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Routledge Handbook of Air Power

John Andreas Olsen

Air Power Theory

Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315208138-4 Phillip S. Meilinger Published online on: 26 Feb 2018

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The Vietnam War was awatershed thatledtoarenaissance in abandonedthefieldofairpowervirtually thinkingtocivilian academicswhodevised theories the abilitiesofaircraft andweapons ofthetime. Post-Second World War, leaders military espoused. Between andSecond theFirst World Wars they spunideasthatwere years aheadof and sea. Unfortunately, seldomsynchronised theirideaswiththetechnology airtheorists they (Howard 1987: 416; Ader 2003: 3). This ideasoonproved tobeanillusion. deliver would thatnationswould from make bedeterred usingsuchmethods war sohorrifying and,purposes indeed, would helptoeliminatewar. itcould andthedestruction The airplane Clément Ader inFrance, opinedthatthenew invention would beusedonlyforpeaceful flight. Despitethedoomsayers, someearlyairmen, suchasOrville in and Wright America latertechnologyand alittlemore hadadvanced thanacentury tothestageofheavier-than-air from theskies. Bytheendofeighteenthcentury, balloonswere theimagination, capturing goddesses tossingthunderbolts, flyingshipsthatraineddeath andRenaissancesagesimagined and how theairwould becomeamediumofwar. Ancient cultures conjured wingedgodsand Before theaircraft was even invented, speculatedaboutflight thinkers andwriters farsighted millions, andhadaprofound effectontheconductofwar. The heavy lossoflifeconvinced First World War. That war smashedempires, spawned dictatorships, causedthedeathsof both ofwhomwere ofwar thewar anew theory –imagined British during officers Army receptive audience. Moreover, thinkers suchasJ. original F. C. FullerandB. H. – LiddellHart consideration thanthey would have. ordinarily This demandforalternatives gave a airmen thattacticsandstrategyhad tobealtered, leaders military soradicalsolutionsreceived greater most mobileweapon we possess, itisdestinedtobecomethedominant offensive ofthe arm onairpower,centring reinforcing theairmen’s credibility. Fullerstated: ‘As theaeroplane isthe By the beginning ofthetwenty-first century,By thebeginning airpower hadbeguntodominatewar onland AIR POWER THEORY Phillip S. Meilinger The earlyyears 3 35 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:46 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315208138, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315208138-4 paradox common among other air theorists suchas paradox common amongotherairtheorists and Wright Ader, hemaintained thatair itself was inhuman, there and inthewar were just experienced noinnocents. a Offering A pragmatist, Douhetrejected arguments thatattacksoncivilians were immoral. To him, war cations were obvious: hewas convinced thatdropping bombsonacountry’s majorcitieswould these strikes were,these strikes they effects. haddisproportionately largepsychological To Douhet, theimpli cause such disruption anddevastationcause suchdisruption thatrevolt were andsubsequentsurrender inevitable. absenteeism andevacuation from thecities. Relatively limitedinnumber andscalethough thatcontention.support inItaly,The bombingstrikes thoughsporadic, causedwidespread prone topanic, from garnered the First andthelimitedexperience World War seemedto and over timehasbecomeeven more complex. war, togetherplayed during inholdingacountry parts crucial theproblem becamedaunting, suchasreligion, factors notedthatintangible air planners nationalism, traditionand culture also mean itwas valuable, andavaluable targetable. assetwas notnecessarily Thus, whenperceptive thus becametheessenceofairstrategy. Yet simplybecausesomethingcouldbetargeteddidnot not allofthesetargetscouldbestruck, sowhichwere Selecting targets themostimportant? railroads, steelmills, power andotherspecificassetswas electrical interesting, grid, factories but withthespecificworkingsfamiliar ofanation. Knowing dependedonits thatacountry enemy was army nolongerthemaintarget, thenwhatwas? now hadtobecome Airmen contests hadbecometoobloody ofpolicy. toserve asrationalinstruments collapsed,army sodidresistance. The First World War demonstratedthatsuchattritional therefore equatedtheenemycenturies withthemaincentre army ofgravity, becausewhenthe exposedandvulnerable,the interior thelosersuedforpeace. over theorists Military the tothevictor.interior Often, oreven actualdestruction occupationproved unnecessary: with War therefore becameacontestbetween armies: inbattleexposedtheircountry’s thelosers they were generallywell behindthefrontier andheavily defendeditwas difficulttoreach them. differed significantly.tegically routinely