTIMATES L LIAISON COSTS OCAC, WASH

WAH PLANS SCHOOLS t ORCANIZATION OF THE AIR CORPS AS OF 26 NOVEMBER 1926. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AIR ARM FLUCTUATED DURING THE PERIOD 1920-1934, BUT THIS CHART IS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE PERIOD b P

P3 THE ARMY AIR ARM % X ( UTE 1935 1

ISECRETARY OF WAR

c. c 0 I CG,GHQ AIR FORCE I I CHIEF OF AIR CORPS I I COMBAT UNITS

IST WIN 2D WlNC 3D WlllC UUCi flND VlRClNlA LOUISIANA

PERSONNEL INFORMATION WAR PLANS- SUPPLY FINANCE RESERVE TRAlNl WC DIVISION DIVISION DlVlsHyll lxVlSlON DIwsI)I1 DlVlSlON - THE ARMY AIR ARM ( UTE 1840 1

SECRETARY OF WAR

Q1 f CHIEF OF WFF i DErVTY FpI1 AOWllSTRATlOW DEWTV FOR SUPRY WUTV FOR AIR (ACTIIK I URR DEPARWEIT CElERAL STAFF

SPECIAL 6 HP CHIEF Of THE AIR CORPS ~~s~~s c c -l 1C6,CHQ AIR FORCE I LECAL DIVISION COMA1 AIR WTS I *I I MEDICAL DIVISION YORTHIEST I , IOARDS liND WClAL COYNITTEES DlSTRlcl DISTRICT DISTRICT DISTRICT -1 I

'D PERSalnEL IYTELLlCEmX puns MATERIEL MISC. INSPECllDN DIVISION olvlslow $$yg 8 DlVlSlOW OlVlSlDl DIVISION MVlSlOY DIVISION a AVIATION IN ARMY ORGANIZATION 1941 ( 20 JUNE- 7 DEC. 1

I SECRETARY OF WAR I ASST. SECRETARY I -OF WAR FOR AIR DEPUTY CHIEF FOR AIR (ARNOLD) i WAR OEPIGENERAL STAFF b------AIR COUllclL I U

TRAINIWG OR COUUAT

AIR FORCE OFFICE,CHIEF OF THE COMBAT COMMAND AIR CORPS

OEFENSE FIRST ARMY NORTHEASTERN 6 ------FIRST AIR FORCE AIR SERVICE COlllWlO COORDINATION MATERIEL DIVISION SECONO AMY - - --- CENTRAL +------. SECONO AIR FORCE FERRYING COMMAND TECHNICAL TNG COMMAND THIRD ARMY ----- SOUTHERN +------THIRD AIR FORCE FLYING TNG CENTERS PROVING GROUND FOURTH ARMY ----_ WESTERN FOURTH AIR FORCE OTHER ACTIVITIES Appendix 2

