PARTTHREE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF KEITH LEHRER

1957 (a) 'The Aboutness of Thoughts', The Graduale Review, October, pp. 26-32.

1!HiO (a) 'Can We Know That We Have by Introspection?' The Joumal of , March, pp. 145-157. I argue in this paper tha! introspection gives us adequate evidence that some of our actions are free. Introspection reveals that we deliberate and philosophy that deliberation involves the conviction of freedom. Thus, freedom is a conviction, and, 1 argue, a warranted one. 1 side with and reply to Hempel and Griinbaum who argue that such evidence is inadequate. (b) 'Ifs, Cans, and Causes·. Analysis. June, pp. 122-124. Reprinted in The Nature of Humon Action (ed. by M. Brand) (Scott, Foresman and Company), pp. 179-181.

1961 (a) With John Canfield. 'A Note on Prediction and Deduction', , April, pp. 204-208. (b) 'Cans and ConditionaIs: A Rejoinder" Analysis, October. pp. 21-23. Reprinted in The NatureofHumanAction (see 1960b), pp. 184-186.

1962

(a) 'A Note on the Impossibility of Any Future Metaphysics·. Philosophical Studies. June, pp.49-51.

1963 (a) 'Decisions and Causes', The Philosophica/ Review, April, pp. 224-227. Reprin!ed in

Bogdan, R. J. (ed.), 'Keith Lehrer', 245-255 245 Copyright © 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland. KEITH LEHRER

New Readings in (see Books Edited), pp. 661~70, and in Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series. (b) 'Descriptive Completeness and Inductive Methods', The Journal of Symbolic Logic. June, pp. 57~. In this paper, I propose a solution for a paradox Salmon generated from an appliea• tion of Camap's probability theory to languages with different predicates but some overlap. 1 propose that one should choose languages with greater descriptive completeness and prove that equally complete languages cannot yield ineompatible results no matter which predicates are taken as primitive.

1964 (a) 'Could and Determinism', Analysis, March, pp. 159--160. (b)'Doing the Impossible', The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, May, pp. 86-97. (e) 'Doing the Impossible: A Second Try', The Austra/asian Joumal of Philosophy, August, pp. 249--251. (d) ' and Probability', The Journal of Philosophy, June, pp. 368-372.

1965 (a) With Richard Taylor, 'Time, , and Modalities', Mind, July, pp. 390-398. ft is natural to assume that if a person ean perform an aetion as a means to another that wiII inevitably result, then the person ean perform the resultant aetion. Taylor and 1 argue that this prineiple leads to paradox when the person eannot perform the resultant aetion unless he performs the means and fails to perform the means. For then we must say both that he ean perform the resultant aetion because he ean perform the means and that he cannot perform the resultant aetion beeause he does not perform the means. This article bas been mueh discussed, and 1 think it contains a genuine puzzle. (b) 'Knowledge, Truth, and Evidenee', Analysis, April, pp. 168-175. Reprinted in Knowing (ed. by M. D. Roth and L. Galis) (Random House, New York), pp. 5~, and in Bobbs-Merrill ReprintSeries. This was my first attempt to deal with and is, in my opinion, still important for the refutation of a number of popular but unsatisfaetory solutions. My positive proposal was that for a person to have knowledge that a is true, the proposition must remain justified for him even it he were to suppose any false proposition to be false whieh entails the proposition in question. (c) 'Letter: On Knowledge and Probability' ,Journal ofPhilosophy, February 4, pp. 67~8.

1966 (a) 'An Empirieal Disproof of Determinism?', in Freedom and Determinism (see Books Edited), pp. 175-202. Reprinted in Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility (ed. by G. Dworkin) (Prentiee-Hall, EngIewoodCliffs), pp. 172-195. This is the best known of my articles on freedom and determinism. 1 argue that we have adequate evidenee of our freedom without appeal to introspeetive evidenee, that the hypothetical analysis of freedom fails, but, finally, that freedom and

246 BlBLIOGRAPHY

determinism are compatible anyway. My argument is that the evidence that shows that we are free does not refute determinism which it must if freedom entails the falsity of determinism. This article remains one of my favorites. (b) 'A Third Analysis ofPrediction', Theoria, pp. 71-74. (c) 'Critical Review of Science, , and Reality, by ', Joumal of Philosophy, May, pp. 266-277. This is technically a book review, but 1 believe Ihat it contains a c1ear and simple exposition of the principal theses of Sellars philosophy. For that reason, I think it remains of interest, especially to those who find Sellars difficult reading.

