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PARTTHREE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF KEITH LEHRER 1957 (a) 'The Aboutness of Thoughts', The Graduale Review, October, pp. 26-32. 1!HiO (a) 'Can We Know That We Have Free Will by Introspection?' The Joumal of Philosophy, March, pp. 145-157. I argue in this paper tha! introspection gives us adequate evidence that some of our actions are free. Introspection reveals that we deliberate and philosophy that deliberation involves the conviction of freedom. Thus, freedom is a common sense conviction, and, 1 argue, a warranted one. 1 side with Thomas Reid and reply to Hempel and Griinbaum who argue that such evidence is inadequate. (b) 'Ifs, Cans, and Causes·. Analysis. June, pp. 122-124. Reprinted in The Nature of Humon Action (ed. by M. Brand) (Scott, Foresman and Company), pp. 179-181. 1961 (a) With John Canfield. 'A Note on Prediction and Deduction', Philosophy of Science, April, pp. 204-208. (b) 'Cans and ConditionaIs: A Rejoinder" Analysis, October. pp. 21-23. Reprinted in The NatureofHumanAction (see 1960b), pp. 184-186. 1962 (a) 'A Note on the Impossibility of Any Future Metaphysics·. Philosophical Studies. June, pp.49-51. 1963 (a) 'Decisions and Causes', The Philosophica/ Review, April, pp. 224-227. Reprin!ed in Bogdan, R. J. (ed.), 'Keith Lehrer', 245-255 245 Copyright © 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland. KEITH LEHRER New Readings in Philosophical Analysis (see Books Edited), pp. 661~70, and in Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series. (b) 'Descriptive Completeness and Inductive Methods', The Journal of Symbolic Logic. June, pp. 57~. In this paper, I propose a solution for a paradox Salmon generated from an appliea­ tion of Camap's probability theory to languages with different predicates but some overlap. 1 propose that one should choose languages with greater descriptive completeness and prove that equally complete languages cannot yield ineompatible results no matter which predicates are taken as primitive. 1964 (a) 'Could and Determinism', Analysis, March, pp. 159--160. (b)'Doing the Impossible', The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, May, pp. 86-97. (e) 'Doing the Impossible: A Second Try', The Austra/asian Joumal of Philosophy, August, pp. 249--251. (d) 'Knowledge and Probability', The Journal of Philosophy, June, pp. 368-372. 1965 (a) With Richard Taylor, 'Time, Truth, and Modalities', Mind, July, pp. 390-398. ft is natural to assume that if a person ean perform an aetion as a means to another that wiII inevitably result, then the person ean perform the resultant aetion. Taylor and 1 argue that this prineiple leads to paradox when the person eannot perform the resultant aetion unless he performs the means and fails to perform the means. For then we must say both that he ean perform the resultant aetion because he ean perform the means and that he cannot perform the resultant aetion beeause he does not perform the means. This article bas been mueh discussed, and 1 think it contains a genuine puzzle. (b) 'Knowledge, Truth, and Evidenee', Analysis, April, pp. 168-175. Reprinted in Knowing (ed. by M. D. Roth and L. Galis) (Random House, New York), pp. 5~, and in Bobbs-Merrill ReprintSeries. This was my first attempt to deal with Gettier problem and is, in my opinion, still important for the refutation of a number of popular but unsatisfaetory solutions. My positive proposal was that for a person to have knowledge that a proposition is true, the proposition must remain justified for him even it he were to suppose any false proposition to be false whieh entails the proposition in question. (c) 'Letter: On Knowledge and Probability' ,Journal ofPhilosophy, February 4, pp. 67~8. 1966 (a) 'An Empirieal Disproof of Determinism?', in Freedom and Determinism (see Books Edited), pp. 175-202. Reprinted in Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility (ed. by G. Dworkin) (Prentiee-Hall, EngIewoodCliffs), pp. 172-195. This is the best known of my articles on freedom and determinism. 1 argue that we have adequate evidenee of our freedom without appeal to introspeetive evidenee, that the hypothetical analysis of freedom fails, but, finally, that freedom and 246 BlBLIOGRAPHY determinism are compatible anyway. My argument is that the evidence that shows that we are free does not refute determinism which it must if freedom entails the falsity of determinism. This article remains one of my favorites. (b) 'A Third Analysis ofPrediction', Theoria, pp. 71-74. (c) 'Critical Review of Science, Perception, and Reality, by Wilfrid Sellars', Joumal of Philosophy, May, pp. 266-277. This is technically a book review, but 1 believe Ihat it contains a c1ear and simple exposition of the principal theses of Sellars philosophy. For that reason, I think it remains of interest, especially to those who find Sellars difficult reading. 1967 (a) 'Wants, Actions, and Causal Explanation: Comments on Professor Aiston's Paper', in lntentionality, Minds, and Perception (ed. by Hector Castalleda) (Wayne State University Press, Detroit), pp. 342-350. (b) 'Caus ing Voluntary Actions: Comments on Professor Feinberg's Paper', in Meta­ physics and Explanation (ed. by W. Capitan and D. Merrill) (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh), pp. 52-55. (c) With R. Roelofs and M. Swain. 'Reason and Evidence: An Unsolved Problem', Ratio, pp.38-48, 1968 (a) 'Scottish Influences in Contemporary American Philosophy', The Philosophical Joumal, pp. 34-42. In this article, 1 show that Reid's c1aim that perceptual beliefs are justified in themselves without reasoning from sense impression constitutes a solution to the problem discussed by the American Realists and adopted by Chisholm. (b) 'Cans Without Ifs', Analysis, pp. 29-32. (c) 'Belief and Knowledge', The Philosophical Review, pp. 91-99. In this article, I first attempt to refute aII arguments intended to show that knowledge does not entail belief, and, finally, I present an argument to show that the entailment holds. (d) With James W. Cornman, Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An lntroduction (First Edition, Macmillan, New York). 