REDESIGNATIONS OF THE ARMY AIR ARM, 1907-1942

Aeronautical Division, Signal Corps. Director of Air Service given complete control Created 1 August 1907 by Office Memo No. 6, of DMA and BAP in March 1919 by Executive Omce of the Chief Signal OfRcer, 1 August 1907. Order of 19 March 1919. (In anticipation of this Executive Order, on Aviation Section, Signal Corps. 15 March 1919 OfRce of Director of Air Service Created 18 July 1914 by act of Congress. was reorganized to conform as nearly as pos- (The law of 18 June 1914 did not specify that sible to the organization of the Air Service, the official title of the section would be “Avia- AEF. On 11 July 1911, legislative authority was tion Section.” Hence, from July 1914 until May granted to continue the wartime organization 1918 the aviation section of the Signal Corps of the Air Service as an independent branch had numerous redesignations, being named of the War Department for another year.) variously Aeronautical Division, Air Division, Division of Military Aeronautics, and others. Army Air Service. For convenience, however, the air arm is Given statutory recognition and established as usually referred to during this period as a combatant arm of the Army by the Army Aviation Section, Signal Corps). Reorganization Act of 2 June 1920. (Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces was created on 3 September 1917 by Hq. AEF Army Air Corps. a0 31, 3 Sspt. 1917 and remained in being Until Created by Air Corps Act of 2 July 1926. demobilized in 1919. Air Service, AEF, how- ever, was distinct and apart from the evolution GHQ Air Force. of the air arm within the War Department.) Established as a coordinate component with the Air Corps on 1 March 1935 by TAG letter Division of Military Aeronautics and Bureau of Aircraft Production. of 31 December 1934. Created as coordinate components of the air Army Air Forces. arm on 20 May 1918 by Executive Order. Created on 20 June 1941 by Army Regulation (This Executive Order, issued under authority 95-5. 20 1918, of the Overman Act of May removed (The AAF was to coordinate the activities of aviation from the jurisdiction of the Signal the OfRce of Chief of Air Corps (OCAC), the Corps and established the DMA and BAP as separate units under the War Department.) Air Force Combat Command (AFCC), (formerly GHQ Air Force), and other air units.) Director of Air Service. Appointed on 28 August 1918 by Secretary of Army Air Forces. War, and given supervision and direction over Reorganized as one of the three major army the Division of Military Aeronautics and Bureau commands, and WAC and AFCC abolished, by of Aircraft Production. War Department Circular 59, 9 March 1942.