1967

(a) 'Wants, Actions, and Causal Explanation: Comments on Professor Aiston's Paper', in lntentionality, Minds, and Perception (ed. by Hector Castalleda) (Wayne State University Press, Detroit), pp. 342-350. (b) 'Caus ing Voluntary Actions: Comments on Professor Feinberg's Paper', in Meta• physics and Explanation (ed. by W. Capitan and D. Merrill) (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh), pp. 52-55. (c) With R. Roelofs and M. Swain. 'Reason and Evidence: An Unsolved Problem', Ratio, pp.38-48,

1968 (a) 'Scottish Influences in Contemporary ', The Philosophical Joumal, pp. 34-42. In this article, 1 show that Reid's c1aim that perceptual beliefs are justified in themselves without reasoning from sense impression constitutes a solution to the problem discussed by the American Realists and adopted by Chisholm. (b) 'Cans Without Ifs', Analysis, pp. 29-32. (c) ' and Knowledge', The Philosophical Review, pp. 91-99. In this article, I first attempt to refute aII arguments intended to show that knowledge does not entail belief, and, finally, I present an argument to show that the entailment holds. (d) With James W. Cornman, Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An lntroduction (First Edition, Macmillan, New York).

1969 (a) 'Neglecting to Do What One Can', Mind, pp. 121-123. (b) 'Theoretical Terms and lnductive lnference', in Studies in the Philosophy of Science: American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph No. 3, pp. 30-41. This article is an attempt to explain how theoretical terms achieve inductive systematization in science and are essential for that purpose. The inductive rule 1 employed was the one articulated more fully in 1970a. 1 regard that rule as unduly restrictive, but that does not undermine the argument. It was intended to iIIustrate that a difference between deduction and induction, based on the failure of probability

247 KEITH LEHRER

relations to be transitive, could make theoretical terms indispensible for inductive inference in science. (c) With Thomas Paxson, Jr. 'Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief, The Journal ofPhilosophy, pp. 225-232. Reprinted in Essays on Knowledge andJustification (ed. by G. S. Pappas and M. Swain) (Cornell University Press, Ithaca), pp. 146-154. Paxson and I presented a new solution to the Gettier problem intended to avoid problems that arose for my earlier attempt. Our proposal was that justifieation must be undefeated by any false statement. Our positive proposal has technical problems whieh moved others 10 present alternative defeasibility theories. The article remains interesting as the origin of such theories and for the refutation of important alter• native theories presented by Goldman, Skyrms, and others. (d) 'Induction: A Consistent Gamble', Nous, pp. 285-297.

1970 (a) 'Induction, Reason, and Consistency', British Journal for the Philosophy ofScience, pp. 103-114. This articIe contains a rule of induetive inference that avoids the lottery paradox and which, in iterated application, allows quite strong conclusions to be drawn in some eases. It had the merit of showing a probability based rule could avoid the lottery paradox. This was thought not to be possible. (b) 'Justification, Explanation, and Induction', in lnduction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief(ed. by M. Swain) (Reidel, Dordrecht), pp. 100-133. In this article, I defend the idea that a proposition is justified either because ofwhat it explains or because of what explains it. I used an inductive rule proposed in 1969b and 1970a to show how something eould be explained by the probabilities that permitted it to be induced from the evidence. Salient features of the inductive mie show it to be a principle of explanation. (e) 'BelievingThatOne Knows', Synthese, pp. 133-140. (d) 'The Fourth Condition of Knowledge: A Defense', Review ojMetaphysics, September, pp. 122-128.