effects; withstrategic however, thespecific ways inwhichtoemploy airpower stra function(Douhet1942:country 15, 27–28). haveAirmen oftenhailedthisabilitytooperate Those centres consistedoftheindustrial, political, economicandpopulationlocithatmadea gravity orvitalcentres ofanenemywere, country intheory, always withinrangeofaircraft. weapon strategic inwaysan intrinsically forces were thattraditionalsurface not: thecentres of warfare fundamentallyfrom warfare. differs surface Nonetheless, ofairpower thepathtoacoherent theory was steepandrocky, becauseair partly immediately attheseatofopposingwillandpolicy whichshieldstheenemyarmy government, industry, andpeople, and future’ (Fuller1935: 209). was LiddellHart more effusive: ‘Aircraft enable ustojumpover Douhet identified the population as the prime targetforairattack.Douhet identifiedthepopulationasprime Heviewed civilians as Air power offered apotentialsolutionwhilealsointroducing anew setofproblems. Ifthe An opponent’s forces, vitalcentres hadlongbeentheultimategoalofarmed but because GiulioDouhetnotedasearly1909thatairpowerThe Italiangeneralandairtheorist was navy hadtimetomobilizeatall! preservation, upanddemandanendtothewar would –thisbefore and rise theirarmy andsuffering,an endtohorror thepeoplethemselves, driven by theinstinctofself- to thiskindofmerciless pounding from theair. The timewould sooncomewhen, toput A completebreakdown cannotbut ofthesocialstructure take subjected placeinacountry Phillip S. Meilinger 36 ’ 1925: (LiddellHart 37; emphasisinoriginal). so strike directand so strike (Douhet 1942: 58) the - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:46 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315208138, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315208138-4 original air thinkers prior totheSecond airthinkers prior original World War. College. This broad background, mind, combinedwithafirst-rate madeSlessor oneofthemost Trenchard’s staff, personal and in1931was oftheBritish Staff assigned tothefaculty Army cooperationsquadronlater commandedanarmy from 1925to1928. Afterwards, heworked on national will(Meilinger1996). todestroyto bombindustry capability, Trenchard soastofracture the soughttobombindustry be sodebilitatingthatthepeoplewould demandpeace. In short, whereas the wished Americans lifeofthepeople–lossjobs,normal wages, services, andgoods–would transportation was infrastructure target. theappropriate industrial ofthe Hereasoned thatthedisruption Instead, Trenchard advocated somethingsimilartothe Tactical School’s idea: acountry’s attacking thepeopledirectly was theway toproduce trauma. thatpsychological outweighed itsphysical effects(Boyle 1962: 577–578). However, Trenchard didnotbelieve that oftheRAF.formation Heargued, asdidDouhet, effectsofbombing thatthepsychological 1918; indeed, hadprompted ZeppelinsandGothabombers the theseraidsby German in1917and airattacksonBritain totheGerman of thepopulationandtheirpoliticalleaders , tookaslightlydifferent approach. Trenchard hadwitnessedtheextreme reactions the Army intotheSecond Air Forces carried World War. 19–25; Hansell1972: 6–49). –that by –unsupported combatexperience Itwas thisdoctrine were theentire edificewould struck 1926: come crashing down (Sherman 218; Wilson 1971: system, but at thesametimeviewed thisweb asinherently fragile: bottlenecktarget iftheright the termed web’,‘industrial andmutually supporting envisioned asanintegrated acountry totheeffective orfunctionsintegral operationoftheentire system.those factories Their theory, Ken Walker, Don bottlenecks– thatsoughtoutindustrial devisedWilson andothers atheory processes (Biddle2002). economic andindustrial goodsneededtosustainawarmanufactured military effort. The key was these todisrupt becausethey constitutedthebuilding importance actually ofgreater blocks forothertypesof power,resources suchaselectric steel, coal, chemicalsandoil were targetsand alsomilitary and alltherest. Moreover, tookaneven mostairmen broader view, arguingthatessential mass productiongoods: ofmilitary ships, aircraft, tanks, trucks, , ammunition, uniforms not itspopulation. According tothiseconomicview ofwar, statedependedon themodern theinterwar yearsUnited Statesduring focusedonanenemy nation’s infrastructure, industrial winning wars by destroying things ratherthanpeople. andthe inbothBritain Air doctrine out anentire generation(Douhet1942: 9–10, 61, 181). by airpower was much preferable toanotherworld war thatmightdragonforyears andwipe ofwar.but many millionsdiedintheoldform A short, violentanddecisive conflictdominated itwouldwarfare would behumanizing. besohorrible many thousandswould Certainly die, Another RAFofficer, Wing CommanderJohn Slessor, was a World War Icombatpilotwho The Royal Air