The Influence of Airpower Architects on Structuring the Air Forces COL (RET.) FLAVIO NERI HADMAnn JASPER, BRAZILIAN AIR FOrcE Introduction The theory of airpower was born before the First World War (WWI), the scenario for its first great application; with Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and Hugh Trenchard being cited among its best- known theorists. All of them, in one way or another, faced much opposition to their ideas, mainly because they antici- pated the application of the new war machine that had emerged: the airplane. However, David MacIsaac1 argues that the term airpower would have to find a clearly defined, or at least irrefutable, place in the history of military or strategic theory. He states that the influence of theorists has been limited because, in their field of application, the effects of technology and the exploits of agents have had a greater role than ideas. MacIsaac2 points out that “the use of the airplane was a specific result of the choice of each nation . reflecting an effort to integrate the peculiar possibilities of the aircraft in support of ground or naval forces, or in in- dependent operations . for the achievement of national objectives.” Therefore, the problem on which this brief investigation focuses is pinpoint- ing the degree of influence of airpower theorists—highlighting Douhet, Mitch- ell, and Trenchard—in the structuring and operational organization of air forces, with emphasis on the period from 1910 to 1950 and the focus on the air forces of Brazil, Italy, the US, the United Kingdom, and Germany. As a theoretical framework, the analyses of Edward Warner and David Ma- cIsaac on the theories of Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard were used. Warner observes that Douhet’s theory reflects the geographical position of Italy and that it would have minimized the possibility of the existence of a battleplane to prevent attacks by bombers, a central point of Douhet’s theory to achieve air dominance.3 This article investigates a relatively unexplored field. Normally, studies cover the basic points of each theorist’s thesis on airpower—that is, em- ployment on the battlefield and the technology involved. However, the connec- tions between the organization of an Air Force and the respective theories of airpower are usually not addressed. The article examines the period between 1910 and 1950, since this period encapsulates when practically all air forces consolidated as organizations; and is divided into two sections. The first is a brief analysis of each theorist’s organiza- 240 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS SECOND EDITION 2020 The Influence of Airpower Architects tional and operational vision of the air force in their respective countries, against the backdrop of the principles envisioned by those theorists. The second briefly recounts the evolution of the organization of air forces in the US, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Brazil, and the influence of each theorist’s vision. This section also contains, in summary form, an analysis of Italian theorist Gi- ulio Douhet’s thoughts regarding the creation and organization of the Ministry of Aeronautics and the Brazilian Air Force (FAB). The conclusion brings the results of the research and a comparative approach between the ideas of the studied authors. Airpower Theory Initial Considerations This section’s objective is to highlight the main points of airpower theorists’ vi- sion that may have influenced how air forces were structured from 1910 to 1950. The chosen period encompasses the advent of aviation, the two World Wars and their results—highlighting the independence of aviation from the other armed forces. The Principles Envisaged by Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard In Dik Daso’s vision,4 the history of the evolution of airpower was more than just the combat aircraft used in war. In his opinion, airpower characterizes a technological system, as it represents the unification of an instrument and a function and, in short, has a greater implication than just a power-driven air- plane. Daso mentions that Holley5 also highlights that aviation learned an im- portant lesson “on the organization for decision in a unified command” to re- place the dispersed, poorly organized, and overlapping chains of command that existed during WWI. Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard saw this as a basic principle defining the independence of aviation from the other armed forces—that is, the creation of an air force as an armed force with the same status as land and naval forces. Douhet and Mitchell had strong discussions with their superiors to convince them of the importance of independence from land and naval force aviation. This cost each court-martial, with Douhet remaining in prison for a year and Mitchell, already a general, demoted to colonel. Douhet addressed the distance between the combat front and the rearguard when he pointed out that, before the advent of the airplane, it was not possible to go beyond the battle lines without first breaking them, a fact that had been superseded by aviation. He found that, despite that WWI had affected entire JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS SECOND EDITION 2020 241 Jasper nations, only a minority of citizens fought and died, while the majority contin- ued to live, work, and supply the means to fight.6 The air force had changed that dynamic. This analysis coincided with the ideas of Trenchard and Mitchell that the airpower was essentially offensive and strategic. An aircraft’s ability to move in a three- dimensional arena gives it an offensive capacity that breaks the prin- ciple of war that the attacking forces need to be more numerous than the defen- sive ones. The plane reverses that equation.7 With that in mind, Douhet and Trenchard advocated using bombers as weapons capable of deciding the air war, in Douhet’s vision of “air dominance” and in Trenchard’s vision of “air superiority.” Bombers would eliminate enemy aviation on the ground, destroy the country’s industrial base, and destroy a population’s morale. During WWI, Mitchell suggested that the North American Expeditionary Force be divided into two sections: one “strategic” (with bombers on missions independent from ground and naval forces) and the other “tactical” (with recon- naissance and strike aircraft on behalf of ground and naval forces).8 Having been commander of striker and fighter units in the European theater, even con- curring with Douhet’s and Trenchard’s ideas on the use of bombers as a strategic and offensive weapon, Mitchell noted that, for bombers to carry out their mis- sion, they must be protected by fighter aircraft. Trenchard’s key idea was that an air force should concentrate on bombers, how to select targets, and on the search for how to demoralize the enemy. 9 Seversky 10 emphasized this when referring to the British campaign in Norway, noting that the army, although superior to the German army, was defeated, hav- ing to withdraw due to Luftwaffe attacks by Messerschmitt and Heinkel air- craft. This cost the British their aircraft carrierGlorious , sunk during the evacu- ation of British troops from the city of Narvik. In the Skagerrak region, the British paid a heavy price for their fighter jets (Spitfires and Hurricanes) lacking sufficient range to protect both the navy and their bombers, a reverse situation to that of the Battle of England. Seversky further noted the superiority of land- based versus carrier-based aviation. Seversky observed that Germany, as well as other nations, did not have fighter jets with sufficient range.11 In the campaign British against Norway, Germany’s advantage was geographic. This reinforced Mitchell’s view that bombers would only be effective if they were protected by fighter aircarft. Both English and German air forces had not focused on a stra- tegic strike force (to achieve range), resulting in defeats for both sides, only in different geographical situations. The air forces’ capabilities were taking advan- tage of existing technology, but this wasn’t taken into consideration by strate- gists. As an example, Seversky cited the case of the German Condor, at that 242 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS SECOND EDITION 2020 The Influence of Airpower Architects time a civilian aircraft that could make the Berlin–New York flight nonstop and could have been adapted as a long- range bomber with a large cargo capacity.12 Mitchell’s vision (protecting bombers), together with that of Gen Henry H. Arnold, commander of US Army Aviation in the 1930s (focused on developing technology to improve airpower), resulted in the development of the P-51 Mustang aircraft. This fighter jet was essential mainly due to its operating range, allowing the Allies to effectively carry out attacks on German territory during World War II (WWII). Seversky emphasized quality over quantity, as an element linked to the devel- opment of technology.13 Douhet and Trenchard, despite paying attention to technology, were more concerned with its employment rather than its develop- ment. 14 Another important element of the principles envisaged by Douhet and Mitchell was the contribution of state resources. Both believed more resources should be allocated to the air force than to the army and navy. Mitchell was so emphatic that, to convince the US Congress, he made an attack demonstration on American Navy ships, sinking three of them, which angered the admirals.15 An aspect that distinguishes Douhet from the other theorists is his focus on civil aviation. Douhet proposed centralizing aeronautics as an institution that would have jurisdiction over both military and civil aviation, subordinated to the state for the establishment of public policies of national security. However, he suggested separating activities that were of military interest from civilian ones. In Douhet’s vision, “The Ministry of Aeronautics must have full compe- tency to take care of all aeronautical matters.”16 However, for Douhet, unlike Arnold, “the State should not be concerned with industrial interests and, conse- quently, it would be advisable that .