149

INDEX

A P-51, 87n. 123 PW-8A, 38 AAF: established, 127 XA-7, 67 ABC-1, 123-24 XB-1, 44 Aero Dfgest, 104 XB-2, 44 Aeronautical Board : 35 ; recommendations followed XFM-1, 66, 87, 121 by Army and Navy, 68; and coast defense con- Air Force Combat Command, 122, 127 troversy, 69 Air Intelligence: omce created, 10; functions, 10 Air Board: appointed, 113; membership, 113; report, Air ofacers: discipline, 2; contention with ground 113, 118 officers, 3-4, 14-16, 22-25; arguments, 21; divided, Air Corps: proposed, 28; established, 29; versus 21-22 Navy on land-based bombardment, 67-70 Air Service: 1, 4-5, 26, 32; organization in AEF, 4-5; and pursuit tactics, 8; and industrial bomb- Air Corps Act of.1926, 29 ing, 10; Air Service History, 10; missions, 12; Air Corps Board: on pursuit type, 65-66; on air de- views on nature of war-and air weapon, 15; dis- fense, 76; on Air Corps mission. 76-77; on escort, tinction between ofacial and unomcial doctrine, 82; on bomber armament, 83; on attack aviation, 16; contention with the General Staff, 25; 1923 88, on Joint Action paper, 90 manual on doctrine for bombardment, 38 Air Corps Tactical School: 11; created from ASTS, Air Service Field Officers’ School: established at 30; qpproval of aircraft specifications, 45; move Langley Field, Va., 29; director, 29; aim, 29; be- to Maxwell Field, 47; and doctrinal development, comes Air Service Tactical School, 29; later Air 47-49, 51-57, 77; concept of nature of war, 48, 77- Corps Tactical School, 30 78. 110-11; influence of Mitchell and Douhet, 48- Air Service Tactical School: established at Langley 52. 58, 115; The Doctrine of the Air Force, 48; Field, Va.. 16n; concept of war taught, 16; be- Air Force course text, 51, 53-56, 58. 72; A Study comes Air Corps Tactical School, 30; Mission, 30; of Proposed Air Corps Doctrine, 51; Air Force Air Force course, 40, 48; Air Force text, 40-43, 48; course, 51-52, 79, 111-13; employment of air- bombardment text, 41 ; Strategic Aviation con- power, 52-55, 78-79, 111-13, 115-16; and air de- cent.- , 42-43~~ _. fense, 52-53 ; texts, 54; offensive principles, 54-55, Air supremacy. 5-9, 19 78-79; and strategic aviation, 56-57, 60, 88-82; Air War Plans Division: 113, 124: membership. 124 precision bombing, 57-58.115-16; and ground sup- American Aviation *Mission,20-21 port, 66-67. 88; observation course, 66-67; Attack Andrewa, Frank M. : 47, 95% 96; and coast defense course, 66-67, 88; on principles of centralized con- controversy, 70; heads GHQ Air Force, 73; on trol of air force, 72; critical of Kilbourne’s paper bombardment, 80, 82; on bomber development, on role of GHQ Air Force, 74; divergence in 90-92, 94; on airpower, 94; on Italian Air Force, teachings, 79-80; Pursuit course, 83; and attack 102; on GHQ Air Force, 104; on Air Corps, 104-5; aviation, 88; on pursuit, 120-21 approves FM 1-5, 113 Air Council, 127 AR 95-5, 127 Aircraft: design, 44-47, 88; development, 39, 44-47. AR 95-10, 72 See also fighter and bomber Army Reorganization Act of 1920, 25-26 Aircraft Board, 28 Arnold, Henry H.: 28, 87, 96; and separate air arm, Aircraft Types : 2, 22, 104; compares air arm of WW I and WW A-8, 67 11, 4; on Mitchell, 17; and bomber development, A-12, 67-68 47, 90, 119; bombardment vs. pursuit, 56, 59-60, A-17, 67-88 116, 120; on strategic aviation, 82, 107; on White A-18, 88 House aviation conference, 100; on Japanese Air A-20, 88, 122 Force, 102; on GHQ Air Force, 104; sends ob- A-24, 122-23 servers to Europe, 109; on German airpower, 109, A-32, 123 117; on bombardment, 115-18; on RAF, 117; on A-36, 123 precision bombing, 115-18; on B-29, 119; and B-2, 46 pursuit aviation, 120 B-9, 45, 47, 58 Attack aviation: concept emerges, 12; mission, 121- B-10, 45, 47, 58, 60, 102 23; doctrinal development, 66-67 ; aircraft types, B-12., 59-60_.__ 67 B-l5,47, 69, 89, 95-96, 98-99, 101 Aviation experiments, 3 B-17, 45-47, 58, 83, 83% 92-99, 101, 105. 116-19 Aviation Section, 2-3 B-18, 83% 92, 96, 98-99, 105 B-19, 89, 96, 120 AWPD/l: 60, 110, 127-28; called for by President, B-20, 97-99 123; drawn and approved, 124; on air mission, B-24, 45, 118-19 125; employment of airpower, 125-26; plane re- B-29, 47, 69, 96, 119 quirements, 125-26; and fighter escort, 126 B-32, 96, 119 B-36, 47 B MB-2, 39 NSB-4, 39, 44 0-35. 45 Baker, Sec. of War Newton D.: appoints CSO, 2; P-26,. 59-60, 65 orders investigation of aeronautics, 2 ; doctrine P-35, 65 of aerial bombing, 14-15; directs Crowell to or- P-36, 65 ganize aviation study group, 21; establishes P-38, 86-87, 121 *Because ranks of Army officers mentioned In this study P-39, 86, 121 changed frequently durlng the perlod of thls study no ranks P-40, 65, 85-86, 121 are given In this Index.