Force (RAF), ledby Hugh Air ChiefMarshal Trenchard forthedecadeafter In the America Air Corps Tactical School(ACTS) refined thisconcept. further HalGeorge, By contrast, Douhet’s saw inairpower counterparts andBritish thehopeof American covered andmachineguns. by massartillery are hurledagainsttheenemies’formations strongest pointsprotected by barbedwire and casualties thaneithernaval blockade, anaval bombardment, orsieges, orwhenmilitary fewer andwillobtainitsendwithfar lessbrutal andfar lessindiscriminate will befar bombardment,I emphaticallydonotadvocate indiscriminate andIthinkthatairaction Air powertheory 37 (Trenchard 1928) Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:46 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315208138, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315208138-4 fighters, attackaircraft (Evans andmediumbombers andPeattie 1997: 332–340). was andprotectService toscoutand tosupport thefleet. Bothcontingentsconsistedlargelyof Army Japanese was groundtroops NavalAir Service tosupport andthatoftheImperial Air separate, independent air force. Instead, forboth services: itbuilt airarms the missionofthe Second World War; instead, they focusedontacticalairpower thegroundforces. tosupport In short, France, the andRussiadid notdevelop bomberduring Germany strategic atrue 1992: ofaidingthisrapidgroundassault(Corum purpose 144–169). would concentrateonthedevelopment fortheexpress andmedium bombers offighters be mechanisedandmotorised, andtanks would play amajor role intheoffensive. The whatwouldand sowas born laterbetermed Under thedirection ofGeneral Hansvon Seeckt, embracedthisnotion, military theGerman thatmobilityhadbeenlostandmust nowand determined beregained forfuture success. whohadfoughtonthe combatofficers German Western Front studiedthelessonsofwar tactical airpower between the World Wars (Cain2002). 1997: (Corum bombers 159–162). A similarbeliefprevailed inFrance, whichalsofocusedon air power, pushingforaforce composedoffighters, structure attackaircraft andmedium bombingwouldideas onstrategic give way tothoseof Amedeo Mecozzi, whofavoured tactical their objectives (Boyle 1962: 183–188). Hewould laterchangehisopinion. InItaly, Douhet’s First World War missionofairpower thattheprimary shouldbetohelpgroundforces achieve effects –hadexistedsincetheearlydays offlight. Trenchard, forexample, believed the during nornavies canexistunlesstheairiscontrolledarmies over them’ (Mitchell1925: XV). tests of1921and1923inwhichaircraft sankseveral battleshipsreinforced thisbelief: ‘Neither more efficientfashion. Mitchellsaw fleetsaseven more vulnerable thanarmies, andhisbombing battle (Mitchell1921: 15). Onlynow, inaquicker aircraft couldaccomplishsuchdestruction and words, inthetime-honoured methodofthedecisive counter hesawoccurring victory book, Mitchellcalledfortheuseofairpower todestroy forces oftheenemy. themilitary Inother that ofthe ACTS, immediatelyaftertheFirst hiswritings World War were different. Inhisfirst would by thelate1920sfluctuatebetween astrategyakintothatofDouhetandonecloser had devastating effectsonGermany’s entire war (Tedder effort 1948: 106–115). systemsin addition, railandbridge oftheGerman thewholesaledestruction Western Europe landings by severely reinforcements theflow restricting tothelodgementarea. ofGerman In in 1944. This plan’‘transportation thesuccessofNormandy was successfulinensuring Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, pushedstrongly forjustsuchanaircampaignagainstGermany ational-level airinterdiction campaign. theSecond During World War, RAFleaders, notably Air will (Slessor1936: 97, 111, 122–147). Inessence, Slessorwas advocating oroper astrategic- network –wouldhave inturn adecisive effectonnotonlytheenemy’s capability, but alsoits paralysed. This paralysation–alsoeffectedbyoftheenemy’s destruction commandandcontrol would beunable thearmy tooffereffective resistance, but would theentire country be andneutralised. systemmust bedisrupted transportation Ifthiswere accomplished, notonly onthismatter;not thinkonlyintacticalterms rather, hemaintainedthattheenemy’s entire the enemy army’s linesofsupplyandcommunication were thekey targets. Significantly, hedid posits awar inwhichtheBritish hasbeen deployedArmy totheContinent. Slessorarguedthat Japan was unique. Ithadbothastrong andapowerful army navy but didnotestablish a In Russia this same intellectual journey tookplacewiththesameresultsIn Russiathissameintellectualjourney (Hardesty 1982). In Germany, atraditionallandpower, thisnotiontookroot withtenacity. After thewar, Such anidea–inessence, theuseofairpower inatacticalrole thatwould have strategic tookanunusual approachairtargeting.Others tostrategic Although GeneralBillyMitchell Slessor’s