1971 (a) 'How Reasons Give Us Knowledge, or The Case of the Gypsy Lawyer', Journal of Philosophy, pp. 311-313. (b) 'Induction and Conceptual Change', Synthese, pp. 206-225. In this articIe, I began to articulate a theory of induction and evidence that avoids tht: assumption that statements of evidence must be certain. Statements chosen as evidence are not immune from error. Moreover, 1 explain how semantic shifts may determine what is accepted as evidence as well as what is inductively inferred. I propose a less restrictive rule of inference that still avoids the lottery paradox and recast the earlier inductive rule as a rule for the selection of evidenee based on prior probabilities. (c) 'Why Not Scepticism?', The Philosophical Forum, pp. 283-298. Reprinted in Essays on Knowledge and Justification (see 1969c), pp. 346-363. This articIe is an exercise in the defense of scepticism, the thesis that we know

248 BIBLlOGRAPHY

nothing. The argument is complicated, and has, I believe, some merit. It shows that the ordinary meaning of the word 'know' is not a satisfactory basis for a theory of knowledge but should be traded for an improved concept that picks out what we take to be the extension of the word 'know' as it is customarily used. In the article, I restrict myself to the usual meaning and articulate an agnoiology, a theory of ignorance. (d) 'Scepticism and Conceptual Change', Empirical Knowledge (ed. by Robert Swartz and ) (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs). This is a further elaboration of the sceptical position focusing on the conception of knowing something for certain. I suggest that if a person knows something for certa in, then there is no chance that he is in error. 1 argue that there is always some chance of error, perhaps only very small, and, therefore, that we do not know anything for certain. The argument that there is always some chance of error is based on an appcal to scientific innovation and conceptual change.

1972

(a) 'Evidence and Conceptual Change', Philosophia, pp. 273-281; also in Logic, Language and Probability (ed. by Radu Bogdan and Ilkka Niiniluoto) (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1973), pp.lOO-107.

1973 (a) 'Reasonable Acceptance and Explanatory Coherence: Wilfrid Sellars on Induction', Noas. pp. 81-102. This is a discussion of Sellars theory of induction based on explanatory coherence. Sellars oUers us a complex theory to show how reasonableness is derived from the objective of obtaining the simplest overall explanatory system. I argue that part of this theory, especially that part concemed with statistical inference, leads to a paradox similar to the lottery paradox. I suggest a way of avoiding this result by appeal to a rule of inductive inference I had proposed. Thus, the article provides a comparison between the s~stem Sellars articulates and the theory I developed. (b) 'Minimally Inconsistent Sets and Relevant Deduction', Philosophia, pp. 153-165. (c) 'Evidence, Meaning and Conceptual Change: A Subjective Approach', in Conceptual Change (ed. by R. Maynard and G. Pearce) (Reidel, Dordrecht), pp. 94-122. In th" e~~ay. I explore more fully the problem of selecting statements as evidence on the assumption that evidence is not to be restricted to what is certain. The rule of evidence proposed is the same as that articulated in 1971b, but I associate a measure of epistemic expected utility with the rule. The rule of evidence is based on prior probability of a subjective or personalist variety. (d) The Philosophy of Skepticism, a training module written for and published by Empire State College, Sara toga Springs.

1974 (a) 'Belief and Error', in The Ontological Turn (ed. by M. S. Gram and E. D. Klemke) (University of Iowa Press, Iowa City, 1974), pp. 216-229, and in Romanian translated