151 Menoher Board, 21; opposed to separate air arm, Drum, Hugh, 71 23 Dusseldorf , 11 Baker Board: report on employment of the Air Duval, General: on potentialities of airpower, 25 Corps, 71, 73; appointed, 73; membership, 73 Beck, Paul: and separate air arm, 2; bomb ex- E periments, 3 Benedict, Dorothy, 51 Eaker, Ira C.: on Douhet, 50; on development of Bingham, Sen. Hiram, 28 strategic concepts, 82; on pursuit types, 85; on the Bissell, Clayton: on bombardment vs. pursuit, 82; Air Corps’ limited range offshore, 91, and Ger- criticizes Chennault’s ground net, 84-85; on pur- man airpower, 109 suit type, 86; on attack aviation, 87 Echols, Oliver P.: 96-97; and air research and de- Bombardment. See Bomber and Precision bombing. velopment, 119 Bomber: types in 1920’s 38-39; delay in develop- Edison, Sec. of Navy Charles, 100 ment, 39; design and development, 44-47, 93, 95- Eliot, George Fielding, 90 96. 118-19; B-12 vs. B-26, 59; light, 88; long- Ely, H. E.: on air viewpoint, 32-33 range, 89-101, 118-19; versus pursuit, 115-17, Embick, Stanley D.: 90, 101; opposes air force de- 120-21. See also Aircraft and Aircraft types. velopment, 95; opposes bomber development, Bombsights: Norden Mark XV, 57 97-99 Bradley, Follett: 47; on separate air arm, 126 Emmons, Delos: on British airpower, 110; on need Breckenridge, Asst. Sec. of War Henry S., 1 for pursuit, 120 Burns, J. H., 96, 99 Engineering Division : and bomber development, 39 Ethiopian War, 102 C F Carter, Warren R.: on divergence of Tactical School, 79 Fairchild, Muir S.: 105; on Munich conference, 103, Cassidy, J. Edward: on air defense, 32 111; on German airpower, 109; on nature of war, Chaffee, A. R.: 96; opposes bomber program, 98 111; on employment of airpower, 111-13; on Chandler, Charles DeF. : machine gun experiment, bombardment, 115-16 3; separate air arm, 22; on Douhet, 51 Fechet, James E.: yields to General Staff on bomber Chaney, J. E.: on German airpower, 117; and air design, 45: and ACTS, 48; calls conference on research and development, 119 pursuit, 61 Chennault, Claire L.: 82; on formation tactics, 8; Federal Aviation Commission: appointed, 52; in- on bombardment vs. pursuit, 55-56, 58-59; on vestigations, 52; and ACTS instructors. 52; on ground net, 59, 64; criticism of Arnold’s state- employment of air force as independent units, ment, 59-60; on doctrine of pursuit, 61-66; on 72-73; report, 73 Pursuit tactics, 62-66, 85; “The Role of Defensive Fickel, Jacob E.: and aviation experiments, 3 Pursuit,” 63-64; on pursuit types, 65-66 Fighter: types in 192O’s, 37-38; P-26 vs. B-12, 59; China. See Sino-Japanese War. interceptors. 85-87; single seater vs. multiseater, Coast defense: 31-33; Navy vs. Air Corps, 33, 67-69; 86, 120-21, 126; long-range, 120-21, 126; as escort, Army and Navy policy, 68; Joint Board assigns, 120-21, 126. See also Aircraft. 68; and bomber program, 88 FM 1-5, 111, 113-15, 121-22 comn. Howard E., 21, 28 FM 1-15, 120-21 Cologne, 11 Foch, Marshall : approves Mitchell’s recommenda- Combined Chiefs of Staff. 127 tions, 5; on potentialities of airpower, 25 Congress: 27-28; and separate air arm, 1, 20-21; and Fokker Anthony, 7 air research and development, 118 Formation flying: German, 7; in pursuit, 8 Coolidge, President Calvin, 26, 28 Foulois. Benjamin D.: 28; and separate air arm, 2, Craig, Malin: 91, 100; and bomber program, 96-97, 22; on bombing effects in WW I, 15, and bomber 99 development, 46; and Douhet, 50 Crowell, Benedict C.: and Crowell Mission, 21; sep- Frank, Walter H.: 50-51; on Douhet, 51 arate air arm, 22 Frankfort, 11 Crowell Mission: 20-21; members, 21; report, 21 Culver, C. C.: 47; and bomber development, 45; and G “The Doctrine of the Air Force,” 48 Curry, Rep. Charles F.: bill for independent air Gardner, Grandison, 85 arm, 20 General Staff: 15, 22, 28, 31, 58, 91; and separate air arm, 