seminalbookAirPowerand Armies Phillip S. Meilinger 38 was basedonhislectures attheStaffCollegeand – lightningwar. Ground forces would force - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:46 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315208138, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315208138-4 the strategic level.the strategic intellectual exercise, but hardly likely tobeimplemented–ifonlybecausethesuperpowers weapons. As aresult, gave fewthought totheuseofconventional airmen serious airpower at the sametime, accepted thepremise thatfuture themilitary wars would involve nuclear hopedthatthemere existence ofsuchweaponstheorists would deterwar. time inthefuture. At thesametime, thevery thoughtofnuclear that war was so horrible andonthedevelopmentrelied ontheory ofweapons thatwould andtechnologies existsome interwar ideasof airmen, whichwere alsolargelydevoid ofconcrete examplesandinstead positive aspect, however, was thegrowing realisation thatnuclear warwas theory aninteresting The Vietnam War hadmany negative services. effectsontheUnitedStatesanditsmilitary One (Mueller 1997: 290–305; BallandRichelson1986). Inthissensethey were notunlike the War era. Significantly, theseideaswere largelytheoretical andbasedonlogic, notexperience sufficiency andthelike –were elegant, reasoned andserved the West well throughout theCold professionals. The ideasthey proposed –balanceofterror, mutual assured destruction, strategic academics were seeminglyascapable ofnuclear ofdevising war atheory aswere uniformed ofnuclear war.theories withthistypeofwar, Sincethere was noexperience virtually these Schelling, inwar emergedtodefineandarticulate forexample–withlittleornoexperience his life, anew breed ofcivilianBrodie, academics–Bernard Kahnand Herman Thomas civilians. After deSeversky, whoenjoyed usinghis Reserve rankofmajorthroughoutAir Corps years, airmen, mostlyuniformed andthoseoftheatomic/nuclear era, mostofwhomwere necessary, defeatthem(Libbey 2013: 22–41). therefore wrote abouttheneedforanatomic-capable airforce todetertheSoviets or, if awestruck by thedevastation unleashedby bombing–especiallyby theatomicbombs. He movie by Walt Disney.) After thewar, deSeversky toured Europe war-torn andJapan andwas and Japan totheirknees. (Thebookwas abestsellerandwas even intoananimated turned popular work through Victory Air Power centred issues(Libbey 2013). madehimanauthoritative commentatoronair- technical acumenandcombatexperience P-47 Thunderbolt. Healsobecameaprolific spokesman andadvocate forairpower. His company. His designs were years aheadoftheirtime, andhisP-35was theancestoroffamed built anairrefuelling device intheearly1920sandeventually foundedhisown aircraft immi new age. force inthis emergedwhoattemptedtoexplaintheuseofmilitary different groupoftheorists obsolete.experience The atomicandthennuclear agesredefined war. As aconsequence, a worldwide.leaders The new weapon appeared torevolutionise warfare inways thatmadeprior not occur. onJapanThe atomicstrikes hadbothacatalysingandnumbing effectonmilitary would have spawned ofnew anoutburst ideasintheyears following 1945; surprisingly, thatdid One would expectthatthemassive anddecisive useofairpower intheSecond World War Regrettably, tooeasilyabandonedtheintellectualfieldtocivilians. airmen military At De Seversky was transitionalfigure oftheinterwar between animportant theairtheorists theSecond During World War bombingandinhis ofstrategic hestressed theimportance Alexander P. deSeversky, theFirst aRussianfighterpilotandaceduring World War, had grated totheUnitedStates.grated Having lostalegincombat, toengineering. He heturned The impactofthe Vietnam War Post-war nuclear theory he detailedhow Germany wouldAllied bombers bring Air powertheory 39 - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:46 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315208138, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315208138-4 in anideallocationwhenSaddam Husseininvaded Kuwait inthesummerof1990. Puttinghis itself–andthenactquicklyontheresulting insight.orienting Becauseoftheemphasison war Boyd sawconsistentlygoingtothesidethatcouldthinkmost creatively victory – dogfight,play notonlyinan aerial but alsoatthehigherlevels ofwar. of Intracingthehistory alwaysthat theadversary reacted eithertoolateor inappropriately. phase ofhisOODA Loop. The goalwas tothinkandoperatemore quicklythantheenemy so process andcreation’‘destruction (Osinga2015: 51–52). This process dominatedtheorient essential components, andthenreassemble theminnew andunusual ways. this Hetermed andideasfromisolated facts different disciplinesandevents, themintotheir deconstruct worldthat theincreasing complexitiesofthemodern necessitatedanabilitytotake seemingly