249 KEITH LEHRER

by Radu Bogdan in Informatics and Mathematical Models in Social Sciences, 1973, pp. 77-96. (b) 'Truth, Evidence, and Inference', American Philosophical Quarterly, pp. 79-92. This article is the culmination and summary of my work on induction and the selection of evidence statements. The approach is again subjective, being based on subjective probabilities, and avoids assuming or positing antecedent knowledge or certainty. Evidence is derived from prior probabilities, and induction is based on probabilities conditional on the evidence. Measures of epistemic expected utility aîe formulated to articulate the rules. It is shown that such measures and the expected utilities derived from them are determined by comparative probabiIities. It is concluded, therefore, that quantitative probabilities may be regarded as a useful mathematical fiction for the acceptance of statements of evidence and inferred hypotheses. Comparative probabilities suffice for the construction of our evidential base and the results we infer therefrom. (c) Knowledge, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Sections of Chap. 8 reprinted in Essays on Knowledge and Justijication (see 1969c), pp. 289-308. This book is my construction and defense of a coherence theory of knowledge. 1 argue against a foundation theory of knowledge beginning with self-justified beliefs that guarantee their own truth and proceeding {rom these to justify the rest. Instead, 1 argue that a relation of coherence among beliefs generates the justification a belief must have to be knowledge. Such a theory requires both a system of beliefs and a relation of coherence. The relation of coherence is defined in terms of a competition relation which is based on probabiIity. A proposition must be more probable than its competitors to be justified. The system, which I caII a corrected doxastic system, consists of the set of statements affirming the various things the person , thinned by the removal of those things he would not believe as a truth seeker. When the system is further corrected so that false beliefs are replaced with belief in the contradictories of the falsehoods, we obtain the verific alternative for a person. A person knows only if the proposition in question is more probable than its competi• tors in both the corrected doxastic system and the verific alternative. It then coheres in the proper way within these systems. There is no assumption that something must have a probability of one, or be certain, to be knowledge. This result may conflict with some ordinary conceptions of knowledge, but, 1 allege, the theory coincides well with what we ordinarily suppose the extension of knowledge to be. It provides a theoretical explication of why we consider that c1ass of cases to be important. (d) With lames W. Cornman, Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction, Second Edition.

1975 (a) 'Reply to Dr. Radford', Philosophical Books, pp. 6-8. (b) 'Induction, Rational Acceptance, and Minimally Inconsistent Sets', in Volume VI, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Induction, Probability and Confirma• tion (ed. by G. Maxwell and R. M. Anderson, lr.), pp. 295-323. This article is one in which the rule of induction I articulated in other articles is connected with notions of relevant deduction and minimally inconsistent sets. I show that the conclusions inductively inferred by the rule are innocent until proven guilty

250 BIBLIOGRAPHY

in the sense that there is no relevant deductive argument to a contrary conclusion alI of whose premises are as probable on the evidence as the inferred conclusion. An expected utility interpretation of the rule is articulated and defended. The rule is shown to be a bold one directing 'us to infer a hypothesis that is more probable than other equally strong hypotheses. (c) 'Social Consensus and Rational Agnoiology', Synthese, pp. 141-160. This is one of the first articles in which I explore the conception of social rationality. The problem is to specify what is socialIy reasonable, where this may conflict with the opinion of some members of a group of experts. I argue that when the object is to arrive at a true hypothesis, majority rule or compromise are defective or conspira• torial. I then propose a method for amalgamating the probability assignments of other individuals in the group in terms of their evaluations of each other to find a social probability assignment. The major theorem is presented in 1976b and devel• oped in other later artic\es. I end by dealing with the question of why anyone should take consensus as a guide to truth. (d) 'Reason and Consistency', in Analysisand Metaphysics (see Books Edited), pp. 57-74. I deal here with the problem of when it is reasonable to have a 10gicalIy inconsistert set of beliefs. In more cases than one might imagine, inconsistency is perfectly reasonable. It is alleged by others that it is reasonable to have a logically inconsistent set of beliefs because it is reasonable to believe that at least some of your beliefs are false. I consider this argument in detail and reject it. My contention is that someone seeking to avoid error and to accept what is true as well would neither reject nor accept the c\aim that some of his beliefs are false. He would, of course, agree that it is very probable that some of them are false. For the purposes of prediction and justification, consistency is an advantage, and one may obtain this advantage by withholding assent and dissent from the claim in question. That, I argue, is the reasonable course. (e) With Joseph Richard, 'Knowing without Remembering', Grazer Philosophische Studien, pp. 121-126. (f) 'Reference, Predication and Semantic Interpretation', in Proceedings of the Eleventh International Congress of Linguists (ed. by Luigi Hellmann) (Societa editrice il Mulino, Bologna), pp. 587-592.