1969 (a) 'Neglecting to Do What One Can', Mind, pp. 121-123. (b) 'Theoretical Terms and lnductive lnference', in Studies in the Philosophy of Science: American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph No. 3, pp. 30-41. This article is an attempt to explain how theoretical terms achieve inductive systematization in science and are essential for that purpose. The inductive rule 1 employed was the one articulated more fully in 1970a. 1 regard that rule as unduly restrictive, but that does not undermine the argument. It was intended to iIIustrate that a difference between deduction and induction, based on the failure of probability 247 KEITH LEHRER relations to be transitive, could make theoretical terms indispensible for inductive inference in science. (c) With Thomas Paxson, Jr. 'Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief, The Journal ofPhilosophy, pp. 225-232. Reprinted in Essays on Knowledge andJustification (ed. by G. S. Pappas and M. Swain) (Cornell University Press, Ithaca), pp. 146-154. Paxson and I presented a new solution to the Gettier problem intended to avoid problems that arose for my earlier attempt. Our proposal was that justifieation must be undefeated by any false statement. Our positive proposal has technical problems whieh moved others 10 present alternative defeasibility theories. The article remains interesting as the origin of such theories and for the refutation of important alter­ native theories presented by Goldman, Skyrms, and others. (d) 'Induction: A Consistent Gamble', Nous, pp. 285-297. 1970 (a) 'Induction, Reason, and Consistency', British Journal for the Philosophy ofScience, pp. 103-114. This articIe contains a rule of induetive inference that avoids the lottery paradox and which, in iterated application, allows quite strong conclusions to be drawn in some eases. It had the merit of showing a probability based rule could avoid the lottery paradox. This was thought not to be possible. (b) 'Justification, Explanation, and Induction', in lnduction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief(ed. by M. Swain) (Reidel, Dordrecht), pp. 100-133. In this article, I defend the idea that a proposition is justified either because ofwhat it explains or because of what explains it. I used an inductive rule proposed in 1969b and 1970a to show how something eould be explained by the probabilities that permitted it to be induced from the evidence. Salient features of the inductive mie show it to be a principle of explanation. (e) 'BelievingThatOne Knows', Synthese, pp. 133-140. (d) 'The Fourth Condition of Knowledge: A Defense', Review ojMetaphysics, September, pp. 122-128. 1971 (a) 'How Reasons Give Us Knowledge, or The Case of the Gypsy Lawyer', Journal of Philosophy, pp. 311-313. (b) 'Induction and Conceptual Change', Synthese, pp. 206-225. In this articIe, I began to articulate a theory of induction and evidence that avoids tht: assumption that statements of evidence must be certain. Statements chosen as evidence are not immune from error. Moreover, 1 explain how semantic shifts may determine what is accepted as evidence as well as what is inductively inferred. I propose a less restrictive rule of inference that still avoids the lottery paradox and recast the earlier inductive rule as a rule for the selection of evidenee based on prior probabilities. (c) 'Why Not Scepticism?', The Philosophical Forum, pp. 283-298. Reprinted in Essays on Knowledge and Justification (see 1969c), pp. 346-363. This articIe is an exercise in the defense of scepticism, the thesis that we know 248 BIBLlOGRAPHY nothing. The argument is complicated, and has, I believe, some merit. It shows that the ordinary meaning of the word 'know' is not a satisfactory basis for a theory of knowledge but should be traded for an improved concept that picks out what we take to be the extension of the word 'know' as it is customarily used. In the article, I restrict myself to the usual meaning and articulate an agnoiology, a theory of ignorance.
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  • SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY in ITS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PUBLISHED by JAMES MACLEHOSE and SONS, GLASGOW $Nbltshers to the Clmbersttti

    SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY in ITS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PUBLISHED by JAMES MACLEHOSE and SONS, GLASGOW $Nbltshers to the Clmbersttti

    V STUDIA IN / THE LIBRARY of VICTORIA UNIVERSITY Toronto SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY IN ITS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PUBLISHED BY JAMES MACLEHOSE AND SONS, GLASGOW $nbltshers to the clmbersttti. MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD., LONDON. New York, The Macmillan Co. London, Simpkin, Hamilton and Co. Cambridge, Macmillan and Bowes. Edinburgh, - Douglas and Faults. SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY IN ITS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BY HENRY LAURIE, LL.D. PR9FES30R OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE GLASGOW JAMES MACLEHOSE AND SONS publishers to the Smbersttg 1902 GREAT BRITAIN. L4- 9-11-35 GLASGOW: PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS BY ROBERT MACLEHOSE AND CO. PREFACE. Tins work was originally intended to form one of a series, projected by Professor Knight of St. Andrews, on Philosophy in its National Developments. Though the idea of such a series has been abandoned, little excuse will, I hope, be required for the appearance of this volume. The philosophy of Scotland deserves, indeed, to be treated as a national development. Every philosophy is an expression of the spirit of its time and the mental life of Scotland is ; clearly mirrored in its intellectual and moral philosophy. The Scotland which gave birth to men so diverse as John Knox and Eobert Burns produced also David Sir Hume, and Thomas Eeid, and William Hamilton ; and its philosophies of scepticism and common sense, though influenced by the thought of other countries, have drawn their special sustenance from the national history and character. There is room, if I mistake not, for a concise and connected statement, in the light of recent thought, of the course of philosophy in Scotland.