loop begananew. (observe–orient–decide–act). As soonasonesideacted, itobserved theconsequencesand the opponent. Heexpressed theOODA thisconceptinacyclicalprocess hetermed loop broader context. The key was tovictory actmore quickly, bothmentallyandphysically, than than theMiG. thought,After further Boyd ina begantoseetheimplicationsofthistheory flight controls thatallowed manoeuvre ittotransitionfrom toanothermore rapidly oneaerial reflection, hedecidedthattheF-86’s advantage was duelargelytoitshydraulically operated (Werrellair combatwiththeMiG-15(aneight-to-onesuperiority) 2005: 221). Upon began withColonelJohn Boyd. two poleshadtoberecaptured. conventionalThe renaissance ofstrategic airpower thought indicated thatneitherextreme offered decisive results. The vast middlegroundbetween those of nuclear holocaustandthosewhoprepared tofightthetacticalairbattle, world conditions Staavaren 2002). attemptingtoimplementitaswell astocivilianscasualties toairmen ontheground(van accommodating. Itwas adisastrous strategythatproduced nousefulresults, but didcauseheavy inducements, ofincreased bombingiftheNorth andsticksintheform Vietnamese were not ofaneasingairattacksonNorth form Vietnam, aswell asother diplomatic andeconomic Washington, calledforanaircampaignthatoffered andsticks: Hanoibothcarrots inthe carrots policy ofGradualEscalation, devised by civiliantoPresident advisors Lyndon Johnson in were oftheobjectsstruck the vast interdiction majority targets(Thompson2000: 307). The Force, aircraft bombtonnage onNorth dropped Corps enormous Navy andMarine Vietnam, demon were sowell prepared towage ofwar. suchacatastrophic form At thesametime, Vietnam the psychological facet isdifficultto measure oreven facet the psychological must focus on identifytheair strategist Iraq’s centres ofgravity. intopractice,theories Warden attacksagainst designedanaircampaigncalling forstrategic War Collegein1986(Warden 1989). HissubsequentassignmentinthePentagon placed him combat veteran, Warden studyofairwarfare whileastudentattheNational beganaserious on enemy asthekey, leadership was ColonelJohn Warden. Like Boyd afighterpilotand forairoperations:blueprint toBoyd, thisprocess governed allofwarfare (Osinga2015: 91–92). mind oftheenemy leadership. Although apilot, more thana encompassedfar histheories phaseoftheloop,orientation Boyd calledforastrategydirected inpracticalterms againstthe Even more significant, Boyd laterhypothesised thatthiscontinuously repeating cyclewas at oftheloop. portion phaseasthemostimportant Boyd identifiedtheorient Hespeculated theKoreanAs afighterpilotduring War, Boyd by was thesuccessofF-86in intrigued Thus, whileideasaboutairpower between thosewhothoughtonly hadbecomepolarised Warden thatwar asserted isacombinationofphysical factors, andpsychological but because airpower, whohasthoughtdeeplyaboutstrategic Another airman andwhoalsofocused strated thattacticalairpower mightnotbeawar-winning weapon. Although US Air Phillip S. Meilinger 40 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:46 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315208138, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315208138-4 short, theroutewas tovictory thesameasit hadbeenforcenturies: thedefeatof enemy War.examined theresults oftheGulf Hearguedthatitwas nottherelatively smallnumber of Vietnam, studiedtheworks ofDouhet, Mitchellandotherclassicairthinkers, andthen role ofairpower was tocomplementthegroundforces inthedefeatofenemy’s forces. In assault even beganattheendofFebruary. the air. To Pape, was theIraqiarmy rendered ‘combat ineffective’ before theCoalition ground outcome ofthewar; rather, themassive use ofairpower directly againsttheIraqiforces and the targetsinand around directed againststrategic Baghdadthatdetermined air sorties Bombing to Win, Pape reviewed aircampaignsintheSecond strategic World War, Korea and academic whotaughtattheSchoolof Advanced Airpower Studies. Inhisseminalwork, Warden, italsorevived ofairpower anoldtheory employment. Pape Robert was acivilian what really counted(Deptula2001). created thedesired effect to damagekey elementsthatcouldbeeasilyrepaired, althoughnotforseveral hours. This oftime, period for ashort thenit was todestroy notnecessary anentire power plant, but simply Rather, ifthegoal, forexample, sector ofBaghdad were inacertain toshutofftheelectricity wasrealisation thatdestruction notalways thesuccessofanairstrike. todetermine necessary paralysis oftheIraqiregime. This airstrategycametobetermed ‘effects-based operations’: the numerous missionstolocateandkillSaddamhimself, but heremained well hidden.) slowed, whileSaddamhimselfwas effectively cutofffrom hisforces. (Thecoalitionalsoflew inhisdecision-makingprocess.confusion anduncertainty HisOODA