1-2, 20, 25; and military aviation, 2, 14; D doctrine of War, 16; view reflected in Bombard- ment text at ASTS, 41; and pursuit types, 66; Daniels, Sec. of the Navy Josephus: and separate War Plans Division, 69; bomber procurement, air arm, 24 92-93, 97; flghts bomber development, 94-95, 99- Dargue, H. A.: 47; aviation experiments, 3 101; metamorphosis, 107-8 Defense: as basis of air doctrine, 30, 32 George, Harold L.: 41, 124; appears before Federal de Montgelas. Gen. Max, 51 Aviation Commission, 52 ; bombardment vs. pur- Department of Aeronautics: 23; campaign for, 20; suit, 56-57, 117; refutes Baker Board, 71; and bill for, 20 Navy efforts to control bombardment, 118 Department of National Defense, 25-26, 28-29 GHQ Air Force: 26, 44, 53-54, 90, 127; established, de Seversky, Alexander: on flghters, 85; on air- 29, 70, 73; organization, 27, 73-75, 105-6; role, 74; Power, 104; on German vs. British airpower, 110 planes intercept liner Ret, 91; mission, 115 Dickman Board: appointed, 24; report on lessons of GHQ Reserve, 4-5, 27, 72 World War, 24 Gorrell, Edgar 5.: exposition of bombardment doc- Dickman, Joseph T., 24 trine, 10; study of bombing situation, 10; becomes Dwliet, Giulio: influence on ACTS, 48-52; writ- head of Strategical Aviation Branch, 10; plans ings. 49. 51 for strategic force, 11-12, 38; promoted to Air Drum.Board: report on employment of the Air Service officer of G-3, 11; and Air Service mis- Corps, 71, 73 sion, 15 152 Grey, Spencer, 11 Me Ground support: 32: observation, 7, 32: counter- sir force, 32; doctrinal development, 66-67; McAndrew, J. W.: admonishes General Patrick, 4; on air-ground relations, 4 changing ideas of eaubment for, 122 MacArthur, Douglas: and coast defense controversy, Groves, P.R.C.: quoted by Patrick, 19 68-69; on GHQ Air Force, 74-75 McSwain, Rep. John J., 50 H M Hansell, Haywood S., Jr.: 124; on escort, 60, 126; on the development of ACTS strategic concepts, Mannheim-Ludwigshaven, 11 81-82 Marshall, George C. : 100; promotes Roosevelt's air- Harmon, Millard F.: on pursuit, 83-84 craft program, 101 Hay bill, 1-2 Martin, Glenn L., 22 Hay, Rep. James, 1 Materiel Division: and bomber development, 39, 44- Hines, John L., 29 47 Hitler, Adolph, 100, 119, 123 Mauborgne, J. 0.: aviation experiments, 3 Hopkins, F. M.: 115; on attack aviation, 121-22 85 100 Me-109, Hopkins, Harry, Menoher, Charles T.: Menorer Board, 21; report, Howell, Clark, 73 21; opposed to separate air arm, 22-23 Howell Commission. See Federal Aviation COmmiS- Meuse-Argonne, 5-6, 54 sion. Meyer. Prof. Andre, 51 Hughes, J. H., 96 Miles, Sherman, 96 Hurleu. Sec. of War Patrick J.: on coast defense Milling, Thomas Dew.: machine gun experiment, 3; controversy, 68 comments on early aviation, 3; on doctrine, 3; in charge of ASTS, 16; on separate air arm, 17 I Mitchell, William: 14, 42, 54; and concentration of force, 5-7; and control of the air, 5-7, 31; opera- Indiana, 34 tional plans, 5-6; flexibility of airpower, 6-7, 50; on Pursuit, 9, 37; on bombardment and strate- gic aviation, 9-10, 38, 55; on attack aviation, 12- J 13, 39-40; court-martial, 14, 14n; crusade for air- power, 16-19, 50; flght for separate air arm, 2, 17. Joint Army and Navy Board: conclusions from ship 22; inconsistent, 17; Wtnued Defense, 18; on air bombing tests, 34; on coast defense, 68, 90-91; organization, 22; and Morrow Board, 28; on coun- paper on functions of Army and Navy air arm, ter-air employment, 31; on air defense, 31; on 68-70, 89-91; and bomber development, 99; and coast defense, 33-34, 36, 67; and bomb-dropping war requirements, 124; and strategic policy, 124- tests, 34; influence on ACTS, 48-52; on GHQ Air 25 Force, 75 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 127 Moffett, Rear Adm. W. A.: and coastal defense, 68 Monell, A.: succeeds Gorrell, 11-12 K Monroe Doctrine, 76-77 Morgenthau, Sec. of