1976

(a) 'Induction, Consensus, and Catastrophe', in Locallnduction (ed. by Radu Bogdan) (Reidel, Dordrecht), pp. 115-144. In this artic\e, I show that the rule of induction that 1 have advocated is equivalent to the rule to accept the most probable truth set if there is one. A truth set is a maximally consistent set, and, therefore, if you.accept such a set, you accept every true state• ment from a field. I defend the rule ajZlliost a number of criticisms, for example, those of Levi. I then go on to consider the notion of probability used in such a rule, and I propose a concept of consensual probability articulated in 1976b. Ifwe assume that the probability is a consensual one, then we should expect revolutionary or catas• trophic shifts in what is accepted following a rational method for determining a consensual probability assignment. Hence radical shifts in what is accepted are

251 KEITH LEHRER

perfectIy compatible with following rational methods for amalgamating the informa• tion individuals possess. (b) 'When Rational Disagreement is Impossible', Nous, pp. 327-332. This article is the basis for my various articles on consensus. 1 exposit a theorem, which Kit Fine and Gerald Kramer assisted me in discovering, for aggregating the information individuals possess to tind a consensual probability assignment. The principle idea is that individuals weigh the reliability of members of the group, take a weighted ave rage of each person 's probability assignment, and arrive at an improved assignment. It this procedure is repeated, then, under quite realistic conditions, people will converge toward a consensual assignment. In the article, 1 formulate briefly the mathematics of the theorem and justify the iterated procedure. (c) '''Can'' in Theory and Practice: A Possible Worlds Analysis', in Action Theory (ed. by M. Brand and D. Walton) (Reidel, Dordrecht), pp. 241-270. In this article, I present a possible worlds analysis of'can' and ·could'. I argue tirst that hypothetical analyses of these notions fail and explain both why they fail and why they seem plausible. The possible worlds analysis I offer instead uses ideas developed to provide truth conditions for conditionals. The analysis says that accessible worlds are, roughly, those in which a person has no advantage for perforrning the action which he lacks in the actual world. I argue that the resultant conception of freedom is logically consistent with determinism. (d) 'Comments on Walton's Paper', in Action Theory (1976c), pp. 289--290.

1977 (a) 'Rationality in Science and Society: A Consensual Theory' , in Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy (ed. by ) (Oriel Press, Stockstield), pp. 14-29. (b) 'Sociallnformation', The Monist, October, pp. 473-487. This article is badly named and might better have been entitIed 'scientific revolution and social consensus' - for that is what the article is about. I argue that theories are underdetermined by experimental data but that this by no means commits us to the thesis that science is the outcome of mere social dominance. For, building on the 1976b result, 1 argue that consensus can articulate the rational aggregation of indi• vidual information, including social information individuals have about the expertise of each other. Such a consensus results from the precept to use the total information available. (c) 'Reichenbach on Convention', Synthese, pp. 237-248. (d) 'Reid's Influence on Contemporary American and British Philosophy', in Thomas Râd: Critical lnterpretations (ed. by S. Barker and T. Beauchamp), Philosophical Monographs (Philadelphia), pp. 1-7. The first part of this article summarizes the 1968a paper on Reid and the American Realists, but it adds a second, and more important part, showing the extent to which G. E. Moore was indebted to Reid. Moore makes several references to Reid, and internal evidence corroborates the very great influence Reid had upon the epistemo• logical doctrines Moore defended in the name of common sense. (e) 'The Knowledge Cycle', Nous, 1977, pp. 17-25. This article is one that articulates the overall structure of a coherence theory of knowledge. Some of the details were hurriedly sketched to meet a deadline. but the

252 BIBLIOGRAPHY

essay shows very c1early the way in which a coherence theory departs from a foundation theory of knowledge. In particular, I argue that no part of an epistemic system is immune from rejection, and thus the metaphor of a foundation is otiose. There is a new account of when it is rational to accept something as knowledge based on the extension of the notion of opportunity cost in economics. What we accept as knowledge is so accepted because the costs of acceptance are within reason rather than because such acceptance is founded on a particular base.