Loopwas expandedand difficult forSaddamHusseintocontrolforces, hismilitary andalsoinducedenormous communications network, road and railsystems, power madeitextremely andelectrical grid War represented1991 Gulf therealisation ofsuchanairstrategy. againsttheIraqi Air strikes Warden focusedinsteadonhittingtheform centuries. Inshort, airpower paralysis(Olsen2007). couldleadtostrategic produced thetypeofrapidandrelativelyhadsoughtfor leaders military bloodless victories routinely possible. Inhisview, nature ofairpower, thestrategic combinedwithnew technology, has always beenthemosteffective intheory, but onlytheinvention ofairpower madeit tooffensive ring action.the leadership Warden concludedthatthistypeof ‘inside-out’ warfare distractions bestavoided. These targetsystemsshouldbeattackedtoexpose only as necessary andtransportation), (industry infrastructure thepopulation andfieldedforces –were captured, –theenemy thentheentire country body–would beincapacitated. so tooenemy was leadership thekey toenemy resistance. couldbekilledor Iftheleadership body –itcontrolled allmovement whilealsoreceiving allinputsandwas – thusirreplaceable leadership, equatedtothehumanbrain. Just asthebrainwas organofthe themostimportant but alsothemosthardenedleast important (Olsen2007). –the ring forces astheoutermost –andarmed centre ofgravitywhilealsothemostfragile target consistingoffive rings, asthebull’s-eye concentric withleadership –themostimportant the physical manifestationsoftheenemy. The device heusedtoillustratehisconceptwas a 80,000 or so surrendered virtually withoutafightasresult ofsixweeks80,000 orsosurrenderedvirtually ofpoundingfrom their supplylinesproved decisive. Approximately theirpostsandanother 80,000Iraqisdeserted Pape was revisiting theearlyideasofbothBillyMitchellandHugh Trenchard: the primary War ofBoyd and thetheories of1991tendedtosupport the Gulf during Just asexperience In effect, ofBoyd and thetheories Warden helpedtoenable astrategythatresulted innear- Thus, whereas John Boyd theprocess soughttodisrupt Warden andpower), –organicessentials(raw went materials ontoarguethattheotherrings Warden likened hisFive Ringsmodeltothehumanbody. ring,The innermost theenemy – shutting off the electricity for a specified period oftime–whichis foraspecifiedperiod – shuttingofftheelectricity Air powertheory of that leadership (Olsen2007).of thatleadership For bothmenthe 41 of theenemy’s leadership, John Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:46 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315208138, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315208138-4 power was equaliser. thegreat Northern Alliance hadairpower behindit, with targetscalledinanddirected by SOF. Air 2,000 Northern Alliance troops (Andres, 2006:Wills andGriffith 149). the Butofcourse by the Taliban; atMazar-e-Sharif, forexample, 5,000 Taliban indefensive positionsconfronted Northern Alliance, even ofSOFtroops present, withthesmattering was always outnumbered before conventional USgroundtroops even intheatre. arrived Also ofimportance, the recon with theindigenousNorthern Alliance andbacked by ubiquitousintelligence, surveillance and This isremarkable, andcomparable with the Afghanistan situationwhere SOFtroops, teamed words ofoneobserver: (Andres 2006: andKirkukfalling surrendering 412). withthe5thIraqiCorps April Inthe March, andthe81st38thdivisions on2 April. front collapsedon10 The entire northern these forces destroyed division, theIraqi4thinfantry followed by the21stdivision on31 apparent thatoperationsfrom thatfront would bedenied. Nonetheless, on30March 2003 with almostnoneofitsequipment, whichhadbeenpre-positioned in Turkey before itbecame the 173rd thatwas air-dropped Brigade intoBashur.Airborne Ofnote, arrived thisbrigade there were –fewer USspecialoperationsforces (SOF)teamsinthenorth than600men–plus todefendagainstapossible invasionpositioned inthenorth from Turkey. Besidesthe Kurds, remarkably few casualtiessincethe Vietnam War –airpower limitsrisk. Because ofitsrange, precision, lethality, –airforces have flexibilityandsecurity suffered ground troops) thathave plagued interventions inthepost-Second American World War era. problems ofconventional (largenumbers ofcollateraldamageandthelargeintrusive footprint weapons, thennationsmust advantages. counterthemwiththeirown asymmetric gold. orunconventional and Ifaterrorist strategies enemy war pursues with asymmetric maximises thechancesofachieving politicalsuccesswhileminimisingthecostinblood and Afghanistan andIraqpost-9/11. Panama, (albeittemporary), Storm Desert Bosnia, Kosovo, , in andtheearlyvictories successes, largeandsmall, have includedremoval from kingManuelpower Noriega ofdrug in war –atleastthewaymodern itispractisedby