Treas. Henry, 100 Kenney, George: 51; on air defense, 53; on ground Morrow Board : appointed, 28; membership, 28; support, 66-67; observer in Europe, 108 witnesses, 28; report, 28-29; conclusions, 28-29 Kerr, Admiral: on potentialities of airpower, 25 Morrow, Dwight W., 28 Kilbourne Board: appointed, 35; report, 35 Munich Conference, 100, 102, 107 Kilbourne, Charles E.: 35; and roh of GHQ Air Mussolini, Benito, 102 Force, 74 Kilner, W. G.,28, 105 King, Adm. Ernest J.: 127; repudiates agreement N on coast defense, 69 National Advisory Commission for Aeronautics, 128 Knerr, Hugh: 47; and bomber development, 45, 82; on escort, 82; on pursuit types, 86 Navy Department: 22, 28, 32; opposed to separate 108 air arm, 23-24; on coast defense, 35; General Knudsen, William, Board, 28 Navy, U.S.: attitude of ofRcers on separate air arm, 1 24; versus Air Corps on land-based bombard- ment, 67-70; on air'defense, 31; on coast de- LaGuardia. Fiorella H., 22 fense, 33-34, 36, 67; and bomb-dropping tests, 34; Lampert Committee: appointed, 28; membership, supports Drum and Baker boards, 72; flghts Air 28; report, 28; recommendations on air organi- Corps long-range program, 90-91, 97 zation, 28 New Jersey, 34 Lampert, Rep. F. F., 28 New, Sen. Harry S., 22 Landis, Reed, 28 Nieuport XXIII, 7 miter Board: membership, 26; report, 26-27; rec- ommendations on air organization, 27; influences 0 TR 440-15, 40 Ussiter, William, 26 Oface of Chief of the Air Corps: and ACTS, 48, 55; Liddell-Hart, Basil H.: Paris: Or The Future of on The Doctrine of the Air Force, 48; and ACTS War, 19; views on nature of war, 19; influence on bombardment theories, 55, 59 ; bombardment vs. U.S. airmen, 19 pursuit, 58; on coast defense, 69; jurisdiction Lieb, Rep. Charles: and separate air arm, 2 over GHQ Air Force, 106, 127; and attack plane, Lovett, Robert A.: on ground support, 122 122; .and reorganization of air arm, 127; and Kil- Ludendorff, Gen. Eric, 51 bourne Board, 74 Luftwaffe, 83, 117. 119 Olds, Robert, 47 153 P Squier, George 0.: appointed chief Signal Ofllcer, 2 Stark, Adm. Harold, 100 Parker, James E., 82, 84 Stearley, Ralph: on Italian Air Force, 102; on Partridge, Earle E.: on escort, 83; on warning net, Spanish Civil War, 103 85 Stimson, Sec. of War Henry L.: orders changes in Patrick, Mason M.: 4, 28, 32, 42, 54; on attack avia- air organization, 127 tion, 12; manual accepts General Staff’s doctrine Strategic bombardment: 9-10; doctrine, 10 of war, 16; reflects influence of Liddell-Hart, 19- Stuka, 110 20; on air supremacy, 19-20; relates nature of war to air arm, 20; symbolizes Air Service spirit, 25; on airpower, 25-26, 33; on air organization, ‘1 26-27; proposes Air Corps, 28; on air defense, 34, 36; and bomber development, 39, 44; and coast TR 10-5 : enumerates “Doctrines, Principles, and defense, 68 Methods,” 16 Patterson, Robert P.: on long-range bomber, 108 TR 440-15: 33, 40n, 40-43; revised to include role of Pershing, John J.: 5; on airpower, 3-4; opposed to GHQ Air Force, 74; superseded, 113 separate air arm, 23; appoints Dickman Board, 24 Training and Operations Group : Westover criti- Pratt, Adm. William V., 68 cizes activities, 23 Precision bombing, 115-18 Trenchard, Sir Hugh M.: and strategic aviation, 9; Principle of mass, 11 and IAF, 9; program of bombardment, 9-10 Project A: 47, 96, 98; approved by WD, 89 Tyner, George P.: on long-range bomber develop- Project D: 89, 120; approved by WD, 96; contro- meht, 97-99 versy, 96-97; conference, 96-97 Pursuit, 7, 61-62; equipment, 8; pilots, 8; organi- U zation, 8; tactics, 8, 62-66, 126-21; versus bom- bardment, 55-60; doctrinal development, 36-38, 66-67; single seater vs. multiseater, 64-66, 85-86, V 120-21; types, 37, 85-86; need for in WW 11, 120- 21; mission. 120-21. See also Fighter. Virginia, 34 Pursuit Development Board, 65 von Richthofen, Baron, 7