1978 (a) 'Consensus and Comparison: A Theory of Social Rationality', in Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory (ed. by C. A. Hooker, J. J. Leatch, and E. F. McClennan) (Reidel, Dordrecht), pp. 283-310. This is a long study in which I extend the method for finding social consensus in the quest for truth to that of finding consensus in practical matters. In 1977b, I explained that the method for finding a consensual probability assignment was equivalent to a method for finding consensual weight to be assigned to each person and then using such weights to obtain a weighted average of probability assignments. A similar method for finding the appropriate consensual weight to assign to the preferences of each individual may be used to solve problems of social choice. The problem of social choice was articulated by Kenneth Arrow in the most poignant form. The method I propose is one where we are not restricted 10 individual preferences as the basis for social choice but may use appropriate weights assigned to individuals as weB. I discuss five melhods of using the weights to make social choice which depend 10 different degrees on quantitative measure. Ultimately, I defend, against some of Arrow's arguments, the use of a social utility assignment derived from consensual weights and individual preferences as the basis for social choice. (b) 'Reid on Primary and Secondary Qualities', The Monist, April, pp. 184-191. (c) 'Sellars on Proper Names and Belief Contexts', in The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions (ed. by J. Pitt) (Reidel, Dordrecht), pp. 217-228. (d) Knowledge, Paperback Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

1979 (a) 'The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge', in Justification and Knowledge (ed. by G. Pappas) (Reidel, Dordrecht), pp. 65-78. (b) 'Knowledge and Freedom in the Philosophy of Leonard Nelson', in Vernunft, Erkenntnis, Sittlichkeit (ed. by P. Schroder) (Felix Meiner Publisher, Hamburg), pp. 69-B2.

1980 (a) 'Coherence and the Racehorse Paradox', in Midwest Studies in Philosophy V (ed. by P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein) (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis), pp. 183-192. (b) 'Truth, Evidence and Error: Comments on MilIer', in Applications of Inductive Logic (ed. by L. J. Cohen and M. Hesse) (Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp. 130-142.

253 KEITH LEHRER

'Preferenees, Conditionals and Freedom', in rime and Cause (ed. by P. van Inwagen) (Reidel, Dordreeht), pp. 187-201. (e) 'Language and Rational Consensus', 'Reply: The Rationality of Disrespect', and 'Comment: Postulation and Conceptual Innovation', in Concept Formation and Explanation of Behavior (ed. by R. V. Hannaford) (Ripon College Press, Ripon), pp. 56-{)3, 67, 89-90. (d) 'Preferenees, Conditionals, and Freedom', in Time and Cause (ed. by P. van Inwagen) (Reidel, Dordrecht), pp. 187-201.

In Press and Forthcoming (a) 'Scepticism and Prior Probabilities', Philosophia. (b) 'A Model of Rational Consensus in Science', in Rationality in Science (ed. by R. Hilpinen) (Reidel, Dordrecht). (c) 'Probabilities Among Probabilities', Grazer Philosophische Studien. (d) 'Ubereinstimmung und Wissenschaft Wandel', Conceptus.

Edited Books (a) Freedom and Determinism (Random House, New York, 1966, and republished by Humanities Press, New York, 1976). (b) With A. Lehrer, Theory of Meaning (Prentiee-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1970). (e) With H. Feigl and W. Sellars. New Readings in Philosophical Analysis (Appleton• Century-Crofts, New York, 1972). (d) Analysis and Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of R. M. Chisholm (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975). (e) With R. Beanblossom. Reid's Inquiry and Essays (Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1975).

254 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Critical Literature

Freedom and Determinism G. E. M. Anscombe, in G. Ryle (ed.), Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy (1976), 403-411; B. Aune, Analysis27 (1967),191-195 and (1970), 77~3; J. Cargile el al. , Mind 77 (1968), 572-574; D. Blumenfeld, Phil. SI. 22 (1971),26-30; B. Brody, Phil. SI. 20 (1%9),92-95; D. Coder, Phil. St. 24 (1973), 280-281; C. Dore, Phil St. 21 (1970),33-37; B. Goldberg and H. Heidelberger, Analysis 2 (1960--61), 96; A. Goldman, A Theoryof Human Aetion (1970), 199ff; T. E. Horgan, Phil. St. 32 (1977), 403-411; B. Mayo, Mind 77 (1968), 271-278; E. McCann, Phil. St. 28 (1975), 437-441; L. Nissen, Mind78 (1969), 134-135; D. Pears, Canadian J. Phil. 1 (1972), 369-391; P. van Inwagen, Phil. SI. 23 (1972),351-357; D. Walton, Personalist 56 (1975),242-249.