theUnitedStatesanditsmajorallies. Military WarThe decadesfollowing Gulf have thefirst strengthened thedominanceofairpower in (Pape thancouldanotherarmy 1996:more easilyandatlessrisk 240–253). army. Onlynow, airpower hadadvanced tothestagewhere itcoulddestroy faster, anarmy power. Ofimportance, theseindigenous forces were to notconsidered ofhighquality prior when Croats andKosovars benefittedfrom North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) air Indigenous troops were essentialtobothoftheseoperations, asthey hadbeenintheBalkans As anexample, oftheIraqoperationin2003, atthebeginning Iraqidivisions were thirteen The increasing useofprecision-guided munitions hasallowed airpower tomitigatethe must away focusonsuccessesaswell planners Military todetermine asfailures aheadthat portion ofIraq’sportion army. Moreover, asingle death. itdidsowithoutsuffering American with unskilledindigenousalliesandhighlyconstrainedairpower defeatedasignificant successful. Despitenumerous andpolitical obstacles, logistical asmallSOFgroupworking In short, againstallprewar expectations, Iraqwere fantastically SOFoperationsinnorthern naissance (ISR)assetsandCoalitionairpower, produced– a rapidandstunningvictory The aftermath of Desert Storm andtherevolution Storm ofDesert inwar The aftermath Phillip S. Meilinger 42 (Andres 2006: 412) Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:46 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315208138, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315208138-4 freedom on gainingcommandoftheairattheatre level. allows boththe Gainingairsuperiority rapidly aspossible. Somearguethisisessentialonlyintheoperationalarea, insist whileothers quickly,ability tostrike anywhere, virtually andoftenwithlittleornowarning. may ofwar bethestrongest onland, form suchisnotthecasewithairpower becauseofits all three levels ofwar simultaneously from theoutsetofwar. weapon inways forces are thatsurface not. At thesametime, itcanalsooperateeffectively at themes becomemostprominent. First, airpower hasbeenrecognised asaninherently strategic When reviewing over airtheory thepastcentury, andasconducted, bothasimagined four NATO forces (Mueller2015). opposition groundforces whichbrought down MuammarGaddafi–withnocasualtiesto success (Lambeth2001: 221–227, 242–243). InLibya, itwas airpower teamedwith local Taliban previously. Yet, whenstiffenedwithSOFandairpower, they achieved enormous quality, trainingandweapons; they hadproven largelyunsuccessfulinfightingtheSerbsor hostilities. The Kosovars andtheNorthern Alliance, forexample, were deficientinquantity, forces, andindigenousgroundtroops inthetypesofwars now endemic. events pointtowards anew paradigminvolving airpower (includingrobust ISRassets), special United Nations-sanctionedprotection missionswitnessedover thepastfourdecades. Recent ofconflictsthatwillseeUSor the majority Western involvement are thetypesofpunitive or them andstatetheirintentionofusingifdirectly attacked. Nonetheless, that itisalsotrue key reason nuclear weapons have notbeenemployed since1945isthatsomany nationshave weapons –must always leaders. forpoliticalandmilitary remain aconcern Itisprobable thata thatmust remainpetitors deterred. A majorconventional war –orworse, oneusingnuclear correct targets when fighting a terrorist organisationsuchasso-calledIslamicStateinIraqand targetswhenfightingaterrorist correct supremacy. –andusuallyair United Statesanditsallieshave cometodependonthisairsuperiority a neighbouring country,a neighbouring thenhow, exactly, thepower –oramunitions factory, willstriking grid bombing thepower Iftheiroverall grid? objective istoforce theenemy tohaltaninvasion of chosen andtheobjectives sought. For example, expecttogain by whatspecifically doplanners forces involved.military combining theresults intoacoordinated operationsorder that canbeimplementedby the destroyed)target setsthatmust beaffected(notnecessarily toattain thoseobjectives, andthen leaders. This involves broadobjectives, goalsintospecificmilitary transforming identifyingthe must devisestrategists acampaignplantoachieve thepoliticalgoalssetby thenation’s civilian worth totheenemy toprevent you from achieving it. After addressing thesebasicquestions, air mental questions: whatisthegoal; how much isitworth toachieve thatgoal; andwhatisit noted above andtranslatethemintoaworkable plan. withaskingthree funda This begins modified. (ISIS).Syria Oldtemplatestraditionally usedagainstconventional opponentsmust now be Third, have as airtheorists continually ofachieving stressed airsuperiority theimportance Second, airpower hasalways beenviewed asapowerful offensive weapon. Although defence In sum, theworld involves inthisseconddecadeofthetwenty-first century peercom