R W RAF: 120, 126-27; becomes separate service, 9; opin- Walker, Kenneth N.: 47, 57, 124; on bombardment ion on day bombing, 116 vs. pursuit, 56; on air defense, 71 Reconnaissance, 3, 7 War Department: 14, 22, 32, 44, 71; opposed to Rickenbacker, Eddie, 7 separate air arm, 23-25; Annual Report 1919, 23; Robins, A. W., 101 favors Morrow Board report, 29; Assistant Sec- Roosevelt, President Franklin D.: 72, 103, 124; and retary of War for Air created, 29; on air defense, separate air arm, 24; and aircraft procurement 30-31; on coastal defense, 35; and pursuit types, and development, 100-101, 118; calls White House 66; approves Project A, 69; establishes GHQ Air aviation conference, 100; reaction to Munich, 107; Force, 73-74; regards GHQ Air Force as solu- aviation program, 108, 118 tion, 74; limits Air Corps’ off shore range, 91; Russian front, 122 bomber procurement, 92-96, 107-8; and air re- search and development, 118; and air arm war requirements, 124 S War Plans Division: on coast defense, 69 Webster. Robert M.: 57; refers to Drum Board, 71; St.-Mihiel, 5-6, 54 on tactics, 79; recommends change in ACTS pro- Scott, Riley E. : bombsight, 3 gram, 79 Scriven, George P.: 1; and military aviation, 2 Weeks, Sec. of War John: appoints Lassiter Board, 2d Bombardment Group, 45 26 Sherman, William C.: summary of military theory, Westover, Oscar: 96; on separate air arm, 23, 104-5; 16; “The Fundamental Doctrine of the Air Serv- criticizes Mitchell, 23 ; bombardment, 80 ; and at- ice,” 16 tack aviation, 88; plea for a stronger air force, Signal Corps, 1-2 89; and bomber development, 92-93, 97, 99; on Single-seater : in pursuit aviation, 7-8, 64-66, 85-86, Spanish ’Civil War, 102; accepts subordinate posi- 126 tion of Aviation, 104-5 Sino-Japanese War, 102 White house aviation conference, 100 Slessor, John C.: on strategic aviation, 80 Williams, Al: 104; on German airpower, 109 Smith, Frederic H. Jr., 91 Wilson, Donald: on Douhet, 51; appears before Spaatz, Carl: 28, 74; on pursuit, 37-38; on attack Federal Aviation Commission, 52-53 : bombard- aviation, 87-88; on bomber mission, 93; observer ment vs. Pursuit, 56’; on precision bombing, 57-58; in Europe, 108; on British, 110; on German air- on employment of airpower, 78; on pursuit, 84; Power, 110; and Navy efforts to control bom- on separate air arm, 105; on German airpower, bardment, 118 109; on Spaight, James M.: on coordinate air arm, 70-71 Woodrjng, f War H. H.,100; bomber program, Spain. See Spanish Civil War. 97-100 Spalding, Gearge R.: 96, 101; opposes air force de- velopment, 95; opposes Project D, 96-97 XYZ Spanish Civil War: influences attack doctrine, 87; air action, 102-3, 122 Zepplin raids, 9 Spitflre, 110 Zero, 86

Sr GPO : 1985 0 - 487-778 : QL 3 154