Knowledge, lnduetion and Consensus In most of Lehrer's works these areas are integrated. The criticalliterature reflects this. W. Aiston, Phil. SI. 29 (1976), 287-305; D. Annis, Analysis 29 (1968-69); Phi/. SI. 24 (1973),199-202, and Philosophia 6 (1976), 209-213; D. Batens, BJSP22 (1971),357-361; H. Bbredin, Phil. SI. (Ireland) 25 (1977), 335-338; R. Binkley, Canadian J. Phil. 7 (1977), 841~1; R. Carter, Phil. SI. 31 (1977), 327-335; M. Clark, Mind 86 (1977), 142-144; l. W. CQrnman, APQ 14 (1977), 287-297; C. Dunlop, Australasian 1. Phil. 55 (1977), 201-205; P. Gomberg, Phil. Rev. 85 (1976), 396-400; G. Harman, J. Phil. 63 (1966),241-247; D. C. Hubin, Phil. Forum 7 (1976),367-377; J. Kenyon, Philosophy 50 (1975),483-485; P. D. Klein, J. Phi/. 73 (1976), 792-812; J. R. Kress, J. Phil. 68 (1971), 78-82; M. lenes, Phil. SI. 24 (1973), 392-396; R. Laddaga, Synlhese 36 (1977),473-477; l. Lesher, Phil. Forum 4 (1972/73), 299-303; W. G. Lycan, etc., Phil. St. 28 (1975), 147-150; J. Margolis, APQ 14 (1977), 119-127; R. Meerbote, Phil. St. 24 (1973), 192-197; 1. Niiniluoto, Ajatus 33 (1971), 254-265; C. Pailthorp, Review ofMetaphysics 24 (1970), 129-133; M. Pastin, NoUs 11 (1977),431-437, and Phi/. St. forthcoming; G. S. Pappas in Pappas (ed.), Justijicalion and Knowledge (1979), 51-M; T. Paxson, Jr. Grazer Phil. St 1 (1975), 193-199; J.' L. Pollock in op. cit., 93-114; A. Riska, Philosophia 3 (1973),343-349; E. Sosa, J. Phil. 67 (1970), 59-66, and J. Phil. 73 (1976), 812~21. R. PurtiIl, Phil. Forum 3 (1972), 138-144; C. Radford, Philosophical Books 16 (1975), Hi; R. K. Shope,J. Phil. 75 (1978), 397-413; A. R. White, Philosophieal Quarterly 2S (1975), pp. 284-286. J. Phil = Journal of Philosophy; Canadian J. Phil = Canadian Journal of Philosophy; BJPS = British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; Phil. SI. = Philosophical Studies; APQ = American Philosophical Quarterly; and Phil. Forum = Philosophical Forum.

255 INDEX OF NAMES

Anscombe, G. E. M. 19,20, 24,26,32, Harman, G. 94, 95 110, 118 Heidelberger, H. 5,9 Arrow, K. 70, 71, 72, 166, 175, 253 Hempel, C. 245 Audi, R. 122, 124 Hilpinen, R. 12, 23, 57, 92,93, 114- Aune, B. 5,11,20,108,109,112 117,121,140,223 Austin, J. 107 Hintikka, J. 44,87 Hooker, C. A. 181-203,228-232 Beck, L. W. 12 Horgan, T. 35, 36, 122-124, 223 Bjerring, A. K. 181-203,228-232 Hubin, D. 12 Borda 166 Brodbeck, M. 4, 11 Kitely, M. 5,11 Klein, P. 92,93 Canfield, J. 12 Komer, S. 6,12 Camap, R. 44,246 Kramer, G. 12,252 Carter, R. 84 Kyburg, H. E. 12,47, 140, 143, 159, Cartwright, R. 8, 12 161,162,226 Castafieda, H. 12 Chisholm, R. 6, 7, 9, 75, 76, 86, 87, Ladd, J. 6 100,108,111 Lehrer, A. 6,12 Condorcet 166 Lenz, J. 6 Cornman, J. 12 Levi, 1. 53, 54, 87, 140, 149, 161, 251 Donagan, A. 4 McCann, E. 36 Eberle, R. 12 Merrill, D. 10 Moore, G. E. 4,7,100,108,252 Falk, D. 12 Merton, R. 12 Feigl, H. 4 Fine, K. 12, 252 Nakhnikan, G. 12