Finally, targetingstillremains crucial, but the ingenuity andtrenchant analysistodetermine What cannotbeoveremphasised isthatthere must beaclearlinkagebetween thetargets The task of the air strategist is to make sense of the various conflicting theories andconcepts istomake conflictingtheories The taskoftheairstrategist sensevarious to attack andthefreedom from Key observations Air powertheory attack. Joint force operations asconductedby the 43 - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:46 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315208138, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315208138-4 air warfare, including thetheoretical. Onlythenwillwe beable toselecttheconceptfor the theoretical senseasintheoperational. well Neededare groundedinallaspectsof airmen in war. thatflexibilityisthekey Ithasbecomeanaphorism toairpower. in That isjustastrue well asanincreasing it. andevidence volume tosupport ofoperational experience Andres, R. B., Wills, C., andGriffith, T. E., Jr(2006) ‘Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value ofthe Afghan the nextandfrom onesituationtothenext. ities ofwar. There isseldomoneanswer; moreover, answers usuallyvaryfromto onecountry togive asimpleanduniversallywar thatpurports applicable answer tothenumbing complex the mostvaluable strategist: lessonforany military beware amodelof whooffers thetheorist choose tomake peacebasedonacalculusthatisseldomeasilyidentifiable. And thatisperhaps Just asnationsgotowar ofvaried, foracomplex array oftenconflicting, reasons, sotoothey 2009). viable aircampaignplan(Ehlers have becomekey elementsofthemilitary, andtheirproducts ofa are vitaltotheformulation was tostudythemakeup andvulnerabilities ofanenemy state. Today, theseintelligenceagencies bureaucracies arose, composedofeconomists, andengineers, industrialists whosemainfunction previous intelligencethanthatrequireddifferent typeofmilitary eras. during As aresult, new entire economicandpoliticalsystems. totheSecond Prior World War thiswas afundamentally minor consideration. Air warfarerequires ofanadversary’s ordinarily adetailedunderstanding are whatwere expected, sothatadjustmentscanbemadeforfuture operations. This isnota accurate measurement oftheeffectsairattacks. This analysisisessential toensure theresults of linkingendsandmeansisacrucial, yet toooftenoverlooked, requirement fortheairstrategist. import ive? Inotherwords, justbecauseatargetisdestroyed orneutraliseddoesnotmeanitwas divisions,or armoured towards –contribute orintelligenceheadquarters achieving thatobject Andres, R. B. (2006) ‘The Iraq’,Afghan ModelinNorthern ofStrategic Studies TheJournal Ader, C. Aviation, (2003)Military trans. anded. L. Kennett, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press. employing airpower bestsuitedtothesituationathand. Flexibilityisalsothekey toair As aresult, have ofairtheories up, avariety sprung logic, eachencompassingmuch internal as inanaircampaignhasproven thorny,priority surprisingly andtheanswer isnot self-evident. targetingphilosophies.upon various targetsshouldhaveThe questionastowhichstrategic battlefield, they level, alsoarguedforitspre-eminence atthestrategic basingthiscontention changed becauseoftheirnew weapon. Without denying thedominanceofairpower onthe power. have ofwar-makingAirmen oftenclaimedthatthebasicmethodsandstrategies have operations are extremely difficult, ifnotimpossible, withouttheextensive employment ofair playing role anincreasingly important inwarfare. forcerealise commanders thattheir Surface In summary, ithasbecomeapparent over ofthepastsixdecadesthatairpower thecourse is strategy. Nonetheless, itistimetomove beyond overly prescriptive ofairpower’s interpretations use Model’, 395–422. Perhaps caveat thegreatest tobearinmindisthatfew wars fortheairstrategist are simple. thekey requiresDetermining targetorgroupoftargetswithinacountry careful and ant orthatthecampaignhascomeany closertoattainingitsgoals. The intellectualprocess International Security International 30 (Winter), 124–160. Phillip S. Meilinger Conclusion References 44 29 (June), - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 22:46 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315208138, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315208138-4 Van Staaveren, J. (2002)Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965 Wilson, D. (1971) ofa ‘Origins of Theory Air Strategy’, Werrell, P. (2005)Sabresover Mix Alley, Annapolis, MD: USNaval Institute. Warden, J. A., III(1989)The Air Campaign: PlanningforCombat Trenchard, H. (1928) ‘The War Objectofan Air Force’, Memorandum, 2May, File AIR 9/8, Public Thompson, W.(2000) Tedder, A.(1948) Slessor, J. C. 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