Gettier, E. 12,62,75,95 Pappas, G. 129-163,224-227 Ginet, C. 12 Pastin, M. 76,205-222, 233-241 Goldman, A. 77,248 Paxson, T. 12 Griinbaum, A. 245 Paz,J. 3

257 INDEX OF NAMES

Plantinga, A. 12 Stevenson, J. L. 12 Pollock, J. 34,120,122,223 Suppes, P. 12 Pratt, J. 12 Swain, M. 12 Premack, D. 41 Swatez, G. 11

Quine, W. V. O. 9,75 Taylor, R. 6,7,9, 11, 12, 13,17,23, 223,246 Ramsey, F. 9,46 Tomas, V. 6 Reid, T. 7, 13, 100, 245, 247, 252 Turbayne, M. 12 Ross, G. 12 Russell, B. 8-9 Van Cleve, J. 12 Van Inwagen, P. 38 Salmon, W. 6, 7, 8, 246 Scriven, M. 4, 11 Wagner, C. 68, 73, 101, 165-180, Sellars, W. 4, 5, 6, 75, 80, 247, 249 184-203,228 Shaw, M. 4 Walton, D. 23,107-128, 223-224 Sleigh, R. 6,9, 12 Zuckermann, H. 12

258 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

acceptance 42-43, 47-48, 55f, 79-80, competition 87,147,226-227 among statements 50, 54-55, 86, see evidence, induction 131 analysis and reasonableness 86-87 method of 8 confirmation 153-155 of 'can' / 'could' 19f, 34, 108-109, consensus 63-75, 165-177, 181-200, 111, 120-124, 223-224, 252 251,252 of knowledge 79-84,220 consensus matrix 68-70, 169f, 186f action 13-39,107-128,246 and social choice 70-72 advantage in performing 19f, 28-31, and respect 65, 171, 184f, 187, 34,123 190, 192 and possible history 115f convergence to 68-70,171-172, evidenced by introspection 13, 245, 174,188,231-232,251 246 see freedom decision Arrow's impossibility theorem 166-167 making 41-43 theoretic approach to knowledge belief 21lf incorrigible 206-207 determinism, see freedom self-justified 207, 233 doubtfulness 92 inferential 216, 239-240 doxastic system 82-83, 88, 209, 250 perceptual 247 vs acceptance 79-80 evidence 57~2 acceptance of 58~0, 130-140, 248, coherence 88 249 theory of knowledge 208-210, 234, explanation, see justification 250, 252, 253 probabilistic 81-82 foundation theory of knowledge 26, and reasonableness 85-90 205-208,211-213,233-235,250 see justification freedom 107-128,246 common sense view 7-9, 13, 100, 252 and determinism 13-39, 107-128 compatibilism 16f and causation 15-16 see action, freedom and free will 13f see analysis of 'can' / 'could' 259 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

the Gettier problem 91-96, 218-221, meaning of 249 241,246,248 entails betief 247 and evidence 60-62 incompatibilism 32 see the Gettier problem induction 39-62 theory of 48-50, 249, 250, 251 lottery paradox 46-47, 50-51, 248, 249 and theoretical terms 247 rules of 51, 52, 141-152, 225 meaning and truth 10 justification conditions of 80-85, 215-216, 237 preference among actions 37-38, 112 and probabilistic coherence 81-82 probability and verific alternatives 83-85, 88, theories of 44-45 238,250 subjective 44f, 83, 89 and explanation 153-156, 213, 239, consensual 64-69,251 248 rationality 40 knowledge 75-98, 205-222 reasonableness 85-90 causal theory of 77-79,238 coherence theory of, see coherence social choice, see consensus foundation theory of, see foundation skepticism 96-98, 249 theory of knowledge analysis of 79-84 utility indexical 219 expected 43,53-56,88 multiperspectival 219-220 as benefit minus costs 54-55

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